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POLITICAL AND POPULATION

SURVEY NO. 80

GRUZINSKAYA SSR


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Political and Population

Survey No. 80

T H E G R U Z I N S K A Y A S S R

10 February 1958

Prepared by

Area Section
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N O T E

This report presents a comprehensive survey of the political, economic, demographic, and sociological factors which have influenced the development of present-day Gruzinskaya SSR. It embodies the type of data regularly included in the Political and Population Surveys, but constitutes a much broader approach to an administrative area than has heretofore been presented.

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THE GRUZINSKAYA SSR

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I. HISTORY

The development and continuity of the Georgian state has been greatly influenced by the struggles between western- and eastern-oriented powers to secure and retain control of the area. Throughout its long history Georgia has frequently been invaded, conquered, and divided, a pattern which is strongly reflected today in the intense national consciousness of its people.

Georgia as a kingdom dates from the early fourth century B.C. It was first conquered by the Romans under Pompey in 65 B.C. and in the third century A.D. was divided between the Roman and Sassanian Empires. The Persian Sassanidae, who introduced Christianity to the country, were expelled about A.D. 400, and in the sixth century began the rule of the Bagratid dynasty which continued with interruptions until the nineteenth century. With the Arab invasions of the seventh and eighth centuries, Georgia became subject to the Arab Caliphate. Only after 200 years was this subjection weakened and the national state was reformed. The Seljuk Turks held the country in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, but in the latter twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, under Queen Tamara, Georgia reached its period of greatest expansion and cultural development.

Ravaged by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, Georgia was devastated again by Tamerlane, who invaded the country six times between 1386 and 1403. Political unity was restored under Alexander I (1412-1443); but following the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks, the country became easy prey to incursions by Turkey and Persia and for 300 years was fought over by her two larger neighbors. Georgia accepted vassalage to Russia in 1783 in exchange

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for assistance against the Persians and Turks, and in 1801 became the Georgian Guberniya of the Russian Empire. By 1810, most of the western Georgian principalities had been annexed, but it was not until 1878 that the last area with people of Georgian nationality came under Russian control.

Georgian opposition to increasing Russian political influence in the early nineteenth century was marked by a series of plots to overthrow the new authority, by attempts to re-establish local autonomies, and by peasant uprisings. Russian action at this time bringing the independent Georgian church under the dominance of the Russian Holy Synod aggravated the antagonisms engendered by political changes. Russian control, however, was made firmer by a growing degree of economic integration with the rest of the Empire and by a number of specific reforms such as the abolition of serfdom. Political and cultural discontent remained strong throughout the nineteenth century, and the two currents of dissension acted together to create support for the socialist-oriented political efforts in the period following 1890.

Georgia became one of the chief areas of influence of the Socialist Democratic Labor Party, particularly of its Menshevik (gradualist) wing. With the granting of the constitution and the formation of the Duma (legislative assembly) in 1905, Georgian leaders came into prominence and provided much of the leadership for the Mensheviks. The Party program looked toward the formation of a nationalist federation with wide local control of home and cultural affairs and a gradual socialist solution of economic problems. Had there been a free system of elections, undoubtedly this party would have been one of the major political forces of the country. Popular support for the Bolshevik wing of the party was

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small in Georgia, and although a number of Georgian Bolsheviks such as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Makharadze were prominent in the national growth of this branch, they worked principally in the industrial centers of the Empire and in the oil regions of Baku.

World War I deeply affected Georgia. It seems at first to have revived the old fears of Turkish invasion, thereby strengthening the ties with the Empire. Later, however, the influx of Armenian refugees into many areas of Georgia increased ill will and dissension among the various ethnic groups, who found it necessary to compete for the scarce necessities of life. The fall of the Tsarist regime in 1917 was not unwelcome to Georgians, whether of nationalist or socialist leanings; and political hopes at this time were for the creation of a Russian federation in which the nationalist groups would have a great deal of local autonomy, particularly in cultural affairs.

Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia and center of these efforts, became the seat of the Transcaucasian Commissariat of the Provisional Government when the three major nations in the area--Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaydzhan--attempted to reach a shared goal of autonomy. The Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd in 1917 cut their ties to the center of Russia, and for a time early in 1918 these nations joined in the independent Federation of the Transcaucasus. Despite Georgian attempts to maintain this federation, the threatened advances of the Turkish armies through the territory made the continuance of the Transcaucasian Federation impossible, and after only a few months of futile existence, it was dissolved with a declaration of independence by each petty state.

Disturbed lest the Turks gain control of the port of Batumi, the main gateway to the country, the Georgians sought support of

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Germany, Turkey's ally at the time but the only power able to withstand her advance. Swift action brought about the entry of a few German battalions and prevented the Turks from seizing control of the vital railroad between the Black and Caspian Seas which Germany was anxious to utilize.

With the Armistice in 1918, the Black Sea was opened to Allied shipping and, inevitably, to Allied influence. Britain acted immediately to protect British investments in the Baku oil fields. British forces occupied Batumi and various points along the rail line which extended across Georgia to Baku and became influential in the politics of the region. Throughout most of 1919 Georgian politicians hoped that the British could assure the country the possibility of national existence and peace. British public opinion, however, did not long support involvement in such remote places, and by the end of 1919 British forces had been removed from most of the area. In July 1920 they left Batumi, the last point they occupied.

The campaign against the Communists, of which the acceptance of British occupation and influence was a part, clearly had no chance of success, failing the unity of anti-Communist forces. The White, or anti-Communist, movement comprised many different elements with only one point in common--anti-Sovietism. Georgia could not foster such a campaign with any great enthusiasm since the Russian White leaders in the adjacent north Caucasus favored a return to a "unitary" Russia, without local autonomy for nationalist groups. The three major republics of the area also could not act in unity: their foreign policies were variously oriented, and problems of tariff relations, control of railroads, and delimitation of borders embittered the situation.

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The last major effort of the anti-Bolshevik forces was made in the summer of 1920, although earlier, in April 1920, the Soviets had overthrown the nationalist government in Azerbaydzhan and seized control of the oil fields, a step which ultimately resulted in the overwhelming of the Georgian republic. By November/December 1920, when the Armenian nationalist government was replaced by a Soviet puppet regime, Georgia was isolated between Soviet-controlled Armenia and Azerbaydzhan and nationalist Turkey. A Soviet-inspired revolt broke out in Georgia in February 1921 and a puppet government was established. Soviet troops crossed the border in response to this government's "appeal," and by the end of March, with weak opposition from the Georgian National Republic, the Soviets with the cooperation of some 20,000 local Communist Party members had control of Georgia.

Sovietization of Georgia was not abrupt. The former government had introduced some socialist economic and political measures, and the NEP, adopted by the Soviets in 1921, in many ways paralleled the program of the former nationalist regime. In spite of these mitigating factors early Soviet rule in Georgia was not popular. Many of the remaining old elite classes were seriously threatened and large numbers of civil servants were replaced by Communists. Nationalists of all political shades were opposed to Soviet measures aimed at joining the republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaydzhan into a Transcaucasian Federation rather than admitting them as separate members of the USSR. More serious were the feelings of prominent leaders of the Communist Party in Georgia (e.g., Makharadze and Mdivani) who favored a nationally oriented type of Communism which would not subordinate local interests to those of a vast, centralized state. The Soviet economy itself during this

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period was so weak that it could do little to aid Georgia, much less curb mounting inflation.

Under these conditions opposition could at least be partially organized. Underground groups were formed under Menshevik leadership and in August 1924 an insurrection, poorly led and poorly armed, was quickly suppressed by the Soviets.

Despite continuing strong nationalist feeling and covert opposition, from 1922 until 1936 Georgia was a part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, a single political unit. With the promulgation of the 1936 Constitution this republic was split into primary components based on the three principal nationalities: the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaydzhan SSRs. During these years and until World War II the history of Georgia was marked by collectivization of agriculture, industrialization, and the so-called Great Purge.

Whether the result of peasant resistance, the relatively undeveloped agriculture of the region, or preferential treatment by the Soviets, collectivization was much more gradual in Georgia than in the rest of the Soviet Union. By 1 July 1936 only 36.6 per cent of the sown area had been collectivized, compared with 77.7 per cent in the USSR as a whole; and even in 1938 when 99.3 per cent of the nationwide area was in collective farms, Georgia's agricultural area was only 86.9 per cent socialized. An added factor, however, in creating resistance to the collectivization program was the simultaneous forced change in the types of crops raised in the republic. The Soviets wished to take advantage of Georgia's favorable location and climate for growing subtropical and technical crops at the expense of grain raising, in which Georgia was already a deficit area. There were rumors reaching

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the West during the early 1930s that local opposition to these programs had caused rioting.

Before the First Five-Year Plan, industrial activity was negligible and was chiefly confined to the mining of manganese ore and the processing of tobacco. In 1930, when the first effects of Soviet industrialization were evident, not more than ten per cent of the republic's workers were in industrial employment and only 30 per cent of the gross republic product came from industry. By 1940 industrial employment had more than doubled, and industrial production had increased enormously, particularly in heavy industry such as coal and manganese-ore mining, the production of ferromanganese alloys and machinery, and the development of the republic's large hydroelectric power potential. The shift in agriculture brought an increase in the number of food processing plants, particularly in the western regions along the Black Sea.

The Great Purge, which reached its height in Georgia in mid-1937, marked the attempt of the regime to bring about the ideological integration of that area into the Soviet system. It is impossible to estimate the number of persons who suffered arrest and imprisonment during this period, but the testimony of former Soviet citizens has made it clear that tens of thousands were affected. The purge stopped short of a total disruption of society, but its baneful effects continue to be felt. It cowed the people and ended overt nationalist mutterings, and further deprived them of the willingness to depart the established modes of thought and action, as well as making frustrated outward conformity a part of normal social relations.

By the beginning of World War II in 1939, however, the most immediate effects of the purge period had ended. Georgia, behind

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the Russian lines, found itself comparatively remote and detached from the conflict, although Georgian troops took an active part in the fighting. Its position following the war was easier than that of western Russia and the Ukraine, for there had been no physical damage or invasion. The period since 1945, therefore, has been less difficult for Georgia than for these other areas, although it was gravely affected by the general strain and disorganization of the Soviet economy, of which it had become an integral part.

The most important contribution to the Georgian economy in the postwar years has been in the expansion of its industry. Prewar industrial installations had been physically undisturbed during the war years and there had even been some additions. The industrialization of Georgia has brought with it an increase in urbanization: the proportion of the population in urban areas increased from 22.2 per cent in 1926 to 30.1 per cent in 1939 and is now about 38 per cent of the total republic population; the number of workers and employees increased from 454,000 in 1940 to 732,000 in 1955.

Georgia's industrialization and urbanization has not lagged far behind that of the USSR as a whole. A former agrarian area, possessing only a few backward industries, chiefly of local significance, has been integrated into the economic system of a vast state with a population of more than 200 million.

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II. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND CONTROLS

A. Administrative Composition (See ~~also Map I~~ Map II)

Autonomous republics:	2	(Abkhazskaya, Adzharskaya)
Autonomous oblast:	1	(Yugo-Osetinskaya)
Cities:	10	(Tbilisi, Batumi, Chiatura, Gori, Kutaisi, Poti, Rustavi, Stali- niri, Sukhumi, Tkvarcheli)
Towns:	32	
Rural rayons:	72	
Selsovets:	1132	

B. Government1. Organization

The Gruzinskaya SSR is one of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union. It is the only republic other than the RSFSR with as many as three subordinate autonomous national areas. Its governmental structure is patterned on the Soviet and its written constitution strongly resembles those of the 14 other republics and the USSR, even to the arrangement of articles and phraseology. The authority of the government is much less than the constitutional listing of powers indicates, however; and the real authority rests in the local representatives of the USSR Communist Party and Government. Even among agencies at republic level, policy making is the function of the Communist Party. The republic is a minor unit of a political body which ostensibly grants wide powers while manipulating the individual situation to achieve certain desired results, thereby vitiating the normal processes of government.

As in the other republics, the Georgian government consists of a Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, and a Council of Ministers. The Georgian Supreme Soviet, theoretically the legislative body, comprises about 350 members who are elected every four years. All

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citizens age 18 or over, regardless of sex, race, religion, or social background, are expected to participate in these elections, although only one slate of candidates is offered. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, legally the executive agency, is a body of 17 chosen from the full membership, whose chairman may be considered the head of state. It nominally issues laws and decrees, grants pardons, receives and reviews the work of subordinate bodies, and names and removes ministers. The legal function of the Council of Ministers is limited to acting as the administrative adjunct of the Presidium (see Figure 1).

Actually, governmental authority is the inverse of the constitutional hierarchy. The Georgian Council of Ministers is the republic's paramount executive, legislative, and administrative body. The appointment of its members, however, must be approved, and in some cases initiated, by USSR agencies. The honorific Supreme Soviet is an instrument used by the Council to disseminate policy decisions and lend a semblance of popular support to these policies. The Presidium is largely a device whereby the decisions of the Council are transmitted to the body politic, which remains the stepchild of a highly authoritarian government.

Before May 1957 the Georgian Council of Ministers, though the highest authority in the local structure, was a body of comparatively limited power. It had no control over segments of the political, economic, and social complex which the central authorities considered to be of national significance. It had no authority over any unit of the armed forces within its territory. It did not control any phase of heavy industry or rail transport, nor did it control the planning, finance, supply, and distribution phases of light industry.

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Figure 1

Composition of the Georgian Council
of Ministers: 1 June 1957

Chairman

First Deputy Chairmen

Deputy Chairmen

Chairmen of:

Georgian State Planning Commission
 State Security Committee
 State Control Committee
 Scientific and Technical Committee
 Council of Ministers of ASSR^a (ex officio)
 Council of National Economy (if proposed
 by Chairman, Council of Ministers)

Union Republic Ministers of:

Internal Affairs
 Public Health
 Foreign Affairs^a
 Defense
 Culture
 Communications
 Agriculture
 Trade
 Finance

Republic Ministers of:

Automotive Transport
 Water Economy
 Municipal Economy
 Local Industry
 Education
 Social Security
 Justice

Head, Chief Directorate of Construction

^aNonoperative agency.

On 29 May 1957, however, pursuant to the law adopted by the

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USSR Supreme Soviet on 8 May, the Georgian Supreme Soviet set up the Georgian Council of the National Economy. This body, which is subordinate to the Council of Ministers, is composed of nine functional departments and 13 industrial administrations with a staff of approximately 950. It is responsible for supervising and coordinating the activities of virtually all industrial enterprises within Georgia, save a few of a purely local nature managed by local Soviets or by producers cooperatives (see Figure 2). The Council

Figure 2

Composition of Georgian Council
of National Economy: 1 June 1957

Chairman of Council of National Economy

Deputy Chairmen (5)

Heads of Functional Departments:

Planning and Economic
Industrial and Technical
Capital Construction
Labor and Wages
Cadres and Schools
Central Accountancy
Financial
First Department
Administrative and Economic

Heads of Industrial Directorates:

Metallurgical and Chemical Industries
Machine-Building and Electrotechnical
Industries
Electric Power
Coal, Petroleum and Ore-Mining
Industries
Building Materials Industry
Timber and Paper Industries
Textile Industry
Light Industry
Food Products Industry
Meat, Dairy, and Fish Industries
Transport
Construction
Materials and Technical Supply and
Distribution

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is directed by a board consisting of a chairman, five vice-chairmen and 11 heads of subsidiary departments or administrations. The chairman, if so proposed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, will become a member of the Council of Ministers.

This action, a marked departure from the previous policy of centralizing industrial management within agencies directly subordinate to the USSR government has placed in the hands of local authorities the potential for the creation of a strongly based power to control Georgia's domestic economy, as well as the possibility of Georgia's adoption of a less subservient policy in relation to other areas of the USSR. However, it remains to be seen whether these new institutions will actually succeed in countering the trend toward centralization which has been the dominant economic factor in Soviet life since the adoption of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928.

The Council of Ministers is also responsible for supervising the activities of local government as carried on by the subordinate agencies such as the Councils of Ministers of the two ASSRs, and the executive committees of the one autonomous oblast, the cities, and the rural rayons. (Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the organizational composition of these executive administrative agencies.) The authority of these bodies has increased in recent years as the republic government has become more decentralized, and the creation of the Council of the National Economy, with the consequent transfer of further industrial enterprises to local governmental control, will undoubtedly increase the significance of local government in economic life. It will, however, scarcely alter the subordinate position of the local soviets in the administrative

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Figure 3

Composition of Councils of Ministers of the
Abkhazskaya and Adzharskaya ASSRs: 1957

Chairman
 First Deputy Chairman
 Deputy Chairman
 Ministers of:
 Agriculture
 Culture
 Education
 Finance
 Internal Affairs
 Justice
 Local Industry
 Municipal Economy
 Public Health
 Social Security
 Trade
 Head, Directorate for Construction
 and Architectural Affairs

Figure 4

Composition of Executive Committee
of the Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O.: 1957

Chairman
 Deputy Chairman
 Department Heads:
 Construction and Architectural Affairs
 Culture
 Education
 Finance
 General
 Municipal Economy
 Public Health
 Roads
 Social Security
 Trade
 Heads:
 Planning Commission
 Sector for Cadres attached to Chairman
 of Executive Committee
 Committee for State Security
 Directorate Heads:
 Agriculture
 Internal Affairs
 Justice
 Local Industry

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Figure 5

Composition of Rayon Executive Committees
of the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1956

Chairman

Deputy Chairman

Department Heads:

Agriculture
 Automotive Transport and Roads
 Culture
 Education
 Finance
 General
 Internal Affairs^a
 Local Industry^b
 Municipal Economy^b
 Public Health
 Social Security
 Trade

Heads:

Planning Commission
 Sector for Cadres attached to Chairman
 of Executive Committee

^aFormed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in accordance with rayon conditions, based on the laws of the USSR and the Gruzinskaya SSR, with the approval of the Gruzinskaya Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous oblast.

^bFormed by the rayon Soviet in accordance with special features of rayon economy, with the approval of the Gruzinskaya Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics and the oblast Soviet.

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result, the distribution shown in Table 1 has been altered significantly, and the devolution of certain functions from Moskva to peripheral areas may have brought the addition of a number of persons who formerly were located elsewhere.

3. Government Control Centers

Tbilisi, the center of Russian control over the Transcaucasus throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is the most important government control center in Georgia and in the Transcaucasus Control Area. At present it is military headquarters for the Transcaucasus. It is the administrative center of the republic government, the republic headquarters of the Communist Party, and the center of most USSR Party and Government activity in Georgia.

Other urban areas which might operate as national control centers include the cities of republic subordination (Chiatura, Kutaisi, Poti, and Rustavi), those of autonomous republic subordination (Batumi and Sukhumi), and, to a lesser extent, the capital of the autonomous oblast (Staliniri) and the rayon centers. Tbilisi and virtually all of these possible alternate centers are located along the Transcaucasian Railroad in the valleys of the Kura and Rion Rivers.

C. The Communist Party

The Georgian Communist Party is the instrument by which the USSR Communist Party controls the Gruzinskaya SSR. Organizationally, the local structure parallels that of the national (e.g., the secretarial apparatus of the republic is modeled after the Central Committee Secretariat in Moskva). Operationally, control is exercised through two channels: (1) through the Party apparatus, which consists of full-time employees of the Party organization in the republic,

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oblast, city, and rayon Party Committees; and (2) through Party members, who comprise the leading cadres of the government and of the social and economic agencies. Local Party authorities operate entirely within a framework of directives issued by Moskva.

1. The Communist Party Control Force

The Party control force, comprising an estimated 11,900 full-time employees of the Party, is the single most important organized group in the republic, for it is the channel through which the directives of the central Party authorities pass. While the subordination of the Party control force presented in Table 2 has changed recently in that large numbers of USSR Party employees have been transferred to republic Party agencies in a move paralleling the "decentralization" of the government apparatus, a very high degree of centralization of decision making remains. For the remaining members of this group are representatives of the USSR Central Committee Secretariat who are assigned to republic Party organizations to prevent deviations from the Party line. They are chiefly Party organizers who are attached to the Georgian Central Committee Secretariat of the republic and to military units stationed in the republic.

Table 2

The Communist Party Control Force
in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1957

<u>Subordination</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u> <u>of Total</u>
USSR	4,000	33.6
Gruzinskaya SSR	1,000	8.4
ASSR, A.O., city, rural rayon, and Primary Party Organization	<u>6,900</u>	<u>58.0</u>
Total	11,900	100.0

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The republic Party control force plays a similar role in activities subordinate to the republic government or its local agencies. Its organization reflects and parallels the government structure, except that the highest Party agency in each of the two ASSRs is called the "oblast" Party Committee. Each segment of the republic Party apparatus, from the Secretariat of the Georgian Central Party Committee down through the bureaus of the primary Party organizations, operates through production-branch departments whose numbers vary according to the nature of the socioeconomic complex which they supervise. These departments are charged not only with the responsibility of ensuring ideological conformity and political reliability of the area or activity under their control, but also with the fulfillment of all government directives, including the quarterly, annual, and Five-Year Plan goals. Theirs is a supervisory rather than an operational responsibility, and they function largely through Communists employed directly by the agency under supervision. These Communists are either recruited from the staff of the agency or are assigned by the apparatus to jobs within the agency.

2. Party Membership

Communist Party membership in the Gruzinskaya SSR, as of 1 January 1957, totals an estimated 209,100, including 193,100 civilian Party members and 16,000 serving in the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air Force and MVD troops. Party members constitute 5.1 per cent of the estimated republic population, the highest proportional representation among the 15 union republics. The 193,100 civilian Party members constitute 4.8 per cent of the civilian population, 7.6 per cent of the adult population, and 9.3 per cent of the civilian labor force in the republic. Party membership in the

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military in relation to the total military strength of the republic is not known, but probably approximates the estimated national average of 20 per cent.

As elsewhere in the USSR, Party membership has never constituted a majority of the republic's adult population; it did not even represent a plurality during the early twenties when other political groups were active. The development of Party membership, however, has always been consistent with the current state of the national Party and the standing of the national leaders of Georgian extraction. Periods of comparative stability have been punctuated by sharp increases in membership or, with one exception, with lesser decreases. The first Party figures were reported in January 1922, when membership totaled 18,821 (see Table 3). One month later, following Lenin's illness, almost 50 per cent of the members had been purged or had left the Party voluntarily. Between July 1930 and January 1932 membership increased more than 40 per cent, and during the purge years, 1934-39, when the USSR Party decreased by 11.8 per cent, the Georgian Party increased 13.2 per cent, the highest among the three union republics showing net increases. On the eve of World War II, civilian Party membership increased about 50 per cent in a single year. The first figures released after the war indicated a growth of 87 per cent in civilian membership between 1940 and 1949. Total membership increased 183.6 per cent in the ten-year period following 1939 and the military component increased by 213.8 per cent. More significantly, the Georgian Party for the first time became the largest party, among the union republic Party organizations, in relation to the total population. The rate of growth has decreased greatly since the end of the war and now approximates the natural increase of the population. The greatest

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Table 3

Growth of the Georgian Communist Party: 1922-57

<u>Year^a</u>	<u>Civilian Membership^b</u>	<u>Military Membership^c</u>	<u>Total Membership^d</u>
1922-(Jan.)	18,821		
1922-(Feb.)	10,816		
1923	11,138		
1923-(March)	11,800		
1924	11,607		
1924-(April)	11,618		
1925	16,378		
1925-(Nov.)	21,619		
1926	23,581		
1927	23,508		
1927-(Nov.)	32,712		
1928	30,553		
1929	33,242		
1929-(May)	34,788		
1930	34,672		
1930-(May)	33,963	7,978	41,941
1930-(July)	35,827		
1932	51,582		
1932-(July)	54,973		
1934	—	—	57,088
1939-(March)	59,219	5,380	64,599
1940-(March)	88,951		
1949	166,367	16,883	183,250
1952-(Sept.)	173,298	15,452	188,750
1954	176,473	21,277	197,750
1956	185,224	17,526	202,750
1957	193,100 ^e	16,000 ^e	209,100 ^e

^aAs of 1 January unless otherwise indicated.

^bReported.

^cResiduals obtained by subtracting civilian membership from total membership.

^dDerived through extrapolation of delegate listings.

^eEstimated.

variation since 1949 has been in the military component of the Party. While showing an over-all decrease between 1949 and 1956, Party membership in the military increased 38 per cent in the 1952-54 period, probably chiefly in the months immediately following Stalin's death and the purge of Beria.

Data on the "normal" rate of turnover are not available, but

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an analysis of gross changes in membership indicates that between 1949 and 1956 approximately 12,200 Party members (an annual average of 1700) were purged or transferred to duties outside the republic. The annual average represents approximately 0.7 per cent of average membership during this period. The average rate of turnover ranged from a high of 2600 per year, between September 1952 and January 1954, to a low of 1200, between 1954 and 1956. From January 1949 to September 1952, 1600 Party members were purged or transferred each year.

3. Party Distribution

The distribution of Party membership among the administrative divisions of an area, when considered in relation to the populations of these areas, is considered an excellent indication of the importance of the area to the regime. In general, those divisions with the highest Party incidence are considered by the regime to be the most significant.

In Georgia, the significance of urban areas is emphasized by the fact that the four cities of republic subordination, while containing only 21 per cent of the total population have an estimated 35 per cent of Party membership (see Table 4). The extremely high incidence in Poti (113 per 1000 total population) is largely the result of the relatively small population coupled with the probable size of the naval garrison. The high incidence in Tbilisi is a direct reflection of the city's importance as the government, economic, and military control center of the republic. Makharadzevskiy Rayon is located in the heart of the highly profitable tea-growing area, and all of its collective farms are considered "millionaires." In general, the incidence of Party membership in less profitable agricultural areas is lower.

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Table 4

Estimated Distribution of the Georgian Communist Party: 1957^a

<u>Administrative Division</u>	<u>Total Membership</u>	<u>Per Cent of Republic Membership</u>	<u>Members per 1,000 Total Population</u>
Cities and rayons of SSR subordination	171,100	81.9	51
Tbilisi	56,900	27.2	89
Kutaisi	8,700	4.2	89
Poti	4,400	2.1	113
Rustavi	3,300	1.6	73
Makharadzevskiy R.	5,500	2.6	81
Zugdidskiy R.	4,600	2.2	51
Samtredskiy R.	3,800	1.8	56
Zestafonskiy R.	3,600	1.7	46
Khashurskiy R.	3,600	1.7	53
Akhalkalaskiy R.	3,300	1.6	59
Akhaltikhskiy R.	2,700	1.3	60
Chiaturskiy R.	2,400	1.2	53
Tsulukidzenskiy R.	1,500	0.7	33
Oniskiy R.	1,200	0.6	35
Others	65,600	31.4	34
Abkhazskaya ASSR	17,800	8.5	47
Adzharskaya ASSR	14,500	6.9	63
Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O.	<u>5,700</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	209,100	100.0	51

^aBased on extrapolation of delegate listing reported for the XVII Georgian Party Congress; includes military membership.

4. Civilian Party Composition

The average civilian member of the Communist Party in Georgia is a comparatively young, well-educated male who joined the Party after 1940 and who probably had some military experience during World War II.

It is estimated that of the 193,100 civilian Party members, 55.9 per cent, or 108,000, became Party members between 1941 and 1948 (see Table 5). Many of these were soldiers in their twenties who enrolled during World War II; others became members during the immediate postwar period when Communist policy favored the recruitment of young people. Only an estimated 6.1 per cent have been

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Table 5

Estimated Tenure of
Civilian Party Members: 1957

<u>Year of Entry</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Prior to 1917	100	0.1
1917-21	3,100	1.6
1922-29	8,500	4.4
1930-40	42,900	22.2
1941-48	108,000	55.9
Since 1948	<u>30,500</u>	<u>15.8</u>
Total	193,100	100.0

members since before the Five-Year Plans.

Almost one-half the total membership is in the 30-39 age cohort (see Table 6), reflecting intensive Party recruitment during the early forties. An estimated 78.9 per cent of the civilian Party are less than 40 years of age.

While the Party has strengthened its position among women, their number and role remain limited. In general they do not occupy high positions, either in the Party or the government. And although in 1951 only 24.5 per cent, or 47,310, of the civilian Party in Georgia were women, their relative number far exceeded that in the USSR Party where in the same year 19.6 per cent were women. Even in Tbilisi, a political and governmental center which might be expected to show a greater concentration, only 26.8 of Party members were women.

The educational level of civilian Party members in the republic is somewhat higher than in the USSR Party: although in 1952, 68 per cent of the Georgian Party and 67 per cent of the USSR Party had some secondary education, 20.3 per cent of the Georgian members had at least some higher education as compared with 15

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Table 6

Estimated Ages of Civilian Members
of the Georgian Communist Party: 1957

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
18-29	65,900	34.1
30-39	88,200	45.7
40-49	29,600	15.3
50-59	7,900	4.1
60 and over	<u>1,500</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Total	193,100	100.0

per cent of USSR membership (see Table 7). Seventy-two per cent

Table 7

Educational Level of Civilian Members of
the Georgian Communist Party: 1952^a

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Membership</u>	<u>Per Cent of USSR Membership</u>
Higher and incomplete higher	35,179	20.3	15
Secondary and incom- plete secondary	82,664	47.7	52
Primary	<u>55,455</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>33</u>
Total	173,298	100.0	100

^aReported in Soviet press.

more members in the republic Party had a higher or incomplete higher education than in the USSR Party, while 19 per cent fewer members had only a primary education. It is reported that more than 50 per cent of the intelligentsia in Georgia are Party members.

The ethnic composition of the civilian Party is probably in rough correlation with the ethnic composition of the general

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population, but with significant bias in favor of the Georgian component. Data on the ethnic composition of the civilian Party are lacking, but information on the ethnic membership of the full delegates to the 1956 Party Congress show that in 1956 Georgians constituted 79.9 per cent of the leading Party cadres (see Table 8) although they comprised only 60 per cent of the 1957 population. Russians, on the other hand, constituted 9.7 per cent of the Party cadres and 10.8 per cent of the population. Discrimination against the Armenian, Ossetian, and Azeri Turk segments of the population may also be noted.

Table 8

Ethnic Composition of
Leading Party Cadres: 1956^a

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Ethnic Group in Total Population^b</u>
Georgian	611	79.9	60.0
Russian	74	9.7	10.8
Armenian	21	2.7	11.4
Abkhaz	20	2.6	na
Ossetian	15	2.0	4.1
Ukrainian	11	1.4	na
Azeri Turk	7	0.9	5.2
Belorussian	4	0.5	na
Greek	<u>2</u>	<u>0.5</u>	na
Total	765	100.0	

^aReported in Soviet press.
^b1957.

5. The Komsomol

In the early years of the regime the Komsomol in Georgia, as elsewhere in the USSR, was a small, highly selective class organization of young people with working-class backgrounds. It

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constituted a reservoir from which future Party members were selected and trained and generally numbered far less than the Party itself. Since 1949, however, its membership has grown enormously at the expense of selectivity and it has become more than twice as large as the Georgian Communist Party. Now an all-embracing mass organization, it is open to almost every young person between the ages of 14 and 26 who is clearly not unsuitable. In addition to its original function of preparing the more promising of Soviet youth for Party membership, it now serves as a tool for the organization and indoctrination of youth for general service to the regime.

The estimated Komsomol membership in Georgia in 1957 was 451,000, which is equivalent to 428 per 1000 population between the ages of 14 and 26.

6. Political Dynamics

Although the Georgian Communist Party purports to represent a broad, popular movement, it remains a small, seemingly ideologically united group. Its chief task is and has been to implement the plans for the republic made by the remote USSR Party organization, a course which is often at variance with the needs and desires of the Georgian people. Thus, individual Georgian Communists often find themselves torn between the desire to accept Georgian solutions for Georgian problems and the necessity of yielding to the dominant influence of the central Party apparatus with its frequent overtones of Great Russian chauvinism.

Certain mitigating factors have smoothed individual adjustment to this situation, however. There has always been the possibility for members to rise above the republic Party level and achieve status in the All-Union Party. There has also been the

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possibility of individual gain through personal contact with nationally prominent Georgians such as Stalin and Beria. In addition to identification with top-level USSR officials and the feeling of pride in their national origin, many Georgians have received significant economic benefits from the republic's integration into the Soviet system. This is probably reflected in part in the fact that the average per-capita income in Georgia appears to be significantly above the national average.

The death of Stalin and the purge of Beria significantly altered the situation for many Georgians, both Communist and non-Communist, and resulted in substantial changes in the upper echelons of the Georgian Party. The campaign against the "cult of personality," which was clearly aimed at Stalin, seems to have shocked many Georgians for Stalin had remained something of a local hero. Political insecurity followed and was apparently coupled with a fear of losing what the Georgians considered a favored economic position. The central authorities, apprehensive of possible political ramifications, sharply increased the number of troops in the republic between 1952 and 1954, but by January 1956 they apparently felt that the condition had ameliorated and the number was reduced. The third anniversary of Stalin's death, in March 1956, brought disturbances in Tbilisi, principally among students of the State University and the Railroad Engineers Institute, which reportedly were finally put down by the military. There followed a series of actions designed to reaffirm centralized control over the Georgian Party and the republic as a whole. Many Party authorities were purged or demoted, following accusations of bourgeois nationalism and anti-Communist "crimes"; steps were taken to re-establish control over the ideological development of youth and to refashion the Party

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organization in Tbilisi and in Georgia as a whole; and for the first time, non-Georgian Communists were appointed to leading positions in the Party apparatus. The underlying causes of the uprisings remain, however, and undoubtedly will find expression again in the future.

D. Military

Although there is a Ministry of Defense in the Georgian government, it is merely a paper organization with no real command function. All military commands in the republic are completely independent of the Georgian government, reporting through their respective chains of command to Moskva. Tbilisi, the republic's most important city, is control center for most of the armed forces stationed in the Transcaucasus. Headquarters of the Transcaucasian Military District, located within the city, controls all Army troops, estimated at 115,000 (1956), and the majority of Air Force personnel, estimated at 62,000 (1956), stationed in the Gruzinskaya, Azerbaydzhanskaya, and Armyanskaya SSRs. It also exercises general supervisory control over Navy personnel, estimated at 10,000 (1956), stationed along the Black and Caspian Sea Coasts, and Air Defense Command (PVO) personnel stationed in Georgia and Armenia. Armed forces units with headquarters in Tbilisi include the Transcaucasian PVO Command, the 11th Tactical Air Army, the Georgian MVD Border District, and probably at least a command headquarters for republic MVD security troops, estimated to total 18,000 (1956). Long Range Air Army (LRAA) personnel, possibly stationed at the major airfields, are probably subordinate to the 2nd LRAA Headquarters in Vinnitsa (Ukrainskaya SSR).

Armed forces strength within the republic has fluctuated sharply since 1949. The 1949-52 period saw a decrease of nine per cent

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(see Table 9), but immediately after Stalin's death in 1953, presumably anticipating Georgian reaction, the number of troops was increased. By 1954 the total was more than 38 per cent above the 1952 estimate. Although a decrease of almost 18 per cent is indicated in the 1952-54 period, it is probable that the riots in Tbilisi and other parts of the republic in March 1956 have resulted in an appreciable increase which is comparable to that estimated for 1952-54. Recent travelers to Georgia from the west have reported that virtually all armed forces personnel observed were not native, in contradistinction to the predominantly Georgian militia and civilian police force.

Table 9

Armed Forces in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1949-56^a

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Change over Previous Year</u>
1949	89,000	—
1952	81,000	- 9.0
1954	112,000	+38.3
1956	92,000	-17.9

^aBased on extrapolations of ARD estimates of Communist Party membership in military.

It is estimated that almost half the military personnel are in the Army (see Table 10). In 1956 more than 25 per cent of all males in the prime military ages (20-34) were in the armed forces, and 77 per cent of the military were members of the Communist Party or the Komsomol.

The area of greatest military concentration is the Tbilisi-Rustavi complex, where the highest military commands and some of the

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Table 10

Armed Forces Composition: 1956^a

<u>Branch of Service</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Army	44,000	47.8
Navy (excl. Soviet Navy Air Force)	5,000	5.4
Air Force (incl. Soviet Navy Air Force)	25,000	27.2
MVD	<u>18,000</u>	<u>19.6</u>
Total	92,000	100.0

^aEstimated total distributed among branches of service on basis of Orders of Battle dated 1 August 1956.

best air facilities are located. Air force and air defense personnel are also concentrated in the Kutaisi-Samtredia area and along the sea coast, where numerous radar installations are located. Most of the small Navy complement are stationed at minor naval bases in Poti and Batumi. MVD Border Guards are stationed along the international border, and internal security troops are stationed in the vicinity of the railroads and within restricted areas believed to contain forced labor camps and colonies. Several such areas have been identified: the largest is in the vicinity of Kutaisi; smaller areas are in the vicinity of Tbilisi, Dviri, Gesdania, Tkvarcheli, and Chiatura. Known military commands and facilities include:

Adigeni	Ground control intercept radar
Akhalkalaki	Airfield, Class 5
Batumi	Hq., u/i AAA Brigade (FVO)
	Hq., 607th AAA Regt. (FVO)
	Naval base
	Naval training center
	Naval POL depot
	Airfield, Class 1
	Fire control radar
	Ground control intercept radar
	Early warning radar
	Hq., u/i MVD Border Detachment

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Chiatura	Hq., u/i MVD security troops
Dvini	Hq., u/i MVD security troops
Gagra	Airfield, Class 5
	Ground control intercept radar
Gali	Ground control intercept radar
Gesdonia	Hq., u/i MVD security troops
Gori	Airfield, Class 5
Goria	Early warning radar
Gudauta	Airfield, Class 2
	Ground control intercept radar
	Early warning radar
Kobuleti	Airfield, Class 4
Kutaisi	Hq., u/i corps, AAA regt.
	Airfield, Class 4
	Airfield, Class 2
	Ground control intercept radar
	Hq., u/i MVD security troops
Makharadze	Airfield, Class 5
Mikha-Tskhakaya	Airfield, Class 5
Ochemchire	Naval base
	Airfield, Class 5
	Early warning radar
Poti	Naval base
	Naval general stores
	Naval POL depot
	Naval munitions storage
	Airfield, Class 5
	Airfield, Class 6
	Early warning radar
Samtredia, E	Airfield, Class 5
Samtredia, N	Airfield, Class 2
Sukhumi	Naval training center
	Airfield, Class 7
Sukhumi/Dravda	Airfield, Class 4
	Ground control intercept radar
	Early warning radar
Tbilisi	Hq., Transcaucasus Military District
	Hq., 11th Tactical Air Army
	Hq., 1st Guards Mech. Div.
	Hq., 1st Guards Mech. Div., AA Regt.
	Naval training center
	Hq., 8th MVD Regt.
	Hq., 231st MVD Convoy Regt.
	Hq., Georgian MVD Border District
	Hq., 31st MVD Border Detachment
	Hq., u/i MVD security troops
Tbilisi/Navtlug	Airfield, Class 5
Tbilisi/Orkhevi	Airfield, Class 3
Tbilisi/Sandar	Airfield, Class 2
	Ground control intercept radar
	Early warning radar
Tbilisi/Sartichala	Airfield, Class 4
Tbilisi/Soganlug	Airfield, Class 2
Tbilisi/Vaziani	Airfield, Class 2
Telavi	Airfield, Class 5
Tkvarcheli	Hq., u/i MVD security troops
Tsnori	Airfield, Class 5
Tsulukidze	Airfield, Class 2
Zugdidi	Ground control intercept radar

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The military control force is estimated at 40,300 (1956), including 14,800 officers and 25,500 NCOs (See Table II). The proportional distribution of this group is approximately the same as the distribution of total military personnel within the located commands and facilities, with a slight bias in favor of Tbilisi. There are probably few Georgians on the officer and NCO staffs. Almost all of the officers and probably more than 50 per cent of the NCOs are members of the Communist Party, and the commanding officer of the Transcaucasian Military District is a member of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party.

Table 11

Estimated Military Control Force: 1956^a

<u>Branch of Service</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	5,700	11,000	16,700
Navy (excl. SNAF)	600	1,200	1,800
Air Force (incl. SNAF)	6,200	8,800	15,000
MVD	<u>2,300</u>	<u>4,500</u>	<u>6,800</u>
Total	14,800	25,500	40,300

^aPrimary control force equates with officers; secondary, with NCOs.

E. Civil Defense (See ~~also Map II~~) Map IV)1. Organization

The organization of Georgia's civil defense system probably follows the national pattern. Operational responsibility rests with the local MFVO (Local Anti-Air Defense) groups; training in civil defense techniques is the responsibility of local units of the Georgian branch of DOSAAF (All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Fleet); local units of the USSR Red Cross or, in Moslem areas, the Red Crescent Society

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provide first-aid courses and guidance in the treatment of casualties.

The local MFVO groups consist of "volunteers" from the local population or workers in governmental institutions or industrial enterprises. They are directly supervised by superior governmental agencies, including the MVD, its fire defense and militia (police) commands, and the higher ranking soviets. Although their specific number and organization in Georgia are not known, presumably the form of organization adopted in the USSR during World War II continues to be the model. At that time local MFVO groups were organized on the basis of one group for each 200-500 inhabitants of housing areas or one group for each 100-300 workers in governmental institutions and industrial enterprises. Membership was obligatory for all hall porters, janitors, charwomen, firemen, plumbers, and electricians, while others between the ages of 16 and 55 were strongly urged to join. These groups were responsible for sounding warning and all-clear signals, maintaining blackout regulations, organizing fire-fighting and emergency reconstruction activities, decontaminating areas affected by chemical attack, erecting and controlling shelters, providing first aid, and assisting in maintaining order. Each group was divided into six squads: medical, shelter, fire defense, emergency reconstruction, decontamination, and observation and public order. Although organizational changes may have been made, this network of local MFVO groups reportedly continues to be the only significant factor in local preparedness for attack and although their equipment may be rudimentary, their plans for thorough and continuous training, if implemented, will probably compensate for major deficiencies.

DOSAAF, in addition to training in civil defense techniques,

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carries on an extensive program of activities in other fields, all designed to provide a reservoir of people with skills of some military value. It sponsors and maintains sports, ski, rifle, flying, and boating clubs. A paramilitary organization, it provides pre-draft training for its younger members and prepares the older for various rear-guard services. Although membership is ostensibly voluntary, strong pressures are used to urge the population to participate in DOSAAF work. Membership in the Gruzinskaya SSR includes at least 203,000 members of the Komsomol as well as an unknown number who are not members of this organization; membership in the USSR totals more than 25 million.

2. Evacuation

The evacuation of any sizable group of persons from the Gruzinskaya SSR to areas outside republic boundaries would probably not be feasible as existing routes are unsuited to large emergency movements and the distances to be travelled are too great. Evacuation from urban areas to other sections of the republic could be accomplished but would be limited by the availability of food to support the moving population.

Movement north across the main range of the Caucasus into the RSFSR is particularly unlikely since the use of any of the five available routes is limited by their capacity and by terrain and climatic conditions. The Black Sea rail and highway routes in many places cross narrow shelves cut into the seaside cliffs, and the numerous bridges, trestles, and tunnels would make interdiction relatively easy. The capacity of the Ossetian Military Highway, which crosses the range at 9300 feet, is not great and any movement might be cut off by winter snows or spring washouts. The Georgian Military Highway, although the historic avenue of penetration by

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the Russians, is also limited in capacity and, with its highest point at 7800 feet, involves many steep gradients. Winter service over this road is much better than along the Ossetian Military Highway, but no large-scale movement is possible. The Sukhumi Military Highway apparently is used only by tourists and local summer traffic.

Evacuation to the west by sea, chiefly through the ports of Batumi and Piti, would depend upon the availability of shipping, the control of the seas, and the weather.

Movement across Georgia's southern border into the Republic of Turkey is also unlikely because of the lack of roads and the long-standing political tension between the USSR and Turkey. The rugged highlands of the Armyanskaya SSR, adjacent to Georgia on the southeast, are traversed by two major highways and a rail line, but grades are steep and there are frequent bridges and tunnels. Large groups of people probably could not be accommodated, as the capacity of these routes is limited and the regions they cross are poor in resources. Existing capacity might also be reserved for persons coming from Armenian centers of population.

Access to the Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR, which bounds Georgia on the east and southeast, is chiefly along the Kura River, through a region in which terrain presents no obstacle. The most serious hindrance to any extended movement, particularly during the summer months when precipitation is low, would probably be the lack of drinking water in areas away from the Kura River. The region is not thickly populated except in the irrigated section adjacent to the river, but its ability to sustain evacuees might be under prior claim by those removed from Azerbaydzhani cities.

Any movement within the Gruzinskaya SSR would be conditioned by the geographic separation of the republic into two regions. The

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marshy area which is intersected by numerous streams and drainage canals as well as by the meandering Rion River. Batumi, the republic's principal petroleum port, is hemmed in on the E by rugged hills and on the S by the Turkish border; the only developed routes lead to the N, but both rail line and highway are closely confined between the hills and the sea. For Kutaisi, located on the Rion River at the edge of the foothills, evacuation WSW to the prosperous agricultural regions would be most feasible.

The evacuation of Sukhumi, a port in the Abkhazskaya ASSR, would probably be into the prosperous and well-settled agricultural coastal regions to the NW and SE. Again, however, agricultural specialization might limit the availability of food.

3. Emergency Reserves

Information on inventories of food and nonfood items for retail enterprises provides some indication of the reserves of consumers' goods which might be utilized by the general population during an emergency (see Table 12). It should be noted, however, that these inventories are probably stored in urban areas, near the mass of consumers, and would therefore be subject to air attack. And although there are substantial reserves of canned goods, potatoes, and vegetables, items such as bread (which forms a disproportionate part of the Georgian's diet), meat, fats, and sugar are in short supply. The stocks of cloth, clothing, knitwear, and shoes are substantial, in terms of average daily sales, but considering the high prices of clothing in the USSR, the actual daily sales volume of these items may be presumed to be small and the reserves are probably not sufficient for emergency needs. Kerosene, which is the common cooking fuel and which would probably be used for lighting if electric power were not available, is particularly scarce.

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chief route, rail or highway, between the two sections crosses the NE-SW Surami Range, through the Suram Pass at an altitude of 3800 feet. The rail line and the highway both approach the pass from the E via the Kura River valley and from the W via the Kvirila River, a tributary of the Rion. Numerous bridges and cuts are necessary, and these would be vulnerable to attack. The railroad passes below the crest of the pass through a tunnel 2.4 miles long, but gradients at each end of the tunnel are steep and in spite of helper engines, traffic is limited.

In the eastern region, the probable direction of evacuation from Tbilisi and Rustavi, the chief center of population, would be to the WNW, into the prosperous agricultural region around Gori, a relatively level area on the left bank of the Kura River, or into a similar area along the Alazani River to the ENE. The availability of foodstuffs in these areas might be lessened by the current policy of favoring the cultivation of vineyards and orchards at the expense of grain and other food crops. Movement from Tbilisi to either area, however, seems possible at all times of the year. The evacuation of other major centers of population in this region would pose no problem.

The populations of Poti, Batumi, and Kutaisi, the chief urban centers in the western region, could move into the general region of the Kolkhida Lowlands. This region offers the best local food resources although the availability of adequate food supplies is questionable since here, too, official policy has encouraged the cultivation of tea and fruit trees at the expense of the traditional maize. Some areas along the Rion River are also subject to spring flooding, which would restrict movement during these periods.

Poti, on the coast, is located on the west side of a large

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marshy area which is intersected by numerous streams and drainage canals as well as by the meandering Rion River. Batumi, the republic's principal petroleum port, is hemmed in on the E by rugged hills and on the S by the Turkish border; the only developed routes lead to the N, but both rail line and highway are closely confined between the hills and the sea. For Kutaisi, located on the Rion River at the edge of the foothills, evacuation WSW to the prosperous agricultural regions would be most feasible.

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Table 12

Supply of Consumers' Goods in the Gruzinskaya SSR^a

<u>Item</u>	<u>Supply (in Number of Days)^b</u>
<u>Food (all items)</u>	25
Meat	7
Fish	28
Canned goods	122
Fats	14
Milk and milk products	11
Cheese	18
Eggs	4
Sugar	9
Confectionery	32
Tea	180
Salt	173
Bread	0.4
Flour, groats, and macaroni	24
Potatoes	44
Vegetables	46
Fruits and berries	22
Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and other items	65
<u>Nonfood (all items)</u>	111
Cloth	95
Clothing	112
Knitwear, stockings	112
Shoes	56
Household soaps	83
Tobacco	62
Matches	90
Kerosene	5

^aBased on inventories of retail organizations, as of end of 1955.

^bIn average daily sales.

In addition, supplies are held in storage facilities controlled by the Chief Directorate of Food Reserves and by the Chief Directorate of Material Reserves attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR; food depots are also controlled by the armed forces and MVD units. Location and capacity of these facilities

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are unknown, however, as is the degree to which these depots might be used for civil supply.


4. Underground Installations

Large areas within the Gruzinskaya SSR are suitable for the construction of underground installations. Areas of moderate to good suitability for tunnel-type construction are located N and W of Tbilisi; to the N and SSE, bunker-type construction is possible. Areas along the Suram Ridge, which runs generally NE-SW about 75 statute miles W of Tbilisi are well suited for tunnel-type construction; as is the area immediately E of Tbilisi. The area along the Rion River, upstream from Kutaisi is moderately well suited. The low relief and poor drainage of the region around Poti is not adaptable to the construction of tunnels or bunkers. Near Sukhumi, outcroppings of rock in the cliffs fronting the sea might be suitable for the construction of underground submarine pens, although local danger from landslides could hinder their utilization. Favorable sites for bunker installations are also found near Sukhumi.

Existing underground installations within the republic include:

Batumi-Mys Zelenyy:	Tunnel (rail and pipeline), 625 feet.
Gagry:	Tunnel (railroad), 3100 feet.
	Tunnel (railroad), 4100 feet.
Sukhumi:	Underground factories.
Sukhumi-Tkvarcheli:	Tunnels (railroad), 1.5-1.9 miles.
Suram Ridge:	Tunnel (railroad), 2.4 miles.
Tbilisi:	Underground warehouses.

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ECONOMIC REGIONS

(1)- Central Region (Tbilisskiy) - industrial, field crop and fruit-growing region; II Eastern region (Iakhetinskii) - viticulture, field crops, and livestock raising; III Southern Region - field crops, fruit growing, and livestock raising; IV Western Region (Kutaiskiy) - power and industrial, viticulture, fruit growing and field crops; V Coastal Region - subtropical agriculture and industries for processing agriculture products; VI High Mountain Region - livestock raising, field crops, mining; (a) western subregion; (b) eastern subregion; VII South Osetinskaya AO: (1)- subregion - field crops, fruit growing; (2)- subregion - livestock raising, mining; VIII Abkhazskaya ASSR: (1)- subregion - subtropical agriculture, health resort area; (2)- subregion - livestock raising; IX Adzharskaya ASSR: (1) subregion - subtropical agriculture, health resort area, oil processing industry; (2)- subregion - livestock raising, field crops.

Fig. 6

Source: Gvelesiani, G. Gruzinskaya SSR. Moskva, 1955; p. 137.

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
III. THE ECONOMY OF THE GRUZINSKAYA SSR

A. Economic Geography (See ~~Maps I and III~~ Figure 6, opposite)

The Georgian republic is divided by the Surami range into two major geographic regions: eastern Georgia, in the Caspian watershed, and western Georgia, in the Black Sea watershed. These two regions are significantly different, not only in climate and topography but also in potential and actual economic development.

The western region is characterized by a humid subtropical climate, with annual rainfall averaging from 50 to 100 inches. Native plant cover is dense and varied, and many exotic plants such as tea, citrus fruits, eucalyptus, and bamboo are cultivated. While the broken terrain limits the area suitable for cultivation, when combined with the abundant precipitation, it creates a tremendous hydroelectric power potential which has barely been developed. The principal mineral resources in the republic are found in this region: at Chiaturi is located one of the largest proved manganese deposits in the world; extensive bituminous coal deposits are found in the Tkibuli and Tkvarcheli areas.

The eastern region has a more severe and varied climate, depending upon elevation and orientation. In general, a mesothermal climate prevails. Yearly precipitation averages 15 to 30 inches, although some mountainous areas have 40 to 60 inches annually and other areas are semidesert. The lack of precipitation in many areas limits agricultural development without irrigation. Eastern Georgia contains the only producing petroleum field in the republic (at Mirzaani), but mineral resources are much less significant than in the west.



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Fig. 7

INDUSTRY IN THE GRUZINSKAYA SSR

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Although the regions are approximately equal in terms of area, in terms of economic development and specialization the eastern region is much less important. The greatest amount of utilizable and sown land lies in the eastern region, but in terms of gross republic product, the western region produces more (see Table 13). Only 47 per cent of the republic's industrial production is concentrated in the western region; again, however, in terms of gross republic product, this area is far more significant than is the eastern.

Table 13

Distribution of Economic Activity in the
Gruzinskaya SSR: 1954^a

Category	Per Cent of Republic Production	
	Eastern	Western
Industry ^b	53	47
Cultivable land	65	35
Sown land	67	33
Meadow and pasture land	69	31
Agricultural products		
Citrus fruits	--	100
Corn	29	71
Sugar beets	100	--
Tea	--	100
Tobacco	31	69
Wheat	96	4
Wine	52	48
Livestock		
Horned cattle	44	56
Hogs	45	55
Sheep and goats	82	18

^aUnits probably measured in ruble value.

^b1951.

B. Industry (See ~~also Map IV~~) Figure 7, opposite)

The mining of manganese ore and the production of ferro-manganese alloys, seamless steel pipe, and airframes constitute

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the republic's most significant contributions to the national economy (see Table 14). Other producers goods and all consumer goods production, except for leather shoes and textiles, is of local or regional importance. In general, industry within the republic is now controlled by the Georgian Council of the National Economy (see Figure 8). Some consumer goods enterprises producing solely for local consumption are controlled by local soviets, and plants producing directly for defense are possibly still controlled by national agencies.

The mining of manganese, the republic's most important industry, is controlled by the Administration for Coal and Mining Industries, under the Georgian Council of the National Economy. Approximately 55 per cent of the total Soviet output of manganese ore comes from the mines at Chiatura, the site of the world's largest deposits; and part of this production is utilized in the ferromanganese works at Zestafoni, just S of Chiatura. The republic's first metallurgical installation, this plant has an annual capacity of 60,000 m.t., or 25 per cent of estimated USSR production. It is subordinate to the Administration for Metallurgical and Chemical Industries, under the Council.

The Administration for Metallurgical and Chemical Industries also controls the recently completed iron and steel mill at Rustavi. Here is produced an estimated 20 per cent of all seamless steel pipe (oil-well casing and small diameter pipe) in the USSR, 1.7 per cent of all rolled steel, 1.7 per cent of pig iron, and 1.4 per cent of steel. Raw materials are reportedly two to three times as expensive for this plant than for comparable plants elsewhere, resulting in almost prohibitive

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Table 14

Industrial Products of the Gruzinskaya SSR

<u>Product</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Reported Annual Production</u>	<u>Per Cent of USSR Total</u>
<u>Producers' Goods</u>			
Manganese ore	1955	2,370,000 m.t.	55.0
Ferromanganese alloys	1955	60,000 m.t.	25.0
Seamless steel pipe	1955	na	20.0
Nitric acid	1957	na	8.8
Ship repair	1957	na	5.7
Airframes	1954	na	5.1
Textile looms	1955	741 units	4.6
Ammonia	1957	na	3.9
Mining equipment	1957	na	3.6
Cement	1956	673,000 m.t.	2.7
Building lime	1955	163,000 m.t.	2.6
Machine tools	1957	na	2.4
Gypsum	1955	85,300 m.t.	2.0
Roofing tile	1955	30,500,000 m.t.	2.0
Pig iron	1957	610,000 m.t.	1.7
Rolled steel	1957	693,500 m.t.	1.7
Coke-chemicals	1957	na	1.5
Trucks	1955	5,800 units	1.5
Paper	1955	25,900 m.t.	1.4
Steel	1956	684,500 m.t.	1.4
Coke	1955	585,900 m.t.	1.3
Brick	1955	257,000,000 pieces	1.2
Agricultural equipment	1957	na	1.0
Fertilizer	1956	92,800 m.t.	0.9
Sawn timber	1955	608,000 cu. m.	0.8
Coal	1956	2,805,000 m.t.	0.7
Floor tile	1955	27,600 sq. m.	0.5
Plywood	1955	4,200 cu. m.	0.4
Radio-TV equipment	1957	na	0.3
Roofing material	1955	1,100,000 units	0.2
Petroleum	1956	39,000 m.t.	0.05
Peat	1955	1,800 m.t.	Less than 0.1
<u>Consumers' Goods</u> <u>(Food Items)</u>			
Tea	1955	12,000 m.t.	97.0
Wine (finished ind. prod.)	1955	3,717,000 decaliters	7.2
Canned goods	1955	71,200,000 std. cans	2.2
Confectionery	1955	17,200 m.t.	1.2
Meat (ind. prod.)	1955	29,300 m.t.	1.2
Refined sugar	1956	19,500 m.t.	0.4
Butter (ind. prod.)	1955	1,538 m.t.	0.3

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Table 14

Industrial Products of the Gruzinskaya SSR
(Continued)

<u>Product</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Reported Annual Production</u>	<u>Per Cent of USSR Total</u>
<u>(Nonfood Items)</u>			
Textiles			
Silk	1955	17,669,000 m.	3.4
Wool	1955	4,331,000 m.	1.7
Cotton	1956	41,500,000 m.	0.8
Leather shoes	1956	8,145,000 prs.	2.8
Knit underwear	1955	7,304,000 pieces	2.1
Knit outerwear	1955	1,415,000 pieces	1.7
Stockings and socks	1955	5,328,000 prs.	0.7
Rubber shoes	1955	285,000 prs.	0.2

production costs. It is the only metallurgical combine in the Transcaucasus, however, and is strategically important.

Other nationally significant industries include the airframe plant at Tbilisi, which has an estimated 5.1 per cent of USSR capacity for airframe construction, and the automobile plant at Kutaisi, producing 1.5 per cent of Soviet trucks. The former may be controlled by the USSR Committee for Aviation Technology; the latter, by the Administration for Machine-Building and Electrotechnical Industries, under the republic Council for the National Economy. Truck production is chiefly of regional importance as is the production of textile looms (4.6 per cent of USSR production in 1955), mining equipment (3.6 per cent of USSR capacity, 1957), machine tools (2.4 per cent of USSR capacity, 1957), and agricultural equipment (1.0 per cent of USSR capacity, 1957). These industries are all controlled by the Administration of Machine-Building and Electrotechnical Industries.

A lithopone plant at Kutaisi and a nitrogen plant at Rustavi are subordinate to the Administration for Metallurgical and

ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ECONOMY (SOVNARKHOZ) OF THE GRUZINSKAYA SSR :1957




Figure 6

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Chemical Industries. The lithopone plant, the largest in the USSR, is based on extensive local deposits; the nitrogen plant uses coke-oven by-products to produce nitrogenous chemicals and fertilizer. Production of fertilizers in Georgia, however, amounts only to 0.9 per cent of USSR production (1956).

Production of construction materials is comparatively well advanced since the republic has large supplies of suitable stone. Brick and cement production are low, however, and in 1955 accounted only for 1.2 and 2.7 per cent of USSR production, respectively. Asphalt is produced at two petroleum refineries E of Tbilisi and at the refinery in Batumi, but production data are not available. While the production of these materials is controlled by the Administration for the Building Materials Industry, the lumber industry is controlled by the Administration for the Timber and Paper Industries. Although 34 per cent of Georgia is forested, timber cutting is limited in the western region by the necessity of soil conservation and in the eastern region by scanty cover and a slow rate of growth. Of the 1.1 million cu. m. of timber felled in Georgia in 1955, only 484,000 cu. m. was suitable for use as lumber; the remainder was used as firewood. Woodworking enterprises of the republic chiefly produce furniture or decorative items, often from lumber from other parts of the USSR; most building lumber comes from outside the republic.

The Administration for the Timber and Paper Industries of the Georgian Council of the National Economy also controls the cellulose and paper combine at Zugdidi which in 1956 produced 25,900 m.t. of paper (1.4 per cent of USSR production).

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C. Fuels and Power1. Coal

The most important fuel resources of the republic are the extensive bituminous deposits at Tkibuli and Tkvarcheli; smaller lignite deposits are found at Akhaltsikhe. The Administration for the Coal, Petroleum and Ore Mining Industries of the Georgian Council of the National Economy, with headquarters at Tbilisi, which is responsible for virtually all coal production in the Transcaucasus, coordinates production of the mines in these three fields. Since Georgia is a coal-deficit area, other USSR agencies direct the allocation of coal, chiefly from mines in the Donets Basin, to Georgian industry.

Coal reserves at the Tkibuli and Tkvarcheli fields total an estimated 309 million m.t., only 0.02 per cent of the estimated USSR reserves (1957). While coal production in the republic has increased significantly since 1937 (see Table 15), it has not kept pace with industrialization and still fails to

Table 15

Coal Production in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1937-56

<u>Year</u>	<u>Production (million m.t.)</u>	<u>Per Cent of USSR Production</u>
1937	0.4	--
1940	0.6	0.35
1950	1.7	0.65
1953	2.4	--
1954	2.6	0.75
1956	2.8	0.7

meet local needs, particularly in view of the need of the metallurgical combine at Rustavi for high-grade coking coal.

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Table 14

Industrial Products of the Gruzinskaya SSR
(Continued)

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directs the exploitation of the petroleum fields in the Mirzaani, Norio, Telavi, and Kachreti areas; other local agencies direct the movement of crude from the producing fields to two nearby, small refineries and from Baku to the large refinery in Batumi and from the refineries to the consumers.

Petroleum reserves total 1,284,629 m.t. (proved and unproved). The first development began in 1930, and the several small fields are reportedly being increasingly exploited. The chief producing field is in the Mirzaani area, about 75 miles SE of Tbilisi. Total crude production in the republic in 1956 totaled only 39,000 m.t. (0.05 per cent of the USSR total). A small refinery (probable capacity less than 2000 bbl. per day) near Tbilisi receives crude via pipeline from the Norio field, several miles N, and a new refinery at Tsnoris-Tskali, reported in 1951, draws crude from the Telavi area and also from near Kachreti in the Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR. Georgia has one important refinery, however--at Batumi in the western part of the republic. The fifth largest in the USSR, this installation has an estimated annual capacity of 2 million m.t., or 3 per cent of the national total. Crude arrives via pipeline from Baku, and production is chiefly destined for export to other parts of the USSR or abroad.

3. Natural Gas

Production and distribution of natural gas are controlled by the Administration for Coal, Petroleum, and Ore Mining, of the Georgian Council of the National Economy. The small quantity of natural gas available may be utilized by a power plant at Maykop, a glass factory in Tbilisi, and other industries in Batumi and Kutaisi. There is no evidence of distribution by gas pipeline, however.

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4. Wood

The utilization of all forested areas in the republic is the responsibility of the Administration for Paper and Timber Industries of the Georgian Council of the National Economy. Wood fuel is scarce, and even the cutting and distribution of available firewood is controlled by this agency. Soviet data on the felling of timber and production of sawn lumber indicate that in 1955 there may have been only 623,000 cu. m. of timber available as firewood. Cutting in western Georgia is restricted by the need to protect the mountain slopes against soil erosion and is limited in eastern Georgia by the slow growth of timber.

5. Power

The generation and distribution of virtually all electric power within the republic, in accordance with recent changes, is probably controlled by the Administration of Electric Power of the Council of the National Economy. The only other significant producer is the Georgian Ministry of Agriculture which directs the operations of a few small individual hydroelectric plants which serve some rural areas.

The Georgian Regional Power System, extending SE-NW across the republic, is reportedly connected with the Armenian and, since 1956, with the Azerbaydzhani systems. Minimum installed capacity of plants controlled by the Administration (but not necessarily a part of the system) totals an estimated 552,000 kw (see Table 17). The hydro stations are located along the Kura and Rion Rivers and their tributaries or along the short, rapid rivers flowing into the Black Sea; thermal stations are chiefly concentrated in the Tbilisi-Rustavi and Tkvarcheli areas. Power output in 1955 totaled 2.2 billion

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Table 17

Plants of the Georgian Regional Power System^a
(Installed Capacity, 5000 kw or above)

<u>Location</u> (in or near)	<u>Type</u> (H-Hydro; T-Thermal)	<u>Estimated</u> <u>Installed Capacity</u> (1000 kw)
Akamara	T	5
Akhaltsikhe	H	17
Alazon	H	5
Batumi	T	8 ^c
Dviri	H	18
Gagra ^b	H	5
Gori	H	5
Khrami River	H	105 ^c
Kutaisi	H	48 ^c
Machunzeti	H	16 ^c
Ochamchirri	T	5
Plaviz	H	5
Rustavi	H	30
Rustavi	T	38 ^c
Samgori	H	5
Shauri ^b	H	20-30
Sioni	H	36
Stalinini	H	5
Sukhumi ^b	H	35
Sviri ^b	H	10
Tashbash	H	6
Tbilisi	T	12
Tbilisi	H	9 ^c
Tkvarcheli	T	50
Zemo-Achal	H	54 ^c

^aBased on Georgetown University Research Project No. 9725, "Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas: Caucasus (c)," 16 February 1956. SECRET.

^bUnder construction.

^cARD estimate.

kw-h; 1.4 billion kw-h of this total was reportedly generated by hydroelectric plants.

The tremendous hydroelectric potential of Georgia remains relatively untapped, although actual and planned development of water resources has been extensive. In 1955, output of hydro plants reportedly accounted for less than two per cent of the republic's hydroelectric potential. Development

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of this power source may be limited, however, since an uneven water flow resulting from summer droughts in eastern Georgia and the severity of the winters in the mountains of both eastern and western Georgia creates seasonal water shortages.

D. Transportation and Telecommunications (See ~~also Map II~~ Map IV)

The Gruzinskaya SSR depends chiefly on the Transcaucasian Railroad for intra- and inter-republic transportation. All industrial concentrations in the republic are served either by the main trunk line or by branch lines of this system, which offers direct access to most parts of the USSR. Two petroleum pipelines, paralleling the rail line from Baku in Azerbaydzhan-skaya SSR reportedly carry 75 per cent of Baku's crude and refined petroleum to Batumi on the Black Sea for processing or transshipment. Tbilisi, in eastern Georgia, is the most important rail center of the Transcaucasus; Batumi, in western Georgia, is one of the most important petroleum transshipment ports in the USSR. Highway transport is primarily of local importance, although the Georgian and Ossetian Military Highways, terminating at Tbilisi and Kutaisi, respectively, extend across Georgia and the Greater Caucasus range to the Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR. Tbilisi is a terminus of the important arterial airline which links the republic with the other republics of the Transcaucasus, the North Caucasus, the Ukraine, and Moskva.

Agencies located in Tbilisi which are subordinate to the USSR government control the movement of all rail traffic and the operations of rail facilities and the petroleum pipelines within the republic. Maritime activity is also controlled by local offices of national agencies. Highway transport over

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secondary roads is controlled by the republic Ministry of Automotive Transport and Highways; traffic on the Georgian and Ossetian Military Highways is controlled through a local agency of the USSR government. Civil air traffic is under the direction of the regional Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet.

1. Rail Transport

The Directorate of the Transcaucasian Railroad System, located in Tbilisi, controls the movement of all traffic and the operation of all facilities on trackage extending to Adler (329 rail miles WNW of Tbilisi), to Akstafa in the Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR (58 rail miles ESE of Tbilisi), and to Norashen in the Nakhichevanskaya ASSR (289 rail miles SSE of Tbilisi). This area includes all trackage in the Gruzinskaya and Armyanskaya SSRs, 29 miles on the main line to Baku and 57 miles on the Yerevan-Baku line in the Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR, and four miles within Krasnodarskiy Kray. During the period of the consolidation of agencies following Stalin's death, control over trackage of the now independent Azerbaydzhan railroads was also exercised through Tbilisi. Control is effected through four division headquarters: Tbilisi, Samtredia, and Sukhumi in the Gruzinskaya SSR; and Yerevan in the Armyanskaya SSR.

The rail lines serving Georgia include the main trunk line of the Transcaucasian Railroad, extending from Baku through Tbilisi to Batumi, and a branch line which extends from Baku to Tbilisi via Yerevan. Major sections of both are single track. Connections with other areas of the USSR north of the Caucasus mountains are via Baku-Derbent along the Caspian Sea and via Sukhumi-Tuapse along the Black Sea. The sections of the system within the republic which carry the heaviest traffic (Tbilisi-Samtredia-Sukhumi and Batumi-Samtredia) are electrified. The

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total length of rail trackage in use within the republic is 826 miles.

The most important car loadings in 1956 (see Table 18) were coal, POL, ferrous metals, timber, and grains. Georgia's deficiencies in POL, timber, and grains are reflected in the preponderance of receipts over forwarding in these commodities, while the significance of the metallurgical plants at Zestafoni (ferro-alloys) and Rustavi (iron and steel) is indicated by the excess of tonnage of ferrous metals forwarded over that received. The structure of coal movements reflects outgoing shipments of the

Table 18

Summary of Rail Traffic in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1940-56

	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
Trackage controlled by Ministry of Transportation (1000 miles)	702	801	832	826
Passenger traffic (million persons)	22.4	18.0	18.0	--
Suburban	5.7	8.5	9.6	--
Freight (million m.t.)				
Dispatched	5.2	8.2	13.2	15.4
Received	8.2	10.6	18.1	20.2
Per Cent of USSR Fgt.				
Dispatched	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1
Received	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5
Coal (1000 m.t.)				
Dispatched	408	1267	3418	3833
Received	321	1202	3152	3578
POL (1000 m.t.)				
Dispatched	90	712	600	676
Received	2259	726	2362	2742
Ferrous metals (1000 m.t.)				
Dispatched	101	280	918	1160
Received	144	336	670	754
Timber (1000 m.t.)				
Dispatched	202	285	267	299
Received	639	1229	1503	1376
Grain (1000 m.t.)				
Dispatched	579	300	419	457
Received	520	516	680	766

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comparatively low-grade local coal to other areas of the Transcaucasus and the need for high-grade coking coals (primarily from the Donets Basin) to supply the metallurgical industry.

Known rail facilities within the republic include:

Batumi	Locomotive repair shop, Class III Car repair shop, Class III
Borzhom	Steam enginehouse
Gurdzhaani	Steam enginehouse
Khashuri	Steam enginehouse Electric enginehouse Car repair shop
Kutaisi	Steam enginehouse Electric enginehouse
Ochamchire	Steam enginehouse
Samtredia	Steam enginehouse
Shorapani	Steam enginehouse
Sukhumi	Steam enginehouse
Tbilisi	Car repair shop, Class I Classification yard Steam enginehouse Car repair shops, Class III (6) Engine depot
Zestafoni	Electric enginehouse Steam enginehouse

These rail facilities are controlled by the operations divisions of the system, except for the Class I car repair shop in Tbilisi which is subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Transportation in Moskva.

2. Highway Transport

Of the 10,500 miles of highway in the Gruzinskaya SSR, 7400 miles are hard surfaced, predominantly gravel (see Table 19). The Chief Directorate of Highways, attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, controls more than 1100 miles of highway; the Gruzinskaya Ministry of Automotive Transport and Highways, more than 1700 thousand miles; while the remainder, of local significance, is controlled by Highway and Roads Department of the Executive Committees of local administrative units. The Ossetian and Georgian Military Highways, Georgia's major highways, link Kutaisi and Tbilisi with Ordzhonikidze in

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Table 19

Highways in the Gruzinskaya SSRDevelopment of Highway Network

	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
Mileage				
Total	8,400	10,000	10,500	10,500
Hard-surfaced	5,000	6,900	7,100	7,400

Surfacing (as of 1 January 1957)

Hard-surfaced	7,400 miles
Cement, asphalt-cement, blacktop	1,500 miles
Paving block and other	800 miles
Gravel	5,100 miles
Unsurfaced	3,100 miles

Significance (as of 1 January 1957)

All-union	1,100 miles
Hard-surfaced	1,000 miles
Republic	1,700 miles
Hard-surfaced	1,500 miles
Local	7,700 miles
Hard-surfaced	4,900 miles

Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR in the RSFSR, with the Black Sea Highway, running from Samtredia to Sochi in the RSFSR, and with roads connecting Georgia with the Armyanskaya and Azerbaydzhanskaya SSRs. The terrain in many areas of the republic limits road capacity, while traffic on the Georgian and Ossetian Military Highways is particularly subject to interruption by winter snows.

In 1956, 62.5 million m.t. of freight were carried 405.5 million ton-miles by truck. Only 7,302,000 m.t. (72 million ton-miles) of this were carried by common carrier, the rest being carried by vehicles controlled by separate agencies and enterprises. Passenger traffic by common carrier totaled 146.4 million persons traveling 471.3 million passenger miles. Of this, 140 million persons and 322.9 million passenger miles were in intracity traffic, and 6.4 million persons and 148.4 million passenger miles were in intercity traffic (see Table 20).

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Table 20

Summary of Highway Traffic in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1940-56

<u>Type of Traffic</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>
Freight (million ton-miles)	84.5	189.4	375.7	405.5
Freight (million m.t.)	14.3	29.5	58.7	62.5
Freight by common carrier (million ton-miles)	4.7	3.2	64.5	72.0
Freight by common carrier (thousand (m.t.))	372	211	6497	7302
Passenger traffic via common carrier (million persons)	17.0	19.1	119.8	146.4
Passenger traffic via common carrier (million passenger miles)	73.2	73.6	375.7	471.3
Intracity passenger traffic via common carrier (million persons)	--	17.4	114.7	140.0
Intracity passenger traffic via common carrier (million passenger miles)	--	35.4	258.3	322.9
Intercity passenger traffic via common carrier (million persons)	--	1.7	5.1	6.4
Intercity passenger traffic via common carrier (million passenger miles)	--	38.2	117.4	148.4

3. Water Transport

Georgia's only significant port is Batumi, the principal petroleum port on the Black Sea and one of the Soviet Union's most important petroleum transshipment ports. Poti, at the mouth of the Rion River, is used chiefly as an outlet for Chiatura manganese but also handles lumber, corn, and wine. Other ports, including Sukhumi, Gagra, and Ochamchire, serve minor coastal trade. Cargo handled by Georgian ports increased substantially in the period

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1950-55, with ores and POE being the most important items dispatched; POE, coal, and grain led in receipts (see Table 21). With the exception of minor traffic (40,000 m.t. in 1956), on the lower reaches of some rivers which flow into the Black Sea, there is no inland navigation.

Maritime traffic on the Black Sea and the operation of port facilities are controlled through the regional directorates of the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet in Odessa.

Table 21

<u>Summary of Maritime Traffic in the</u> <u>Gruzinskaya SSR: 1950, 1955</u> <u>(in Metric Tons)</u>		
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>
Total cargoes (m.t.)		
Dispatched	2,377,000	5,169,000
Received	1,387,000	2,793,000
Oil and oil products		
Dispatched	654,000	2,222,000
Received	703,000	1,136,000
Coal		
Dispatched	--	--
Received	116,000	914,000
Ore		
Dispatched	1,589,000	2,698,000
Received	166,000	114,000
Timber (excluding firewood)		
Dispatched	1,000	--
Received	23,000	10,000
Grain		
Dispatched	1,000	18,000
Received	99,000	267,000

4. Civil Air Transport

Adequate facilities for long-distance air traffic are found only at Tbilisi's airfields. A scheduled flight to Moskva and several local air routes operate from these fields; civil air traffic in other urban centers is negligible, although single

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daily flights from Moskva into Kutaisi are reported. All civil air traffic in the republic is controlled through the Georgian Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet, which is subordinate to the USSR Chief Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet.

5. Pipelines

Two petroleum pipelines extend across the republic, generally paralleling the Transcaucasian rail trunk line from Baku to Batumi. An eight-inch pipeline, estimated annual capacity 900,000 m.t., carries refined petroleum; a ten-inch line, estimated annual capacity 1.5 million m.t., carries crude. These lines reportedly carry 75 per cent of the crude arriving at Batumi for processing and/or transshipment as well as all of the refined petroleum shipped into this city. Control is through agencies of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Industry.

6. Telecommunications

The administration of all communication facilities in the Gruzinskaya SSR is centered in Tbilisi. Civil communication facilities are controlled and operated by the Georgian Ministry of Communications. The armed services, the MVD, and all transportation agencies control and operate their own facilities. In addition, the MVD monitors all civil communications traffic.

Wire service links the major cities of the republic with all parts of the Soviet Union. Connections with areas N of the Caucasus are provided via three principal routes: along the Black Sea coast; across the Caucasus along the Georgian Military Highway to Ordzhonikidze; and via Baku in Azerbaydzhanskaya SSR. The focus of these three routes is Tbilisi. A high-speed teleprinter circuit and a phototelegraphic line also operate between Tbilisi and Moskva. Telegraphic traffic, measured in messages

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per capita, was 1.3 in 1956 as compared with the national average of 1.0

The telephone system of the Gruzinskaya Ministry of Communications supplies the major telephone service to Georgia. The 45,900 instruments in its network (see Table 22) are limited chiefly to administrative and economic institutions, with private residential phones probably being quite rare. Of the 5900 phones in rural areas, 47 per cent are found in rural soviets, MTSs, and state and collective farms. Automatic exchanges are found chiefly in the major cities such as Tbilisi and Kutaisi; in the whole republic there are only three rural exchanges. Traffic as measured in intercity calls is somewhat greater in proportion to the urban population (18.2 calls per year per 100 persons) than in the USSR as a whole (16.2 calls per 100 persons), but is far below that in the United States (1500 calls per year per person). Traffic volume and the precise nature of calls through these exchanges such as the Ministry of Transport, the armed forces, and the MVD is not known, except that it involves, in part, dispatching and similar operations for the railroads. The MVD's communications


Table 22

Telephone Service in the Gruzinskaya SSR

	<u>Ministry of Communications</u>			<u>Other^a</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Total</u>		
Exchanges	92	474	566	229	795
Automatic	16	3	19	16	35
Connections	40,000	5,900	45,900	19,500	65,400
Automatic	15,000	60	15,060	4,800	19,860

^aData do not include telephones of the systems of the Ministry of Transport or of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet.

SECRET



SECRET

Fig. 9

AGRICULTURE IN THE GRUZINSKAYA SSR

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network, which practically duplicates the civil network, is used to assure the security of MVD communications traffic. Its Georgian headquarters is in Tbilisi. The signals and communications system paralleling and serving the railroad lines in Georgia is controlled and operated through headquarters of the Transcaucasian Railroad System, also in Tbilisi. Tbilisi is connected with Moskva and many other Soviet cities by regular two-way radiotelephone service.

Coastal radio communications stations of at least 50 watts are located at Gagry, Ochamchire, Poti, and Batumi. Navigational aid stations are also found in several coastal cities. Military communications facilities, both wire and radio, are controlled by the Transcaucasian Military District headquarters in Tbilisi. The air navigational aids subordinate to this command are probably also utilized in directing the aircraft of the Soviet's Civil Air Fleet which use Georgian airfields.

Radiobroadcasting facilities, both local and international, are centered in Tbilisi. The republic Ministry of Communications is responsible only for broadcast installations and technical services within the republic; program content is determined at the local level by the Georgian Ministry of Culture. Local programs are predominantly in the Georgian language, although the Tbilisi radio transmitter probably also originates most foreign language broadcasts beamed to the Near East and southeastern Europe.

E. Agriculture (See also Map V)

The agricultural importance of the Gruzinskaya SSR lies in its crops of subtropical fruit and tobacco and in its vineyards. As with Georgian industry, agricultural production is chiefly for local consumption; the republic supplies only tea, citrus fruits,

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and wine to the rest of the USSR. It is obvious from per-capita production figures that the republic is a food-deficit area despite the high percentage of sown area devoted to grain crops (59.5 per cent in 1955).

The administration of agriculture is identical with that in other areas of the USSR; most of the agricultural product is grown on collective farms which are nominally subordinate to the rural rayon executive committees. Prior to 1958 these farms were controlled by the machine tractor stations (MTS) which serviced them; the MTS, in turn, were subordinate to the republic Ministry of Agriculture. Proposals were made by N. S. Khrushchev in January 1958 that the MTS sell their agricultural equipment to the collective farms and retain only their repair functions, in order to reduce unit costs of production by eliminating one element of the dual system of control over the collective farms. This suggestion parallels the reorganization of industry in 1957. In mid-February 1958 the precise outlines of the new system of control over agriculture were not yet clear, but it was evident that many previous methods would be discarded and old institutions modified.

State farms, of which there were 101 in 1955, are chiefly devoted to specialized crops and are operationally subordinate to the production-branch trusts of the Sovnarkhoz Administration of the Food Products Industry and of the republic Ministry of Agriculture, both located in Tbilisi.

Only 38 per cent of the republic's total area, or 6,919,000 acres, comprises utilizable land, as compared with 80 per cent in Moldavskaya SSR which has a similar agricultural economy. This small proportion is directly attributable to Georgia's

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mountainous terrain. Less than one-third of utilizable land represents sown area; and sown area in 1956, totaling about 2.26 million acres, represented less than 0.5 per cent of the USSR total sown land (see Table 23).

Table 23

Sown Area in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1956

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Area Sown (1000 Acres)</u>	<u>Per Cent Republic Sown Area</u>	<u>Per Cent of USSR Area Given Crop</u>
Grains	<u>1627</u>	<u>72.02</u>	<u>0.51</u>
Winter grains	<u>654</u>	<u>28.95</u>	<u>0.83</u>
Rye	3	0.13	--
Wheat	597	26.42	1.87
Barley	54	2.39	3.67
Spring grains	<u>973</u>	<u>43.07</u>	<u>0.41</u>
Wheat	60	2.67	0.05
Corn	766	33.86	3.32
Barley	102	4.52	0.36
Oats	13	0.58	--
Millet	2	0.08	--
Vetch	3	0.14	0.30
Beans	27	1.20	0.84
Technical Crops	<u>100</u>	<u>4.44</u>	<u>0.31</u>
Sugar beets	<u>13</u>	<u>0.58</u>	<u>0.25</u>
Sunflowers	43	1.90	0.39
Soya	1	0.04	0.16
Tobacco	37	1.64	13.48
Other	6	0.27	--
Potatoes and vegetables	<u>126</u>	<u>5.58</u>	<u>0.44</u>
Potatoes	<u>67</u>	<u>2.97</u>	<u>0.29</u>
Vegetables	50	2.21	1.25
Pumpkins and squash	9	0.40	0.45
Fodder crops	<u>395</u>	<u>17.49</u>	<u>0.38</u>
Annual grasses	<u>178</u>	<u>7.88</u>	<u>0.35</u>
Perennial grasses (current-year sowing)	18	0.80	1.03
Perennial grasses (previous years)	73	3.23	0.25
Silage crops	100	4.43	0.57
Fodder roots and pumpkins	26	1.15	0.69
Perennial cover grasses	<u>11</u>	<u>0.48</u>	<u>0.08</u>
Total	2259	100.00	0.47

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The area reported under cultivation in 1955 represented about 43 per cent of utilizable land in the republic. Although 60.1 per cent of this area was devoted to grains (see Table 24), production was not sufficient for local needs. The regime has emphasized the policy of growing high-value technical crops and importing grain, although some local leaders apparently have attempted to increase wheat production at the expense of other crops.

With only 5.1 per cent of the acreage under cultivation devoted to tea, Georgia produces 97 per cent of the USSR output. Tea is an important part of the income of the collective farms in western Georgia, particularly in the Adzharskaya SSR. In 1951, for example, 1.5 per cent of the total income of collective farms in the Soviet Union was from tea produced in this republic. Thirty-three per cent of the wine in the USSR is also produced in the republic. Vineyards are concentrated in eastern Georgia, although a few are located in the western part of the republic; one rural rayon in the Alazani valley derives 90 per cent of its income from wine making. Production of citrus fruits is concentrated in the Abkhazskaya and Adzharskaya ASSR's, and orchards in this area produce almost all of the citrus fruit in the USSR. Although the cash value of this crop is not known, available data indicate that a significant percentage of the income of collective farms in the Black Sea coastal region comes from fruit crops. In some rayons of the Abkhazskaya ASSR the chief source of income is high-quality Turkish tobacco. Other areas, particularly in the center of the republic around Gori, are noted for their good orchards and the excellence of the fruit produced.

The acreage sown to corn for grain in 1956, represented 3.3 per cent of USSR corn acreage, a greater amount, proportionally,

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Table 24

Area under Cultivation in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1955

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Acres</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Grain crops	1,790,000	60.1
Corn (for grain)	820,000	27.5
Wheat	724,000	24.3
Corn (for silage)	101,000	3.4
Other	145,000	4.9
Fodder crops	326,000	10.9
Orchard crops	257,000	8.6
Tea	151,000	5.1
Vineyards	141,000	4.7
Vegetables	136,000	4.6
Potatoes	77,000	2.6
Other	59,000	2.0
Technical crops	101,000	3.4
Sunflowers	44,000	1.5
Sugar beets	12,000	0.4
Other	45,000	1.5
Citrus fruits	40,000	1.3
Tung trees	40,000	1.3
Total	2,982,000	100.0

than in any other union republic. Despite the post-Stalin program for increasing production by increasing acreage, the area devoted to corn for grain decreased 30 per cent in the period 1950-56; if area devoted to corn for silage is included, however, the decrease was only 3.1 per cent. In 1956, acreage devoted to wheat represented 0.51 per cent of USSR total; vegetables, 1.3 per cent; and potatoes, 0.29 per cent. Slight increases in these acreages were registered in the period 1950-55.

Based on per capita production of livestock, Georgia supplies only horned cattle and goats to the national market, and these in insignificant amounts. In 1956, livestock in all categories totaled 4.4 million head (see Table 25), and although this represents an increase over the 1954 level, it is markedly lower than in 1953 and is slightly lower than during the prewar period.

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Table 25

Distribution of Livestock: 1956

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of USSR Head</u>
Horned cattle	1458	2.1
Cows	(501)	(1.6)
Pigs	771	1.4
Sheep	1703	1.3
Goats	371	2.3
Horses	108	0.8
Total	4411	--

Only hogs show a significant increase in the period 1941-56. In 1956, 51.3 per cent of all livestock was raised on household plots.

Of the 6,919,000 acres of utilizable land in the republic, 96.4 per cent, or 6,672,000 acres, is in collective farms (see Table 26). The amount of utilizable land in the republic cultivated individually by collective farmers (in household plots), although comprising only 7.1 per cent of the total utilizable land, is more than 4 times greater than the national average: the average household in Georgia cultivates approximately one acre of land privately, or 14 per cent more than the national average.

Table 26

Distribution of Utilizable Land: 1955

<u>Productive Units</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Utilizable Land (1000 Acres)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Collective farms	2,200	6,672	96.4
(Household plots)	(500,000)	(494)	(7.1)
State farms	--	247	3.6
Machine tractor stations	97	--	--
Total	--	6,919	100.0

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The 2200 collective farms in Georgia are among the "wealthiest" in the Soviet Union. The most profitable are those which produce high-value technical crops requiring relatively small acreage. The average acreage of Georgian collective farms is 75 per cent less than for the USSR as a whole, yet the average labor force is approximately the same. About 83 per cent of Georgia's collective farms have a sown acreage of less than 1250 acres (see Table 27).

Before 1958 Party and governmental control of collective farms was centered in the republic's 97 machine tractor stations. The work of Party organizers with each area served by a single MTS was directed by a secretary assigned through the rural rayon Party Committee. The MTS was also the government's planning and fiscal agent in the countryside; it determined planting and harvesting schedules and collected the obligatory and "voluntary" deliveries to the state of agricultural products or tax in kind. Finally, the MTS was the supplier of virtually all motive power and equipment to the farms. On average, Georgian MTS served 22 collective farms; 48.5 per cent of the MTS served from 6 to 20. The high average number of farms served is a direct reflection of

Table 27

Distribution of Collective Farms
by Sown Acreage: 1956

<u>Sown Acreage</u>	<u>Number of Collective Farms</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Collective Farms</u>
Less than 1,250	1,816	82.5
1,250 - 2,500	253	11.5
2,501 - 5,000	92	4.2
5,001 - 12,500	37	1.7
12,501+	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	2,200	100.0

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the large number of collective farms with relatively small acreages. The majority of the MTSs were also small, with almost 90 per cent having less than 100 tractors, measured in 15 hp units. Again, the low capacity of most of the tractor parks is probably a direct reflection of the average sown acreage for collective farms. Tractor parks in the republic increased almost 125 per cent, from 3700 to 8500 units (15 hp) in the period 1940-56. In this same period, however, sown acreage served by one tractor averaged less than in the USSR as a whole, and in 1956 was almost 16 per cent below the national average.

As noted above (p. 63) N. S. Khrushchev's proposals of January 1958 that MTS equipment be sold to the collective farms seemed to foreshadow a great change in the distribution and methods of use of mechanized equipment in agriculture. However, in mid-February 1958 none of these proposals had taken actual effect within the Gruzinskaya SSR and the situation described above continued to prevail.

The majority of the 101 state farms in the republic produce technical crops (see Table 28). The vineyard state farms are administered by the republic Ministry of Food Products Industry;

Table 28

Distribution of State Farms
by Crop: 1955

<u>Type of State Farm</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Vineyards	40	39.6
Tea	20	19.8
Citrus fruit	17	16.8
Fruit	7	6.9
Tung	3	3.0
Sheep	1	0.9
Others	<u>13</u>	<u>13.0</u>
Total	101	100.0

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other state farms are operationally subordinate to production-branch trusts of their respective ministries. Georgia has all the citrus-fruit state farms, 62.5 per cent of the tea farms, 15.2 per cent of the vineyard farms, and 5.1 per cent of the fruit farms in the USSR.

F. Retail Trade

The Gruzinskaya SSR in 1955 was served by 11,415 retail trade enterprises (see Table 29). The 8817 stores and booths include 6904 stores and 1913 stalls and booths. The stores range from rural general stores to hardware, furniture, and department stores. The stalls and booths provide small-scale vending services in public gathering places such as railroad stations, parks, and collective-farm markets. The 2598 food service installations include 1434 snackbars and lunch counters, 948 dining rooms and restaurants, and 216 tea rooms. The dining rooms are usually attached to large industrial enterprises or governmental institutions to provide the workers with simple meals, while the tea rooms are found chiefly in rural areas or

Table 29

Georgian Trade Installations: 1955

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Persons per Installation</u>
Stores, booths, stalls	8,817	445
Urban	(5,076)	(305)
Rural	(3,741)	(673)
Food service installations	2,598	1,509
Urban	(1,800)	(861)
Rural	(798)	(3,164)
Total	<u>11,415</u>	<u>343</u>
Urban	6,876	225
Rural	4,539	556

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in urban places such as grain collection points and collective farm markets where peasants congregate. Both stores and food service installations are primarily urban in location, although the republic population is 62 per cent rural.

The administrative subordination of these enterprises is shown in Table 30. Those controlled by the Ministry of Trade are intended to serve the general public, while those managed by the Workers Supply Administrations may be compared to "company stores," being primarily designed to serve workers in a specific enterprise or institution. The trade enterprises of other ministries include drugstores, news stands, and book and music stores of the Ministries of Health, Communications, and Culture, respectively. The 5130 cooperative shops (predominantly in rural areas) are nominally consumer cooperatives but are actually firmly controlled by the Georgian branch of the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives, the policies and operations of which are set by the government. The 387 remaining enterprises presumably

Table 30

Administrative Subordination of Trade Installations: 1955

<u>Controlling Agency</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Retail Trade</u>	<u>Food Services</u>
State organizations	5,898	4,074	1,824
Ministry of Trade	(3,131)	(2,001)	(1,130)
Workers Supply Administrations	(1,998)	(1,343)	(655)
Other (health, communications, culture)	(769)	(730)	(39)
Cooperative organizations	5,130	4,356	744
Other organizations (armed forces, militia)	<u>387</u>	<u>387</u>	<u>na</u>
Total	11,415	8,817	2,598

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serve members of the armed forces and militia and are closed to the general public.

Retail sales in 1955 (see Table 31) totaled 10,769 million rubles. Of this sum, 8931 million rubles represents purchases in state and cooperative stores and in collective farm markets in urban areas and 1838 million rubles, purchases in rural enterprises. The latter figure is not entirely indicative of rural consumption patterns, however, for many of the food items

Table 31

Georgian Retail Sales: 1955

Category	Total (Million Rubles)	Per Capita (Rubles)		
		Total	Tbilisi	Other Areas
Foodstuffs	6,495	1,656	3,764	1,204
State and coop.	(3,953)	(1,008)	(2,055)	(780)
Collective farm markets	(2,542)	(648)	(1,709)	(424)
Nonfood items	4,274	1,090	2,245	839
Clothing and footwear	(2,214)	(565)	(1,266)	(415)
Total	10,769	2,746	6,009	1,943

consumed by rural residents are obtained from household plots, through barter, or as payment in kind for work on the collective. Furthermore, a significant part of urban trade actually represents purchases by people from the countryside. This reportedly totaled 13 per cent of USSR urban sales in 1939. The prosperity of Georgian agriculture has probably increased this proportion, particularly near the major cities or along the lines of communication.

Per-capita expenditures in Tbilisi indicate a relatively high level of consumption (see Table 32). This is further supported by

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Table 32

Estimated Per-Capita Consumption of Selected Food
Items in Tbilisi: 1955
(in Rubles)

<u>Item (in Pounds)</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Source</u>	
		<u>Coop.</u>	<u>Network Farm Market</u>
Vegetables	248.4	37.4	211.0
Grains and flour	181.7	148.6	33.1
Potatoes	161.0	51.0	110.0
Fruits	119.7	23.7	96.0
Beans and groats	28.2	18.5	9.7
Meat	21.0	3.4	17.6
Vegetable oils	7.9	5.4	2.5
Butter	2.4	1.1	1.3
Milk (liters)	20.4	19.5	0.9
Eggs (each)	26.0	14.0	12.0

the fact that Tbilisi (with 16.2 per cent of republic population) has 2111 trade enterprises (18.5 per cent of the republic total) with 1955 sales of 3846 million rubles (35.7 per cent of the total).

Per-capita expenditures within the republic (see Table 33) provide an indication of republic standards of consumption. The high proportion of expenditures for bread and cereal indicates that diet standards are probably low and are heavily based on starches. Grain items probably form a larger part of the average diet than the figures indicate, since information from other parts of the USSR shows that the price of bread is kept low in relation to other foodstuffs. If Georgian expenditures for "alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages and other grocery items" are distributed among these headings as they are in the USSR as a whole, beverages (probably mostly alcoholic) would appear as important items of expenditure. Georgia's spending on this does not, however, exceed the all-union average.

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Table 33

Annual Per-Capita Expenditures in Georgian State and
Cooperative Trade Enterprises: 1955

<u>Item</u>	<u>Expenditure (Rubles)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Expenditures for Category</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Expenditures</u>
<u>Food Items</u>			
Alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages; other grocery items	246	24.4	11.7
Bread	218	21.6	10.4
Flour and cereals	103	10.2	4.9
Meat and meat products	77	7.6	3.7
Sugar	72	7.1	3.4
Confectionery	70	6.9	3.3
Fats	62	6.2	3.0
Canned goods	24	2.4	1.1
Fish	20	2.0	1.0
Milk	18	1.8	0.9
Cheese	16	1.6	0.8
Fruit	11	1.1	0.5
Vegetables (excluding potatoes)	9	0.9	0.4
Potatoes	8	0.8	0.4
Eggs	4	0.4	0.2
Salt	3	0.3	0.1
Tea	3	0.3	0.1
Other	<u>44</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>2.1</u>
Total	1008	100.0	48.0
<u>Nonfood Items</u>			
Yard goods	251	23.0	12.0
Clothing	132	12.1	6.3
Shoes and footwear	112	10.3	5.3
Knitwear and stockings	69	6.3	3.3
Tobacco	66	6.0	3.1
Building materials	61	5.6	2.9
Sewing materials	52	4.8	2.5
Cultural goods	50	4.6	2.4
Furniture and metal beds	37	3.4	1.8
Soap and perfumes	33	3.0	1.6
Metal table and kitchen ware	30	2.8	1.4
Printed matter	25	2.3	1.2
Clocks and watches	20	1.8	0.9
Kerosene	16	1.5	0.8
Glass, pottery, and porcelain	14	1.3	0.7
Matches	4	0.4	0.2
Other	<u>118</u>	<u>10.8</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total	1090	100.0	52.0
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>2098</u>		

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The high per-capita expenditures for clothing and footwear reflect the reported high cost of such articles in the Soviet Union. As elsewhere in the USSR the cost of minimal clothing requirements forms a large part of the expenditure pattern. Since expenditures for yard goods and sewing materials are a higher and ready-made clothing a lower part of the total than the national average, household production of garments is probably significant. The proportion of expenditures for building materials, higher than in the USSR or in the other two Transcaucasian republics, probably reflects the favored income status of Georgian agriculture since, according to USSR data, most building materials are sold in rural areas.

Retail inventories in the hands of Georgian retail enterprises at the end of 1955 were equivalent in value to 19.1 per cent of sales for that year. They were higher for nonfood items (32.4 per cent of sales) than for food items (4.8 per cent), indicating that there is a rapid turnover of foodstuffs, with comparatively low stocks on hand, while the nonfood items move less quickly. The probable reason for such large nonfood inventories is that frequent failures in the transport and distribution services require that the prudent retail manager hold goods in reserve. That this is not always possible is shown by reports of total failure of supplies, particularly in remote areas where there are often complaints about the lack of salt, cotton cloth, matches, and kerosene. In Georgia the mountain areas seem to suffer especially from such shortages and it is indicative of a comparatively low standard there, for these items are usually the first industrial goods to become a constant part of the consumption patterns of peasants just entering a market

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economy. Even in more accessible areas it is often reported that although necessities of the foregoing type may be available, there is a deficiency of other goods, that summer or winter clothing, for instance, is not put on sale until too late in the season, or that the proper sizes or colors are not available.

A further factor in Georgian commerce, about which no statistical information is available, is the black market. Press reports from the Soviet Union indicate that there is a wide, often substantial, trade outside official channels, particularly in scarce manufactured goods. References to such activities in Georgia seem to indicate that the local black market is extensive and active. It is chiefly supplied by the diversion of goods by those in charge of warehouses and trade organizations. Although frequent attempts are made to stop such trading, the scarcity of some items is so great that many are willing to resort to illegal dealings to get them. Items traded include salt or matches, which may be locally scarce, or luxury goods, the demand for which greatly exceeds the supply. Passenger automobiles, still rarities in the USSR, are often sold on the black market. The persons engaged in such trade include those ostensibly working in retail or wholesale organizations as well as some who are professional black marketeers. Although they are of all nationalities, the ethnic Georgians seem to feel that the Armenians are particularly active. Some basis for this may be found in the fact that Armenians, as a consequence of their historic proclivity toward commerce, are numerous among trade organization workers. The volume or value of items in the black market cannot be estimated but it is undoubtedly substantial.

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IV. POPULATION

A. Distribution and Growth (See Map III)

* The population of the Gruzinskaya SSR, as of 1 January 1957, is estimated to total 4,075,000. This constitutes 2 per cent of the USSR total and 44 per cent of the total for the Transcaucasus Control Area. Of the four primary administrative areas of Georgia, the cities and rayons of republic subordination account for the overwhelming majority of the population (see Table 34).

Table 34

Distribution of Population by Administrative Area: 1957

<u>Administrative Area</u>	<u>Population (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Cities and rayons of republic subordination	3359	82.4
Abkhazskaya ASSR	378	9.3
Adzharskaya ASSR	228	5.6
Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O.	<u>110</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Total	4075	100.0

The development of Georgia's population during the twentieth century is characterized by continuous but irregular growth (see Table 35). During the first two decades of the century fertility was near peak level but mortality was also high, resulting in a low rate of natural increase. In-migration, mostly of Great Russians and Armenians, was of little importance. As a consequence, the population increase between 1897 and 1921 averaged only one per cent per year.

In the period following the establishment of Soviet rule in 1920, there was a marked rise in the rate of increase. Population

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Table 35

Population Growth in the Gruzinskaya
SSR: 1897-1957

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Average Annual Increase Since Year Above (in Per Cent)</u>
1897 ^a	1913.9	--
1921 ^b	2401.5	1.0
1926 ^a	2677.2	1.8
1939 ^a	3542.3	2.6
1956 ^b	4000.0	0.6
1957 ^c	4075.0	1.9

^aBased on All-Union census.

^bOfficial Soviet estimate.

^cARD estimate.

development entered the first stage of the "demographic transition," characterized by declining mortality and relatively stable fertility. Natural increase was high, and by 1938 the birth rate reportedly exceeded the death rate by 234 per cent. Moreover, in-migration from other areas of the USSR was extensive, with almost 200,000 Great Russians coming to the republic in the period 1926-39 alone. The combination of these factors led to a rise in the average annual rate of growth to 1.8 per cent during the years 1921-26 and to 2.6 per cent in the period 1926-39.

World War II witnessed a sharp break in Georgia's population development: a marked deficit in births occurred as young men left for military duty, while mortality increased as a result of military losses and, to some degree, material deprivations for the civilian population. The rate of natural increase declined precipitously. Territories annexed to Georgia from the Chechen-Ingushskaya ASSR, the Karachayevskaya A. O., and the Balkaro-Karbardinskaya SSR of the RSFSR in 1943-44 contributed little to

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the growth of the population since the indigenous elements in these areas had previously been deported.

With the termination of hostilities the rate of population growth rose, but not to the level of 1926-39. The natural increase was apparently not as high as during the earlier period. In-migration was also of little importance, the moderate movement into the republic being counterbalanced to a large degree by the deportation of "unreliable elements" from the border regions beginning in June 1949 and, to a much lesser degree, by movement into the new lands areas and, possibly, into other regions of the Soviet Far East. The retrocession of Klukhorskiy Rayon to the RSFSR in 1955 also reduced population growth by approximately 10,000.

Utilizing the official Soviet estimate for 1956, Georgia's population increased in the period 1939-56 by 0.6 per cent per annum. While this low rate primarily reflects the depressant effects of the war, underregistration in the 1956 estimate is probably also of some importance.

B. Urban Population

Georgia is the least urbanized republic of the Transcaucasus Control Area and has a slightly lower proportion of its population residing in urban areas than does the USSR as a whole. On 1 January 1957, urban population in the republic totaled an estimated 1.55 million, or 38 per cent of the total population. Urban population has increased about 45 per cent since 1939 and by more than 160 per cent since 1926.

The greatest concentrations are found in the valleys of the Kura and Rion Rivers, the location of the republic's major mining and industrial centers, and along the Black Sea coast. In three

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of Georgia's four administrative areas, the degree of urbanization is only slightly below the national average of 43 per cent (see Table 36). The Yugo-Osetinskaya A. O., however, with only two small urban areas, is only 18.2 per cent urbanized.

Table 36

Distribution of Urban Population by
Administrative Area: 1957

<u>Administrative Area</u>	<u>Population (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Area Population</u>
Cities and rayons of republic subordina- tion	1294	38.5
Abkhazskaya ASSR	145	38.4
Adzharskaya ASSR	91	39.9
Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O.	<u>20</u>	<u>18.2</u>
Total	1550	38.0

There is no consistent trend apparent in the distribution of the republic's urban population in the past 20 years (see Table 37). Between 1926 and 1939 the proportion distribution, considered within broad ranges, remained relatively constant. In the period 1939-57, however, the proportion of the population in cities of less than 20,000 population declined appreciably, while in cities of 20,000-50,000 a comparable increase occurred. The shift within these two ranges is probably the result of industrial development in the larger urban centers during the war and postwar years. In 1957, almost 50 per cent of the urban population was concentrated in two cities of more than 100,000 population (see Table 38); 38 cities, or almost 58 per cent of the total number, had populations of less than 10,000.

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Table 37

Distribution of Urban Population: 1926, 1939, 1957
(in Per Cent)

<u>Population Range</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1957</u>
Less than 10,000	22.2)	30.5	10.7
10,000 - 20,000	8.4)		13.1
20,000 - 50,000	19.9	6.5	18.5
50,000 - 100,000	--	14.3	8.8
100,000 - 500,000	49.5	--	7.4
500,000+	--	48.7	41.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 38

Distribution of Urban Centers and
Population: 1926, 1939, 1957

<u>Population Range</u>	<u>Number</u>			<u>Population</u> (in Thousands)		
	<u>1926</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1926^a</u>	<u>1939^a</u>	<u>1957^b</u>
Less than 10,000	34)		38	132.3)		166
10,000 - 20,000	4)	45	14	49.7)	325.4	203
20,000 - 50,000	3	2	10	118.2	69.6	288
50,000 - 100,000	0	2	2	--	152.4	137
100,000 - 500,000	1	0	1	294.0	--	115
500,000+	0	1	1	--	519.2	641
Total	42	50	66	594.2	1066.6	1550

^aBased on census data.^bARD projection of 1954 election district data and data appearing in Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR (1956).

The industrialization of Georgia and the exploitation of its natural resources by the Soviets have influenced to a large degree the population growth of the republic's cities. Tbilisi, the largest and most important city even prior to the Revolution, grew most rapidly in the period 1926-39 through the development of light and heavy industry (see Table 39). Population growth in Kutaisi, also prominent in pre-Soviet years, paralleled industrial

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Table 39

Development of Georgian Cities: 1922-57

City	Population (in thousands)			
	1922 ^a	1926 ^b	1939 ^b	1957 ^c
Tbilisi	233.9	294.0	519.2	641.0
Kutaisi	45.3	48.2	81.5	115.0
Batumi	60.8	48.5	70.9	80.0
Sukhumi	17.4	21.6	44.3	57.0
Rustavi	--	--	30.0	45.0
Poti	11.4	13.1	25.3	39.0
Tkvarcheli	--	--	10.0	34.0
Gori	na	10.5	14.0	30.0
Zugdidi	na	5.6	na	27.0
Chiatura	na	4.4	13.0	23.0
Khashuri	na	7.8	na	23.0
Samtredia	na	13.7	na	23.0
Tkibuli	--	1.0	na	22.0
Zestafoni	na	5.4	na	20.0

^aData from All-Union city census.

^bData from All-Union census.

^cProjections of data in Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR (1956).

development between 1926 and 1939; a further large increase accompanied the establishment of an automobile plant after the war. The growth of Batumi and Poti was conditioned by their importance as Black Sea ports, although each is now also an industrial center and Poti since 1932 has been the center of the Kolkhida Lowlands reclamation project. New cities resulting from Georgia's economic advancement include Rustavi, created as a metallurgical center after World War II, and Tkibuli, a small mining settlement before the war.

C. Rural Population

On 1 January 1957 Georgia's rural population totaled an estimated 2,525,000, or 62 per cent of the total population (see Table 40). Rural population has increased only 2 per cent since

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Table 40

Growth of Rural Population in the
Gruzinskaya SSR: 1897-1957

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Percentage Increase over Year above</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Population</u>
1897	1601.7 ^a	--	83.7
1921	1926.5 ^b	20.3	80.2
1926	2083.0 ^a	8.1	77.7
1939	2475.7 ^a	18.9	69.9
1957	2525.0 ^c	2.0	62.0

^aData from All-Union census.

^bOfficial USSR estimate.

^cCARD estimate based on 1954-55 election district data and other material.

1939, although in the period 1926-39 it increased almost 19 per cent. Several factors influenced the large increase in the earlier period, a time when the rural population of the USSR as a whole declined. The rate of natural increase in Georgia's rural areas has always been higher than in many of the other republics, and although these were the years of most intensive industrialization in the republic, heavy in-migration from other parts of the USSR obviated the necessity for draining this rural natural increase into the cities to supply industrial manpower needs. A growing need for agricultural manpower, created by Georgia's extensive land reclamation program also tended to hold the population in rural areas. In the 1939-57 period these same factors obtained, although the effects of the war and the general decline in natural increase resulted in a relative stability of the rural population as a whole.

Rural population density averages 97 (see Table 41 and Map VI) and ranges from a high of 422 (in Gurdzhaanskiy Rayon) to a

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Table 41

Estimated Population, Land Area, and Population Density
in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1957

Administrative Division	Total Area (Sq. Miles)	Population (in Thousands)			Population Density	
		Urban	Rural	Total	Rural	Over-all
<u>Gruzinskaya SSR</u>	<u>26,055</u>	<u>1,550</u>	<u>2,525</u>	<u>4,075</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>156</u>
<u>Cities and rayons</u> <u>of republic</u> <u>subordination</u>	<u>20,110</u>	<u>1,294</u>	<u>2,065</u>	<u>3,359</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>167</u>
Abashskiy	116	2	44	46	379	397
Adigenskiy	309	4	18	22	58	71
Akhalkalakskiy	425	11	46	57	108	134
Akhaltzikskiy	386	31	15	46	39	119
Akhmetskiy	926	--	34	34	37	37
Ambrolaurskiy	463	2	32	34	69	73
Aspindzskiy	309	--	11	11	36	36
Bogdanovskiy	540	--	34	34	63	63
Bolnisskiy	270	11	34	45	126	167
Borzhomskiy	463	21	14	35	30	76
Chiaturskiy ^a	193	23	46	69	238	358
Chkhorotskuskiy	232	--	23	23	99	99
Chokhataurskiy	309	2	32	34	104	110
Dmanisskiy	463	--	34	34	73	73
Dushetskiy	181	8	38	46	210	254
Gardabanskiy ^a	193	46	23	69	119	358
Geghechkorskiy	347	--	46	46	133	133
Goriyskiy ^a	540	30	69	99	128	183
Gurdzhaanskiy	116	8	49	57	422	491
Kachretskiy	309	--	34	34	110	110
Karelskiy	309	2	55	57	178	184
Kaspskiy	270	7	51	58	189	215
Kasbegskiy	425	--	11	11	26	26
Khashurskiy	502	34	34	68	68	135
Khobskiy	154	--	34	34	221	221
Kutaiskiy ^a	193	116	48	162	238	839
Kvarelskiy	425	--	46	46	108	108
Lagodekhskiy	347	7	39	46	112	133
Lanchkhutskiy	193	4	41	45	212	233
Lentekhskiy	502	--	11	11	22	22
Makharadzevskiy	309	22	46	68	149	220
Marneulskiy	386	7	50	57	130	148
Mayakovskiy	386	--	34	34	88	88
Mestiyskiy	1,235	--	23	23	19	19
Mtskhetskiiy	193	7	28	35	145	181
Onskiy	502	6	29	35	58	70
Ordzhonikidzevskiy	309	2	44	46	142	149
Sachkherskiy	309	7	39	46	126	149
Sagaredzhoyskiy	502	--	34	34	68	68
Samtredskiy	116	23	46	69	397	595
Signakhskiy	386	16	41	57	106	148
Telavskiy	425	18	39	57	92	134
Terzholskiy	116	--	34	34	293	293

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Table 41

Estimated Population, Land Area, and Population Density
in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1957
 (Continued)

Administrative Division	Total Area (Sq. Miles)	Population (in Thousands)			Population Density	
		Urban	Rural	Total	Rural	Over-all
Tetrtskaroykiy	463	2	44	46	95	99
Tianetskiy	309	--	23	23	74	74
Tkibulskiy	193	21	25	46	130	238
Tsagerskiy	309	2	32	34	104	110
Tsalendzhikhskiy	232	--	34	34	147	147
Tsalkinskiy	425	9	37	46	87	108
Tsitelitskaroykiy	965	9	25	34	26	35
Tskhakaevskiy	193	11	34	45	176	233
Tskhaltubskiy	154	7	28	35	182	227
Tsulukidzevskiy	154	11	34	45	221	292
Vanskiy	193	--	46	46	238	238
Zestafonskiy	154	25	55	80	357	519
Zugdidskiy	270	27	64	91	237	337
City of Poti	94	39	18	57	191	606
City of Tbilisi	418	654	35	689	84	1,648
<u>Abkhazskaya ASSR</u>	<u>3,359</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>233</u>	<u>378</u>		
Gagrskiy	309	17	29	46	94	149
Galskiy	386	7	51	58	132	150
Gulripshskiy	695	--	46	46	66	66
Gudautskiy	618	11	34	45	55	73
Ochamchirskiy	733	53	39	92	53	126
Sukhumskiy	618	57	34	91	55	147
<u>Adzharskaya ASSR</u>	<u>1,119</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>137</u>	<u>228</u>		
Batumskiy	193	80	34	114	176	591
Kedskiy	154	--	23	23	149	149
Khuloyskiy	270	--	23	23	85	85
Kobuletskiy	270	11	34	45	126	167
Shuakhevskiy	232	--	23	23	99	99
<u>Yugo-Osetinskaya ASSR</u>	<u>1,467</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>110</u>		
Dzhavskiy	618	2	21	23	34	37
Leningorskiy	386	--	23	23	60	60
Stalinirskiy	309	18	23	41	74	133
Znaurskiy	154	--	23	23	149	149

^aIncludes population of city of republic subordination located within rayon.

NOTE: The population statistics presented here are projections of 1954 election district data.

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low of 19 (in Mestiyskiy Rayon). For the USSR as a whole, rural density averages 16. Concentrations of rural population (more than 100 persons per square mile) form a longitudinal core through the center of the republic and are found also in the Alazani River basin in SE Georgia and along the republic's southern boundary. Rural density in only four rayons (Gurdzhaanskiy in the Alazani basin and Zestafonskiy, Abashskiy, and Samtredskiy in W-central Georgia) exceeds 300 persons per square mile. The areas of lowest density (less than 50 persons per square mile) are found in the N-central part, at the NE rim, at the S-central border, and at the SE edge of the republic.

During the Soviet period there has been a significant movement of rural population into the sparsely populated southern and eastern rayons, resulting in important distributional changes. Large numbers of the Georgian peasantry have been transferred from the congested regions in the W to less heavily populated and reclaimed areas such as in Adigenskiy, Akhaltsikhiskiy, Bolniskiy, and Marneulskiy Rayons. Settlers have also migrated into the reclaimed areas of the Kolkhida Lowlands along the Black Sea coast and the newly irrigated Samorgorskiy Steppe in the SE section. Reclamation work is continuing in these areas and further shifts of the rural population may be expected in the near future.

The movement of certain ethnic subgroups within the republic and the deportation of others to Soviet Asia are also reflected in rural distributional changes. Mass transfers from the mountainous regions of northern Georgia to the Tsitelskaroyskiy and Sagaredzhoy-skiy Rayons in the SE affected almost the entire Khevsur population and a portion of the Pshav. The Chechen and Ingush were deported from the area of Georgia annexed from the RSFSR and were largely

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replaced by Georgians. These latter two groups, however, are reportedly being returned to their native land which is to be retroceded to the RSFSR.

The populations of Georgia's villages, in general, are less than 500. In some regions, however (notably Kutaiskiy and Goriyskiy Rayons), villages have as many as 5000 inhabitants, while in the more mountainous regions, they often comprise only a few households.

D. Labor Force1. Total Labor Force

The 1957 Georgian labor force is estimated to total 2,085,000, or about 51 per cent of the total population. The proportion of Georgia's population in the labor force is slightly lower than in the USSR as a whole, where the labor force constitutes about 53 per cent of the total population. The growth of the Georgian labor force, resulting in an increase of almost 69 per cent in the period 1936-57, has paralleled the economic development of the republic. Although it will continue to increase, the rate of increase will undoubtedly lessen, reflecting the expected gradual reduction of the potential working-age group after 1960.

2. Labor Force Categories

Collective Farm Workers. Collective farm workers constitute the majority of the labor force, although largely as a result of the rapid growth in the number of workers and employees the relative size of the group has decreased in the past 20 years. Collective farm workers total an estimated 1.05 million, an increase of 20.3 per cent over 1936 and constitute 50.4 per cent of the labor force (see Table 42). Only about four-fifths of this

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Table 42

Labor Force of the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1936, 1957

Category	1936		1957	
	Number ^a (in Thousands)	Per Cent of Total	Number ^a (in Thousands)	Per Cent of Total
Collective farm workers	873 ^b	60.8	1050 ^c	50.4
Workers and employees	336 ^b	23.4	745 ^c	35.7
Military	30 ^c	2.1	90 ^c	4.3
Forced labor	20 ^c	1.4	80 ^c	3.9
Members of cooperatives and unorganized handicraftsmen	30 ^c	2.1	30 ^c	1.4
Others	147 ^c	10.2	90 ^c	4.3
Total	1436	100.0	2085	100.0

^aRounded to nearest thousand.

^bReported.

^cARD estimate.

group are engaged directly in agriculture; the remainder are employed in kolkhoz administration and services.

Workers and Employees. Workers and employees, in general, those who work for wages or a salary, form the second largest segment of the labor force. This group, economically the most significant in the Georgian labor force, has grown steadily throughout the Soviet period. In the period 1936-57 it increased 409,000, or almost 22 per cent and in 1957 constitutes 37 per cent of the total labor force, as compared with about 23 per cent in 1936 (see Table 43).

The most significant of the several subcategories of workers and employees is that of industry which in 1957 accounts for more than 28 per cent of the total (see Table 44). This group also shows one of the highest rates of increase in the 1936-57 period, reflecting the extensive industrialization of these years.

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Table 43

Increase in Workers and Employees: 1936-57^a

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number (in Thousands)</u>
1936	336
1940	454
1950	623
1954	730
1955	732
1957	745

^aData reported for 1936, 1940, 1950, 1954, and 1955; 1957 figure, ARD estimate.

Table 44

Distribution of Workers and Employees: 1936, 1957

<u>Category</u>	<u>1936^a</u>		<u>1957^b</u>	
	<u>Number (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>	<u>Number (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total</u>
Industry	76	22.6	209	28.1
Construction	40	11.9	121	16.2
Education	51	15.2	105	14.1
Transportation and communi- cations	45	13.4	90	12.2
Agriculture	38	11.4	80	10.7
Trade and pub- lic dining	32	9.3	45	6.0
Health	18	5.4	50	5.4
Government	21	6.3	25	3.4
Others	<u>15</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>4.0</u>
Total	336	100.0	745	100.0

^aReported.

^bARD estimates.

The number of workers and employees in large-scale industry has increased more rapidly than in industry as a whole and now represents 85-90 per cent of all industry. More than 50

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per cent of those in large-scale industry are probably engaged in the manufacture of producers goods and the trend is toward an even higher proportion. The distribution of workers and employees among the more significant branches of Georgian industry follows: machine-building and electrical equipment, more than 28,000; mining, 28,000; and metallurgical and chemicals, more than 17,000.

Among all categories, workers in construction increased at a higher rate in the 1936-57 period. Trade and public dining and government have not increased appreciably and constitute significantly lower proportions of the total than in 1936. The increase in other groupings is approximately the same as for workers and employees as a whole.

Specialists, comprising the professionals and semi-professionals of the workers and employees, are the elite of the labor force. Although they fall within no single occupational category, they may be divided into two broad groupings: those with higher education; and those with specialized and secondary education. In December 1956, specialists with a higher education numbered 86,500, of which 19,600 were engineers and 8900 were agricultural experts (agronomists, veterinarians, zoo-technicians, and foresters). Those with a specialized secondary education totaled 64,700, including 11,600 technicians and 6500 lower-level agricultural experts.

Forced Laborers. The greatest increase among the categories of the labor force has been in the forced labor group, which quadrupled in the period 1936-57. The relative size of this group also increased markedly, from 1.4 per cent of the total labor force in 1936 to 3.9 per cent in 1957. Little data are available on the types of economic activity in which forced

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laborers in Georgia are engaged, but on the basis of the national pattern it can be assumed that a high proportion are employed in construction or mining. The exceptional growth of this group is in keeping with a general growth in the number of forced laborers in the USSR as a whole.

Other Categories. The military, including members of the armed forces and MVD troops, constitute the largest of the numerically less significant categories of the labor force.

Georgia's position on the Soviet border, facing Turkey, probably determines to a large degree the military strength of the republic. The military represent 4.3 per cent of the total labor force, or 90,000, as compared with 2.1 per cent in 1936.

Members of cooperatives (handicraft, trade, transport, and lumbering) constitute a group which has become increasingly less important in relation to the total labor force. Other occupational groupings which are small segments of the whole include a few self-employed persons, collective farmers who are engaged exclusively in caring for their household plots (numbering about 7000), and full-time Party and Komsomol officials.

3. Manpower Prospects and Labor Productivity

Georgia's manpower prospects could pose a serious problem to the future of the Georgian economy, for beginning in 1960 the effects of low fertility during the war years will be reflected in the number of youths entering the working-age group. The consequent slowing of the growth of the potential labor force will create a manpower shortage unless there are compensating factors. To a certain extent the problem can be met by drawing nonworking elements, such as housewives, into the labor force, but it is doubtful that this will prove an adequate solution unless there

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is also a rise in labor productivity.

Lack of data prevents any prediction of possible future trends in agricultural labor productivity, but the probable nature of developments in industrial labor productivity is more evident. Even admitting considerable bias in Soviet data, the trend in the past has been generally upward. In 1940, for example, production in Georgia's large-scale industry was reportedly 16 times greater than in 1927/28, although the labor force increased only 4.9 times during this period. In the most recent period for which data are available--the first six months of 1956--labor productivity was 8.6 per cent above the figure for the equivalent period in 1955.

Certain factors point to a continuation of this upward trend. A planned increase in capital investment in Georgian industry implies further mechanization, and mechanization is one of the most significant factors in increasing labor productivity. Moreover, a steadily increasing proportion of skilled workers in the annual increment to the labor force is occurring as a result of the increased number of students who are graduating from specialized and higher educational institutions. Based on a consideration of these factors and including the possibility of drawing various nonworking elements into the labor force, increased labor productivity may well compensate for the anticipated decline of the urban labor force after 1960.

E. Age-Sex Structure

The proportion of the Georgian population less than age 16 is slightly lower in Armenia or Adzerbaydzhan: an estimated 31 per cent of the republic's population are in the 0-15 age group (see Table 45), as compared with 35 per cent in Armenia and 34 per cent in Adzerbaydzhan. Although low for the Transcaucasus

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Table 45

Estimated Age-Sex Composition: 1957^a

Age Group	Number (in Thousands)			Per Cent of Total Populations		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
0-15	638	627	1265	32	31	31
16-59	1202	1225	2427	60	60	60
60+	160	183	343	8	9	9
Total	2000	2075	4075	100	100	100

^aBased on 1954 data on school children and voters.

Control Area, this is comparable with the national average. The working-age cohort (16-59), constituting 60 per cent of the population, is relatively high for the Transcaucasus. A decrease in the absolute size of this group can be expected after 1960, however, reflecting the birth-deficit years of World War II. In common with other areas of the Caucasus, Georgia has a relatively high proportion of its population in the older age group (60 plus), compared with the USSR as a whole. And with the trend toward lower fertility and mortality, these ages will probably constitute an increasingly important element of the population.

Among the primary ethnic groups the Armenians and Azeri Turks probably are the youngest and the Russians the oldest in terms of age structure. The Georgians probably occupy an intermediate position.

The outstanding characteristic of the sex structure of Georgia's population, compared with that of the USSR as a whole, is the relatively low proportion of females. Within the Soviet population, there are 115 females for every 100 males; in the republic, the estimated sex ratio is 104 females to every 100 males. Among

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the republics of the Transcaucasus, however, Georgia has a relatively high proportion of females, surpassing both the Armyanskaya and the Azerbaydzhanskaya SSRs.

F. Ethnic Structure

The Georgian population is characterized by ethnic heterogeneity. Georgians constitute an estimated 60 per cent of the republic's population (see Table 46); Armenians, Russians, and Azeri Turks, the three most significant minorities, together represent only an estimated 26.4 per cent of the population. The most significant change in any of the primary ethnic groups is evident in the Russian, which has increased from less than 4 per cent of the population in 1926 to its present estimated 10.8 per cent.

Table 46

Ethnic Composition of the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1926, 1939, 1957
(Numbers in Thousands)

Ethnic Group	1926 ^a		1939 ^a		1957 ^b	
	Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total
Georgians	1788	67.1	2175	61.4	2444	60.0
Armenians	307	11.5	414	11.7	466	11.4
Russians	96	3.6	308	8.7	441	10.8
Azeri Turks	138	5.2	188	5.3	211	5.2
Ossetes	113	4.2	149	4.2	167	4.1
Abkhaz	57	2.1	na	--	na	--
Others	167	6.3	308	8.7	346	8.5
Total	2666	100.0	3542	100.0	4075	100.0

^aData from All-Union census.

^bARD Annual Estimate.

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Important differences in ethnic composition exist between Georgia's two geographic regions. In the western region, with the exception of the Abkhazskaya ASSR, the population is almost entirely Georgian; in the east the populations of the cities and of some rural areas contain significant admixtures of Armenians, Russians, Azeri Turks, and Ossetes. The populations of the Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O., the southern border region, and the city of Tbilisi are particularly diverse.

Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O. is the only one of Georgia's three autonomous areas in which the basic nationality (Ossetes) has apparently remained predominant. In the Abkhazskaya ASSR, the Abkhaz constitute only about one-third of the population, while the Adzhars are a minority in the Adzharskaya ASSR.

Georgians constitute a majority of the republic's rural population but probably only a minority of the urban population. They are found in every section of the republic, although in the Abkhazskaya ASSR, the Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O., and the southern border area they form a less prominent element than elsewhere. The Adzhars, a Moslem subgroup of the Georgians, have been organized into their own autonomous republic. Other Georgian subgroups, including the Pshavs, Svanetians, and Khevsurs, have remained culturally distinct from the mass of Georgians owing to their isolated residence in the main range of the Caucasus Mountains. The recent transfer of some of these peoples to the lowlands of the republic will undoubtedly facilitate their assimilation.

The Armenians, the largest ethnic minority, are found chiefly in southern Georgia, in Abkhaziya, and in the cities of the republic. In many cases, they constitute a numerically significant element of the urban populations, particularly in Tbilisi, Telavi,

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Signakhi, Akhaltsikhe, and Sukhumi. Many Georgian Armenians have been partially or entirely assimilated, although in the city of Tbilisi and in the southern border region, thus far, such attempts have been successfully resisted.

The Russians, the third most significant ethnic group in the republic, are not an indigenous group. Although a considerable number had migrated to the area even before the Soviet period, most have come since 1920, settling primarily in the urban areas. In the period 1926-39 approximately 200,000 Russians settled in the republic, while since 1939 almost 100,000 have in-migrated. The primary zone of Russian agricultural settlement lies along the southern border, where a number of Dukhobors established themselves in pre-Soviet times. Tbilisi also has a significant Russian minority, as have many of the other large cities.

Of the less important ethnic minorities, the primarily rural Abkhaz and Ossetes are confined almost entirely to the territories of these respective autonomous areas. The Greek minority at present is concentrated in a pocket on the southern border, the group once resident in Abkhaziya having been largely deported. The Ukrainians, Jews, and Kurds are also represented, although in very small numbers.

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V. PUBLIC HEALTH, EDUCATION AND PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

A. The Public Health System

The past 50 years have seen important advances in health conditions in the Gruzinskaya SSR. The incidence of tuberculosis, one of the best indications of the general health of a people, has declined significantly: in the period 1913-35, the proportion of Georgian draftees found to have pulmonary tuberculosis fell from 7.88 per 1000 to 0.86 per 1000. Even more marked results have been achieved in the fight against malaria, once the scourge not only of Georgia but of the entire Caucasus: in the period since 1920, morbidity from this disease has reportedly declined 98 per cent, and Soviet planners prophesy its complete eradication by the end of 1960. Various epidemic diseases such as smallpox and cholera, according to Soviet sources, have been eliminated. The fight against other diseases has also been successful, although not as spectacular.

A decisive factor in the betterment of health conditions in the republic has been the expansion of its structure of health protection. This development has had two leading aspects: 1) the marked increase in the number of health institutions; and 2) the increase in the number of primary and secondary medical personnel.

1. Medical Institutions

The medical institutions of the republic may be divided into five broad categories: 1) inpatient curative institutions; 2) outpatient curative institutions; 3) restorative institutions; 4) mother-and-child welfare centers; and 5) medical research institutes.

The inpatient curative branch of Georgia's public health

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system in 1955 included 538 general and specialized hospitals with 24,000 beds (see Table 47). The significant expansion of Georgia's hospital system during the period 1929-55 is emphasized by the increase in hospital beds per 1000 population: in 1929 the rate was less than one bed per 1000 but by 1955 had increased to six per 1000. More than 75 per cent of Georgia's hospital beds are in urban areas, although less than 40 per cent of the republic's population live within cities.

Table 47

Georgian Hospitals: 1920-55

<u>Year</u>	<u>Hospitals</u>	<u>Beds</u>
1920	45	na
1929	na	3,600
1936	na	8,300
1940	299	13,300
1946	346	15,224
1955	538	24,000

The outpatient curative institutions of Georgia, in general, provide treatment to nonhospitalized patients. Polyclinics, often associated with hospitals, provide general medical care. Medical practitioner (feldsher) and midwife stations offer rudimentary medical and obstetrical treatment in rural areas not served directly by dispensaries. Dispensaries specialize in the treatment of special conditions and diseases and are located where required. The number of outpatient institutions in the republic, excluding dispensaries, totaled 2500 in 1955 as compared with 65 in 1913.

The restorative institutions of Georgia include sanatoria and rest homes. The many mineral springs in the republic (reportedly

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one-third of the Soviet total), the beaches along the Black Sea, and the republic's mild subtropical climate with plentiful sunshine and mountain air have combined to make Georgia one of the leading resort areas of the Soviet Union. Approximately 200,000 persons take advantages of its facilities each year, many coming from distant regions of the USSR. Sanatoria and rest homes in the republic total 140. The health resorts are Gagra, Sukhumi, Akhali-Afoni, Gulriphi, Kobuleti, Tsikhisdzhiri, Zeleniy Mys, and Makhindzhauri on the Black Sea coast and Abastumi, Bakuriani, Tsemi, Bakhmaro, and Ritsa in the mountains. The leading spas are Borzhomi, Tskhaltubo, Mendzhi, Tbilisi, Dzhava, and Saimre.

Georgia's system for mother-and-child care includes three basic types of institutions: mother-and-child welfare centers, maternity hospitals, and nurseries. The mother-and-child welfare centers, usually associated with polyclinics or dispensaries, provide consultation services and health care in the fields of obstetrics, gynecology, and pediatrics. In 1940 there were 140 of these in Georgia; 127 were in the cities and 51 were in rural areas. Maternity hospitals, of which there were only 58 in 1955 are found in virtually all urban centers. The nurseries care for children three years of age and under, whose mothers work. In 1947 there were 295 nurseries in the republic with a total capacity of 12,794.

A final aspect of the institutional structure of Georgia's public health system is its 14 medical research institutes. Among the best known are the Institute of Epidemiology, Microbiology and Bacteriology in Tbilisi, one of the largest in the USSR; the Malaria and Medicinal Parasitological Institute, which has an important role in the antimalaria campaign in Georgia; and the Institute for Labor Hygiene and Professional Diseases which is working to reduce

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occupational diseases in the factories and other economic enterprises in the republic. Other scientific research institutes in Georgia specialize in resortology, experimental cardiology, and psychiatry.

2. Medical Personnel

The improved staffing of the republic's medical facilities and the increase in the number of physicians and dentists (see Table 48) have been major factors in the betterment of health conditions in the republic. Georgia now has more physicians and dentists on a per capita basis than has any other Soviet republic,

Table 48

Physicians and Dentists in
the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1913-55

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1913	461
1940	4,894
1950	9,510
1955	11,768

and the ratio of three doctors per 1000 population (1955) is considerably above the USSR average of 1.7 per 1000. In great part, however, this is the result of the large number of sanatoria and health resorts within the republic. Of the 11,768 physicians and dentists in Georgia (1955), only 4000, or less than 35 per cent, practise in rural areas.

As elsewhere in the USSR, all Georgian doctors are assigned to a state-operated medical facility. And although no physician derives his entire income from private practise, specialists often treat private patients after regular hours. A continuing supply of

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primary medical personnel is assured by the republic's doctors' training program. The Tbilisi Medical Institute has graduated more than 10,000 and is currently training 2,000 more. The Institute for Doctors' Improvement, in the same city, also offers refresher courses each year to approximately 1000 doctors.

Improvement in the medical staffing of the republic is also evidenced by the number of secondary medical personnel, which increased from 8,593 in 1940 to 22,370 in 1955. This category includes, in addition to feldshers (medical practitioners who assist and carry out the instructions of physicians, practice minor surgery, and perform tasks of an antiepidemiological nature), other medical semi-professionals such as midwives, nurses for both hospitals and nurseries, laboratory technicians, and pharmacists.

3. Planned Development of Health Facilities

A continued development of Georgia's health facilities is projected under the current Five-Year Plan. Hospital capacity is to be increased 20 per cent; and 30 new hospitals are already under construction. These include several in various rayon centers, rural hospitals, and industrial medical facilities at the Rustavi metallurgical combine and the Tkvarcheli and Tkibuli coal-mining centers. Facilities are also planned for the workers of the Gori textile and Kutaisi automobile plants.

It is also planned to improve the staffing of the republic's hospitals and clinics. Doctors will be assigned to the mountainous areas of Kazbegskiy, Akhaltsiskiy, and other rayons to supplement the few now there, and specialists will be supplied to areas where their services are presently unavailable.

B. Education

Organizationally similar to those of other Soviet union republics,

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Georgia's educational system comprises three levels: preschool, elementary and secondary, and higher. The republic's schools, in general, are controlled and administered by the Gruzinskaya SSR Ministry of Education. Universities and other schools of higher education, however, are under the USSR Ministry of Education; Party schools are controlled by Communist Party agencies; and specialized secondary (or vocational) schools, by the various related ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Finance controls schools of accountancy and the Ministry of Health, secondary medical schools).

Georgia's educational system is relatively well developed, and the level of education in Georgia is probably one of the highest in the USSR. The proportion of the population with a higher education is greater than in any other Soviet republic, and although the proportion with a secondary education is not now known, in 1938/39 the republic ranked first in this area. The proportion of specialized secondary school graduates, however, is lower in Georgia than in the USSR as a whole, probably because the rate of industrialization has been slower in this republic than in other areas of the Soviet Union (see Table 49).

Table 49

Educational Level of Georgia's Population

<u>Level of Education</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Graduates in Per Cent of Total Population</u>	
		<u>Georgia</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Higher	1955	1.8	1.1
Secondary	1939	11.3	7.8
Specialized secondary	1955	1.4	1.5

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1. Preschool Education

Georgia's preschool system consists of 569 kindergartens or nursery schools, with an enrollment of 30,603 (1955) which offer a full day's care and training for children from three to six years of age. Their major function is to free mothers for participation in the labor force; in addition, they prepare young children for entrance into elementary schools. The curriculum includes training in hygiene, instruction in the fundamentals of reading and arithmetic, gymnastics, free and supervised play, and excursions. Largely an urban institution, kindergartens are usually operated by local industrial enterprises, producers' cooperatives, trade unions, and collective farms, although a few are directly controlled by local educational authorities. During the harvest season many temporary nurseries are established to care for children of mothers engaged in field work. The potentialities of the preschool system as a substitute for maternal care have been only partially realized, for in 1955 less than 10 per cent of the children of eligible age in the republic were in attendance. During any manpower shortage, however, an expansion of the system could help fill the gap by releasing mothers to participate in the labor force.

2. Primary and Secondary Education

The second basic level of the educational system offers schooling through grade eleven and includes two types of schools--general and specialized. At present compulsory attendance through grade eight is universal in the republic; compulsory attendance through grade eleven is planned for 1960.

The general primary and secondary system, which trains the great majority of school children, includes the primary schools (grades one to four); the incomplete middle schools (grades one to eight); and the complete middle schools (grades one to eleven).

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Both the incomplete and complete middle schools have one grade more than is standard in other Soviet schools. These were added in the year 1946/47 to make it possible for Georgian students to study the Russian language, previously not included in the curriculum.

The number of primary and general secondary schools in Georgia more than doubled in the period 1914/15-1955/56; attendance during this same period more than tripled. The greatest increase was in general secondary enrollment; the over-all increase in primary school enrollment was much lower, and in 1955/56 was more than 30 per cent below the 1940/41 level, largely because of the wartime birth deficit (see Tables 50 and 51).

General subjects occupy about half the students' class time in the general schools (see Table 52). Both Russian and world literature are taught; language instruction includes Russian, the native language of the student if he is non-Russian, and a foreign language. Other subjects offered are USSR and world history, the Soviet Constitution, and, in a few schools, psychology and logic. Mathematics and science are important parts of the curricula of both the elementary and secondary schools. Study in the complete middle school includes six years of general science (including geography) five of physics, four of chemistry, and one of astronomy. Training in mathematics begins with basic arithmetic in the first grade and continues through trigonometry, offered in the upper grades of the complete middle school. Singing, drawing, physical culture, and military training are also a part of the course of study, although none of these subjects is required for promotion or graduation. A recent development in elementary and secondary education in Georgia, as well as in the rest of USSR, has been the renewed emphasis on polytechnical training, in an effort to

Table 50

Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1914/15-1955/56
(Numbers in Thousands)

	1914/15	1927/28	1940/41	1950/51	1954/55	1955/56	1955/56 in Per Cent of		
							1927/28	1940/41	1950/51
Total students	157.6	297.2	792.8	761.7	743.3	734.7	247	93	96
In classes 1-4 of the general schools	140.3	230.9	426.0	397.9	277.8	293.1	130	94	97
In classes 5-11 of the general schools and in specialized secondary schools	17.3	66.3	366.8	363.8	465.5	441.6	670	69	74
In classes 5-11 of the general schools	16.8	58.6	240.7	340.0	436.7	411.4	700	120	121
In seven-year and complete secondary schools	(16.8)	(56.3)	(318.5)	(319.7)	(411.6)	(385.1)	680	121	121
In schools for working and rural youth and adult schools	--	(2.3)	(22.2)	(20.3)	(25.1)	(26.3)	1,140	121	120
In specialized secondary schools	0.5	7.7	26.1	23.8	28.8	30.2	390	119	130

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Table 51

Primary and General Secondary Schools in the
Gruzinskaya SSR: 1914/15-1955/56

<u>School Year</u>	<u>Primary Schools</u>	<u>Incomplete Middle Schools</u>	<u>Complete Middle Schools</u>	<u>Total</u>
1914/15	1,677	48	40	1,765
1927/28	2,070	373	102	2,545
1940/41	2,441	1,283	759	7,483
1955/56	2,029	1,278	890	4,197

Table 52

Summary of General School Curriculum^a

<u>Class of Subjects</u>	<u>Per Cent of Class Time (Eleven-year School)</u>
General education	53.9
Mathematics and science	35.2
Other	10.9

^aExcluding time devoted to study of Georgian and other non-Russian languages.

train students in the operation of mechanical equipment and technological processes.

Specialized general schools include schools for working and rural youth and boarding schools. The schools for working and rural youth have been established for young workers who can devote only part of their time to obtaining an education. In November 1956 there were nine schools for young workers, with an enrollment of 25,000 and 200 rural part-time schools. The boarding schools, or shkoli-internaty, ostensibly provide an education as well as board, room, and clothing to orphans and to children whose mothers are single or working or whose family life is considered unsuitable. Some American authorities, however, consider the real purpose of

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these schools to be the training of young people destined for entrance into the Soviet elite. A relatively new addition to Georgia's educational system, there are only five boarding schools in the republic.

Specialized secondary education is provided by the middle technical schools which include the tekhnikums. These schools provide vocational training in the student's occupational specialty as well as some general education. The graduate is required by law to spend three years working in the field of specialization in which he was trained. Vital to Georgia's economy, specialized secondary schools furnish a large part of the republic's second-echelon professional manpower. In the year 1955/56 there were 105 middle technical schools in Georgia with an enrollment of 30,148 students (see Table 53).

Table 53

Middle Technical Schools in Georgia: 1955/56

<u>Field of Instruction</u>	<u>Number of Schools</u>
Agriculture and forestry	30
Education and culture	29
Health and medicine	26
Engineering	12
Trade, finance, and credit	3
Unknown	<u>5</u>
Total	105

Georgia's primary and secondary school system seems to be above average for the USSR as a whole and is probably far superior to those of many other republics beyond the Transcaucasus. The teaching staff is considerably above average both in terms of training and experience: 43.3 per cent of the primary and secondary

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teachers in 1955/56 had a higher education as compared with only 23.5 per cent for the USSR as a whole; a relatively high proportion had at least a complete secondary education. In 1955/56 only 20.9 per cent had had less than five years' teaching experience, while in the USSR as a whole the comparable figure was 24.8 per cent. The Georgian teacher-student ratio is also above the all-union average: in 1955/56 there was one teacher for every 13 students in Georgia (primary and secondary) as compared with one to every 17 in the USSR as a whole.

As in the rest of the USSR, overcrowding in schools is a problem, although a less critical one than in many areas. Of the primary and secondary students, 34.6 per cent must attend school during a second shift as compared with 36.5 per cent in the USSR as a whole; 0.5 per cent must attend during a third shift. The short supply of textbooks during the 1955/56 school year was apparently critical, but the situation has probably eased.

It is a legal requirement in Georgia that instruction be given in the student's native language, and at the present time this law is being substantially obeyed. Schools exist for all major ethnic groups, and most children attending elementary and secondary schools are probably being instructed in their native language. At the same time many tendencies toward linguistic Russification and Georgification of the system are evident. In the period 1945-53 Abkhaz, Ossetian, and Armenian students were deprived, at least in part, of the right to study in their native languages and were forced to attend schools where instruction was offered only in Georgian. Steps have been taken to rectify this situation, officially attributed to Beria's catering to Georgian nationalism, although it is not entirely clear whether the conversion has been complete. While Georgification in the school system has been

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largely eliminated, linguistic and cultural Russification continues to be a major trend. In 1938/39, 9.2 per cent of the elementary and secondary students of the republic (approximately the same proportion as in the USSR as a whole) were enrolled in Russian-language schools. By 1955/56, however, 20 per cent of the Georgian students were being instructed in Russian, although Russians constituted only about ten per cent of the republic population. The basic reason for this Russification seems to be the desire of young people to attain proficiency in the national language, thus increasing the possibility of furthering their careers.

Although probably not important in the increase of Russian as the language of instruction in the Georgian schools, state-promoted Russification has been a significant factor in the extension of the teaching of Russian. In 1938 the teaching of Russian in all schools of the USSR was enjoined by law, and in 1946/47 an additional grade was added to both the seven- and ten-year schools in Georgia so that the increased emphasis on the Russian language and literature would not be made at the expense of other subjects. A pedagogical institute was also established in Tbilisi to train Russian-language teachers.

3. Higher Education

Georgia's institutions of higher education, at the apex of the educational system, train the professional personnel and top-echelon technicians who comprise the elite of the republic's labor force. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, all institutions of higher education are controlled by the USSR Ministry of Education. The 19 institutions at this level (see Table 54) include one university and 18 institutes and have a total enrollment of 37,948 students (1949/50). The university offers five-years' training in a variety

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of fields; the institutes, four- to six-year programs in various branches of professional specialties. Of the total instruction time, 62-70 per cent is devoted to subjects in the student's major field of study, 25-30 per cent to general cultural studies, and six to eight per cent to political and social science subjects (primarily indoctrination in the official version of Marxism and current political and ideological orthodoxy).

The Tbilisi State University im. I.V. Stalin, the leading institution of higher education in the republic, has a total enrollment of 4865 students (1949/50). It includes the following divisions: philology (including oriental studies), economics, mechanical-mathematical sciences, biology, chemistry, physics, geology, geography, and law. The 18 institutes offer training in engineering, agriculture, veterinary science, medicine, music, graphic arts, theatrical arts, education, and physical education (see Table 54).

The primary language of instruction in all higher educational institutions is Georgian, although as in the primary and secondary schools the trend is toward increasing instruction in Russian. In 1947 all courses at the University of Tbilisi were offered in Georgian except in the Russian Philological school. Since then, however, the Pushkin Pedagogical Institute, which offers courses only in Russian has been added to the university and instruction in Russian has probably been introduced to other faculties. And although until recently all dissertations at the university were presented in Georgian, a large number are now in Russian.

As in other areas of the USSR, higher education is more easily accessible to children of the intelligentsia and white-collar workers. To a large extent this results from the fact that the monthly stipends granted many of the students are not always adequate

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Table 54

Educational Institutes in Georgia

<u>Name</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Speciality</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>
Georgian Polytechnical Institute	Tbilisi	Engineering	5,500 (1949/50)
Institute for Railway Transport Engineering	Tbilisi	Railway Transport Engineering	2,100 (1949/50)
Georgian Agricultural Institute	Tbilisi	Agriculture	3,200 (1949/50)
Georgian Veterinary Institute	Tbilisi	Veterinary Science	na
Tbilisi Medical Institute	Tbilisi	Medicine	2,400 (1949/50)
State Conservatory	Tbilisi	Music	na
Academy of Fine Arts	Tbilisi	Graphic Arts	na
Institute of Physical Culture	Tbilisi	Physical Education	na
Georgian State Theatrical Institute	Tbilisi	Theatrical Arts	na
Tbilisi Pedagogical Institute	Tbilisi	Education	na
Pedagogical Institute for Foreign Languages	Tbilisi	Education	na
Telavi Pedagogical Institute	Telavi	Education	na
Sukhumi Pedagogical Institute	Sukhumi	Education	na
Gori Pedagogical Institute	Gori	Education	na
Kutaisi Pedagogical Institute	Kutaisi	Education	na
Staliniri Pedagogical Institute	Staliniri	Education	na
Batumi Pedagogical Institute	Batumi	Education	na
Kutaisi Agricultural Institute	Kutaisi	Agriculture	na

for their needs and only the families in the higher income groups can afford additional support. It is also important that members of the state, Party, and economic bureaucracy, as the ruling class, are granted many privileges. Finally, the cultural environment of

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children of the intelligentsia and white-collar workers makes it more likely that they will meet the high standards of admission to higher educational institutions.

It may be assumed that Georgian students, because of the longer term of secondary education and the better training of their teachers, have an initial advantage which continues through their further education. The high proportion of professionals with university or institute degrees in the republic--higher than in any other republic of the Soviet Union--would also argue for the system's superiority.

One of the most significant goals of the educational system of any totalitarian state is its effectiveness in political and ideological orientation. That Georgia's higher educational system has failed in this regard is clearly indicated by recent events. Particularly indicative are the antiregime student riots of 9 March 1956 and the preceding period of passive insubordination, marked on one day by mass cutting of classes in dialectical materialism at the University of Tbilisi and the Railway Transport Engineering Institute. Ostensibly the result of the regime's anti-Stalinist campaign, these incidences probably also reflect Georgian nationalism. Whatever the causes, however, the regime feels that ideological indoctrination in Georgian universities has been ineffective.

4. Evaluation of the Georgian Educational System

Georgian education fulfills three important functions: 1) as a major source of political and ideological indoctrination, it tends to mold the youth of the republic into a closely integrated force, dedicated to the ideals of Communism; 2) through training manpower essential to industrial and technological development, it bolsters the republic's industry and, ultimately, Soviet political

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and military power; and 3) as education, particularly at the higher levels, is more easily available to children of the elite, it has the effect of preserving status and thus strengthening the loyalty of the privileged class among which the regime probably finds its principal support. The tendency of education to weaken the regime has been particularly manifested during the past two years, however, and recent events clearly show that the intelligentsia and university students are among the most restive elements in Soviet society, despite the strict controls exercised.

Thus, paradoxically, education in Georgia is both a powerful bulwark of the regime and a major weakness. Its future role vis-a-vis the Communist regime would seem to hinge on the question of whether or not its "positive value" in strengthening the political and military position of the regime will be weakened or nullified by its "negative role" in creating dissatisfaction.

C. Public Communication

The system of public communication in Georgia, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, is part of a political monopoly designed by the regime to further the purposes of the Communist Party. Public communication is an important tool in effecting the purposes of the Party, for it is the means by which the Communists systematically campaign to change the attitudes and influence the actions of large social groups. Thus, the selection of the media of communication and their patterns of content and operation are determined by the Party's needs. The public expression of ideas is rigidly controlled by the Party, and in Georgia this control is particularly severe because of the average Georgian's intense nationalism and attachment to his native culture. Control in Georgia extends even to filling Georgian-language publications with Soviet catchwords and

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slogans or substituting words of Russian or other foreign origin for acceptable every-day Georgian phrases.

Control over the content, production, and dissemination of public information is vested largely in the Georgian Ministry of Culture, in Tbilisi. Communist Party agencies participate to a lesser extent, principally in the newspaper field. Their most important function in this respect is a close supervision of media content—achieved by placing Communists in virtually all editorial and managerial positions. A degree of control is also exercised by the MVD through its post-release censorship of media content.

In Georgia, the most important medium of public, or mass communication is the printed word.

1. Newspapers, Periodicals, and Books

Despite the dullness and monotony of text and format in Georgian publications, the distribution of printed material in the republic is apparently extensive. In 1955 the Georgian population reportedly spent 75 million rubles on newspapers, periodicals, and books, or approximately 24 rubles per person. These expenditures represented 1.2 per cent of total retail sales and 2.2 per cent of all nonfood sales.

Newspapers. The Georgian press is controlled by Communist Party and government agencies, including the Georgian ministries of Health and Education, the Komsomol, and the Union of Soviet Writers. Single-edition imprint of the 105 newspapers published in the republic in 1955 totaled 718,000 (see Table 55). Circulation was supplemented by the five to eight papers received from outside the republic (chiefly central-press publications) which had a single-edition imprint totaling about 200,000. On the basis of the republic's ethnic composition, it is estimated that one copy of a

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Russian-language newspaper was available for each 2.3 ethnic Russians; for Georgians, there was one Georgian-language paper available to each 4.9 Georgians. This bias in favor of Russian readers is further increased if one considers that most of the newspapers supplied from outside the republic are published in the Russian language. The actual situation is probably modified, however, by the fact that all non-Russian secondary school graduates are at least partially bilingual and therefore can read Russian-language publications.

Most of the domestic newspapers are published semiweekly; two are published six times a week; eight, five times weekly; three, weekly; and 28, three times a week. Individual single-edition imprint rarely exceeds 2500, and papers with the largest imprint are published, for the most part, in Tbilisi. A few are published in two languages, usually in Russian and one of the native languages.

Table 55

Survey of the Georgian Press: 1955

<u>Category</u>	<u>Newspapers Published</u>	<u>Imprint: Single Edition</u>	<u>Persons per Copy^a</u>
Total	105	718,000	5.5
<u>Language</u>			
Georgian	82	516,000	4.9
Russian	7	164,000	2.3
Other	16	38,000	30.8
<u>Press Level</u>			
Republic	12	481,000	
ASSR and A.O.	7	44,000	
City and rayon	79	184,000	
Other	7	9,000	

^aBased on ethnic composition of republic.

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Periodicals. Annual imprint of the 76 periodicals published in Georgia in 1955 totaled 2,471,000 (see Table 56). About 72 per cent of this number and almost 98 per cent of the total imprint were in the Georgian language. This apparent bias in favor of Georgian readers is negated by the 4.5 million copies of periodicals supplied from outside the republic, none of which was in the Georgian language. The concentration of subject matter (as shown in Table 56) is believed to be paralleled in the periodicals which are supplied from outside the republic. Most periodicals are published irregularly; those with the largest single-edition imprint, however, are published either semimonthly or monthly.

Table 56

Survey of Georgian Periodicals: 1955

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Annual Imprint</u>	<u>Persons per Copy^a</u>
Total	76	2,471,000	1.6
<u>Language</u>			
Georgian	55	2,416,000	1.0
Abkhaz	1	13,000)	35.0
Other	20	42,000)	
<u>Subject</u>			
Literature and art	10	1,053,000	3.9
Political and socio-economic	11	936,000	4.3
Culture and education	11	265,000	15.4
Agriculture	10	137,000	29.7
Press and publication	6	53,000	76.9
Science, medicine, and technology	28	27,000	675.0

^aBased on ethnic composition of republic.

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Books. The publication of 1,906 book titles in Georgia in 1955, with a total imprint of 10,211,000 (see Table 57) was well below the national average for that year and accounted for only about 50 per cent of the estimated circulation of books within the republic. Although books in the Georgian language represented 79.8 per cent of the republic imprint, 27.3 per cent of these were translations from other languages, principally Russian. While Russian-language originals account for only 15.9 per cent of the imprint total, Russian books, including translations into Georgian and other languages, represented more than 33 per cent of the titles. And the favored status of the Russian-reading population is even more clearly stressed if one includes the 8.8 million copies supplied from other areas of the USSR, virtually all of which were in the Russian language. The degree of centralization of book publishing is even higher than in the press: 1,723 or 90.4 per cent of the titles and 9,843,400 or 96.4 per cent of the total imprint were published in Tbilisi.

Table 57

Survey of Books Published in Georgia: 1955

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Titles</u>	<u>Total Imprint</u>
Total	1,906	10,211,000
<u>Language</u>		
Georgian	1,529	8,149,000
Original	1,111	na
Translations	418	na
Russian	258	1,618,000
Original	228	na
Translations	30	na
Other USSR	97	243,000
Original	53	na
Translations	44	na

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Table 57

Survey of Books Published in Georgia: 1955
(Continued)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Titles</u>	<u>Total Imprint</u>
<u>Subject</u>		
Literature and art	452	4,225,000
Political and socio-economic	397	2,355,000
Science and mathematics	166	1,351,000
Agriculture	335	894,000
Culture and education	191	614,000
Science, medicine, and technology	365	772,000
<u>Location of Publisher</u>		
Tbilisi	1,724	9,838,000
Sukhumi	58	139,000
Batumi	36	117,000
Staliniri	61	104,000
Other	27	13,000

2. Libraries and Clubs

The average Georgian probably spends very little each year on newspapers, periodicals, or books, as annual per-capita expenditures for printed matter average only 24 rubles. His limited purchases, however, are undoubtedly offset to some degree by the availability of books in the republic's libraries, which for the most part are controlled by the Georgian Ministry of Culture. Soviet libraries are agencies of indoctrination, and a free selection of books by the reader is prohibited. Library personnel are required to make every effort to direct the readers' attention to currently acceptable material, and all facilities are carefully controlled to prevent inclusion of books incorporating deviant ideas. In 1955, Georgia's libraries totaled 2674 and had a total of 9.67 million volumes (see Table 58). Although only 14 per cent

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Table 58

Survey of Libraries and Clubs in Georgia: 1955

Category	Number		
	Total	Urban	Rural
<u>Libraries</u>	2,674	375	2,299
Volumes	9,670,000	4,043,000	5,627,000
Average volumes/library	3,616	10,781	2,448
Persons/library	1,524	4,133	1,098
Volumes/person	2.4	2.6	2.2
<u>Clubs</u>	1,809	175	1,634
Persons/club	2,250	8,750	1,550

were located in urban areas, these facilities had almost 42 per cent of the total volumes. And each of the urban libraries, on average, had about four times as many volumes as had the rural libraries.

In rural areas, libraries are often part of local clubs which serve as social centers. Managed by the Georgian Ministry of Culture, collective farms, or trade unions, these clubs provide reading rooms and facilities for drama and art groups, physical education, and lectures. In many rural areas, where other recreational facilities are lacking, they are important gathering places. They have frequently been criticized by the regime for their preoccupation with nonpolitical entertainment programs which emphasize the generally low level of political activities.

3. Oral Propaganda and Agitation

Although the major emphasis is on the printed word as a medium of information and indoctrination, the Soviets do not neglect the oral presentation of their ideas in attempting to mold public opinion. They make a sharp distinction between "propaganda," which is strictly defined as the "intensive elucidation of a complex grouping of ideas, such as Marxism-Leninism and of the history of the Communist Party and its tasks," and "agitation" which is defined as

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"the chief means for education in communism of the broad working-class masses." Thus, Communist propaganda is directed primarily toward the administrative and intellectual elite; agitation, toward the broad masses. The general themes and methods used in both instances are set by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Georgian Communist Party.

The outstanding single agency for oral propaganda in Georgia is the republic branch of the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. This organization lectures intellectual and student groups on a wide variety of subjects ranging from science and literature to history and politics and are intended to shape the thinking of these potential leaders. The Georgian branch of the society probably follows the example of the RSFSR branch by issuing some of these lectures in pamphlet form for wider distribution.

In addition, there are 4 lecture bureaus, 80 lecture groups, and 749 rural lectureships under the direction of the Georgian Ministry of Culture, as well as workers in Party and trade union organizations. Activity is greatest during periods when impending changes must be explained and justified to persons who will be most strongly affected.

There is no single organization engaged in oral agitation as such, for the group to which it is directed is so large and has such diverse interests that the approach must be tailored to fit the particular segment. Themes are usually simple, however, and are often bolstered by examples drawn from the audience's experiences: constant repetition is used to drive home a point. The themes and general methods are determined by the Party's Department of Propaganda and Agitation and are set forth in its publication Bloknot

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Agitatora (Agitators' Handbook). The Georgian edition of the handbook, published fortnightly in Tbilisi, has the largest printing of any Georgian-language periodical.

The Unofficial Public Information System. Despite its many controls, the regime has never been completely successful in regulating the expression of public opinion. The widespread dissemination of rumor or news by word of mouth supplements or corrects the official news and occasionally reveals what the regime would prefer to keep hidden. Long experience has made people expert at discounting rumors spread by this system, to arrive at some measure of the truth. The degree of participation and belief in these rumors varies with age, education, and social status. Old peasant women are believed to be the most active participants and, indeed, the whole system is sometimes called the odna baba skazala ("an old woman says"), or OBS system.

Although specific information relating to the spread of rumor is lacking, a wide body of gossip seems to be directed against the Russians and other ethnic groups. It is often an ill-natured expression of Georgian feelings of national and cultural unity seeking to defend itself against foreign interference and control.

4. Domestic Broadcasting

Domestic broadcasting is controlled by or through agencies of republic ministries: programming, by the Chief Directorate of Public Information, under the Georgian Ministry of Culture; transmitting equipment and facilities, through the Georgian Ministry of Communications. Radio broadcasting facilities include the regional network, centered in Tbilisi, and the radio-diffusion (wired speaker) network; a single television station in Tbilisi serves a few viewers.

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The radio network, a part of the national network, receives programs for rebroadcast from central broadcasting in Moskva, either by air or over intercity telephone lines, and originates local programs designed for specific political and/or administrative needs. Transmitting facilities, reportedly located only in Tbilisi, are designed to reach Azerbaydzhanskaya and Armyanskaya SSRs, although facilities in these two republics are reportedly not strong enough to reach other than local listeners. Local programs are broadcast in Azerbaydzhani and Armenian, as well as in Georgian; programs received from the central network undoubtedly are in Russian. The radio receiving network in Georgia is markedly underdeveloped, for in 1956 only 117,000 radios, or one set for approximately every 35 persons, were registered in the republic (see Table 59). In rural areas, the lack of tunable receiving sets is even more evident: there is only one set for every 210 persons, or one for every 40

Table 59

Distribution of Radio Receivers in Georgia: 1956

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number of Persons per Unit (approx.)</u>
<u>Radios (tunable direct receivers)</u>		
Total	117,000	35
Urban	105,000	15
Rural	12,000	210
<u>Radio-diffusion receivers (wired speakers)</u>		
Total	251,000	16
Urban	125,000	20
Rural	126,000	12
<u>Total (both types)</u>	368,000	11
<u>Urban</u>	230,000	7
<u>Rural</u>	138,000	11

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to 50 families. In urban areas, one family in every 3 or 4 has a radio.

The vast majority of Georgian listeners, however, particularly those in rural areas, receive their programs by means of wired speakers, the "voice" of the radio-diffusion exchanges, located in their homes or dormitories or in public gathering places such as group or reading rooms or recreation halls. The listener may also hear programs over the extensive public address system, generally tied into the same radio-diffusion network as the wired speakers, which reaches him in public schools or in his factory shop, meeting room, or lunchroom. The radio-diffusion exchange permits a minimum of receiving equipment to serve a maximum number of listeners and at the same time allows the regime to limit severely the public's access to conflicting interpretations of events. In 1956, 251,000 wired speakers were reported in the republic, or one speaker for every 16 persons (see Table 59).

Georgia's one television station, in Tbilisi, began transmitting early in 1957, and although the number of television sets in the Tbilisi area is not known, they are probably few in number and of mediocre quality. Thus far, television programs have primarily been film presentations, but it is expected that in the next few years the quantity and quality of telecasts will improve and will approximate those presented in Moskva.

5. The Film and the Theater

The Film. The film industry in Georgia is administered by the Directorate of Cinematography, under the Georgian Ministry of Culture. This directorate is responsible for all aspects of motion picture work in the republic, including the production of films in Tbilisi and the allocation of films and

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projectors to all areas. The republic's only studio, in Tbilisi, produces art, scientific, and technical films, and newsreels and documentaries, chiefly intended for Georgia and nearby areas. It also dubs in Georgian-language soundtrack on films produced in other languages.

In 1955, Georgia had only 798 film projectors to serve its estimated population of 3,950,000. Almost 71 per cent were allocated to rural areas, although the rural audience represented only 27.5 per cent of the total republic audience in that year (see Table 60). The average Georgian filmgoer in 1955 attended only 7.3 showings, in contrast to the USSR average attendance of 12.5. Rural and urban attendance was also lower than in the USSR as a whole: average rural film attendance per individual was 58.4 per cent lower than USSR rural attendance; urban, 25.7 per cent lower. The relatively low attendance is possibly the result of the short supply of films with suitable soundtracks or the repetitious showings of old films. Available films are chiefly of Soviet origin, although a few careful selections from other Communist, or even from non-Communist countries have reportedly been exhibited recently.

Table 60

Summary of Georgian Movie Habits: 1955

	Total	Urban		Rural	
		Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total
Film projectors	798	234	29.3	564	70.7
Annual audience	28,819,000	20,890,000	72.5	7,929,000	27.5
Average film attendance per individual	7.3	13.9	--	3.2	--

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The Theater. The drama in Georgia, although restricted in extent and appeal, is one of the more important forms of national expression. The Department of Cultural Enlightenment, under the Georgian Ministry of Culture, selects, censors, and produces all plays shown and operates the 20 theaters within the republic. Seventeen of these theaters present works in the Georgia language; Tbilisi also has one Armenian and two Russian theaters. The content of most Soviet plays is of a level of sophistication which interests only the better educated portion of the population, and much attention is given to achieving a high technical level of acting and production. The Georgian audience in 1955 totaled only 2.5 million, an extremely low participation in relation to the total population which does not reflect the extensive participation of the intelligentsia.

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VI. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND CONTROLS

A. Social Structure

For 36 years the Soviets have attempted unsuccessfully to replace or reshape the traditional social values of the peoples of Georgia. And although important changes have occurred during this period, they have largely resulted from the impact of the forces of modern life--urbanization, industrialization, and education--rather than from direct Communist indoctrination. Despite the attempts of the regime to substitute the concept of service to the state for that of service to the smaller social group of the family, loyalty to the smaller group remains the foundation of the Georgian social structure, although the roles of individuals within the group constantly change.

1. Ethnic Structure

The Georgians. As the largest indigenous group, the Georgians tend to establish the pattern for community life. They have weathered repeated attacks upon their culture and traditions and even under the Soviets, their most persistent assailants, have managed to retain a high degree of cultural cohesion. Communal solidarity remains strongest in rural areas where the old patterns of life have been less subject to change. In urban areas, where the influences of modern life prevail and the atmosphere is more cosmopolitan, traditional Georgian patterns have become muted, although even in the largest urban areas the Georgian flavor of life continues to be manifest.

The average Georgian lives and works within a strongly patriarchal society. His personality traits are those usually ascribed to the Latin temperament, but his codes of conduct have

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been strongly affected by Persian and Turkish ways of life. Of a volatile nature, he tends to react violently if his honor seems threatened, but otherwise he is easygoing and hospitable. The male possesses a roving eye but jealously guards the purity of his own womenfolk. Generally an indifferent businessman, he has a great capacity for political intrigue. To the other peoples of the USSR, and particularly to the Russians who have been influenced by generations of novelists and poets, the Georgian is a romantic mountaineer with whom it is best to be on good terms--a fierce and proud man who is addicted to "light wines and dancing."

Native Minorities. Other ethnic groups in the Gruzinskaya SSR which are native to the Transcaucasus have an equal degree of cohesion. The Armenian minority is strongly attached to its traditions and is even more clannish than the Georgians. Possessing outstanding commercial talents, Armenians have predominated in this field for many years in the republic. Other groups consider them shrewd traders and tend to suspect their business methods. Armenians are found chiefly in the urban areas and in rural areas along the Georgian-Armenian border where the population has long consisted of mixed elements. Although the Georgian and Armenian social organizations are similar there has been relatively little assimilation of one group by the other.

The Azeri Turkic minority is composed principally of peasants who live chiefly in the Georgian-Azerbaijdzhanian border regions. They are Moslems and are culturally the most divergent of the major native groups. They usually maintain a social distance from the other groups who reinforce this differentiation by viewing them as a backward and rather inferior people. Minor groups such as the Abkhaz, Adzhar, and the Ossetes, which are indigenous to the

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republic, have equally long histories and strong attachments to native values.

The Great Russians. The principal agent of social change in Georgia has been the urban segment of the Great Russians. Prior to 1917 the Russians, as the ruling group, had a strong effect on the governmental organization; it has only been since the Revolution that their influence on the basic social structure has been important. Still relatively few in number and recently arrived (most have come since 1926), they hold a disproportionate number of positions of influence and power. Not only do they possess many of the skills essential to an economy which is in process of being industrialized but they represent the dominant element in the Soviet system. Many Russians tend to equate the Great Russian cultural heritage with Communist theory and practice despite the obvious differences, and are thus often able to minimize their personal conflicts with the Soviet system and, at the same time, to become strong advocates of the regime while remaining non-Communists. The cosmopolitan nature of their social organizations as well as the tacit support which they receive from the regime permits them to wield a disproportionate influence upon newly arrived natives in the cities where they are most numerous and where the industrial system they represent has taken firmer root.

The rural segment of the Great Russian group is far less significant than the urban although it has been established for almost a century. These people are largely the descendants of nineteenth century religious dissenters who settled at the direction of the Tsarist government in compact areas along the existing lines of communication. They, too, apparently benefit from the favoritism which the regime bestows upon Russians and tend to

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maintain a cultural distance from other groups, and on occasions have displayed open animosity toward the "natives."

The native groups are ambivalent in their attitude toward the Great Russians. The younger, more educated segment tends to emulate Russian ways but at the same time is most vociferous in its glorification of things Georgian, Armenian, or Azerbaydzhani. The older, more conservative element resents the threat which "Russian" innovations pose to the established social order and way of life.

2. Rural Society

The peoples of rural Georgia are predominantly of the peasant class. Although the continuity of many single settlements in rural areas has been destroyed during the numerous invasions of the country, for the most part these people have been domiciled in one place for centuries and the historical social institutions which have developed during their long occupation still persist to a great degree. Attempts by the Soviets during their relatively brief rule to refashion them have succeeded only in heightening existing tensions, thereby strengthening the forces for resistance to change.

The Rural Family. The family is the psychological and economic nucleus around which life revolves and, in view of the strong interpersonal relationships which are thus established, it is the social element most resistant to change. Since Georgia has always been predominantly a region of peasant agriculture, the usual form of familial organization for both Georgian and non-Georgian ethnic groups is the large patriarchal unit in which the chief authority is held by the senior male, unless age or illness events him from acting as head. Although the usual legal norms have never given him full ownership of the household property,

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historically he has always acted as the responsible representative of the family and has managed its activities.

Women in a patriarchal family usually play a subordinate role. While their status may be high, they are deprived of most substantive rights and have little influence except that which they may win individually by force of character. Thus, while Georgian and Armenian women may enjoy honored status as wives and mothers, they contribute nothing beyond physical labor to the conduct of family affairs. Among the Azeri Turks, women, as in other Moslem areas, enjoy neither high status nor position. Under the Soviet system, women are accorded equal legal rights. As members of collective farms, for example, they are freed from some of the traditional male control since pay is on a personal and not a family basis. Some women have even gained positions of formal control, such as brigadiers or farm chairmen, which makes them even less a part of the male-centered economic unit. Reports from other areas of the USSR with traditions similar to Georgia suggest that where women have chosen to exercise their legal rights, the family relationship has been seriously affected, socially as well as economically, and the usual relationship between man and wife has tended to become disorganized. Within Georgia this situation is probably particularly noteworthy in the richer agricultural areas, but in most areas of the republic, while women exercise their rights as wage earners, they tend to continue to accept the male dominance in the family organization.

In a peasant society such as rural Georgia's, children are viewed as a blessing, for, according to the proverb, "every mouth brings another pair of hands." This is particularly true of boys, for in all peasant groups in Georgia a daughter is viewed as a

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potential economic loss. The marriage of a daughter means that not only does a family lose a worker, but that it must pay the costs of a dowry and the wedding celebration. A son by his marriage can add a worker, items of household equipment, or livestock to the family unit. The traditional attitudes toward the value of children and their marriage have changed somewhat under the Soviets, but the essential features remain. Although the number of children per family has declined since the Revolution, the average Georgian rural family is still larger than the average Soviet family. And the average child in rural Georgia probably occupies a more central and prominent position in the family than does his Soviet counterpart.

In Georgia, as elsewhere, one of the greatest sources of conflict within the large patriarchal family is between the adult sons remaining at home and the patriarch who remains actively in charge of the household and its activities. The young adult males look forward to gaining their independence and establishing their own households, but are often frustrated by the continued domination of the father and the necessity of remaining within the parental household even after they have married and established families. Under the Soviets the economic position of young males has been strengthened through their payment on an individual rather than a family basis when they are members of collectives. It is reported, however, that on many farms payment of an individual's "shares" is made to the head of the family rather than to the individual. There also exists the possibility of employment away from home, particularly in cities, but this phenomenon is less prevalent in Georgia than elsewhere, and the number of sons remaining with the family is relatively larger here.

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The extended family units also tend to survive in rural Georgia, as do some remnants of clan and tribal organization which are found particularly in the more remote areas. Groups still retain a consciousness of a common descent and a certain mutuality of interests which unite them with regard to other persons who are beyond this network of relationships. Although the Soviet regime has sought to break these traditions, already weakened by the intrusion of a more commercialized and segmented way of life, they are not without influence, particularly in certain collective farm settings and they contribute to resistance to the social changes which are imposed by the regime.

Religious Beliefs. Religious belief is stronger among the rural section of the Georgian population than the urban. This rises from the conservative nature of the rural society as well as from the fact that Christianity as practised in Georgia has had the nature of an agricultural religion. Harsh measures undertaken by the government against the expression of religious beliefs and the propagandization of atheism have weakened but not destroyed the place of the Church in the life of the Georgian peasant.

Effects of the Collective Farm System. Perhaps the greatest threat to the traditional modes of Georgian peasant life has been the changed system of land tenure brought about by the imposition of the collective farm system. From the abolition of serfdom in the 1860s to the beginning of World War I, the system of land tenure in Georgia was in a state of flux. Although the landowning nobility retained the largest part of their estates, the peasants, seeking more than had been granted them on emancipation, gradually bought land or, more frequently, rented it at exorbitant

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rates. As a result, many succeeded in acquiring at least enough land on which to subsist and, in some cases, enough to produce a marketable surplus. Land hunger remained high, however, and during the period 1905-17 it was an influence inclining the Georgian peasantry to support the Menshevik (moderate) wing of the Social Democratic Party which had adopted local policies favoring a redistribution of land.

The overthrow of the Tsarist regime and the setting up of the Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) government in 1917 brought with it a reshaping of the land tenure system. A nationalization policy was adopted which, together with the economic decay of the landowning nobility, transferred the land into the hands of the peasants. Although specific instances of coercive action were absent, the final result in Georgia was similar to that in Soviet Russia, for in both areas small-scale peasant holdings replaced entirely the large semifeudal estates. The seizure of power by the Soviets in 1921 did not, therefore, bring an immediate substantial change in landholdings.

By the end of the 1920s agricultural production in Georgia seems to have returned to the level of the pre-1914 period and the peasant small-holding system appeared to be firmly established. In 1928, however, the regime, in pursuance of its plan for industrialization and an increase in all forms of production, began to bring the peasants into collective farms. When persuasion failed, force was used. Not only were the peasants required to join, but they had to surrender all of their real and substantial amounts of their personal property to the collective. Ostensibly controlled by their members, the collectives were in reality subject to agents of the state and were forced to follow state plans for types of crops and

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systems of management. Discontent over this policy was great, and in some cases was expressed in terms of open violence. These instances, however, do not seem to have been as numerous in Georgia as in other parts of the USSR, especially since collectivization was a more gradual process in this republic than in other areas.

One major concession made to the peasants' desire to retain control of their land involved the granting to each peasant household a private plot, usually about one acre, on which small livestock could be pastured and fruit and vegetables could be grown. Although these plots were intended only to supplement the receipts from the collective farm, it soon became evident that much of the peasant income, whether in produce or money, was based on these plots, and a lively system of free-market trading in household produce developed as one of the primary sources of food in urban settlements.

In addition to the influence of the delay in collectivization and the granting of private plots, the Georgian peasant seems to have been somewhat appeased by the fact that new crops, such as tea and citrus fruits, or the expanded planting of old ones, such as grapes and tobacco, began to return considerable sums of money, at least to a few regions of the republic. This meant that a number of peasants began to find unsuspected advantages in the collective system, and their economic difference with the regime dwindled. Such factors undoubtedly contributed during World War II to keeping Georgia comparatively free from disturbances and antiregime manifestations.

These economic benefits did not extend to all regions, however, for the remote mountain areas and those with an economy based on the raising of livestock do not seem to have been affected. Nor

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did all cultural differences between the peasants and the regime disappear. Discontent continued to exist in Georgia as even the most prosperous of peasants retained a feeling that in some ways the system crossed the boundaries of what he had been taught was right or proper. As a result, the regime still is faced with the task of winning complete support for its policies among the rural population of the republic against the strong resistance of a society which, because of economic disadvantage or cultural tradition has remained faithful, at least in part, to other standards.

3. Urban Society

In contrast to the stable, conservative, intensely local society of rural Georgia, with its strong attachment to land and family, Georgian urban society is a fluid structure, in transition from the traditional rural customs of its indigenous in-migrants to modes common to other Soviet urban areas and to other rapidly industrializing areas the world over. Established social modes which are peculiar to urban Georgia are chiefly the result of differences in the cultural heritages of the various segments of the urban population, and to a great extent reflect the introduction of new ethnic elements at various periods of Georgia's long history.

Historical Development of Urban Centers. Many of Georgia's cities are old trading and administrative centers, some dating back to the early fourth century. Truly native centers, they were ruled by Georgians and displayed an ethnic homogeneity which persisted until the beginning of the fourth century despite the introduction of Moslem cultural elements during the repeated invasion by the Turks and Persians. Only in the field of commerce and trade did non-Georgians predominate: merchants, then as now, were generally Armenians.

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Not until the first quarter of the nineteenth century did the ethnic character of the urban centers begin to reflect Russian influence. Although a few of the incoming Russian group were workers and tradesmen, in general, they replaced the Georgian ruling class. Since administrative power was in Russian hands and much of the economy was controlled by Armenians, Georgians found themselves increasingly excluded from positions of influence or profit. Economic development during this period was frequently obstructed by restrictions placed on industry in the area in favor of central Russian enterprises. Gradually, the newer urban centers became alien islands in the Georgian countryside. Tiflis (Tbilisi), the seat of the Viceroy of the Transcaucasus, was considered especially alien in nature, and much of Georgian cultural life centered around Kutaisi, which was considered more Georgian than any other city. Since Tiflis was the economic and administrative center of the country, however, the Georgians were forced to turn to it for many services not otherwise available.

World War II added to the Armenian population as many Armenians of Turkish nationality fled into Russian-held areas to escape Turkish action. They tended to concentrate in urban areas where fellow nationals already lived and at the economic and transportation centers. As the Georgian and Armenian republics each sought to assure its own nationality in the postwar period, tension increased as the Armenians in Georgia were considered an alien and dangerous element.

After the Bolshevik seizure of power, Georgia's cities became even less native in character. Although the growing need for labor brought many ethnic Georgians to urban areas, alien predominance continued as the Soviets increased their control and added

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to the number of Russians in the ruling class.

Ethnic Georgians, although still the largest urban group, now constitute considerably less than half the urban population. The Armenians remain the largest minority, followed closely by the Slavic group--the Great Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians--among whom the natives make little differentiation, and a number of smaller, unimportant nationalities such as the Azeri Turks, Ossetes, and Kurds.

Urban Social Relationships. In any urban society, family, social and work relationships are markedly different from those of rural society and, of necessity, habits and values must be constantly changed and adapted. Instead of the strongly defined marital system of rural society, which limits the choice of partners and assigns a fairly rigid postmarital role to each, the urban system offers a broader choice and after marriage the status of man and woman is not so clearly defined. Traditional male control of the family is lessened, although cultural patterns may foster attempts to re-establish the patriarchal system. For the woman, urban life often eliminates many traditional tasks of housekeeping and child rearing, freeing her for outside work.

The relationship of the child to family in urban society also reflects the profound differences between urban and rural life. The child is often considered an economic burden, for his rearing demands time and money for which he provides no immediate recompense as, in part, he may contribute in rural areas where even young children are set to minding the farm animals or weeding the crop. His schooling, which must be maintained if the industrial society is to continue, is expensive and often provides channels of indoctrination contrary to parental ideas. Parental control is

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further weakened by the larger variety of activities offered children of an urban society.

The ties of kinship in the urban family are usually much weaker than in rural society. The aged are less respected for there is little place for them. Life, in general, is oriented toward the wage-earning job and old people have little usefulness in the urban industrial society. Ties with members of the kin group beyond the immediate family are also lessened through the indirect, rather than direct, or face-to-face, relationships of individuals in the urban community.

In work situations, also, attitudes are demanded which tend to negate the unity found in the rural family. In place of the unregimented work of peasant agriculture, carried on by small family groups, there is a controlled system of mass operations in which workers are united only by the job and beyond which they need have no relationship. The urban worker usually has less interest in the product of his labor than has the peasant, for his return is in the form of wages which are usually paid for a single mechanized activity, rather than in profits from an integrated nonmechanical activity. The rise of Georgian industry since 1930 has had a marked influence in this direction.

Religion in Urban Society. Beyond the areas of family and economic activity are other areas in which the necessity for change and adaptation are at least as great. This is particularly true of religion, for Christianity as it developed in Georgia was oriented toward agriculture. Its cycle of festivals and its list of saints reflected the peasant's desire to secure a formal blessing of the yearly round of his labors. In urban life much of this need does not seem relevant and the regime fosters this feeling

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by its propaganda and by objective measures designed to interfere with organized worship. The little information that refers specifically to urban religion in Georgia indicates a great drop in church attendance and probably, therefore, also in religious feeling. The three most important groups of Georgia's urban population are adherents of different forms of Christianity which may have caused sectarian feeling and affected the attitude to worship. Although both the Russians and Georgians are members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, there are important differences in their rituals and languages of service. The Georgians have an historical resentment of the Russian Church, which controlled the Georgian sees during the period 1801-1917. The Armenians, as adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church, are considered heretics by the two other groups.

The traditional Georgian rural hospitality has no place in its cities, for a different attitude toward strangers and newcomers must be assumed. Personal and vocational relationships tend to be segmental in nature, without deep interpersonal communication. A superficiality of outlook and a craving for novelty is occasioned by the more rapid flow of events in the city. Class relationships are also less stable in contrast to the less mobile rural situation.

B. Socioeconomic Groups¹

According to Soviet dogma, there are only two classes in Soviet society—the workers and the peasants—plus a common social stratum

¹Much of this discussion of Georgian classes is based on the known characteristics of Soviet society as modified by local factors. Since no field studies or unbiased reports are available, Soviet data has been carefully interpreted. The quantitative estimates are based on Soviet data for 1955 and 1956 on educational and health workers, persons with higher education, and workers and employees and on the reported distribution of groups within these categories available for previous years. The proportional distribution of the Georgian peoples within these categories is probably similar to the distribution in other areas with like historical backgrounds; the

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consisting of the administrative, white-collar, and professional groups (usually called the intelligentsia). And, although by Marxist definition the workers and peasants represent two separate classes, they are considered nonantagonistic as a result of their supposed common devotion to the goal of building a communistic society under the leadership of the Communist Party. Officially, their only difference lies in their relationship to production: the peasants theoretically retain partial ownership of collective farm property and a right to share in profits which the workers are denied. Inevitably, however, clashes of interest arise, and when publicly recognized are usually blamed on an atypical, individual "survival of capitalism." The official propaganda system continues to emphasize the concept of unity, however, and, in addition, attempts to stress harmony between local and national interests.

In Georgia, the division of functions and interests of the population has created a socioeconomic system, which although of a class nature has little relation to the official Soviet definition. Its structure is roughly pyramidal, with the three major classes, or groups, forming the pyramid (see Table 61). At the apex is the smallest but most influential class--the elite, who occupy the positions of power and prestige with their accompanying substantial economic returns; at the base are the peasants--greatest in numbers but having the lowest social and economic status. Each of the groups has certain interests which are not shared by the others;

¹(Continued)

estimated distribution within Georgia is also in general accord with the known distribution of such categories in the USSR as a whole.

The estimates refer only to the active population of the republic and do not show the distribution of membership by families. It should not be assumed that class membership among the population as a whole could be distributed in this manner since there are variations among classes in the size of families and in the number of persons per family who are counted in the active population.

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Table 61

Socioeconomic Stratification in the Gruzinskaya SSR: 1957

<u>Group</u>	<u>Number (in Thousands)</u>	<u>Per Cent of Population</u>	<u>Per Cent of Group Total</u>
Elite	50	1.2	2.3
Secondary adminis- trative	210	5.2	9.7
Professional	80	2.0	3.7
Subprofessional	70	1.7	3.2
Military rank and file	50	1.3	2.3
Workers	480	11.8	22.2
Peasants	1130	27.7	52.4
Others (incl. forced laborers)	<u>90</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Total	2160	53.0	100.0

they have common values which must be defended or they seek common advantages. Class solidarity is substantial and although individual differences undoubtedly exist, it is possible to determine in broad outline the place of each group in society and to forecast the general degree of attachment to or detachment from the system.

1. The Elite

The elite in Georgia is approximately equivalent to the republic's primary control force. It is an influential body, for as the local agent of the Soviet system it assures the functioning of the system. Occupying the central positions of power and prestige in the Party, its 50,000 members include the paid workers of the Communist Party, the employees of governmental administrative agencies, and commissioned officers of the armed forces, as well as a few highly paid individuals such as scientists, writers, and artists. The economic return to the group as a whole is much higher than to the rest of the population and is accompanied by many possibilities for personal economic and social advantages. The

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ethnic composition of the known components of the group (the Council of Ministers, the republic Supreme Soviet, and the Party Central Committee) is overwhelmingly Georgian, and although that of the group as a whole is not known it is also probably predominantly Georgian.

Viewed against the background of the Soviet Union, the elite in Georgia is a minor part of a large body and as such is closely supervised by the USSR authorities to assure conformity with All-Union plans and policies. Reportedly, this supervision has increased since the death of Stalin and the execution of Beria, probably in an effort to offset to some degree the favors and privileges granted Georgia and, particularly, Georgia's elite, by these native sons.

This loss of favor has probably narrowed the separation of the elite from the rest of the population which was not as large as elsewhere in the Soviet Union due to the ethnic homogeneity of the two groups. The recent assignment to the republic of sizable components of the armed forces which are overwhelmingly of other nationalities may be an attempt by the regime to discourage any expression of unified sentiment through undesirable forms of inter-class cooperation; the attempt to dilute nationalist tendencies of the elite by introducing a large non-Georgian element is implicit.

Members of the elite have frequently been attacked for their attitude of "semeistvennost," which may be roughly defined as clannishness strongly inclined toward nepotism. This attitude reportedly has had a strong influence on the Georgian elite, and has probably been a major factor in the development of a strong class consciousness.

The elite has achieved its favored position through the Soviet system, and as long as the system continues to provide

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advantages the group as a whole will remain loyal. Their power and prestige will probably not be lessened by deviations of individual members, although internal dissension may result in shifts in the relative positions of the civil, military, and Party components from time to time.

2. The Secondary Administrative Class

The secondary administrative class, estimated to total 210,000 in Georgia, is responsible for the operational control of the republic economy. It includes collective farm and factory administrators, supervisory workers in the trade system, certain utility and service workers, and the noncommissioned components of the armed forces. Although its rank is lower than that of the elite, in comparison with the majority of the population, it has privileged status. The favorable position of its members is suggested by the many accusations of the misuse of the control of allotment of scarce goods for their personal benefit. The ethnic composition of this group is predominantly Georgian. Specific exceptions are found in the trade system, where large numbers of Armenians are reportedly concentrated, in the armed forces, and in some economic enterprises whose managers have been transferred from other regions.

This group is under continual pressure to fulfill the goals set for the trade and economic institutions under its control. If successful, its methods are not questioned, although penalties for failure may be harsh. Its members are continually harassed by the realization that although many of the production quotas are unrealistic, if they do not meet demands they will be punished. One common action of the government in such cases is to relieve economic managers of their posts, and chairmen of collective farms or factory managers are frequently replaced. Members often enter into

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patronage relationships with persons whose influence might be used to ward off possible punishment. Group consciousness is high, for members are bound together by a network of favors granted or hoped for which restricts access from other classes. Members are often accused of preoccupation with the enhancement of their careers and accompanying privileges.

Other groups lower down on the socioeconomic scale reportedly resent the manipulative practices of the secondary administrative class, and as their discontent can have no possible overt outlet, it is channeled into grumbling purposeful inefficiency or passive noncompliance. Some observers feel that the discontent of these lower groups and their failure to fulfill quotas is largely based on such feelings. And since to many the secondary administrators personify the system, they become the object of resentment which is actually directed toward the regime as a whole. The higher authorities have used this to relieve social pressures and many of the secondary administrators have been made scapegoats for the faults of the system.

The feeling against this class may be less harsh in Georgia than in other areas of the USSR because of common ethnic background and certain shared national traits. Members of other groups may also have adopted and assimilated its modes of thought and patterns of action, thus creating a unifying factor, in an attempt to move upward to greater economic and social advantages.

In general, the secondary administrative class, in spite of the harsh and capricious controls to which it is subjected, tends to be thoroughly integrated into the existing system and probably will not adopt an attitude of opposition. Its members have been trained to the existing order from which they have

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received or hope to receive favored status, and only a grave crisis, threatening the very foundations of their class, would detach them.

3. The Professional Class

The professional class in Georgia totals an estimated 80,000. It includes all those with university educations--teachers with a higher education, physicians, engineers, agricultural specialists, and students in institutions of higher education. Their status is comparatively high, since the regime places great emphasis on education and the increase of skills, but the economic return is reportedly low, particularly for physicians and teachers. The proportion of women in this group is high, as about 75 per cent of the republic's physicians and many of its teachers are women. There is no indication that any sizable number of persons of non-Georgian background are included.

By virtue of their skills and education the members of this class contribute a number of essential services to the regime and, in return, receive some rewards. This is particularly true of the engineers and scientists; the physicians and teachers, whose services are judged of lesser importance since they do not contribute directly to production, are not so favored. It is felt that the physicians may grant too much sick leave, thus interfering with industrial and agricultural operations, and that teachers, particularly of the humanities, may introduce subversive ideas. The regime attempts to guard against such possibilities by carefully controlling working methods, by limiting the proportion of workers who may be granted sick leave, by surveillance of classroom teaching, and, particularly, by careful indoctrination of university students who represent the replacements for this group. The demonstrations of the students of Tbilisi's higher educational institutions

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in March 1956, however, suggest that control is probably not entirely successful.

Several methods have been used to reduce this concentration of possible opposition among the professional group. The summer of 1956 saw a heightening of the propaganda activities of the regime as new people were placed in the responsible posts dealing with public opinion in the Party and Komsomol. The control of university teaching and research has also been strengthened, while the admission of students to universities is now more than ever contingent upon the "proper" views they hold. Efforts have also been made to increase the effectiveness of the program under which graduates of higher educational institutions are assigned to posts outside or in peripheral areas of the republic. This program has also not been entirely successful, for it has been reported that two-thirds to three-quarters of the graduates have avoided accepting their assigned posts and have obtained more desirable assignments through personal or family connections. This latter circumstance may account for the large proportion of persons with a higher education among the Georgian teaching force.

The professional class, by virtue of its past experience and the intellectual tone of its occupations will undoubtedly continue to be the most influential reservoir of antiregime thought in Georgia. The attachment of its members to the regime will never be as great as that of the two higher classes for, in addition to their economic disadvantages, their intellectual discontent will serve as a basis for possible cleavage.

4. The Subprofessional Class

The 70,000 members of Georgia's subprofessional class include teachers with training below university level, technologists,

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agricultural specialists and others with the equivalent of a technical high school education, and students in secondary technical schools. Their function as a group is chiefly operational, for they provide skilled services to the republic. Although their prestige is not as high as that of the professionals, the occupations of this group are favored over manual labor and economic returns are slightly higher. The pay of teachers in this group, however, is extremely low, often below that of a skilled laborer. The ethnic composition probably corresponds with that of the republic as a whole, with large non-Georgian components found only in urban areas.

Of all groups this one probably is in closest conformity with the general population, for its members tend to accept the values and premises of the groups with which they have closest contact. Some of the intellectual tendencies found among the professionals, however, are probably current among the subprofessional teachers, who are usually supervised by university-trained persons; by virtue of slight administrative functions, a few others may also tend to conform to other higher classes.

The subprofessional class does not have the individual stimuli for cleavage which exists among the professionals, and tendencies toward deviation from regime-approved attitudes probably arise only from discontent engendered by economic or work conditions. Support for the regime is probably based on the relatively favorable economic status of a few of the components of this group as well as upon individual chances of upward mobility.

In addition to those who have subprofessional training, this group includes an undetermined number of praktikanty, or persons with on-the-job training. In the mid-1930s it was reported

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that more than 40 per cent of all Soviet technical workers were in this class, but the marked extension of educational opportunities has since reduced the need for using persons without formal training.

5. The Military Rank and File

Enlisted personnel of the armed forces stationed in Georgia--soldiers, sailors, and airmen--are estimated to total 50,000. They represent the final argument of Soviet control in the republic and, since they are overwhelmingly non-Georgian in origin, their presence is considered an affront by many Georgians. Incidents reported between members of the armed forces and the local population indicate that the petty frictions common between troops and civil populations in other parts of the world are heightened in Georgia by the nationalism of its people. The military stationed in the republic have little to do with the general population, and this isolation is furthered as much as possible by the regime.

Enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces are predominantly conscripts, and their attitude toward service is not that of the career serviceman, for their general orientation is toward the preservice or postservice periods. Pay is low for the Soviet common soldier and privileges are few, especially in Georgia where there are reports of units being confined to camp in order to avoid clashes with the populace.

Military service provides an unequalled opportunity for Soviet indoctrination, and the regime devotes a disproportionate amount of time, by U.S. standards, to indoctrination, as opposed to actual military training. To help counter those circumstances which might tend to detach the serviceman from full devotion to the system, the Soviets attempt to foster a patriotic attitude, which

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apparently is most successful among the Great Russians who are proud of the regime and its power. To many, service in the armed forces also offers a chance for travel and education which would otherwise not be available.

In view of the special characteristics of Georgia, the regime has probably been careful to insure as high a degree of reliability as possible among enlisted men in Georgia by developing these feelings and, perhaps, by granting special material favors such as additional goods and services. The presence of a substantial number of armed forces in Georgia assures control by the Soviets, and the personal attitude of the enlisted man is not likely to affect this control unless the whole system of command, indoctrination, and supply breaks down as it did during the period 1914-17.

6. The Workers

The wage-earning class, or workers (which includes members of producers cooperatives) is estimated to total 480,000. Although predominantly urban in character it includes 28,000 employed in MTS, 39,400 sovkhos workers, and 12,300 forestry workers. The largest part, however, probably comprises semiskilled workers in industry, although it is impossible to make even an approximate enumeration of this group. The ethnic composition of this class probably reflects the high proportion of non-Georgians in urban areas; the proportion of women in both rural and urban areas is probably also high.

The social status and economic rewards accorded this class reflect the standing of its subgroups, which range from highly skilled workers through minor clerical personnel to common laborers. In general, the wage earner is at a greater economic and social disadvantage than any other group. He suffers from his position

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at the bottom of the chain of command and from the fact that there are no organized means through which he might voice his objections. His wages are low in relation to prices, and the piecework system under which he usually works often drives him either to speedups or to falsification of output records. Living conditions for those at the bottom of the income scale are extremely difficult, since housing is scarce and expensive and the supply of consumers' goods is often faulty.

There are some alleviating factors, however. Education, which provides the chief means of social and financial advancement, is more readily available in the cities; some public services and entertainment activities are also more accessible. Certain material rewards may also be earned by those workers who manage to fulfill their work norms. And some workers possibly achieve a sense of identification with the regime on the basis of its purported working-class orientation.

The basic situation of the wage earner remains a difficult one, however, and he presumably feels certain resentments toward the system which directs his life yet prevents complete integration. Since concerted expression of these sentiments is impossible except through word-of-mouth communication, extreme differences among the various subgroups of this class probably exist. These differences might be important determinants of events in times of crisis.

7. The Peasants

Peasants in Georgia number approximately 1,130,000. With the exception of about 7000 who are engaged in the cultivation of garden plots, the peasants are the active workers on the collective farms. Except in a few areas which are predominantly settled by other nationalities, they are probably overwhelmingly Georgian.

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Their status in an economy which is increasingly industrialized and urbanized is low, although the prosperity of certain sectors of Georgian agriculture has perhaps alleviated this to some degree. The average rural income of the republic is undoubtedly higher than the USSR average, however, for 24 per cent of Georgian collective farms have annual incomes of at least one million rubles as compared with ten per cent in the USSR as a whole. The distribution of income is uneven, with the peasants in the less productive regions, particularly those in mountainous areas or areas devoted to stock raising, at the bottom of the income scale.

The regime tends to distrust the peasants, suspecting them, and probably justifiably, of wishing to abolish the collective farms and return to private farming. Investigations among refugees indicate that this feeling is widespread in other parts of the USSR and although specific confirmation is lacking, it probably also exists in Georgia. The peasant also retains cultural traditions and customs which are at odds with the highly regulated and consciously productive type of activity the regime wishes to foster.

The regime unsuccessfully attempts to overcome peasant distrust through a system of rewards for high agricultural productivity and propaganda campaigns designed to promote acceptance of the system's standards. The peasant, however, continues to feel that the economic system cheats him, for it takes at low prices his farm products yet charges him exorbitant rates for those things he must purchase. He is further thwarted by the fact that although he ostensibly controls the collective farm, actually the collectives are subordinate to agencies of the government.

The standards of living in the peasant areas of Georgia vary with the returns to each area for its products. The incomes

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of those rayons in which the high-income crops of tea, citrus fruits, and grapes are produced are substantially above the USSR average. More remote rayons--those devoted to general agriculture or stock raising--are less favored. In all areas, however, the supply of consumers' goods is probably faulty, partly because of mismanagement of the trade network and partly because of insufficient production. Trade outlets in remote parts of the republic are frequently without supplies of salt, kerosene, matches, or hardware, suggesting that trade is limited to the bare necessities in many areas and that the purchasing power of the peasants is low.

Education, health, and other public services are less readily available in the republic's rural areas than in its cities. Transportation, particularly in the areas removed from the rail lines, is hampered not only by the terrain but also by the lack of facilities.

These many deficiencies and inadequacies have slowed the integration of Georgia's rural areas into the Soviet system and have helped preserve the cultural traditions of the Georgian peasant and, through him, of the Georgian nation. These tendencies toward loss of cohesion will increase in importance in any circumstances in which the physical control of the regime is weakened.

8. Others (Including Forced Laborers)

The largest group in this category are the forced laborers who in 1957 totaled an estimated 80,000. The remainder includes a few persons working as domestics, occasional laborers on collective farms, and casual labor in cities.

The forced laborer is at the bottom of the Soviet class pyramid. He is deprived even of the limited freedom of movement of the peasant, and he must work under harsh conditions with no

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pay. His experiences make him less apt to support the Soviet system, although some forced laborers reportedly attempt by overconformity and zealous work to win the mitigation of their sentences and possible rehabilitation. The regime's policy of sending long-term prisoners to remote areas has probably tended to remove prisoners from Georgia, although the construction of hydroelectric stations and drainage and irrigation projects, known to be in progress along the lower reaches of the Rion River, has customarily been carried on by forced labor.

Controls over the forced laborer are too severe to allow overt resentment. This group is in no position to affect the course of public opinion or even to attempt its own freedom. There may be individual instances of strikes or restlessness, but since this group is so strictly segregated these are not likely to spread.

The other groups, although allowed formal liberty as the Soviets define the term, are engaged in work of low status and are at an economic disadvantage. Except for crisis situations, they are necessarily so preoccupied with daily life and its hardships that they have little tendency toward antiregime views.

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C. Nationalism in the Gruzinskaya SSR

Two dominant forms of nationalism are found in the Gruzinskaya SSR: Soviet "patriotism," the officially sponsored doctrine emphasizing the unitary nature of the USSR and the overriding allegiance owed the regime by Soviet citizens, and local nationalism, which is based on Georgian history and traditions. The years since the Soviet seizure of power in 1921 have seen a continuing struggle between Soviet ideology—an alien point of view—and the Georgian's devotion to Georgian interests and Georgian unity. Despite the major events of this period, however, the basic nationalism of the people has not been overcome. Clear evidence of this is found in the continuing resistance of both peasants and intellectuals, manifested in acts of resistance to collectivization, politically tinged incidents of banditry in the postwar years, and, most striking of all, the Tbilisi riots in March 1956 under the leadership of university students. The regime has made certain concessions to nationalist feelings in the past and, in effect, has even encouraged them. The recently initiated Georgian Council of the National Economy, by its policy of decentralizing the control of industry, will probably also have the effect of strengthening economic nationalism and may even result in the acceptance and practice of some form of localism by the economic managerial group. Georgian particularism will probably continue, although the basis for its support and its means of expression will undoubtedly change with the times.

1. Soviet Patriotism

Soviet patriotism is defined as the "boundless devotion of Soviet people to the Soviet social and state structure... one of the motive forces in the development of the Soviet socialist society." Zealously propagated in Georgia as throughout the USSR as an

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antidote to "bourgeois nationalism," to which a derogatory connotation has been given by the Communists, it finds supporters among all Soviet groups, but particularly among the Party, government, and managerial groups for whom it represents a set of values of possible personal use. Not all supporters are insincere in their use of this ideology to justify the existing order, but since in spite of formal disclaimers it reflects many cultural assumptions which are Great Russian in origin, the non-Russian and particularly the non-Slavic groups are probably less active exponents.

Although the term "Soviet patriotism" did not appear until the mid-1930s, and although until that time the official ideology tended to support a purportedly "internationalist" point of view, it has always been the Communist belief that loyalty to the USSR should override all local, and therefore lesser, loyalties. By 1945 it became clear that this loyalty should also include a firm devotion to Great Russian culture and a recognition of the primacy of that nationality in the USSR. It has given rise to such phenomena as the forced adoption of Russian words by minority languages, despite the existence of suitable native expressions and has also given rise to a tendency of some among these peoples to consider both Great Russian culture and the Soviet state as alien forces which should be resisted.

Soviet patriotism, therefore, has created both supporters and enemies among the national groups of Georgia. Although some persons may favor the ideology on one ground and deny it on another, there is often a class differentiation, with the peasants and some intellectuals in opposition, while the Party and managerial groups at least mimic support.

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2. Local Nationalism

Local nationalism, which is strong in the Gruzinskaya SSR, is the tradition based on an attachment to local cultural patterns and heritage. In Georgia this feeling is particularly deep rooted, for its people are strongly conscious of their long history and high culture. They have common reactions to the major events of life and respond in similar ways to current events, resisting firmly any attempt to force them to conform to other modes. Although this common form of response is basic to the Georgian nation, there may be deviant personalities who deny some part of the tradition, just as there are class differentiations in manner or type of nationalist feelings.

Of the several national groups in Georgia, the ethnic Georgians are the most important, for as the majority, they set the pattern of social life. And among the Georgians, the two classes which have been the firmest exponents of nationalism are the peasants and the intellectuals. The peasants represent the traditional way of life, least touched by other influences, while the intellectuals, trained in the manipulation of symbols, are those who can best adapt the values of the past to fit the new situations imposed by history.

3. Minority Nationalism

Nationalism is also found among minority groups of the population. The most important native groups are the Armenians and the Azeri, whose nationalism is undoubtedly strengthened by the close proximity of the Armenian and Azerbaydzhanian SSRs; both presumably feel a greater kindred attachment to the Armenian and Azerbaydzhanian SSRs than to Georgia as a political unit. Both groups have strong cultural traditions which have been highly resistant to centuries of

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attack by various invaders. The Armenians, in spite of their fervent attachment to their well-developed culture and their historic Christian church, fear detachment from the Soviet Union because of their past experience with the Turks. The Azeri, who are Moslem and have the characteristic devotion to Islam and its patterns of life, in the period 1917-21 showed some Turkophile leanings. Both groups are at variance with the Georgians who tend to dislike the Armenians as sharp traders and who look down upon the predominantly rural and supposedly backward Azeri.

The comparatively small and isolated Ossetian and Abkhaz groups have a cultural and territorial unity which entitles them to be called nations. During most of their histories they have been dominated by the Georgian state, a phenomenon which continues even to the present, as witness the press criticism after the disturbances in Tbilisi in March 1956 that Georgia had thwarted their cultural activities. This animosity probably inclines them to favor Russian domination as freeing them from specific, more distasteful forms of subordination. There are also certain kinship ties with other groups, particularly with the Ossetes in Georgia and those in the Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR of the RSFSR, but this does not reinforce their role in Georgian affairs.

One group, the Adzhars, is Georgian ethnically and linguistically but Moslem in religion. Although this has involved some separation from the bulk of the population, very little is known of their attitude toward the Russians, the Georgians, or the neighboring Moslem Turks.

Additional small groups such as the Kurds, Aisors (Assyrians), and Greeks, although representing kindred bodies which are often highly nationalistic, are so intermingled with the general population

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and so disunited that nothing of value can be deduced about their relationship to the Soviet system or to any other political body.

The major non-Caucasian ethnic group is the Russian. The few Ukrainians and Belorussians living in Georgia tend to follow Russian practices and, in any case, the local population makes little distinction among them. They include old settlers, chiefly religious dissenters placed in Georgia by the Tsars, and more recent arrivals, chiefly urban workers and administrators. There are, therefore, certain internal differences within the Russian group, for some continue to represent the agrarian, peasant tradition of old Russia and others, Communism and the new urban, industrial ways. Although they may all be presumed to be nationalistic in outlook, not all can be considered consistent supporters of "Soviet patriotism," especially on points which contradict long-standing cultural assumptions. In most cases, they may be expected to agree with one another more than with the Georgians or other ethnic groups, even over the most controversial of questions.

4. The Development of Soviet Patriotism and its Effect on Georgian Nationalism

Soviet Seizure and Consolidation of Power, 1921-28. The Georgian Republic, which the Soviets seized in 1921, had been trying since 1917 to organize an independent national existence under a moderate Socialist Democratic government. Popular support seems to have been substantial in spite of the economic and political difficulties which the republic faced. Even among the comparatively small number of Bolsheviks in Georgia there was a prevailing sentiment in favor of a large degree of autonomy and the development of some form of what has since been called "national communism."

After Soviet seizure of power it became clear that those in control did not favor as great a degree of autonomy or as many

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variations within the framework of Communist ideology as had been expected. The thin ranks of the Communist Party were purged immediately to free them of the unreliaables and possible deviationists, and a large number of Russian Communists were placed in administrative posts since trustworthy natives were not available. Georgia was even deprived of certain rights to control the local currency, railroads, or passage over its borders. There were some among the Communists, however, who disputed the wisdom of Soviet nationality policies, favoring instead a wider liberty for local action. These few, however, were overruled and had to acquiesce to Georgia's subordinate position.

The populace as a whole remained attached to Georgian nationalist views. Support was still strong for the outlawed Social Democratic Party which, through its underground organization and in cooperation with the remnants of other parties and of the landowning and noble classes, organized an insurrection in August 1924. Although it suffered immediate defeat, it was clear that the population had hoped for its success. For this reason, the Soviets probably refrained from the harsher forms of retaliation. As compared with later practices, the regime was surprisingly lenient and many persons, who might have been accused of complicity or sympathy with the revolt, retained a measure of liberty.

The Economic Integration of Georgia into the USSR. Originally concerned with the political integration of Georgia into the USSR, after 1928 the Soviets concentrated on economic policies; and their plans in this field had social and political consequences which contributed to new forms of nationalist feeling.

The most important economic change at this time was the suppression of independent peasant agriculture and a sweeping

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substitution in 1929-30 of a network of ostensibly cooperative, but actually state-controlled, collective farms. This change attacked the economic basis of peasant life and deprived the agricultural population of their lands and their right to manage their own affairs. Reaction was sharp, as the peasant, whether by open violence or covert resistance, sought to protest against the destruction of their habitual patterns. One phenomenon of this process was an increase in a nationalistic type of expression, particularly as the peasants began to consider Communism and collectivization as a Russian-managed system, not applicable to the local situation. Open violence was frequent as they sought to defend the economic basis of their national life. This was true although Georgia, among all the Soviet republics, was collectivized more slowly than any other Soviet republic, so that by 1935 only 44.7 per cent of the land was in collectives as compared with 94.1 per cent in the USSR as a whole.

A second change came with the rapid industrialization which followed the adoption in 1928 of the First Five-Year Plan. This made the factory and its system of labor important and introduced a new group of persons, mostly of Russian origin, as managers. The influence of the ethnic Georgian urban group, already small considering the predominantly non-Georgian city population, declined. The consequent social dislocations probably sharpened the marked antagonism already existing between national groups in the urban population, but it is not known whether there were overt physical manifestations.

Consolidation of the Soviet Position. The USSR Communist Party began in 1933 a purge of its membership to eliminate known or possible deviationists. This procedure was particularly

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directed against the members of minority groups who had leanings toward local national autonomy; and Georgia, a center of such tendencies, was evidently one of the focal points in this process. A number of trials of prominent Georgian Communists were held to impress the public, in which the charges were evidently based on the attitudes of the accused at the time of the XII Party Congress more than a decade before. Others were accused and tried by the secret police or arrested and sentenced through administrative procedures which made no pretense to judicial form. In Georgia as in many other minority areas the charges all revolved around the question of nationalism. Even when persons were charged with specific crimes of sabotage, murder, or fraud, it was alleged they acted from nationalist motives:

The process of purge, investigation, and imprisonment reached such a peak in 1938 and involved such a large part of society that if social cohesion were to remain, the regime had to end a self-defeating series of acts. In 1938 Yezhov, the head of the NKVD, was discharged and Beria, a native Georgian, was appointed to his place. This gave rise to some hopes among the public that Georgia's position in the USSR would be improved because of the vast power wielded by a native who not only was head of the secret police but was also one of the leaders of the Communist Party of the USSR.

Even before Beria's appointment, however, there had been some changes which were interpreted as concessions to local sentiments. In practice, however, these changes had little real effect and did almost nothing to alter Georgia's subordinate position, although for a time they were effective sops to public opinion.

The slow tempo of collectivization in the republic had the

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effect of lessening peasant discontent as well as of helping the republic avoid the effects of the famine and mass slaughter of livestock which took place elsewhere. Furthermore, most of the land in Georgia was not collectivized until after the rules governing the kolkhoz system were clarified, and many peasant families thus had the legal use of a household plot from which they could sell produce. And by the mid-1930s, some of the new crops such as tea and citrus fruits had begun to prove such good sources of income that in some areas the peasants were at least partially reconciled to the kolkhoz. As a result, reactions to the new economic system, which might have taken a nationalist or at least a xenophobic direction, were muted and peasant antagonism to the regime was not as sharp as in other regions.

World War II. During World War II, the population of Georgia seems to have remained loyal to the Soviet Union. The workers and peasants proved effective laborers, as far as the general economic situation permitted, and the vast majority of those drafted to the armed forces were trustworthy. As western USSR was invaded and its industrial capacity destroyed, Georgia's economic importance increased, for the republic re-established within its boundaries many industries evacuated from the invaded areas. Georgia's part in the political life of the Soviet Union also grew.

The comparative prosperity of the republic undoubtedly did much to assure loyalty to the regime during the late summer and early fall of 1942 when German forces swept through the northern foothills of the Caucasus Mountains to the boundaries of Georgia. There were, however, some instances of defection to the German among Georgians who were taken prisoner and some attempts were made

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to use these men as anti-Communist soldiers. A few disorders may also have occurred within the republic.

Any attempts to win Georgia to the regime were doomed to failure as the war began to turn in the Soviets' favor and as the republic was more completely absorbed into the regime's political and economic system.

1945-53. Immediately following the war it became evident that the regime was intent upon increasing Soviet power as a basis for its program of diplomatic expansion, and that the various national regions could not expect any concessions to their local sentiments which would interfere in any way with this process. The official propaganda agencies continued their praise of Stalin, begun during the war, and although his nationality was recognized he was treated as a Soviet rather than as a Georgian leader. Nevertheless, Georgians undoubtedly had some pride in his accomplishments.

Beria, the Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, was actually the more influential personality in the operational phase of local politics. Many of his men occupied high posts and Georgian economy and public services seem to have benefited. Under his sponsorship Georgians were prominent enough to attract a fair amount of animosity from other ethnic groups and there was some jealousy of the privileges supposedly accorded the Georgian republic.

It is likely that Stalin, at most, was a symbol to the Georgians while Beria and his supporters provided the actual basis for a rise of particularistic feelings among the population. The propaganda campaign stressing the services of the Great Russian people, suggesting that their culture was worthy of close emulation by the minorities, and advancing the idea that the union of the

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various national areas with Russia had, even under Tsarist rule, been beneficial, did a great deal to irritate the Georgians' self-esteem, particularly since they were fully cognizant of the fact that Georgia was a highly cultured independent state when the Russians were still split into semibarbaric tribes. This campaign probably created in Georgia a divided state of mind, with adherence to the symbol of Stalin and appreciation of the supposed favors granted by Beria existing simultaneously with a renewed sense of discontent over the culturally subordinate role assigned the republic.

There were some overt indications of dissatisfaction among the Georgian people. In 1951, the Georgians did not commemorate the one-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Russian rule in Georgia. There were also reports of minor incidents in which Georgian animosity toward the Russians was expressed in grumbling or quarreling over positions in shopping queues. Instances of resistance by armed bands which occurred during this period seem to have combined the Caucasian traditions of banditry with antiregime orientation.

During the latter part of this period Georgia showed marked signs of a potential disaffection based on nationalist sentiments. The regime's rigid control over the republic, the influence of the Stalin symbol, and the surface favors granted by Beria, however, all combined to keep the country, if not loyal, at least unwilling to disturb the existing order.

1953-57. Stalin's death in 1953 removed him as a living symbol; and although the Soviet central press quickly ceased to refer so copiously to him and his works, the Georgian press was less hurried in their rejection. The republic probably suffered greater actual loss when in July 1953 the announcement of Beria's

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arrest on charges of plotting against the regime was made. As a consequence, a number of prominent local leaders were removed and it was indicated that the republic would no longer enjoy special consideration. Although the period was marked by a moderate relaxation of the Stalinist rigid control, the general outline remained the same: Georgia continued as a subordinate part of the USSR, ruled by an alien group and forced to conform to alien ideas. The moderating influences of the Stalin symbol and Beria's control over local politics had vanished.

Public discontent was widely felt, although it did not become marked until early in 1956. With the "secret" speech of N. K. Khrushchev to the XX Party Congress in February, publicized soon after, the desire of the Soviet leaders to blame Stalin for the defects and errors of the system was clear. Georgian public opinion, already disturbed by the changes in the republic's position, was more gravely disturbed, for Stalin had long been a national symbol. On 6 March 1956, the third anniversary of Stalin's death, a crowd in Tbilisi led by students from the university and the technical schools attempted to hold a public commemoration. The Tbilisi Russian-language newspaper later indicated that they were impelled by nationalist rather than Stalinist-Communist sympathies. The crowd was dispersed by military force, for the authorities seem to have felt that the militia (civil police) were unreliable. Casualties were numerous.

Following a sweeping investigation to determine the causes of this outbreak, the newspapers made it clear that the students and intellectual classes, in general, were seriously disaffected. The regime made numerous changes in Party and Komsomol personnel, particularly in those posts involving propaganda and agitation

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activities, while it strengthened its campaigns of persuasion to its goals. It does not, however, seem to have taken harsh measures of retaliation against the dissidents.

Later in 1956 the unsettling influence of the events in Hungary and Poland was reflected in the renewed criticism of "bourgeois" nationalism in the Soviet press, but it is not possible to determine the extent to which Georgia was affected. One may presume that questions raised by Georgian university students were similar to those posed by students in Moskva and Leningrad and that, tinged by Georgia's history and the experience of the preceding spring, they revealed the continuance of Georgian nationalism among the youth.

The reform of Georgian industrial management through the agency of the Georgian Council of National Economy, brought about sometime between the end of March and the beginning of July 1957, by creating a locally controlled economic unit, may strengthen tendencies toward a species of economic localism if not toward political nationalism among the managerial classes. It is too early, however, to determine the effect which this reform will have on the national consciousness of the Georgian people.

D. Social Dynamics

Although Georgia is a small country, its society is the product of native forces influenced by complex outside forces. It is impossible to present a complete account of the Georgia social system or, indeed, even to indicate more than the general areas in which significant social movements may be expected. All societies, however, and particularly urbanized and industrialized societies, exhibit certain common characteristics. And as a country which is becoming increasingly urbanized and industrialized and which is also

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a part of the Soviet Union, Georgia presumably shares many of the social traits observed in other parts of the USSR. It is felt, therefore, that a discussion of the social forces in Georgia which effect its relationship with the Soviet Union can be based on known social forces within the USSR as a whole.

The forces which generate cohesion and conformity to the existing order in Georgia arise chiefly from the economic and political integration of the republic into the USSR, although some socio-ideological integration results from intensive indoctrination in approved modes of thought and equally intense attempts by the Soviets to prevent the development of any opposing standards. In any case, there are many Georgians for whom the existing order provides physical or emotional satisfactions which, at the least, prevent their detachment from the regime. Although force and coercion probably play a more prominent role in Soviet society than elsewhere, of themselves they cannot replace the need for some substantive compensation to the people of Georgia. And in spite of its inadequacies, inefficiencies, and harshness, the regime provides some compensation in the form of public peace, personal safety, and a measure of economic improvement; opposition tendencies, therefore, are not likely to prove immediate and total threats.

Certain social forces, however, diminish the degree of social coherence and generate harmful tensions. Some, common to all societies, arise from the inevitable failure of all persons or all groups to be satisfied completely by existing conditions; others are common only to urban and industrial societies; still others seem to be inherent to the Soviet system. In Georgia many are based on the incompatibility of the traditional social system of the republic and the Soviet system.

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As a result of the interplay of cohesive forces and disruptive tensions, Georgia reflects a number of contradictions and anomalies of social development, and some groups, or some individuals, support the validity of the regime in one field yet deny it in another. This duality of sentiment has probably decreased the ability of the Georgian social structure to sustain shock and has created a potentiality for sweeping changes should any crisis necessitate some form of reorganization. However, just as some structures stand for many years even though their foundations have eroded, so may Georgia's system continue, though many of the republic's citizens are seriously discontented.

The following discussion is considered to include the most important of the factors contributing to cohesion or tension, although others of equal importance may have been omitted because it has been impossible to develop any substantive conclusions in regard to Georgia. The order in which these factors are listed, however, is not intended to indicate any established order of importance.

1. Cohesion

Political. One of the major factors of cohesion is that resulting from the thorough political integration of the Gruzinskaya SSR into the Soviet system. The almost complete unity of government and Party in the republic is found also in every other republic of the Soviet Union. The Georgian constitution, its laws, and governmental structure are almost exact facsimiles of those of other Soviet republics. The various forms of governmental actions and the methods of supervising and controlling government officials are also the same. Even appointments, at least to the major local posts, are made by outside agencies.

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The real center of power is the Communist Party, which is actually only an extension of the USSR Communist Party. And although some Georgians occupy influential posts in the Party, it conforms to the higher body with little opportunity for individual action.

The integration of Georgia's government and Party into the Soviet system, however, has brought some substantive benefits, such as the introduction of improved administrative and work methods. For many participants in government or Party activities there is the psychological stimulus of the possibility, however remote, of achieving individual all-union prominence, as did Stalin and Beria.

The complete subordination and control of the police and military systems by the all-union authorities provides the ultimate basis for Georgia's adherence to the Soviet Union. Although the civil police occasionally may be unwilling tools of the regime because of their local origin, they supply a certain impetus toward conformity. The military and MVD troop formations are reportedly usually of non-local origin and are considered more reliable. The use of direct force, however, is probably not a decisive factor in the social process, although this constant possibility may foster adherence, even though it is often involuntary.

Economic. As an integral part of the economically isolated and highly autarkic Soviet system, the Gruzinskaya SSR produces for and is supplied by one market. Under conditions of free trade Georgia's products would be overpriced, for they are produced at an unrealistic cost of both labor and materials, a cost which the Soviets are willing to overlook since no foreign currency is involved. There is no indication that the Georgians recognize the republic's vulnerability to such competition, and even if this realization were present, the daily operations of the economy have

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created a firm nexus between Georgia and the Soviet Union as a whole.

During the Soviet period, and particularly since World War II, the significant rise in the standard of living has been an important factor in the strengthening of Georgia's ties to the system. Those groups which have received economic or social benefits from the regime, or which have good reason to hope for such, are the least likely to engage in deviant activities. They are not inclined to pose threats to a system which has given them prestige or power, and their attitude toward any who might is probably forbidding. Even among classes which are relatively disadvantaged it is probable that the increase in health and educational services and public amenities and the significant postwar rise in real wages have reduced dissatisfaction.

Social. The regime has zealously fostered adherence to the system by vigorous inculcation of its ideology. At the same time it has eliminated most of the possibilities whereby the Georgians might acquire knowledge of other systems which might provide standards for comparison and has warned the people of the serious consequences of ideological deviation. Intensive propaganda, lack of bases for comparison, and the threat of punishment for deviant thinking thus combine to create adherence to the system and impose the official point of view.

The increase in the Georgian urban population tends to increase adherence to the regime, since as a result of changes in family structure and general social organization there is a lessening of the cultural distance between Georgia's urban residents and the Soviet norm. Urbanization of the Georgian peoples involves the relinquishment of the usual modes of peasant life and the adoption

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not of indigenous urban customs but of customs shaped by an alien regime, based on the cultural presuppositions of the Great Russians. Much of this would have developed even had there not been a clear propaganda effort to indoctrinate the Georgians with a feeling of respect for the Russians, for the latter as the dominant element in the USSR often unconsciously set the patterns for social organization in all parts of the country. It is a particular concomitant of the urbanizing process in Georgia, however, for as former rural inhabitants relinquish their customary social forms they tend to adopt those which are provided readymade.

Georgia's realization that independence would involve the republic in serious, perhaps insuperable, problems of self-protection may also foster attachment to the Soviet Union. The incessant maneuvering of the three Transcaucasian republics for local advantages in the period 1917-21 and Georgia's attempts to win the support of Germany, Great Britain, and the League of Nations (1918-21) as a counterthreat to Turkey and Soviet Russia seem to have convinced the Georgians that independence in the near future would be untenable. The Georgian public, without agreeing completely with the Soviets, value Soviet protection against internal turmoil and external aggression; and the regime's incessant allegations of aggressive tendencies among capitalist nations has probably strengthened this feeling.

Finally, the psychological gratifications which arise from self-identification with the rich and powerful Soviet Union rather than with a poor and remote Georgian republic may incline some parts of the population toward support of the regime. This is often true of poor and disadvantaged groups in other countries who find compensation for their own positions in their membership in a larger more

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powerful group, so that the existence of such sentiment in Georgia may be presumed.

2. Tensions

Political. Among the political tensions, those stemming from Georgian nationalism are most important. For despite the efforts of the Soviets to suppress it, local nationalism remains strong and is expressed particularly in the continuing resistance of both peasants and intellectuals to the regime. The long period of Soviet domination has given rise to nationalistic types of expression which seemingly have varied in intensity according to the attitudes of the regime. It should be noted, however, that even among those in the governmental apparatus, who are probably best adjusted to the present system, there are longings for a freer role for Georgia which might take the form of permitting certain of the nationalist phenomena observed prior to the student disturbances in March 1956.

Factional differences between the primary and secondary control forces may also be important in shaping political tensions since the primary control group, more closely integrated into the regime and receiving more benefits, may be resented as a non-national group of sycophants by the secondary force which is predominantly native in composition and less thoroughly indoctrinated in Soviet ideology. The strivings of the secondary group to rise in the social scale may take the form of personal animosity directed against those whom they consider collaborate too closely with the regime. Considering the severe controls on the expression of opinions in the Soviet Union, however, it is unlikely that any overt political movements led by members of the secondary control force will develop in the foreseeable future, although the tendencies toward divergences of political views will continue to be influential. Political

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feelings as such do not seem to exist in the wider classes of the population.

Economic. The lower classes in Georgia--the peasants and workers--seem more moved by economic than by political considerations. In general they resent the poor return for their labor and the constant pressure to increase production with no assurance that they will benefit proportionately. Their animosities seem to be directed at specific persons or groups above them, rather than at the system as a whole. Although they may not wish the regime abolished as a whole, their latent resentments could be important influences in its reshaping.

The economic advantages of the urban worker, however, give rise to sharp antagonisms among the rural peasant farmers, who feel that townsmen benefit disproportionately from the economy and that their greater gains came from the exploitation of the farmer. There have been reports of overt resentment of Soviet peasants against the unfair allocation of goods to urban retail trade, the provision of fewer rural public services, and the lower rates of pay in rural areas. These resentments are probably shared to some degree by members of rural classes other than the peasants.

The Georgians may differ amongst themselves on many matters, but there is probably a substantial unity of ill-feeling against Soviet management of the Georgia economy, for the industrial and agricultural production of the republic is planned to meet Soviet, not Georgian, needs. Although the integration of Georgia into the Soviet economy has been the source of many cohesive tendencies, there are still many persons in the republic who wish for greater economic autonomy.

There is also widespread discontent arising from the

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knowledge that the standard of living in the USSR and Georgia is much lower than in other countries of western Europe. Only a narrow segment of the population approaches the level of these countries; for the masses there is a bare sufficiency of poor-quality, high-cost consumer goods which, in Georgia, are inequitably distributed. The shortage of goods may vary with class or geographic location, but in the republic the remoter areas are often deprived of important items for long periods and even the central areas have deficiencies in the flow of goods. The most common expression of the tensions arising from this situation are the quarrels which often occur among those queuing up to purchase scarce items.

The change in work patterns occasioned by the mechanization of agriculture and industry and the introduction of compartmentalized methods undoubtedly have increased tensions among both the rural peasants and the urban workers. Resentment thus generated apparently has found an outlet in a reported lack of punctuality and excessive absenteeism, as well as in poor work habits. If continued, such expression could constitute a significant hindrance to the realization of the policies of the regime.

Social. Tensions within Georgia which are social or cultural, in general, are an outgrowth of the clash between Georgian culture and Russian or Soviet elements which have been imposed. Their definition and effect are less easily traced than is the effect of economic tensions, however, since Soviet sources usually avoid any discussion of the true nature of their society. It is possible, however, to indicate the areas in which disaffection most is likely.

Although nationalism is primarily a political force, it also has its social aspects. This is particularly true among Georgian

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groups who desire no political separation from the USSR yet favor a greater cultural autonomy for the republic. A similar point of view was current among the so-called national communists in the early 1920s, and many of those purged in the period 1934-38 were also accused of supporting such ideas. The numerous reports of Georgian resistance to Russian art and literary forms indicate that the tendency probably continues.

A more widely based intellectual tension arises from the generalized disagreement between the educated classes and the regime. The former feel that the basic structure of the regime is ethically and objectively false and that they are forced to pervert their labors to demonstrate its validity. Some attempt to avoid involvement by retreating into the fields least restricted by Soviet ideology; others take up specialized topics in which the possibility of conflict with constantly changing Party lines is not so great. The regime, in turn, periodically attempts to counter these efforts by violent campaigns which criticize the waste of effort spent in areas which it does not consider socially useful. As a result, the educated class is in a constant state of tension, driven by the regime into intellectual endeavors in which failure is heavily penalized. Forced into lip service to Marxism, they must accept the fact that objective truth is no defense against the wishes of the regime. This situation has contributed in large degree to a depreciation of the value of scientific and other research in Georgia, and has created among the educated classes a latent disorientation from the system which might prove important under conditions of lessened control.

Religious tensions are similar to intellectual tensions in that they involve differences between two systems of thought. Religious feelings in Georgia, however, are found chiefly among

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classes other than the intellectuals, who are essentially non-believers. Originally an independent branch of the Eastern Orthodox church, the Georgian church was made a nominally autonomous part of the Russian church in the early nineteenth century. In the years following, until 1917, the church seems to have lost prestige on nationalistic as well as intellectual grounds. It suffered from its inflexibility toward changing conditions and modes of thought as well as from a popular distaste for Russian control of the organization. The socialist orientation of Georgian politics in the period 1905-21 also weakened religious feeling, especially in rural areas where the Socialist Democratic Party was strongest. Restoration of an independent Georgian church in 1917 removed some of the onus from the clergy but the following years were too turbulent for religion to win much popular support or to adapt itself to new conditions. Since 1921 the influence of the church has decreased greatly, and only among the more conservative rural groups is religion probably now an important part of life. To some among the rural groups, the state is often equated with the antichrist and all its works are anathema; others are partially appeased by the existence of a token Georgian church organization, although the latent conflict between Communism and Christianity cannot be erased too easily.

Tensions arising from the family situation, although common to those found in other urbanized and industrialized environments, are given specific coloration in Georgia by the mingling of Georgian and Soviet influences. Chief among them is the conflict between the younger and older generations. Traditionally, youth deferred to its elders, particularly to the family patriarch, but the Soviets attempted to destroy this tradition by their policy of

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disrupting the existing family system. As the regime consolidated itself and as the young rebels matured, however, a renewed appreciation of the family as a means of social control asserted itself and Soviet denigration of parental authority ceased. Today, urban conditions as well as continued official criticism of parents with "retrograde" views breed tendencies toward juvenile insubordination which often is directed in ways not approved by the regime. As a result there are acts of hooliganism on the part of young, socially disoriented people and, more disturbing, there is also the phenomenon of a rising nonacceptance of the official ideology among those youths who are expected to be reliable because of their background and long indoctrination. Striking examples of this latter feeling were revealed in the press discussion which followed the disturbances of March 1956 in Tbilisi. It was clear that even the favored student group was bored with the regime's ideology and that their impatience with its stale orthodoxies might become dangerous. Subsequent efforts to force attendance at lectures and participation in Komsomol work, adopted as countermeasures, will probably have little effect, since the basic lack of ideological realism continues, and the unrest among youth will remain as an important source of tension.

The changing status of women in society has also given rise to grave tensions within the republic. Georgian women, as well as those of most other ethnic groups in the Gruzinskaya SSR, are traditionally subordinate to men and have no independent part either in the economic or social life of the community. Under the Soviets, however, women have a theoretical equality with men, which in Georgia is partly typified by their extensive participation in the economic activities of the republic: women constitute more than 40 per cent

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of the Georgian labor force. Although the regime officially decrees that women will work outside the home, in part, their participation in the labor force is necessitated by the high cost of living which makes it almost impossible for a single breadwinner to support a family comfortably. And although some women have been trained in skilled labor or in the professions, and a few have been placed over men in positions of authority, in general, their jobs consist of low-paid manual labor. Under such conditions the task of rearing a family is particularly difficult. The regime, however, has sought by means of special taxes on small families, by granting improved maternity benefits and by prohibiting abortions (in the period 1937-56) to encourage a higher birth rate. Women are thus subject to the tensions engendered by the conflict between the economic necessity of taking outside employment and official pressures for larger families and the maintenance of a home. Male reaction to woman's expanding role outside the home has generally been adverse, particularly in rural areas where the instances of women being appointed chairmen of collective farms, leaders of work groups, or agronomists has called forth opposition from those who are more traditionally oriented. Undoubtedly there is some appreciation of the added income from female participation in the kolkhoz, but the pattern of male domination can scarcely be expected to have disappeared entirely and men probably do not accept calmly the current status of women. Tensions undoubtedly exist, particularly as women are placed over men or take jobs which are considered to be men's work.

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VII. URBAN AREAS

Tbilisi

41-43 N; 44-49 E.

Population: 641,000 (1957 est.)Administrative: Capital of Gruzinskaya SSR; city of republic subordination.Military: Headquarters: Transcaucasus Military Dist.; 11th TAA; 1st Guards Mech. Div.; 1st Guards Mech. Div., AA Regt.; 8th MVD Regt.; 231st MVD Convoy Regt.; Georgian MVD Border Dist.; 31st MVD Border Detachment; u/i MVD security troops. Naval training center.Airfields: Two, Class 1; two, Class 2; one, Class 4.Transportation: Car repair shop, Class I; classification yard; steam engine yard; 6 car repair shops, Class III; engine depot.Economic: Airframes, 5.1% USSR cap. (1957 est.); machine tools, 2.4% USSR cap. (1957 est.); agricultural machinery, 1% USSR cap. (1957 est.); radio-TV equip., 0.3% USSR cap. (1957 est.). Machine building and metal-working; food processing; textiles; wearing apparel; pharmaceuticals.Cultural: University; polytechnical inst.; railroad transport engineers inst.; zoological-veterinary inst.; agricultural inst.; medical inst.; conservatory of music; Academy of Arts; physical culture inst.; theater arts inst.; pedagogical inst. (2). Tekhnikums: petroleum; metallurgical; light industry; railroad transport; electrotechnological communications; agricultural mechanization; credit and finance. Secondary medical schools (8); pharmaceutical school; dental technicians school; railroad secondary medical school; physical education school; teachers' training schools (2); physical education school; cultural workers schools (2); music schools (2); art school.Kutaisi

42-15 N; 42-40 E.

Population: 115,000 (1957 est.)Administrative: Rayon center; city of republic subordination.Military: Headquarters: u/i corps, AAA Regt.; u/i MVD security troops. Ground control intercept radar.Airfields: One, Class 2; one, Class 4.Transportation: Steam enginehouse; electric enginehouse.Economic: Mining equipment, 3.6% USSR cap. (1957 est.); trucks, 1.5% USSR cap. (1955 est.). Food processing, textiles, leather products; lithopone.

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Kutaisi (Cont.) Cultural: Pedagogical and agricultural inst.;
tekhnikums: mining, auto-mechanic, timber
industry; secondary medical school; teachers
training school; cultural workers school;
music school.

Batumi 41-39 N; 41-39 E.
Population: 80,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Capital of Adzharskaya ASSR;
city of (autonomous) republic subordination.
Military: Naval base; training center; naval
POL depot. Headquarters: 607th AAA Regt.
(PVO); u/i AAA brigade (PVO); u/i MVD border
detachment. Fire control radar; ground con-
trol intercept radar; early warning radar.
Airfields: One, Class 1.
Transportation: Petroleum port, 2.6% USSR cap.
(1957 est.); ship repair, 1% USSR cap. (1957
est.). Locomotive repair shop, Class III;
car repair shop, Class III.
Economic: Petroleum refining, 1% USSR cap.
(1957); food processing machinery; food proc-
essing.
Cultural: Pedagogical inst.; mariners tekhnikum;
trade tekhnikum; secondary medical school;
teachers training school; music school.

Sukhumi 43-00 N; 41-01 E.
Population: 57,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Capital of Abkhazskaya ASSR;
city of (autonomous) republic subordination.
Military: Naval training center.
Airfields: One, Class 7.
Transportation: Steam enginehouse.
Economic: Tobacco, food, and fish processing;
cigarette making. Atomic energy research.
Cultural: Pedagogical inst.; industrial
tekhnikum; secondary medical school; teachers
training school; music school.

Rustavi 42-17 N; 43-51 E.
Population: 45,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: City of republic subordination.
Economic: Steel pipe, about 50% USSR cap.
(1954 est.); ammonia, 3.9% USSR cap. (1957
est.); nitric acid, 8.8% USSR cap. (1957
est.); pig iron, 1.7% USSR prod. (1957);
rolled steel, 1.7% USSR prod. (1957); coke-
chemicals, 1.5% USSR cap. (1957 est.); steel,
1.4% USSR prod. (1956); fertilizer, 0.9% USSR
prod. (1956).

Poti 42-09 N; 41-41 E.
Population: 39,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: City of republic subordination.
Military: Naval base; naval POL depot; naval
munitions storage. Early warning radar.
Airfields: One, Class 5; one, Class 6.

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Poti (Cont.) Transportation: Port, 5.7 USSR cap. (1957 est.).
Economic: Ship repair, 4.7% USSR cap. (1957 est.).
Cultural: Secondary medical school.

Tkvarcheli 42-51 N; 41-41 E.
Population: 34,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: City of (autonomous) republic subordination.
Military: Headquarters, u/i MVD security troops.
Economic: Coal mining; food processing.

Gori 41-58 N; 44-07 E.
Population: 30,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: City of republic subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 5.
Economic: Textiles; food processing.
Cultural: Pedagogical inst.; agricultural tekhnikum; secondary medical school; teachers training school.

Chiaturi 42-19 N; 43-18 E.
Population: 23,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: City of republic subordination.
Military: Hq., u/i MVD security troops.
Economic: Manganese ore mining and processing.
Cultural: Secondary medical school.

Khashuri 41-59 N; 43-36 E.
Population: 23,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: City of rayon subordination; rayon center.
Transportation: Steam enginehouse; electric enginehouse; car repair shop.
Economic: Quarrying. Health resort.

Samtredia 42-10 N; 42-21 E.
Population: 23,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 2; one, Class 5.
Transportation: Steam enginehouse.
Economic: Silk spinning; food processing.

Tkibuli 42-22 N; 42-59 E.
Population: 22,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Economic: Bituminous coal mining.

Zestafoni 42-06 N; 43-02 E.
Population: 20,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Transportation: Electric enginehouse; steam enginehouse.
Economic: Ferroalloys, 10.9% USSR cap. (1957 est.). Wine making.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum.

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Ochemchire 42-43 N; 41-29 E.
Population: 18,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Military: Naval base; early warning radar.
Airfields: One, Class 5.
Transportation: Steam enginehouse.
Economic: Tobacco and food processing; light industry.

Staliniri 42-14 N; 43-58 E.
Population: 18,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Capital of Yugo-Osetinskaya A.O.; city of oblast subordination.
Economic: Woodworking; furniture prod.; food processing; brick and tile.
Cultural: Pedagogical inst.; agricultural tekhnikum; secondary medical school; teachers training school; art school.

Telavi 41-55 N; 45-31 E.
Population: 18,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 5.
Economic: Wine making; food processing.
Cultural: Secondary medical school.

Akhaltstsike 41-38 N; 42-59 E.
Population: 17,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Economic: Lignite mining; woodworking; food processing.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum; secondary medical school; teachers training school.

Borzhomli 41-51 N; 43-23 E.
Population: 17,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Transportation: Steam enginehouse.
Economic: Health resort.
Cultural: Secondary medical school.

Gagra 43-20 N; 40-14 E.
Population: 17,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 5; ground control intercept radar.
Economic: Food processing. Health resort.

Makharadze 41-56 N; 42-00 E.
Population: 14,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 5.

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Makharadze
(Cont.)
Economic: Food and silk processing; wood-working.
Cultural: Tea-industry tekhnikum; secondary medical school; teachers training school.

Vale
41-38 N; 42-31 E.
Population: 14,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Urban-type settlement.
Economic: Lignite mining.

Akhalkalaki
41-24 N; 43-29 E.
Population: 11,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 5.
Economic: Metalworking; coal mining; textiles; food processing.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum; teachers training schools (2).

Bolnisi
41-28 N; 44-33 E.
Population: 11,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.
Economic: Wine making.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum.

Kobuleti
41-51 N; 41-46 E.
Population: 11,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 4.
Economic: Food processing. Health resort.

Mikha-Tskhakaya
42-17 N; 42-04 E.
Population: 11,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 5.
Economic: Wine making; carpet weaving.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum; teachers training school.

Surami
42-01 N; 43-35 E.
Population: 11,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Urban-type settlement.
Economic: Health resort.

Tsulukidze
42-20 N; 42-26 E.
Population: 11,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Airfields: One, Class 2.
Economic: Food processing; silk spinning.
Cultural: Agricultural mechanization tekhnikum; teachers training school.

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Dusheti 42-05 N; 44-42 E.
Population: 8,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Economic: Resort area.

Gurdzhaani 41-45 N; 45-48 E.
Population: 8,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Transportation: Steam enginehouse.
Economic: Wine making; food processing.

Avchala 41-49 N; 44-45 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Urban-type settlement; subordinate to Gardeubani city rayon of Tbilisi.
Economic: Hydroelectric power plant.

Gali 42-30 N; 41-43 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Military: Ground control intercept radar.
Economic: Food processing.

Gudauta 43-06 N; 40-38 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Military: Ground control intercept radar; early warning radar.
Airfields: One, Class 2.
Economic: Metalworking; wine making; tobacco processing.

Kaspi 41-56 N; 44-25 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.
Economic: Cement production.

Lagodekhi 41-50 N; 46-17 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.
Economic: Tobacco processing.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum.

Molotovo 41-33 N; 44-06 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Urban-type settlement.
Economic: Electric power plant.

Mtskheta 41-50 N; 44-41 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.

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Mtskheta (Cont.) Economic: Woodworking; bricks; matches.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum.

Oni 42-35 N; 43-26 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Economic: Food processing.

Sachkhere 42-21 N; 43-24 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.
Economic: Wine making.

Shaumyani 41-22 N; 44-46 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Urban-type settlement.
Economic: Cotton ginning; clothing production.

Signakhi 41-37 N; 45-55 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Economic: Food processing.
Cultural: Secondary medical school; teachers training school.

Tsiteli-Tskaro 41-28 N; 46-06 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.
Economic: Metalworking; food processing.

Tskhaltubo 42-20 N; 42-36 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; city of rayon subordination.
Economic: Health resort area.

Tsnori 41-37 N; 45-58 E.
Population: 5,000-10,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Urban-type settlement.
Airfields: One, Class 5.
Economic: Wine making; tobacco and food processing.

Abasha 42-17 N; 42-17 E.
Population: Under 5,000 (1957 est.)
Administrative: Rayon center; urban-type settlement.
Economic: Food processing.
Cultural: Agricultural tekhnikum.

Abastumani --
Population: Under 5,000 (1957 est.)

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<u>Ordzhonikidze</u> (Cont.)	<u>Administrative:</u> Rayon center; urban-type settlement. <u>Economic:</u> Wine making; food processing.
<u>Shorapani</u>	42-06 N; 43-05 E. <u>Population:</u> Under 5,000 (1957 est.) <u>Administrative:</u> Urban-type settlement. <u>Transportation:</u> Steam enginehouse. <u>Economic:</u> Metalworking.
<u>Tsageri</u>	43-28 N; 42-47 E. <u>Population:</u> Under 5,000 (1957 est.) <u>Administrative:</u> Urban-type settlement. <u>Economic:</u> Wine making; silk processing. <u>Cultural:</u> Orchard management tekhnikum.
<u>Tsagveri</u>	41-38 N; 43-27 E. <u>Population:</u> Under 5,000 (1957 est.) <u>Administrative:</u> Urban-type settlement. <u>Economic:</u> Health resort.
<u>Ureki</u>	42-01 N; 41-47 E. <u>Population:</u> Under 5,000 (1957 est.) <u>Administrative:</u> Urban-type settlement.

