


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		GDR		
			DATE OF REPORT	5 Nov 50X1-HUM
SUBJECT 16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU				
SUMMARY GDR				
<p><u>OF Information:</u> This report gives information on the 16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU, which was equipped with T-54 Tks in summer 1957. The report includes details on alerts, including pinpoint location and description of the assembly area. It also includes information on the status of training and training activities in troop training area at NCCHTEN (UTM 33UVS7298) including details of tactical training of a Tk Plt in an attack. The report also furnishes information on organization, strength, equipment, and on morale and discipline.</p>				
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16th Tk Regt, LOEBAUREPORT1. Location and Installations

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The 16th Tk Regt is stationed in a caserne (UTM 33UVS 779620) at LOEBAU. The area of this caserne was somewhat enlarged toward the N in 1956 to 1957. From autumn 1956 to winter 1956/57 an unknown number of garages for tanks were erected within the caserne area. An old building which had formerly served as gymnasium was rebuilt and turned into a "Kulturhaus" (cultural center). In 1952 or 1953, the Hq building was extended by another wing. In spring 1957, the construction of a "Panzerwaeche" (installation for the cleaning of tanks) was started but not yet completed on 12 Dec 57.

In autumn 1957, the construction of a firing range, approximately 1-km in length and 300-m in width was started and was to be completed by the beginning of Jan 58. [redacted] this firing range is intended to serve as a firing range for infantry weapons and for tank MGs.

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2. Identification and Subordination

Subject Regt's APC number is Loebau 3127. The Regt is subordinate to the 7th TR Div, DRESDEN. This Div is subordinate to the 3d MD in LEIPZIG which is subordinate to EGA II., STRAUSBERG.

Subject Regt was integrated into the EGA in Aug 56. Part of the officers, NCO and EM were from the Mecz Inf Regt, LOEBAU I, which had been deactivated. CO's of Battalions and specialists (technical officers) were assigned from u/i Tk schools and other u/i Tk Regt's located in other parts of the GDR. At that time subject Regt was equipped only with T-34 Tanks. The full strength of this Regt (880 Off, NCO and EM) was not reached until summer 1957. In or about Jun 57, this Regt was equipped with approximately 40 T-54 type tanks replacing the T-34 type tanks. These brand-new T-54 type tanks arrived in two RR transports at LOEBAU escorted by Soviet military personnel who drove these tanks at night into subject caserne and handed them over to the subject Regt.

3. Organization and Strength: (See CB Summary, Incl 1, and charts, Incl 2 to 4)

The Soviet advisor, a colonel, left subject Regt in Sep 57 or Oct 57, and will not be replaced according to Lt KRUSE, fnu, who functioned as interpreter in the Regt.

4. Supplies

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Fuel is picked up by the unit's own tank-trucks at an unknown point in DRESDEN. Two filling stations are available in subject caserne; but their capacity is unknown to source. There is an order stating all tanks and vehicles must be completely filled with fuel every evening.

[redacted] It was only referred to as an order of the CO of the Regt but [redacted] it is a written order from EGA II. in STRAUSBERG.

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Ammunition (quantities unknown [redacted]) for infantry weapons is kept in the armories of each Co.

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Subject Regt keeps 17 rounds of gun ammunition per tank stored in an ammunition depot (UTM 33UVS 789609) located close to "Loebauer Berg" (Loebau hill).

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infantry ammunition are also stored there, a. ammunition and part of the

All food is picked up by the unit's own trucks in an unknown depot in DRESDEN with the exception of bread, rolls, milk, fresh fruit and vegetables which are purchased locally.

Minor repairs on tanks and vehicles are carried out in the unit's own maintenance shop located in subject caserne. 50X1-HUM

6. Training

Up to Aug 57, when subject Regt went into the training area at RUCHTEN (UTM 33UUS 7298) for two months training consisting of routine training on tanks as mounting and dismounting of tanks, throwing of hand-grenades by tank-crews, assembling and disassembling of the MG, aiming with the gun while in motion, halting and during a short halt, instructions on tank nomenclature, loading of the gun, and firing with infantry weapons. This had been greatly neglected in subject Regt for reasons given under Part 9 (Morale and Discipline).

The firing of tanks could not be practiced at all until movement to training area because there are no facilities for such training in the area of LCEBAU.

Only the CO's of the tank battalions, of the companies and of the platoons, as well as the technical officers, were familiar with tank technique because they had been transferred to subject Regt from other tank units or tank training schools.

A great number of the tank commanders and of the tank drivers were well trained on tanks because they had been assigned to subject Regt from the "Lehrbasis" (a training battalion in which tank commanders and tank drivers are trained) located at SPREMBERG (UTM 33UVT 5714).

Between Dec 56 and Dec 57, three training courses for tank gunners, of six weeks duration each, in which 30 to 40 men each participated, were held in subject Regt, and are to be continued in future.

In Jun 57 to Jul 57 a training course for the 12 technical officers of subject Regt was held at ZEPHILIK (UTM 33UUS 8488). This course lasted four to six weeks with the officers received training on the T-54 tank.

Most of the officers of subject Regt are not in possession of a license for driving a motor vehicle (and cannot drive one) because of the shortage of fuel allocated for this purpose. On the other hand an order had existed for the last two years that all officers should possess a driving license No 5 (for passenger cars and trucks).

In Jun/Jul 57, checks made in subject Regt by the Div, the LD and by SGA H. revealed that the training status of the Regt was poor and the combat effectiveness was not ensured.

In Aug 57, subject Regt went for two months to training area at RUCHTEN.

At RUCHTEN there was no time for routine training on tanks. The Regt started immediately with tactical training on T-54 tanks. The first training phase was: The individual tank in the attack and in the defense however, this training took only a few days.

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The next phase of training consisted in the training of a Tk Plt in the attack and in the defense, but stress was laid on training for an attack. At a sand-table the attack and the defense were first discussed by a Staff Cff and officers of the battalions and the companies. The CO's of the companies then discussed the problem with the CO's of the platoons. Finally the platoon leaders discussed the same problem at the sand-table with their platoons, in the presence of the Co CO's and the Bn COs.

A special sand-table was also set up at an elevated point in the training area so that the training on this sand-table could be compared with the actual tactical training performed by a Tk Plt in the terrain below. One Tk Plt prepared for a demonstration in the terrain while nearly all the officers of the Regt were assembled near the above-mentioned sand-table. These officers received general instructions by the Deputy CO of the Regt on the tactics of a Tk Plt in an attack, whereas the CO of the demonstrating unit explained the various phases of the demonstration. (See Incl 5).

The demonstration of the attack by this Tk Plt was as follows: The plt had moved into the assembly area (See a, Incl 5) located in a forest. The tanks were spaced 40 m to 50 m apart. An air observer with an A. MG was posted on one of the tanks. The crews of the three tanks were concealed near their tanks, except for the platoon leader and the commanders of the other two tanks. These three crept to an observation point (b) for reconnaissance and, upon the COs return to the platoon, the crews of the tanks were informed of the situation.

As stated before, most of the officers, including Source, stood around the sand-table (See c, Incl 5). The CO of the Co stood on top of a tank to observe the performance, to supervise same and to have certain phases of the attack repeated if not carried through efficiently. With him was a radio operator to transmit orders to the CO of the demonstration Plt. However, the latter was in charge of the operation. Every phase of the operation was observed by the officers on the hill, and the CO of the Regt gave them certain explanations.

First the Tank crews practiced the attack on foot in double time. Then the tanks in the assembly area (See a, Incl 5) formed a column and deployed at a point located about 500 m in front of the lane (See d, Incl 5).

An engineer unit had previously prepared a lane (See d, Incl 5) through simulated minefield. The tank of the platoon leader halts at the side of this lane (See d, Incl 5), and gives fire support to the other two tanks which drive at great speed through the lane. After they have passed through they deployed at once

The Plt then began its attack on the first enemy trench. The tanks fired alternately during short halts, (while one tank stopped and fired, the others moved on.)

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The tank platoon gets fire support by the Arty until the platoon has passed through the lane, and when the Plt is about to attack the first enemy trench (e) the Arty fire is shifted to the second and third enemy trenches (f and g). When the Plt attacks the second and third enemy trenches (f and g) the Arty fire is shifted to rearward positions of the enemy.

After the Plt had successfully attacked and overrun the first trench (e) the attack was stopped and evaluated. The second and third trenches (f and g) are attacked in the same manner as the first trench (the guns of the tanks fired in turn during short halts while the MG's of the tanks fired continuously at the enemy trenches.)

After the Plt had overrun the three trenches a second evaluation was made. The Plt then started its attack on the strong point (h) of the enemy. This strong point was located on elevated terrain, and consisted of three dug-in tanks. Two of these tanks were properly camouflaged, whereas the third tank was not (for training purposes.)

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The tank located in the middle of the attacking platoon found a concealment in the terrain and fired at the strong point of the enemy from the front. The tank driving at the right drove in a curve at great speed toward this strong point and attacked it from the side. The left tank drove around this strong point taking advantages of depressions in the terrain, and attacked from the rear.

After the destruction of this strong point the Tk Plt formed a column and immediately started the pursuit of the retreating enemy. The training exercise was now finished. If one of the phases of this exercise had not been carried through satisfactorily it was repeated.

This training exercise of the Plt was now evaluated at sand-table (c), and the following points were brought up:

- a. The tanks had not been directed in the direction of the enemy when they were in assembly area (a).
- b. The commanders of the tanks had at first picked out an observation point which did not allow them to survey the terrain properly. The description of the terrain and of the enemy positions by the CO of the Plt had been unsatisfactory. The movement of the CO and the other two Tk CO's in the terrain from assembly area (a) to observation point (b) and back had been poor (poor movement in the terrain, insufficiently camouflaged, did not take sufficient cover while surveying the terrain).
- c. The tanks had given such a poor show in their drive toward the lane that two tanks had collided and were slightly damaged. They did not drive through the lane at sufficient speed.
- d. The greatest error the Plt made consisted in the three tanks having been ordered to halt shortly before they reached the first enemy trench.
- e. The short halts of the tanks were not sufficiently carried through in an alternating fashion, so that it occurred that all three tanks halted simultaneously.
- f. When the strong point (h) was attacked the tank in the middle had to fight this strong point alone for some minutes because the other two tanks had taken too long in circumventing the strong point. The left tank which was supposed to attack the strong point from the rear missed with its gun fire because of bad orientation of the tank commander, and because of inaccurate orders given by the CO of the Plt.
- g. When the CO of the Tk Co (who observed this exercise) had ordered a halt of the attack by radio after the first enemy trench had been overrun the tank of the platoon leader stopped and the second tank had moved on to a point before the second enemy trench, and the third tank had even moved to a point located between the second and third trench before it halted.

This demonstration lasted from 0800 to 1600 hours. Every Tk Plt now held the same attack on its own. This took about two or three weeks in all. The same attack was also practiced on Co level.

An exercise on Bn level was carried through in another terrain and comprised a meeting engagement. Source was not present when the exercise on Co level was held, and was under arrest when the exercise on Bn level was held. The exercise on Bn level was evaluated as satisfactory by the Div Hqs.

In the training area at HOCHTEN, at which Source was present, the training program also included the training of CO's of battalions and other officers. This lasted six days. A lecture was held followed by a seminar on tactics of the "Imperialistic" Armies. The following was also included in this training program:

An assumed situation was marked down on a map and referred to an attack against an enemy which had prepared a hasty defense. March columns and marching

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time for the individual units were computed. [redacted] CPX followed in which stress was laid on target designation and the description of the terrain because these were two things on which the officers badly needed training.

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In the training area at NOCHTEN sharpshooting with the guns and MG of the T-54 tank was also practiced (during day-time and at night). [redacted] the deputy of the CO of subject Regt had so badly organized these exercises, that they had been delayed for half-a-day. The results of these exercises in day-time were evaluated as satisfactory and 50X1-HUM excellent. The results of the shooting exercises at night-time were evaluated as satisfactory and partly as poor.

In early Oct 57, subject Regt returned from NOCHTEN to the caserne at LOEBAU and prepared for the autumn inspection by the Div, held at the end of Oct 57. The requirements for this inspection were:

- a. Condition of tanks
- b. Condition of the motor vehicles
- c. Condition of the weapons and ammunition
- d. The results of political indoctrination
- e. Execution and speed of alarms
- f. Results in tactics (for officers)
- g. Knowledge of the contents of service manuals (for officers)
- h. Firing with infantry weapons
- i. Firing with MGs from tanks
- j. Basic training
- k. Chemical training
- l. Sports
- m. Check of supplies
- n. Questioning of Officers, NCO and EM (wishes, complaints, suggestions)

This inspection was evaluated as satisfactory. The following items showed poor results: the pistol firing of Officers, knowledge in tactics, and of the contents of service manuals (except Staff Off). CW training was rated as poorest.

The movement from LOEBAU to NOCHTEN and back was carried out by rail. For the last three to four years troop transports from the casernes to Nochten training area and back have been mostly by rail, in order to train troops in this type of transportation. The number of RR axles required is figured out in the Regt, and an officer of the EGA comes from COTTBUS to supervise such movements.

Early in Aug 57, a CPX of the 7th Tk Div took place in Bezirk Dresden. Source was not present. He heard from the CO of subject Regt that the Staff of the Div was graded as poor by ED because it had not mastered the situation, because the radio communication had been interrupted at times so that entire regiments had been ordered in the wrong direction and could not be contacted again until three - fourth (3/4) of a day later.

7. Security and Alerts

a. Security

an SSD security officer, Sr Lt KAUFMANN, fnu, is attached to subject Regt who had constant contact with the CO of subject Regt, with the political officer the SSD secretary and the CO of the regimental personnel section. It is Source's belief that KAUFMANN, fnu, had formed an organization of informers among the personnel of subject Regt.

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As of 1952, [redacted] never learned of a case where mail was censored. However, [redacted] all incoming mail was picked up by the First Sgt of each Co who was obliged to take all mail to the political officer of each Co.

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If mail arrived for a soldier from the West such letters were passed on to the political officer of the Regt who called for the addressee in question. The latter was more or less forced to open the letter and read its contents in the presence of the political officer and the SSD officer.

All personnel of the Regt were instructed every month to the effect that they must not have any contact with the West; and every Officer, NCO and EM had to sign a paper each month stating that he and his family will observe this order.

An order existed in subject Regt received from EGA Hq stating that subject Regt had to give assistance to Kampfgruppen and the GST groups in their pre-military training activities. This order was disregarded because subject Regt itself was lagging behind in its military training program. Source recalled only one case in 1957 when two or three officers were ordered to assist the local GST organization in a field exercise.

b. Alerts

An air observation team composed of three men (1 NCO and two EM) existed in subject Regt. One of these three men was always stationed on the roof of one of the caserne buildings, and he had binoculars with him.

In case of an alarm the duty officer had to open a sealed envelope containing the written orders for an alarm (details unknown to Source). This duty officer now had to operate a siren and to contact the telephone exchange in the caserne. The CO of the Regt and his deputy were called back into the caserne over the telephone. At the same time all units of the Regt were notified of the alarm by telephone and by messengers at the disposal of the duty officer. Moreover, alarm is given in each unit as soon as the siren is sounded. In each unit of subject Regt a system had been worked out whereby every officer living outside the caserne area within a certain distance had to be called back into the caserne by a runner. Officers who reside further away from the caserne were picked up by truck.

All Off, NCO and EM living outside the caserne area had to report to their unit in the caserne at time X plus 30.

The first measure each unit had to carry through in case of an alarm was a black-out. Each NCO and EM then had to pack his personal belongings and hand them in at the clothing section. The soldiers then had to pick up their weapons and the ammunition in the armory of each Co, and each Co had to assemble within the caserne buildings. The soldiers had to have all their field equipment.

The individual units then moved to the tank area and to the motor pool respectively to get their tanks and their vehicles ready for moving out.

A rear party of each Bn stayed behind in the caserne for about one hour to make sure that everyone left the caserne, that the rucksacks of the tank crews were loaded on trucks, and they also had to hand over to a rear party of the Regt the caserne buildings as well as the personal belongings of the soldiers (to be sent to their home address).

The First Sgt and two or three soldiers of each Co go to the food supply depot in the caserne area to get the food for their men, a two-days supply as Source believes. Each Bn has one field kitchen at its disposal whereas in normal times all the kitchen personnel were attached to the supply Plt subordinate to the Regt Staff Hq.

X time plus 45 was the time by which all units of subject Regt had to be assembled in the caserne area ready for moving out to the assembly area. (See Incl 6.)

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The three battalions took different routes on their way to the assembly area. The 1st Bn took route (See Incl 6). It picked up ammunition at a point located close to RR level crossing. (See Incl 6). The ammunition was brought to this point by truck from ammunition depot (See Incl 6). The other two battalions loaded ammunition in the caserne area prior to moving out to the assembly area. This ammunition was carried by truck from ammunition depot into the caserne area. This was ammunition for tanks but probably also some infantry ammunition.

The Regt Staff, the Sig Co and the Rear Services took prescribed route.

The 2d and 3d Tk Bn took route (See Incl 6), through the town of LCEBAU in the direction of CTENHAIN (UTM 33UVS7856) but Source did not know the continuation of their route into the assembly area.

All supporting units (AA Co, Mtz Inf Co, the Recon Co, the Engr Plt, the decontamination squad, the medical center) took a route or routes unknown to Source. Upon arrival in the assembly area they took up positions located around and between the Regt Staff, the 2nd Bn and the 3d Bn (See 5, 6 and 7, Incl 6)

The individual units of the Regt had to reach the assembly area by X time plus 180. The rear services were allowed extra time, they could reach the assembly area about an hour later.

The entire assembly area was located in a forest. The various units were widely dispersed to prevent destruction of the whole Regt in case of an atomic attack. All vehicles and tanks were supposed to be dug in according but were actually only camouflaged by branches of trees so as not to cause too much damage to the forest.

Since the time subject Regt was activated the assembly area has been located here. A temporary communication center was set up by the Sig Co in area (See 8, Incl 6), and telephone lines were temporarily laid out to the Regimental Staff (See 5, Incl 6) and to the 2d and 3d Bn (See 6 and 7, Incl 6) but Source cannot say whether telephone lines were also laid to the 1st Bn (See 11, Incl 6) and to the other individual units. Radio communication in this assembly area was not used and forbidden to be used.

The Regt stays in this assembly area until it receives further orders from higher Hq. On Regt level such a combat alarm and move into the assembly area was only practiced once in spring 1957. The Regt returned to the caserne two days later.

The individual battalions practiced such an alarm including a move into the assembly area several times in 1957. Limited alarms within the caserne area by individual battalions, and supporting units were practiced at least twice a month.

8. Court Martial System

A court martial system did not exist in subject Regt. There is a prosecutor in Div Hq for whom two to three officers in subject Regt function as investigators. Source stated that it often happened in his unit that officers and men were turned over to civilian courts for trial. Such matters were put into the hands of the prosecutor in Div who filed the indictment with a civilian court where the trial was held.

An officers "court of honor" did not exist in subject Regt but a written order from SGA Hq according to which an officers "court of honor" is to be set up by approximately the middle of Jan 58.

9. Morale and Discipline

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From Aug 56, when this Regt was intrigrated into the SGA and up to Aug 57,

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the morale and discipline as well as its combat effectiveness were very poor.

The reasons for the very poor morale and discipline were:

a. Part of the tank commanders and tank drivers did not have any tanks at their disposal and therefore did not get the 30 Eastmarks extra pay per month (as specialists). They were dissatisfied, undisciplined, reluctant to do their duties, and even refused to carry out orders.

b. The Regt was continuously filled up by new recruits from other units. NCO and EM were often transferred from one unit to another within subject Regt. This frustrated a proper and regular training, and caused dissatisfaction among the soldiers.

c. Up to Aug 57 a regular training program was not carried through in subject Regt. The soldiers had to help creating the prerequisites for such a training program. The old firing range was reconstructed, training aids had to be made, the soldiers had to help construct new garages. This led to lethargy and dissatisfaction among Off, NCO and EM.

d. Units of subject Regt were far too often detailed for guard duty, within the caserne, at the ammunition depot (UTM 33UVS 789609), to an u/i place in the area of DÜPERRUG-KIRCHHAIN (UTM 33 UVT 0022) and even to Div Hq in DRESDEN. There were NCOs and EM in the Regt who had not had any weekend leave for six months and longer. This also led to dissatisfaction among Off, NCO and EM. What happened on a large scale were unauthorized absence from the unit and refusals to obey orders. In Jun/Jul 57 two EM even deserted to the West. It was said in the Regt that they had written a postcard to one of the Regt Officers from near BERLIN.

Checks made by higher Hq (Div, MD and EGA Hq) in Jun/Jul 57 revealed that the combat effectiveness of the Regt was not ensured, and that the morale and the political conditions were in an unhealthy state.

The Regt went for two months training into training area at NOCHTEN in Aug 57. The morale and discipline improved here to some extent at first. During these two months of training activities leave was not granted, the training was overdone, the weather got worse, the billets were in a poor state, the flu epidemic broke out and medical treatment was unsatisfactory. The morale and discipline again got worse.

On 5 Oct 57, the Regt returned to the caserne at LOEBAU. On the way back two soldiers deserted but were caught in LEIPZIG. They had planned to defect to the West. They were imprisoned in the military prison at DRESDEN. Source heard from an officer of subject Regt that they were discharged from the EGA after 20 days imprisonment. Up to the time when Source left on 12 Dec 57 the morale and discipline in the Regt had improved but there were still cases of unauthorized leave.

In Nov 57, approximately 150 NCO and EM were discharged. Toward the end of their term of service they sloughed down in their activities, did not care, and took no interest in military activities.

Most men in the Regt resented political indoctrination, including even officers. The soldiers kept their notebooks on political indoctrination in very bad shape, they slept during lectures and wrote letters or read books. The reasons for this were: Political indoctrination was too one-sided, the same subjects were repeated over and over again. Many lecturers were not qualified and did not prepare well for their lectures. The political indoctrination was on a far too theoretical and monotonous basis, and did not correspond with the life outside the caserne.

10. Miscellaneous**CONFIDENTIAL**

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In spring 1957, [redacted]

a demonstration of

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an alarm in the 7th Arty Regt at ZITTAU (UTM 35UVS 8638). In this Regt an AT gun. This gun had a very long tube with muzzle break, was said to have a high muzzle velocity, and an enormous force of penetration. An engine was mounted on this gun which had three rubber-tired wheels, including a trail wheel. Source believes that it was the 85 mm APAT Gun when he was shown the illustrations in the Identification Handbook Soviet Ordnance Equipment. 50X1-HUM

During this demonstration at ZITTAU, [redacted] the "Propagandist" of the 7th Arty Regt (located in the same caserne), showed Source and another officer a 57 mm fully-automatic AAA gun identified as the 57 mm M1950 AA gun from Identification Handbook, Soviet Ordnance Equipment. [redacted] this equipment had just been received. Further details on Gun are unknown. 50X1-HUM

In Nov/Dec 57, the following CO's of the following Regts were released, and transferred into the reserve [redacted] 50X1-HUM

- Lt Col BRUENNING, fnu, of the 14th Tk Regt, SPRUEB.ERG
- Maj JUNGE, fnu, of the 15th Tk Regt, SPRUEB.ERG
- Maj BLAETTERMANN, fnu, of the 7th Arty Regt, ZITTAU.

Maj JUNGE, fnu, was one of the officers in the 7th Tk Div who was said to be very much liked by his co-officers and subordinates, and it may be that he was not released but transferred to another unit unknown to Source. 50X1-HUM

INCLOSURES

1. Order of Battle Summary
2. Organizational Chart
3. Organizational Chart
4. Organizational Chart
5. Sketch showing a Tk Flt in attack and defense
6. Overlay showing the assembly area.

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Incl 1

ORDER OF BATTLE SUMMARY

UNIT DESIGNATION: 16th Tk Regt

SUBORDINATE TO: 7th Tk Div, DRESDEN,
3d MD, LEIPZIG

TYPE OF UNIT: EGA

CASERNE: Name: None
Coord: (UTM 33UVS 778620)

PBN: LOEBAU No 3127

T/O Strength

KEY PERSONALITIES:

Approx STRENGTH: 132 OFF
750 NCO & EM
60 CIV

CO: Maj WINTER, fnu
C of S: Maj KOENIG, fnu
Pol Off: Maj TREPTOW, Ewald

Actual Strength

SSV:

ARTY: 130 Off
550 NCO & EM
60 Civ

Sedans: Approx 2 BMW

Mort: None

Trucks: Approx 25 H3A
Approx 5 K30

Guns: None

Motors: 15 type SIM, with sidecars,
750 ccm each

Other: 2 ambulance trucks, type unknown
Approx 3 decontamination trucks, type G-5
Approx 6 maintenance trucks, type G-5

How: None

ARMOR: 3 to 5 tank-trucks, types unknown

Gun/How: None

Tks: 35 to 42 type T-54

AT Guns: None

AG: None

APC: None

AA Guns: One Btry 37mm guns
(number and types of guns unknown)

Other: 3 to 5 armored personnel
carriers MTW
2 amphibious tanks

Other: None

UNCONVENTIONAL WPNS & EQUIP:

None

SMALL ARMS: Unknown quantities of
pistols type TT-100, carbines type
M1944 SMGs M1941 and light MGs

UNIT HISTORY:

REMARKS:

SOURCE: DOECKE, Manfred

DATE OF INFO: Dec 57

DATE OF INFO: X. Served in same unit Personal observation Hearsay

USAREUR IC Form 59 1 May 56

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
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16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU
actual T/O and E of 16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU, GDR

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Incl 2
Organizational Chart



Strength, Weapons & Equipment:

Approx 130 Cff
Approx 550 NCO & EM
approx 60 Civ

35 to 42 T-54 Tks.
2 Amphib Tks
3 to 5 APCs
1 Btry 37-mm AA Guns of bunk type (number of guns unknown)

Two Sedans BMW
Approx 25 Trucks H3A
Approx 5 Trucks K30
Approx 15 Mtrcls with sidebars, Type SIM, 750 cc
Two ambulance trucks
Approx 3 decontamination trucks type G-5
Approx 6 maintenance trucks, type G-5
3 to 5 tank-trucks, type unknown

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x) The actual strength of the Mtz Inf Co fluctuates from 5 to 60 NCO and EM. Recruits get infantry training in this unit for six weeks, and are then transferred to one of the special units of the Regt.

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
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16th Tk Regt, LGZBAU

Incl 5

Sketch showing a Tk Plt in attack and defense



Attack frontage for plt was predetermined, but was unknown to Source

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
Actual T/O and E of the 16th Tank Regt, LOEBAU

Inclusur- 3

Organizational Chart at Regimental Headquarters

Page 1 of 1 Page

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
Actual T/O and E of the 16th TK Regt, LOEBAU

Inclosure 4

Battalion Organizational Chart

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Page 1 of 1 Page



Subject Regt was equipped with 35 to 42 T-54 type Tks but the organizational strength is approx 65 tanks.

The 3d TK Bn was the heavy TK Bn but was presently without any tks except for three tks type T-54 loaned from the 2nd Bn. The 3rd Bn is to be equipped with heavy type tks. (Types and dates unknown to source).

Source had only a very superficial knowledge of the T-54 tks. He once sat in such a tk and he once participated in theoretical training. An amphibious tk he saw once in a garage. No details available.


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16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU

Inclosure 6 LOCATION SKETCH

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
- LEGEND
- 1. CASERNE
 - 2. LOEBAU R.R. STATION
 - 3. R.R. BRIDGE
 - 4. AMMO DEPOT
 - 4a. R.R. LEVEL CROSSING
 - 5. ASSEMBLY AREA OF REGT'L STAFF
 - 6. ASSEMBLY AREA OF 3d BN
 - 7. ASSEMBLY AREA OF 2d BN
 - 8. ASSEMBLY AREA OF SIG CO
 - 9. ASSEMBLY AREA OF TRAFFIC REGULATION PLT
 - 10. ASSEMBLY AREA OF REAR SVC
 - 11. ASSEMBLY AREA OF 1st BN
 - a. ROUTE OF 1st BN
 - b. ROUTE OF STAFF, SIG CO AND REAR SVC
 - c. ROUTE OF 2d & 3d BN

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16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU

Inclosure 6 LOCATION SKETCH



MAP REFERENCE:
 GERMANY 1:25,000
 EBERSBACH, SHEET No 4953
 AMS M841 (GSGS 4414)
 FIRST EDITION, 1952
 LOBAU, SHEET No 4954
 AMS M841 (GSGS 4414)
 FIRST EDITION, 1952
 HOCHKIRCH, SHEET No 4853
 AMS M841 (GSGS 4414)
 FIRST EDITION, 1954
 REICHENBACH, O. L., SHEET No 4854
 AMS M841 (GSGS 4414)
 FIRST EDITION, 1952

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
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16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU

Inclosure 6

LOCATION SKETCH



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- AMS M841 (GSGS 4414)
- FIRST EDITION, 1954
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- AMS M841 (GSGS 4414)
- FIRST EDITION, 1952



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16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU

Inclosure 6 LOCATION SKETCH

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- LEGEND
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 2. LOEBAU R.R. STATION
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
Actual T/O and E of the 16th Tk Regt, LOEBAU

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Inclosure 4

Battalion Organizational Chart

Page 1 of 1 Page



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Actual T/O and E of the 16th Tank Regt., LOEBAU


Inlosure 3

Organizational Chart at Regimental Headquarters

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