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
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THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY
1919 - 1949



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THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY

1919 - 1949

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NOTE:

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INTRODUCTION

The pattern of Soviet policy in Central and Eastern Europe following World War II is well-known by now in its characteristics. The Soviet seizure of six European countries in less than five years, through the combined employment of overwhelming military force and superior political finesse, resulted in: Conquest Through Penetration.

The methods which were used are known. Basically, there is only one Soviet master plan. It varies in each country according to the political "terrain" and circumstances which may make it necessary for the Communists to make comparatively insignificant adjustments in the tactical phase.


To study this pattern of Soviet policy in the case history of Hungary has a special significance. The reason for this is that in that country, already once before, a full-fledged Communist regime was in power. This study endeavors to prove that Communism in Hungary, in all its tactical and strategical aspects, is rooted in that defeated 1919 Revolution of Bela Kun, and in the consequent decades in the life of a small group of professional revolutionaries who emerged from the defeat. All the important leaders of Communist Hungary today without exception played a part in the Russian Revolution which was defeated in 1919. Its leaders fled to Russia, and in the following decades there an important part of the International movement. Their activities...

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1. They analyzed, with scientific Marxist logic, every phase and detail of 1919, exercising conscientious samo-kritika over the mistakes of that revolution.
2. Through frequent underground journeys and the network of agents, they compiled social, political and economic data in Institutes on Hungary and the area of Central and Eastern Europe.
3. In close cooperation with Czech, Polish, etc. Communists in Moscow prepared the design to be followed in the future, utilizing all the experiences of the 1919 failure in Hungary, but preparing both the strategic and tactical details for all countries in the area.

Thus, the basic design of the Soviet Policy in that area of Europe after World War II goes back with its roots to the Bela Kun revolution, and through that to the instructions and principles given to them by Lenin with whom they were in constant contact. As a result of the 1919 experience, while the basic strategy of Communism in Hungary and the whole area of Central and Eastern Europe remained unchanged, tactics were considerably improved.

Those of the Bela kun regime who survived and the others, made a return in 1945 under the wings of the Red Army and started once again. This time, however, they were...
 fighting... favorable... experiences...



C o m m e n t s

on the "Strategy and Tactics of Communism in Hungary, 1919-1949".

The study is not so much a detailed analysis of Communist policy and tactics as an attempt to prove three theses:

- /a/ that postwar Communist rule in Hungary was the direct continuation of the Communist regime of 1919;
- /b/ that it fitted exactly the pattern for a successful revolution described by Lenin;
- /c/ that Communist moves were greatly facilitated by the explosive state of Hungary.

In surveying postwar events attention is concentrated on the 1947 crisis, the Mindszenty case, the Rajk case, in general on political moves. The intricate pattern of moves in the social and economic fields is given but scant attention.

ad /a/ It is undeniable that the Communists have learnt from their mistakes in Hungary in 1919. But it seems to me that the importance of 1919, both in its national and international aspects, is greatly overrated. 1919 mainly showed the Communists what not to do or rather how not to do things. In its positive aspects, postwar Communist policy was based on the experience gained in the Soviet Union. I do not think it reasonable to regard the experience of five chaotic five months that ended in failure ^{is} as decisive and dismiss rather lightly the value of 30 years of experience in the Soviet Union, where Communist policy has great achievements to its credit.

Much is made of the fact that some of the leaders of the 1919 Communist regime had met Lenin and Stalin and that the leaders of the

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Russian Revolution were interested in the fate and wished the success of the Communist regime in Hungary. But these facts prove nothing that could be interpreted as a key to 1919 failure or post-war success. Lenin and Stalin were then the leaders of a small band of revolutionaries, known to a large number of people. They did not become inaccessible demigods and oracles until much later. Dimitroff, Rosa Luxemburg and others of international fame knew them as well as, if not better than Bela Kun, who never impressed anybody in either camp as a great figure. The Russian revolutionaries were then engaged in a deadly struggle in their own country the ultimate success of which depended, on their own estimate, on the chain reaction an initial success in Russia would evoke in other countries. The establishment of the Communist regime in Hungary seemed to justify their hopes and explained their interest.

However, they could not give practical guidance on strategy and tactics because they themselves lacked experience and had no clear cut policy in their own country. They could not give military help because they were not strong enough and were not at all sure of their victory.

The statement that the people who unsuccessfully tried to establish Communist rule in Hungary in 1919 came back carefully prepared in 1945 does not correspond to facts. Of the present rulers of Hungary Matyas Rakosi was the only one who played a rather prominent part in 1919, although he was by no means a key figure. Bela Kun, the principal figure, the "friend" of Lenin, was liquidated in 1934 in the USSR as a deviationist. Eugene Varga, in 1919 People's Commissar of Finance, has had a chequered career in the Soviet Union,

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with well known ups and downs. It is likely that he was instrumental in drafting Communist economic policy but it is not clear to what extent he was concerned with and was responsible for details. He only paid fleeting visits to Hungary after the war. Gyorgy Lukacs, in 1919 People s Commissar for Education, became a window piece after the war, was not given a responsible position and was not rated very highly even as a n ideologist. Laszlo Rudas, who returned as the chief ideologist of the Party was not very prominent in 1919 and held no high position. Erno Gero, one of the most powerful Communists of the postwar era, had played a most obscure role in 1919. As no reference has ever been made to it, it can safely be assumed that it was insignificant. Zoltan Vas and Jozsef Revai, two important postwar figures, were young men in 1919 and held no important positions. The same applies to Imre Nagy and Istvan Friss. This accounts for most of the old guard that returned.

ad /b/ It seems to me that to prove that postwar events in Hungary followed the pattern described in the five conditions of Lenin, it would have been necessary to give first a detailed and comprehensive analysis, without reference to the model, and draw the appropriate conclusions at the end. As it is, events are marshalled under headings to fit the pattern. However, the main trouble is that, on close scrutiny, Lenin s five conditions and the chain theory, like so many of the famous Communist dicta, are found to contain little that is startling or new and are not the key to Communist success. They are old established principles of warfare, political or military, to which the Communists added refinement and which they applied with ruthless logic.

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Tactics and strategy are not in themselves a sufficient explanation of success. It seems to me that the basic factors are:

/a/ a Messianistic creed which appeals to a number of intellectuals as well as to groups of under privileged;

/b/ the discipline of the Communists in contrast to the loose organization and lack of discipline of the non-Communists;

/c/ the infiltration tactics used not only for destroying opponents but also for giving an exaggerated notion of Communist strength;

/d/ the utilization of the niceties of the democratic process as long as the Communists are a minority of uncertain strength;

/e/ the utter cynicism in disguising their aims and motives, in making promises and in granting favours to gain support.

Without these, the five conditions of Lenin cannot be realized.

ad /c/ I believed that the "rape" of Czechoslovakia had once for all exploded the myth that the "explosive" state of the Eastern European countries was a major factor in the victory of Communism. Unoccupied Czechoslovakia had a much higher Communist vote than occupied "explosive" countries and went under without visible resistance when the Communists decided that the time for taking over had come.

Apart from this, the "explosive" state of the East European countries was due not nearly as much to their "obsolete" political and social systems as to their inability to attain a fair rate of economic progress and level of well being. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, they all suffered from a surplus population in agriculture, rather meagre bases for industrial development, and lack of capital. In point of fact, the origin of strong governments was very often the desire of well-meaning people to improve things quickly through purposeful though

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autocratic action. The democratic process is known to be slow even in countries where it has well established traditions and the need for quick progress is smaller. Elimination of inequalities in wealth and income, glaring because of the great poverty at the bottom, may satisfy one's sense of social justice but does not solve the problem of raising the standard of living of the masses in poor countries where the aggregate wealth and income are small. But it can well eliminate an elite necessary for progress, material, cultural and political. Egalitarian peasant societies in Eastern Europe were not noted for greater political stability and a higher rate of progress.

This should by no means be construed to mean that all had been well and that social, political and economic reforms were not necessary. It only serves to emphasize the need for a comprehensive view of a situation or a process and points to the danger of over simplification.

- o -

As I see it, the basic difference between 1919 and 1945-50 was that /a/ in 1919 the political and administrative machine was relatively intact;

/b/ the positive results of Communist policy in the USSR could be utilized in framing Communist policy in detail;

/c/ working in the shelter of the Soviet Union and working in close contact with the underground movement in Hungary, the Communists were able to prepare themselves for taking over power;

/d/ the Soviet Union as occupying power was able to give help to the Communists by paralyzing non-Communist forces and direct intervention if necessary;

/e/ the Western Allies who did not hesitate to intervene in 1919 and were largely instrumental in bringing the chaotic regime of 1919

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to an early downfall, followed a policy of strict non-intervention in the critical years of 1945-47. Even later, when they decided to act, their action was largely negative and was confined to notes and retaliatory acts.

It is not for me to speculate on the motives of the policy of non-intervention. To those on the spot it seemed that the Western Allies saw in the Communist Party a truly progressive force and misunderstood the aims and nature of Communism. But just because of that and because Communism is still a potent force in a number of European and non-European countries, I believe that a true assessment of the factors that contributed to the success of the Communists in one particular country is not an academic problem. It would be fatal if the policy of combating Communism were to become the victim of slogans and a onesided interpretation of facts.

Space does not permit me to deal in extenso with small inaccuracies which do not affect the argument of the study or, for that matter, my own.

Washington D.C.
October 15, 1950.

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failure were well utilized. The post-1945 events are a continuation of 1919 in the Communist mentality. The only way to understand their tactics and strategy is to adopt the same approach of continuation.

No previous comparative study has been made of the 1919 Hungarian Communism and Communism in the post-World War II period. This made it essential to utilize almost exclusively primary research. To ascertain the strategic features of Hungarian Communism which remained permanent and the improvement and changes in the non-permanent aspect of tactics, it was essential to use extensive and systematic documentation of original source material. This fact makes the study more tiresome to digest, but it also may give a chance to reveal the essential general characteristics of both revolutions and their interrelation in principles as well as in persons. As Communist tactics make an extensive use of mass emotional aspects and utilize the social dynamism which is characteristic of the area of Europe, it is necessary to analyze certain aspects of mass reaction in the population in addition to the impact made by the Communists. It is further to be noted that this material, which could only be made available through the unique collection of the Hoover Library, will be utilized as a comparison with forthcoming events in Hungary and elsewhere in the area of Central and Eastern Europe.

The system of Europe today is explosive in its nature.

hostility against the Soviet power and Communism.

Structure

PHASE ONE analyzes the past and present roots of Communism in Hungary to the doctrine and the Soviet, and includes:

- Chapter I: Horizontal Outline of Communist Party Policy in Hungary.
- Chapter II: Ideological Roots of Communism in Hungary.
- Chapter III: The interrelation of the Hungarian Communist Party with Soviet Russia.

PHASE TWO presents the five conditions set down by Lenin which are essential for a successful revolution and shows how the five conditions were systematically fulfilled by the Communists in Hungary following World War II. The cycle was completed by 1949 when the final phase, "The Road to Socialism" was laid out in practice in the Five Year Plan. This phase includes:

- Chapter IV: The Communist Party Design in the Field as Prescribed by the Doctrine.
- Condition 1: State of Confusion.
- Condition 2: The Embroilment of Forces.
- Condition 3: All the Forces.
Sufficiently
- Condition 4:

18a

Condition 5: The Proletariat is Ready.

Chapter V: Horizontal Analysis of Communist Party Tactics
in Light of the Doctrine.

PHASE THREE makes a vertical study of three aspects which are of great importance to the future in the negative and positive character, both to the Communist world and, in retrospect, to the non-Communist world. This phase includes:

Chapter VI: Horizontal Analysis of Communist Party Tactics
in Light of the Doctrine.

Part 1: The Five Year Plan.

Part 2: The New Elite.

Part 3: Hungarian "Titoism."

In the study, phrases like "Democracy", "Socialism", etc. are consistently used in their Communist interpretation. The translations of the 1919 Bela Kun regime material are intentionally left in their primitive status. They sound similarly alien in the original Hungarian too. The reason for this is that they were translated in many cases by men of limited intellectual caliber from the Russian Communist propaganda.

In Phase Two, to give a background to the evolution of the circle of the five Leninist conditions, a careful study is made to each part which, in some cases, is a complete review of the development of the conditions in those countries where they have been applied. This is done in the case of the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba.

19a

mean a slight difference in the time of the actual occurrence and its release.

The development of the Communist pattern in Hungary being an integral part of the fight for world revolution reflects in its improvement during the three decades between the two revolutions the changes and developments of the international movement as well. Every phase of the Communist Party policy in the case history of Hungary shows a careful following of the Leninist-Stalinist line. A small number of "basic definitions" and the whole science of Marxism are the handbook which the planners and executors of that policy use. They believe in their "mission" fanatically and it is the only purpose of their life. The other part of the world which believes in those basic human liberties and dignities, which constitute the difference between existence and living should carefully study the pattern of the Communist Party in its own interest to be able to work out a similarly long-range strategy of defense.

CHAPTER I

HORIZONTAL OUTLINE OF COMMUNIST PARTY POLICY IN HUNGARY

The Foundations of World Revolution

1945-1949

The Long-Range Aims. Lenin, speaking before a gathering of The Third International, said: ". . .the comrades who are present in this room have seen how the First Soviet Republic was founded; they now witness the founding of the Third International, and they will all witness the establishment of the World Federation of Soviet Republics."¹

This declaration contains the essence of the Soviet Communist Party's plan for world-wide revolution. This aim, and its particular application to Hungary, was reaffirmed by the Bela Kun regime as early as July 16, 1919, when the official Communist newspaper in Hungary published the following:

". . .in either internal or external affairs, the politics of the Revolution--is revolution its life. World Revolution proceeds from East to West. . . the interior and exterior politics of proletarian states are guided by the same principles and viewpoints. . .the world revolution. . .and its interests.

The principles and viewpoints of Communists remain unchanged. They are part of the permanent heritage of the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. . . the experience of the International Communist Movement.

The Communist Party of Hungary . . .

Union as a "Fortress of Democracy"* to provide a permanent locus from which to direct operations. From this premise emerged the directing force of the Communist movement throughout the world: The primary interests of the Soviet Union take precedent over and become the immediate objectives of all other Communist considerations.

The Short-Range Plan. This Moscow-directed pattern became apparent in the program of Soviet Policy following World War II, and under the rigid provisions of that program it became clear that the aims of the Communist Movement are two-fold in nature:

1. The long-range final plan of World Revolution.

2. The formation of a cordon sanitaire around the

European flank of the Soviet Union. as an immediate step.

The historic experience of invasions against Russia explains the latter. The cordon sanitaire emerges as the short-range plan of Communist strategy. As a practical measure for the ultimate realization of the dominant, long-range plan, the immediate results of this aspect of Communist strategy are a matter of post-World War II record in Soviet-dominated countries.

Nations Within the Area

Within the confines of the so-called cordon sanitaire.

* The term "Democracy" is used in the
generalization.

lie the sovereign territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. These five nations are politically, socially, and economically within the "sphere of interest" of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, with its attempts to free itself from "the Great Ally," is by no means considered a separate unit by the Soviet.

These countries--with the exception of Yugoslavia-- (an anomaly to be dealt with in a separate chapter), are closely allied with the Soviet Union. Only future events will determine how far the Soviet can regard them as cordon sanitaire should any emergency arise in which they would have to serve as "a cushion region" between the Soviet Union and the Western World.

Dominant Trends Within the Area

Inside the area the two most characteristic and vitally influential--trends are

- a. Extreme nationalism.
- b. Extreme social eruptiveness.

The latter can be explained by the outdated agricultural structures which--with the exception of Czechoslovakia--kept the living standards far below the European average.

The mosaic characteristics of Central and Eastern European countries are typical. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy made it impossible to draw just lines of

national frontiers on ethnical principles; and, this factor coupled with the outmoded pattern of the social structure, created the explosive character of the region which became a constant threat to world peace. It is not, therefore, coincidental that both of the occurrences which started World Wars I and II took place in this area.

Factors Favoring the Soviet

For a better understanding of the present successes of Soviet Foreign Policy in the area of Central and Eastern Europe, two important factors must be borne in mind:

a. It is a region which after 1944 only had an Eastern side. The disappearance of German political, economic and social power on the side which used to be the West created a vacuum.

b. It is the only area in the world where an entire region experienced an almost complete social re-shuffle as a direct consequence of World War II. Social forces that for centuries only broke to the surface in the form of occasional Peasant Rebellions were released; this partly by the advent of Soviet power into the area. The process has by no means ended, and these suppressed social forces present a challenge-- if not a threat--to the very power which was instrumental in securing their release.

The Hungarian Political Terrain

As for Hungary, the subject of this present study, the following characteristics have to be observed in comparison with the other countries in the area: Factors which make it similar to other countries of the area:

a. Its predominantly peasant character. This is a common characteristic of all countries in the area, excluding Czechoslovakia, but including Yugoslavia. This "peasant character" is expressed, not so much in occupational statistics, but in the "peasant attitude" to life which exerts a wide influence on certain sections of the population which are not peasant. This peasant attitude has a basic influence in the formation of national character in the area.

b. Limited Western Democratic experience. Owing to historic reasons, and as a result of political, economic and social circumstances, Hungary--like all the other countries in the area, with the exception of Czechoslovakia--had only a limited experience in Western Democracy.

c. Enforced Alliance with Germany. Hungary, as a satellite of Germany, was forced into the equivocal position of fighting against the Allies and Russia during World War II. This unhappy experience she shared with Rumania and Bulgaria.

The factors which differentiate Hungary from the other countries in the area:

a. Communist experience. Hungary had the unique experience of a Communist Revolution in 1919 led by Bela Kun, at that time, the only "Soviet" besides Russia.* This revolution failed in a few months, but its large-scale terror left a deep impression on the wide masses of the population to such a degree that for decades following the negative attitude towards Communism was an important factor in the political picture. As for the Communists who participated in this revolution, they regarded the post-World War II period as a continuation of the 1919 effort.

b. Ethnic and Religious Characteristics of Hungary. Hungary is the only non-Slav and non-Orthodox country in the region. Soviet tactics, therefore, were operative in a field where the emotional ties of Pan Slavism and the non-Orthodox world could not be utilized.

c. The Political Vacuum. As a consequence of Nazi rule in 1944, and the collapse of the pre-war system, a complete tabula rasa resulted when the new regime came to power in 1945.

d. The New Elite. The need for a new "elite" was apparent in Hungary. The Communists, in recognition of this need, started in 1945 to lay down the first steps towards creating a new ruling class. The "Muscovites," the Communists who played an active part in the 1919 revolution, and who spent the decades from 1919 to 1945 in the Soviet Union or in the

* The official title of the first Hungarian Soviet Republic was "The Soviet Republic of Hungary."

service of the International Movement, were the nucleus of such a new "elite." The Muscovites also played a prominent part in the shaping of Soviet power in the country.

e. Anti-Soviet Feeling. Owing partly to the unhappy memories of the Bela Kun Revolution; the lack of sympathetic bonds between Hungary and Moscow; and the mass excesses of the Red Army, the Hungarian population is more hostile to the Soviet and to Communism than the other countries in the area. This antipathy is due in part to the national temperament of the Hungarian people.

f. Nationalism in the Hungarian Communist ranks. After the break between Tito and Moscow, dynamic signs of "nationalist Communism" appeared in the ranks of the Hungarian Communist Party.

Four Steps Toward the Realisation of Lenin's Aim

If world revolution is the final aim as outlined by Lenin, four steps toward its realization must be considered.

These four steps, in order of importance, are:

1. The basis for the achievement of world revolution.
2. The prerequisites pointing toward the goal.
3. The guiding principles and methods.
4. Who is available to achieve the goal?

Lenin, in one of his important pronouncements on Communist policy, declared that ". . .without a revolutionary theory there cannot be a revolutionary movement. Only a party guided by an advanced theory can act as a vanguard in the fight."³ In his definition of the theory, Stalin said that "Revolutionary theory is a synthesis of the experience of the working-class movement throughout all lands--the generalised experience."⁴

In the case of Hungary, this quotation by Stalin decided the ~~ory~~ character of the approach. The development of Communism in Hungary goes back to 1919 when the revolutionary roots took firm hold under the personal guidance of Lenin. The permanent features of Communist strategy and the modified features of Communist tactics become apparent through a detailed study of the Hungarian revolutionary experience. The analysis not only provides an opportunity to observe how the Muscovites, returning to Hungary after twenty-five years, utilized the experiences of the 1919 failure, it also demonstrates how the Bela Kun experience became a training ground for Communist policy in the whole area.

The Stalinist "Line"

The "synthesis of experience", to which the 1919 revolution added considerably, accelerated the International Movement in its 1944 struggle, not only in Hungary, but in the whole area as well. A new book of instructions in the field of Communist

tactics emerged as the product of the 1919 to 1945 struggle.

The Effects of the Bela Kun Failure

There is a close connection between the men who now direct Communist policy in Poland, Rumania and Hungary. Their common utilization of a systematic and scientific evaluation of the Bela Kun failure places the importance of the study of Hungarian Communism above the integrity of Hungary itself.

If, to quote Stalin, ". . .revolutionary theory is a synthesis of experience,"⁵ this experience, for the Muscovites, was the Bela Kun revolution. This experience permanently influenced the future decisions of Soviet policy in Hungary. The Muscovites, with decades of personal experience as an integral part of the International Movement, were determined that the failures of the Bela Kun revolution should not be repeated. The most important factor for them was the scientific dissection of the experience of that revolution⁵ in its permanent and non-permanent aspect. In their task they were guided by the instructions of Stalin:

. . .Tactic is the determination of the line to be taken by the proletariat during a comparatively short period of the ebb and the flow of the movement; of advance or retreat of the revolution; the maintenance of this line by the substitution of new forms of struggle and organization for those that have become out-dated, or by the discovery of new watchwords, or by the combination of new methods, etc. Whereas strategy is concerned with such wide purposes as the winning of the war against Tsarism or the Bourgeoisie, tactic has a narrower aim. Tactic is concerned, not with the war as a whole, but with the fighting of this or that campaign, with the main aim of

this or that victory which may be essential to them during a particular period of the general revolutionary advance or withdrawal. Tactics are thus parts of strategy and subordinate thereto." 6

The analysis of contemporary Communist policy in Hungary will show that while almost all the tactical aspects have been changed in light of the experience of that failure, none of the strategical aspects have changed at all. The immutability of the long-range strategical aims is axiomatic in the Movement.

The Basic Methods Employed by the Communist Party in Hungary

In their policy in Hungary, the two most important methodical theories employed by the Communists were

1. The "zigzag" policy.
2. The theory of "the next link in the chain."

The zigzag policy has been explained in detail by Stalin:

To wage a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, more prolonged, more complicated than the most blood-thirsty of wars between states, while renouncing beforehand the use of maneuvering, of playing off though for a time only the interests of one foe against the other, of entering upon agreements and effecting compromises, even though these may be of an unstable and temporary character would not such renunciation be the height of folly? We might as well, when climbing a dangerous and hitherto unexplored mountain, refuse in advance to make the ascent in zigzag, or turn back for a while, to give up the chosen direction in order to test another which may prove to be easier to negotiate.

This "zigzag" policy was most apparent during the political phases of the Hungarian development:

- a. Nationalism.
- b. The Peasant Question.
- c. Coalition.
- d. The Church.

The principle of "the next link in the chain" as a "fighting tactic" was characterized by the Hungarian Communist leader, Rakosi, as one of the most important methods in his bid for titular supremacy. He stresses this importance in a statement referring to the discovery of one link in the chain, which "if we grasp it with all our strength, permits us to hold the chain in our hands and secure access to the next link in the chain."

CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY

The Muscovite Conspiracy

Motto:

1949, May 1st slogans: Hail to the liberating Soviet Union, the guardian of world peace! the defender of the people's freedom! Hail to Stalin, the great leader of the workers of the world! Hail to Stalin, the great friend of the Hungarian people!?

* * *

In order to understand in full the strategical and tactical line of the Hungarian Communists, it is essential to analyze the relationship of the Party in Hungary through its ideological roots stretching through Lenin to the Bela Kun revolution of 1919.

In 1919, and in the period following the Second World War, the most important aspect of Communism in Hungary was its relation to Soviet Russia and the Soviet Communist Party. It is essential to bear in mind that ideologically the Soviet Revolution of Hungary in 1919, and the post-war continuation, were directly rooted in Lenin's person, teachings, and guidance. The defeat of 1919 was never regarded by the fleeing Communists as anything but an interruption of the long-range plan. This is only logical in light of the fact that...

beliefs of the Communist Party is the final victory of Communism all over the world. The Western World, including the Horthy regime in Hungary, congratulated itself--prematurely--over the annihilation of Communism in 1919.

Knowing that in the broad masses of the Hungarian population widespread antipathy was left as a result of the Bela Kun terror, the anti-Communists blindly under-estimated the stamina of their opponents, and failed to study the principles of Lenin and their interpretation by Stalin,--although these principles were to be found in almost every library in the West.

The fact that the anti-Communists refused to adopt a serious view of the fanatic Communist beliefs placed them--in their relationship to Communism--in the proverbial stance of the blind ostrich.

Meanwhile, with the collapse of the Bela Kun regime, the Muscovites arrived safely in Moscow and, without wasting any time, continued the struggle.

The Political "Shuttle Service" of the Muscovites
the two world wars

To establish and maintain contact with the
any, the Muscovites, upon their arrival in
to establish a similar service for the
purpose of maintaining contact with the

Moscow. Their second trip took them back to Hungary--via the illegal shuttle service--where they deposited instructions for the establishment of underground Communist organizations. When they returned to Moscow they carried with them the first files of basic information on Hungary which, when delivered in Soviet Russia, became the foundation of the archives of Institutes which dealt scientifically with every Hungarian problem.

The next trip through the shuttle was back again to Hungary with new instructions to the underground, then the return to Moscow with new information which, after every journey, increased the volume of the Institutes. These experts classified and systematically evaluated the information received from Hungary, co-ordinating it with the data received from the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

The last shuttle journey of the Hungarian Communists took place in 1944. This time they returned with the Red Army--and, as far as they were concerned, for good. Thus occurred the rather rare phenomenon whereby a policy which was built up over its foundation by a group of men was finally--after almost two decades of preparation--put into operation by those same men, on the very scene on which the operation was planned.

These men were the so-called "shuttle" men, a group of Hungarian Communist leaders who had spent

their defeat to Moscow and spent the following decades in the service of the International Movement. Today they are the nucleus of the Communist Party in Hungary.

Interruptions did occur though. Partly they were due to the fact that the interests of the International Communist High Command needed the talents of some of those men who played important roles in their ranks for other tasks like organizing excursions to different European countries--or into the Spanish Civil War.

Partly, these interruptions were due to what could be termed "the occupational hazards" of being a professional revolutionary," i.e., being caught and imprisoned by the government of Hungary or other countries in question. Interruptions of this nature usually resulted in long prison terms, ranging from fifteen to twenty years.

The Muscovites were prepared for both types of interruptions to insure that the continuity of the work would not suffer. From 1919 to 1949 the principle of "expandability" was often heard in Communist declarations. On April 8, 1919, Bela Kun exclaimed:

We comrades may temporarily fail, but in the movement there is no such thing as an individual. . . If one falls out, another steps in to fill the place.

This is a basic and permanent feature of Communist organization.

methods, and Bela Kun's pronouncement was no idle statement. His own end emphasized the truth of this Communist practice.*

The Muscovites, however, knew that even in the solitary confinement of prison cells they were not forgotten by the Soviet. In the prison diary of Zoltan Vas (economic leader of the Hungarian Communists) appears astonishing proof that the imprisoned Muscovites were in constant contact with Moscow.

The Vas diary, which is a record of the decades of prison experience which he shared with Rakosi, reveals the transference from Moscow to prison of regular news concerning the families of prisoners, world affairs, and Party events. All this in Vac Prison in Hungary, where not only the higher prison authorities but the lower strata of the administrative machinery as well were vehemently anti-Communist.

Furthermore, the Communists in prison knew that when trials were arranged, funds would be provided to engage top-ranking lawyers for their defense, and exchange of their persons would take place when possible.

For example, in the case of Rakosi--to defray the expense of his second trial in 1954--unknown sources in Switzerland contacted a well-known lawyer, Rostem Vambery, and offered him an unusually high fee to undertake the legal defense of Rakosi.

characteristic of Communist methods. With Vambery* engaged for Rakosi's defense, machinery was immediately put in motion to inform liberal opinion in the Western World. English liberals and liberal organizations in the United States were mobilized to protest the claimed injustice of the Rakosi trial. Thousands of telegrams flooded the Budapest Government. This pressure on behalf of a body of liberal non-Communist organizations and individuals in the West was utilized by Moscow in an ingenious way, and was not unimportant in saving the life of Rakosi.

Gratitude does not exist in the constant class-struggle minded mentality of the Communist Party. The very same international liberals who saved his life are condemned by Rakosi as spies in the pay of Western imperialists, and they could hardly hope for any mercy should they ever become involved with the jurisdictional machinery of the Soviet.

Lenin and Bela Kun

There were no historic roots of Communism in Hungary, nor could the Communists claim any considerable support from the Hungarian population on the basis of an emotional link, as in Bulgaria, or on a parliamentary basis as in Czechoslovakia. They could, however, claim that the movement, with its principles and operational details, was not foreign to the country. It is never clear how directly Lenin's ideas were applied in Hungary.

part of the Soviet effort using the Lenin-Kun relationship as a supporting basis. .Ideologically, Rakosi and his associates could and did regard themselves as a "Mayflower" aristocracy of Communists who had arrived on the very first boat launched by the same men who launched the Soviet in Russia. Their pride of the past was further strengthened by the realisation that the revolution in Russia after W.W.I. was theoretically as much of a gamble as the undertaking in Hungary.

In the decades following the defeat in 1919, many of the leaders of the 1919 adventure in Hungary continued to interpret Lenin as Stalin did, and as a result they continued as members of the aristocracy of the International Communist hierarchy. Rakosi and Eugen Varga belong to this class. Others, whose interpretation was not in accordance with the doctrinal line, had different experiences. Bela Kun was an insignificant figure in the ranks of the heretics. (See Appendix, Chapter II.)

Bela Kun began his revolutionary career as a prisoner-of-war Party member. During the period of his close personal relationship with Lenin, Bela Kun, after a whole night's conversation, convinced his chief that prisoner-of-war camps in Siberia were not only a waste of time and energy, but a practical step towards the liberation of Europe. He was the first to suggest that the prisoner-of-war camps in Siberia should be used as a base for the liberation of Europe. He was the first to suggest that the prisoner-of-war camps in Siberia should be used as a base for the liberation of Europe.

and thus the activity of Bela Kun in those camps was begun and continued on the road to revolutionary operation in Hungary.

Kun received his training in an agitator school under the personal guidance of Lenin. His futile, personal background before the war in Hungary--an association with an insurance company in Kolozsvar, some rather unsavoury financial dealings, and failure to secure a post on the staff of "Nepszava," the Social Democratic Daily--was later forgotten.

After receiving his assignment for work in Hungary, Kun arrived there on November 19, 1918 carrying a false passport issued to a certain "Dr. Sebestyen," associated with the Hungarian Red Cross branch in Moscow. Twenty-four associates and considerable finances were under his control.

The Kun contingent arrived at a propitious moment. The war was lost, public opinion was shattered, the misery of four years' warfare, coupled with the humiliation of defeat and the uncertainty of the future of the decrepit monarchy of the Hapsburg Monarchy--all constituted a situation in which Moscow could hope for easy achievement of their revolutionary street demonstrations, etc.

In January of 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. The Kun government was established in Budapest. The Hungarian Soviet Republic was a short-lived experiment in socialism. It lasted only 133 days before being crushed by the intervention of the Romanian and Czechoslovak armies. The Hungarian Soviet Republic was the first and only socialist government in Hungary. It was a significant event in the history of the country and the world.

We follow with great pleasure your appearance and your struggle under the flag of revolutionary socialism. . . the realistic power of the bourgeoisie which is now defended by the grateful socialist clowns must be replaced by the realistic power of the proletariat; this will become stronger when it becomes a revolutionary dictatorship. . . only one is possible of the two. . . the bloody dictatorship of the generals. . . or the dictatorship of workers who build a new world on the ruins of the war. . . and the party of the proletariat is our party which was regarded in the beginning of the revolution as a "small group of crazy men" and which by now already more than a year has held the reins of state power with a firm hand. . . and sees with special pleasure how the brother parties strengthen. . . the Russian party of the workers is surviving the period of concessions with the bourgeoisie which is always ready to appease with the counter-revolution. . . In Hungary, too, our brother party is strengthening and leads to our common purpose of socialism on our common road: the dictatorship of the working class. . . then collapse of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat is inevitable. . . our victory, comrades, is inevitable. Hail to world revolution! Hail to the dictatorship of the proletariat! Hail to the international Socialist Republic! Hail to Communism! *R*

This message demonstrates the spirit of respect for the period of the Party struggle in Russia. This period has had a long impact on the philosophy of Communist leaders like Stalin when they look Westward--remember the exultation of those days and days.

The Articles by Lenin

Soon after his arrival in London, the Party published a series of three articles titled "The Party and the Masses" with the first article published in the "Morning Star" in London. . .

the beginning. He wrote:

Marx and Engels found it definitely essential to draw the attention of the workers to the fact that the proletariat cannot just use the machinery of the bourgeois state, cannot just get it started to its own purpose, but has to destroy it, has to break it to pieces.

That was the purpose both in 1919 and 1945. But the 1919 experience taught the Communists that the methods had to be more subtle. For instance, instead of large-scale firing of former civil servants, "legal" purges--effected gradually, and with the cooperation of and endorsement by the non-Communists as well--gave the procedure a semblance of legality. Meanwhile--the Communists reasoned--in this somewhat lengthier process, as it was executed in the post-World War II period, ample time would be available for the training of a new state machinery of reliable Communists, new civil servants. This reasoning was part of the utilization of bourgeois civil servants during the formative period of Communist rule after World War I.

The article by Lenin in the 1919 Hungarian Communist Bill continued:

. . . To talk about pure democracy and equality of rights means nothing else but to laugh at the exploited. . . bourgeois democracy, a step toward historic advance a step forward. . . We should not fear of using the power of the state, we should not fear of using the power of the state to suppress the class enemy. . . We should not fear of using the power of the state to suppress the class enemy.

instructed them by the method of suppression of one class by an other. The term, "Democracy," has a new connotation for the Communists. Mr. Rakosi, in his definition of the word voices the Party Line view:⁴

A people's democracy. . . is, according to its function, a dictatorship of the proletariat without the Soviet form. . .

Then he asks,

What does it mean. . . when power is taken into the hands of the working class in a democratic republic? Is that also dictatorship? To this there is only one answer, yes; unconditionally.

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" finds lucid explanation by Rakosi who continued in his speech:

The dictatorship of the proletariat, said Stalin twenty-five years ago, is exactly like any other class of dictatorship, a means to suppress resistance of the class enemy. The proletarian state is the apparatus for the suppression of the bourgeoisie.

Further, he explained that

The people's democracies, and among them the . . . people's democracy, are in a position to establish a proletarian dictatorship without the Soviet form. . . can base themselves on the great Soviet Union.

And he affirmed the possibility of establishing . . . ship without . . .

The . . . word, and the . . . because of their . . . for . . . the . . .

not until the battle was won and Communist power was secured.

The "Coalition Government", anesthetic, offering idealistic cooperation with all other parties, was successfully applied in Hungary from 1945. It took the patient quite some time to discover that some of his limbs had been amputated. The population in Hungary discovered the loss of those democratic they voted for in 1945 only after the operation of the Communist Party was accomplished. All this, however, according to Lenin, would result in "the liberation of mankind."

The bourgeoisie is forced to be hypocritical and call the bourgeoisie republic 'the rule of the people' or even 'pure democracy', but the Marxist communists ruthlessly throw light on the fraud . . . all this is nothing else but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and only the dictatorship of the proletariat can liberate mankind.

Again, referring to Marx:

. . . the revolutions are the locomotives of history
 . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat will free
 humanity from the yoke of capital and war. Signal.
 Moscow, December 23, 1918. Lenin.

The Communist daily in Hungary prefaced the Leninist
 with the remark that

Comrade Lenin, the foremost fighter on behalf of
 the international proletariat, sent us that article,
 which fact gives more strength to every worker
 the right for the interests of the proletariat . . .
 in the loud shriek voices of black alliance
 Hungarian Social Democrats!

It is evident that the Leninist . . .

Communist . . .

part of the international revolution closely allied with Soviet Russia. This principle has always been upheld, although certain variations in the tactical phases were employed. In December of 1918 the Communists announced:

We want to arouse the class consciousness of the Hungarian proletariat. . .we want to organize them for the fight and arouse in him the feeling of international solidarity which was willfully lampooned in them. . .it will link them to the Soviet Republic of Russia as well as everywhere where this revolution has to break out. Hail to the class struggle. Hail to the proletariat revolution. Hail to the Third International.¹⁶

The Radio-Contact with Lenin

On March 21, 1919, the Communists in Hungary seized the power from the Socialist Karolyi regime. That very night they contacted Moscow on the wireless under difficult technical circumstances, as at that time the radio was a primitive affair. The following Hungarian message was sent to the capital of International Communism:

. . .The Hungarian Soviet Republic asks Comrade Lenin, the Hungarian proletariat, last night conquered the power over the whole country, introduced the dictatorship of the proletariat, and you as the leader of the International proletariat, to convey the expression of our revolutionary greetings to all the Russian revolutionaries.

As a most important news item, the following message was sent to the capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow, on March 21, 1919:

The Hungarian Soviet Republic asks Comrade Lenin, the Hungarian proletariat, last night conquered the power over the whole country, introduced the dictatorship of the proletariat, and you as the leader of the International proletariat, to convey the expression of our revolutionary greetings to all the Russian revolutionaries.

step. In 1945, however, employing the improved tactic in Hungary and all the other countries in East Europe, the Communists carefully postponed the merger of the Social Democrats until all other dangers were abolished. In fact, the merger in 1945⁸ became the final step in the process of consolidating power; the very step, however, without which the Gleichschaltung of power--the prerequisite to socialism--would not be complete. This is a permanent feature. Thirty years later, in June of 1978, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wired its congratulations to the Congress of the Hungarian Workers Party on the occasion of the merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party:

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union sends its warmest greetings and all its best wishes to the new unified party, congratulates past results of the fight and economic reconstruction. The union of the two working parties is an event in the history of the Hungarian working movement of historic significance."¹² Signed, Moscow, June 12, 1978, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The name of the merged parties in 1919 was "Socialist Party," pending the final decision of the coming Moscow Conference of the Third International. After a considerable period of negotiation--an agreement--and final decision in the matter, the Party from Moscow--the Party agreed to select the name "Socialist Party and Communist Party."

The name of the Communist Party was finally decided at the Moscow Conference of the Third International in 1920.

The name of the Communist Party was finally decided at the Moscow Conference of the Third International in 1920.

relationship and trust of Lenin in Kun. Further, this radio message appealed to Soviet Russia for guidance:

The Hungarian Socialist Republic requests the defense and arms alliance of the Soviet Government, and with arms in our hand we will fight all the enemies of the proletariat . . . we request immediate information on the military situation.

This showed how closely the Hungarian Soviet was tied to the fate of the Russian Soviet at that time. The Hungarian Communists wired to Lenin the complete text of their Manifesto issued "For All" which gives the essence of their whole program. This program of the Hungarian Communists was thus submitted to the approval of Lenin the very first night of their rule.*

The main features of the Hungarian Manifesto were:

Declaration of the complete unity in principles and spirit with the Russian Soviet Government. Offers alliance hopes to maintain a powerful Army, details the drastic land reform, etc.

Lenin answered:

To Comrade Bela Kun, I have forwarded your message just now to the Russian Communist Bolshevik Party Congress. The enthusiasm is boundless. We will let you know the decisions of the Moscow conference of the Third International as soon as possible as well as send you reports on the military situation . . . It is definitely essential to maintain constant wireless connections between Budapest and Moscow, with Communist greetings. Lenin.

The Hungarian Communist daily commented on the Lenin message in the following lines:

With you in the success, that is the message of Lenin, whose words speak the noblest things, the love of the people and the love of proletarian revolution.

*The Hungarian Communist Manifesto, issued in Budapest, 1919, is a document of great historical interest. It is a program of complete unity with the Russian Soviet Government, and it is a program of complete unity with the Russian Soviet Government, and it is a program of complete unity with the Russian Soviet Government.

Lenin, my sincere greetings to the proletarian government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and especially Comrade Kun.* Forward--we are with you in the victory, but in the struggle too. Forward . . . constantly forward.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MUSCOVITES

This realization of the close association from the beginning is essential to understand the mentality of the Muscovites who from that time onward spent decades of their lives in the fight waged from Moscow, all over Europe, in the underground, and in prisons. After thirty years the consolidation of the power which they unsuccessfully tried to retain in 1919 made them regard the success as a logical sequence and part of the "historic necessity." This absolute identity with the interests and aims of Moscow is even more important than the fact that they were all Soviet citizens, married to Russians, and held important positions in the Soviet Army and the Civil Service. All these features they retained through the arrangement of "Dual Citizenship" laws passed in Hungary in 1945. Their very essence became their oneness with Moscow in every respect, blindly and without any consideration as to any other sentiment or interest. To them, Communism on a "national" basis, i.e., not "through" the nation

*The close relationship between Kun and the leadership of the Russian revolution, and particularly Lenin, was so well known that the entente sent General Smuts to Budapest in 1919 to discuss with the probable design of feeling out if Kun could be used as an in-between with the Soviet Russian government. The negotiations took place on April 4th and 5th, 1919, in the private train of General Smuts. Ostensibly, the negotiations were on the Hungarian frontiers and broke down without result. Constant telephone conversation was maintained between Lenin and Kun.

interest of Soviet Russia was as unthinkable as was Christianity on a national basis to a Catholic. Barankovics, the leader of the Hungarian People's Democratic Party, before he fled Hungary in 1949, had a talk with Rakosi concerning national Communism. Rakosi tried to persuade the Democratic leader to organize a Hungarian National Catholic Church which would be independent of Rome. Barankovics declined, explaining: "Christianity on a national basis does not have any meaning for me. You, Mr. Rakosi, who are fighting Tito, should understand that."²⁰ Rakosi did not have an answer.

The Telegram from Lenin

In March, 1919, Bela Kun refers to a telegram from Lenin which clarifies the all important aspects of "leftist deviationism":

It is not necessary to stick to the letter of the Russian constitution. . .one has to learn of the mistakes of the Russian Revolution. . .I do not know such thing as a leftist counter-revolution. . .there is no man in the Party who is more left than I am. . .* 21

Lenin further clarified the issue in this same telegram:

We are happy that you lay the main emphasis not on words but on facts which are the mature guarantees of the revolution and where the stress has to be laid on the shift of class relations to the interest of the proletariat. . .

The significance of this Lenin telegram as an indicator on the tactics of Communism was that the emphasis was on facts and not on words. This very essence of Communist tactics in every phase of Communist policy, even in the tactical as well as in the political sphere, is the same. Policy.

During the first May 1st celebration of the Hungarian Communists, in 1919, Chicherin, the Soviet Russian Commisar of Foreign Affairs, sent

. . . warmest brotherly greetings . . . and with particular pleasure we greet the heroically struggling working people . . . who fight as a vanguard in the fight for international workers brotherhood in the great world war of the liberation of work . . . we have many enemies . . . the luck of battle bends here and there . . . their power is great . . . and we cannot always pride with victory . . . but the success of our cause is increasing day by day . . . and we proceed forward in the certainty of victory . . . 22

This message clearly shows that at that time the alliance was not only close between Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary, but it was on equal footing, a fact which changed considerably after World War II. The Muscovites conceded that the battle in Hungary in 1919 was a lost one, but the other battle, in Russia, was won and, therefore, offered an opportunity to continue the fight in Hungary. When the timing was right, with the full backing of Moscow, not only ideologically this time, but with the powerful Red Army's support, another battle could be fought. This consistency of purpose is an essential feature of the Muscovite mentality, dating back to 1919. In that degree of oneness with Soviet Russia, how could anyone expect the Muscovites to see that almost all the acts of the Red Army in Hungary in 1945, culminating in the arrest of an important Hungarian non-Communist leader, would be an infringement of Hungarian sovereignty. There is only one sovereignty existing to the world today.

*The Soviet Army again invaded Hungary in 1956, and in 1957, the "Hungarian Revolution" was crushed.

tactics in the battle for "socialism", both in 1919 and in the post-World War II period could only be guided by the sole motive of interest of Soviet Russia. This explains the possibility that Rakosi is one of the few men living who has reportedly a direct telephone line to Stalin.

The almost symbolic military aid in 1919 was dwarfed by the gigantic steamroller machinery of the Red Army in 1945, which for a considerable period kept over one million members in Hungary after 1945,--this in a country of nine and a half million.

Aside from the ideological backing of 1919, the seeds of military aid from Moscow were sown already. In March of 1919, Maxim Gorki had sent a wire to Kun congratulating the Hungarian Communist leader on the achievement of victory: "Our hearty greetings . . . a new era starts . . . your example will shortly be followed by the whole world."

Gy. Lukacs, Commissar for Education in Hungary in 1919, who plays an important role today as well, explained the difference between the movement in Hungary and Russia in 1919:

They say we want to copy the Russian Revolution . . . There is a considerable difference between the movement in Russia and in Hungary . . . that is that while in Russia the movement could only consolidate itself after several resistance fights . . . the weakness and immorality of the Hungarian bourgeoisie made it possible to fight the first battle without blood, and in the institutional organization we got considerably further than they.

The same type of praise by the Russian revolutionaries . . .

resent in . . . on . . . 1919, 1919 :

We had the advantage against Russia that we could proceed with the rebuilding immediately, and in four weeks could socialize more than 1,000 factories, while the Russians were only able to socialize 513 after a year.²⁵

This rashness of reforms, under which the Hungarian economy became paralyzed in 1919, was one of the very important lessons to the Communists. In 1945 they no longer attempted to excel Russia. More gradual speed was a basic improvement in the tactics over 1919, a clear demonstration that the 1919 Bela Kun revolution, as well as the whole 30-year experiment in Russia, was utilized to the utmost by the Communists.

The Letter from Lenin

As proof of the importance to Lenin of Hungarian Communism, Pravda, on June 6, 1919, published a letter from Lenin to the Hungarian workers from Petrograd, in which Lenin calls the Hungarian Communist revolution "the first revolution which broke out in Western Europe (sic) and is therefore the first example in Western Europe."²⁶

The complete tactical line was also laid down in this letter, and in Lenin's message to the Hungarian workers:

Fighting for final socialism, the hesitations and concessions of other elements can only be effectively suppressed by the unending steel-like dictatorship of an organized revolutionary proletariat. . . in order to achieve the goal of the revolution, all this has to be executed without regard to all resistance that is to be broken. . . the social revolution is not only opposed by the capitalist and bourgeois classes, but by the small bourgeoisie as well, and even by those workers who can not rid themselves from bourgeois traditions. . . the working element of the proletariat must strive for socialism and the workers' dictatorship. . . the seller of his cross will not find the door of the workers' dictatorship. This is the only way to the final goal.

broken down by the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .
 these elements will have to be educated by showing them all
 the benefits of the new order.²⁷

Neither Bela Kun or Rakosi succeeded in achieving this tactical
 line. The essence of tactics remained the same--the dictatorship
 of the proletariat--but the sugar-coating of the people's democracy
 could be applied with a different form, owing to the changed status
 of the Soviet Union. In his book The Year of Decisions, Rakosi
 explains it:

As to the functions of the People's Democracy, it is
 a dictatorship of the proletariat--that's exactly where we
 come back to 1919--without the Soviet form. The transition
 from capitalism into socialism varies. One follows the
 Soviet form; the other one is the people's democracy. The
 reason is that the people's democracy can have a dictator-
 ship of the proletariat without the Soviet form is . . .
 the new strength gained by the victory of the Soviet Union
 against Fascism, which resulted in the people's democracies.²⁸

Lenin, in his 1919 message, gave specific instructions for
 handling "the hesitating elements" and the "new joiners":

Be firm. If hesitation is apparent among those who
 joined . . . just yesterday or among the small bourgeois
 element, suppress that hesitation. The class rule of the
 proletariat relies on the organized strength of the prole-
 tariat and all the achievements of science, technique and
 capital . . . this and the knowledge of the psychology of
 all types of workers and its superiority against the workers
 in the villages and small producers who are less organized
 and less consequent . . . these are needed to win over the
 peasants and the small bourgeois worker to socialism . . .
 in times like these when according to the historic situation
 only two types of dictatorship are possible, either the
 capitalist counter-revolution or the revolutionary prole-
 tariat dictatorship, everything can weaken the latter and
 alienate it from them. That half and half way of thinking
 endeavours as a means of counter-revolution dictatorship,
 to overthrow the power of the proletariat . . . and by
 hampering the revolutionary proletarian dictatorship, in

reality is the vilest instrument of the counter-revolution, to break the strength of the revolution.²⁹

The Doctrinal Roots of Contemporary Communist Party Philosophy
in 1919

Foreign Policy

Immanent in the basic philosophy of Communism is the ever-stressed belief that the entire world will one day be dominated by the Communists:

. . .we have the unshakeable conviction that the evolution of the world unavoidably leads towards Socialism. . .but we also know that on this road it may be stopped by arms for a considerable time. . .Our struggle is for the interests of the proletaires all over the world.³⁰

This belief is indigenous to the operation of Communist Foreign Policy:

The basis of the foreign policy of the proletar state is the unshakable trust in historic necessities. . . a foreign policy of offensive character would be the maximum of folly and purposelessness. The attack was always started by international imperialism for the very reason that the very existence of the proletare state means a life threat to every capitalist state.³¹

The essence of Communist foreign policy, which is operating on the 1919 basis, is harmonious with the above quotations. It includes the motive of the fanatic belief that the capitalist states are bound to collapse within themselves without the necessity of outside intervention. However, as this is a historic necessity, and some of the Imperialist leaders also realize it, the capitalists will try to annihilate the Communist states before their own collapse occurs. This state of tension constitutes a perpetual threat to the peace of the world and the existence of

the Communists states who, therefore, have to maintain a strong army to defend themselves against the aggressive designs of Western imperialists.

Communist Concept on the Use of Diplomacy for World Revolution

The role of Foreign Policy in the Communist state is closely allied with the long-range plan of World Revolution:

. . .The only viewpoint in foreign policy is world revolution . . .Our foreign policy is to increase that revolution. To increase the Hungarian proletare revolution is our interior policy. Foreign and imperial policy are equally: revolution, both in national and in international frames. . . The many exchanges of notes, all the diplomatic courtesies don't mean anything on any side. Clemenceau and his associates, if they could do it, would strangle with armed forces the Russian and the Hungarian proletare states.²²⁾

This outlook is basic in Communist philosophy. The Communists are convinced that owing to the permanent warfare between capitalist powers and warfare between the international revolution and international capitalism, the so-called peace is nothing but an intermission of the capitalist system for the next war. Furthermore, they are convinced that the West is never sincere in its expressions of peace towards the Communist states. All the diplomatic courtesies, the speeches of the West, are regarded as nothing less than a disguise for war purposes.

This logic in Communist philosophy regarding diplomacy as just another form of warfare between states convinced them of the justice of their own diplomacy: using their own diplomats for conspiracy against the very states to which they are accredited, while painfully adhering to the forms of protocol.

The same Communist philosophy takes a cynical stand on international friendship, as the Communists strictly believe in the continuity of class warfare. The fact that the masses in the West do not exhibit their complete willingness to join the world revolution is interpreted by the Communists with the explanation that they are not yet ready; thus, it is the purpose of agents carrying diplomatic passports to serve the revolution through penetration of the lower ranks in capitalist countries.

The Use of the "One Policy" in Exploiting the "Contradictions"

The line was indicated clearly in 1919 in an explanation of the fact that in Communist strategy there are no separate policies, only the policy of the revolution, which must be achieved through various tactical means in the Communist state itself and in the non-Communist states abroad:

. . . Prior to the imperialist developing. . . there was no united reactionary mass. . . It was reactionary, but not united. . . It would be a wrong attitude not to exploit the contradictions which stand between. . . different imperialist countries. . . These contradictions are so deep growing, that it is dead certain that we can base part of our foreign policy on these contradictions. . . 33

These are, according to Stalin, the three most important contradictions in the capitalist system:

First contradiction: The conflict between labor and capital.

Second contradiction: The conflict between the various financial groups and the different imperialist powers in their competition for control of the sources of the raw material for foreign territory.

Third contradiction: The conflict between the small groups of dominant 'civilized' nations on the one hand, and the hundreds of millions of persons who make up the colonial and dependent peoples of the world on the other. 34

In 1919, Bela Kun delineated the interior policy of the workers' movement in accordance with the contradictions of imperialist states:

. . .In the interior policy of the workers' movement, the tactics which wanted to utilize the contradictions of interest between the various sections of the reactionary masses was completely justified. . .The Imperialist capitalism of Wilson. . .wanted to secure the possibility for the United States to have free and large-scale business traffic with European countries. . .All these and the question of their vassal satellite states in their spheres of interest, the economic orientation of the Poles. . .are such questions on which we can securely build our foreign policy. . .We don't claim that only the international proletare revolution helps us. . .We have to make use of all those gaps and contradictions which stand between the hostile imperialists, from each other. . .who stand opposite us. 35

The Communist Concept of the Interrelation of Western Imperialism and German Imperialism

Many years prior to the outbreak of the Cold War, the Communists had established their basic attitude toward the German Question, and hurled the charge (now commonly heard) that American and English capitalists were bidding for mastery of the world. The Hungarian Communist daily, in 1919, wrote:

. . .The imperialist world will employ every means to have the English and American ruling class as the force to move the world. . .The foreign policy of the leading powers of the Entente are filled with blood and business. . .and they force this bloody business activity on all those states whom they force to join them. . .Again they return to the territory of most selfish business calculations, and they want to direct the world again from a business office. . .Colonization in big and small, that is the new course of the international capital. . .The exploitation policy of the International capitalists and on to the new stage. . .and although to the Hungarian workers it is a great honor that England and America want to make them work for their capitalists. . .and even their workers, he doesn't ask any of this honor and prefers to die till the last than to sell his body and soul and wife and children to the devil of capital. . .He will

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no longer be cannon fodder. . .but will remain on the present Communist system which. . .unites all the material and spiritual forces to stop the exploitation of his body and soul and to organize a society which will serve the well-being of the people equally.³⁶

The power of Germany was--even in 1919--recognized as a vital factor in the movement toward conflict: Referring to the reluctance of the imperialists to dismantle German war industry after World War I, Bela Kun said:

. . .This is nothing else but a disguised fight against Bolshevism, which became open in Germany where the viewpoint concerning the limitation of armed power was that so much armed power should be left to Germany, which would just be enough to defend the capitalist system and break down the Bolshevik movement. . .The peace politics of imperialism is nothing else but grave reaction against which nothing else can be done but to continue the class struggle . . .Now the center of gravity is on the question of German and Austrian peace treaties. . .The workers will have no other choice but either to bear the consequence of the imperialist war by hunger or to get rid of the consequences of the imperialist war by organizing their own power their own dictatorship. In the international progress of revolution, not only these two countries Russia and Hungary mean a step forward, but it is undoubtedly a fact that the victorious imperialist countries cannot avoid their fate . . .We can surely reckon with Italy and France. The solidarity of their proletaires besides the Hungarian and Russian Soviet. . .As apparent in those strikes which go on in Italy and France and the size of which is huge, according to our information.³⁷

This reference by Bela Kun to the mobilization of the workers in Italy and France and to have them express their solidarity with widespread strikes closely resembles the repetition of those same tactics which were employed thirty years later; tactics which are a basic part of an ideology which features war as an essential prerequisite for the disturbed condition which will aid the aim of the world movement.

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The tone of this article, as well as that of the following, is almost identical with Communist Party tactics at the present time:

. . . The foreign policy of the Western democracies does not differ in any aspect. . . from the foreign policy of German imperialism. Exactly the same is emphasized today. The Western democracies are by no means better. . . The imperialist character of Western politics is bared now. . . The contradictions which distinguish the individual victorious capitalist states are deep and grave. . . Although these countries are united in their designs that every country has to be colonized and drawn into the sphere of interest of the big imperialist robber states and that every country has to get under their yoke; however, the imperialist states have to fight among themselves. . . The unity of imperialism does not mean lack of competition between the individual nations, but means a continuing fight for the redistribution of the world, the fight for the most ruthless competition on the completely anarchic world economic markets.³⁸

The only expression missing from these phrases is "The Marshall Plan." The pattern of Party Line tactics in 1919 has its counterpart in every Communist utterance today. As examples: In 1919, a Communist article on the pacifism of the West:

. . . Nobel--Carnegie. . . the pacifists of capitalist imperialism. . . Pacifism is unnecessary; in fact, it is a harmful lie, as long as there is capitalism, because capitalism doesn't recognize peace. The proletare revolution and the production of Socialism is the only road leading out from this dark thoroughfare which leads essentially to war. . . Socialism is peace. . . Capitalism is war. . .³⁹

From a speech in 1919: "Foreign imperialists and ours made an alliance."⁴⁰ In today's phraseology, exactly the same arguments are emphasized, replacing, usually, the word "counter-revolutionary" with "reactionary", and instead of calling themselves "proletare states," usually "people's democracy" is used. Even

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more significant is the fact that exactly the same Communist philosophy is emphasized in addition to Moscow by Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia.

The fact that Communist philosophy in foreign affairs was laid down in 1919, and announced in several of its aspects by Bela Kun earlier than Stalin, indicates that in the Communist mentality, and in this case, the mentality of the Hungarian Muscovites, the imperialist reactionary forces repeat themselves unavoidably, trying to use exactly the same strategy, and, consequently, the Communists employ the same line representing continuity in their own policy.

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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

The Trial and Death of Bela Kun

In the May 19, 1919 issue of "Nyugati Hirnök," appears a report on the death of Bela Kun, signed by Fhonti. (The paper remarks that, according to their information, A. Gellert, while on a Scandinavian journey in 1948, acquired the information from a witness who was present at the occurrence.)

In July of 1937, the Presidium of the Comintern met under the chairmanship of Dimitrov in Moscow. In addition to the members, two others were invited: Bela Kun, who formerly had been a member of the Presidium, and Eugen Varga, the well-known economist who took an important part in the 1919 revolution in Hungary.

After a few introductory remarks, Chairman Dimitrov emphasized the great importance of the meeting and asked the members to be firm and energetic. Following him, Manuilski, the representative of the Russian Communist Party, took a file from his briefcase and read the Russian translation of a letter which Bela Kun wrote to the member organizations of the Hungarian Communist Party. This circular letter criticized the policy of the Comintern. After reading a paragraph which particularly and severely criticized the Third International, Manuilski stopped and turned to Kun. "Tell us, Kun, is this text really from you? Did you write and distribute it?"

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of his service to the Party, his connections with Lenin which go back prior to 1917, his activity in Hungary, his imprisonment in Budapest and Vienna. He explained, on the basis of his old relationship with the very beginnings of the Party, that he felt he had a right to criticize certain aspects and he gave all his ideological and political reasons.

The members of the Presidium, who mostly lived in the same place, the Hotel Lux, which was reserved mainly for well-known foreign Communists, listened to him. They were: Dimitrov, Manuilski, Togliatti, Piecke, Juusinen, etc. After Kun finished his explanation, Manuilski continued by emphasizing a sentence of the Kun letter which was directed against the leaders of the Comintern: "Isn't it true, Bela Kun, that you wrote this besmirching accusation against the leaders of our Party? Whom did you want to hurt with that?"

Kun lost his temper and shouted to Manuilski, "To you and the ones who are similar to you!"

"No, Bela Kun, you didn't mean me or others similar to me. You know exactly that we all only execute the will of our beloved leader, Comrade Stalin. You wanted to attack Stalin."

The Finn, Kuusinen^{en} spoke similarly, and then Professor Varga accused Bela Kun and, in fact, made him responsible for the failure of the Hungarian Communist revolution in 1919. According to Varga, this was a direct consequence of the economic policy of Bela Kun, particularly in that he nationalized the

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land immediately instead of distributing it first, thus deviating from the Soviet example, and arousing the peasants against the regime, facilitating the work of the reaction. (On checking the 1919 sources in newspapers, this critical attitude of Eugen Varga's can clearly be ascertained on several occasions and in public speeches in which he criticized Bela Kun.)

Bela Kun answered, "I am going to protest to Comrade Stalin against all your accusations. I will tell him all the details and I am sure he will agree with me."

Manuilski answered, "Comrade Stalin will be informed of the details, but not by you."

After a short debate, Dimitrov summed up the political attitude of Bela Kun, explaining that he deviated from the Line and wanted to foment a rebellion within the Third International; therefore, he is an enemy of the people and has to be dealt with as such. Dimitrov suggested that Kun be excluded from the International and deprived of all his functions. This was accepted unilaterally.

At the gate policemen waited for Bela Kun, and it became known that fifteen days later he was executed in Uman in the Ukraine.

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CHAPTER III

THE INTERRELATION OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
WITH SOVIET RUSSIAThe Interrelation in 1919

It is important to note that in the beginning Russian aid to Hungary assumed a purely ideological and political form with Russian divisions playing only a symbolic role. The strength of the Soviet regime in 1919 in Russia was extremely limited, but, acting on the military threat against the newborn Communist regime in Hungary, Moscow, on April 28, 1919, declared: "Everybody should take arms to defend. . .the Hungarian Soviet Republic."⁴¹ And on May 4th, the Communist daily, under the caption: "The Russian Workers Aid the Hungarian Republic with Arms,"⁴² reported from Moscow: "On May 1st--in Moscow--they emphasized everywhere the necessity do actual fighting for the Hungarian Soviet Republic." On May 9th, Trotsky sent a telegram to the Russian division of the First International Red Brigade in Hungary:

Give our brotherly greetings to every fighter of the Hungarian Red Army. . .I trust that your voluntary division will be such a self-sacrificing part of the Hungarian Red Army as the Hungarian brigade has been in the Russian Red Army. Hail to the Hungarian Red Army. Hail to the Hungarian Revolution.⁴³

On the same day, Chickerin wired:

The breast of the revolutionary Hungarian proletariat is the strong shield of proletarian freedom.⁴⁴

While actual military assistance was not considerable, the unity of Moscow and Hungarian Communism could hardly have been

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demonstrated better, and it is only logical to the Muscovite mentality that in 1945, when the position of the Soviet was radically altered, they should accept and welcome without hesitation the help and pressure of the Red Army in their fight.

During the May 1st celebration of the Hungarian Communists, Csicserin, Commissar of Foreign Affairs in Soviet Russia, sent

. . . warmest brotherly greetings. . . and with particular pleasure we greet the heroically struggling working people . . . who fight as a vanguard in the fight for international oneness in the workers brotherhood in the great world war of the liberation of work. . . we have many enemies . . . the luck of battle bends here and there. . . their power is great. . . the success of our cause is increasing day by day. . . and we proceed forward in the certainty of victory. . . ⁴⁵

This message clearly shows that during that time the alliance between Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary was not only close, it was almost on an equal footing: "We do not stand alone, Soviet Russia stands by us." ⁴⁶ Today the same sentiment is expressed in the election appeal of the Independent People's Front as broadcast by Budapest on April 17, 1949:

We will defend our country; we stand shoulder to shoulder with our great liberator and ally, the U.S.S.R. ⁴⁷

The abiding faith which the Hungarian Communists felt for Russia was well expressed by T. Szamuely during the Congress of the Party:

The duty of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the most eminent solidarity toward the Russian Soviet. . . I do not want to go into the details of the duty towards the Rus-

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sian Soviet. . .but undoubtedly we cannot give up the fight or stop it until the Russian proletariat is in danger.⁴⁸

The Communists, even then, regarded themselves as fighting for the interests of Soviet Russia.

Szamuely himself was the liaison with Soviet Russia, flying several times to Moscow and back, in 1919, a 2000-kilometer flight over the Carpathians.

After one such flight, when Szamuely returned with Russian newsreels on the Communist fight in Russia, the arrival of Lenin in Kiev, etc., the Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, Bohm-- Hungarian Minister in 1947 in Stockholm--in a Command of the Day lauded the flight of Szamuely as "endangering his life and thus fulfilling the task with which he was entrusted."⁴⁹

Contemporary Communist Party Reappraisal of the 1919 Interrelation

Pro-Soviet orientation of 1919 is traced in an article published in the official Communist daily in Budapest. The writer compares 1919 with the failures of other struggles for freedom in Hungarian history (the Revolution of 1848, etc.):

In 1919 for the first time in Hungarian history at last it happened that we received aid to the Hungarian national cause, to the Hungarian national progress from the East. The alliance and unity in arms, the Soviet orientation concluded by the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and opens up a new phase in Hungarian national foreign policy. It is necessary to speak more about the fact how much the foreign policy of our people's democracy continues on the same route which was opened up in 1919.⁵⁰

Comparing the status of Soviet Russia at that time with the then existing regime, the article continues:

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At that time the Socialist state was just about born in the Soviet Union, was bleeding of thousand wounds and fighting for its very existence. Today the Soviet Union is the first power of the world and one of our most staunch supporters for the fighting working class. At that time the Hungarian bourgeoisie survived the war with small wounds. In 1945 it was crushed to pieces under the beating of the Soviet Army and the Hungarian people. At that time the peasantry, because of the land reform we missed, was hostile to us or neutral in the best case.

THE INTERRELATION FROM 1945

The Red Army Excesses

The Soviet Army was characterized by the commandant of the Soviet garrison in Budapest as "the Soviet Army which moved West in the spirit of Humanism."⁵¹

"Humanism" was the word with which General Sviridov characterized the spirit of the Red Army. This army set an almost unprecedented record of excesses which are customary in all wars by all armies. Looting, raping, plundering reached such dimensions as were hardly known anywhere before. From the very day of its arrival in Hungary, tens of thousands of men of the best working ages were taken by the Red Army, most of them civilians. The number of these deportations cannot be estimated, but for several months trainloads of young men were removed from the country and the population left in a constant state of anxiety and fear. No house was safe, nobody knew what was to follow next. To the women, an almost unbelievable scale of raping occurred in all age groups, from 8-10 year old children, to women up to the age of 70. One of the foremost Hungarian Opposition

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leaders, D. Sulyok, estimates the number of raped women to one million, in a nation where the total population is under ten million. The very low standards of hygiene and cleanliness in the Red Army resulted in wholesale infection of the population. Entire villages were infected with syphilis.

These Red Army excesses added to the wide-scale memories of the Bela Kun terror in 1919 and increased the widespread and popular dislike of the population against the Red Army and the Communists whom the Hungarian people associated with the Army.

As to the material damage, according to the note of the Department of State, out of the 345 millions of total war damage, Russian removal was responsible for 124 millions. This, of course, was besides the reparation of 3000 millions in 1938 dollar valued goods which crippled the economy of Hungary.

When the Hungarian government visited Moscow in 1947, during a discussion of economic problems, Prime Minister Nagy and the Hungarian Government Delegation complained to Stalin regarding Nazi plundering:

Laughing out loud, Stalin remarked, 'Say, our soldiers carried away quite a bit from there too--even if you do not talk about that now.'

Mass Reaction of the Population

The attitude of the Hungarian population, however, was not so facetious. In the 1945 and 1947 elections the returns showed that the Communists, in several cases, did not succeed in gaining

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a majority even in working-class districts. With the aid of direct and indirect pressure, a number of "class conscious" male votes were secured. The voting, working woman, however, was more influenced by Red Army outrages than class consciousness.

The elections demonstrated a comparatively rare occurrence, where mass violence exhibits its effects in a consecutive political census changing the sentiments "en masse" of a section of the population which, according to the doctrine, was bound to cast votes to its own class interest. The mass looting of working-class homes in the suburbs of Budapest, where a lone sewing-machine suggested a bourgeois home to the Red Soldier, certainly added to the ubiquitous fear and dislike of the Red Army and the Communist Party.

The Germans removed whole factories, but they used slips of paper carefully stamped "Military Orders," giving the procedure a semblance of legality which was more easily accepted by the law-abiding population than the looting--without any order--of their personal belongings.

There was hate against both the Nazi soldiers and the Red Army, but the former was based on elements of fear and respect, while in the latter case, loathing and fear dominated. German propaganda was also an effective public relations achievement, to which the primitively printed and worded Moscow propaganda could not be compared.

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The Long-Range Purpose of the Red Army Excesses

While these circumstances rendered the hate and fear against the Red Army and the Communist Party almost uniform among the wide masses of the population, they had a long-range purpose. Many a democratic-feeling, politically intelligent person at that time in Hungary felt sincerely upset by the excesses of the Russians and felt that because of these occurrences Soviet-Hungarian friendship was made impossible for generations.

Once again it has been proven that separate actions of the Russians do not make sense, as they were conceived as a part of a long-range plan without the understanding of which they cannot be understood. In this case, the Red Army helped the future tactics of the Communist Party considerably even with its mass excesses. They laid a basis of fear--a complete sense of insecurity and isolation in the wide masses of the population. On that basis, the technique of employing fear, both directly and indirectly, which is one of the basic features of Communist tactics, could be employed successfully to its fullest. That is the reason why it was not contrary to Russian interests to command the roughest troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Army to the Hungarian scene.

Hungarian Dependence on Soviet Russia

The new regime had to look to the Soviet for every political hope. The same tactics were employed by the Soviet here as in the case of Germany concerning the Eastern Provinces which were

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given to Poland by Russia. Hungary was--according to all appearances--dependent upon Russia for the return of the lost territories.

In the case of the peace treaties of Hungary--with innumerable territorial and population problems--Russia, in a very subtle way, employed the tactics of intimation and promise. When Prime Minister Nagy was in Moscow the behavior and words of Stalin tempted him to say, on his return to Budapest: "In connection with the peace treaty took we met the greatest understanding."⁵³ The Socialist Minister of Justice, Ries, on the same day, said: "The Soviet Union will be the country which will fight on the peace conference for every just demand of Hungary."⁵⁴ Proof that this was the official line of tactics was given by Rakosi on May 1, 1945: "Comrades, on May 1st, we also demonstrate for a good Hungarian peace."⁵⁵ Stalin also assured Hungary of Soviet non-intervention in the spring of 1946. In an after-dinner speech to the Hungarian government, he said:

In my opinion, it is easy to create friendly relations between Russia and Hungary. The Soviet Union never sinned against Hungary. Czarist Russia, speeding to the help of the Austrian armies in 1849, committed a grave assault against Hungarian interests; but we shot the last Czar in 1920, and we cannot assume responsibility for their misdoings. Soviet Russia never wanted to be involved in a war with Hungary. The leaders of Hungary declared war on Russia, which under such circumstances, had to defend herself. . . .⁵⁶

Stalin assured the Hungarian Government that Russia had no interest in Hungarian affairs:

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In 1944 the Soviet Union was glad to receive Horthy's offer of an armistice; but Horthy was weak and could not enforce the temporary agreement signed by his emissaries. Hungary has leaders today who sincerely love the people, and this is an assurance she will stay on the correct political road in the future. The Soviet Union does not wish to meddle in the internal affairs of Hungary; in general, the peoples of small nations are frightened needlessly of Soviet oppression. If the Soviet Union would undertake to oppress or influence small nations, it would betray the ideologies of Lenin and invalidate its practices in the past. The Soviet state consists of a union of many nationalities, among these are some who, under the Czar, were destined for extinction. To these we gave protection and culture, and today, advancing swiftly, they enjoy their own flourishing life. . .

He further assured the Hungarian people that a major power and a small nation could live side by side in harmony:

We are conscious of the fact that each and every small nation contributes its own to the treasury of mankind; with its own culture it enriches life throughout the globe. Consequently, if we do not influence or suppress small nationalities within our borders, this should be a guarantee for the small nations beyond our borders that we have no desire to influence upon them or oppress them. We wish only to live with them in peace and friendship. It is our conception that there can be true friendship between a major power and a small country without endangering the independence of the latter.

Conclusion on Soviet Russian Policy in Hungary

In 1919 and in 1945, Communism came to Hungary via Russia. In both cases, the persons who represented it were alien to the population and felt at one with the interests of the international revolution guided by and from Moscow. The Red Army played its role not only in filling in the vacuum of the defeated German power and the consequent psychological softening up of the masses, but also in creating a political tabula rasa

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by forbidding the continuity of any aspect of the past political picture. It was an overall rule of the country under the disguise of the Allied Control Commission, whose Chairman was a Russian general.

It may be some indication of the importance Russia attached to the Hungarian political terrain as a training-ground for future operation, that the A.C.C. Chairman was no less a person than Marshall Vorosilov.

The tactics employed were highly hypocritical. While the total political and economic life of the country was under the domination and orders of the Red Army, the U. S. request in July, 1946 for an inter-Allied examination of the "alarming deterioration of the Hungarian economy" was refused, the Russians indicating that this would interfere with the "exclusive competence" of the sovereign Hungarian government!

A year later, when the United States requested a joint A.C.C. inquiry into the every-increasing "conspiracy" charges, the Soviet Union refused, explaining that this would constitute an "open intervention into the internal affairs of the Hungarian Republic, and a rude violation of the legal rights of the Hungarian Peoples' Court."⁵⁸

Shortly afterwards, when Red Army units removed Bela Kovacs, Secretary General of the Smallholders Party, from the custody of the Police and arrested him "for crimes directed against the Soviet armies,"⁵⁹ again a United States request for a joint inquiry was refused; this time--it was no concern of the United

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States.

Thus, the wide masses in Hungary regard the Communists and the Soviet as one. The Communist Party realizes this and utilizes it to the utmost. In all phases of tactics this is apparent. The basic difference in the case of Hungary, however, as compared to the other states in the Russian sphere of Europe, is that all of the other states are Slav and Orthodox, and the ties of Pan Slavism, with all their important effects on mass emotions, could be employed, ameliorating the Russian task. But in Hungary the Pan Slav attraction could not be used. The Russians tried to bring the country closer to the Pan Slav concept by inviting a Hungarian observer to participate in the All-Slav Congress of 1947 in Belgrade. This, if anything, only deepened the gap between the regime and the population. Neither could any ties of religion bring the Hungarian population closer to the Moscow-directed Orthodox Church. Hungary is the most Eastward outpost of the Vatican in Europe.

The rule of the Budapest regime is mainly due to and based on Soviet Power. This means that the Red Army not only cleared the way for the Muscovites and the rising Communist Party, it was also instrumental in keeping them under control through pressure--direct and indirect--and displays--existing or potential--of violence.

The gambling for time, which is the Communist Party answer to the situation--with a new generation being educated by them and for themselves--is for the present a question of future developments.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY DESIGN IN THE FIELD
AS PRESCRIBED BY THE DOCTRINE

The theoretical basis set up by Lenin determined the whole line of developments in the Communist policy in Hungary from 1945 to 1949.

Those absolutely essential prerequisites without which no revolution can be successful were laid down by Lenin in five conditions as follows:

We may consider that the time is ripe for the decisive struggle:

when all the class forces arrayed against us are in a state of confusion,

are sufficiently embroiled one with another,

have been sufficiently weakened in combats for which their strength is inadequate;

when all the vacillating, unsteady, unstable, intermediate elements, the petty bourgeoisie, democracy, in contradiction to the bourgeoisie have exposed themselves enough before the people, have made a sufficient parade of their utter bankruptcy;

when there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favor of decisive and unhesitatingly bold revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie.

Then the time is ripe for revolution. Then, if we have kept good account of the aforementioned conditions, and have chosen our moment well, our victory is assured.

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The five principles of Lenin became the essence of the Communist Party tactics in Hungary for their whole political problem program.

The Overall Communist Plan in Executing the
"Five Conditions"

The Muscovites in Hungary from the very beginning have kept good account of these conditions as set by Lenin. All the events in Hungary since 1945 have been influenced by the combined tactics of the Party and the Red Army with the combined means of economic, political and military pressure--to bring about these conditions which make "time ripe for the decisive struggle." This process eliminating the non-Communist forces from the field and creating the circumstances necessary in the Communist philosophy was directed by the full utilization of all the experiences of the 1919 failure. This process--as far as the non-Communist forces in Hungary and the West was concerned meant their elimination from the Hungarian picture and by being forced to flee the country, the end of their struggle for the time being. From the Communist point of view they were all just parts in creating the necessary prerequisites for the "decisive struggle." To them, the "decisive struggle," the road to "socialism" only started after the merger of the Social Democrats could be effected.

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Then came the important moves, the "liquidation" of the Church and the "Kulaks" and the introduction of the Five Year Plan -- which already points the way to Utopia. The gradual disintegration of all opposition for four years, the sacrifice of some of the best human values--were from the Communist point of view--nothing else but the clearing away of the rubble of the past. To the non-Communist elements in most cases it meant the disappearance of everything in life, that makes the difference between life and existence.

For the long range planning of the Communists, however, the introduction of the Plan, the mass training of an entirely new elite, are the important factors. That, however, does not mean that the final period of "making the time ripe for the decisive struggle," which was reached by 1949 in Hungary, would have been achieved as successfully as it may look from the angle of the losers, the non-Communist forces.

POOR ORIGINAL**THE CYCLE OF THE FIVE LENINIST CONDITIONS****CONDITION 1: STATE OF CONFUSION****The Siege Period in Hungary and the First
Political Developments**

The first condition for the achievement of "victory," according to the prescription of Lenin, was: "all the class forces arrayed against us. . .in a state of confusion."

On the Hungarian scene the first year after the liberation in 1945, was the period establishing that condition.

In October, 1944, the Hungarian Armistice was signed in Moscow, and as the Red Army proceeded to liberate the Eastern part of the country, the first moves towards political consolidation were made. The Muscovites arriving under the wings of the Soviet Army contacted democratic local political elements and formed the Hungarian National Independent Front as an ad hoc organization. The components of the Front were: the Communists, the National Peasant Party and the Trade Unions who were pressed to be accepted as a partner by the Communist Party, the Smallholders Party and the Social Democratic Party that formed already an alliance in the times preceding the liberation. In addition to this, the Bourgeois Democrats were added

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shortly. In that front almost all the variety of non-Nazi shades were represented--from Legitimist aristocrats to Muscovite communists. As early as Christmas 1944, the so called "Szeged Program" was issued. (As a significant coincidence the Horthy regime in 1919 also started out from the provincial town of Szeged.) This program included basic, new, political ideas for the future Hungary which were to be incorporated later by legislation. All former democratic laws and regulations were to be cancelled, Hungary was to join the Allies and declare war against Germany. The program included the plan for the land reform and also all the basic principles of civil rights as declared by the Allies during the war.

On December 21, the Provisional National Assembly was formed in the liberated part of Hungary, in Debrecen. This Assembly nominated the First Provisional Government, and at least on paper, there was already a Democratic Government in Hungary. On Christmas Day, 1944, the same day the Red Army completed the military encirclement of Budapest where a two month long siege started.

In Debrecen the Provisional Government which was very much an ad hoc creation--including whoever could be located on liberated territory with any former political association was crowded into a single building. The Cabinet members had usually one or two rooms, which included their private living quarters and the quarters of

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the Ministry as well with an occasional typist and one or two employes constituting the staff of the Ministry. It was a makeshift arrangement. The government did not even have contacts with most cities in the liberated part of the country. Transportation, telephone or wireless connections, and supplies were all under Russian military control.

The National Committees

As it was not possible for the government to exercise any actual power, lacking all necessary facilities, National Committees were formed in all liberated areas. They were locally compiled on the same inter-party basis as the Provisional National Assembly and exercised the same powers which in ordinary circumstances would be the task of central and local governments. In all these local National Committees the Trade Unions were equal partners-- by the insistence of the Communist Party.* These local National Committees, and particularly the one which was formed later when the capital was liberated, were actually functioning as a government, but at that time their power and influence was more considerable. The local Red Army

*The same National Committees were used in every Central and Eastern Europe country after World War II.

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units were instructed to let them act as civilian administrators. They were usually formed by Communist professional organizers who came with the Red Army. The leaders of the Communist Party had been provided with transportation to travel in the liberated areas and they were repeatedly emphasizing "what we want is a coalition democracy, and by no means a dictatorship of the proletariat." However, in the National Committees it was the Communist Party which dominated. Even after several months following its liberation, Budapest still only had Marxist newspapers. As the National Committee "elected" the deputies to be sent to the Provisional Assembly, a leftist majority was maneuvered into that Provisional Parliament by the Communists. Partisan units appeared on the political scene--somewhat mysteriously--and aided the tactics of the Communist Party. The Red Army furnished transportation as well as newsprint to the Communist Party. Propaganda material was flown in from Moscow, sound trucks toured the liberated areas blaring the promise of the Party for the rebuilding of the ruined country with a democratic system. Nothing could have been more desirable to the population than these promises.

Meanwhile, the most important key positions in the liberated areas--still outside of the reach of the Debrecen Government, were given to the Communist Party by the National Committees. The National Committees later were decidedly reluctant to surrender their power

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to the Central Government. In the weeks to follow, as the liberation of the country proceeded, National Committee's orders often crossed the orders of the government when it tried to reoccupy its own buildings and administrative functions.

The Red Army in Hungary

During all this time Red Army requisitioning continued as well as the large scale excesses of the Red Army in looting, plundering and raping. Nobody could feel safe. Confusion was the most important characteristic of 1945 in Hungary. The Communists organized local Political Police Forces with the task of persecuting former Nazi collaborationists. They, in cooperation with the numerous Red Army Intelligence Units, often arrested people on the basis of personal vengeance. At the same time, people whose Nazi collaboration was well known were often retained in official capacities through their connection with the local Soviet Commander or some influential person in the local National Committee.

Very slowly the picture started to clear. Even after Budapest was liberated by a ravaging house-to-house siege, the Soviet did not permit the government to move to the capital. The excuse given was that "public safety is not secure yet" -- which indeed it was not even a year later.

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The material breakdown of the country left its impact on the whole political picture. Systematically stripped of all its resources by the retreating German Army, which forced over half a million young men to accompany them; soldiers and workers in the most important productive age groups, and was constantly looted by over a million Russian soldiers.

Tabula Rasa

One of the most important aspects of the Hungarian political picture was that in 1945, with the entrance of the Red Army, a complete political "tabula rasa" was accomplished, preventing any continuity of the pre-war regime such as occurred in Poland or Czechoslovakia. This aided the Communists in full and facilitated their tactics of putting their own impact on the regime from the very beginning onwards, even while coalition was the order of the day.

Confusion in political life was prevalent. No one knew exactly what the political shape of the country would be. With a million Russian soldiers in the country as an absolute power, the Western world seemed remotely far. The democratic leaders of the prewar regime, many of whom were spending the last few months of the war in basements under disguise, reappeared. Confused by the ruins and by the new emerging world the "siege atmosphere" was typical

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to those political elements. . .an atmosphere of physical and spiritual anguish and uncertainty--somewhat similar to the atmosphere of a prison. In comparison, the Muscovite Communist leaders arriving from Moscow were well fed and clothed and knew little about the siege sufferings, and were protected and fed by the Red Army.

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The Land Reform

The most important legislative action was the land reform which was enacted by the government in March 1945. The land problem has been the most important social, economical, and political problem in Hungary since ages.

The 1945 VI tc., the land reform redistributed almost 35% of the territory of Hungary. The number of new land owners was nearly 650,000, which meant over two million people including families. The number of those still without land is over 100,000 -- the land not being large enough to be distributed among the applicants. The average holding is slightly over seven yokes; according to statistical figures, the minimum needed to maintain subsistence level for peasant families is around twelve yokes. This situation serves Communist Party designs in two ways:

1. There still is a section of the agrarian population to whom land can be promised, or who can be persuaded to leave the agrarian occupation and become urban industrial workers.

2. The so called "dwarf holders" can be artificially forced to accept the benefits of the "producing cooperatives."

The land reform in 1945 was handed over to the Hungarian Government by Marshall Voroshilov; readily made up in Moscow, and forty-eight hours were given to pass it.

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As an indication to the importance of the land reform it should be mentioned that it effected one-third of the total population. The 1945 land reform was geared to a situation where the Communist Party was still in a coalition and did not have complete power. The Communist Party design to solve the land problem remained unaltered in its strategy, similar to the 1919 Bela Kun regime. Both in 1919 and 1945 Eugen Varga was the planner of the conception. The 1919 defeat of the Communist Bela Kun regime, and the paramount part played in it by the peasantry, only made the Party change their tactics almost completely^{in 1945}. . .but the strategic line remained unaltered.

It was a "non-Communist" Government which presented the land reform to the population in order to secure the trust of the peasants. The public was not to know that the Land Reform Act was handed to the government by Marshall Voroshilov completely prepared without any chance given to the government to consult its own experts and make any suggestions as to alterations in the law. It was a land reform; presented as an ultimatum. A score of Hungarian agricultural experts were studying for decades the Hungarian land problem. All the democratic opposition before the war had the land reform on its program as the number one agenda. No use of any former experience could be made in 1945.

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Class Tendency in the Land Reform

In the Communist Party tactics in the post liberation period the 1945 land reform was the key to the situation. It had very obvious class revenge tendency; not only was its character drastic, which could be explained by the extremity of the situation, but its methods were ruthless as well. Its basic features were as follows:

1. The average holding should be 142 acres as a maximum.
2. Owners of peasant origin who are on the land already may retain a maximum of 284 acres.
3. Those who were exceptionally notable in their anti-Nazi resistance may be left with up to 426 acres by a special committee.
4. While those who owned land up to 1420 acres could retain 142 acres; those who owned over 1420 acres-- 1,000 cadastral yokes--could retain none of their property.

This later was unmistakably a clause of revenge against the big land owning class and the church. The later although deprived of huge holdings and almost all the financial backing of its school system, made no attempt against the land reform and Cardinal M. in his Pastoral Letter of May 1945, explained, "we do not criticise the land reform, only the revengeful spirit which was manifested by it."

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Part of the Communist Party tactics was to convince the masses that as the Catholic Church was the owner of vast estates it is against the distribution of the land. Owing to the very careful policy of the Church and the realization of the historic importance of even this somewhat improvised land reform, the Church was able to realize the enormous vistas of a now anti-Communist potential in it, which the Communists themselves were not able to recognize at all. The two thousand year old experience of the Vatican realized that the Communist strategy which gambled first on a large scale winning over of the peasant masses, will bring different results than what the party policy makers would expect. Besides, the Church had a unique system of having a regular flow of first hand information from every part of the country, without interruption, through the whole organization of the Church in the villages.

Communist Party Safety Measure in the Land Reform

Another important long range safety measure taken by the Communist Party through the utilization of the land reform was the partisan ring around Budapest.

Already in 1945 one of the measures of security taken by the Communists against any threat of a counter revolution was by utilizing the land reform and the Communist Party influence in the local administration. When

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mass expulsion of the German population was ordered in 1945, most of their houses and land left empty by the expelled German population were given to new farmers. Around Budapest, however, systematically a ring of partisans was formed by the Communists. They numbered between fifteen and twenty thousand men and were grouped into partisan cells. The new partisan settlers spoke no Hungarian or just brokenly, many of them took part in the Spanish Civil War, or in the partisan warfare for Tito. They had special permission by the Red Army to carry arms, which at that time was hardly ever granted to civilians. The population was hostile to them, but the government under Communist pressure, insisted upon putting these strongholds of Communist safety in all strategically important villages, road and railroad junctions in a ring encircling the capital.

The Mistaken Calculation of the Communist Party

The Muscovites, thousands of miles away, living in the different world of the Soviet, with over a quarter of a century out of contact with the Hungarian people, and particularly the peasants, made basic mistakes of judgements in their gamble with the peasantry in this phase of their tactics.

After the introduction of the land reform in 1945,

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the government was still paralyzed, and had no access to most of the villages, even in the liberated parts of Hungary. Hundreds of Red Army lorries, broadcasting trucks, carried groups of Communists into the villages announcing the land reform and distributing texts of the Act on leaflets, which significantly enough were printed much earlier in Moscow. The language of these pamphlets, which closely resembled the language of 1919 revealed that they were written by the Hungarian Communists in Moscow. It also indicated how the whole land reform in its entity was prepared, even before the Muscovites re-entered Hungary under the wings of the Red Army. With the aid of the Red Army trucks, carrying the Communists who took the good news of the land reform to the peasants. The very existence of the agrarian proletariat in Hungary which was largest in the world in its proportion, numbering over three million, made the Communists somewhat justified in believing that they will win over three million faithful allies who will be thankful to them for the fulfillment of the ownership of the land, which was a centuries old dream in Hungary.

The 1945 Election and the Communist Party Defeat

In the face of that Communist Party activity, the resounding defeat they suffered in the October 8 Budapest Municipal Elections, came as a surprise.

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As an immediate step, on October 19, 1945, the Soviet ordered the Hungarian Political leaders to hold the General Election on the basis of a Soviet type "common ticket." The non-Communist parties vehemently opposed this and instead made an agreement as a concession that the coalition regime would continue; whatever the outcome of the general election might be.

On September 26, the United States announced that it was willing to recognize the new Hungarian Government if a free and unfettered election would be held.

November 4, was the date set for the General Election.

On September 28 Russia recognized Hungary.

On November 4, 1945 a free and unfettered General Election took place. Although only the Communist Party had enough newsprint for large scale propoganda and with all the indirect pressure by the Red Army. The result was somewhat of a surprise to the Communists. The votes were 17% Communist, 83% non-Communist, with a 58% majority for the Smallholders Party.

The Basic Miscalculation of Communist Tactics in 1945

The results of the 1945 election, when the wide masses of the population were given the right for the first time to express their sentiments, were 83% non-Communist

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votes. This feature of granting the right to vote to the wide masses was suggested by the Communists who hoped to cash in the political credits of the land reform from the millions of agrarian proletarians. Any of these millions of the landless were with their dynamism of dissatisfaction since generations, were a ready and willing explosive for any revolutionary change. In the very moment, however, when he received his own 10 or 12 acres through the land reform he became the most staunch supporter of private property. No former big land owner who may have owned hundreds of thousands of acres could be more jealous of his belongings than the new farmer of his new land. Communism, to them, with the potential threat of the collective farm, was a deadly enemy endangering the newly gained land for which they waited for centuries. Therefore, these elements in 1945 voted for the non-Communist parties. This "human element" of private ownership was not recognized by the Communist Party. The Church apparently saw that potential aspect. Further, it has to be emphasized that the Red Army's behavior in not making any class distinction whatever in their excesses and the rape of approximately one million women in Hungary included a considerable number of the wives and daughters of the agrarian proletariat. Thus, the same tactics which may have been effective in paralyzing through fear any potential resistance in city and middle-class elements, effectively alienated hundreds of thousands of women who belonged to the agrarian proletariat, and who, according to the

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doctrine, were bound to vote Communist.

To the Muscovites, the discovery of the fact that millions of the "exploited" in the provinces are lost as potential members to the Communist Party was a bitter disillusionment. They were so certain in the election victory, that although over a million Russian soldiers were in Hungary in November, 1945, no interference of any sort was committed by them. The Communists felt that they could afford the luxury of a clean election when victory was certain.

After the returns were in, even a superficial analysis of the provincial returns gave a definite indication that all the hopes of the Communist Party of winning over the millions of peasants on their side have failed. They did not succeed in getting the almost 650,000 new farmers--which meant over two million people, including their families--to vote Communist.

Communist Party Tactics

In The Aftermath of the 1945 Election Defeat

This election, and their failure in tactics, was the cornerstone of Communist Policy. All Communist Party tactics in the following phases of development were designed to alter the political status quo resulting from the 1945 election.

The first Communist Party move, soon after the election, was on November 23, when the Communist leader, Rakosi, and the Social Democratic leader, Szakasits, became Deputy Prime Ministers

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(Rakosi still retains the rank, while Szakasits became President in August, 1948). Not having portfolios, this arrangement did not take their time away from Party leadership, and at the same time gave them the desired legal pretext to have a controlling voice in the government.

The Peoples Courts^{*}, one after the other, enacted death sentences on former pro-Nazi Hungarian politicians, and under Communist pressure, the trials included a considerable motive of "class vengeance as well!" The Communist Party played a dominant and well published influenancing role in the activities of the Peoples Courts.

To add to the confusion, on December 17, the Communist Controlled Political Police in Budapest arrested alleged Monarchist conspirators who were linked to some persons prominent in the Debrecen Government. From that time onward, these acts of terror in the form of arrests became widely associated with the Political Police in Hungarian public opinion. Typical of their methods was the phenomenon of the "preventive arrest." The explanation given by the Communist Political Police is that the "preventive arrest" of a few politicians today, may prevent the mass arrest of many which would become necessary tomorrow. The Political Police was controlled by the Interior Ministry. That explained that like almost in every Central

* The Peoples Courts were set up in every country in Central and Eastern Europe.

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and Eastern European country after World War II, the most important key position the Communists secured for themselves in the coalition government was the Interior Ministry.

A very important revelation years later explained why the Smallholders Party in 1945 had accepted the Communist demand for this key position. A Paris press conference by an escaped Hungarian Cabinet member explained that after the 1945 elections Marshal Voroshilov called the responsible Hungarian statesmen together, and informed them that unless a Communist was placed at the head of the Interior of the Ministry, the number of the Soviet Army would be increased to three million. At that time the approximate number of the Soviet Army in Hungary was one million, causing a heavy burden on the country economically, politically and socially. The threat of sending three times as many Russian soldiers was much too serious for any politician to disregard.

The Church already clearly showed its disapproval over the New regime. On November 3, 1945, Primate Mindszenty sent out a pastoral letter condemning inhuman acts of revenge, and the motives of class revenge in the land reform.

The masses as well as the politicians themselves--still isolated from the Western part of the world felt utterly confused about the whole political situation as well as about the future of Hungary. The U.S. and British military representatives in the Allied Control Commission had the "backing" of under two hundred soldiers as against the one million men of the Soviet

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member--who was also the Chairman of the Commission.

Two Different Interpretations of Terms

The Allied Control Commission was bound by the Armistice Agreement to dispel all Fascist organizations and to prevent hostile propaganda. As to what should be regarded as such, however, the interests and decisions of the Soviet Command in Hungary was the only forum who made the decisions.

The very term "democracy" was interpreted as a Soviet interprets it, and in that philosophy the Western interpretation of democracy is nothing else but the dictatorship of exploitation. Thus, even the most important terms in the armistice agreement reflected two entirely different conceptions among the wartime allies on their actual meaning and application. This difference of interpretations became a decisive factor in that phase of political development in Hungary.

The general definition of the A.C.C. tasks was interpreted by the Soviet as a strict control through military economic and political interference over every phase of Hungarian life. Any contacts with the Western World were made impossible--the Allied Control Commission permit for any person regardless of citizenship who wanted to enter Hungary or leave it: sealed down the frontiers.

Even responsible Hungarian politicians found it very difficult to have any contacts with the representatives of the Western Powers. As to the government, according to an Allied

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Control Commission regulation, they were only permitted to contact United States or British authorities through the chairman of the Allied Control Commission--Marshal Vorosilov.

Soviet Tactics of Disintegrating the Hungarian Economy

On October 18, 1945, the Russian-Hungarian Trade Pact was announced, which was concluded by Communist members of the Cabinet who were negotiating under the leadership of Minister Gero in Moscow. They concluded the Trade Pact without proper authorization by the Cabinet as a whole--in the fashion of a "putsch". This Pact gave Soviet Russia considerable control over the economy including oil, aluminum, transportation, etc. At the time of the Pact, the number of the Russian occupation troops in Hungary was around one million, and the coalition parties who were non-Communist could do little except employ some delaying tactics before finally consenting to the Pact.

On October 22, 1945, the United States and Great Britain protested against the pact, referring to it as a violation of prewar trade treaties as well as the Yalta Agreement.

The Inflation as a Factor in the General Confusion

As a consequence of the disintegration of Hungarian production factors and capacity, the currency inflated to an almost unknown degree. The main components of the process of disintegration were:

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- 1). The war-time losses of the Hungarian economic system.
- 2). The large-scale removal of material by the Red Army.
- 3). The heavy burden of reparations, and the maintenance of the over-sized Soviet-occupying Army.

This economic disintegration, and the inflation crippling business, affected the life of everybody in the population and added considerably to the general confusion of the picture. The circumstances of the sudden conclusion of the Soviet-Hungarian Trade Pact furthered this confusion. All Western suggestions for economic rehabilitation talks were refused by the Allied Control Commission, and even the Government officials were forbidden to supply the United States and British Legations with the economic information which they requested. This instability of all elements in all sections of the population, with the almost complete uncertainty of individual existences as well as that of the whole regime, resulted in considerable general confusion. This constituted the fulfillment of the "first condition" as laid down by Lenin.

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1945

- ²⁰
Jan. 21. M. Government signs truce with Allies.
- Feb. 20. Provisional Government decree gives up areas taken from Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia.
- March 1. Provisional Government Prime Minister Miklos promises purge of Fascists.
- April 28. Election to Parliament of Count K., B.B., G.B. and Prof. V.
- ²²
Sept. 26. U.S. willing to recognize Hungary on condition of a free election.
- Sept. 26. For the election date Nov. 4 is set.
- Sept. 28. Russia recognizes Hungary.
- ⁷
Oct. 8. Budapest City Council election with great victory for Smallholders over left-wing parties.
- ²
Oct. 18. Marshall V. Ratifies Russian Hungarian pact which gives control over Hungarian economy to Russia.
- ¹³
Oct. 18. Hungarian Government ratifies the pact.
- ¹⁷
Oct. 19. Russia orders Hungarian parties to form common election list for Nov. 4 elections.
- Oct. 22. United States and Great Britain protest against Russian-Hungarian trade treaty.

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Oct. 23. United States claims that by unilateral action Russia acts against Yalta agreement, explains that the three allies should have talked prior to conclusion.

Oct. 24. Political parties promise to continue coalition after elections as well, refuse the common election list.

Nov. 3. United States recognizes Hungary.

Nov. 4. ³ Former Premier Bardossy sentenced to death.

Nov. 4. Election held. Cardinal M. pastoral letters ³⁻¹⁻¹ condemns Government again. M. Government resigns as a result of election.

Nov. 4. Communists and Social Democrats attack Cardinal M. for his pastoral letter, criticizing new regime and land reform.

Nov. 10. ¹⁷ Mr. Tildy becomes Prime Minister.

Nov. 10. U.S. protests against Soviet- Hungarian economic pact, explaining it interferes with valid Hungarian pact of 1925.

Nov. 18. Great Britain recognizes Hungary but owing to Armistice condition only de facto.

Nov. 23. ¹⁸ Communist Rakosi and Social Democrat Szakasits become deputy prime ministers.

Nov. 24. Former Premier Imredy sentenced to death.

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Dec. 17. Political police arrest conspirators claiming to conspire for monarchy.

Dec. 27. Government asks Allied Control Commission for delay on payments to U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia.

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CHAPTER II.

Party Rivalries: Communist Party Tactics

This second condition was the dominant characteristic of 1946. Under the surface of coalition cooperation the undercurrent of passionate differences soon became apparent. By that time the basic differences in the interpretation of "democracy" between East and West became apparent in the Hungarian political picture as well. The basic tactics of the Communists' employing the "divide and rule" was explained by the Communist Interior Minister Rajk as the following, "If you have four enemies and you want to get rid of all the four of them, the thing to do is to make an alliance with all the four, assuring them of full cooperation after awhile start to persuade three that the fourth one is a menace to the whole alliance and get their help in having him removed After awhile persuade two that the third one is a menace to them all and, while assuring them of the very sacredness of the common aims, get their help to remove the third After awhile, etc." On a larger scale, that was the very essence of the Communist line of tactics from the coalition period of 1945 onward.

The parties themselves, with the sole exception of the Communist Party were far from being homogenous. In the

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majority Smallholders Party itself, elements ranging from the most conservative right, mingled with extremely radical young "left wingists." The most important characteristic of the situation, however, has been the jealous fight between the parties for every position, every appointment, whether it was a high government position or a seat in the local "Purging Committee."

The Leftist Block

To widen the rift between the coalition parties under the instigation of the Communist Party the so called "Leftist Block" was formed in 1946. It included the Communist Party, the Social Democrats, Trade Unions, and the National Peasant Party as well, and increased its demands continuously for more nationalization. It was a "coalition within a coalition" and served the Communist Party tactics in full. It marched the workers through the streets of Budapest frequently and the object of the demonstration was always for the leftist demands and was employed as a means of pressure -- against the government which was a Coalition Government including the Cabinet members from the parties who formed the "Leftist Block."

On October 19, 1946, the "Leftist Block" made demands against the Smallholders Party for the State control of banks, fight against reaction, and/a State monopoly of school books.

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On May 1, 1946 a common declaration was signed by the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, and the Trade Union Council addressed to workers, peasants, and comrades. The slogan was declared by them, "Keep left." The unity of this declaration symbolized the tactics of the Communist Party in mobilizing the Social Democratic Party and the Trade Union Council as instruments in the maneuvering of the masses for their own purposes.

On August 30, 1946 the workers were demonstrating for the nationalization of the W. M. and Rima and Ganz, the biggest heavy industrial plants in Hungary.

By December 1 the state took them under control, calling the combined control "Nik" Heavy Industrial Center.

The Tactics of the Communist Party

The system of coalition had the advantage for the Communist tacticians that whenever an unpopular law or move had to be made by the government, it could be blamed on the "majority party" instead of them. The Communist Party was using the National Peasant Party through their left wing as a front organization, emphasizing extreme chauvinistic and anti-Semitic slogans.

On March 13, 1946 twenty members of parliament left the Small Holders Party and formed the so called Kossuth Party.

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Communist Philosophy on Political Opponents

The legal jurisdictional foundations which the Communists used in their future operations during the "conspiracy trials" were already laid down during the early period. Severeness of the New Law was advocated by the Communist Party particularly as far as the question of the death penalty was included.

When they were arguing in an inter-party meeting in Budapest about the new law of the Defense of the Republic, there was a lengthy argument about whether the death sentence should be included in the act. The non-Communist parties were principally against the death penalty as a punishment for political attitudes. The Communists, however, were for it. Rakosi declared, "I can only regard my political opponents as finally finished when they are no longer alive I was convicted during the Horthy regime altogether to twenty-three years of imprisonment. And look here: Here I am. From their own point of view, the Horthy regime would have acted much more right if they would have hanged me." ⁶²

Encouraged
Illusions of Independence / by the Soviet

As to the international position of Hungary, the Communists repeatedly emphasised that the Soviet had no designs whatsoever against the freedom of the country. The Social Democrats echoed the same.

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On March 24, 1946, Szakasits wrote in the "Nepszava," "No one has any reason to be afraid that we are going to be absorbed as a nation. The Soviet Union trusts more the independence of small nations than any other power. It doesn't need to absorb us." This was, from the very beginning, the line in Communist propaganda trying to dispel the fears from the Soviet Union for the independence of Hungary.

These tactics were carefully and systematically backed up by the Soviet Union up to its highest functionaries. As an example of how unilateral this line of tactics has been and how careful both the Soviet and the Communist Party cooperated to promote that impression, Stalin, in his toast at the dinner in Moscow given to the Hungarian government delegation in 1946, stated, "It is easy to create friendly relations between Russia and Hungary. It is our conception that there can be true friendship between a major power and a small nation."⁶³ While this clearly illustrates the backing of Communist Party tactics by the Soviet Union to the utmost, no Western power backed up any non-Communist Parties in Hungary at the same time. Western diplomats painfully insisted upon the sacred principle of non-intervention, which may have been important and befitting for the peaceful public opinion in western countries. In Hungary and the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, where the foundations for future total Communist political domination

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were already laid down, these principles did not offer any encouragement or any opportunity for assistance to those parties who tried to represent the very same conceptions of democracy for which the Western Powers fought the war.

The Communist Tactics in Fostering the "Embroidment of Forces"

The state of constant "crises" continued with the parties splitting their own ranks and fighting each other. Street brawls followed a Budapest Social Democratic meeting on February 16. On July 3, 1946, the Communist Interior Minister dissolved over 1300 organizations including almost all the important youth groups. All the emotional strains which were accumulated during the siege period in 1944 and 1945 and the confusions of the liberation found an outlet of individual petty jealousies and hatreds.

Under Communist incitement, the undercurrent of mass anti-Soviet and anti-Communist feelings broke out in the provinces in a series of anti-Communist and anti-Semitic riots, and culminated in the assassination of Soviet Army officers in Budapest. The commander of the Soviet forces, Sviridov, spoke on the funeral of the Soviet Russian officers who were assassinated in Budapest on June 23, 1946. "This assassinator does not stand alone. . . . Here in your country, Hungary, which you like to call the friend of the Soviet Union, fascist criminals assassinate Soviet men."

This assassination, as all other popular demonstrations of hostility against the Soviet and the Communist Party,

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were always exploited in full by the Communist Party tacticians in pressing for further concessions from the frightened non-Communist parties in the coalition.

All these events splitting the non-Communist elements, both in the political field and beyond, served the principle of having the "forces. . . sufficiently embroiled one with another" following the establishing of the confusion as the first condition as the fulfillment of the Lenin's conditions. During all that phase rivalry between the non-Communist parties was prevalent/^{encouraged by the Communists}from the background, skillfully utilizing their own "fifth columnist" in the parties concerned. The Communist Party directed this trend and it was in strict accordance with "condition two" in the long range plan. By 1946 this inter-party competition reached a degree where even diplomatic appointments could not be effected without the five parties agreeing on the candidate and usually every party sponsored a candidate of its own. When the appointment was finally made the new civil servant was unmistakably informed that for the backing of the party he owes allegiance. Thus he assumed the responsibility of making regular reports to his own party regarding confidential inter-office data. In the case of the Foreign Ministry this meant that/^{important data was regularly transmitted}through the channels of the Communist Party to the Soviet, informing them in advance about the details of the Hungarian policy. This inter-party jealousy culminated

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in the fact that even when sent abroad in a diplomatic mission the Party appointees continued to send separate political reports to their party, often by using a code, different from the official code.

This bellum omnium contra omnes of Hungarian politics was indeed "sufficient embroilment" of the . . . "forces!"

The Communist Party's Tactics

The Communist Party was concentrating all its efforts to appear as the only party who does not fight; the only element which really wanted to rebuild the country. Already since 1945 the Communist party in Hungary vehemently championed the defense of private property. By no means did they claim destruction; on the contrary, the slogans, posters, headlines of the Party were preaching all the time that the country had to be rebuilt, that it was the Communists who were going to fight the 'battle of rebuilding,' and that they were going to show an exemplary way of doing it. Thus they were impressing the people with the promise of rebuilding instead of destruction. All this in a situation when materially, and morally as well, the whole country was in ruins. They went much beyond words; wherever construction work started, Communist engineers and special working battalions put in excellent work. No capitalist 'slave-driver' would have been able to get out the maximum of workers as

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Communist Minister Gero, who ~~led~~^{directed} the rebuilding of the destroyed Budapest bridges over the Danube. With spectacular speed, one bridge after the other was rebuilt. The very cutting into two of one city, Budapest, has been overcome. This was not only an important result, but a spectacular result as well. And the Communist Party knew how to cash in on the success with propaganda and gain Communist credits by it. Every phase of the rebuilding, which was under Communist control, had a set date. The Party made a special feat of being ready before the dates; the opening speeches of the Communist Minister always mentioned the achievement as the Communist Party's contribution to the country.

Wherever the Communist Party put a man, engineer or factory manager, they made a special effort to put in men of first class quality. Whenever there was any communist corruption, it would only be done as a contribution to the Party. Individual corruptions were ruthlessly persecuted by the Party. The Communist Party did not want members and representatives who were corrupt. They claimed to have higher ethics than the others--that, of course, meant ethics in a Communist interpretation.

The Disintegration of the Former Ruling Classes

Meanwhile the Communist Party energetically started propaganda to increase its "cadre." The "new joiners" were

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not only from the working class but from the middle class as well. In addition to the permanently dissatisfied and idealists who always read about the Communist ideology in books or heard about it, there were, as in every Central and Eastern European country, tens of thousands of outright opportunists who joined the Party. The radical land reform swept away the power of the aristocracy. As to the middle class in that region, the two world wars, the upheavals following them, inflation, and the economic world crisis of 1931 gradually and ruthlessly weakened and demoralized the middle class. The high ethical traditions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were dying out with the disappearance of the older generation. ^{The middle class tried to retain} ~~Imitation-of~~ the glamour of the monarchy as a world power, but without the economic prerequisites, and that applied to the material ambitions as well as the ambitions for power and influence, ^{became the} These/patterns of living of the middle class. The cycle of their disintegration was almost over by 1945, and the Red Army, on its entrance, found the middle class weak and split up. To the middle class the only ambition by that time was survival and the semblance of safety. The period of violence following the entering of the Red Army and the rise of the Communist power as a central strong party found hardly any effective opposition by that weakened class. The traditions and remaining principles of the middle class were much closer to the Western conceptions of democracy. The fact, however,

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that the vacuum left by the retreating German power was ~~only~~ filled by the Soviet power alone and they couldn't hope for any positive help or encouragement from the West. Further Communist Party Tactics in Fulfilling "Condition Two"

During the first three months of 1946 several prominent former Nazi politicians were hanged accompanied with the fanfare of class vengeance against "fascists," a term with a new interpretation introduced by the Communist Party. It not only designated a pro Nazi, but anyone who was not friendly to the new regime -- and soon, anybody who was not a Communist.

It was used against Primate Mindszenty to whom the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission refused a permit to leave for Rome where he was to be elevated to a Cardinal.

On February 1, 1946 the 945 year old Hungarian Kingdom was proclaimed a Republic, and former Smallholder Prime Minister Tildy was elected the new president.

In the Spring of 1946, Moscow, the new Hungarian Government, visited Paris, Washington, and London contacting the corresponding government for aid in the Peace Treaties.

Even the raging inflation was utilized by the Communist Party in their tactics as a method of promoting the jealousies between the parties of the coalition regime. The population was bitter about the inflation which became worse by the hour. On May 27, 1946, Communist leader Rakosi as a clever propaganda move announced the new currency -- the

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Florin. This replaced the inflated old currency on August 1, 1946. The Communist Party propaganda thus presented the new stable currency to the Hungarian population as a Communist Party achievement and not as a measure taken by the Coalition Government. The Communist phraseology, "the battle of the currency" was used and Rakosi was unanimously declared by the Communist press and public speakers as the "Father of the Florin."

This furthered considerably "the embroilment of the forces with each other." The non-Communist parties jealously observed the unfair Communist tactics which disregarded the unwritten laws of the coalition regime, but they were impotent. The tension of the political atmosphere increased. The non-Communist parties felt encouraged to look out for other achievements which they could expropriate from the other parties for the purposes of gaining political credit. Behind the Communist Party stood the Soviet so they could only do the fighting among each other. This added considerably to the fighting and jealousy between the non-Communist political forces in the Hungarian political scene.

Part of the Communist tactics in fostering inter-party rivalry was by encouraging the policy of the Social Democrats for western connections--thus having them compete with the Smallholders in orientation. The several journeys of leading Social Democrats westward gave them the feeling

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of being "insured" by the West and resulted in/calling the Social Democrats
Bevin in their Press as "Comrade Bevin" and they announced
that it is only due to the presence of Social Democrats
in the coalition that Great Britain places any confidence
into the new regime.

In every aspect of political life the Communist
Party used the method of inciting the non-Communist parties
against each other and usually gaining by the following rift.

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1946

- Jan. 8. UNRRA 4 million dollar program. Foreign relief begins to arrive.
- Jan. 10. Former premier Bardossy hanged. Soviet-Hungarian Trade Agreement of Aug. 27/ratified? *comes into force*
- Jan. 13. UNRRA aid announced.
- Jan. 19. Expulsion of Swabians begins.
- Feb. 1. Z. Tildy elected President.
- Feb. 4. F. Nagy Premier.
- Feb. 5. B. Varga President of National Assembly.
- Feb. 10. Premier announces will be reduced by 30 per cent; Minister of Interior said by 90 per cent. Struggle over Redundancy List until mid-July; over re-instatements until end of year. Inflation gathering momentum. On July 31 one pengo of Jan. 1st equalled 300,000,000,000,000,000 paper pengos. Yet economic reconstruction proceeding steadily till end of 1946.
- Feb. 15. After Budapest Social Democratic meeting, street brawl. Opening of Communist initiated Government crisis.
- Feb. 18. Demonstration in Budapest against Cardinal M.
- Feb. 19. After 8 days of waiting for Russian exit permit to leave for Rome, Cardinal M. arrives in Rome on personal plane of Gen. K.
- Feb. 22. 10 million dollar U.S. loan granted.
- March 1. Former Premier Imredy hanged.
- March 7. Workers called out to demonstrate.
- March 8. Joint Executive of Social Democrats, Communists, National Peasants and TUC sent "ultimatum to Premier".
- March 8-12. Mass meetings in provinces; many degenerated into anti-Semitic demonstrations.
- March 11. Premier accepted economic demands, but only 20 (instead 60) members expelled from Smallholder Party, and not deprived of mandates.

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1946 (Cont.)

- March 10. Hungary and Russia sign Civil aviation agreement for 30 years after civil U.S. approaches refused.
- March 13. Joint statement by Coalition Parties.
- March 13. Nazi leader Szalasi and four associates, hanged.
- March 14. Prime Minister M. announces his agreement to Communist demands for nationalization of industry.
- March 20. L. Rajk, Communist, new Minister of Interior.
- March 25. Association of foreign correspondents protests law which threatens with penalties anti-Government statements.
- March 26. Communist Congress approves new Coalition program.
- April 6. Soviet-Hungarian Reparations Agreement for 1946 signed.
- April 8. Soviet-Hungarian Navigation, Air, Bauxite-Aluminum and Petroleum Agreements signed, respective Soviet-Hungarian companies formed.
- April 9. Premier Nagy, Ministers Szakasits, Gyongyossi and Gero leave for Moscow.
- April 11. Interview with Stalin.
- May 3. U.S. ten million dollar surplus credit.
- May 12. Large-scale conspiracy uncovered, 80 arrested, head Catholic priest formerly in U.S.
- May 12. Hungarian bishops forbid political activities Catholic priests.
- May 13. Two members of Parliament announced to be connected with conspiracy.
- May 16. Count Karolyi takes honorary parliamentary seat after return from England.
- May 20. Social Democrats refuse to merge with Communists.
- May 26. Communists, Social Democrats, National Peasants and TUC form Left Wing Bloc.
- June 5. Government crisis "solved". Communists promised concessions.
- June 9. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister arrive in U.S.

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- June 12. Received by Truman.
- June 20. One Russian officer killed, four others wounded when Hungarian youth shoots on Russian Troops.
- June 20-22. In London; interviews with Attlee, Noel-Baker, Dalton and officials.
- June 23. In Paris; interview with Bevin.
- June 25. Returned to Budapest.
- July 7. Russian commander S. orders Government to purge youth organizations.
- July 8. Head of ACC orders Government to purge anti-Soviet elements.
- July 14. ACC approves Hungarian diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Roumania and Finland.
- July 15. Crisis "solved".
- July 18. British protest to Moscow about Sviridov's conduct.
- July 3-22. Minister of Interior dissolves 1311 organizations, including Boy Scouts.
- July 13. ACC agrees to restoration of diplomatic relations with Italy, Roumania and Bulgaria.
- July 23. U.S. note to Soviet on Hungarian economic deterioration.
- July 23. President of National Assembly announces that Deputy L. Filler has been kidnapped.
- July 31. Peace treaty draft published.
- August 2. Russian reply rejects U.S. demands.
- August 2. Cardinal M. in letter to Prime Minister asks for amnesty for political prisoners.
- August 7. Return of gold by National Bank of U.S.
- August 12. Under Russian pressure, Poland demands reparations.
- August 16. Additional five million dollar U.S. surplus credit.
- August 19. 3 new ministers: National Defence -- A. Partha; Information -- B. Padanyi-Gulyas; Agriculture -- K. Baranyos.
- August 25. Former Prime Minister General Sztojav executed.

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1946 (Cont.)

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- Sept. 5. Cardinal M. in his letter to Premier Nagy says Government failed to "defend the honor of the Catholic Church" and they will "impose with the spiritual power of the Church severe punishments upon those who decreed and implemented dissolution of Catholic associations."
- Sept. 6. Cardinal M. criticizes government for anti-Christian acts.
- Sept. 6. Internment cases to be revised; 67 per cent to be released.
- Sept. 14. Hungary invited to F.A.O.
- Sept. 21. Second U.S. note to Russia, refuting Soviet note of July 27.
- Sept. 27. Smallholder warning against street fighting. With the end of the Peace Conference, political tension growing; rumors of civil war.
- Sept. 28. III Communist Congress.
- Oct. 1.
- Oct. 5. Communist R. speaks on closed relations with neighboring countries.
- Oct. 13. Draft approved by Peace Conference.
- Oct. 16. Government announces control of nation's industry.
- Oct. 22. A.C.C. sanctions D. Sulyok's Freedom Party.
- Nov. 6. Szakasits and A. Kethly arrive in England for Bournemouth Socialist Conference.
- Nov. 7. Government crisis "solved"; no new electoral law -- no municipal elections.
- Nov. 20. New Smallholder Minister of Propaganda --- J. Bogнар.
- Nov. 24. Freedom Party inaugural meeting.
- Nov. 26. Government orders control of heavy industry.
- Dec. 3. Premier announces Smallholder 10 Point program. Government crisis unsolved by end of December.
- Dec. 3-6. Demonstrators against high cost of living break into Parliament. Some admitted, "We were made to come."

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1946 (Cont.)

- Dec. 11. Rakosi broadcasts attack on Smallholders. Echoed by all Communist speakers.
- Dec. 15. Social Democrats "Old Guard" attacks present leadership.
- Dec. 23. Bill introduced in National Assembly prohibiting "old" landowners taking recourse to Courts over irregularities of Land Reform, either against State or "new" owners. Previous findings in their favor not to be executed.
- Dec. 31. Cardinal Mindszenty's broadcast. Anti-Catholic attacks continue throughout 1946.
- Dec. 31. General V. and 250 others arrested for conspiracy.

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CHAPTER III.

All the Forces have been sufficiently weakened in
~~condition as laid by Lenin was that "all class forces" should~~
 be "sufficiently weakened in combats for which their strength
 is inadequate." The events in 1945 and the following tactics
 of confusing the same forces all prepared the same process.
 The very essence of the "combat" for the Communist Party was
 to change the status quo which arose as a result of the 1945
 election and gave the majority to the Smallholders Party.
 Every effort had to be taken to weaken that Party. This pro-
 cess culminated in the Soviet arrest of Bela Kovacs the
 Secretary general of that Party and the Nagy crisis in the
 Summer of 1947 with the consequent new election in which the
 Smallholders suffered a considerable defeat. That process
 of the gradual "weakening" until almost complete disinte-
 gration was accomplished by the Communist Party was a
 gradually and systematically prolonged process. Unlike the
 action in Czechoslovakia where one "coup" acquired a complete
 hold over the state, in Hungary as in almost all the other
 states in the area, the "overtaking" was by no means one
 mighty single eruption but a series of eruptions. Each
 marked an important stage in the creating of the "conditions"
 as advocated by Lenin. After the "Nagy crisis" came the
 Mindszenty trial, etc. Thus the picture in Hungary instead
 of being a "still picture" was a "motion picture." A
 special analysis will be given however of the Nagy crisis as
 it was the very accomplishment of the "weakening" phase and
 deprived the majority party of the country of the gains of

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the first victorious election. Furthermore this crisis, which was widely publicized in the West, while it was not the completion of the Communist designs, was an occasion where the technic of Communist Party tactics could be ascertained in revealing details.

Communist Party preparatory tactics

1946 ended with Hungary in the state of another unsolved "crisis." The nervousness created by outright leftist demands---immediately following any non Communist concession was supported by a systematic whispering campaign which injected into the overstrung public opinion wild rumors of Soviet intervention and similar possibilities, in case the demands of the left were not satisfied. The process of "weakening" the opposition as part of the basic conditions for the "decisive victory" was the longest and most difficult one for the Communist Party to maneuver. Occasional weakening of other parties other than the Smallholders was also included in the agenda, the Bourgeoisie Party for example was simply never permitted to strengthen, the careful tactical maneuvers of the Communist Party succeeded in creating splits in the National Peasant Party and a serious crisis in the Socialdemocratic Party in December 1946, with the open rift between the "old guard" and the vehemently leftist leadership of Deputy Prime Minister, Szakasits. On December 8, 1946. The memorandum of the Peyer faction of the Social Democratic Party; to the leftist Party leadership.

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"....We observe events with anxiety....The common list--with the Communists--in Budapest was a mistake....We don't want to make anti-Russian politics....but this careful anxiety we want to take care that the party should not leave the road of democracy....and dictatorship should not be a power....Fascist type methods.... the Social Democratic Party should not become either a dependent or a serving satellite of any other party.... The country should not be on the mercy of any single great power or a satellite....or a vassal....The masses are disappointed in their leaders....The Czech, Rumanian, Yugoslav examples showed that the Social Democratic parties there, by using a mistaken tactics similar to the one of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, have lost their electors and in their countries their influence decreased very considerably....The same fate is awaiting the Hungarian Social Democratic Party,"
The memorandum of Peyer explains in details the corruption, the mistakes in the land reform, the shady business connections of the Social Democratic Party, the fact that the influence of the party has almost diminished in the army, the police, and the administration and that the influence of the party "is equal to nothing."

The Social Democratic leaders reacted to the memorandum in a very vague and stuttering line of excuses and explanations. They weren't quite sure enough in their own powers; they knew that Charles Peyer has a great influence over the masses of old Social Democratic party members. This serious breach xxx in the "brother workers party"--that is the expression the Communist press used as a reference to them--was serving future Communist tactics to the utmost.

The most important task however was the annihilation of the Smallholders Power. Under Soviet and Communist demands^{at} the party was gradually forced---since the first part of 1946 to exclude members, many of them deputies in the Parliament for their "rightist" leanings. The bulk of the party was still strong, backed by the solid peasant masses,

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the only section of the population which remained comparatively exempt from the confusing campaign of the Muscovites. It was clear that the Smallholders Party had to be the main target.

The Year of decision

In the very first days of 1947 the year which was called by Rakosi the year of decisions the Communist controlled Interior Ministry announced that it had discovered a large scale conspiracy against the Republic. Mass arrests followed by the Political Police and by the Military Police--- the two most important security organs of the Party. Several high ranking Army officers were involved. A member of the Cabinet, the Smallholder Minister of Reconstruction was forced to resign--only to be arrested promptly. The Communist Press implicated several prominent Smallholder Deputies of the Parliament in the conspiracy. The Parliament had to waive their immunity and they too were promptly arrested. Diplomats serving abroad who had Smallholders associations were also declared to be connected with the conspiracy. The investigation from the very beginning was in the hands of the Communist authorities and even the head of the Government could only obtain occasional and one sided information. Soon it became apparent that the chief "accused" was the Secretary General of the Smallholders Party B. Kovacs. He was the widely popular "strong man" of the Party. When the Communists demanded the waiver of his parliamentary immunity the influential group of peasants who were in Parliament as Small-

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holders Deputies, energetically refused to comply with the request. ^{On} February 8, 1947. The peasant members of the parliament stood out in an open declaration, for their leaders, saying, "We take a stand against any such endeavor which would try to defeat the Smallholders Party by violence."

The Kovacs-case

The only concession made to the Communist Party demands was the voluntary agreement of Kovacs to appear several hours each day before the Police to be interrogated. This naturally made it impossible to have him arrested and obtain the "necessary" confession which could be used for further political maneuvering. On February 26 Soviet units abducted Kovacs from one of these interrogations---took him to his house and announced that he is under arrest for "having actively participated in the formation...of anti Soviet terror groups"....and in "organizing espionage directed against the Soviet Union." ⁴ The news of his arrest became known to the population within hours and great excitement followed. Sharp U.S. and British notes followed denouncing the arrest as well as the whole "conspiracy" case---but they were promptly refused by the Soviet and Kovacs disappeared from the political scene. ^{Szakasits} ~~Szakits~~ said, referring to the United States note protesting against the Soviet arrest of B. Kovacs -

I saw to it that the British government would not join the U.S. action. As Secretary-General of the workers party, it was naturally possible for me to give such advice to the British government, which is a labor government, as well. 65

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By this time the British protesting note was already handed to the Hungarian government, protesting against "unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of Hungary."

Isolating the Non-Communist Forces

In its further effects the arrest of B. Kovacs was very important as an impact on all the non-Communist political parties. This interference of the Soviet force and the attitude of the West which could not help the arrested politician in any way made them realize how isolated and defenseless they are. Rakosi knew that and, ~~existing~~^{gloating} over the failure of the Western diplomatic notes to free Kovacs, underlined that the only force in the area is the Soviet Army. The Kovacs arrest with the consequent futility of the energetic Western diplomatic protest made the non-Communist forces realize in full how isolated they were and how any of them at any time could suffer the same fate as Kovacs if that becomes advisable for the tactical maneuvering of the Communist Party.

Non-Communist illusions: The policy of Nagy

The conciliatory policy of Nagy was causing further rifts and weakenings in the majority party. Nagy himself realized that and referred to those charges on May 3, 1947. Nagy, quoted by the Magyar Nemzet.

They call us the party of concessions, but politics have to be made according to the general interests of the nation. We, too, could have made steps on several occasions which would have made us popular among the broad masses, but would have unavoidably led us to collapse.

This defense against the Communist Party tactics, the very

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policy of Nagy was based on gaining time until the Russians left Hungary. This somewhat negative policy alternately applied open resistance and conciliatory steps. On three occasions, he resisted openly. One was in October, 1945, when he flatly refused the common list suggestion of the Communists. This time the very recognition of the regime by the Western Powers was pending on a free election, and the Communist Party itself gave in, not wanting to cause an untimely shipwrecking of the coalition regime. The second occasion was in August 1946 when Nagy threatened the Russian Commander in Hungary with his resignation if the Russian commander did not permit the convening of the Peasant Congress in Budapest. This time, too, the Russians made a concession because they realized that it would mean a mass alienation of the peasants.

As against these points, Nagy yielded to the Communists in December, 1946, when, after insisting on the removal of the Communist head of the Military Police for acting arbitrarily,*using Russian commands as a shield--which was promptly denied by the Russians to Nagy--the Prime Minister consented to the Communist decision to keep the man in his position. The Communist argument and threat employed against Nagy in that case was that unless he withdrew his demand, all the accused in the conspiracy case would be deported to Russia.

The effects of the negative policy of the West-on the policy of Nagy
The conciliatory policy of Nagy preceded the period

in United States foreign policy when a more active stand was

*This officer: G. Palffy - a leading Communist was arrested in 1949 by the Communist Party as a "Titoist" deviationist.

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accepted against the Soviet Union and when the very existence of a cold war was accepted by the public in the West. In fact, the Communist tactics in Hungary causing the Nagy crisis and removing with him Rev. Varga preceded the announcement of the Marshall Plan. Moreover, the Nagy crisis, as it was widely reported by the British and the United States Press, considerably added as an illustration for the need of a more firm policy.

The most serious mistake admitted by Nagy was his permission to accept the forming of a Leftist Block and the fact that they included the mass front organization of the Communist Party, the Trade Unions as well. Thus, Nagy was negotiating with a block within the coalition itself, and also with leaders of a Trade Union organization as if there would be equal partners like a coalition party. This regrouping of forces by Communist tactics gave them a much easier bargaining position against the non-Communist parties. This mistake of Nagy, however, by no means affected the strategic lines of Communist policy.

As against this, Nagy in his book justifiably refers to the negative attitude of the Western Powers who showed the first important signs of interest^{only} when the Secretary General of the majority party was arrested and abducted by Soviet forces in Budapest. The fact that representatives and go-betweens representing Western powers requested clandestine meetings of various Hungarian non-Communist political leaders was not too effective, either, as a demonstration

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for an outright and positive stand. In the same period Russian military diplomatic forces ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{counselled} Rakosi without any hesitation. The impact of the conciliatory attitude by the United States and Great Britain towards Russia was reflected in the Allied Control Commission in Budapest and made an important impression on the non-Communist political forces. They felt isolated ~~and~~, by the slogans of "non-interference" emphasized by Western representatives and the very existence of Soviet power in the whole area. Nagy also explained in details why he had to accept Russian economic penetration in lack of any corresponding Western suggestion.

The most important excuse, however, for his conciliatory policy was that as former German satellite state, the non-Communist element in the country could have hardly hoped to adopt a positive attitude against Soviet demands and the Communist demands backed by them without the backing of the Western powers, and in view of the fact that the attitude of the West against the Soviet that time was not positive on the world-wide scale either.

The results of the Communist Party tactics
Soon "right wing" Smallholder Cabinet members were forced to resign and were replaced by "left wing" Smallholders. The Peoples Courts meanwhile started the "conspiracy trials" to which the Communist Party Press gave all the publicity utilizing the facts of the trials as weakening the prestige of the majority party in the public.

Even after the signing of the Peace Treaty, Russian troops in accordance with the signatories in Paris,

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lines of communications remained in Hungary to safeguard/~~command~~ to Austria.

After several Smallholders purges Prime Minister Nagy hoped that the complex of conspiracies is finished. He did not realize however that the peak of the conspiracy maneuvers was yet to come as the most significant Communist Party political move in the whole process of "weakening" the opposition forces. This meant the removal of his own person from the political scene.

The Crisis of the Summer 1947

This crisis which started as the "Nagy crisis" soon after Nagy left for a vacation in Switzerland resulted in the removal of Rev. Varga one of the most important Smallholder leader and the disintegration of the whole majority Party in the following election. In its details and its maneuvering that the Communist Party has proved their old principle^a a coup d'etat is: a revolution by prearrangement."

Actually very little happened. Nagy left for a vacation. He was already in Switzerland when the Soviet Government transferred the "confessions" of B. Kovacs to the Hungarian Government as a reply to an earlier Hungarian request to hand over Kovacs to Hungarian authorities. The "confession" of Kovacs implicated Prime minister Nagy as being part of the conspiracy. The Smallholders Party immediately notified Nagy and requested him to return to Hungary. Nagy was preparing to leave immediately to clarify himself against the absurd charges. The Communist Party directly and through intermediaries "informed" Nagy that

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if he returns he will probably be arrested like B. Kovacs. Against the ransom of his son whom the Communist Party sent out to Switzerland--Nagy resigned. Rev. Varga was forced to flee at the same time in order to avoid immediate arrest.

The details of the case, particularly if the Budapest and Moscow aspects are analyzed show the whole line and application of Communist Party tactics as well as the cynicism with which the Communist Party will go ahead for its own long range designs: the weakening of the opposing force.

1947, May 22 Budapest radio announced that several small holders were purged from the party.

First Hint from Moscow

The somewhat somber comments of Radio Moscow threw a shadow over coming events. Radio Moscow, May 27, 1947.

Reviewing the Hungarian political situation -

...The present political situation in Hungary...is proof that reaction has not downed arms but is still trying to foil the establishment of democracy and the economic and cultural revival of the country...The Small Holders party was forced by the pressure of public opinion to expel its former secretary general, Kovacs, to dismiss from the executive the extreme right-wing members, and to carry out a certain purge in the party. The new secretary general, Balogh, speaking at a party rally recently described the role of his party as that of a brakeman. Care must be taken lest the brakes be applied too much, but also lest they should fail in an emergency. Such a political conception causes great dissatisfaction among the progressive public of Hungary.⁶⁶

First Sign of Crisis in Hungary

The first important signal of the coming crisis was the article by Father Balogh, the "eminence gris" of Hungarian

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politics in 1945 and 1946, titled "We have to stop the coming crisis." He refers to the suspicions which were demonstrated by the Communist Party and says, after reaffirming the foreign policy orientation of the Small Holders Party as peaceful to all nations, May 28 -

Rakosi and Revai attacked the two phases of Small Holders policy, calling them the unofficial and official party line and referring to suspicious occurrences and 'underground party leadership'.⁴⁷

Furthermore, he refers to the Communist demands for the immediate nationalization of the three largest private banks (which control almost the whole Hungarian industry) and the National Bank, and demanded a 75% taxation of the rich.

Father Balogh continued,

The Hungarian Communist Party knows exactly as well as we all do what the reason for the failure of the 1919 revolution has been. They made a revolution in Hungary without the peasantry. This may be possible somewhere else, but with us it is unimaginable. The reason that democracy could start on a firm basis was that we started to go together with the peasantry....We should not underestimate that 'going together'. The fact that the Communist Party and its leaders have been accepted with trust by the Hungarian people can only be explained because they entered political life with the Small Holders Party and the Small Holders Party used every opportunity to emphasize and realize the necessity of further close and intimate cooperation with the Communist Party....

Even Father Balogh, one of the wisest and shrewdest of all Hungarian politicians after 1945, who was often compared to Talleyrand as well as Machievelli, could not conceive that in politics, and particularly in Communist politics, there are no emotions or motives or gratitude. To Communists, political life and activities are nothing else but part of

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the class warfare. He continued in the article,

For momentary tactical advantages, they are willing to forget the merits of that Nagy without whom it would have been much more difficult to get the trust of the peasants for the new regime and thus for the Communist Party as well. ...Rakosi must be fully aware that if the masses would ever stand up against this leadership they would not look for new ideas or new leaders in the Leftist Block. Such a change would be a tragedy to the whole nation.

The basic mistake of that shrews politician was that he did not see that for once, now, it was not tactics for the Communist Party, but strategy. It was not just "another one of those tactics," many of which have been encountered in the past, brilliantly by Father Balogh, but it was strategy because the Communist Party felt the time and the situation were right to proceed with the total disintegration of the former majority party, the Small Holders.

On May 28th prominent Small Holder ^{Mihalyfi} ~~Mihalyf~~ announced

"There is no reason whatsoever for a political crisis." ⁶⁸
The three most important elements in the Communist Party planning
The first important factor in the planning of the of the
 Communist Party crisis.
 crisis was that while letting Nagy go abroad for a vacation, Deputy Prime Minister Rakosi was for the time of the whole crisis not only leader of the Communist Party, but also the head of the whole Hungarian government.

The second important aspect in the Communist planning of the crisis was to have Nagy conveniently and safely removed abroad. They themselves were by no means discouraging Nagy in his plan to spend his vacation in Switzerland--which was not very usual for active Hungarian politicians--in order to escape completely from politics.

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The third Communist
 An important part of the well planned tactics was that they have chosen the right timing when the United States minister, Arthur Schoenfeld, who was in Hungary from the very beginning of the regime, has already been recalled, was out of the country, and ^{the} a new Minister, Selden Chapin, has not yet arrived. Thus, the most important outpost of the United States, its diplomatic mission was in a transitory state.

The Communist tactics in engineering the crisis

Father Balogh however soon got some wind that there was trouble, because already on the 29th of May he declared he was sick and cancelled his appearances in public.

The fact that the Social Democratic Party or at least its leftist leaders knew about the plan of the Communists beforehand can be ascertained from a public speech by leader Szakasits ~~xxxxxxx~~ on May 28th.

We don't know how long the coalition peace will continue. There are many dark clouds over the coalition. The atmosphere is tense.... It starts to become unbearable.... Wouldn't it be perhaps better to stand in front of the nation and ask them, 'Whom do you want, what do you want?'....I call the population of Angyalfold (important suburb of Budapest inhabited by industrial workers) to be prepared....be ready, even for the battle if necessary. 49

The contents of the Russian charges against Nagy became known on May 30th. The day was quiet. Political discussions were taking place with the President and after that the Political Committee of the Small Holders Party requested Nagy to return home.

United States Minister Schoenfeld went for a final

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visit to Rakosi--United States General Weems gave a reception in which the whole government, foreign diplomats, and dignitaries participated.

² ^{May} June 30. The Hungarian Telegraphic Agency announced that Nagy resigned ~~at~~ the Hungarian legation in Bern, Switzerland. This, was untrue. Only on June 2nd after his four year old son had been delivered to him did Nagy resign. The Communist tactics of confusing public opinion worked all during the crisis.

Confused and alarmed, the Small Holders the same day cancelled all their scheduled mass party meetings.

As part of the "zig-zagging tactics," Rakosi on May 30th greeted ^{the} departing United States Minister Schoenfeld in a speech which he delivered in English, praising the objectiveness and understanding of the American diplomat and even praising the dynamic strength of democracy which explains the present tremendous power["] of the United States. (It may be significant that the ^{similar} ~~same~~ "dynamic" expression was applied in a speech a week before that by Rakosi on the Communist Party) // ^{and the Hungarian democracy.} On the dinner he toasted the United States and the departing diplomat.

This analysis does not use the account of Mr. Nagy on the whole crisis as detailed in his book, but bases the whole analysis on Communist and non-Communist sources in Budapest. They affirm, however, the events as related by Nagy and justify it in full that he refused to return, thus

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entering with this action in prisonsof the M.V.D. It would have been a certainty, a few weeks after his arrest "a confession" by him could have been published admitting his guilt. In its details the Communist attitude in the Nagy crisis, and which is even more important, their very characteristic tactics in maneuvering the Nagy crisis, have not been analyzed before on the basis of their own declarations and moves. It seemed to be more lucid to use them for reappraising the events by this study in the analysis of the pattern of Soviet and Communist attitudes in the Nagy crisis of the Summer of 1947.

The Comments by Moscow

From the point of view of long range planning it was the analysis of Moscow Radio which revealed most of the real objectives behind the crisis. Moscow radio presented the events to its listeners from their own angle: June 2, 1947.

The resignation of Ferenc Nagy was brought about by the fact that new and important data had been brought to light in connection with the Horthyite antirepublican conspiracy. Concrete facts prove that the former president of the Smallholders Party and the former head of the Hungarian Government has played a leading part in the conspiracy against the Hungarian democratic order.

These facts were kept secret very skillfully by the conspirators and their sympathizers for a long time. But after the confession of Bela Kovacs, former secretary general of the Smallholders Party, the secret has come out. The conspiracy, and in the first place the part played by the leading circles of the Smallholders Party in it, has brought in a storm of indignation in Hungarian democratic public opinion. 70

The inclusion of the "Status quo Ante

Then Moscow went into a detailed analysis of the Smallholders Party:

At the same time this caused a great panic in reactionary circles, as shown by the remarks of foreign

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newspapermen in Budapest who are close to these circles. This panic is well founded. The old Horthyite circles belonging to the Smallholders Party have until now used the democratic flag of the party as camouflage. In this they were able, even after the discovery of the conspiracy, to continue their dark machinations by changing their tactics and re-grouping their forces. The purpose of their machinations was to annihilate the democratic achievements of the Hungarian people.

The very same philosophy so often emphasized by the Muscovites in Hungary, that everybody who opposes Communism is a "fascist" was explained and interpreted on the alleged conspiracy which already has been amplified into a putsch attempt. The very actions of the Communist Party in creating the Putsch--- were justified by explaining it as being nothing else but averting the danger of one:

In Hungary the fascist putsch was being prepared by a whole gang of Hungarian fascist Horthyites under the political leadership of the Smallholders Party's Horthyite circles. When the Hungarian community organization fell through the reactionaries in the Smallholders Party again began to sabotage the country's economic recovery.....

The old attitude towards "bourgeois democracy" as being nothing else but capitalism and fascism, was applied to the Smallholders Party behind whom actually the real forces were the Horthy clique. The Horthy regime, the regime which succeeded the 1919 Bela Kun Revolution, was still the most dangerous of all forces to the Soviet: it is hard to ascertain to what degree exactly the Communist Party and Moscow really believed the existence of a danger of reestablishing the "status quo ante" ^{in Hungary.} As one of the basic features of Communist Party philosophy is a constant fear of a capitalist aggression against them, there is room for belief that they

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really felt the nightmare of the threat of the returning
"ancient regime." Moscow radio put it as follows:

This activity was aimed at the overthrow of the democratic Republic. The Horthyite clique praised bourgeois democracy...sp as to conceal its fascist aims and to be able to finish with even this bourgeois democracy in a suitable moment. According to their time-honored habits, the Horthyites were flirting with democracy and fascism habits, the Horthyites were flirting with democracy and fascism simultaneously, but also according to their time-honored custom were all the time employing the bloodiest fascist methods, the oppression and confusion of the people, for they thought that in Hungary, the home of bourgeois democracy, they would be unable to deal with the dissatisfaction of the masses. But the bourgeois democracy was not only a camouflage for the conspirators' fascist aims; it served foreign political aims as well as home political purposes.

Moscow Analysis - Analyzed

Moscow broadcasted one more detailed comment on the Nagy crisis, addressed to the Hungarian audience. Moscow, June 5, 1947.

The galaxy of anti Republican conspirators has been enriched by the former leader of the Smallholders Party, the former minister Nagy. On one occasion he hypocritically stated that at last Hungarian political life must be clarified at all costs. Now Hungarian political life has indeed been fairly clarified, but against the will of Ferenc Nagy. It was his most trust man, Bela Kovacs, who exposed Ferenc Nagy as one of the political leaders of the conspiracy against the Hungarian democracy. 7'

Praising the role of the Communist Party it continued

The vigilance of the Hungarian progressive democratic elements was, therefore, the more justified, and for the discovery of the anti-Republican conspiracy, and ultimately the unmasking of Ferenc Nagy, it is they who can be thanked.

Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Nagy, and their associates have been far too prominent players to make an open stand. Officially they have recognized the coordinated de-

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cisions of the parties, but in reality they hampered their enforcement, undermined the unity of the coalition, and were responsible for a chain of political crises.

Playing up skillfully to the dominant left wingers of the Smallholder Party, Radio Moscow concluded:

They did not voice their true views but through the most reactionary stratum of the Smallholders Party, from whom, in the way of a pharisee, compliance with the party discipline was demanded. Besides this they have also aired their opinion through the so-called Sulyok (leader of the Freedom Party--~~FA~~.) organization.

Explaining what the essence of the whole Nagy crisis was--- i.e., that in the area compared to several other countries in Hungary civil liberties were still comparably in existence. This as interpreted by the Soviet was explained by referring to the unforgettable Communist experiences three decades ago:

Istvan Balogh, for instance, when he was appointed secretary general of the Smallholders Party said that as long as the party was lead by Ferenc Nagy democracy rested on firm foundations. But later he stressed that Hungary was the only pillar of bourgeois ideals in southeast Europe.

What 'democracy' and the 'bourgeois ideal' mean in Horthy's language the Hungarian workers know full well from the time of the 25-year Horthy era. What the 'sole pillar of southeast Europe' means is also clear. Many still remember that the Horthites often dallied with this kind of slogan in 1920, when they were saying that Hungary was the 'pillar of order in southeast Europe', and offered their services to the imperialists for the support of the White Poles in their war against the USSR.

If the danger of the Hungarian system and the population was anti-Communism then Moscow radio, from its own viewpoint could indeed feel justified by the events of the Summer of 1947. This linking up of the Nagy crisis with

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the events around 1920---as much as they may seem fantastic and far fetched to Western observers---proves how vivid and how ~~influential~~ ^{influential} the memory of those years in the life of the Soviet when they were fighting with their back to the wall-- still are in the Soviet mentality....

A note of satisfaction concludes the comment of Moscow Radio on the Nagy crisis:

Now with the discovery of Ferenc Nagy, who has also given himself (up), it has been established, in the most concrete fashion that the secretary general and president of the Smallholders Party both belonged to the Horthyite clique. The democratic mask has not after all helped Ferenc Nagy who, foreseeing that he could not avoid being discovered, left for a Swiss holiday and there announced his resignation on May 29.

The Communist Party line of tactics in the Nagy case and the technics of handling the affair

During the maneuvering of the whole crisis, from the Communist angle,--the only seriously embarrassing phase must have been when Nagy expressed his complete willingness to return immediately from Switzerland and clarify his position against the Russian charges of conspiring against his own government. This prompt willingness to return was upsetting to the Communist Party tacticians. The whole line of tactics was pre-planned and the fact that Nagy would automatically refuse to return was taken as granted. His willingness must have greatly upset the whole scheme. One of the basic weaknesses of Communist tactics being that they are only able to operate successfully if the pattern go ahead exactly as scheduled and among the circumstances created by previous preparatory

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work. If any unexpected motive upsets the arrangements, then instead of quickly altering any part of their pattern, they concentrate all efforts to remove the unexpected circumstance so that they can proceed with the original plan. Thus they had to get close associates in the Small Holders Party of Nagy, like the Foreign Minister and Father Balogh to phone him and warn him against the Communists and advise him not to return to Hungary. They even sent out feelers in Switzerland to Nagy, making sure that he would not return. This was essential, for their whole pattern was built on the refusal of Nagy to return from Switzerland, which they planned to use as a proof that he admitted guilt in all the charges of conspiracy brought against him.

After the "danger" of Nagy's return had been successfully averted Rakosi, in a speech on May 31, quoted himself as saying to Nagy, while talking to him on the phone in Switzerland,

Pack your things fast and tell me immediately on the phone when you plan to arrive to the frontier so that we can await you there in order that you should meet no trouble. 72

This was an unmistakable reference to the Soviet arrest of Kovacs. "Then I told him," he continued, "that in Budapest he would have to appear in court.... He didn't have the conscience to do so. He stayed there." Rakosi, priding himself on the swiftness of that phase of the "revolution by prearrangement," said, "Before the United States could rub its eyes the whole thing was over."

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The developing of the crisis

On June 1, Rakosi concluded with satisfaction,

The crisis which to many looked grave and dangerous four days ago has been solved by us quickly... Whatever the newspapers will lie in London or Paris the Hungarian democratic people will not be influenced.⁷³

In that case, as well as formerly under the expressions "the Hungarian democratic people" Rakosi meant the Communists and their front organizations.

The Communist Interior Minister Rajk said:
Rajk "Nagy admitted his guilt."⁷/~~June 1~~.

June 1, Communist deputy Orban went further in the tactic of besmirching Nagy with a fantastic accusation, "Nagy demanded 400 thousand Swiss francs for his resignation."¹⁵ Trade Union leader, Communist Kossa, declared that the whole crisis had important family aspects as Small Holder Deputy Salata (who had to flee previously as he was accused of conspiracy) has married the daughter of Nagy. None of these allegations had any basis of truth.

On June 1st the Hungarian press published the "confession of Kovacs," implicating Nagy in the conspiracy. The Nagy crisis was an extraordinary occurrence whereby an active Prime Minister was accused by a minority party to have conspired against his own government under his own leadership. In fact he was accused of conspiring against himself.

The Communist daily on May 31st wrote,

There are hardly any examples to an occurrence that in a country in whose territory there is no civil war or war with a foreign power, the prime minister should submit his resignation from abroad.⁷⁴

Szakasits
~~Szakasits~~ Social Democratic leader Szakasits demanded immediately a new election.

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Rakosi, referring to the report that the U.S. had suspended the 15 million dollar American loan until the situation becomes clarified used a somewhat capitalistic approach in his attitude. He said on May 31, Rakosi, "I figured," ~~he said~~, "out of 15 million dollars, each ^{person in Hungary} ~~inhabitant~~ would receive about 18 florins-- well, for 18 florins (about \$1) we are not going to change our political convictions."⁷⁷ The ~~two~~ Streamling of Hungarian Foreign Policy was announced by the Communist Party Interior Minister: June 2, 1947, Budapest, Hungarian Home Service

In his Sopron speech yesterday, Leszlo Rajk, Social Democrat Minister of the Interior, said that Hungarian foreign policy would have to put an end to double-dealing. Responsible statesmen could not--while advocating, for the benefit of foreign listeners, friendship toward the USSR--in fact conspire with Horthy's diplomats to undermine Hungary's good-neighborly relations with neighboring democratic peoples."⁷⁸

Rakosi himself commented on the Nagy crisis and the effects of it. On June 6th, Rakosi said,

The Communist Party decided to break away with the former production methods and start the system of planned economy.⁷⁹

About the Nagy crisis, he quoted himself as saying to Nagy on the long distance call to Switzerland,

Come home if you are a man; we will see to it that you will be met on the frontier; no harm will be done to you; we will bring you home but you have to answer in the courts for what you did.⁸⁰

This could hardly be interpreted as a persuasion of Nagy to return. Typically Communistic in its concept of the guilt of the accused, he takes it as granted from the beginning that he is guilty. Rakosi continued,

Nagy did not return home. He remained in Switzerland because he rightly presumed that the air in Switzerland is better than in 60 Andrassy Street.

Nothing could have been more true. The address ~~quoted by~~ ^{referred to by} Rakosi was the dreaded headquarters of the Communist political

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police. Rakosi continued, drawing the conclusions,

The fact that he didn't dare to stand out shows that he is a vile traitor and the same applies to his associates. How many times Reverend Varga (the speaker of the parliament) was beating his breast to me that he is a real original all-Hungarian son of his people....And now that the situation where he had to stand up and answer for his deed, he preferred to escape like a mouse. Rev.

Never before have any charges been presented against Varga.

The Communists, however, wanted to make the most of the Nagy crisis and they succeeded in having Reverend Varga removed at the same time. Reverend Varga, with B. Kovacs arrested previously by the Soviet Army, and Nagy were the trio who headed the whole party and in whom the peasant masses had great trust. Decades of respectable political background on democratic principles made them popular and influential in the country.

Father Balogh meanwhile, entered the hospital. The Small Holders Party deprived Nagy and Father Varga of their membership.

A front organization of the Communist Party, the National Committee, a political leftover from the 1945 period when they exercised administrative power in the country in lack of central government, ^{also} blamed the whole crisis on the refusal of Nagy to return, echoing the Communist line.

The Aftermath of the Crisis

After the Nagy putsch, formalities were painfully adhered to. This formal hypocrisy is a permanent characteristic of the Communist party tactics in every phase of the struggle. When an employee of the Hungarian Legation in

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Switzerland returned with the written resignation of Nagy, it was emphasized that the letter could only be handed to the Personal Aide of the President, as it was addressed to the President. The same formality as on the arrest of B. Kovacs when the Russian army only arrested him after taking him away first, from the Political Police, taking him in his own home and then reading the arrest to him there, formally carried him away from his own address. This phenomenon is one more illustration of the fact that in the Communist philosophy the laws, customs of the bourgeoisie systems are nothing else but empty formalities with which the ruling class camouflages its dictatorship. They painfully maintain diplomatic protocol, always - guided by the same philosophy.

The Nagy crisis in Hungary was not permitted to be regarded as a crisis. The Communist tactics took care not to have any immediate radical change immediately after the departure of Nagy. They insisted that the new Prime Minister and all the former Small Holder members should belong to the "majority party." The new Prime Minister said, on June 3rd, "The only change is a change in persons, nothing on the party line."

Rajk, on June 9th, declared,

The Communist Party never considered and does not consider today either the overtaking of the power....We continue to stand for coalition and cooperation. 8'

The new Small Holders Prime Minister, Dinnyes to the icy atmosphere in politics after the Nagy crisis, exclaimed on the 10th of June, "I am proud and happy that the

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forming of my government was not accompanied by the usual applause."

On June 24th, the Hungarian government published its White Book, giving the details of the "Confession of Kovacs," alleging that Nagy also was part of the conspiracy. The whole Nagy crisis was presented by the Communists as not being a crisis - just a refusal of a "guilty conspirator" to return.

In the new government the actual number of the Smallholder Cabinet members was retained. In fact the real significance of the Summer 1947 activity of the Communist Party concerning the Smallholder Party was not so much in weakening that majority party in quantity as in quality. Their best leaders were removed by Communist tactics.

The Communists even went as far as utilizing the Hungarian Constitution for their tactics, quoting an English newspaper which claimed that Hungarian events in connection with the Nagy crisis were in strict accordance with the Hungarian Constitution, and democracy. (The paper quoted is the Daily Worker and its judgment on constitution and democracy is about as valid as the general view of that paper on those subjects.)

The Three Year Plan in Hungary

At the end of July the Peace Treaty was ratified and the Three-Year Plan submitted to Parliament. This was the most important long range result of the Nagy crisis - as prepared the way for the 1949 5-year Plan.

On July 1, 1947. The Communist deputy, Mod, who belonged to the close personal friends of Rajk, speaking on the 3-Year Plan, said,

With the success of the Three Year Plan, the most important condition for the strengthening of the Hungarian democracy has been achieved and the sincerely democratic nationalist unity. §2.

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The European Recovery Plan and Hungary

On July 6, 1947, when the Marshall Plan was announced, the following opinions were voiced in Budapest; The Small Holders Party expressed active interest and even hopes about the Plan, waiting for further information. The Hungarian Minister in London was ordered to go to the Paris meeting as an observer. Social Democratic leader, Szakasits said,

We shouldn't stay away from an American aid plan....The Social Democratic party's view will be identical with the view of the Social Democratic parties who are our neighbors.⁸³

As against these hesitant and hopeful opinions, the Communist Party's stand was clearly expressed in the Szabad Nep.

The Soviet Union will not be there; neither will the neighboring countries like Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria....The stand of Czechoslovakia and Poland is not doubtful either....Hungary cannot take a stand against her neighbors....cannot pursue an anti-Soviet politics....⁸⁴

The Government soon announced that it will not take part in the ERP.

The end of the crisis

On July 10, 1947, United States Minister Chapin presented his credentials to the president of the Republic. On July 17th new electoral law was introduced which deprived from 10 to 20% of the voters of their right to vote on flimsy excuses, calling people with decades of democratic background Fascists--Jews, Nazis and classifying respectable old ladies as prostitutes. New elections were announced. The very purpose of the whole move was to neutralize the 1945 elections and the majority of the Small Holders Party. It was once again a reaching cut by the Communist Party for legal popular support and although they used every political chicanery to

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win a majority by depriving masses of voters of their voting right who would have voted against them, and using indirect pressure on the whole population, they could still count on 22% of the votes. Never again did they attempt to use parliamentary elections for power. The next election in May, 1949 was based on the Soviet pattern of elections and a united front. This time the success was almost 100%.

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- Jan. 4. The Ministry of the Interior announces that an anti-Republican conspiracy has been discovered.
- Jan. 5. Minister of Reconstruction, E. Mistet (Smallholder) resigns. Later arrested as a conspirator.
- Jan. 5. Interior Ministry announces conspiracy plot, the role of Hungarian Unity Society.
- Jan. 6. Communist daily newspaper connects conspiracy with Smallholders Party.
- Jan. 7. Minister of Justice announces 130 conspirators held, 22 more arrested.
- Jan. 9. Cardinal M. makes protest against policy interference and removal of books.
- Jan. 12. Interior Minister Rajk reports that Deputy Salata, Prime Minister Nagy advisor, is conspirator.
- Jan. 14. Newspaper daily Kossuth Nepe banned for reporting Yugoslav-Hungarian economic conference.
- Jan. 16. Reconstruction Minister Misteth arrested.
- Jan. 17. Paris and London Hungarian diplomats accused of conspiracy, ordered home.
- Jan. 17. Deputies Salata and Jaczko deprived of parliamentary immunity.
- Jan. 17. Nagy criticized by his party.
- Jan. 18. Salata flees.
- ✓ Jan. 19. Communist Rakosi threatens with Soviet intervention unless Government arrests six more Smallholders deputies.
- Jan. 20. Large-scale arrest of Army officers and right-wing elements of Smallholders Party announced.
- Jan. 21. Prime Minister announces purge of his party. Smallholders Party suspends eight deputies who are deprived of immunity.
- Jan. 22. Right-wing party leader Sulyok criticizes sharply coalition.
- Jan. 27. A.C.C. agrees to resumption of diplomatic relations with Austria.

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- Jan. 31. In Budapest the Social Democratic Party Congress
 Feb. 3. rebukes C. Peyer and other Western minded Social Democrats.
- Feb. 4. B. Kovacs, Secretary General of Smallholders Party, goes on leave. The party excludes the 8 arrested Smallholder deputies.
- Feb. 6. Minister of the Interior says that confessions of the men accused of conspiracy implicate B. Kovacs.
- Feb. 10. In Paris the Peace Treaty signed.
- Feb. 22. Committee of Privileges refuses to suspend parliamentary immunity of B. Kovacs.
- Feb. 25. Kovacs offers to give evidence to the Political Police. He is arrested by Soviet authorities.
- Feb. 27. Trial of the first batch of conspirators begins.
- March 5. Byrnes attacks Russia for burden of occupation troops in Hungary.
- March 6. United States protests to Russia against her intervention in Hungarian affairs.
- March 8. Hungarian Government bans publication of note on order by Soviet.
- March 8. Great Britain sends a note to Russia demanding a tripartite inquiry into B. Kovacs' arrest.
- March 9. Russia rejects the American, and March 11th the British Note of Protest.
- March 9. ACC chairman refuses U.S. request for inquiry into Soviet arrest of Kovacs.
- Mch. 10. Hungarian press publishes U.S. and Soviet notes.
- Mch. 12. ACC rejects British note.
- Mch. 12. New York Times claims 3000 held in conspiracy.
- Mch. 13. Crisis in Smallholders Party. Prime Minister resigns for few hours, wins battle for new party purge.
- Mch. 13. Three Smallholder Ministers resign.
- Mch. 14. Three Left Wing Smallholders sworn in as new Ministers.

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- March 17. U. S. sends second Note of Protest to Russian authorities in Hungary.
- March 18. Cabinet reorganized. Left-wing Smallholders cabinet members. U.S. again claims Soviet interference and demands three-power inquiry, cites Soviet arrest of Kovacs. Hungarian press banned to publish note. American Legation distributes mimeographed copies. British note rejected by Soviet.
- March 21. British protest note to ACC requesting inquiry into arrest of Kovacs.
- March 22. Russia rejects British note.
- March 28. United States grants fifty-million-dollar loan. ^{tlw}
- April 10. Cardinal Mindszenty threatens government to excommunicate all members of Parliament should they pass bill to end compulsory teaching of religion in schools.
- April 10. Printers refuse to print the Freedom Party daily, "Holnap." Vatican Radio describes difficult situation of the Church in Hungary.
- April 13. Szakasits demands new elections.
- April 14. Rakosi derides UNRRA aid.
- April 15. ACC agrees to resumption of diplomatic relations with Finland.
- April 16. Peoples' Tribunal sentences first batch of conspirators; three to death, the rest to long terms of penal servitude.
- April 26. Minister in Berne takes over from the custodians Hungarian gold which had been placed in Switzerland by Kallay Government.
- May 2. Roumanian Premier Groza and members of his Government visit Hungary.
- May 13. Stalin agrees that Hungarian p.o.w.s. be repatriated. From then onwards they returned in a steady flow.
- May 18. Premier Nagy goes to Switzerland on holiday.
- May 18. Minister of Education admits that the plan for optional religious teaching would be dropped.

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1947 (Cont'd)

- May 20. An economic delegation leaves for Moscow.
- May 22. Russia demands Hungary pay \$200,000,000 owed previously to German firms. Germany's debt to Hungary disregarded.
- May 31. Premier Nagy said to have resigned by telephone. In fact he resigned on June 2nd in writing after his 4-year-old son was handed over to him at the Swiss border.
- May 31. L. Dinnyes (Smallholder) appointed Premier.
- June 5. President Truman calls Hungarian developments "an outrage."
- June 7. Five Hungarian Ministers abroad and members of their staffs resign. Alleged confession of B. Kovacs, and of F. Kapocs, F. Nagy's secretary, published.
- June 9. Smallholder leader, speaker of Parliament Rev. Varga, flees Hungary.

POOR ORIGINAL**CHAPTER IV**

**"WHEN ALL THE VACILLATING, UNSTABLE INTERMEDIATE ELEMENTS...
HAVE EXPOSED THEIR UTTER BANKRUPTCY"**

The Nagy crisis accomplished the third condition for victory as set by Lenin: The opposing forces "have been sufficiently weakened." The next condition in the fulfillment of the instruction was to create conditions wherein "all the vacillating, unsteady, unstable intermediate elements, the petty bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie democracy, in contradistinction to the bourgeoisie, have exposed themselves enough before the people, have made a sufficient parade of their utter bankruptcy".

The Political Aftermath of the Crisis

July 24, 1947, Parliament accepted the new electoral law and was dissolved until September 16th, to be reconvened after the new election.

In his election speech, Rakosi, as a skillful tactician, brought up the problem of the war prisoners in the Soviet which was one of the most painful problems to the

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population. The Communist Party had always championed their return, but the Soviet was slow to return the men and reluctant to return any officers except those who had been indoctrinated with Soviet ideology. Public opinion associating the Communists with the Soviet Union put almost all the blame for the lack of the return of these men---most of them in the productive age groups---on the Communist Party.

Rakosi said:

We would have liked to do more for the prisoners of war, but even our strength is limited. We received 17% of the votes...Now there are going to be new elections...." 69

This was clever tactics---just shortly before the people went to vote, blaming the lack of the return of their fathers, brothers and fiances on the fact that the Communist Party did not receive enough votes in the 1945 elections and hinting that through its connections with the Soviet Union they would be able to do more if they received a larger vote. Thus even parliamentary procedure and the "helplessness" of the minority group (in that case the Communist Party) could be played up by Rakosi. At the time of this speech important phases in the campaign of that minority for a complete control of the Hungarian political scene were accomplished facts. The most important Smallholder Party leaders were removed by the Red Army force and by Communistic tactics and they were just about to have a new election which would put a legal end as

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well to the achievements of the 1945 elections. A speech from a leading Communist at that time referring to the helplessness of the Communist party being a minority of 17% showed how far Soviet tactics can go in misinterpreting an obvious situation and distribution of the political forces.

On July 20th, Reverend Balogh announced that he had formed a new party under the title of Independent Hungarian Democratic Party. This was part of the Communist tactics to break away as many voters from the Smallholders as possible.

The most energetic and outspoken non-Communist leader was D. Sulyok. On June 12, he said, "We have become a police state." The violent breaking up of his party meeting became a repeated occurrence ever since it was formed. Once he tried to get assistance and asked the Interior Minister for defense against the mobs, largely Communists, who broke up his legal party meetings with violence. Rajk answered, "Naturally, you are being attacked. You are enemies of the democracy. It is the very duty of the Communists to attack you. I sit opposite you here as a Communist leader and as a Hungarian Interior Minister. As a Communist leader I tell you, 'if

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it would depend on me, you would no longer be alive'; as Interior Minister, unfortunately, I am bound by laws. Thus I cannot realize my inside conviction against you." 86

Rakosi had already told him:

"If you are against us, you are against the democracy--- if you are against the democracy you are the enemy of the Hungarian people and enemies of the Hungarian people have nothing to do in this country."

On July 23, the party of Sulyok announced its dissolution. "We wish to prove our sense of responsibility by the fact that we stop the activity of our party... As a consequence of the fact that our press has been banned." 87

To conclude this condition of Lenin successfully, the Agenda for the Communist Party was as follows:

- a. Secure the most political benefit from the Nagy crisis as far as the majority party is concerned.
- b. Liquidate the remnants of the non-Marxist political forces.
- c. Liquidate the Social Democratic party as an independent organization in order to pave the way for the next phase: "When there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favor of decisive and unhesitatingly bold revolutionary action".

The 1947 Election

As far as the first agenda was concerned, the new elections on August 1, 1947 brought the desired result. (See tabulation on next page)

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	<u>1947</u>		
	<u>1945</u>	<u>1947</u>	
Smallholders Party	50%	15%	Democrat Peoples Party 16% Hungarian Independent Party 13% Reverend Balogh Party 5%
Communist Party	17%	22%	
Social Democrat Party	17%	14%	
Peasant Party	6%	0%	

For the 1945 elections the Radical Party and the Bourgeoisie party together record less than 2% of the votes. In the 1947 election, three minor parties, the Christian Womens' Communist Party, the Balogh and Radical Party received together 5%. (Be sure to note as above that the Balogh vote was split three ways).

Thus in 1947, the Soviet Union Party forces were disintegrated as follows:

Democratic Peoples' Party	16%
Hungarian Independence Party	13%
The Balogh Party	5%

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The Smallholders Party which won a majority of 58% votes in 1945 emerged from the 1947 election with 15% of the votes. This, however, did not mean a considerable change, only a regrouping of the political ^{opinion} ~~union~~ of the population. After the Smallholders Party lost its leaders, the leftist party chiefs were only regarded by the broad masses as Communist stooges. In fact the voters backed the new non-Communist parties, as there was a definite rightist trend in the country as a reaction to the Communist Party tactics in neutralizing by force and cunning their expressed political choice of 1945. The other non-Communist parties polled considerable votes which surprised the Communist leaders. The Peasant Party polled 8% and after consequent purges became an obedient tool of the Communist Party.

The Hungarian Independence Party, ~~led by~~ headed by former Smallholder Pfeiffer, polled 13%. The Democratic Peoples Party led by I. Darankovics, a progressive Catholic party received 16%. The Independent Democratic Party headed by Reverend Balogh had 5% of the votes while the results achieved by the smaller non-Communist parties was not significant.

Thus while the non-Communist forces in Hungary were not eradicated, they were successfully atomized into several smaller parties and no longer concentrated in one majority party.

With all the direct and indirect pressure and all the chicaneries of election techniques, the Communists gained only 5% more votes than in 1945.

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The Tactics of Liquidating the Remnants of the Balogh Parties

September 6, 1947. Rakosi discussing the election returns, said, "The result of the Communist Party would have been better if the dirty lie wouldn't have thrown against us that: 1. We want to be a member of the Soviet Union instead of an independent Hungary; 2. The fairy tale of the Kolbos. This slander campaign found followers in every village"...He called the Balogh party a continuer of the old regime, "fascist type", Christian Socialist party, and called the party of Pfeiffer outright Fascists.⁸⁸

The non-Communist forces were dispersed by the fall of 1947, but were not liquidated yet.

October 1, 1947. Still the remnants of opposition can be found. On October 2nd, the non-Communist daily, Magyar Nemzet, in an editorial titled "National Education or Party School", "In the people's colleges extremist ideologies in every school violent party spirit...education for party politics."⁸⁹ The article attacks the Communist influence on education.

On October 9, 1947 in Parliament, Deputy Barankovics criticizing the three year plan, said that the three year plan leaves God out of the whole plan. Communist deputy Revai sarcastically asked, "How does deputy Balogh imagine the inclusion of God in the three year plan." Balogh, answering, "For example, through the weather."⁹⁰

November 4, 1947. Middle class party spokesman, Pfeiffer, a well known journalist, said "Our greatest task is, besides the survival of the nation...domestic freedom...The people shouldn't have to fear."⁹¹

The atomizing of the opposition by the Communist Party continued:

November 7, 1947. Rakosi gives an important tactical speech. It attacks the parties of Balogh and Pfeiffer but also claims that the Social Democrats were not completely reliable either. The speech was aimed to create confusion where the Communist Party stands, as against the other parties. Rakosi quotes a Social Democratic deputy who is also a youth leader and who

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attacked the Soviet Union without any steps being taken against him by the Party.

On November 19, the Independence Party was dissolved. The next day the venerable Social Democratic Leader Payer was forced to flee. The next day the banks were nationalised. Communist tactics by that time became accelerated. The liquidation of the opposition was stepped up. After the Pfeiffer Party was dissolved, the only serious obstacle was the Social Democratic Party and the party of Barankevics. This later, however, indirectly linked to the Catholic Church---in the Communist Party plans could wait with its liquidation when the Church would be the next on the agenda. Thus disintegration of the Social Democrats was the next step:

A. THE LIQUIDATION

The Social Democratic Party

The disintegration of the Social Democratic party was the next step. Two different approaches to the line of tactics were used.

After the importance of the sequence of events in political developments, there were two entirely different approaches from the Communist and non-Communist political philosophy.

To the non-Communist party leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, and Western public opinion as well, the most important phase was whenever the Communist Party succeeded in forcing them out of their positions. When they had to flee

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their own countries whether it was Mikdajczik in Poland or Nagy in Hungary, to them "the story ended" with their fading out of the picture. This is humanly understandable.

The viewpoint of the Communists was entirely different. While they realize the importance of eliminating the various bourgeois political forces as part of the class warfare, all this to them meant nothing else but the creating of the essential prerequisites for the only important final aim, the building of Socialism. The disintegration and elimination of the non-Marxist political parties was nothing else to the Communist Party mentality but the clearing away of the rubble. For the final aim, the building of Socialism, the most important prerequisite was the elimination of the Social Democratic party. The Gleichschaltung of mass organizations, the solving of the problems of the church and the Kulaks could only be followed as the next links in the chain after the all-important event of the annihilating of the Social Democrats has been accomplished.

The Communist Party Reason for the Importance
of the Social Democratic Problem:

To non-Marxist observers, the vehement hostile attitude of the Communist Party, a Marxist party, towards any other Marxist party presents an enigma. The violence of language and action if and when some social democrat offers resistance is also somewhat puzzling. They are considerably more violent and more passionate and more ruthless than with the most

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powerful of the capitalist foes. To understand this riddle, one has to go down to the depth of the communist faith. The very explanation constitutes the core of communist philosophy. It is the fact that a fullfledged Communist believes in the certainty of world revolution; i.e. that Communism will be victorious everywhere because that is a historic necessity. No force can prevent that. He believes in that as fanatically as a Jesuit believes in the Dogma. He believes that whatever the capitalists will try to do, they may succeed in gaining temporary delays but no power can stop the total collapse of the Capitalistic system and the coming of Socialism.

The ideological importance of this doctrine is so strong that all the steps before the eventuality of Socialism are merely tactical steps---which can and should zig zag all the time as the Doctrine prescribes. To these tactical steps the doctrine is an almost too complete Book of Instruction. After the final preparatory step...the most difficult one: The liquidation of Socialism is achieved and the revolution will enter the phase where tactics become insignificant and into the realm of fulfilling the building strategy of Socialism which is the very purpose and dream which leads into Utopia.

This phase, however, can never be entered without first liquidating Socialism. This is an absolute rule. It has been faithfully followed in Russia, in the Bela Kun evolution and in all Central and Eastern European countries without exception. And, it is on the Communist agenda for the plans and designs in any future operations in all the Western European countries and overseas.

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When this will be achieved, the capitalists will be automatically annihilated, partly through the battles with Communistic forces and mostly because their collapse is automatic and a historic necessity. However, when that great moment will be finally achieved and they would be near to the final utopia---socialism for all mankind---there would still be one enemy left, who would try to claim all the benefits, who would try to reach out for the same masses whom only communism has a monopoly to make happy: the workers. This surviving lone force, the most dangerous one of the Socialists would be still there. Their collapse unlike that of the capitalists, is not automatic---according to the Doctrine. That is the reason that they are the deadliest of all enemies as they pretend to be on the same side, and in fact reach out for the same aim and followers, although claiming the use of different methods.

Therefore, as the very prerequisite for the final aim in the operational scheme, they have to be made harmless before the Communist Party can actually start to build socialism. They have to be merged, those elements in their ranks who would not be willing to disintegrate have to be annihilated by every possible means. For the final decisive big battle, this move is the prerequisite. After that, the Communist Party becomes the only dominant party force throughout the world.

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In Central and Eastern European countries, in the period following World War II, this annihilation was usually done in the more subtle form of merging, thus having the Social Democrats themselves to vote the party out of existence. In the Bela Kun Revolution, they started out by merging the Social Democrat Party the same day when they got the power. The experience of the Bela Kun failure taught them in the period following World War II to act differently, and postpone that step until the non-Marxist forces are disintegrated.

As a result of election irregularities sponsored by the Ministry of Interior, an open revolt broke out in the Social Democratic Party which only gained 13% in the election. The same policy was followed against them by the Communist Party in 1947 after the Nagy affair, the 1947 elections and its aftermath during which the non-Marxist parties were disintegrated and gradually purged from Hungarian Political life.

It was the Communist Party excesses in that 1947 election which caused a serious palace revolution in Social Democratic ranks. The Communist Party using the so called "blue tickets" which permitted persons voting when they were away from their permanent residence was utilized by Communist Party voting techniques as "Flying voting". Truckloads of Communist members were travelling all day on election day casting a Communist Party vote in each town. Some of them

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later admitted to have succeeded in voting up to 16 times during the day. The opposition parties headed by Social Democrats accused the Communist Party with gaining around half a million votes through this trick. Social Democrat cabinet Ministers resigned in protest, feathers were flying in the Social Democratic Headquarters. The Communist Party promised thorough investigation of the accusation and the Social Democrats became "pacified" once again. Even this "social Democrat" revolt, however, aided Communist Party aims: again it weakened the Social Democrat Party because some influential members left their positions during the rift. Cabinet members resigned and a wave of mass protest was sounded against the Communist Party. The Muscovites tried to pacify the Social Democrats by promising an investigation into the election fraud charges and even the Soviet Commander in Hungary tried to help smooth out the difficulties.

The Communist Party Tactical Line

An important event occurred in December: The visit of Tito.

December 7, 1947. Szabad Nep writes, commenting on the visit of Tito in Budapest, "...To celebrate Tito in Budapest is almost such a glory for the People's Democracy as the successful land reform and the nationalization."

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On December 13, 1947, the Szabad Nep attacked the Social Democratic Nepszava for calling the shooting party which was given to the honor of Tito as a Fascist type shooting party which would have been held in the previous regime.

On the same day the Deputy Secretary General of the Communist Party declared that the Social Democrats should merge with the Communist Party. On December 19, 1947, the Communist Party daily, Szabad Nep, went even as far as stating: Szabad Nep as part of their tactics, attacks Szakisits because he doesn't want merger. They accuse him even of being of rightist sympathies. The explanation for this tactic is to make Szakisits feel his weakness to the utmost from both flanks.

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Under Communist Party pressure consecutive purges were conducted in the Social Democratic Party. Peyer, the leader of the "right wing", who fled the country was tried "in absentia" and by March 1948 the planned merger was announced. Within a few weeks the Social Democratic Party in Hungary unanimously voted itself out of existence and was merged with the Communist Party in the so called Hungarian Workers Party.

Soviet and Communist Party Appraisal of the Merger

The approval of Moscow was expressed in a telegram from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Congress of the Hungarian Workers Party on June 13, 1948:

"The telegram sends its warmest greetings and all its best wishes to the new unified party, congratulates past results of the fight, and economic

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reconstruction. The union of the two working parties is an event in the history of the Hungarian working movement of historic significance.⁹² signed, Moscow, June 12, 1948. Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Rakosi in his book also emphasized the decisive importance of this step...which was an essential prerequisite to the really big tasks: the liquidation of the peasants, the Church and through that the road was open to the final aim: the building of socialism.

Page 79 of Rakosi's book: The union of the two working parties is an unbelievable gain in strength in the Hungarian democracy and a turning point not only in the development of the Hungarian working movement, but the whole Hungarian democracy.

Page 201: It is the peak of results by democracy and it abolishes the biggest obstacle as to the building of socialism.⁹³

No 2 — Once again it has to be stressed that while from the Western point of view the various degrees of the liquidation of democratic forces in Hungary was of the greatest importance from the Communist point of view, the most important result was the absorption of the social democratic party. The roots of that go back to the very depth of Communism, directly back to Lenin and the very first links directly between Lenin and the 1919 Communists.

Radio Moscow emphasized the fact by saying on April 27, 1948:

Speaking about the past activities of the right wing Social Democrats, the radio explains that life itself demands a united workers party as an essential necessity for future development.⁹⁴

Only the finishing touch had to be put on the merger like finding a name for the new party. Unlike in 1919, the Communist Party did not wrangle over the name or insist on

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the Communist Party in anything else but the substance of the new Party. Its only aspect to the new name was:

Discussing the name of the new party, he mentions that somebody suggested that the new party should be United Party of Hungarian Workers and Peasants. (All this speech is on June 15, 1948). This name would stress too much the equality of workers and peasants and wouldn't underline well enough the leadership of the workers.⁹⁵

Thus the same phenomenon was repeated in Hungary too by the Communist Party policy maker, that like in all the other Central and Eastern European countries without exception, by the time complete Communist control of power was achieved, the Communist Party merged itself out of existence as far as the Communist name was concerned.

Szakasits, who engineered the merger, was rewarded with the presidency of Hungarian achievements. Now they felt strong enough to start to liquidate the two strongest resistance elements to socialism in Hungary: The Church and the Peasantry.

B. THE LIQUIDATION OF THE CHURCH

Communist Party Tactics that Failed

The Communist Party effort toward the liquidation of the Church was commenced with a typical comment by Rakosi:

The slogan of the masses was, "Cardinal Mindszenty is outdated. Let us have nationalized schools. The whole square of the mass meeting had the new flag of the new party, the nationalist flag was the Red Star and the Golden Wheat."⁹⁶

In Communist policy, the two important phenomena were:

1. The permanence of basic policies of strategic importance;
2. The great degree of changing of the methods in zig-zagging and varying tactics in order to achieve the first.

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These are perhaps best represented in the fight between Moscow and Rome with Hungary as a battleground. No other aspect of the Communist policy became as well known as a "cause celebre" in the world as this battle which culminated in the arrest and conviction of Cardinal Mindszenty. Last, but not least, in no other aspect of Communist policy was their failure so apparent as in the one concerning the line of tactics to be followed as regards the Church. Not only did they fail to pacify the Catholic public opinion in Hungary, but in addition, they succeeded to a larger degree than the churches ever did...to create harmony and unity between Protestant and Catholic masses in Hungary. The aim of the basic Communist policy was to handle the delicate affair with the Church as quietly and as much of a domestic affair as possible without attracting too much attention from public opinion outside of Hungary.

The outcome of their policy proved that hardly could any other phase penetrated deeper and wider into world opinion from Australia to South Africa.

It is worthwhile to analyze the reason for the failure of the Communist policy. It has to be emphasized in the beginning that the mistake was not in the Communist tactics. The Muscovites can have a clear conscience as far as the criticism of the guardians of the Doctrine are concerned in Moscow, which by no means they are, as they did not make any basic slip or mistake in their tactic. The line was "in line" from 1919 up

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in its development to 1948. This is a clear case where it can be undoubtedly ascertained in the fact that the predestinated failure of the Communist case lies not in their tactics---but the basic strategy. The permanent, long range attitude seems to be failing---the very issue of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism---versus church and the human masses who seem to refuse steadily to surrender their characteristics as human beings, imperfect as they may be with their biases and emotional complexes---for the purified emotionless status of class conscious exploited.

The clash of two different sets of values brought into the picture, the lack of human experience and insight as a basic weakness of Marxism, as against the superb 2000-year old machinery of Catholicism. This clash of two global conceptions ended not only as a means of amplifying to the utmost the hostility of the population in Hungary, but amplified world wide forces of very different character into an increasing attitude of hostility against International Communism. The robust figures of the Muscovites in Hungary as well as the mounting personality of the Cardinal were dwarfed by the size and dimensions of the issues which broke ^{up} into the open and swept away the local character of the case.

The important and interesting factor is that three decades of experience in tactics all well considered and

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utilized, the greatest possible care of the assuring of essential prerequisites to the battle all were lined up with the methods of Marxist scientific logic---and in view of this "total rearmament" of the Communists, the totality of the defeat became more conspicuous too.

The "terrain" for the Mindszenty Case

It is by no means a coincidence that the Mindszenty case occurred in the political terrain of Hungary. Former persecutions like the failing of Protestant leaders in Bulgaria lacked the dynamism of the Mindszenty case, the great attention to the slow moving drama of the battle now raging in Csecho-slovakia to take part of its world wide attention from the effects of the Mindszenty case as well. This is by no means a reflection as to a lesser degree of religionism or deepness of convictions in any other central or Eastern European country. It is simply the very characteristic of the extreme dynamism of the terrain in Hungary, where all the circumstances and traditions of a basically peasant character population, the traditional impact of Catholicism for 2000 years predestinated the country to be the scene for the battle. In addition to this, the lack of Slavic relationship with Mother Russia and its own Church made it impossible for Moscow to tie down at least part of the potential mass emotional eruptions through these ties.

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Mindszenty

Early in 1945 the primate of Hungary died and the young energetic Bishop Mindszenty was appointed in his place. A man of great courage, stubbornness and fanatic conviction, Mindszenty was arrested in 1944 by the Nazis and paraded when they arrested him in the full regalia of a Bishop. This dignified behaviour made him well known all over Hungary.

Shortly after the liberation of Hungary in 1945, and after a mere few months of the new order in Hungary, his stand became clear. Mindszenty was unrelentingly anti-Russian and anti-Communist. The unsavory mass excesses of the Red Army were still an everyday occurrence. Aristocrats, conservatives and high officials of the former Government tried everything to win the favor and defense of the Russians. Mindszenty, as head of the largest Church in the country even refused to make the courtesy visit to the Russian Military Commander. In pastoral letters, speeches, gestures, he not only openly criticised the new regime, but with particular care he made it understood that he did not recognize the regime as such. This opposition of the Church under Mindszenty leadership thus grew out from the very early period of the life of the new regime. Should the later policy of the Communist Party not have clashed so sharply with the sentiments of the majority of the population, the rift within the Church may have never grown into a statewide and international affair. However, as it did, the Cardinal became the symbol of re-

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sistance in Hungary as well as the whole of Central and Eastern European area.

The Communists had to realize from the very beginning that parallel with their reappearance in Hungary after three decades, a new Cardinal also appeared on the scene who was just as fully fanatical in his faith in the moral power of Church, as the Communists were in their ideological fanaticism to the Doctrine, and who was just as conscious of the global influence of Rome as the Communists were of the global designs of Moscow. Furthermore, Mindszenty was a born fighter who was just as skillful and jealous in the use of the backing of the world wide ideological and political power of the Church as the Communists were in their use of the Soviet power.

From the very beginning the Communist tactic was to try and isolate the Cardinal and try to minimize the conflict to as much to a personal level as possible. A nationwide whispering campaign was started against him (all the popular issues of the day were used in that tactic). Charges of pro-Nazi sentiment were made out of a pastoral letter which condemned inhuman treatment of war prisoners. His criticism on the Land Reform, based mainly on its character of class revenge, were used for whispering propaganda against him as being against the Land Reform.

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Communist Party Tactics Against the ChurchAfter the 1947 Election

After the 1947 election, the battle started in full swing. The next step in the Communist tactics was to get the support of individual Catholics against the Primate. The answer from Mindsenty came promptly----Excommunication! From every church the crowds listened to the Pastoral letter declaring: "Should a Catholic become unfaithful to the Church, we have to warn him and if necessary apply sanctions against him".

The next step of Communist tactics was a full scale propaganda for the nationalizing of the schools. Radio, the press, thousands of party meetings all over the country and mass demonstrations were arranged by the party to be utilized by the Communists:

June 3, 1948

"Who controls education controls the people." Front page editorial. Reviewing the past systems of education which were in service of reaction, Rakosi explains that the majority of workers were banned from higher education in the past 25 years, wonderful palaces were built for schools especially by the Catholics, but for the people old out-dated elementary schools, poor equipment and one teacher for 80 to 120 pupils.⁹⁷

No. 2 ← In 1945 the old school system had ceased to exist and the free so-called general school for the age of 6 to 14 was established.

The Explosive Aspects of the Case

By that time, the masses were getting very excited. The accumulated hostility of the last three years against the Red Army, the Communists, the gradual disintegration of the non-Communist political opposition by the tactics

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of the Communist Party manifested themselves in widespread public anger. By this time no longer was the issue the cardinal, much less the problem of the nationalization of schools. In connection with a demonstration against the nationalization of schools, the people killed the policeman. In that atmosphere, the incident in Pocspetri happened, J. Revai, the Muscovite Ideologist of the Communist Party, wrote a full front page editorial in Szabad Nep the Communist daily. It is essential to quote in some length of that article as it reveals the whole structure of the Communist philosophy at this stage of development. It also shows that by this time the Communist Party also realized that the issue of the day was the whole issue.

June 6, 1948 by Josef Revai.

"The Violence in Pocspetri"

Pocspetri is a small village in the county of S. The majority of the inhabitants are very poor peasants who got very little of the land reform. Out of 2200 people only 200 got land. The boss of the village is a Catholic priest. He has 160 acres. In the election last year, the majority of the village voted for the party of B. The priest, some Kulaks, some exploiting mill owners, and one or two officers left over from the previous regime, these were the people who in Pocspetri fought against the nationalization of the church schools. Here is the result: On June 3rd, rebellion broke out in Pocspetri; the people attacked the village hall; they disarmed the policeman on duty and shot him. The seeds of Mindszentny ripened in Pocspetri. Should we blame the people, the poor backward peasants of Pocspetri. No. The instigators are the real criminals whether they are in Pocspetri or in Europe. Before the rebellion in Pocspetri, at a parents group meeting the Catholic priest prepared the atmosphere by saying, "Unworthy people want to decide the fate of the Church. We have to stop the nationalization of the

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Church schools. If that happens, the Church itself gets destroyed. We cannot let that happen. We must stop it with all our energy. If we don't do so, you lose your bread, you will be excommunicated by the Church and can't even be buried in a Catholic Church yard." The women of Pocspetri who forced their way into the village hall shouted: "Don't take our God away from us; we don't want to become pagans; we don't want the school; we don't want to be ladies; it is enough for us if we can use the spade." 98

Behind the case in Pocspetri is the allied forces of reaction, the dynasty, capitalism, etc.

We believe with Louis Kossuth*, the fate of the country, the fate of democracy, and the fate of state's control over the schools is one." The Hungarian people in that follow Kossuth and not Mindszenty. 99

There were several rebellions similar to that in Hungary. The writer contradicts himself by explaining that it was the ordinary people who revolted. Of the many cases of open violence in Hungary, ever since 1945 under the

*Hero of the 1848 Revolution

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pressure of Communists, only those cases were published which 1. were too big to be concealed; 2, could be exploited for propaganda. For example, the village priest or a former army officer or a representative of the Smallholders Party or similar pro-Western political element could in some way be dragged into the case. The investigation of the imperial ministry, which was a key position in Hungary as well as in the other countries in the Russian sphere always took care that extortion of facts should be as skillful as possible. The Communist press, later on the radio and mass meetings which were voluntary only in their name all helped to exploit the propagandistic value and potential of these cases to the utmost.

Under the mounting tension of the country, the Communists tried to make a twist in their tactics by emphasizing that it was not religion, even less the church which it opposed

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but only the person of Mindszenty. Every possible charge was leveled against him in which "Fascist murderer" was only among the less violent ones. At this point, the Vatican openly intervened.

The Pope using the Anniversary of the Eucharistic Congress of 1938 as an occasion, addressed the people of Hungary--- partly in the Hungarian language---a feat which had caused mass jubilation once before during the Congress of 1938, when he, as a Cardinal, spoke a few words in Hungarian to the masses. Now he blessed Mindszenty, thus answering the Communist charges that the Primate acts without the sanctions of the Pope.

The Fight Between Two Concepts:

From this time onward the Church became the main next link in the chain. The next aspect of the Communist Party has been the conclusion of an agreement on nationalization with the Protestant Churches by exempting the most important six Protestant Schools, by giving 20 years financial aid to the Protestant Schools. Then they made a similar offer to the Catholics. Mindszenty rejected it in principle. He was able to see in those tactical steps not only isolated moves but the conception of a long range plan in Communist Party strategy. He witnessed how the whole non-Communist political front was gradually disintegrating and crumbling to pieces under Communist tactics. He regarded the temporary Government concessions to the Protestants as parts of a similar

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strategy and was resolved not to permit it to the utmost of his power. In his pastoral letters almost every Sunday, passionate attacks were read in the Churches referring to the present terror as unprecedented in the 1000 years of Hungarian history. All this happened in a country, Sunday after Sunday, where political opposition had been ruthlessly muzzled, where opposition in press or radio was non-existent. The reaction of Rakosi was very typical: "It cannot be tolerated that one certain party should hold a mass meeting of a mass of several hundred thousand people---every Sunday".¹⁰⁰ April 27, 1948

The Communists could not afford to show weaknesses by losing that battle. 65% of all the schools were denomination-al and 50% of all teachers had to be nationalized. In Parliament the only opposition was represented by remnants of Catholic parties. The Bill was passed on June 16, 1948. Parallel with this phase of the Communist Party policy, the purging of Church organizations continued. Once again the old and always applicable method was used. A number of priests and the Secretary of the Catholic Action Committee were arrested.

The answer of the Cardinal to the passing of the Bill was to excommunicate all who voted for it. He also felt it is time to answer several of the charges against him or at least some of those which he considered worthy to answer at all.

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As for the charges of mediaevalism, The Cardinal retorted:

"Abroad my position is said to be mediaeval. But if the parochial schools of the United States were taken away and in their places were substituted schools for the inculcation of Marxism, what would they say?

"In his book 'Religion and Marxism', now on sale in Hungary, Lenin says 'We desire the true Communist education of children. We must teach youth Communist ethics and morals, including denial of the Ten Commandments. We do not believe in eternal moral values.'

"In every major question in the last three and a half years, including the constitution, land reform and nationalization, I have demanded a plebiscite. I ask if those are mediaeval who refuse to let the public express its will or I who demanded it?

"I do not want the Middle Ages; I want the rights of man. Ages and times do not concern me. The rights I demand were expressed long before the Middle Ages, and I notice that they have been incorporated in the charters drawn up since.

"On the basis of the natural right of parents and the church's divine mission to teach, the church will continue the struggle against the nationalization of the schools with every legal means."---The New York Times, June 29, 1948

July 19, Nyugati Hirnok quotes an article by I.S., the intellectual Secretary of the Communist Party written in the Communist Daily of Budapest and titled, "The Glory of Youth". "The schooling in' is a great problem which has to be solved in high schools and universities by the improving of their social structure, by increasing their influence among the young industrial workers and peasant youths, so that on that basis we can organize a United Youth Organization. The relationship between

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the party and the youth organizations has to be tightened so that our young ones can do their work under the firm guidance of the Party."

Tactical Aspects of the Mindszenty Trial

By this time, the order arrived from Moscow to liquidate the Cardinal---Vatican Radio January 10, 1949 quoted by east Europe January 20, 1949. "Mindszenty ordered that the Cardinal should be liquidated by December 31, 1948". A special commission was set up including members which "considered three solutions: the Cardinal's departure abroad, his suppression by accident or his arrest". He was offered the chance to leave the country, promised that no attack would be made against his person even after he left, he could excuse his departure in the pretext of ill-health. It is of great significance that after the Vatican was approached through the Hungarian Ministry in Rome with the same proposal that the Vatican itself offered Mindszenty that he can leave if he wants to. These Communist tactics were bound to fail. Mindszenty would have denied all his past attitudes if he had deserted his fight. On the contrary he was all ready, and inviting the consequences. He only saw clearly that his arrest was imminent, but in a Pastoral Letter warned the people that if he were arrested,

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any "confession" which may be made by him would be due to duress and "human frailty". This move underlined the dramatic nature of the consequent events for which the stage was set. The Communists first arrested his Secretary. This pattern had by now become almost uniform, its purpose was to extract confessions from the Secretary against Mindszenty.

A few days before the Moscow deadline on December 26, Mindszenty was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment for treason, conspiracy and blackmarketing. The details of the trial were publicized all over the world, as were its unique international repercussions. To include them would be outside the scope of this study which concentrates on Communist Party tactics. The fact, however that "black market" operations---explained and justified since the Minister of Finance who fled Hungary---were included, was an important step. It was designed to discredit the Cardinal in the eyes of the masses. It shows the complete lack of understanding of mass psychology of the Muscovites that even in that stage they could imagine that they could succeed in belittling the Cardinal as a criminal caused an international interest and concern.

The Barabkovics Party after the Communist Party saw that they could not use them as a conciliatory force with the Church had no longer a justified existence in the eyes of the Muscovites and was dissolved after its leader fled.

The Communist attitude towards the escape of Barabkovics, the president of the democratic people's party and the consequent dissolution of the party was: "As a by-product of the Mindszenty case, we also got rid of Barabkovacs."

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C. THE LIQUIDATION AND THE KULAK-QUESTION

The fight against the Kulaks became more violent. Legislative as well as police measures were taken against them and parallel with that the introduction of the Producing Cooperatives as the prerequisite of the kolkhoz was promoted by a wide scale propaganda campaign. All sections of the population including the Communist Party members were frightened by 1949 except the broad masses of the peasantry.

The Communist Party Line of Tactics
in Theoretical Aspect

In the technique of liquidating the peasant problem, the Muscovites have as an experience not only the 1919 events when this aspect caused their failure to a large extent, but the bitter struggle of the peasants against collectivization in Soviet Russia, the great famines of 1932-33, and the circumstances which forced the Soviet Government to the employment of mass removal of the peasants into camps. In Hungary before the campaign against the Kulaks was launched, specially selected groups of rural Communist Party officials toured the Soviet studying the collective farm system and spending weeks on the famous Stalin Collectiva, thus receiving first hand coaching in the tactics of handling the details of the problem.

This explains why the Communist Party is painfully careful in proceeding gradually with the program and fully realizing the delicate nature of the problem of "the Middle Peasant" avoids with meticulous care any offence against

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them---at least in the present phase of the campaign.

The main line of the tactics to be followed was outlined by Rakosi on June 1, 1949:

Our party leadership brought up the problem of winning over the middle peasants to our ranks. It explained those practical mistakes of the party policy which threw off away from us the middle peasantry to the Kulaks and which, instead of putting limits on the Kulaks as a class, aimed to destroy them mistakenly. Our central leadership, consequently, employed the Leninist-Stalinist slogan to rely on the poor peasantry to make an agreement with the middle peasantry and not to cease to fight the Kulaks even for a second.¹⁰¹

The method used in 1919 and in Soviet Russia followed with mathematical exactness. The now almost classical method of dividing the peasants into classes and the "cutting off" of the kulak was the order of the day. A concentrated full time all front attack started in that direction. Again, as proof of the final policy, the strategy was unaltered... the sequence of targets, however, was different and the timing more careful.

The Communist Party Line of Tactics in Practical Aspect

The whole communist press with all the communist controlled non-communist press, the radio all announced that there are three classes of peasants: 1. The Dwarfholder up to 15 yokes or the agricultural proletariat (landless class), they are promised that he will get land. 2. The middle peasant (15-25 yokes) who is in close alliance with the proletariat against the exploiter; 3. The Kulak---or Pasha Peasant---over 25 yokes---a popular hint to the oligarchy of the non-working fat Turkish Pashas of the Hungarian history.

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This third category is clearly defined by Revai:

Once again, who is a Kulak? A functionary asks us. It would be so much easier if we could have an exact guidance where does the Kulak start from the middle peasant.

He takes special care of its social status, expects to be the first everywhere, in church and in the villages; despises and looks down on the poor workers in the villages. Very dangerous is the so-called good Kulak.

From the 1919 experiences, Revai realizes the danger of the excesses:

The other great danger in that respect is those of us who go into excess on the left and they don't care whether they fight against the exploiters while gaining the dislike of the people at the same time, thus they strengthen our enemies, they mistake the policy of the strong hand with oligarchy, thus breaking the tactics of our party.

Our purpose is to isolate the Kulaks, but in the same time we have to discipline these leftists who go into excess and with haphazard mistakes try to solve the problem by methods of liquidation instead of trying to build on the masses. 1923

This reveals the painful care which the Party exercises in steering the fight against the Kulaks---more carefully isolating the other sections of peasantry from the fight.

Now the line of tactic is: one at a time in the memory of the Muscovites. The fight is decisive. This time the Middle Peasant must be declared as an ally! The reasons of the lost battle against the peasants in 1919 are still vivid. The same principle of special attention to be given to the Middle Peasant is further stressed:

The Alliance With The Middle Peasant

April 17, 1949 In Permanent Alliance with the Middle Peasant

We wouldn't be living in realities if we wouldn't realize that in the villages there is insecurity

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and anxiety, particularly among the workers of the village, the middle peasants. What is the reason for that? He explains that the material welfare of the middle peasants is better than ever before and details it.

However, it is the lack of trust in the system and anxiety of mixing up by local authorities of the Kulak and the middle peasant. As one example, a middle peasant complained, a Kulak was fined about 6,000 florin because there was no sand and water in his attic; ever since that I am anxious; how about if they take a look at mine? This peasant sees that the punishment of the Kulak was only an excuse and it hurts his sense of justice. Thus, instead of opposing the Kulak, it hurts his sense of justice. Thus, instead of opposing the Kulak, he sympathizes with him. We cannot afford the people of our own rank should weaken the alliance of the working class with the working peasants. Irresponsible elements going to excess in the villages were already mentioned by Lenin and we have to stop oligarchy too. We have to make our alliance permanent with the middle peasants. We emphasize for important reasons its a permanent alliance, not tactics. The working class doesn't want to go ahead without the middle peasants.

The article forgets to mention the fact of numerous death sentences. Life imprisonments of Kulaks were imposed recently for crimes such as not submitting their crops or failing to comply with detailed orders of production.

Fighting the Kulak

The government does everything in its power to persecute. They are forbidden to enter the markets. Excuses like sabotaging the instructions of sewing, cutting down of a tree, failing to surrender the log, the exploitation of employees are severely punished with heavy imprisonments.

The newspapers in Hungary ever since the Communists "took direction" of the villages, which is the official term, meaning "to take up the matter seriously", reported day by day death sentences against kulaks for 8 or 10 years imprisonment

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for crimes like cutting out a tree without permission.

The court condemned to death a kulak who instigated the peasants in Pocspetri to lynch the head of the local cooperative society.

This was the first result of Revai's exclamation, "The peasant policy of our party follows the line of Leninism and Stalinism."¹⁰⁴

The Resistance of the Peasants

The resistance against the Government's plan to introduce the "producing cooperative" met open hostility, although the timing and method was much more careful than in 1919.

As a mass resistance on behalf of the peasants, ever since the idea of collectivization was introduced by the Communists, the landmark signs marking property, instead of being pulled out of the ground, are pushed down into the earth by the peasants as a proof for later that certain piece of land is their property. This primitive sign of mass psychology indicates how deep the sentiment of private ownership lies within the peasant mentality.

Rakosi
~~Revai~~, recognizing that fact tries to explain it by claiming that:

The majority of peasants used to be servants or dwarf-holders. That meant in the Hungarian times such horrible animal-like, hopeless, insecure fate that even if they would have lived in the jungle, they wouldn't have to suffer more from the fear of the unemployment, the whip of the supervisors, the fate of their daughter, and their future. Compared to that, the situation of the new peasant today is a paradise. It is only natural that these people who live under better conditions only since a few years desperately insist upon what they have.

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The majority of the small farmers today never before owned any horses, cows, a home or land. Besides, the people's democracy defends them.¹⁰⁵

The order of the government for the defense of the producing cooperatives punishes with 2 to 10 years of prison anybody who criticizes or besmirches a cooperative or its member or any of its family. If anybody, according to the same order, steals, robs or in any way damages the belongings of a producing cooperative, the punishments can be life sentence.

The producing cooperative, as interpreted by the Communists, resembles the democratic cooperatives in Scandinavia only in name. The Scandinavian cooperatives had a fine reputation all over Europe and were able to give individual peasants all the benefits of owning combines, tractors, etc., without possessing a large capital. The present interpretation of the cooperatives by the Communists, like in 1919, is poorly disguised form of state control and the collective farms.

This belief is uniform in the peasant masses and by now goes so deep that even if the Communist party would not strive for the collective farm, as it actually does---the peasants would'nt believe any reform which tries to take away their newly gained property.

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The new tactics

The Communists fully realize that the "battle of the village" will be a considerably more prolonged, desperate and difficult one than the "battle for stabilization" or the "battle against reaction", etc. The attitude of the peasants, unlike the one shown by the terrorized middle classes in the past, phases of the battle---show open hostility and resistance. The winning of the "middle peasant" as an ally of the Communist Party seems to be not more than an empty slogan of wishful thinking.

Recognizing the full weight of the situation and all the factors which are at stake, Rakosi demands full "Realpolitik" in the handling of the situation and he himself reveals the most discouraging aspects of this battle---as a technique of policy.

On June 1, 1949 he said:

We have to defend the poor peasants against the exploitation by the capitalists of the village, the Kulak, but we shouldn't for a moment think that through an alliance with the middle peasants we have won them over once and for all, and that they are going to come with us through any fire and will no longer hesitate. We wouldn't be disciples of Lenin and Stalin if we would forget that the middlepeasant through its position in the production is hesitating and will hesitate between the workers and the capitalists. Whenever we will see a mistake on our behalf or a greater difficulty, it will fall back, if not all of them, at least a part, especially considerable will be that hesitation when the movement of the village cooperatives becomes much greater than at present. We already have to reckon with that.

Although we realize that the majority of the middle peasants is hostile and fearful against the village cooperatives, we didn't make a secret of that during the election. We have to continue our propaganda and prove to the middle peasantry that we want to make our alliance more effective, well planned, and

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stubborn, we have to continue to get them away from the side of the Kulaks and that is most important because the Kulaks will do everything in their power to make sure that more and more links tie them to the middle peasants and that the transition which divides the middle peasant from the Kulak should be difficult to find. We have to make the middle peasant to join an alliance with the industrial workers. ¹⁰⁶

Like in Soviet Russia, the Kulaks present serious resistance. Hungarian public opinion and the attitude of the masses became stubbornly anti-Communist in the two pyrrhical victories of the Party, the Church and the Peasant question. The Communist line of tactics was in order to fulfill provision 4 of Lenin; 1. to disintegrate and fight the organized leadership in the case of the Church; the Cardinal and the Catholic schooling system; in the case of the peasants the strongest political organization of the Hungarian peasantry, the Smallholders Party. Instead, they set up a new peasant organization Dekosz, which advocates cooperatives on the Soviet line. The second one was the National Peasant Party which by 1948 became practically a tool of the Communist Party.

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Anti-Semitism

Anti-semitic feeling is widely prevalent in Hungary today. The population associates the present regime as a continuation of the 1919 regime. In both the majority of those who play a prominent part are Jewish, which does not mean that the Jews play a prominent part.

The Muscovites are Jewish without exception, but do not regard themselves as such neither in sentiments nor in actions. Moscow accepts only one allegiance. In fact, the average Jew is pilloried by the Communist Party as typically bourgeois. Many conspicuous positions like the political police were occupied by Jews, especially in the beginning when the effects of Nazism were still alive. The population associates Russians and Jewish Communists as one.

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Whenever it was important for the Communist Party that the public sentiment should let up a little, they did not hesitate to use anti-semitism as a tactic. The two best examples are the pogrom in Miskolc and the pogrom in Kunmadaras. Both were proven to be instigated by Communists. The purpose of the tactic was: to take away the public grievances at least partly as against the Russians and Communists. At least part of the bitterness should find an outlet in anti-Semitism. In both cases the Communist Party planning saw to it that class element of the exploiting capitalists should also be involved.

In the case of Miskolc, the masses got out of control and it developed into an open challenge to the Government authority.

The Kunmadaras affair was an agrarian anti-Jewish outbreak. Miskolc was industrial. It happened during the inflation. Jewish Budapest merchants offered higher prices for goods on the market. The local public felt bitter and the competition and the tension was mounting. Suddenly a half-wit girl screamed that her sister's child had been killed by the Jews who made sausage of her. That started the pogrom, the masses attacked the Jews in the market and after they were beaten up, they proceeded toward the houses of Jews, wounding and killing several. One Jew escaped from the market and while fleeing, passed by a group of Communist workers who were handling bricks. When he told them why he was fleeing, the workers started to attack him with bricks and killed him. The follow-

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ing official Government investigation found that the whole affair was organized and instigated by Communists. The fact that the Communist Party tactics of swelling the party from a few thousand into a mass party and enlisting the former "small Nazis" started to show its effect.

The Outline of Mass Dynanism

The Miskolc affair was on a much larger scale and included elements of anti-state anarchism as well.

The big steel plant, Diosgyor, operating a few miles from the city of Miskolc was where it began. The Communist Party announced a rally demonstration of the workers in Miskolc to demonstrate against the high prices and inflation. That was part of the Communist Party tactics at the time. All over the country centrally-directed similar demonstrations were proceeding. The Communist-led workers marched through the city to a mill owned by Jews, got hold of the owners, dragged them into the city by their feet on the streets, killed one and seriously wounded the other. Several Jews were beaten up, Jewish shops damaged, etc. The Government ordered the arrest of the murderers by military police. This was carried out. Next day, the fire sirens in Diosgyor were sounded, work was stopped and thousands of workers started to march to Miskolc "to free the prisoners". They marched up to police headquarters and demanded the prisoners. With violence, they freed the prisoners. The prisoners complained that the Jewish head of the police division beat him during the interrogation. Enraged by that, the mob stormed the police, captured and

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and killed the officer, and freed all the prisoners. No resistance was offered by the policemen who saw the lynching of their chief. After that the mob marched through the streets beating up all the Jews they could find, breaking into Jewish shops, and shouting anti-Russian Soviet slogans. They attacked the internment camp of Miskolc freed all the prisoners, criminals and Nazis as well. They were stopped in their rage by the full force of the local Russian Commander. No other party representative was involved, but Communists who directed the mob from the beginning. Under pressure from Budapest, the Communist Interior Minister Rajk, transferred or dismissed the whole police force of Miskolc, brought in emergency squads from other parts of the country, and the original murderers who were freed by the mob were taken into custody again. Under Communist pressure, they were soon set free by the Department of Justice and no proceedings were taken against them.

Similar occurrences were widespread; anti-Jewish acts as in Csepel, anti Russian acts and assassinations of Red Army officers repeatedly, as the case in Gyongyos or the Terez kortut case in Budapest, etc. The motives were a combination of mass emotions let loose hatred against Jews, Russians, combined with bitterness against the regime and anarchism. They were hard to analyze because of their complex nature, but all without exception confirmed the dynamism of the undercurrent in the masses.

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The Official Gazette in Budapest in almost every issue publishes the name of those schoolchildren who are banned from all the schools of the country for anti-Communist Party or anti-Russian acts. Their number increased considerably since the Miskolc affair. So did the number of those scientists, academic people and writers, politicians who fled the country. The only record revealing the name of at least the better known ones is the Official Gazette which publishes the Government Decrees dismissing them from their positions, and depriving them from their citizenship. Their number too increased after 1949 when the Miskolc case was closed.

The completing of condition 4 by the Communist Party left Hungary in a turmoil of explosive mass sentiments regularly erupting in anti-Russian, anti-Communist and anti-Jewish occurrences, ranging from whispering propaganda to large-scale industrial sabotage. "The utter bankruptcy of the intermediate element, however, became an accomplished fact by 1949."

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1947 (Cont.)

- June 12. State Dept. charges Soviet with interference in Hungarian affairs, violation of Yalta Agreement, criticizes Communists.
- June 12. British Government denounces Hungarian situation. In the National Assembly D. Sulyok said, "We have become a police state."
- June 14. Liberty Party leader Sulyok announces that he will boycott election unless guaranteed freedoms.
- June 11. Premier Dinnyes announces thorough purging of Army and also increase with new officers.
- June 15. Russian ACC head rejects U.S. note. Communist press attacks Sulyok for his suggestion of allied supervision for future elections.
- June 17. His party meeting is heckled by Communists and dissolved by police.
- June 17. New arrests in conspiracy. Sulyok protests to ACC against breaking up his party meeting. On 25th he appeals to Interior Minister for protection on charges that in Hungary only Communists enjoy human rights.
- June 19. Liberty Party meeting cancelled.
- June 19. Government publishes the White Book on the conspiracy.
- June 25. Premier Dinnyes says that new elections will be held on the basis of a new electoral law, but on separate lists.
- June 27. Peace Treaty is ratified. The Three Year Plan is submitted to the National Assembly. A trade agreement with Bulgaria is signed.
- June 30. Prime Minister Dinnyes upholds private party principle, charges Communists in speech with exceeding power.
- July 2. Three-year Plan bill debated in Parliament, attacked by Deputy Sulyok, who leaves floor after being assailed by Communist editor R. Parliament approves the three-year plan July 3.
- July 3. M. Karolyi appointed Hungarian Minister to France. British and American governments invited Hungary to participate in the Paris Conference to prepare the Marshall plan.
- July 10. Government decides not to participate in the Marshall plan. Liberal Party criticizes suppression of position through new Election Law.

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1947 (Continued)

- July 19. Further arrests for conspirators.
- July 21. Hungary admitted to Unesco.
- July 23. Liberty Party announces withdrawing from election in protests, dissolves on July 23. Same day Reverend Balogh starts new party.
- July 26. Parliament dissolves.
- July 29. State Department denies Communist R. charges against American imperialism.
- August 5. Vatican orders Catholics to refrain from voting in election.
- August 10. Rakosi says that the Workers' Parties should unite. Hungary's application for UNO membership turned down.
- August 13. Smallholders charge against election.
- August 17. Great Britain and U.S. protest against election irregularities. British Foreign Office estimates about 20% of the electors would be disfranchised by the new electoral bill. August 18th, Premier Dinnyes says that only 10% would be disfranchised.
- August 20. Cardinal Mindszenty in letter to Prime Minister charges election barred large number of Catholics from voting.
- August 22. Freedom Party dissolves itself. Later D. Sulyok escapes abroad.
- August 25. Government declines to admit election fraud.
- August 28. Government bans Independence Party, election rally.
- August 31. Election. Heavy losses of Smallholders Party; as a result of election, serious rift between Social Democrats and Communists. Minister of Justice Ries resigns in protest. Serious crisis within Social Democrat Party.
- Sept. 5. Socialist deputy secretary---General Marosan resigns, party masses demonstrate against him and Szakasits, reshuffle the same day in Smallholders ranks.
- Sept. 6. Russian commander requests Smallholders to cooperate, Szakasits declares he is unwilling to resign. Only the congress of the party has right to remove him. Moscow Radio announces discovery of new conspiracy with Independence Party leader linked up. Same day Communist Rakosi attacks Independence Party and leader.
- Sept. 7. As a step of tactics to conciliate Smallholders. Reverend Balogh's party is ordered by Communists to merge with Smallholders.

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1947 (Cont.)

- Sept. 10. Socialist Congress criticizes election and Communists, demands equality in Government and trade unions, votes confidence for Szakasits after his brief resignation.
- Sept. 12. New Government under Premier Dinnyes is formed. The Socialist and Communist Parties reached agreement.
- Sept. 16. Formal deposition of treaty to Moscow. Hungary regains legal sovereignty.
- Sept. 23. Press freedom further limited by three decrees.
- Sept. 24. Dual price system established.
- Sept. 26. ACC left Budapest.
- Sept. 28. Joint Communist-Social Democratic Government program published.
- Oct. 3. F. Nagy and D. Sulyok deprived of their citizenship.
- Oct. 7. The new Government presents themselves to Parliament. Workers of the biggest industrial plant in Hungary WM, on Communist instigation, strike against high prices.
- Oct. 13. In Belgrade Premier Dinnyes signs cultural agreement with Jugoslovia. Social Democratic Party welcomes Cominform.
- Oct. 22. Last batch of the conspirators sentenced. Trade agreement with Switzerland signed.
- Oct. 23. Social Democratic Party Conference held.
- Oct. 24. Dr. Donath hanged for conspiracy.
- Oct. 27. Socialist minister of industry Ban resigns, later becomes head of left-wing Socialists in exile.
- Oct. 31. Woman Deputy Slachta banned from Parliament for 60 days, for remark against Russia.
- Nov. 1. Trade and payments agreement signed with Czechoslovakia. Peoples' attorney attacks Independence Party leader. Pfeiffer, asks Parliament to waive his immunity.
- Nov. 4. A.P. correspondent Guinn accused of link with espionage activities of Independence and Liberal Party. Is expelled.
- Nov. 6. Pfeiffer flees Hungary.
- Nov. 7. Government cancels Resistance Certificates for anti-Nazi activities. Parliament empowered Government to rule by decree.

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- v. 16 Time bomb found in the town hall. The self-confessed perpetrators hanged next day two hours after their sentence had been pronounced.
- v. 19 Independence Party dissolved.
- v. 20. C. Peyer's parliamentary immunity suspended. He flees abroad.
- v. 21 Parliament passes the Bill for the Nationalization of the Banks. Leader of right-wing Socialists Peyer, charged with conspiracy, sought by political police, flees Hungary.
- v. 22. Government protests to U.S. because of the political asylum which had been immediately granted to Z. Pfeiffer.
- v. 22. A Government delegation, headed by Premier Dinnyes, visited Rumania.
- v. 24. Workers' Tribunals set up.
- ic. 4 Parliament passes bill abolishing difference between accepted and recognized churches.
- ic. 6-9. A Yugoslav Government delegation, headed by Marshal Tito, visits Hungary.
- ic. 8. Treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Jugoslavia is signed.
- ic. 9. In Moscow agreement is reached on German assets in Hungary
- ic. 13. Deputy Secretary-General of Communist Party insists that fusion with Social Democrats should take place in near future.
- ic. 26. Government denies A.P. report that Soviet troops are staying in Hungary at their request.

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- Jan. 4. Catholic "Uj Ember 1948 Calendar" is confiscated. Campaign against the Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal Mindszenty in particular, continues with mounting emphasis until the end of the year. Campaign against the right-wing Social Democrats continues until their elimination in February.
- Jan. 11. At the Communist Party conference Rakosi says "During 1948 agricultural cooperatives must be developed."
- Jan. 16. Purge of the Foreign Ministry begins; Jan. 27th, 100 officials dismissed.
- Jan. 17. Interior Ministry announces ban of U.S. movies starring anti-Communist actors.
- Jan. 29. Officials of Nitrochemical Plants Co. arrested. March 4 the director-general, K. Szabo, sentenced to death; September 17th executed.
- Feb. 3. The trial "in absentia" of C. Peyer begins. February 16th he is sentenced to 8 years.
- Feb. 10. I Kovacs says that the Communist Party will be purged of "former gendarmes, reactionary Army and Police officers, former leading members of fascist organizations, and so on".
- Feb. 15. Government delegation headed by President Tildy arrives in Moscow. February 18th Soviet-Hungarian T.F.C.M.A. signed.
- Feb. 18. G. Marosan announces that the Social Democratic Party has been purged, and that A. Kethly, O. Kishazy, A. Ban. F. Szeder, I. Szelig and many others had "resigned." On April 1st they were "recalled from Parliament".
- Feb. 22. Independence Party purged.
- Feb. 25. The National Peasant Party is purged.
- March 8. Social Democratic Party congress elects a new executive, resolves on fusion with Communist Party and expels "39 right-wingers."
- March 19. COMISCO expels the Hungarian Social Democratic Party.
- March 20. New united Labor Party merges Communists and Social Democrats.
- March 26. All industrial plants employing more than 100 workers nationalized.
- April 3. Minister of the Interior announces that a single party

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1948 (Continued)

- April 3. (continued)
organization will be formed.
- April 4. Admissions to the Communist Party suspended.
- April 11. The liason committee of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party decides to carry out the merger between April 20th and May 22nd.
- April 27. Parliament authorizes the Government to rule by decree.
- April 28. President of the Calvinist Synod, Bishop Ravasz, resigns.
- May 1. May 1st is celebrated jointly by Communist Party and Social Democratic Party.
- May 8. The full program of the U.W.P. is published.
- May 14. The Catholic Church states the conditions of its reconciliation those who side with the State.
- May 19. The Government invites the Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist Churches to negotiate. Oct. 7th an agreement with Calvinist and Unitarian Churches signed.
- May 20. Hungarian Minister in U.S. resigns.
- May 23. Mindszenty's pastoral letter accuses the Government of having broken its pledge of school nationalization. May 24th negotiations between the Government and the Catholic Church are postponed.
- May 25. Councilor in Warsaw legation refuses to return, flees to Sweden.
- May 31. Pope broadcasts to Hungary.
- June 8. Russia agrees to reduce reparations from July 1st.
- June 7. Cardinal Mindszenty pastoral letter bars all Catholics from Government, violently attacks Government.
- June 11. Cardinal Mindszenty sets Catholic terms for a pact with Government.
- June 12-15. U.W.P. holds its constituent congress.
- June 15. Draft bill for school nationalization published. June 16, Parliament passes it; June 19th State took over 4769 Church schools.
- June 16. In Warsaw Dinnyes signs Polish-Hungarian T.F.C.M.A.

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1948 (Continued)

- June 13. Mass meeting of workers celebrating merger.
- June 20. Mindszenty cancels negotiations with the State. Attacks on rich peasants gain impetus.
- June 29²⁹ 30. Central Executive of the U.W.P. endorses anti-Jugoslav resolution of the Cominform. According to N. Y. Times, serious rift within Communist Party between deputy Premier and Interior Minister connect with anti-Semitism.
- July 3. Catholic leaders arrested by Government for conspiring with Vatican and U.S. Amer. National Catholic Welfare conference attacked by Government.
- July 6. Arrests for listening to Voice of America.
- July 8. Workers Party expels two members for Titoism.
- July 10. In Prague President Gottwald says that soon all outstanding questions with Hungary will be settled. Gero said, "Kulaks must be eliminated."
- July 13. Hungarian Government protests against U.S. denunciations of arrests.
- July 11. Large-scale purge of Agricultural Ministry.
- July 18. Vatican reports ousting of 600 Catholic teachers who failed to swear allegiance to Government.
- July 19. In Sofia T.F.C.M.A. with Bulgaria signed.
- July 24. Court passes verdict on Catholic leaders.
- July 28. Foreign Ministry states an official of the Jugoslav Legation had murdered a Jugoslav student.
- July 31. Son-in-law of President D⁶xornoky arrested, President Tildy resigns, new president Social Democrat leader
- August 3. A. Szakasits elected President. Aug. 5th L. Rajk succeeds E. Molnar as Foreign Minister. J. Kadar succeeds L. Rajk as Minister of the Interior.
- Aug. 5. New Minister in U.S. presents credentials.
- Aug. 13. Decree on agricultural cooperatives published.
- Aug. 16. Three Olympic winners in Great Britain refuse to return to Hungary.
- Aug. 19. Fliers flee Hungary. St. Stephen's Day procession cancelled. August 20, Rakosi says that with present

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- Aug. 19. (Continued)
agricultural production living standard could not be raised.
- Aug. 23. Establishment of tractor stations announced. August 26, land sales are suspended.
- Sept. 1. Mindszenty and the Episcopate issue a pastoral letter explaining why they could not reach agreement with the State.
- Sept. 6. Government demands that the Lutheran Synod be purged. Sept. 9th: A. Radvanszky, Bishop L. Ordas and L. Varga arrested.
- Sept. 8. Two Army officers executed as spies.
- Sept. 10. Peasant Party leader resigns as Minister of War, succeeded by Farkas; left-wing element of Peasant Party wins at Erdei, becomes State Minister without portfolio.
- Sept. 18. 4 high officials of MAORT, 2 of them U.S. citizens, arrested; Sept. 26, the latter released; Nov. 26th opens the trial of the Hungarian officials; December 4th, the chief accused, Dr. S. Papp, is sentenced to death, the others to long terms of imprisonment.
- Sept. 30. Ordas sentenced to 2 years, Varga to 3 years penal servitude. Radvanszky released.
- Oct. 2. Hungarian-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed.
- Oct. 8. Dinnyes says the Government is ready to prove its strength against Mindszenty.
- Octo 9. Social Democratic Party in exile holds congress in Paris.
- Oct. 14. Head of legation in Vienna with associates resigns.
- Oct. 22. Cabinet discusses Mindszenty's disapproval of Hungarian-Czechoslovak agreement. Attacks on the Cardinal become increasingly threatening. Protests against him said to be pouring in from all quarters. Endless trials of saboteurs, spies and enemies of the people taking place; heavy sentences passed on the kulaks; 3 concentration camps opened for them.
- Oct. 23. Hungarian Government accuses Cardinal Mindszenty of interference in Government affairs.
- Oct. 30. 73 people charged with conspiracy, severe sentences.
- Oct. 28-30. National Conference of the Smallholders Party resolved to help in the formation of cooperatives.

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- Nov. 16. Son-in-law of former President B. Tildy condemned to death.
- Nov. 19. A. Zakar, Mindszenty's private secretary, arrested.
- Nov. 20. Government confiscates Catholic publication for Publishing Mindszenty's charges.
- Nov. 20. Communist Party Congress held. Army and war industries being expanded.
- Nov. 22. Communist Minister of Industry claims Catholic reaction must be liquidated.
- Nov. 27. Rakosi warns Mindszenty the State will take action against him; that the workers are dissatisfied, and that unless agriculture is collectivized, the living standard cannot be raised.
- Nov. 28. Communist Rakosi attacks Catholic Church and Barankovics opposition party as pro-Catholic.
- Dec. 5. Minister of Finance resigns in Switzerland while on official mission.
- Dec. 8. Lutheran Synod signs agreement with the State.
- Dec. 10. Prime Minister Dinnyes resigns.
- Dec. 15. The Government rejects U.S. protest about MAORT case.
- Dec. 18. Communist-instigated mass demonstration against Cardinal Mindszenty. All peasant organizations merged.
- Dec. 20. The Episcopate declares its willingness to settle relations between Church and State.
- Dec. 26. Szakasits said, "Mindszenty constitutes an obstacle on the road of democracy which must be eliminated."
- Dec. 27. Cardinal Mindszenty arrested on charges of "espionage treason and blackmarketeering." His arrest is made public two days later.

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The Fifth Condition of Lenin

. . . "The proletariat is ready". . .

By the Spring of 1949 the Communist Party felt that the "unsteady. . . unstable intermediate elements. . . have exposed their utter bankruptcy to the people". . .

The achievements of the Communist Party were announced in the Communist Party's presentation of the success of the Three Year Plan. Slogan: With the realization of the Three Year Plan the phase of rebuilding has ended.

By the end of 1949 the Three Year Plan is about completed, seven months earlier than planned--in two years and five months. This makes it necessary to work a new plan.

The Three Year Plan was the plan of the reconstruction of the Hungarian economic system which had been destroyed during the war.

The Three Year Plan has been a reconstruction plan, but already considerable industrialization has taken place.

Industry, mining, within the Three Year Plan brought a hundred per cent success. We got further than planned in heavy and machine industry and a little short of our plans in light industry. In agriculture we reached the set standards. In living standards we succeeded more than originally planned.

This result was achieved without and against imperialists.

Three years ago industry and mining were almost

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completely in capitalist hands. At present 87% is in state control.

Three years ago banking was almost completely in capitalist hands. Today it is in state hands.

Three years ago foreign trade was almost completely in capitalist hands. Today it is completely a state foreign trade.

Three years ago wholesale commerce was almost completely in capitalist hands. Today 75% of it is state controlled.

Three years ago retail trade offered but 3% of its volume for state interests. Today the state and the cooperatives take a 20% share.

Three years ago hundreds of thousands of working peasants faced the greatest difficulties and the danger that the big land owners and the Kulaks entangle them. Although in agriculture small farming is still dominant, the cooperative system has been already started.

Within three years our state became decidedly a people's state of the workers and working peasants. Power in our country is exercised by the working class in alliance with the working peasants.

With the completion of the Three Year Plan, the period of reconstruction is completed; a new period starts--the period of reforms and further developments. The Three Year Plan brought the conditions for us to continue and complete what we started laying the basis for--socialism, not only in the cities,

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but in the villages as well, not only in industry, but in agriculture and commerce as well. To that purpose we need the Five Year Plan.¹⁰⁷

The First Soviet-type Election

They announced a new election without any separate parties. The 1949 election was the "next link in the chain."

May 8, 1949 Talking about the election:

"The democracy criticizes our election as not being democratic. They only regard as democratic the democratic way of elections, which is, however, a cheating of the people and a dirty comedy.

In 1945 we voted for the people's rule, the land reform, the friendship of the Soviet Union instead of the imperialists and the big lands. In 1946 and 1947 we chose stabilization, ^{and} planned economy as against anarchy and inflation. In 1948 we chose socialization and the socialist industrial production instead of capitalism. In 1949 we are choosing the peace, the Five Year Plan, and the people's front instead of internal fights."¹⁰⁸

Every force is being merged in the Hungarian Independent People's Front. It includes the Hungarian Workers Party, the Small Holders Party, the Peasant Party, the Trade Unions, and Peasant and Agricultural Worker Alliance, the Democratic Union of Hungarian women, and the Union of Hungarian Youth.

May 10, 1949 According to the election speech of

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Rakosi:

"The main purpose of the new election is to ask the Hungarian working people to approve of the policy of the last two years and the Five Year Plan." ¹⁰⁹

May 10, 1949 How to Vote:

"The whole list of the people's front was printed on the paper. If the voter approves of it, he doesn't put any signs or marks on it, just puts it in an envelope, seals the envelope, and drops it in the ballot box, which is in front of the committee." ¹¹⁰ If he disapproves, he has to mark a certain circle on the paper, thus, any movement except the sealing of the envelope makes it obvious what the vote is.

After the complete cycle was accomplished and all five conditions set by Lenin were duly created, the final step, the Soviet-type 1949 election, was announced. Chief theoretician, Revai, analyzed its character in an article on April 17, 1949, entitled "Why We Want a Common List":

The big English newspaper, the "Times", comments on the Hungarian election, saying, "By dissolving the parliament, the last remains of the democracy in Hungary are quietly being buried". We are not going to protest against this explanation. The reaction which won in 1945 was the split in 1947, and has been after changed by the dissolving of the various opposition parties and the union of the workers parties, but even so, it still had remains of the bourgeoisie democracy."

Please remember the very essential definition of the bourgeoisie democracy by the Communists, going back to the

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roots of 1919 and Lenin.

The "Times" was right; the election of May 15 will be considerably different from the two previous elections of the Hungarian democracy in 1945 and 1947.¹¹²

There was one United Front--the people's front, the so-called Hungarian Independence People's Front.

After that, in the Communist Party, mentality, the road was open to the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. This is the direct road to socialism.

By this time the Muscovites felt that "there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favor of a decisive and unhesitatingly bold revolutionary action. . ." This was the fulfillment of the least "condition" which Lenin laid down. Now the time was "ripe for revolution". The great step on the final road to socialism has been taken and in Spring, 1949, the Five Year Plan was announced.

On June 5, 1949, Nyugati Hirnok quotes the speech of Rakosi, which outlined the next agenda as the following:

1. The complete distinction of church and State.
2. The new constitution, which will be accomplished by the new parliament.
3. The solving of the kulak question.
4. The strengthening of the fight against reaction.
5. The organization of the village into the Communist Party.
6. To make a presidential council as part of the new constitution on the Soviet pattern.

Thus the five phases--by no means separate but in the

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order previously established--were fulfilled by the Party in Hungary in less than five years. The Communist Party was elastic, highly intellectual and scientific in its leadership. From their own viewpoint, they felt that they "have kept good account of the afore-mentioned conditions and have chosen the moment well, the victory is assured". . .

Quod erat demonstrandum.

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- Jan. 1 Vatican publishes last pastoral letter of Cardinal.
- Jan. 2. President Szakasits announces that despite Cardinal's arrest, Government wants agreement with Church.
- Jan. 6. On seized plane twenty-two flee to Germany.
- Jan. 19. Hungarian Government publishes Cardinal's confession.
- Jan. 22. Bishops back Vatican.
- Feb. 1. Hungary becomes Peoples' Republic.
- Feb. 2. Catholic Party leader Barankovics flees Hungary.
- Feb. 3-5. Cardinal's trial.
- Feb. 13. Rome excommunicates all those who are connected with Cardinal's case.
- Feb. 19. New Finance Minister Communist Gero.
- Feb. 26. Seven members of Parliament flee Hungary rather than form a Catholic faction in independent front.
- March 1. Zionist Movement suppressed.
- March 3. Dissident Hungarian Communist group in Vienna.
- March 17. U. S. and Great Britain charge Hungary with violating peace treaties.
- April 2. U. S. and Great Britain charge Hungary with continuing to violate the Peace Treaty with notorious denial of human rights and freedoms.
- April 14. Parliament dissolves.
- April 22. Three ex-members of Parliament sentenced for conspiracy.
- May 15. Parliamentary election on one ticket. Secretary of State Acheson compares election to Nazi elections.
- May 23. Hungarian elections huge victory reported by Government of the People's Front.
- June 6. New cabinet without Rajk.
- June 18. Government announces expulsion of Rajk and jails him with associates for nationalism.
- June 23. Communist Rakosi announces in Prague that almost a quarter million Communists have been expelled from party.

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CHAPTER V

HORIZONTAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNIST PARTY TACTICS
IN LIGHT OF THE DOCTRINE

The Communist pattern of tactics utilized in the field in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II was a direct development of the 1919 results and their scientific evaluation in the decades following the defeat of the Bela Kun regime.

In the reviewing of the horizontal lines of Communist Party strategy, it is necessary to draw the comparison between the basic characteristics of the two revolutions in the light of the essential Party instructions as to methods. The present leader of Communism in Hungary, M. Rakosi, referred, in a speech thirty years ago as a dignitary in the Bela Kun revolution, to the underlying problems of their program.

In 1919 the details of the counter revolutionary moves were used by the propaganda to keep the workers in a constant state of fear of the bourgeoisie--the same tactics were used after World War II concerning the "conspiracies."¹²

June 28, 1919 An article explains that expropriation is not robbery and demands "... Communized houses."

To ^{an} the article by Reval demanding pure proletare politics, letters of the readers were published by the Communist daily for weeks following.

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Chimney sweeping was nationalized among the first orders of the regime. Any letter going abroad had to be mailed unsealed in the post office. Today the more subtle form of censorship is used.

March 30, 1919, a week after power was taken over all the schools were nationalized; all the jewelry shops communized; furniture, clothing could only be purchased with the permission of the "House Confident". Gendarmes, police, and all other uniformed organizations except the army are merged into one central organization called the Red Guard.

The shops of Budapest were "centralized" by Bela Kun, reducing the number to three or four hundred. Today the same purpose is achieved by state stores.

Editorial on March 30th by Kuh "...break away radically and finally once and for all. Break away, destroying and building not superficially but to the roots." In 1945 the more subtle tactics of gradual change were employed.

May 3, 1919. "...The situation abroad is not encouraging. In the countries of the entante the situation isn't quite ripe yet for the revolution...The Russian proletariat is fighting a desperate battle with counter revolution. For the time being, the Hungarian proletariat cannot reckon yet with the active help of the Russian brothers...The Hungarian working class has to choose between its own dictatorship, the Socialism, or the military dictatorship of the entante and the restitution of private property...There was only one chance left for us to take over production and to create a new state and, as a transition towards socialism, establish the revol-

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utionary dictatorship of the proletariat."¹¹⁵

On April 20, 1919, George Lukacs stated "...The revolution of the proletariat is ceaseless and constant... Those who are willing to sacrifice everything are invincible."¹¹⁶

Among the first revolutionary orders was the socialization of houses. A declaration was made by Bela Kun that all doctors were to be employees of the state; communizing and requisitioning of all gold, jewelry, opening of the safes, and immediate banning of the teaching of religion was ordered. Further, on March 30, 1919, the new electoral law was passed which gave the right to vote to "everybody over the age of 18 who does useful work, including proletarians of foreign citizenship and the Red Army--and no voting right is given to priests, business men, monks and lunatics." [sic]¹¹⁷

In 1919 a terrorist group under the leadership of Csernyi organized the so-called Lenin Boys, an official safety guard of the regime. They went as far as putting a sign on their headquarters, "Political Terror Detachment." Bela Kun ordered the removal of the sign explaining, "Terror has to be practiced and not written."¹¹⁸ Bela Kun was in constant telephone contact with Lenin.

Today, the tactical line is the cooperation of everybody.

The Initial Philosophy of Hungarian Communism

On May 6, 1919, on the anniversary of the birthdate of Marx, the paper writes, "...There always has been class struggle,

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but it has been Marx and Engels who made the proletares aware of it...They couldn't see in the time of Marx the enormous developing of capitalism, but he already knew that it is ripe for failure...History is not made by men, according to Marx, but by the necessity of economic forces...But the times bring men who become conscious vanguards towards the speeding events... The gratitude of the workers is forever...now that the vision of Marx became a reality...The Communist revolution is here! ¹⁷

May 4, 1919 in an article titled "The Evolution of the Revolution" "...The revolution is an eruptive evolution of the war...A transition from capitalism into socialism...as to private property, it does not alter it or change it according to new developments, but simply seizes it...This is the decisive circumstance which gives our revolution the proletare character."¹²⁰

This one is an important tactical change in the period following World War II. Rakosi and his associates now are emphasizing the need of private property to pacify the population and are, as a direct change from the 1919 method, altering it and changing it according to new developments, postponing the seizure until the time is ripe.

Bela Kun on the June 1919 party congress "...Comrades, the dictatorship is suppression. Undoubtedly a suppression... We have to utilize all the theoretical and practical results of the Russian revolution...Undoubtedly the dictatorship is not too advantageous towards the developing of individual freedom...and it is not too advantageous for the developing of

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individualities; however, only the bourgeoisie intellectual life has decreased, and that is only good... A new intellectual life and culture has to rise."¹²¹

May 3, 1919, article by Eugen Varga. Referring to the Hungarian proletariat, "... It couldn't expect any miracles; it had to know that the transition between capitalism and socialism means misery and need... The dictatorship of the proletariat is the victory of the proletare revolution... is the continuation of class warfare from above."¹²² The same principle as expressed by Varga is valid today only that continuation of class warfare is not emphasized frequently for tactical reasons.

Agitator schools were set up in 1919 like the present-day ones for women agitators, for peasant agitators, for student agitators, etc.

To Rakosi and the Muscovites, who regard the whole line as a development of continuity, from 1919 onwards, and who were part of that continuity always were backed by Moscow. To them the whole conception of Tito and conceiving Communism independent of or against Moscow is fantastic.

Twenty-five years of waiting and analyzing the mistakes of 1919 helped the Muscovites to learn one of the most important oriental characteristics of the Russians: the secret of waiting. They learned that Lenin was right, that the phases of development cannot be skipped and the revolution cannot come before the time is ripe. This change in their individual attitudes

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was clearly demonstrated in the whole Communist Party line of tactics from the free elections in 1945 until the totalitarian-type elections in 1949---as the time elapsed between these two elections meant the whole completed cycle of a phase, a gradual and well-planned, and above all, well-timed acquisition of total control by the Communists over Hungary.

1919 Methods: Outlined by Rakosi

On the occasion of the merger of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party in 1919, a speech was made by Rakosi on June 14, 1919. "For the time being we are dealing with two questions. One is the name of the party; the second is concerning the methods of the dictatorship. Although the first question is delicate, it is less important than the second. The situation is that those, too, of whose ranks the 'munitions ministers' come also call themselves Socialists and in France the party which represents the big capital also calls itself Socialist." The opinion is identical today. The party of Blum is referred to by Rakosi with the same phrases. Rakosi continues, "At any rate, it will be a bitter disappointment if our Communist brothers in Russia see that we have asked them for advice...on the day when the 1919 revolution broke out and the merger was declared, Bela Kun announced that they are requesting advice from Moscow from the Third International concerning the name of the new party---and when they give us the advice, then we disregard it. And besides, we have to recognize the fact that this question will be exploited by our own bourgeoisie as well as the foreign press and they will emphasize the seeming contradiction...."

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"The second question is the method of the dictatorship." Rakosi details the method of the regime and explains that it is essential for them to be ruthless, although he doesn't stand for unnecessary terrorism, but what happened was all the result of "the provocations of the bourgeoisie."

He feels that any concessions made will be interpreted by the enemy as weakness. That is one of his basic principles today also. He asks "The comrades not to make any concessions whatsoever" in the easing of the ruthlessness of the methods.

As an example of the danger of concessions, Rakosi cites the following: "We did not ban the bourgeoisie press and as a result the newsprint has gone not only for the bourgeoisie newspapers, but for the proletare press as well."

June 14th Rakosi stated "Now we have reached the point where we can take a rest, stop in the big onslaught, look around, and find out where we made the mistakes, what we did wrong. We can learn of the mistakes and we have to endeavor to find better routes for the future."

April 13, 1919. Article by Rakosi. "...Seemingly the bourgeoisie has accepted its fate...This situation will not last long....No class can commit suicide...When the Hungarian bourgeoisie was through its first surprise, it started to use that battle tactics which we call among the animals, mimicry... similar to the old tactical methods of the proletariat." Rakosi several times used that explanation to the conspiracy moves of the former ruling class in the period following 1945.

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Article by Revai on April 7, 1919. "...Lawyers, business men, priests, all want to take out their own share of the work... We don't want that. We protest that the pure proletare dictatorship should be dirtied with the masses of bourgeoisie hangers-on....The revolution is ruthless, but the tremendous interest of the revolution cannot be sacrificed for individual interests... We have to be conscious for the purposes of the revolution. We have to be ruthless."¹²⁵

The 1919 Beginning in the Retrospect
of Present Communist Party Opinion

The importance of the 1919 beginning in the present evolution is clarified in an article on the Anniversary of the Bela Kun revolution in the Budapest Communist daily, The Szabad Nep on March 21, 1948.

To the memory of the first Hungarian Communism.

Even in working circles after the liberation there was a certain degree of reservedness as to the Hungarian proletar revolution. This reservedness almost indicated that in the past we not only travelled a different route but also that the route was wrong and it is better not to talk about it. This careful silence is a insult to the memory of the heroes of the first Hungarian Communism. We Hungarian Communists stand out for the first Hungarian Communism. Our route today is a different one but that doesn't mean that this route would have been good at that time too. We know that the fighters and martyrs, thousands of them, fought and died during the proletar revolution for the same as we are fighting for now, socialism. To us 1919 is a heritage. The glory of it and an example to be followed is the very benefit which we gained from our own mistakes. It's a great value to know the mistakes we have to avoid. It is a live and effective force even today.

The proletar revolution in 1919 solved those tasks which couldn't be solved by the Kun Government. It broke down reaction and took arms against the counter revolution.

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The article goes into the details of the tactical mistakes of the Bela Kun revolution and then continues.

Another mistake was that we rushed too fast in our general economic policy toward socialism not paying enough attention to the middle classes. This speed brought no advantage. On the contrary, it harmed us, brought masses of the small bourgeoisie in the cities. And we also made many mistakes in our policy with the Army and our foreign policy. Another proof of the lack of experience of our party at that time was that overnight we merged with the Social Democrat Party.

One of the most authoritative opinions is expressed by the Muscovite, J. Revai, who was an active participant of both the 1919 and the present regime and is one of the leading theoreticians in the Party. In the Szabad Nep, he wrote December 25, 1947:

Revai, in an article titled "Hundred Years from the Distance of Three". Writing about the experiences and lessons of the 1919 revolution, "In 1919 they wanted to solve immediately and directly the social tasks in their entity, turning their back on the demands of the bourgeoisie democratic opposition. So it happened that in 1918 and 1919 the peasantry and the socialist working class did not make an alliance and after 1919 turned against each other... In 1918 and 1919 we did not succeed in restituting the continuity of developments. What didn't succeed then succeeded now to the Hungarian democracy and the fact that it succeeded is primarily our merit, the Communists. We drew all the consequences of the lessons of 1919 without omitting to criticize 1918... We did not forget the lessons of 1918 and 1919...The defeats had to be explained, not so much by the outside enemy but by the inside mistakes of the revolutionary process, its weaknesses and contradictions and to the fact that those forces inside which try to reestablish the old order were not liquidated...The Hungarian democracy, drawing the conclusions of the mistakes of 1948, 1918, and 1919, now without hesitation and firmly proceeds towards the final liquidation of the inside enemy....We did not yet reach our aim."

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Strategically, in Communist eyes, 1945 and the years following were a direct continuation of 1919. In fact, the regime between 1919 and 1945 to them was nothing else than an intermission. For tactical reasons, however, they did not emphasize the relationship to the Bela Kun terror which was widely unpopular in Hungary, but used as a historic background 1948, where the freedom for struggle was still alive and widely popular in the Hungarian masses.

The Communist Party Philosophy on the Continuity of 1919

While the Communist Party has proven in Hungary as well as in its policy in Central and Eastern Europe that the tactical aspects of the Bela Kun revolution have been carefully and systematically evaluated, one of the basic weaknesses of the Muscovites is that while the 25 years of absence or underground activities and their work in the international movement made them masters of tactics, but they have lost contact with the atmosphere of Hungary. Furthermore, by viewing the period between 1919 and 1945 as nothing but an interruption of the revolution by a last desperate attempt of reaction, they were unable to realize that the world in Hungary did not stop in 1919. A community of 9 or 10 million people cannot continue without any change during a 28 year intermission. Social progress was made in Hungary although less than was necessary, and the vast impact on the masses by national socialism and the inclusion of hundreds of thousands in the most productive age into entirely new environments and mode of life, the army... the comparative economic boom of the late 30's, which favored

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the industrial workers considerably...the youth movements under the spell of national socialism vehemently nationalistic... All these factors did not fit into the scientific Marxist philosophy of the Muscovites. In their mass psychology, just as in their phrases also and the language of their publications, they were still living in 1919. Not even they could escape the rule that an emigrant is bound to lose contact with the political terrain from which they were forced to emigrate.

Theoretically, however, they faithfully followed the instruction of Stalin that "Revolutionary theory is a synthesis of the experience..." In the process of evaluation of the 1919 beginning, the most important aspect for the Communist Party theoreticians was to distinguish sharply the strategic and tactical aspects of the 1919 complex. It was essential to them that, while every detailed phase of the latter should be reexamined and realigned on the basis of the 1919 mistakes and the changed circumstances, in no manner should any aspect which belongs to the category of strategy, the long-range planning which leads to world revolution, be deviated from. This was the most important methodical principle in the reappraisal of the 1919 revolution.

The Forces in the Battle

It is important to review the forces in the struggle for control in Hungary from 1945 to 1949. Both sides fighting the tactical and strategic phases of the battle were fighting to decide the question whether, at least for the immediate future, it would follow East or West.

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It is necessary to analyze the force power---standing behind the forces on both sides.

The main noncommunist forces were the following:

The Smallholders Party
 The Socialdemocratic Party°
 The National Peasant Party°
 The Balogh Party
 The Democratic Peoples Party
 Hungarian Independence Party
 The Sulyok Party

The main communist forces were the following:

The Communist Party

The Front Organisation of the Communist Party:

1. The Trade Unions----a Mass Organization having almost 1,650,000 members.
2. Left wing sections in the social democratic Party
3. Left wing sections of the National Peasant Party
4. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarian Women
5. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarian Youth
6. The Democratic Alliance of Peasants and Agricultural Laborers
7. The National Comites/Nemzeti Bizottsagok

The NonCommunist Camp

The Smallholders Party is the traditional Party representing peasant interests. During the prewar Parliaments it was the largest opposition Party. In addition to peasants,

° They were tools of the Communist Party through their "left wing."

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who formed the bulk of the Party, it included progressive elements of the intelligentsia and part of the middle class as well. It was anti Nazi from the beginning and stood for land reform as a basic necessity ever since the thirties. The most important force behind the Smallholders Party in the period following World War II was popular support. Its sweeping victory in the elections of 1945 indicated the choice of 59% of the population.

The Socialdemocratic Party after the cleavage with the Communists in 1919 continued to represent the workers in Hungarian Parliament. Its newspaper, the Nepszava, was the traditional organ around which well organized workers rallied for decades. After the liberation, a considerable number of middle class elements entered the Party---mostly because they felt that in view of the overwhelming Soviet Power in the area, the Smallholders will not be able to withstand for long, but they were still reluctant to become members of the Communist Party. The main strength behind the Socialdemocratic Party were the organized workers.

The National Peasant Party traces its origin back to the late thirties to a group of intellectuals, sociologists, writers and teachers who started a movement to explore the problems of the peasantry. A considerable literature appeared ranging from serious sociological studies to literary approaches utilizing emotional effects. The Party after the Liberation included most of the original "Peasant/life/explorers" and their followers, many of them extremist from the left and right.

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Behind the Party there was little power, except the benevolence of the coalition regime and the eventual Communist hopes to utilize the Party in the villages as a front organization.

The Bourgeoise Peoples Party was formed from the remains of a prewar Bourgeoise Party. It included middle-class city elements...and its power and influence was about as insignificant as one of its members.

The Sulyok Party was originally formed by D. Sulyok and his 20 associates who under Russian orders were expelled from the Smallholders Party for their "rightist stand" as early as 1946. The Communists later endorsed it and permission was granted for Sulyok to form a new Party hoping that eventually they can be utilized by Communist Party tactics in order to weaken the Smallholders. The Sulyok Party and its leader, D. Sulyok, became the most outspoken anti-Communist opposition later in Parliament. The force behind them was the indirect sympathy of the West expressed in laudatory editorials, and some of the most courageous non-Communist elements in Hungary.

The Democratic Peoples Party which scored an unexpected victory in the election of 1947 was lead by I. Barankovics and was indirectly associated with the Church. They stood firm until the last and were the most potent parliamentary opposition against the Nationalization of Schools.

The Hungarian Independence Party lead by Pfeiffer was a party including anti-Communist middle-class elements. Like the Democratic Peoples Party and the Sulyok Party, it was permitted by the Communists to weaken the majority Smallholders Army. On the 1947 election they scored considerable votes

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from masses who voted for the Smallholders in 1945. The Hungarian Independence Party, until the forced fleeing of its leader and its consequent dissolution, courageously opposed the Communists. Like the two other mentioned parties, the power behind it was limited to the power and strength of beliefs. As addition to the "opposition", in order to maintain the semblance of democracy and to atomize the non Communist forces to the utmost, the Communists tolerated and encouraged the Party of M. Slachta as a Christian Womens Camp, and the Party formed by the former Smallholder leader and the "grey eminence" of Hungarian political life in 1945-1946, Reverend Balogh.

The Communist Camp

The nucleus of the Communist Party was the small, tight, well-disciplined number of Muscovites, all seasoned in decades in the international party work and decades of prison sentences. They were professional, all-time revolutionaries. Around them, under the pressure of events, a Party was formed that even after a purge affecting over 200,000 members---according to the declaration of Rakosi in Prague in Spring 1948---counted over 1 million members. The basic strength behind it is Soviet Power---but in its actual appearance in the form of the Red Army and its potential power. In addition to that, it built for itself the strength of the Political Police. Through its present tight control of the Army, streamlined in its structure with the Soviet---it has control over considerable forces.

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A very important feature of the power of the Communist Camp are the front organizations controlled by them.

The Trade Unions, with a membership of one million six hundred thousand members are its "mass organization."

The Democratic Alliance for Hungarian Women

The Democratic Alliance for Hungarian Youth

The Democratic Alliance of Peasants and Agricultural Workers

The National Comites---who exercised local power in 1945 before the Government could reach out in its control to the whole country, and who were left with a token of power after.

In addition to this, through the principle of "conquest through penetration", the Communist Party could maneuver with the aid of leftist elements in the Social Democratic Party, the National Peasant Party and even the Smallholders Party.

The most important aspect of the distribution of the forces, however, is that while the Communist Camp had the Soviet Power as an almighty force in Central and Eastern Europe, with the Red Army and the Diplomacy of the Soviet as its instruments, the non Communist Camp felt the "vacuum" character increasingly as the Soviet Power proceeded. The representatives of the West insisted upon the principle of non-intervention until with the slow process on the West which, partly under the initiative of post-war events in Central and Eastern Europe, adopted a firmer stand against Soviet power.

The non-Communist Camp felt isolated both by the repeated warnings of the representatives from the West that they have no authority to interfere, and by the Communists who never failed

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to emphasize the presence of the Soviet Power in the country. From the standpoint of short-range political developments, the backing of the overwhelmingly non-Communist population could not outbalance Soviet Power.

The Communists' View on their Horizontal Tactics

In analysing the tactical aspects of the Communist Party in Hungary following in the horizontal line, the two most important principles of the doctrine which were constantly employed were:

1. The "sigg-sagg" theory of Lenin.
2. The "next link in the chain" theory of Lenin

It should always be borne in mind that while the very achievements of success are a great event in the philosophy of Communism, and the cycle of events completed in Hungary from 1945 to 1949 certainly included many reasons to feel satisfaction---the very factor that the success has been achieved in strict accordance with the doctrine is at least as great a pride to the Communists as the results themselves. It proves to them that the doctrine is right and they immediately draw the conclusion that the doctrine is bound to be just as right in its next phases too---where it claims that the road leads in the direction of utopia: socialism.

In the incipient stages of policy, and during the action, none except a small circle among the very highest know the line of tactics to be followed. After the cycle is completed, however, the analysis is given partly for the benefit to the Party as an example ~~and~~ partly in the self-pride of having

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realized the theoretical prescriptions of the doctrine with success.

Analyzing the whole completed cycle of the creating of the five basic conditions as laid down by Lenin, which are essential to victory in its horizontal aspect from the viewpoint of Hungarian Communists, the pattern becomes clear and unmistakable.

Communist View on the Period of Beginning

(Tactics of Communist Party)

in an article

On June 15, 1948, Rakosi explained the Communist Party policy in the very first phases of post World War II developments in Hungary. He explains that when they entered the Union of the Hungarian National Independence Front, it was because the Party felt that ⁱⁿ this grade of development everybody has to fight against German Fascism. He explained that at that time many Communists felt that it was dangerous to make an alliance with the counts and generals of Hungary. Rakosi says,

These people forgot the teaching of Lenin, 'To conduct a war and besides already surrender the change to play and utilize the differences of interest among the enemies even if it is temporary the possibility of exploiting the unity and comprises with our allies for the time being to surrender these possibilities, wouldn't that be ridiculous?'

First he examines the strategic aspects of the early period:

In these fights, the Communist Party endeavored to employ everywhere the strategy of Leninism-Stalinism. Its strategic purpose was the seizing of capitalist and big landowner exploitation and through the establishment of the peoples democracy, the start to rebuild socialism. In order to succeed in the strategy, we very carefully selected the most important tasks, worked out the tactical steps which were necessary and then systematically and stubbornly we executed them.

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As to the tactical aspects of the same period, he explains:

From the viewpoint of tactics, we first took the direction on the decisive question to liquidate the remains of Feudalism---the big estates. This held us to secure the alliance of the workers and peasants. In order to facilitate the decisive purpose, we had to neutralize the Kulaks and therefore we exempted the peasant holdings under 200 acres, for the same purpose we gave land to the Church in the provinces.

The zig-zag theory of the doctrine of "...maneuvering... entering agreements...even though these may be of unstable and temporary character..." was well utilized by the Muscovites in that early period of developments. Rakosi explained:

When the question of reconstruction came up, we did not hesitate to make an agreement with the capitalists to whom we not only gave a chance to take part in the reconstruction, but also gave them considerable financial help. Many of our comrades criticized that step.

The necessity of that tactical line even against some criticism in the party was explained by M. Horvath, one of the leading theoreticians in the Hungarian Communist Party, in an article dated March 28, 1948.

In 1945, in the time of the new beginning, the only possible producing system for Hungary has been the bourgeoisie system. It was Realpolitik to accept the bourgeoisie system and to "tolerate" the intactness of the private ownership of the producing means and the fact the producing was for profits. This necessity to have this decision also meant that not only did we leave the producing system in life, but we also rebuilt it, although let's admit it, it wasn't too sympathetic or justified to us. The first demand of the people was not "system", but the fact that they wanted to live and for this, they needed mining, transportation and a producing industry. Soon we were facing the question shall we give up rebuilding and the increase of production just because of the fact that profit at the same time increases in leaps, and the fact that we are rebuilding private capital. Or the other choice which offered itself in 1945 once again, I emphasize in theory

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was to take the spectacular mechanic viewpoint of "class struggle" which regards its main task the annihilation of profit and suppression of private capital.¹²⁶

Comment: Nothing could have been more ungenial than for the Communists to celebrate the glory over the victory of capturing a private capitalist system in its ruins. That had happened in 1919 and they profited by it.

The analysis by the Communist Party theoretician continues:

The Hungarian Communist Party in 1945 had no other choice but to stand completely with all its energy on the side of production and rebuilding because it would have been a mistake to overestimate the danger of the profit hunger of big capital and the threat of its economic and politic strengthening in view of the Soviet Union as a neighbor and the people's democracies surrounding us. The best we could have done would have been if we could have connected the curtailing of the profit possibilities and the private character of producing means with the tremendous sweep of production. However, the state structure neither in 1945 or in 1946 gave us a chance to do so also in view of the condition of strength. What we achieved was nothing more and nothing less than the Hungarian producing results which are outstanding even in world relations were coupled with the similar big capitalist strengthening. We knew that the strengthening will become exploitation during the inflation, but we knew that under more favorable conditions the loot will be returned to the people!

Later Communist Party Tactics

This reveals that already in the period advocating "full freedom for private property", the Communist Party never had any doubts about complete nationalization---at a suitable later date. As to the line of political tactics on the eve of the 1949 "election with common lists", Revai refers to earlier Communist Party attempts for the same---

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Soviet type elections; in which on April 17, 1949 he writes:

There will be one list for all instead of separate lists; there will be no competition of parties.

We Communists suggested to the parties of the Independence Front such a common list already for the elections in 1945 and 1947. It is obvious by today that many things could have been avoided if they would have accepted our suggestion. This shows again the line of tactics of the Communist party. The writer of the article is the chief theoretician of the Communist party. And then he gives a very interesting insight into Communist tactics:

It became evident in 1945 and 1947 that the isolation of the Hungarian reactionary forces cannot be achieved by a common list. So we had to change the sequence of things. If the common list could not be achieved, which would have isolated and destroyed reaction, abolished competition of democratic forces, then we had to isolate and destroy first the reaction and achieve the other thing, the absence of party competition and the unity of working classes and democratic parties after. The election on May 15th with the common list of the people's front, therefore, is the result of long fights which the Hungarian working class and its leading party fought successfully against big land owners, big capitalists, reaction, and their agents, built into the democratic parties. If the capitalist foreign countries are criticizing us for the common list and demand competition of parties, they actually complain for the fact that after a long struggle, we won over the reactionaries and parties of the big land owners and capitalists.

Detailing of Communist Party Tactics

A detailed explanation as to the employing of the "next link in the chain" was given by the Szabad Nep in reviewing the book of Rakosi on May 9, 1948:

The year of the turning point. Book by Rakosi.

This period is from summer 1947 to summer 1948. The book is to show "How we employed or how we tried to employ the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to Hungarian conditions."

One of the basic demands of the method of Marxism-Leninism is that the political leadership should be able to select out of the tasks the most decided one and to concentrate all available forces to solve

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it. In other words, out of the forces standing against the people and progress, he should have the right judgment to select the chief enemy and to mobilize all its forces and allies to defeat it. Let us see an example. As a result of the elections in the fall of 1945, such a situation was created where the counter-revolution reaction had a considerable part and influence in the leadership of all coalition parties except the Communist Party. While Comrade Rakosi and the leaders of our party did not underestimate the danger of the right wing in the Socialdemocratic Party and the Peasant Party, they recognized the tremendously swollen up independent Smallholders Party as a chief enemy.

It was a united party in which peasants, the non-socialist democrats in the cities and the reactionary bourgeoisie were controlled by the capitalists or civil servants, church reaction, former landowners and their lawyers. Thus to cut down the right wing of the Smallholders party and to widen with masses the basis of the Communist Party, this was a task. One of the greatest advantages of reaction against us was that the peasants were afraid of the Communists. Agitation alone was not enough to dispel the fear and suspicion.

During all phases of the cycle from 1945 to 1949, the Leninist interpretation of tactics was widely used. The most important uses were made in the solving of four questions:

1. Patriotism; 2. democratic coalition attitude; 3. peasant question; 4. Church.

As to how cynical the "discovery of new watchwords" was utilized, at a confidential meeting already as early as February 1945, Revai declared in a party school, "We are patriots and we are democrats. But we are patriots, not because of our country, and we are democrats not because of democracy. We are democrats for the reason that our greatest aim, Socialism, will be accomplished better under this mask."

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In the same way, and same cynicism^{ish}, already in the beginning of the regime in 1945, the Communist Party constantly repeated how strongly they believe in a free and independent peasantry. This went so far that the whole land reform was presented to the peasantry as an achievement which the Party succeeded in gaining for them.

The declaration of Rakosi was echoed by the Party:

On July 22, 1946, We Communists have no trouble with the peasant masses. We only don't like the Smallholders who wear patent leather shoes. This was part of the tactics which tried to alienate the peasant masses from their leaders.¹²¹

As to the Church, in proving the sympathy of the Communist Party for the Church, words were not adequate. In 1945 when many village churches were destroyed as a result of the war, voluntary Communist Party working brigades appeared in the villages and started to rebuild the churches.

THE NEXT LINK IN THE CHAIN

The constant use of the "next link in the chain" theory of the Communist Party policy after the 1945 election defeat was explained by Rakosi in his book:

The elections in 1945 proved that the election threatens our democracy (he means the Communist Party), threatens it politically, economically and financially. At that time, our party believed that good money and a stopping of inflation is the very link to which Lenin said, "If we grab it with all our strength, we hold the whole chain in our hands and secure the

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access to the next link in the chain". The success of the stabilization strengthened the economic foundations of our democracy and gave us access to destroy the reaction within the Smallholders Party. The next in the line was socialization and the three year plan after the strengthening of the economy and political situations. The conditions were ready for the melting of the two working parties.

The "next link in the chain" was the basic method of the Party in Hungary. In his book: "We Are Building the Country of the People", Rakosi continues:

About the next link in the chain: Immediately after the liberation, it was the cooperation of national democratic forces. The next link in the chain was the land reform, followed by the rebuilding.

As explained by Rakosi the next phase in the Communist Party policy was:

Also in the spirit of the tactics of Leninism-Stalinism was the fact that very carefully and exactly we found and worked out among our purposes the most important task of the time that certain next link in the chain. After the distribution of land we took in our hands reconstruction. After that the building up of the institutions of democracy and the Republic, then we started inflation, then we battled the conspirators and immediately after we took direction for the three-year plan.

The method up to 1948 was detailed by the Communist Party leaders as follows:

Whenever we set a task in front of us, we always saw to it that we should never lose sight of the purpose, in our fight we were always consequent and stubborn, we didn't let the enemy take our attention away from us. When the enemy was beaten we followed them fast and energetically, not giving them time to reorganize their ranks and strength. The revealing of the conspiracy was immediately followed by the elections before the enemy had the strength to recuperate. The defeat of the reaction during the election was followed ten weeks later by the annihilation of the Pfeiffer Party.

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The Pfeiffer Party openly advocated a United States orientation.

We annihilated the most important political organization of the Reaction, the Pfeiffer Party, and liquidated the dangerous allied army of international imperialism and Hungarian reaction, the right-wing Socialdemocrats.

All this shows how cynical and purposeful the Communist line has been. Never for a moment have they really wanted any coalition or cooperation with other parties. It was nothing else but tactics and all for the time being. After the whole thing is over, they don't hesitate to be proud and tell all these tactics because in the Communist mentality, the very fact of complying exactly with the lines and teachings of Leninism-Stalinism in the fight is at least as great a result as the fight itself.

Rakosi continued the utilizing of political results in economics:

This political game was immediately utilized in the economic field. We widened the nationalization of big banks. Ten weeks later, we annihilated the right wing of Social Democracy. This was immediately followed by the "rationalization" of industry which employed more than 100 workers. The same tactics were followed previously when, for example, in March 1946, by mobilizing the masses we not only pushed the reaction back but we succeeded in getting the nationalization of mining and the state control of heavy industry and the securing of the land reform.

As to the line of abolishing the "non-Democratic Bourgeoisie forces", Rakosi explained:

After the generals and Count Teleti got out of the Government, the influence of capitalists and non-Democratic Bourgeoisie decreased, after the removal of the crowd of Reverend Varga. Comment: That is the first time that he refers to the Nagy incident in 1947 as a removal by the Communists, the escape of Sulyok...All this meant a defeat to Catholic reaction. The removal of Pfeiffer increased that defeat.

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Appraising the work of the Party Rakosi explains:

During all this battle our party became stronger. Its cadre has developed and our self-estimate increased. The result of this three and one-half year fight is the fact that today in Hungary the working class and its ally, the working peasantry, are in power.

Our party has been the engine of the fight.

The most important "link in the chain", the merging of the Social Democrats is included as proving the rightness of the Communist Party policy:

The recognition of our results brings to us the Social Democrats this spring and I would like to quote Comrade Szabo who said on the 36th Congress of the Social Democratic Party, "Let's not hesitate to recognize and declare that the road of the Communist Party has been the right road. They did their politics well and they worked well".

Appraising the other important qualities of leadership of Rakosi, the Communist Party daily continues:

The politics of Comrade Rakosi not only discover the exact size of the battle field, select the right system of battle and work them out, but this policy also includes a careful exploitation of the mistakes of the enemy. The very certainty that the old feudal system sooner or later is bound to try to overthrow democracy was in our calculation. Furthermore, we realized that we can only fight right-wing social democrats and establishment of the union of the working parties could no longer be delayed. Comrade Rakosi and our party leadership was right in making the diagnosis in the sequence.

The structure of the Party in the very beginning is also revealed:

After the liberation in the leading cadre of the Hungarian Communist Party, there were those who returned from the Soviet Union, those who were doing legal work at

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home, and became legal now, those who came over from the Social Democrat Party. Those comrades also reappeared who were active in 1919 (and this was a frequent case) who did not take any part in the worker's movement for 25 years.

In the Leninist tradition, the reappraisal by Rakosi includes the essential "samó-kritika".

When we recognize all this success we have to use at the same time the Communist self-criticism that we made plenty of mistakes. Usually our greatest mistake was not to make the right estimate of the different strengths of different classes. We underestimated the strength of Hungarian reaction, its deep roots and stubbornness. We underestimated the enemy before the elections in 1945 and it is no consolation to us that the right wing of Social Democrats made even greater mistakes.

Now that we have the success of the union of the two workers' parties, again we are threatened to be conceited and think that now we have everything in our pocket and that the enemy is finally beaten. On occasions we find it again that our comrades are acting like oligarchs instead of trying to use the weapon of convincing. The enemy, however, is still wrong and just now in connection with the nationalization of the schools, we have to realize that we are still facing hard struggles.

By 1945 the Communist Party knew that a more subtle tactic is to let the non-Communist press appear, thus giving an illusion of liberty to the citizenry, regulate their influence by censorship, direct and indirect, to which the Armistice Agreement and the Soviet Domination gave ample basis...and by regulating their newsprint supply. The Communist-dominated Supreme Economic Council controlled the supply. If and when the historic evolution reaches a stage whereby it becomes feasible, the papers will be taken by a "conquest through penetration". The tactics in that respect were identical with the tactics against the "opposition parties".

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At any rate the Communist Party official press and publication in its volume is excelling all of the other organs. Already on June 15 Rakosi declared:

Our party press in Budapest alone appears on week days in 340,000 circulation, on Sundays 500,000. Since the liberation, the Szikra Publishing Company* published 2,000,000 copies of Marxist literature. Our party education took a new sweep this spring at the same time 38,000 comrades were in party schools.¹³⁰

The Communist Party daily¹³¹ on July 17, 1949, discussing mass culture, mentions the using of 600 "culture brigades", 26 culture trucks, visiting and lecturing 500 villages, showing movies in 700 villages, and the "chorus brigades" singing to over 800,000 people. The newspaper continues on June 20, 1949, writing about "our secret reserve", the wall newspaper.

As to the propaganda by agitation the size is unheard of: Rakosi on June 1, 1949:

"To the victory of the election of the party, in addition to our economic and political results, we have to mention the good work of our people's educators. We mobilized 250,000 of them who started work after a brief, but well prepared training. Every voter was visited at least twice.

These people held among those outside of the Party 80,000 meetings in the homes of such. In these agitations, we gave answers to all problems and for the first time we used this agitation system, which is so typical of our great

*Official Hungarian Communist Publishing Company

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brother party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
A quarter of a million agitators and 80,000 meetings in a
country with a population under 10 million cannot be under-
estimated as an effort." ¹³²

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CHAPTER VI

Part 1

THE FIVE YEAR PLAN.

The Importance of the Five Year Plan.

The importance of the Five Year Plan, introduced by the Central Leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party is of paramount importance. In evaluating the aspects of the Plan, its effect on the non-Communist population of Hungary, and the Soviet Sphere of interest as well, - it is necessary to examine what the Communists plan to achieve through it. The reason for that is that it is designed to change a community of nine and a half million people into a design which is alien to them, and which they do not want. A small minority backed up by the might and potential threat of a World Power, fanatically believes that the ultimate salvation for the good of not only one community but all mankind, lies not in the road they are following. This is a road to socialism, used in its Communist interpretation. They feel justified to use ruthless force if necessary on the majority of the mature population.

The "Five Conditions" set by Lenin as being the essentials to successful revolution were all serving this aim: to start for the the revolution, i.e., a socialist pattern of living.

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These conditions of Lenin were carefully adhered to by the Communists ever since they reentered Hungary in 1945 -- after three decades of preparation and waiting -- following the 1919 defeat of the Bela Kun Communist regime in Hungary.

The official organ of the Communist Party in Hungary announced in an article titled "The Five Year Plan of Industrialization."

The Central Leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party in its decision on the Five Year Plan listing the main designs of the Plan lists as the first "The speeding up of the industrialization of Hungary.

As to the effect of the Plan on the country as a whole, the Communist newspaper continues:

The main purpose of the Plan is that our country should become an industrial-agrarian country instead of an agrarian-industrial i. e. such a country where the weight of the industry is decisive....with the Five-Year Plan a new phase starts in our national economy.¹³²

The Next Link in the Chain.

The Budapest Communist daily then refers to one of the basic methodic tactics of the Hungarian Communist Party which they utilized continuously since 1945: The next link in the chain:

The decisive question in the beginning of that "new" phase is: what should we regard....as the next, the most important link in the chain? This next link in the chain...is industrialization."

The article explains that Stalin also had to face the

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same problem in Russia and quotes him as he referred to the Five-Year Plan in Russia:

...before anything else we have to find the next link in the chain, because only the finding and grasping of that enables us to pull all the other links in the chain....What was the main link in the chain? The main link in the chain was heavy industry and its core: machine industry.

The Essence of the Plan.

Industrialization is the essence of the Plan.

The purpose is: "To change the whole social-economic map of the country."



This large scale industrialization plan should, in five years, increase the living standards 150% above the 1938 level.

The Plan will completely liquidate private enterprise. It includes the training of half a million young men and women as a new elite. It includes the "bigger and better" slogan in every phase of Hungarian life from Maternity Homes (3.8 beds to every ten thousand people as against the present 2.4), to sport Stadiums (People's Sport Stadium in Budapest holding 70,000).


The Plan means that every phase of life in Hungary, every person regardless of age or sex or occupation will become a cog in the wheels of a carefully designed machinery. The Plan utilizes every working hour that can be utilized, and there is no part of life in Hungary -- even in the most remote village -- where its effects would not be apparent. The size of Hungary -

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Polish Steel Production

The Chapter details the results of the Polish Three-Year Plan. Its coal production, iron ore, oil, steel, and electric energy. It is essential for the industrialization of the country to increase the machine industry.

Rumanian Oil Production



The Chapter details the economic planning in Rumania as suggested in December 1948, by the Rumanian Workers' Party and refers to the figures of Rumanian oil production as well as productions of iron ore and coal.

Hungarian Machine Industry


"Our Five-Year Plan is worthy of the plans of the other people's democracies." The Chapter gives a detailed description of industrial figures of the plan emphasizing machine industry, in Hungary.

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ROVÉL ACÉLTERMELES. Len
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 ... a gépek

Polish Steel Production

The Chapter details the results of the Polish Three-Year Plan. Its coal production, iron ore, oil, steel, and electric energy. It is essential for the industrialization of the country to increase the machine industry.

Rumanian Oil Production

The Chapter details the economic planning in Rumania as suggested in December 1948, by the Rumanian Workers' Party and refers to the figures of Rumanian oil production as well as productions of iron ore and coal.

Hungarian Machine Industry

"Our Five-Year Plan is worthy of the plans of the other people's democracies." The Chapter gives a detailed description of industrial figures of the plan emphasizing machine industry, in Hungary.

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It should be noted that in that illustration - which was published by the Communists in their official organ - Yugoslavia is already missing.

The importance of the Plan to Hungarian Communism.

To the Hungarian Communists the Five-Year Plan means the result of three decades of fighting, the success of the movement after defeat in 1919 and stubborn unrelenting revolutionary work since that.

It is to them the realization of the first step towards the Utopia in the Communist Party world: Socialism all over the world. It means to them reality and the safe knowledge that unless a war should break out within the next few years - or any serious popular resistance arise - their force, integrated in Hungary with the Soviet power behind them, will enable them to achieve final success.

The danger of possible resistance to the Communist Party is twofold:

- a. Revolt in violence by the non-Communist majority of the Hungarian people. The Communists realize that only a small numerical minority of the population is in their ranks. The Plan is designed to win over the "neutral elements" and at the same time to bring up a half million young elite - as janissars.
- b. Resistance in the Communist element of the population - in the form of a rightist deviation. It is

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by no means a coincidence that the Rajk case was "liquidated" in the Summer of 1949 - when the Plan had been announced.

To potential resistance, the Plan is force - the planned weapon of the Party. As mentioned above, however, they hope that, using time as an ally - gaining over of considerable sections of the population can be achieved. The design of the Plan clearly shows that with the promises of higher living standards, they hope to win over the grown up generation and, with the entirely new vista in ideologically patterned education, the youth.

The "Great Parallel"

It is significant to observe that the character of the Plan includes the utilization of a "great parallel" from the Communist angle. This is achieved through the "next link in the chain" - industrialization.

The speeded-up industrialization of Hungary would serve parallel purposes for the Party:

1. Increase, considerably, the number of industrial workers who are the only "mass-element" in the Hungarian Communist Party. It will automatically draw away masses from the agricultural occupations, thus decreasing the general importance of the agricultural population, and in the same time bring new masses into the frame of urban living, where

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the Party organization can have a better and tighter control over them.

2. By increasing industrialization, and employment, the production of consumer goods can be considerably increased - thus increasing general living standards considerably. This should serve as a means of winning over the country to Communism from its present generally hostile attitude in the broad masses of the population. This aspect of the Plan is illustrated in Enclosure 2.

Thus the Plan includes all the elements of past success and future hopes for the Communist Party in Hungary. Everything that is important to the Party is included in the Plan.

As to what degree of success they will achieve in overcoming the hatred against them in the vast majority of the population - and to what degree they will be able to gain control over every phase of the physical and...life of the unwilling population, is, with eventual appearance of the motive of "unexpected" violence, a matter of future developments.

The Five-Year Plan.

In analysing the Plan itself three questions have to be examined:

1. What is the over-all character of the Plan?
2. What does it claim to achieve for Hungary as a whole?
3. What does it claim to achieve for the people?

In analysing the details of the Plan an important characteristic generally is that it takes certain factors like control

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ever manpower and for producing means as granted under the control of the state. The Hungarian Communists have often emphasized that without the achievements of the Three-Year Plan from 1947-to 1949 no Five-Year Plan could have been made. The Three-Year Plan prepared the control for the Hungarian economy, in the state, by gradually and systematically eliminating private ownership.

1. The Over-all Character of
the Plan.

The general character of the Five-Year Plan is headed in the official text under the slogan "Reforming and further developing of our people's economy." The general character of the Five-Year Plan gives the design of the Communist conception of the future of a Communist controlled state.

The Communist Party's Concept on Future
Hungary.

The Plan of the Reforming of our People's Economy.

The main tasks of the Five-Year Plan are as follows:

1. The speeding up of Hungary's industrialization,
(Note: This is the great parallel - industrialization brings higher living standards and, at the same time, tighter control over the population.)
2. The liquidation of the backwardness of Hungarian economy in order to help to supply the growing industry with raw materials.
3. raising of the living standards, which is secured

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through industrialization and the reconstruction of agriculture.

4. "Liquidation of the education monopoly of the former ruling classes bring about all conditions to raise the cultural standard of the working class" and its allies, the working peasantry "to train in order to direct the state economy and culture, new working and peasant leaders - engineers, doctors, teachers, economic organizers, industrial leaders, army officers, civil servants, etc."
5. Gradually decrease the difference between city and village by bringing the decisive economic and social conditions.
6. "Develop the army so that we can stand up for our independence and with the Soviet Union and the Friendly People's Democracies and with the freedom-loving people of the world, defend the peace against the pirates of imperialist war-mongers."

"As a result of the Five-Year Plan, our country will become, instead of an agrarian-industrial country, an industrial-agrarian country. That is to say, a country, in the economy of which, it is the industry which is leading, yet, at the same time, modern agriculture is developed."

"As a result of the Five-Year Plan, in the whole people's economy socialist producing conditions will be predominant."

In order to achieve that in five years Hungary will have to invest approximately 35 milliard florins.

National income by 1954 will be 160% of the one in 1949.

The value of industrial production with mining will be

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80% higher, thus, 230% higher than in 1938.

The value of agricultural production will be 35% higher than now and thus 127% higher than in 1938.

2. Designs of the Five-Year Plan for the Country as a Whole.

The slogans in the official text which refer to the Plan as a means of "altering the social economic map of the whole country" are the following:

1. Through industrialization to Socialism.
(Chapter III of the Plan)
2. Liquidate the backwardness of the village.
(Chapter V of the Plan)

As to the first one, the Plan gives the overall design of industrialization:

The Plan details the figures of the plan in industry, mining, energy, consumer goods, new power plants, mentioning that the yearly value of mining, smelting and industry will be increased from 18.7 milliard to 34 mill. fl. Further emphasis is laid on machine-making & heavy industry from 48% to 53%.

Steel production from yearly 800,000 metric tons to 1.5 million tons.

Coal production yearly 11 million tons to 18 million tons.

Electric energy from yearly 2.2 milliard kw hours to 4.2 milliard kw hours.

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Machinery industry, 100% increase.

Chemical industry, over 200% increase.

Agricultural machinery, 3.5 times as much in 1954 as in 1949.

Tractors: twice as many.

Trucks and autobuses: twice as many.

Building industry:

Cement production will increase from 400,000 tons yearly to 1 million.

Brick production, three times as much.

Consumer goods

Food industry, 50% increase.

Textile industry, 56% increase.

Clothing manufacture, 63%.

Leather industry, 65%.

Paper and Printing industry, 50%.

Timber production, 60%.

Cotton goods, instead of 160 mil. meters - 240 mil. meters.

Woolen goods, instead of 25 mil. meters - 40 mil. meters.

Shoes instead of 6 million - 9 million.

Culture:

Book production, 100% increase.

Newsprint, 150% increase.

Better Transportation.

Slogan: "For a developed modern transportation.

After giving the details of road, bridge, and railroad

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construction, etc. it stated that the capacity of transportation should be 65% higher than in 1938.

Changing the Hungarian Village.

As to the second slogan, "Liquidate the backwardness of the Village": a complete change in the life and system of the Hungarian village is scheduled effecting the production system as well as all phases of the everyday life of peasantry.

The Plan openly declares that the mechanization of Hungarian agriculture will not only mean increased productivity but a change over to the Soviet system of agriculture - "the working peasant gets rid of the exploiting kulak and this will prove drastically the usefulness of the leadership of the working class."

The Plan gives detailed data on the higher production in every phase of the agricultural structure.

Planned soil conditioning is the most important factor utilizing fertilizers extensively. Of this latter, four times as much will be produced in Hungary than now.

Planned irrigation is to improve the soil and to control over-producing factors as well as regain more producing area.

Significant is the increase of livestock as against 1938.

Cattle: 1,882,000 increased to 2,400,000.

Swine: 5,200,000 increased to 6,000,000.

Poultry: twice as many.

Meat, fat, milk, egg production: 50% increase.

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Mechanization of agriculture:

Tractors: As against the present 1,300 -- 24,000, in five years.

Combines, harvesting machines, etc.

Agricultural machinery: a quarter of a million various smaller types.

Mechanization aims: "to alter the social structure of the Villages."

The Promises of the Plan to the People

The following parts of the plan are hoped to be an important Communist Party instrument in the winning over of the hostile peasant masses:

Rural electrification: Every village in Hungary will have

electricity

radio

telephone

libraries

Health Centres

baths

sports stadiums

Better water supply:

swimming pools, sport arenas, stadiums.

Important and significant slogans in the Plan are:

"Towards well-being" (heading of Chapter 6 of the Plan).

"The greatest value - the human being" (heading of Chapter 7 of the Plan).

"Educated strong people in a free and independent country" (heading of Chapter 8 of the Plan).

These slogans had the details given as the promise to the people. It is the price offered by the Party

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to the people for the total surrender of their freedom to decide for themselves how and where they want to live.

Liquidate the backwardness of
the Villages.

Living standards will be 35% higher than in 1949, 150% higher than in 1938. It goes into details, telling the quota in meat, dairy, sugar, clothing, shoes etc. which will be available per person as against the present figures. Leisure, new housing projects are included in this paragraph.

150% increase of living standards is promised to each person in Hungary, as against the 1938 levels.

34 kg of meat yearly instead of 25 kg.

14.5 kg of fat " " " 10 kg.

Milk and dairy an increase from 127 litre to 200 litre

Sugar increase from 17 kg to 22 kg.

Cotton goods from 14 m to 22,5 m.

Woolen goods from 1.3 m. to 2.6 m.

Shoes from 0.6 pair to 1 pair

Public housing: 65,000 homes approximately 2,500,000

people in new homes.....one quarter of the population.

Paid holiday: 500,000 yearly.

It also promises complete abolition of unemployment, does not mention that the tremendous human price to be paid for the Plan which is aimed to strength^v the power potential of the Soviet Union means that every individual will be a slave with-

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out choice as to where and what he wants to do. As a contrast, the next paragraph:

VII. Slogan: "Our greatest value, the human being."

Public health, social politics are included here, particularly the comparative backwardness of the health in the villages.

Hospital beds as against 1938 - 10% higher
Nurseries, medical stations etc.

VIII. Slogan: "An educated strong people in a free independent country."

Education:

Improving of quality of all institutions as well as quantity.

New elite educated - (See Elite Section)

500,000 new trained men

New schools in all the industrial centers.

New research centers

38,000 new places in the People's Colleges, mainly for students of worker and peasant origin.

Four new Teachers' Colleges

10,000 new teachers

1600 new engineers yearly - special increase in engineer training.

Books, sports for the masses.

New Scientific Research Centers.

New National theatre

10% increase in schooling system.

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Budapest Stadium for 70,000 people.

Consumer goods:

bicycles, 1 million

Cameras, washing machines, vacuum cleaners etc.

Motorcycles, 85,000

Bathtubs, 200,000

Sewing machines, 120,000

Furniture manufacture: standardized mass production.

Radios, 1,500,000

Manufacturing:

Large scale construction work

New factories

New lines of machinery never manufactured before.

Combines

Tractor-combined agricultural machinery

Bulldozers, etc.

Industrialize the poorest sections of the country and offer full employment.


" As we will have to take away tens of thousands of workers to be leaders of the state in economics and culture, we will need 300,000 new industrial workers for the growing industry."

The Five-Year Plan will change the social economic map of the whole country."


To illustrate the promise to the people, enclosure No. I, gives a detailed account by the Party. The presentation itself

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ÖT ÉV ALATT



A felszabadulás előtt több, mint háromszor, közepünk körüli sűrű erővel
 jlt villanyuram Hogy szellemileg még inkább sokéssében tarthassák, lére-
 szelthesek, elnyomhatóság, Horthyék szoros értelemben sőtétégre (lények)
 dolgozó parasztokat. 149 jalu ennvi villamosítottak 1933 és 1938 között.
 J. öt éves tervünk tizszer enyit, 1500 jalu villamosítással irányozza elő. Öt-
 és munkánk nyomán több jaluiban gyullad ki a villanyfény, mint addigval
 tíz-és mindszor 40 éo alatt, összesen villamosított.



Klebsberg és Híman kezrelmes mák jóvöllébr 1933-1938 között 127
 tanterem létesült Magyarországon. Felháborítottan kicsiny szám ez. De még
 habortibbá váltik, ha meg-... álluk, hogy az öt év alatt mindössze 27 új
 tanterem épült meg. Vagy az meg-... állítjuk, két iparosítanone-
 toát és négy ipari szakszobát.

Mi az ezterdu soroz 2000 új általános iskolai tantermet építünk, csak
 a tanterem annyi maradt, amennyi a Felméleti hatálmás összegeket irányoztuk
 egy év előtársi előnkra is így éppen az iparosítanonek, szakszobák,
 szakszobák, szakter berkek asztalok, re, hogy illy módon is segítsük az ipar és
 mezőgazdaság fejlődését.

ENCLOSURE II ILLUSTRATES THE PATTERN OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN HUNGARY, USING THE FIGURES OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN WITH THE DESIGN OF WINNING OVER THE NEUTRAL OR HOSTILE MASSES IN THE COUNTRY.

THIS APPEARED IN THE APRIL 17 ISSUE OF THE SZABAD NEP ("FREE PEOPLE") THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

Before the liberation of our 3000 villages, hardly 1000 had electricity. In order to keep the working peasants in darkness in their spits too, in order to suppress them and mislead them, the Hungarian regime literally kept them in darkness. 149 villages - so many were electrified between 1933 and 1938. Our new Five-Year Plan will introduce rural electrification in ten times as many villages - 1500.

As a result of our Five Year work, electric light will be turned on in as many villages as the capitalist system electrified during forty years.

Their excellences K and H * They were ministers of Education in the pre-war regime. * Were gracious enough to build 127 new classrooms in Hungary between 1933 and 1938. This is a shockingly small figure, however it becomes even more shocking if we observed that during this five years, they built altogether 27 new elementary schools, however they closed two high schools, two industrial apprentice schools and two industrial High schools.

During five years we built 2000 new general school-rooms, almost 16 times as many as they did. Besides we spent a huge sum on other educational purposes and particularly toward the training of industrial apprentices - skilled workers and agricultural experts in order to facilitate the development of industry and agriculture.

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is characteristic - an important factor in the propaganda is not merely to show how much better the present regime claims to be than the pre-war regime was, but also how much worse the pre-war regime was than the present one. The five years of 1933-1938 are contrasted in specially picked out contrasting figures as against the five years of 1949-1954.

It is designed to counter-balance public hostility through means of propaganda.

The comparative backwardness of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe which had outdated agricultural character, serves as a background for the Communist propaganda in promoting industrialization and promising the "bigger and better" in living standards.

The Essentials in Accomplishing the Plan.

As to those steps which will assure the eventual success of the plan the official text gives the following outline:

In order to achieve the Five-Year Plan, it is essential:

- (1) to economize
- (2) self-discipline labor of the masses of workers, peasants, intelligentsia etc.
- (3) increase the worker-peasant character of the country.
- (4) in the independent people's front, every patriotic force worker, and working peasant should realize a common cause in the fight against exploiting elements, reaction and imperialistic agents and be strong under the guidance of the Communists and the Hungarian Workers' Party.
- (5) We defend the peace, increase our friendly cooperation with the anti-imperialists' camp and its leader, the socialist Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

The Five-Year Plan maps the road of the people's democracy on well-being, strength, education, and a socialist Hungary.

Communist Party Accent on the Human Being.

Comment: In order to achieve that, it would mean that

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9,500,000 people would have to be literally slaves. It is comparable to a man wanting to earn twice his income by working 16 hours a day instead of 8.

Trying to counterbalance this fact is the new slogan:

"The new emphasis is on the new value - the human being.

Rakosi

Speech of ~~xxxx~~ April 20, 1949:

Our greatest value is the working human being. That is the reason we take special care of his health, he doesn't mention that ~~the~~ purpose is to have strong and effective slaves.¹³⁴

The organizational skill of the Communist Party combined with the ruthless fulfillment of the production norms was proved in the Three-Year Plan.

This includes complete control over every working hour of every worker in every Hungarian plant. Should he fail to fulfill his production norm on the first and second occasion he will be punished with wage reduction. On the third occurrence the special workers' Court of the factory will try him for "industrial sabotage."

All profits are to be immediately reinvested. This is made possible by the complete elimination of private ownership of profit of Hungarian industry and banking - without any compensation during the execution of the Three-Year Plan.

As strikes are regarded to be a luxury only for rich countries* (Footnote by Rajk who explained this in Washington on his 1946 visit.) No strikes are permissible in the people's democracy. This is only logical in the Communist mentality. The people's democracy in Hungary being the dictatorship of the working classes it is in the interest of the workers who rule, therefore it cannot be permissible that the working classes should strike against themselves. In its features,

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the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary is much more
the dictatorship of professional revolutionaries (with lower
middle class background) over the proletariat.

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CHAPTER VI

Part 2

THE NEW ELITE - AN APPEAL TO YOUTH

Motto: May 1 slogan. Hungarian youth, build your future, be ready for work and fight. Vote for the People's Front.

In making a balance on Communist achievements the positive factor of assuming total control against overwhelmingly anti-Communist public opinion and masses in Hungary and the absorption of all opposition may prove to be a pyrrhical victory in the long run. The merging of the Social Democratic Party with enthusiastic leaders and reluctant members may be in a similar category. The failure of the policy is obvious and spectacular as far as the peasant problem and the Church issue are concerned. Against all these and some other odds...the most important Communist gamble is: time--and the creating of a new elite. This is done carefully, as part of a long-range plan, from the beginning of the re-entering of Hungary in 1945. Its scale is almost unprecedented. No secret is made that this is the gamble of the Communists which is supposed to counterbalance so many of the negative factors in the scale. To the non-Communist majority of the people of Hungary--the generation of the present-day grown-up--it is also a gamble. How far will the emotional complex of the youth be affected by the impact to its relation to the family

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and particularly the generation of parents. . .the hold of religion. . .the impact of the past in the form of Hungary's historic traditions--against the powerful and aggressive impact of the tactics of the Communist Party--in its campaign to win the next generation on its side. The gamble thus extends to the world community too, at least to the degree as the importance of one country and its future in the strategically not unimportant Danube Valley is concerned. For these reasons it is necessary to study and analyze the Communist policy in Hungary in its effort to create a new elite.

The Problem of the "Elite" in the 1919 Beginning

In November, 1918, when Bela Kun arrived with a forged passport, the instructions of Lenin, money, and twenty-four associates from Russia there was no time to build out a Communist elite. These twenty-five men were supposed to be the nucleus of power and from the day they arrived they were kept busy, first preparing the failure of the Karolyi regime that after they took over power, preparing--unconsciously--the failure of their own regime.

They had a definite idea about the elite to rule the revolution. It was faithfully in line with Marx and Lenin. It was the method and care to build up a ruling class of quality--which alone makes an "elite" out of those who "got to power by force" which they did not realize. Their conception was simple and primitive in its scope. An editorial on

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the 27th in The Red Newspaper:

"The proletare revolution is differing from any other revolution. . .The previous revolutions simply took over all the suppressing organs of the State, the police, the civil service. . .Now the lowest class takes power in its hands and the class state of the proletares builds up a new suppressing organ--and stops the separate-ness of legislative and executive power." 135

The analysis has to approach the problem from two angles: 1. What was the Communist Party attitude towards the first elite. 2. What was their conception with regards to creating a new elite.

As to the first one: in the Communist Party the partisan outlook was so dominant in their mentality that they did not even consider to take over as leaders some of the talented politicians of the past or social democrats. They did not have even^{an} elementary concept of the running of the state machinery and decided to do away with the civil servants without hesitation or without trying to train some of their own for the job.

On March 22nd, the very first day the role of the new elite is emphasized, the Red Newspaper writes,

"The political bastion of defense of the bourgeoisie, the parliament lies in ruins. . .Now the other ever more powerful fortress, the rule of the civil servants, the bureaucracy should also be destroyed." 136

The article explains in detail how the bureaucracy served the previous regime and continues:

"Positions of administration and jurisdiction

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will be in proletare hands. . .The proletares will themselves select the machinists for the machinery of administration. . .The bourgeoisie leading elite is ripe for destruction. . .The ministries as well as local authorities and all their civil servants are the basic fortresses of this dangerous reaction which will surrender immediately to any new system. . . but will in the same way immediately turn against it in the very moment when its position weakens. . .We don't want any of them; we need talented workers who can fulfill their task with conscience and we need them in the administration, in every part of the administration without exception. . .We are in power and we are going to remain in power. The total power of the state belongs to us and we will not yield any of it to the parasites of the past. Just the way we sent parliament to Hell, we send bureaucracy after."

The method in 1945 was subtle, slow and well-timed.

The Communist Party realized that it takes time and training to bring up a new elite and started that training from the very first days of 1945.

In the several futile counter-revolution attempts, the bulk of the middle class, including the remaining few old civil servants, grasped the chance to join those who tried to overthrow the Bela Kun regime which was unable to offer anything else but hunger, misery, humiliation, and widespread terror. The only consequence the Communist Party was able to draw at that time was the justification of their own philosophy as detailed above

The Red Newspaper, writing about the old civil servants,

"...Either they are with us or against us

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has again been proved. . . They attacked us from the back. . . The part of the administration which was taken over was the hotbed of the darkest counter-revolution. From our moderation which they interpreted as weakness, they are unable and unwilling to accept the state where their bossing and civil service privileges have disappeared--that is the reason that it is essential and immediately urgent to reorganize the administration and remove immediately the unreliable personnel. . . Everybody should be destroyed from the administration who doesn't stand on the side of the proletarian dictatorship and its institutions. . . They have to be purged. . .¹³⁷

From 1945 onwards the Communists, in their gradual and systematic demands for purges against the civil servants who, as a necessity have to be taken over from the old regime, accepted and emphasized the very same principles.

April 16, the Red Newspaper, in an editorial:

. . . The politics of the Party can only be class politics and every servant of the regime has to come from our camp.¹³⁸

In 1945 they did not deviate an iota from that stand. The only and not unimportant difference was that they regarded the class-conscious policy as a long-range matter, as a matter of strategy and not tactics. The tactical phase had to emphasize the interest of the whole country, heavily relying on patriotism and all the people who were willing to build the people's democracy. Kun identified the ~~minor~~ terror of a minority as an elite.

Lukacs on the Party Congress of June, 1919, talking

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about the rule of the minority:

The proletare dictatorship is the rule of a minority, but this minority is organized labor which works for the interest of all workers and we need self-criticism to help in the progress of society and we want to serve the present conditions of class struggle in which the workers want to be the elite.³⁹

He did not recognize that while terror is an important instrument of achieving and retaining power ... without skill, training, and quality the minority in question will never want to be the elite.

The general conception about the importance of leadership was somewhat vague too. Even the intelligent G. Lukacs wrote on April 20, 1919, in an editorial on revolutionary action:

Every proletare movement is being led at least as much as we can talk about leadership as such by the one in whom the real will of the totality is personified.⁴⁰

There was no doubt about the need of the absolute leader in the minds of the Muscovites when they re-entered Hungary in 1945--and that included G. Lukacs as well.

Kun saw the retaining of the proletare character of the elite as the most important aspect. Kun, explaining the dangers of the bourgeoisie influence, says:

The great task of the party is the concentration of the elite troops of the proletariat... We have to preserve the pure proletare tendency of the party... Party discipline is very important.

After 1945 the Communist Party carefully retained

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the civil service as a working machinery as being of para-
 mount ^{importance} ~~importance~~ and the parallel training of their new elite.

Class revenge meant more to Kun than the quality
 of the new "elite" as on March 28, 1919:

Workers are heading all the Budapest
 offices in the factories everywhere--
 the new elite everywhere. . . ¹⁴²

The next day the newspaper proudly announces:

We have cleaned out the club of the
 aristocracy. ¹⁴³

The "Muscovites" as a Nucleus of the Elite

Matyas Rakosi. Secretary-general of the Communist Party in
 Hungary.

Had high government position in the 1919 Communist
 regime in the period following World War I.

Born in Hungary, 1890. Graduate of Commercial
 Academy in Budapest and Consular Akademie. Went to business
 first, was employed in London, traveled widely all over Europe
 and later in Asia and the United States. Organized Siberian
 prisoner of war camps, 1917-18. Executive Committee member of
 the First World Congress, 1919. After Government position in
 the Bela Kun regime fled to Russia, took part in revolutionary
 underground work in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Spent
 years in prison in several countries, 15 years in a Hungarian
 prison. Member of the Executive Committee, Seventh Session,
 1935. Speaks Russian, German, French, and English well. Highly
 intelligently read. Returned to Hungary in 1945 after being
 exchanged by the Hungarian Government for 1848 battle flags

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from Russia, during the period of German-Russian appeasement.

Joseph Revai. Editor-in-chief of Szabad Nep, official organ of the Hungarian Communist Party in the period following World War I. Editor-in-chief of Veres Ujsaj, organ of the Communist Party during the Russian regime of 1919.

Chief ideological man in the Hungarian party, member of the Directorate of the Party and representative in the Cominform.

Born 1898. Commercial studies, editor and ideological organizer during the Bela Kun regime. Spent the decades following the 1919 defeat in the International Movement organizing illegal Communist Party in Hungary and was arrested several times. Highly intellectual in approach, speaks Russian, German, and French.

Jeno Gero. Organizational specialist of the Party, Minister of Finance in Hungary.

Born 1898, high-school education. Member of the Communist Party since 1918. After Bela Kun revolution fled to Moscow in 1923. High ranking in the Communist Party, Foreign Area Group on Central and Eastern Europe in Moscow. Took part in the Spanish Civil War. Member of the directorate of the Comintern in 1940, returned with Red Army to Hungary after World War II. Dry personality, excellent organizer. Speaks Russian, little German and French.

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Ferenc Mannich. General of the Hungarian Police Force.
Expert on organization of force.
General of the Red Guard (Police,
Gendarmes, etc.) during the Bela Kun
regime.

Born 1890. Doctor of Law. Fled to Russia, during
the Spanish Civil War commanded a division. Interned in France
in 1939-41, returned to Russia, returned to Hungary in 1945.
Speaks Russian, German, French, little Spanish.

Zoltan Vas. Leading economist of Hungarian Communist Party.
Former Mayor of Budapest.

Born 1903. Some high-school education. As an illegal
Communist leader spent 17 years in prison in Hungary, mostly
together with Rakosi. Had high position in propaganda organi-
zation of the Soviet to Central and Eastern Europe. Returned
to Hungary with the Red Army in 1945. Later organized and
headed the Supreme Economic Council of Hungary which had dic-
tatorial economic power and prepared the Hungarian economy
for the Five Year Plan.

George Lukacs. Professor, Ideological expert of the Communist
Party in the period following World War II
Comissar for Education during Bela Kun regime.

Born 1885, son of millionaire banker, highly educated
and traveled all over Europe. Spent collapse of Bela Kun
regime writing in various countries of Europe. Speaks Russian,
French, Italian, German, and English.

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Eugen Varga. Cabinet member during the Bela Kun regime.

Top economist of the Soviet who had very important position in the Bela Kun regime, did not return with Red Army to Hungary, only occasional visits. Is the planner of the whole Communist Party policy in Central and Eastern Europe. All the principal reforms: land reforms and socialization schemes as well as currency problems of the area were prepared under his direction. Is the "Eminence Gris" of Communist Economic Policy in Hungary, and Central and Eastern Europe.

Interrelation of Communist Party Elites in the Area

In Prague, Rakosi exclaimed on the occasion of the Communist-Hungary agreement, speaking in the Industrial Assembly Hall in Prague in Russian:

I am an old soldier of the Czechoslovak Communism, in 1920-21 I, too, was working at the cradle of the Czech Communist Party. . . . 144

While this speech by a Hungarian Communist leader, in Russian, priding that he too was instrumental in the present-day rule of the Communists in Czechoslovakia will hardly cause pleasure to masses of Czechs to whom the person of Rakosi, his former Russian nationality, his present Hungarian nationality, the language of his speech, his reference to the Czech Communist Party are equally antagonistic--it is not hard to imagine how the very same factors plus the location of the speech as an addition--are received by the population in Hungary to whom the Communist Press and radio dutifully

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reported the great "historic" event.

In the same time, however, the speech is most significant. It underlines a very important factor in the understanding of the world of the Muscovites--who form the nucleus of the Communist Party elite. This factor is that the few dozen men who rule over half a dozen nations in Central and Eastern Europe are all of the same school seasoned by decades of party work, prison, underground activity dangers, and the thorough personal knowledge of each other. The personal bond between them, being part of exactly the same global movement, believing in nothing else but the final aims of that movement, their willingness to take any danger or personal suffering to promote that movement in which they believe fanatically, and from the personal point of view unselfishly constitutes the elements of such a degree of oneness between these men that the fact that they were all Russian citizens, speak and think in Russian and for the Soviet is comparably unimportant in the picture. The man who is assigned by Moscow to fulfill a task in Hungary may have been together with a similar key figure in the Spanish Civil War or may have had a room for years in an Institute on the same corridor with the room of the other. Their motives, their beliefs are the same. To them "to be a patriotic Czech or a Hungarian" is but a mere part of the task. Once they have control over a state and one of their associates is on top of a pyramid of other states, as far as they are concerned how could any squabble

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over minorities or any other "national" question be a problem.

On that close personal relationship a network of Alliances among the Peoples Democracy is based. This system of twenty-four treaties in the area endeavors to tie together the nations in the Soviet sphere economically and politically under one Soviet Aegis. They are all--separately--tied to Soviet Russia as well. The treaties in this network are as follows:

a. Among the Peoples Democracies:

Yugoslav-Polish	March 18, 1946
Yugoslav-Czechoslovak	May 9, 1946
Yugoslav-Albanian	July 9, 1946
Czechoslovak-Polish	March 10, 1947
Yugoslav-Bulgarian	November 27, 1947
Yugoslav-Hungarian	December 8, 1947
Bulgarian-Albanian	December 16, 1947

b.. Satellite Alliances of Soviet Russia

Soviet-Czechoslovak	December 12, 1943
Soviet-Yugoslav	April 11, 1945
Soviet-Polish	April 21, 1945
Soviet-Rumanian	February 4, 1948
Soviet-Hungarian	February 18, 1948
Soviet-Bulgarian	March 18, 1948
Soviet-Finnish	April 6, 1948

The Communist Party leaders in Central and Eastern Europe continue to work for the same purpose--for which they cooperated for decades--and this cooperation is legalized through the bilateral regional agreements. This personal tie is a more important factor than the sentiments of ties populations produced.

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As far as these men are concerned, the federation of Central and Eastern Europe under the Russian Aegis is an accomplished fact from the day they gain complete control over their respective states in their respective posts. Thus no special skill is needed in their new diplomacy.

The Growth of the Communist Party in Hungary

Almost word to word the same sentences were repeated in 1945 too by Communist leaders. But they knew by that time that it takes time to train men into Government service. The Muscovites for almost three decades after their defeat in 1919 were active and by no means unimportant part of a state machinery which even considering many of its Asiatic clumsiness... was a state organization with a definitely global conception. By 1945 they had all the experience of the failure of 1919 and all the experiences of the achievements of the Soviet state machinery. They repeated the threats of 1919 but went slower with the purges. While everyone who was in top position before the 1944 tabula rasa-- was persona non grata -- they did not throw out the rank and file of the civil servants. The initial purges were mostly confined to Nazi associations, anti-Communist activities of 1918-19 and the preliminary elimination of such persons who were, on the record of their past attitude, particularly dangerous as potential future resistance elements against the Communist Party. The Muscovites realized however that to keep the State machinery running is the paramount order of the day... otherwise the rebuilding of a country, of its ruins -- which will be a worthwhile

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taking over-- cannot be achieved. As a safety factor they could rely on the presence of the Red Army numbering around one million and their rapidly developing Communist Political Police and Military Police.

The purges of the former elite however were a gradual process. The weakness of the middle classes, the mounting personal jealousies which are a permanent characteristic of almost any civil service aided the constant slow purge sifting of the former rulers of the state machinery. They invented the concept of "grey reaction" which meant the lesser rank of the civil servant...claiming that they were even more dangerous than the "black reaction" which referred to the ones in leading positions. With great skill they saw to it that the new slogan should not be interjected into public opinion by the Communist Party. They used the Peasant Party, parts of which were already at that time serving them as a front organization, to print and publicize the danger of the "grey reaction".

The very character of the Communist Party policy in that gradual and unceasing process of purging and replacing the former machinery of Hungarian administration, industry and business is like a pyramid. It started on the top of the pyramid in 1945, just removing the ones on the very top. Gradually and carefully timed, they descended to the lower and lower parts of the pyramid. The final aim is to change every stone in the structure. It is not yet accomplished, but the 5-Year Plan of 1949 includes the process in the course of which every single stone in the pyramid structure will be replaced by

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the Communist Party. This will by no means be confined to non-Communists. Even those Communists who were placed there during the years from 1945 will be exchanged. They were in too close contact with the remnants of the ancient regime. The new stones in the structures are all young and brought up from the very beginning by the Party for their future career.

From 1945 onwards every important political move in the Communist Party tactics was accompanied by a new wave of purge in the civil service, industry, banking, etc. The political "crisis" or the "conspiracy" was used as the excuse for the necessity of the purge. In each instance the replacement from the Communist Party ranks followed. In most cases it was far behind in skill and experience of the purged, but they were just good enough to keep the machinery from breaking down, i. e., instrumental in the tactics of gaining time until the very courses which were just at that time in the process of training men for those positions would be finished. The Muscovites, men like Makosi, Gero, fanatic veterans of Communism who were in their own world men of outstanding quality, realized that in full.

Parallel with the first purges, starting from 1945 they gradually planned the training of the future replacement. Courses in every branch of government were started, the applicants carefully screened, and very quietly they continued to train the new civil service. Their appointees placed by the Party into ministries from the very beginning were part of a screening

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tactic. They had very little skill, and the old-timers happily ascertained that the Communist Party men are not too dangerous as they lack all the skill and training. They successfully screened the Communist Party tactics of the training for actually skilled/^{new}men--which at that time was in process. The men referred to were only put in the ministries and other positions partly to camouflage the Communist Party long-range project, partly to pay for the unduly high position given by the Party with absolute allegiance and to supply the Party with constant inside information of the organization in which they were placed. They themselves did not know either that they would be duly discarded when the time would seem ripe to the Communist tacticians.

Forming the New Elite--"En Masse"

After the liberation one of the most hopeful signs was the founding of the Peoples Colleges. It gave the talented sons and daughters of the Peasants a chance for higher learning, offering them at the same time the thrill of urban living. The Communist Party in the beginning was one of the sponsors of the scheme. However, the tendency of the Peoples Colleges turned into a somewhat unexpected direction. The thousands of talented young peasant men and women who were carefully told from the very beginning that it is the new regime which gives them this unique chance in life, while being duly grateful for that, started to learn and understand basic facts very rapidly. The slogan that the Communist Party line is to have the country led by the Industrial workers as against the agricultural workers made them

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conscious of their origin. The memories of the home and family in the villages were usually but a few months old, and they started to look with undisguised awe towards the Scandinavian democracies with their high peasant culture and unique high agricultural standard of living. At the same time they exhibited reluctance and hostility towards the Soviet Union where the peasants were liquidated en masse, and unmistakable signs of nationalism, as an addition. Soon that became apparent. . . the Communist Party as a defensive tactic quickly erected workers colleges--where only children of industrial proletariat were admitted. The result was a series of bloody fights between the two types of colleges and police intervention was necessary to quiet the fights down. That made it imperative to the Communist Party to introduce in the filing of the members of the Peoples Colleges as well the three categories which are used in classifying civil servants:

1. Red File: faithful with industrial or agricultural proletar background
2. White File: class alien
3. Green File: class enemy

Today the admittance to the Peoples Colleges is strictly restricted. Sons and daughters of agricultural workers who are active in promoting producing cooperatives enjoy a priority. The scholarships abroad no longer include Scandinavia or Finland, they are strictly to Peoples Democracies and emphasis

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is laid on study tours to Russia to study the kolhoz system. There was no possibility however to send the members of the original Peoples Colleges back to the lands. They have already tasted the life of the city, the thrill of higher education as well as decent modern plumbing.

The slogan of the Five Year Plan is:

Educated strong people in a free independent country.

The Plan promises: new schooling system specialized training in agricultural system, 100,000 new specialists for the state administration, 38,000 places in the people's colleges, research institutes, new theater, stadiums, etc. ¹⁴⁵

As to the growth of the Party around this nucleus no other authority could give a better informed opinion than Rakosi. With almost unbelievable frankness, he said on June 15, 1948:

The Communist "Army". Let me take this occasion on the Congress of the Union to give a few figures on the development and strength of the Communist Party. Immediately after the liberation we were hardly a few thousand. At the end of February, 1945, the Communist Party had 30,000 members. This number increased by the end of May to 150,000 and after that it developed gradually in a healthy way. This year, just before our union, we concluded the issuance of our new membership books. In the beginning of May this year we had 6,242 organizations with 884,000 members. It is well known that when we exchange the books of membership we left out members whom we didn't regard apt enough to be party members by the ten thousands. It may be difficult to the growth of our party that during the first four months of this year more than 200,000 new members entered our ranks. ¹⁴⁶

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All this is about the best guarded secret of the Communist Party. To understand the reason for that revelation, again it is necessary to analyze the basic philosophy of the Communists. They believe and practice Realpolitik and consequently value achievements as against words. However to them the fact that they achieved what they did with the help and in strict adherence to the Doctrine is at least as much of a satisfaction as the result in itself. This professional pride over the scientific overcoming of a country where the majority of the leaders as well as the majority of the population is opposed to them made Rakosi reveal the figures of the growth of the Party. He emphasized the very small number of men who started out, Muscovites linked up with a few of the former Hungarian underground Communist Party...growing into a one million force... all this and this factor has to be stressed was said by Rakosi on a day which from the Communist point of view was the day of the greatest achievement of all: the merging of the Social Democrat Party.

All these experiences of 1919 are used as a lesson by the Communists in their 1945 reappearance. The "small man" whether he is an independent business man or a small farmer is assured from the very beginning that the Communist Party has no designs against his interest...on the contrary they will stand up for his interests against the exploiters of big industry or the capitalist of the village: the Kulak.

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As to the intellectuals: posters were printed by the Communist Party already in 1945 showing the picture of a man with a book in his hand marching between two workers, and all three are confidently smiling. Its inscription said: "Intellectual, your place is among our ranks." The Peoples Democracy is always termed: the system of working men, working peasants and progressive intellectuals. Special Party Seminars are offered to them, and Party literature is available to them for the asking. The cadre had orders from the very beginning to give special consideration to engineers, teachers, doctors, etc. Thus the improvement in the attitude of the Communist Party against the non-Communist citizenry is to antagonize as few of them as possible. They realized from the experience of 1919 that frightening them into opposition is only a negative result.

For the Party's long range strategic plan, however, there is an elaborate index file system on the population based on the 1949 January 20 census. It consists of red, white and green cards. The red card is the category of the most reliable element. The white one is the class alien...the elements who are not dangerous to the Party although they are alien to them but are potential to be later either enemies or allies. They include the bulk of the peasantry, the middle class, etc. The green category includes the "class enemy." They are the actually dangerous elements, former higher civil servants, landowners, etc. The classification is based on origin; the

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"peoples origin" where the ancestors have been workers is the measuring standard.

The fact that several leading members of the new diplomacy are men who a few years ago were working men is widely known; the Charge Affaires in Vienna, a former iron worker, used to tell laughingly to visiting journalists how he flabbergasted Western Diplomats by revealing to them his former profession on his first courtesy visit. Although the only language he spoke besides his mother tongue was some Serb and Russian, the Representative of Great Britain could carry on a conversation with him inasmuch as the British Diplomat spoke some Russian. This practice is not too difficult for the Communist Party to follow in branches of Government like the Foreign Service, which in that case is but an administrator of a Moscow-conceived Foreign Policy. In Engineering, Industry, and Agriculture, however, where skillful training is more essential, than in a ghost Foreign Service serving the somewhat illusionary sovereign interest of the country, the Communists are now getting a well-trained elite as a replacement:

To foster this, we are starting the whole new schooling system in industry, agriculture, and university in order to equip these new leaders of the state with education. When the reaction tried to stop us from getting our workers and peasant Kadre into the state machinery, we said, first, they should get it, and after they will learn it. We were right in this, too.

As to the allegiance of that new elite Rakosi leaves little doubt:

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A state never hangs in the air. The former regimes were serving the interests of big capitalists and big land owners who placed their own administration and exercised control through hundreds of different ways, organizations, clubs, orders, etc. The workers do the same. We, too, are using hundreds of methods to select our own men and put them into the state machinery.

In a people's democracy the population has work in public affairs, not merely with the parliamentary elections. They become actual parts of democracy.

In the same speech he criticizes some of the shortcomings of the new elite and promises improvement:

Our country has an elite of the working class and its allies, the working peasants. However, we should add, it is a working class and peasant state with the remains of reaction and bureaucratic excesses.

As to the present scope of Party indoctrination in June, 1948, Rakosi announced:

Our Party education took a new step this Spring, at the same time 38,000 comrades were in Party Schools.

The ruling (new) role of the workers in the State as the new elite is methodically repeated to the masses to make them conscious of the fact:

May 14, 1949 In a declaration to the population to vote for the people's front:

Four years have convinced our population that the workers are the only class who can lead the nation. Our cabinet members, leaders in industry, diplomats, high officers of the army and police are more and more of the

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working class,¹⁴⁹

It stresses the importance of women as leaders of the country; premises them the satisfaction of family life and all the careers in the country.

The Conscience of Class in the New Elite

As to strengthen the hold of the Party in industrially and strategically important cities, the speech of Rakosi in Angyalfold, an all-important industrial center, should be studied. He quotes a Swiss newspaper which writes an article saying that the Hungarian diplomats come from Angyalfold. That is the poorest slum of Budapest. The article says that the new diplomats of the Hungarian people's democracy instead of the old school in Vienna, are working men and working women from Angyalfold. Incidentally, that is the place where this speech was made.

According to the Swiss article, this district is the worst and darkest and most crime-infected one in Budapest. The article further complains that in a place where formerly only aristocrats could sit one can see more and more industrial workers. As a horrifying example, he mentions that the head of the Personnel Department in the Foreign Ministry has only elementary school education; the Minister in Albania used to be a shoemaker before.

At this part of the speech, says the paper, the masses get more and more excited.

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The article complains that in the schools for diplomats and foreign service personnel, all the men and women are from the working class.

My dear comrades, we take the complaints of the Swiss newspaper as a praise. As an example, in 1948-49 in the military academies where five or ten years ago only sons of the nobility could enter, now we have 89% of sons of workers and peasants.¹⁴⁹

Speaking about the new chances for women, he mentions women who are cabinet members, leaders in the industrial organization, parliament, etc.

In addition to optimism as a permanent feature in the line of propaganda, is the slogan:

New Hungary is the country of unlimited chances for everyone.

This expression is in the mentality of the masses associated with the United States. The Hungarian emigrants early in the century who made good in the new world and returned to Hungary with their money created the saga of the country of "unlimited chances." The chances for the new elite, for a half a million young men and women to become high in the elite, is now presented in order to replace the United States with Hungary. Individual careers are published in long reports and pictures by the Communist press. The new Minister to Belgrade is a former street-car conductor. So is the almighty head of the Central Trade Unions.

The heads of the counties which used to be a

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special decorum socially as well as in power--very similar in category to State Governors in the U. S.--are in many cases former working men. The head of the county of Szolnok where the population is anti-communist and extremely conscious of its peasant character is especially widely publicized. The reason is that the new "Governor" is a woman, Mrs. I. J., the wife of a former landless agricultural worker. She is thirty-six years old, one of eleven children, grew up in misery, did physical work since she was twelve. She is an old party member, self-educated, read Dostojewsky, Csehov, Upton Sinclair, Gorkij, secretly for years. . . married an active movement worker who was captured and beaten by the gendarmes in 1930. She is instrumental in promoting the "producing cooperatives". Her activity of immediately answering any request is stressed as well as the names of the people who used to fill in the same position before her, Count Sz., Baron U., some of the most illustrious names of the Hungarian aristocracy. Cases like the case of Mrs. I. J. are widely publicized by the Communist Party. It includes the motive of a woman in high position, self-made of poor peasant origin, class vengeance against the former ruling classes...and last, but not least, her outstanding enthusiasm for the "producing cooperatives". All this in a region where the peasant masses just like all over the country bitterly fight the introduction of this form of kolhoz--which hardly camouflages its real character.

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The Communist Party Employing of the New Elite

Examples used by the Communist Party as political tactics.

Important characteristics of the tactics can be deduced from the May 10, 1949 speech of Rakosi in Sopron. The Communist Party tactics makes ~~the~~ double use of their new elite:

1. They can hope to gain permanent control over the structure of the state
2. They can hope to increase their popularity, which they realize is at a very low ebb, by showing the masses where they can get in the new regime

After a long talk against former aristocrats with palaces of over 300 rooms, exploiting their laborers, he continues, "The Mayor of the city of S is a worker." Again here the local tactics of the Communist Party can be observed. He gives all the examples of the very region where the speech is held. The head of the county is a new peasant out of the county, 100 youths are training to be army officers and 24 to be police officers.

Particular attention, he says, is given to women. In front of me sits Mrs. E. She is the head of the county of Z. five years ago she was a poor working woman on the land; two weeks ago we sent her to Paris to the world's Peace Congress to represent Hungarian women. The journalists from the Western capitalist countries just couldn't believe it. They examined even her hands to find out that maybe we sent out an actress

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dressed as a peasant woman. Mrs. B brought honor to the Hungarian working women and particularly to Hungarian peasant women.

This, too, is clever tactics, a gesture to the peasants. He spoke in details about the peasants, chances for women, The Five Year Plan. The repeated reference to the new chances to women--all this in a country where the chances for women up to 1945 were extremely limited and to lower-class women almost none--Rakosi gives as a further example the case of Weiss Manfred works, one of the most important industrial organizations of Eastern Europe:

The example of the Weiss Manfred factory which, in one year, gave 690 workers into leading positions in ministries, the army, and the police, managers of big plants, numerous diplomats, etc., not to mention the fact that this very plant which has 24,000 workers is headed by a former steel worker.¹⁵⁰

About the speed and energy of indoctrination, a perspective can be formed of one year's progress from the speech of Rakosi June 5, 1949:

. . .we have to mention the good work of our peoples educators. . .we mobilized 250,000 of them who started work. . .we have a tremendous task ahead on the field of education. . .Already this Fall we have started the two years Party Academy. . . we widen and specialize the one year, the six month and the other party schools.¹⁵¹

These figures of a quarter of a million "Peoples Educators" and the schools mentioned have to be viewed in a population which is below ten million. The scope of the

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Communist Party concept on trying to put an impact on the masses is unproportionately large. And, certainly a far cry from the clumsy propagandistic handling of the same program in 1919.

Unlike in 1945-46, the applicants for membership were most carefully scrutinized during 1947-48. Purges in the Communist Party took place (33% were purged), and from that period it was a privilege to be admitted into the Party. Since June 1, 1949, a very new selective system goes into operation.

Decision of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party
About the Acceptance of Candidates for Membership

On June 1, 1949, the ban on new members ceases. However, from now on they are only going to take candidates for future membership, not members. Even those candidates can only be admitted after November 1 owing to the sifting of all candidates.

The basic directives are as follows: Into the leading party of the country, into the elite guard of the workers we can only take the very best of the working people. Only those can become candidates who are worthy of that.

Preference is given:

1. To the elite laborers of working brigades and those who are distinguished in the mass organization work;
2. Agricultural laborers and those who prove to be successful in their work in the agricultural cooperatives

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and organizational work in the village cooperatives, particularly its functionaries;

3. Those of the intelligentsia who, as scientists, engineers, technicians, teachers, writers, artists, distinguish themselves in the building of the people's democracy;

4. Special consideration should be given to the most active women and young men. Then it goes into the details of explaining the very careful sifting system of the candidates, a very thorough check on them, and the responsibility in full of those who recommend them. Both of the recommenders have to appear in person with the candidate.

In the parliament 23% are intelligentsia and 6% of the small businessmen and other types of workers. Thus, although the membership ban is lifted, no members are admitted-- only candidates who are checked for half a year before becoming members.

The Five Year Plan and The Human Element

S. N. April 17, 1949, explains that the 10,000 new engineers mean a number 8 times as big as the number of engineers who got diplomas from 1933-38. This is done by establishing a second university of technology:

. . .the importance is not only that we give 10,000 youths a new chance to study; these engineers will be our engineers, the bulk of them will come out of the children of the workers. Besides this, they are a better and more modern training than the small number of the privileged ones before them. 152

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To get an idea about the scope of this new Communist Party concept on the elite problem, it has to be realized that in a country of just under ten million people they will number half a million people. On April 20, 1949, Rakosi announced:

The Five Year Plan, in addition to the
300,000 new industrial workers, needs
100,000 specialists, including
10,000 new engineers
12,000 teachers
60,000 agricultural specialists
13,000 agricultural university graduates
25,000 agricultural high school graduates
75,000 of specialized agricultural schools
38,000 places in the people's colleges for
 working class and peasant youth.

Thus, more than half a million men will become highly educated in five years.

The Five Year Plan will change the future of a half a million people.

All this for the future.

As for the present the figure is lower but not less significant. Four days after the above speech, he announced:

Since 1945, 6,000 industrial workers became the elite in the state machinery, particularly in the last two years in our industry 67% of the leaders

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in our army 66% of our higher officers, in our police force 76% of the officers are already from the working class. In our jurisdiction the layman from the working class became a permanent institution. The ice is broken in the Ministries, too. Such fortresses of the gentry like the Foreign Office and the Diplomacy are already being taken over by people from the working districts.

About the May, 1949 election, Rakosi spoke the following on Budapest Radio:

Emphasized, in addition to the known factor of propaganda, optimism of their program. He is proud that among the candidates there is not one count or baron or big land owner or banker or their lawyers. This latter reference, of course, is a hint against the middle class. That election as described in detail in Part I gave no choice to the voters except to endorse or refuse to accept a prearranged list of United Front. It gained almost 100% victory as against the elections in 1945 and 1947 where the Communist Party scored 17% and 22% of the votes. Rakosi, however, emphasized the social structure of the New Parliament:

Out of the 402 representatives,

176 are workers,

115 are peasants,

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and the others are small business men, etc.

The workers are almost 44%,

the peasants are 29%.

These make up 73% of the new parliament.

18% of the parliament are women,

71% of them, four times as many as in the previous parliament.

41% are laborers

21% are peasants.

Exactly half of the parliament is between the age groups of 20 and 40, in other words, the young generation; 55% of them, younger than 30. We never had a parliament with as many working young men.

It has to be mentioned that the majority of these who are listed as peasants, 29% are not peasants, but are classified as such on somewhat arbitrary judgment on the basis of having an orchard around their house, etc.

The reference to the age groups, however, are significant. That is the essence of the whole Communist Party gamble with the new elite. Month by month stones in the pyramid are replaced with new ones. Great care is taken that the structure should not crumble during the operation. If they can gain time for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan, i.e., five years of comparative peace without any major eruptions in Hungary or abroad. . . half a million men and women trained with the fanaticism of the janissars will be constituting a new elite in the country.

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CHAPTER VI

Part 3

NATIONAL - COMMUNISM - TITOISM IN HUNGARY

Motte: May 1 slogan.

Heil for May 1st, the festival of the internationalism of the workers. "Death to the Nationalist Traitors of socialism!"

National communism is a phenomenon which in Hungary is constituting the greatest danger to Moscow of all the countries of her sphere. The crisis in Poland, Bulgaria are smaller in their scope and their dynamism considerably less explosive than the appearance of Titoism in Hungary. The circumstances and temperament of the Hungarian population are the explanation. The fact that the following of Tito is the strongest in Hungary, in the very country in the Rakosi sphere which by its geographical location has to be the starting board for Soviet Russia for any future military action against Yugoslavia makes it a serious problem.

The Roots of National Communism in Hungary

In the overall balance, while several of the serious setbacks of the Communist Party in Hungary like the peasant problem or the Church problem, are the outcome of negative actions, i. e. the failure of the Party to succeed in solving them: nationalist communism while interrelated with both mentioned complexes is actually a negative result of positive Communist efforts. The Communist Party created the greater part of

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this dynamic deviationist mass sentiment. The basic components are the following:

1. The success of the Communist Party propaganda in convincing masses of industrial workers about the truth of the Doctrine: the historic contradiction of exploiters and exploited, the right of the latter to use means of violence against it, the need for complete socialization of producing means, the fact that the rule of the working world over the imperialist military powers is imminent, etc.

2. At the same time they failed to convince them that the Doctrine with all the above mentioned elements is "only valid" if it includes the absolute and unswerving allegiance to Moscow.

In Hungary the mass excesses of the Red Army were responsible for an important part of the phenomena of national communism. The Hungarian worker is a patriot and particularly sensitive about his women. The lack of any class distinction in the mass excesses of the Red Army left deep scars behind. Already in 1945, Hungary's local Communist organizations were armed as partizans and using Russian supplied weapons were widely rumored to use them not only in fighting the retreating Germans but shooting the Russian soldiers as well whenever their personal property or family was threatened. In the 1944-45 havoc of a bellum omnium contra omnes, the seeds of a mass sentiment were sown: in the bitter class conscious working class masses who did not even think in terms of ever returning to the status quo ante, or sympathize in the least with the Western

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form of democracy. They were violently, radically leftist.. Strong elements of class consciousness, a hatred of the former ruling classes were prevalent in that mentality. The consecutive Party efforts in Party schooling, ideological education through the medium of pamphlets, press, radio etc. amplified these features to a very high degree. At the same time, however, they failed to outdo the deep going ill effects of the barbarity of the Soviet Army with the ^{soothing of the} Doctrine. Thus deep going emotional resistance was encountered as against logic or doctrinal persuasion.

Furthermore there was a widespread animosity against the Muscovites. This was partly due to anti-semitism (many of the workers voluntarily joined the Nazi Movement before hoping for a change in their social status, and many former "small Nazis" who were released by the Communist Police authorities from the interment camp on condition of joining the Party made their influence felt in the masses of the Party). Partly this animosity was due to the somewhat bitter feeling against the Muscovites who spent the decades between 1919 and 1945 in the comparative safety and comfort of Moscow, did not suffer the miseries of war in Hungary and only entered the country under the wings of the Red Army. Furthermore these Muscovites - who incidentally were all of Jewish origin, claimed the right to be the leaders above the old Hungarian Communist Party men who for decades formed the fighting body of the underground Communist Party in Hungary.

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Communist Tactics against "Nationalist" Deviation in 1919.

The principles of Communist philosophy against the dangers of "nationalist Deviation" can be found as early as 1919:

1. A. Lecture of Kun on the reform of the party program

...The old program gave the workers the task to fight for Socialism among the limitations of the capitalist social order... Very little of this can be left in the present party program.... The international character of the working movement, the international character of the revolution has to be the very new aspect for everything... We broke away from the Second International because we are totally opposing the international which is chauvinistic, patriotic, and nationalistic.... We have to emphasize the totally international character of the working movement.... Our opinion on internationalism has to be the base of our foreign policy.... and our foreign policy can only be directed by the exclusive interests of the international proletare revolution.... This dictatorship is a real dictatorship of the proletariat. 153

The danger of "penetration into Party ranks" was emphasized repeatedly:

On June 25th, 1919, after the regime suppressed the counter revolution in Budapest, an editorial in the Red Newspaper titled "Dictatorship of the Proletariat, or Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie" wrote

"The Hungarian proletare dictatorship was established without bloodshed.... It is almost without a precedent in history that the bourgeoisie would surrender its rule....but those who thought that the bourgeoisie will not find a cowardly way to attack the rule of the Hungarian proletares must be disappointed.... We have suppressed it but how did it happen that the bourgeoisie succeeded in its putsch to such a degree that only the strength of the proletariat and its watchfulness stopped the success.... The dictatorship of the proletariat, up till now, was too lenient with the bourgeoisie.. .. Moderate.... The bourgeoisie took the mask of a

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proletare and penetrated into the ranks of the proletares.... Through its influence the slogan of lenient policy was pressed into our policy.... There is only one method to deal with them and that is dictatorship, ruthless dictatorship wherever possible.. .. The danger is not over yet...the bourgeoisie will attempt it several times to get the proletares with sly undermining methods into the ranks fighting their own cause.... Priests, army officers, bankers.... the conquered old regime, the ones who exploited the peasant and the worker and used nationalistic slogans.... The self-consciousness of the proletariat has to increase considerably.¹⁵⁴

The danger of a "Penetration"

The international aspects of the "penetration" into Party ranks already in 1919 were attributed to July 10, 1919 by Red Newspaper to:

....The entente is unable to destroy the Hungarian proletariat by arms, therefore, its agents are using low underground agitation and every means to split workers and try to persuade the workers that they should sell themselves for the imperialist gold to be traitors of their brothers and push a knife into the back of the proletare rule.... They act like the good friend of the workers and they try to incite them to help reestablish the capitalist order.... The workers turn away from these dirty machinations of capitalism with loathing and throw out the agents and traitors.... Only the vilest ones accept the blood price of traitorship.... We have to take an energetic stand against this dangerous manifestation.... We have to set a precedent.. .. and expel these foreign agents just to use the refined diplomatic language.¹⁵⁵

Exactly the same words and expressions are used today in connection with the Rajk case.

From the very beginning the Communist movement used underground methods, the system of agents, spies, and traitors, all this on the global scale. As this forms a basic part of their methods in diplomacy as well as in the interna-

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tional movement, they are simply unable to realize that there may be other great powers besides them or other movements incorporating global ideas and beliefs.... who would not exclusively use the same methods. As they are unable to conceive that, they are living in a constant fright from the shadows of their own system. Constantly they fear agents who penetrate their ranks--the imperialists who use their gold for their own internationalist interests. In the case of post-world war II Hungary, as much as the so-called conspiracies included patriotic resistance elements against Communism and the Soviet Army. Their alleged danger to overthrow the whole regime and a million Russian soldiers was sincerely regarded by the non-Communist politicians as an exaggeration of the Communists for political purposes, using it to amplify the alleged danger which threatens Hungarian democracy. While, undoubtedly the Communist party had these motives in its mind as well, from their angle the appearance of any danger was indeed feared and amplified by the complex of constant danger to the utmost. This deep-seated fear and suspicion makes it impossible for the Communists to be realists in evaluating the actual degree of danger from their own prophecies of the international underground conspiracy of capitalist for their own domination over the workers.

The armed "nationalist proletar" units were a danger symptom to the Communist Party already in 1919.

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Front page editorial on July 5, 1919

"....They are organizing white guards from war prisoners and from the ranks of the "lumpenproletariat" who are ready for anything and whose blood-thirsty nationalist blindness can be used to take them into battle against the Hungarian proletare country.... The imperialists of the entente with their leathsome activities.... nothing can stop us in our way.... Their helping of the backward Hungarian bourgeoisie and the conquered landlords is nothing else but a part of the very same rotting which is typical of capitalism in general and its decay all over the world.¹⁵⁶

This reference today is made to the former small Nazis, replacing the "lumpenproletariat". The fact that according to Communist philosophy, the Western imperialists help the former Hungarian ruling class who are against the present regime-- and the decay and rotting of international capitalism-- are motives which are to be found exactly in the same form in the phraseology of publications of the Communist Party in every Central and Eastern European country.

The action advocated against them is identical with the one 30 years later:

We have to take steps with arms and ruthlessly against every person or organization who is spreading the germs of counter revolution--even if they are dressed in proletare dress.¹⁵⁷

Particularly as a reaction to the Bela Kun terror the role of extremely chauvinistic political desperadoes, who believed in taking the law in their own hands, in Hungary, in the so-called "white terror" was important and was an ideological forerunner in many of its aspects to the later extremists in the ranks of the Hungarian Nazis and also

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supplied the Rajk movement with several important ideological motives.... The Prime Minister in the twenties, Count Bethlen, had to spend a considerable amount of energy in suppressing them and bringing about consolidation.

The Dynamic Factors in National Communism in Hungary rooted in History

The essentially dynamic character of the nationalist communism goes back to centuries, and is an accumulation of centuries of: two basic motives. One related to external historical motives, the other to internal motives. These two motives throughout centuries of repeated experience in history became petrified into myth.

I. External motive: bitterness against outside major powers. Deep down in the emotional layers of the Hungarian people there is the deep suspicion and wrath against the "Neighbouring Foreign Power" who exploits, and suppresses the Hungarians. Centuries of Turkish rule and exploitation followed by centuries of German domination and exploitation are the explanation. It is a direct line from the end of the fifteenth century right up to 1944. Dominant is the lack of trust in the sincerity of these powers, the basic belief that they always suppressed and used the Hungarian for their own selfish interests and benefit. The Hungarian politicians the "gentlemen" usually made some sort of a deal with the Foreign Power: it was the ordinary people who had to pay the

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taxes, were taken as slaves or as soldiers, whose womenfolk were abused by the invading armies, whose children were taken away from them and educated by the invaders in alien spirit. Centuries of actual experience engraved this bitterness as an inherited characteristic of the Hungarian masses. With its arrival the Russian Army, from 1945, stepped into the image of the same category - in the footsteps of the Turks and the Germans. Exploiting, suppressing, taking away men, mistreating women, putting their own impact on the education of their children were the important factors. Centuries of deep bitterness and suspicion seemed once again justified in the conscious and unconscious mentality of the Hungarian people. They came from the East, their race, their language, habits were alien as were the Turks....

II. The internal motive was: the bitterness against the "lords" who always suppressed the poor. It was class suspicion, deep going in its dimensions....although not class hatred. The futile chances in life for the very lower layers in the social structure in Hungary who were always comparably insignificant in their number but were high in their proportion as an explosive dynamic element, and were always ready for any change, feeling that they had nothing to lose. In their mentality the Church stood on the side of the "lords". Protestantism for a while, in its first period offered them some hope....later they became disappointed in that too. The bitter resentments of centuries of suffering accumulated during

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the centuries of misery, war in that minority element and made them explosively dynamic, in their character. Their effect on the large numbers of land hungry peasants who by nature were peace loving was the creating of tensions even among the different social classes within the peasant social structure. The bitter peasant rebellions during Hungarian history always included that same element with its dynamism and all the peasant rebellions were suppressed in blood. This circumstance too increased the inherited dynamism of that particular social layer. A few poets, the sad motives of the folklore, gave only a limited outlet to the tension.

This element played an important role in 1919 in the mob actions of the Bela Kun revolution. In the thirties the same social strain was breaking to the surface in two forms: A. In the fanaticism of religious sectarianism - Jehovah Witnesses and the type of early Christian idealistic communism which did not have any ties with Moscow.

B. repressed in self imposed birth control to now children or only to one, partly to keep the little family belongings from being split up, partly not to increase the misery with many newcomers in the family.

Both factors A and B were being fought by the Government, - without success.

In the late 30's many of this deepest layer, the most dissatisfied ones joined the extreme Hungarian Nazis. These two basic characteristics were not prevalent in the total population because religiousness and the sober peasant menta-

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lity was stronger. On the very bottom of the layer however, a comparatively small minority always felt that the whole weight of the whole structure was on him....carried these deeply engraved myths up to 1945. The communists who mobilized this minority in their ranks did not fully realize these features. The motives of I and II were not known in detail to scientific Marxists. National communism became a strong movement in that section of the population which is a minority in its proportion to the Hungarian nation as a whole but NOT a minority in the Communist Party.

While on the basis of motive II (see page 25) they are ideologically communist and do not want the return of the status quo ante on the basis of motive I they suspect and hate Russia, the Red Army, the Jews, the Muscovites.

These two factors give an indication as to how deep the roots of national communism in Hungary go, and how explosive their character is.

The Leader of Titoism in Hungary: Rajk.

The leader of the Communist Party underground in Hungary before the liberation, was L. Rajk, later the arrested leader of the national communists. After the liberation, Rajk who was one of the foremost Communists in Hungary, was given the all important key position of Interior Minister by the Communist Party, organized the Police, handled all the conspiracy cases including the Kovacs and the Nagy affair. He would not have

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been arrested with all the due loss of Communist prestige both in Hungary and abroad if the reasons had not been imperative for the Muscovites and if the following of Rajk had not been considerable. While the actual numerical danger at the present may not have been threatening, the Muscovites realized that in case of any change or upheaval the potential of hundreds of thousands of Communist industrial workers joining them would be a very great probable threat to the whole movement and to them personally.

Rajk had a magnetic personality, and was a fanatical speaker both in voice and appearance, (he was somewhat handsome.) He stressed the same national motives which in 1945-47 were used as a part of tactics by the Muscovites. The only difference was that from his mouth people were taking it differently than from a Muscovite speaker who was alien to the masses in every aspect. Typical Rajk speeches:

Dec. 18, 1947.

If the Hungarians have ever created something big or something nationalistic, then they did it in 1945 by establishing their independence and freedom....like the great heroes of the Hungarian people, Kossuth and Petofi dreamt it....It is the fulfillment of the dreams of Hungarian workers....and nationalistic rise. ¹⁵⁶

March 22, 1946, Rajk, speaking as the newly appointed Interior Minister,

....They have to feel that they are building this country for themselves, that this country belongs to the workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals, a free and democratic Hungary. ¹⁵⁷

The emphasis laid on the Hungarian and nationalistic

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character of these speeches has to be pointed out. The Muscovites regarded this attitude of Rajk as part of their tactics. They themselves used similar phrases. They were unable to realize, however, that the mass reaction which from their mouth did not take these expressions as anything else but the different appearance of the same forces which sent the looting and plundering and raping Red soldiers to the country -- took the same words from the mouth of Rajk, who already was surrounded with the myths of nationalism, extreme patriotism, anti-Russianism, and anti-Semitism -- in a very different way. Thus the Muscovites were unable to evaluate the effect of similar utterances which differed considerably according to the personality of the speakers and association which the masses formed about the workers in their own minds.

Unlike Rakosi and his associates Rajk had a deep emotional effect on the women in his audiences. There was a Myth around Rajk the only "Hungarian" among the High Communist Party leaders - this rather meant the the negative aspect that he was the only non-Jewish among them because he was actually of Transylvanian-German origin. This myth was an anti Soviet stand too.

Forty years old, one of nine children Rajk was studying to be a teacher. He was leader of the underground movement and organized the intellectual Communist Party cells in Budapest Teachers College which was discovered in the thirties. Rajk spent years in France and Spain. To him "the West" means radical French and Spanish. He despizes Anglo-Saxons. He re-

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turned later and became head of the Underground Communist Party organization in Hungary. In 1944 he was a member of the Hungarian democratic opposition Front to Nazism, and was captured by the Nazis and sentenced to death with the other leaders.

Several of his brothers were however ardent Nazis and one of them was Assistant State Secretary. This brother was in office during the 1944 Nazi regime in Hungary. After Rajk was arrested, they saved his life and he was the only captured underground leader who escaped with a life sentence and was liberated in a few weeks. His brothers fled to Germany with the Nazis, some of them came back to Hungary later, Rajk who by that time was already Interior Minister secured their release from the Internment camp and even helped them to obtain some small position in the provinces. In Hungary former "small Nazis" were considered a good ideological investment. The Communist Party gave a chance to tens of thousands of former Nazi Party members, rank and file, in that category to make good the errors of their past by entering the Communist Party. Rajk enthusiastically backed this Communist Party move. This and his extreme anti-semitism were well known facts in Hungary. It is hard to size up the actual degree of the later motive in Rajk...the myth may have been even greater, but in that case it was the myth that mattered. In every appearance he reflected fanaticism and synamism. While Rakosi had important features of "cooled down" wisdom of age and experience, Gero was cold machinelike soulless party fanaticism in itself, dry and without any appeal to the emotions: Rajk was full of emotions. He preached hatred

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against the exploiters of workers, the international bourgeois, emphasizing a Hungarian Communist future and his appeal was definitely emotional. At that time "Hungarian Communism" was part of the party line tactics... so the words of Rajk did not make the Muscovites think any further. They did however in his audiences and among his followers.

Allegiance to the Soviet, even in the Communist Party rank and file in Hungary was more of a potential threat in Hungary - even to the Communist masses - than an aid in the public relations of the Party.

In radicalism Rajk outdid Rakosi and the Muscovites. Many of the experiences which Rakosi and his associates gained in 1919, which slowed them down, were missing from Rajk. After the Liberation he advocated large scale immediate dismissal of the majority of the whole civil service and shooting en masse of all potentially dangerous enemies, leading capitalists and aristocrats. Rakosi who knew from 1919 how paralyzed a country can get without a trained administration and what effects large scale massacre would have on the people both in Hungary and abroad, did not share Rajk's ideas.

Two Communist Party Views on Rajk

Rajk became, however, the only high-positioned non-Muscovite Hungarian Communist leader and - not insignificantly- the youngest one.

March 20, 1948. The Communist Party official organ wrote,

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commenting on the second year of Rajk as Interior Minister.

Within two short years Comrade Rajk became known to the Hungarian people as the most faithful guardian of the safety of the Hungarian democracy. From the murderous conspiracy of Bilkey-Pap and Father SZ. Kiss* till the conspiracy of F. Nagy, Sulyok and Pfeiffer up to Barankovics who was spying in the pay of foreign imperialists, the Hungarian police annihilated these traitors under his leadership and uncovered the huge industrial sabotage of Kun and the other rival social democrats. Under his leadership the economic police fought to defend a stabilization and higher living standards of the people against the speculators and smugglers. From where does he take the strength for these tremendous tasks? From the fact that as a member of the political committee of the Hungarian Communist Party he is in close contact with this great party of the Hungarian workers and he does not break away, not even for a second, from the working masses of that people and he is one of the most faithful, most self-sacrificing of their sons. His magnificent personal capacities which he proved in the years of the illegal freedom fight of the Communist Party and the fight for Spanish freedom and in the resistance against the Germans. 160

Against the same man in 1949 the whole Communist Party press showered the worst possible names including that he was "even lower and viler a traitor than Mindszenty". A term which in the Hungarian Communist Party terminology means about the worst possible adjective.

The details of Rajk's career and the present Communist Party comments on it are revealing:

The Biography of Rajk

A June 19, official communique of the Ministry of the Interior.

Comments on his Biography by the Communist Party after his arrest for "Titoism" in Budapest:

Transylvanian, one of nine brothers.

Decides to become a teacher.

Organizes Intellectual Communist Party in thirties in Budapest Teachers'

*Convicted for "conspiracy" in 1945-46.

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The Biography of Rajk.

In late thirties goes to Paris and later to Spain to fight in the "Rakosi Brigade" on the Loyalist side.

Returns to Hungary after the Civil War and becomes leader of the underground Communist Party.

All his brothers are "Nazis". One is Assistant State Secretary.

Rajk is member of underground under the name of "KIRGIZ" - which suggests ancient Hungarian origin.

Is convicted to death but brother saves him.

First Interior Minister of the Communist Party.

Organizes political police.

Conspiracy is revealed under his leadership.

Only popular among Communist Party leaders.

In 1948 became Foreign Minister.

In connection with the Mindszenty case, corresponds with United Nations

Comments on his Biography by the Communist Party after his arrest for "Titoism" in Budapest:

Went to Spain against the command of the Party. His purpose was to break the front and attack the communists from the back.

In the pay of Horthy police, as leader of Communist Party, agent, provocateur, betraying his associates. Betrayed, in 1935, the big construction strike: as a result 400 workers were imprisoned, in Budapest.

Betrayed the Resistance Group, in 1944.

Kept the workers far away from his ministry, loathed them, took their fascists and with their help wanted to stop the liquidation of the conspiracies.

Was in the pay of Western Powers, as a spy, wanted as such to destroy the Communist Party to destroy the Hungarian People's Democracy.

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The Biography of Rajk.Comments on his Biography by the Communist Party after his arrest for "Titoism" in Budapest:

In 1949 election leader on the Communist ticket.

"Vile worm, dirty traitor, disgusting spy, even lower and viler than Mindszenty."

Also arrested with Rajk were: Tibor Szűnyi 32-years old. Lived in Switzerland, during war Chief of Cadre. Paul Jusztusz, leftist speed m. helped fusion. Med Aladár tárnai, charge in Paris. Two Tótspe brothers organized provinces from the very beginning. Z. Horvath with official trade Union Daily Lieutenant-General Palfy, highest ranking Hungarian general, reported also by G. Peter head of Political Police.

Oszko Bittmann colonels O. shot as fleeing. Colonel Korondi head of organizing police.

It is openly hinted now that in 1944 when Rajk was representing the Communist faction of the Hungarian underground, he was a traitor who revealed the whole conspiracy to the Nazis through his brothers, who were also Nazis, and thus he was instrumental in the execution of all the other underground leaders. The fact was that some of the most important non-Communist leaders of the conspiracy, who would undoubtedly all have been potential leaders against anti-Communist resistance movements were at that time executed by the Nazis and the only exception was Rajk, who allegedly with the aid of his high ranking Nazi brothers or, as it is hinted now by the Communists, as a price for his treachery, was granted leniency, and escaped. with just a life sentence and was freed in a few weeks.

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L'Affaire Rajk.

The Rajk affair is of considerable importance not only in the Hungarian situation but it has its deep going effects in the masses all over Central and Eastern Europe, particularly now that the cold war between Soviet Russia and Tito's Yugoslavia has reached an advanced stage. The potential of the Rajk case justifies the study of the whole affair as presented from the Communist angle:

June 15, 1949. The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the central control committee, announces the arrest of Rajk and his associates and draws the attention to the danger of enemy penetration into Communist ranks in the following five paragraphs release:

1. The exclusion of Rajk and his associates as the spies of foreign imperialist powers and Trotsky's agents.
2. "The Central Committee finds that in the present stage of development the greatest danger of Hungarian democracy is the penetration of the enemy into our party.... We have to fight against any sort of deviation and be particularly ruthless in our fight against chauvinism or any appearance of nationalism. This nationalism appears sometimes in an openly anti-Soviet attitude, sometimes in the underestimation belittling of the role of the Soviet Union. This nationalism is fed by the self-conceit taking its origin from the over-estimation of our own results."
3. "We have to fight a ruthless fight against any appearance of Trotskyism.... All liberalism or negligence which facilitates for the enemy to penetrate into our ranks."
4. "We have to increase our watch.... have to put a more strict control over the party and state functionaries.... and increase the efficiency of the control and judging of new and old cadres."
5. "The Central Committee reaffirms the actions.... for the liquidation of spies and Trotsky's agents.... and instructs the party to find and liquidate all the

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enemy who succeeded in penetrating into our ranks.... use against them ruthless methods.... the iron fist should annihilate the agents of imperialists and Trotskyists who tried to undermine our party." 161

Nyugati Hirnok, July 31, 1949, explains that the accusations against Rajk are based on their admissions that they were in connection with a conspiracy with Tito and through him with the Anglo-Saxon Intelligence Service. In December of 1947 when Tito was in Budapest, the first discussions were held.

In February, 1948, Rajk went secretly to Belgrade where Tito brought him into contact with the intelligence agents of the American embassy and he started to work for them from that time onwards. On that Belgrade meeting they also agreed on the establishment of a Southeastern European union independent of Moscow under the leadership of Tito and one of their officers in that organization would be the Bulgarian Kostov deputy prime minister. This is an indirect linking of Rajk to the Central and Eastern European Federation Plan, suppressed by Soviet Russia.

On September 10th. the Hungarian government announced that former Foreign Minister Rajk had confessed to plotting with Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia - United Press report - to assassinate three top Hungarian Communists and then take over Hungary by force. The indictment charged that the conspirators were attempting to make Hungary a colony of Yugoslavia with "the backing of American imperialism" and Lieutenant General G. Palfy highest ranking Hungarian Army officer, had put ten battalions at the plotters' disposal. The indictment quoted a confession by Rajk in which he said ".... I maintained consistent and systematic contact with American

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secret agents." The prosecutor Gy. Alapy the same man who was prosecutor in the Cardinal Mindszenty case announced ".... that Rajk confessed that the plot would have made Tito top man in both Yugoslavia and Hungary. The official indictment charged that Yugoslav Minister of Interior, R. Rankovic once secretly crossed the Hungarian border and gave "Rajk instructions from Tito on how to liquidate the present leaders of the present Hungarian party, and the Hungarian state." Apparently the plan included the assassination of all Muscovites according to the indictment "it belongs to Tito's plan of physical liquidation of certain members of the Hungarian Republic, Vice-premier Bakosi Minister of Defence M. Farkas and the Head of the People's Economic Council, Minister E. Gero. According to the prosecutor, the Yugoslav Interior Minister Rankovic in his secret meeting with Rajk told him ".... you have to think over the possibilities of this liquidation; you could produce an accident in the case of one of them, and the second could commit suicide, and the other could die suddenly because of an illness. Or you could kill them suddenly in their homes and give a plausible explanation later. According to the official statement a new government was planned in Hungary headed by Rajk. Indicted were a number of diplomats, including the former Yugoslav charge d'affaires in Budapest, and an attache of the French Legation and several Hungarians who were alleged to be their agents. The indictment said, "....the American and Yugoslav spying organization helped Rajk in every respect," It also claims that the Hungarian

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Titoist group has regularly crossed the border into Yugoslavia to discuss the details of the plan. Indicted were also, high-ranking Army officers and the editor-in-chief of the official trade union organ which was formerly the official daily of the Social Democratic Party.

In Budapest, September 16, 1949:

Rajk confessed fluently today to charges he plotted with Americans and others to smash Hungary's government in an anti-Soviet crusade led by Yugoslav Premier Marshal Tito.

Pouring self-danunciation into a People's Court microphone for four hours, the poker-faced, 40-year-old Rajk described the revolt plot as part of a sweeping plan by Tito "to lead and organize an anti-Soviet movement in every people's democracy (Russian satellite)."

Rajk and seven others went on trial for treason.

He declared Tito planned a military invasion of Hungary, the incitement of border strife with Bulgaria, the liquidation of Greek Communist guerrilla forces and the incorporation of Albania into Yugoslavia.

Rajk showed eagerness to pile detailed blame on himself for acts since he began what he called his double-dealing with the Communists in 1931.

He declared that Alexander Rankovic, Tito's Interior Minister and police chief of Yugoslavia, told him of the Tito plan and said Rankovic promised: "When action starts, the United States will somehow paralyze the Soviet Union so the people's democracies will be unable to act."

Rajk named a former United States Minister to Hungary, Selden Chapin; and two other Americans in the plot. He accused by name Yugoslav officials and others on trial, as British and French spies.

Rajk said he told Chapin about his talks with Rankovic, including the asserted promise to contain Russia. "Chapin hesitated, but later he admitted that such plans existed in the United States," Rajk said.

(In Washington, Chapin denied any talks with

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Rajk about a plot to overthrow the regime and said Rajk was certainly a victim of Communist police pressure. He recalled Rajk as "severe, disagreeable and unco-operative" in talks they had on official matters. Chapin now is assigned to the United States State Department in Washington.)

The chief defendant in the treason trial, Rajk said that he got his first orders as a spy for the United States in 1945 from Lieutenant Colonel George Kovach, a Hungarian-speaking member of the United States Military Mission sent to Hungary after the country was liberated from German control.

He said Kovach had learned Rajk was a police informer who trapped Communist university students in 1933, and threatened to unmask him unless he followed American orders.

"I, of course, agreed," Rajk testified. "Having been a high-ranking Government official, I agreed to report only about questions of high politics to American officials in Budapest - information they otherwise could not get."

Rajk said that in 1946 his orders came from a Martin Himmler, member of an American Army counter-intelligence force that delivered fugitive Hungarian war criminals for trial in Budapest after they were captured in Germany and other countries.

Later in 1946, Rajk said, Himmler told him that he would get his orders thereafter from Yugoslavia.

Rajk and his co-defendants, including Lieutenant General Gyorgy Palffy, former inspector general of the Hungarian Army, filed early today into the courtroom set up in a heavily guarded white stone building which houses the Iron Workers' Union.

Rajk was sent to the witness dock. The other defendants were returned to their cells for appearances later.

General Palffy is expected to enter the dock when the five-judge court reopens tomorrow.

Marked for assassination "if necessary," Rajk said, were Deputy Premier Matyas Rakosi, No. 1 Communist and former Comintern agent; General Mihaly Farkas, the Defense Minister, and Erne Gero, Moscow-trained Commu-

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nist Finance Minister.

Rajk himself would have become the "Titoist Prime Minister" of the new Hungarian government, he testified.

Rajk, whose Communist activity before and during the war had made him a constant fugitive, heaped guilt upon his own head. He testified that in Spain, where he fought against France's forces in the civil war, and later in a camp in France, his only aim was to spy on the activities of Hungarian Communists and "undermine them on instructions from the French secret police."

During the German occupation of Hungary, Rajk said he worked for the gestapo as an informer.

Rajk's background shows he was wounded in the Spanish fighting, was interned in France, and during the German occupation fled France, to return to Hungary and set up an underground Communist organization to fight the Nazis. He was arrested by the Nazis and sent to a German concentration camp, returning in 1945 to become a Communist party leader.)

Rajk said that after the liberation of Budapest in March, 1945, the Germans tried him in a Western Hungarian town, "but when I disclosed my double life, they dropped charges against me."

"Then, taken to Germany, I remained there until the end of the war," he went on. "After the war I decided to return to Hungary and sent word about my decision to my former police bosses, who were then also in Germany."¹⁶²

Thus Rajk was the first major rightist deviationist in the post World War II period in whose case the cycle has been completed. According to the venerable traditions of the Soviet purge trials, he confessed and furthermore accused himself.

In the consequences, however, it is very doubtful how far the Soviet has achieved its aims. As much as fantastic as the

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accusations of U.S. spying by a leading Hungarian Communist, and occupation by Tito may sound to the public in the West, in the over-heated atmosphere of Central and Eastern Europe rumors become reality in the minds of the masses. The hopes of a military intervention by the Western Powers may be mere wishful thinking for the Soviet-hating peasant masses of the area, but they are unavoidably planted there. With the full "confession" of the former No.2 Communist in Hungary and the sentence of the court, about which there is little doubt, the trial of Anti-Soviet Titoism in Central and Eastern Europe is by no means over.

The Communist Party Tactics in presenting the Rajk Case to the Communist masses.

July 5, 1949. A letter published by the paper, written to the Communist Party headquarters by a group: "We thank you for the watchfulness which stopped in time the dirty assassination plan directed against our party, our children, and against the whole country.

June 19, 1949. In an editorial, the Communist Daily¹⁶³ in Budapest, titled "With Iron Fists against the Traitors". The article explains that the whole Rajk case is part of Operation X, a secret underground U. S. plan for Central and Eastern Europe, to undermine the regimes there. The writer gives details about Operation X, its original discussion in the American press and then continues, "Since the liberation it is now that we have given the worst beating to the secret influence and ambitions for power of the imperialists.... The tremendous needs of the Cadre of the Hungarian Communist Party aided that treacherous work." As the chief of the Cadre of the Hungarian Communist Party, P. Szonyi was also arrested. Apparently the whole Cadre policy of the Communist Party --

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the core of the whole organization -- is under deep suspicion. The article continues by quoting a May 31 speech of Rakosi, "When a Communist Party becomes a leading party of a country, when the beaten capitalist class has no longer chances to operate successfully through its legal organs, gradually the enemy will 'take direction' to smuggle its agents into the party of workers." The article comments:

It was the watchfulness of Comrade Rakosi which takes care of the safety of the Party. He was the first who realized the danger.... We are not giving away a secret if we disclose that the removal of Rajk from the Interior Ministry (Rajk was appointed Foreign Minister in August, 1948; - There were widespread rumors already at that time in Budapest which were duly reported in the American press that the removal of Rajk, of the all-important Interior Ministry, and placing him into the top of the Foreign Ministry was actually a demotion) was part of the precautions.... If we want to condense the corner stone of difference between friend and enemy, then the single conception is exclusively the relationship toward the Soviet Union.... The Soviet Union personifies in itself Socialism as realized.... Whoever blubbers about Socialism without the Soviet Union.... is not a Socialist, is a murderer in the service of Trotsky, a renegade of Tito, and to mention even the smallest worms like Rajk and his imperialist spy gang."

Perhaps even more significant is the emphasis on the constant watchfulness of the Party over the whole country, which is explicitly described in the June 21st, 1949, number of the official Communist organ in Budapest.... "The Party has thousands and thousands of eyes. It sees everything."

The Ideological Aspect of the Rajk Affair.

In view of such a serious ideological rift in addition to the other aspects of the Rajk case, the chief Ideological

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spokesman of the Muscovites Revay explained in detail the Communist Party line of connecting Rajk as an in-between from Treckij to Tito:

June 12, 1949. "Trotskyism, Nationalism, the Means of Penetration of the Imperialists." ¹⁶⁴ "What is Trotskyism? Maybe it is some aberration, some mistaken ideology within the workers' movement. No, by no means, Trotskyism is not an aberration, not the wrong direction which can be put back through the necessary criticism on the soil of Marxist-Leninism. Trotskyism is the counter-revolution penetrated into the ranks of the workers movement. The Trotskyists are not just ordinary deviationists; they are conspirators against the working class, against the cause of Socialism on the side of the imperialists and counter-revolutionary." Then the Communist article goes on explaining the program, ideology, of the Trotskyists. In fact, he proves that they have no ideology whatsoever; they are in the pay of the bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionaries who try to use the mask of a Communist and betray them as such. Then he quotes Vishinsky from 1937, who also explains that they started as a small faction within the party and added up as spies of foreign countries. He applies the same to Tito and explains that in eleven months Tito became the most active enemy of the international peace front. After dwelling on the terror of Tito and quoting the Moscow press, the article explains:

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"The Pravda wrote: Under circumstances when the power of the bourgeoisie collapses, the exploiting classes and their agents use the poisonous weapons of nationalism as an aid to put back the old regime. That is the reason -- he explains -- that:

"Nationalism became one of the main weapons of counter-revolution; therefore, nationalism became the main source of Trotskyism. Why is Trotskyism one with Nationalism? Why is Nationalism the most important ideological characteristic of the Trotskyists? The reason is that Nationalism is the same as anti-Sovietism in opposition against the country of vicious Socialism and opposition of the elite guard of international workers movement, the party of Lenin and Stalin. Nationalism breaks out of the community of proletarian brother parties; it is a betrayer of the idea of labor internationalism and he who doesn't stand on the basis of proletar internationalism, the internationalism of workers, he doesn't stand in the camp of Marxist-Leninist, the camp of Socialism. He who stands on the basis of nationalism can be reckoned with by the imperialists and their spy organizations.

"Internationalism or nationalism; this is the very probing stone whether somebody stands on the side of the working class in the camp of peace or on the side of the imperialists. Tito became anti-Soviet primarily because of their nationalistic policy and became vile serf of imperialism, and unavoidably everybody who gets into the swamp of nationalism lands on the side of the imperialists and becomes a traitor to the ideas of international proletar Marxist-Leninist ideology."

After long quotations of the official Moscow line he continues:

"Yes, my dear comrades, the answer can only be yes; we, too, are threatened with the same danger if we deviate from the road of Marxist-Leninism. Therefore, we ordered three months ago at the time when we made our review of the Yugoslav question clear clear the members of our political committee to be on the watch and destroy any such attempt which would lead to the underestimation of the liberating Soviet Army."

• Organized Mass Reaction to the Rajk Affair.

New York World Telegram, July 17, 1949. The wife and six-months old son of Rajk were taken to Soviet Russia.

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Large scale arrests in the foreign ministry in connection with the Rajk case, including the counselor of the Hungarian legation, in Paris, A. Modj, an old friend and associate of Rajk, according to the Samo-kritika of the foreign ministry.... "anti-party attitude could be found for a long time in the ministry and will be stopped now." ¹⁶⁵

In the Interior Ministry, which was organized and led by Rajk, the Samo-kritika published by the Ministry, emphasized that "Rajk and his gang made the ministry a fortress of reaction." ¹⁶⁶ Large scale arrests in that ministry, too, were reported. Approximately 70 to 80 men from that ministry alone.

The Samo-kritika of the Foreign Ministry says, "....The leadership of our party organization learned by our mistakes committed while Rajk was Interior Minister.... We gave him opportunity to chase his own popularity and organize his personal cult." ¹⁶⁷ This is the frankest indication to the widespread popularity of the dynamic Rajk within the Party.

On June 23rd the official Communist organ in Budapest ¹⁶⁸ reports that in a number of factories the workers tore of the pictures of Rajk, ~~strove~~ ^{strove} on them, and threw them in the fire.

Neither was the opportunity missed to associate the Rajk case with the all-important fight against the Kulaks. On June 23rd, the Communist paper wrote:

The discovery of the spy gang opens the eyes of many of our comrades, and now they can realize what they did not see when the election victory almost dimmed their eyes, that the enemies are still among them.... the Kulaks. ¹⁶⁹

The chorus on the mass meeting against Rajk by the Army, "We stand with firm faithfulness for the party and the people." "Comrade Rakosi is our example and our leader," "The cornerstone in the fight for Socialism is the unbreakable faithfulness to

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the Soviet Union and Stalin." "Down with the traitors"
"Ropes on their necks"¹⁷⁰

Not insignificant is a letter published in the Communist Daily written by Mrs. B. K., "...My kulak neighbor who always wished the Communists to Hell....and regarded the workers worse than the devil in the Hell,....now suddenly started to praise Rajk."

It gave details about the alleged plan by Allen Dulles in the spring of 1948, quoting the United States News.

Suspicion and fear by the wide masses within the Party became so apparent by the handling of the Rajk case that the Communist Party leadership found it necessary to use some soothing tactics. The official Communist organ in Budapest on July 1, 1949, in an editorial titled "Watchfulness is not Lack of Trust" writes against the usage of "general suspicion"...."the enemy tries to break up the unity of the Party."

Some of the phrases from the June 19 to 25 copies of the Budapest Communist press used against Rajk: "Dirty worm.... crooked traitor....disgusting spy....loathesome gang.... imperialism spies....without their masks to be thrown in the garbage....in their vileness they exceeded Mindszenty.. ..Monsters in the mask of men....dirty Trotskyists.... loathesome monsters."

June 29, Nyugati Hirnok. Not unlike the occasion of the Moscow purges, thousands and thousands of mass meetings were held all over the country protesting against Rajk and

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demanding his death. Some quotations from the speeches of the most passionate party agitators, women, in a meeting of the Hungarian cotton industry, "When I found out that Rajk and his associates are traitors, I could have strangled them with my two hands, with the very two hands with which I bathe my baby and put him into clean dress."

Communist Party speaker, in the "Kistext" factory meeting (a textile mill): "We have in this factory efficient weaving women. Dear comrades, spin a rope, a good strong one. That's what we will send to the traitors. That's our message."

The Patterns of the Communist Party
tactics in the Rajk Case.

The same heat of passions was used in the meetings all over the country... That was the line which the Party wanted to use. Thousands of telegrams from all over the country, from every plant, Communist local organizations reporting in demanding death on Rajk and his associates. In the Army meetings, special choruses shouted, "Not shooting, but hanging" and tens of thousands of soldiers in their mass meetings shouted, "Hang them".

With these highly strained emotional motives, the Communist Party tries to counterbalance the potential of the Rajk case and its followers who, too, based their strength on the emotional elements of mass psychology.

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The whole line of heresies in Central and Eastern Europe with the Tite case, which is most important as far as international politics are concerned, and the Rajk case, which can be regarded as being most important as far as the explosive element in the area is concerned, convinced the Communists that the only long range solution of their strategy must be the indoctrination of the new generation in their own philosophy. Greater stress has to be laid on education in the Soviet Union. The adulation of Stalin as the leader of all Communists has to be emphasized and both nationalistic and cosmopolitan deviations be interpreted as weapons of Western imperialism and persecuted with equal ruthlessness. As a direct result of the line of recent deviations in Hungary, the party succeeded in creating an atmosphere where every person including Communist Party member lives in a constant fear of being involved into a deviation charge at any time. This atmosphere very similar to the atmosphere of the Moscow purges, however, will have a decidedly different influence on the individualistic minded Hungarian peasant population to whom, through centuries of history, any form of suppression or terror from any central organ was alien and they without exception reacted to it with mass hostility, combining passive resistance with active uprisings. To them it is a most significant encouragement concerning the structure of the Communist power.

Emigrant Hungarian Communists and the

International Organization of "National Communists."

Already in the spring of 1949, an emigrant Hungarian

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Communist Party was formed in Vienna which published as its official newspaper "The Free People's Voice" (the official organ of the Communist Party in Hungary is the Free People). According to the report in the Hungarian Hirnök of August 8th, the paper changed its name in Vienna to "the Hungarian Communists" and declared in its first issue that refugees of the Rakosi Kuns reached foreign countries from Hungary, bringing with themselves the documents of the whole network of spying of the Budapest regime, both at home and abroad. These include the name of informers. The Vienna emigrant communist daily violently attacks the present Budapest regime "...and identifies itself with the "old Hungarian Communist Party," but not with the new Hungarian Communist Party, which only serves the Muscovite gutter-snipe who tried to dope the people." The official organ of the Emigrant/Hungarian Communist Party in Vienna reports that in Pola, Yugoslavia, the National Communist movements had a world conference in August 1949, in which thirty-one nations were represented by fifteen parties, and sixteen movements including the five delegates of the Emigrant Hungarian Communist Party. A new alliance of Communism was formed under the name of "Federation Mondiale Communiste." Until further organization, the World Alliance will be headed by a seven member committee in France from a central office.

An important feature of the Rajk affair is the fact that Hungary is the only purely non-Slavic nation in Central and Eastern Europe, where there are hardly any members of the

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Orthodox religion. These two all important factors missing, Moscow could not utilize them in tying the Public to Russia in any emotional way. There undoubtedly are many Hungarian communists who are faithful to Russia but their main motive is a negative: i.e. a fear that if Soviet power would fail their personal fortune would be ended and they would face the wrath of the Hungarian population which is now oppressed by them. These elements realize that the only power to defend communism is the Russian power, no national communist force could survive in a hostile world and retain its communism.

To the Communist Party in Hungary the Rajk movement is a cancer attacking the only bases on which they could feel secured: according to the doctrine the masses of the industrial proletariat, to whom they hoped to make the leading element of the Peoples democracy. It is impossible for them to appraise how many in their ranks feel with Rajk. As far as the non-Communist citizenry and the peasant masses are concerned, the Rajk case is a great decrease of the Communist Party power and prestige. Among the masses of dissatisfied in the population of Russian sphere Europe -- almost a hundred million people, - the Rajk affair is the next important step in the chain of events in the Titoist breaking away from the all-powerful Russian Soviet Power. It is the first defeat Soviet Russia suffered in the area of Central and Eastern Europe since World War II ended. In that respect the long-range significance of the Rajk affair can only be measured in the light of future developments.

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As to what degree the passive resistance of the peasant masses in Hungary will grow, or any potential of open violence will threaten their designs, are factors which the party cannot even estimate.

The Five year plan promises new and never known chances in the everyday living standards---it offers it, however, to a new type of Soviet men, whom it hopes to mold out of the essentially individualistic Hungarian.

As perfect as the plan may be, from the engineering-planning point of view, it has no clauses to solve the mass hatred of the Communists in the peasant masses, who constitute the bulk of the Hungarian population.

This lack of understanding and evaluating human values is a weakness of the Party which has been lucidly demonstrated in their mistaken calculations during and before the 1945 elections.

The people in villages will use the electricity and Health Centers and other material benefits which may reach them through the Plan. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they will accept the spiritual concepts of Communism. In that respect, the only hope for the Party can be to gain time and bring up an entirely new generation with a changed mentality---away from the atmosphere of the present-day grown-up population in whom hatred and fear against the Soviet--- and hostility against the Communist Party reached the

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state of a psychosis.

As far as world community is concerned, the changes which may occur in the living standards of the population in Hungary, the effects will be that broad masses, many of them for the first time, will get acquainted with civilization in the form of modern planning, electric light and household appliances.

While no system can force millions of working men and women permanently into a "glorified slavery", which is essential if the production norms of the Hungarian Five Year plan are to be reached---no system in the future either can disregard the changes that occurred and hope to reestablish the "status quo ante" decisive Demographical and social changes "in the social-economical map of Hungary" will occur under the impact of the Soviet design.

The "mass-psychological map" in Hungary, however, will not change, as it is rooted centuries long in the myth of history, with traditions to which the image of the Soviet man and its world is entirely alien.

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APPENDIX I

BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF EVENTS
OF THE KAROLYI REVOLUTION IN 1918-1949 in HUNGARY:
AND THE FOLLOWING BELA KUN REVOLUTION:

On October 17, 1918 Count Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary, declared in the Parliament, "We have lost the war, ...owing to the reshift in the strength of the powers, we can have no hopes to win the war and therefore we have to seek peace under such conditions which are acceptable to our enemies."

October 29, 1918, the King Charles IV appointed Count Hadik as Prime Minister.

October 30, 1918, Count Hadik resigned.

October 23, 1918, the National Council is formed. This was the first organizational appearance of the future Karolyi revolution.

October 25, 1918, the Council of the Army is founded.

October 27, 1918, the King appoints Archduke Joseph to head the state temporarily as "homo regius".

October 30, 1918, the National Council issues a declaration to the Army to revolt.

October 30-31, 1918 during the night, the October Revolution of Count Karolyi is declared.

October 31, 1918, Count Karolyi swears up to the King.

October 31, 1918, former Prime Minister Count Tisza is

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is assassinated in Budapest.

November 1, 1918, Count Karolyi requests the King to waive his swearing in of October 31. The request is granted.

November 2, 1918, the officers of the Army swear up to the National Council.

November 14, 1918, the King Charles IV, in the "Declaration of Eckartsau" (in Austria) resigns.

November 16, 1918, the Hungarian Republic is declared.

November 19, 1918, Bela Kun arrives in Budapest from Russia.

January 11, 1919, Karolyi becomes temporary President of the Republic.

January 23, 1919, the Communists destroy the offices of the conservative Budapest daily, "Pesti Hirlap".

February 20, 1919, Communist mob attacks editorial offices of the Social-Democratic "Nepszava". During the clash with police several deaths and injuries occur.

February 21, 1919, Bela Kun and his associates are arrested but continue Communist Party organizational work from the prison.

March 21, 1919, Bela Kun takes over power after Karolyi resigns.

Chronology of the Bela Kun Revolution:

March 21, 1919, Bela Kun contacts Lenin on the radio

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and submits to him the full program of the new Hungarian "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and receives approval.

March 29, 1919, the Revolutionary Council takes over all schools and bans the teaching of religion.

April 10, 1919, all the schools in Budapest are ordered not to start classes with prayer but sing the Marseillaise and the Internationale.

March 26, 1919, all factories and plants are taken over by the State.

April 2, 1919, the temporary Constitution of the Hungarian Soviet is published.

April 4-5, 1919, General Smuts negotiates with Bela Kun in Budapest.

April 19, 1919, the Bela Kun government arrests well-known citizens as hostages.

April 1, 1919, all jewelry and valuables have to be surrendered by the population to the government.

April 4, 1919, all land over 100 yokes is taken over by the government.

June 20, 1919, Peasant Rebellion against the Hungarian Soviet in the provincial city of Kalocsa.

June 23, 1919, Kalocsa Rebellion suppressed.

June 24, 1919, large-scale counter-revolutionary attempt in Budapest, including 254 members of the Military Academy.

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June 24, 1919, Budapest counter-revolutionary attempt is suppressed.

July 23, 1919, in Vienna Colonel Cunningham, head of the British Military Mission, informs the Hungarian Minister in Vienna that a voluntary abdication of Bela Kun would be advisable.

July 31, 1919, Kun regime, after refusing to resign voluntarily, collapses under the military situation, as a decisive factor.

August 1, 1919, Bela Kun flees Budapest.

August 1, 1919, the Social-Democratic Government of Peidl is formed.

August 3, 1919, Roumanian troops occupy Budapest.

August 6, 1919, the Peidl Government resigns.

August 7, 1919, the Friedrich Government is formed.

November 14, 1919, the Roumanian troops leave Budapest.

November 16, 1919, the leader of the counter-revolution, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, enters Budapest.

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APPENDIX II

HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS IN HUNGARY
FROM 1918-1948

1918, October, Count Janos Hadik
 1918, October, Count Mihaly Karolyi
 1919, March, Bela Kun
 1919, May, Counter-Revolution Government of Count Gy. Karolyi
 1919, July, Counter-Revolution Government of D. Abraham
 1919, August, Charles Peidl
 1919, August, Istvan Fridrich^e
 1919, November, Karoly Kuszar^A
 1920, March, Simonyi-Semadam
 1920-1921, Count P. Teleki
 1921-1931, Count I. Bethlen
 1931-1932, Count Gy. Karolyi
 1932-1936, Gen. Gy. Gombos
 1936-1938, K. Daranyi
 1938-1939, B. Imredy
 1939-1941, Count P. Teleki
 1941-1942, L. Bardossy
 1942-1944, M. Kallay
 1944, March Gen. D. Sztojaj
 1944, August, General G. Lakatos
 1944, October, F. Szalasi
 1944, Dez. General B. Miklos
 1945, Z. Tildy
 1946-1947, F. Nagy
 1947-1948, L. Dinnyes
 1948, I. Dobi.

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APPENDIX III

WHO WAS WHO IN HUNGARY

Ban, Antal, left wing Social-Democrat Minister of Industry, purged in 1948, now head of emigrant left wing Social-Democratic Party in Switzerland, fled Hungary after the Mindszenty-trial in 1949. / ~ 1948

Barankovics, Istvan, Democratic opposition editor before World War II, leader of the Democratic peoples.

Bartha, Albert, Liberal Minister of War in Karolyi regime, Minister of War in 1946, now emigrant political party which polled 16% in the 1947 elections. Party was progressive Catholic in its principles.

Bardossy, Laszlo, Hungarian diplomat, Prime Minister in 1941 when Hungary declared war on Soviet Russia. Convicted after World War II as war criminal and executed in 1946.

Bethlen, Stephen Count, Prime Minister of Hungary from 1921-1931, retired from politics later, but became "spiritus rector" leader of the anti-Nazi Hungarian political line. Immediately after the capture of Budapest, Soviet Intelligence units took him to Moscow, reported to have died there in 1949.

Bohm, Vilmos, Commander of the Red Army in Bela Kun regime, Minister in Vienna in 1919, Minister in Stockholm in 1946-1948, resigned in 1948.

Csornoky, Victor, Minister in Cairo, son-in-law of former President Tildy, his arrest for alleged spying in August, 1947 was given by President Tildy as reason for his resignation, executed in 1948.

Dementi, Paul, left wing Communist deviationist executed in 1945 in Budapest.

Donath, Gyorgy, Smallholder Member of Parliament, hanged for alleged conspiracy in 1947.

Fridrich, Istvan, Prime Minister of Hungary in 1919.

Hadik, Janos Count, Prime Minister in 1918 preceding the Karolyi revolution.

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- Horthy, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary from 1920-1944.
- Horvath, Zoltan, extreme left Social-Democrat, editor-in-chief of Budapest daily Nepszava, formerly official organ of Hungarian Social-Democratic Party. Arrested September, 1949 for Titoist rightist deviation.
- Imredy, Bela, President of Hung National Bank and Prime Minister of Hungary, 1938-1939. World War II convicted and executed as war criminal for Nazi collaboration in 1946.
- Jacsko, Pal, Smallholder Member of Parliament, executed for alleged conspiracy in 1947.
- Joseph, Hapsburg Archduke, appointed "homoregius" in 1918-1919.
- Juztus, Pal, extreme left Social-Democrat advocating merger with CP, arrested, executed as Titoist deviationist in 1949.
- Jaszi, Oscar Professor, Cabinet member in Karolyi regime, immigrated into United States, well-known author on Hung.
- Karolyi, Mihaly Count, head of 1918-1919 regime, emigrated to England after 1919, since 1948, Hungarian Minister in Paris.
- Kethly, Anna, leading Social-Democratic woman Member of Parliament, ousted in 1948 for "rightist" views.
- Kovacs, Bela, Secretary General of Smallholders Party, arrested for alleged spying by Soviet Army in Budapest in February, 1947.
- Kovacs, Imre, leader of National Peasant Party, was forced to flee Hungary for "rightist" views.
- Kun, Bela, leader of 1919 Communist regime in Hungary, fled to Moscow after defeat, purged in 1954.
- Misteth, Endre, Smallholder Minister in 1947, arrested and sentenced for alleged conspiracy.
- Mindszenty, Jozsef Cardinal, Primate of Hungary from 1945, arrested by regime in December, 1948, convicted to life imprisonment in February, 1949.

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- Miklos, Bela, General ~~sent by Regent Horthy to Moscow in 1944 to request Armistice~~; Prime Minister of ~~tax-~~ Provincial Hungarian Government in 1945.
naval
- Nagy, Ferenc, Smallholder Leader, Prime Minister from 1946 forced to resign while on a vacation abroad in June, 1947.
- Nagy, Vince, Liberal politician, Cabinet Member in Karolyi in 1918, Member of Parliament after World War II, was forced to flee in 1947.
- Nyarady, Nicholas, Minister of Finance in 1947, resigned in Switzerland in 1948 while on official mission, causing resignation of government.
- Ordass, Lutheran Bishop ~~head of Lutheran Church in Hungary~~,
leading imprisoned for alleged currency dealings in 1948.
- Palfy, Oesterreicher Gyorgy, organizer of the Army Political Police ~~Leading Communist~~, Commander of the Hungarian Army, arrested September 1949 for "rightist" Titoist deviation.
- Peidl, Karoly, Social-Democratic Prime Minister of Hungary in 1919.
- Peyer, Karoly, Cabinet Member in 1919 Karolyi regime, leader of Hungarian Social-Democratic Party until World War II, Germans imprisoned him in Mauthausen Concentration Camp, after his return in 1945 was not permitted to regain leadership for "rightist" views and was forced to flee Hungary in 1947.
- Pfeiffer, Zoltan, Smallholder Deputy in 1946, later Assistant Secretary of Justice, leader of the Independence Party in 1947, forced to flee Hungary in 1947.
- Rajk, Laszlo, leader of illegal Hungarian Communist Party before ar. during World War II, Communist ~~Prime-~~ Minister of Interior from 1946 until 1948, became Foreign Minister in 1948, arrested as leader of "rightist-Titoist" Communist deviatichist and spy in ~~service~~ of U.S. and Tito in July, 1949.
- Ravasz, Laszlo, leading Hungarian Protestant prior to World War II, leader of Hungarian Calvinist Church, forced to resign from church life in 1948.
high
- Salata, Kalman, Smallholder Deputy, was forced to flee

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- Sulyok, Dezso, former Smallholder Party, forced to resign, formed Party of his own, dissolved it in protest before 1947 election, fled Hungary in 1947.
- Szalasi, Ferenc, leader of Hungarian Nazi regime from October 14, 1944, executed as war criminal in 1946.
- Szonyi, Tibor, Chief of Communist Party Cadre until his arrest in July 1949 as "rightist-Titoist" deviationist.
- Sztojay, Dome, Prime Minister in Hungarian Nazi regime, from March 19, 1944, executed as war criminal in 1945.
- Varga, Bela, Revolution leader of Smallholder Party, Speaker of Parliament since 1946, forced to flee Hungary in 1947.
- Veres, Lajos, General arrested in 1947 as military leader of "Conspiracy" and sentenced to death.
- Tildy, Zoltan, Smallholder leader, Prime Minister in 1945, President of Hungary from 1946, was forced to resign in 1948.
- Tizza, Istvan Count, Prime Minister of Hungary during World War I, was assassinated on October 31, 1918 when Karolyi revolution broke out.
- Zsedenyi, Bela, Professor of Law, first Chairman of Hungarian Provisionary Parliament in 1945.

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APPENDIX IV

WHO IS WHO IN HUNGARY

Balogh, Istvan, leader of Independent Hungarian Democratic Party.

Berecsky, Albert, leader of the Calvinist Church in Hungary.

Bognar, Jozsef, Mayor of Budapest, left wing Smallholder leader.

Dobi, Istvan, left wing Smallholder, Prime Minister of Hungary.

Erdei, Ferenc, leader of National Peasant Party.

Farkas, Mihaly, Communist Minister of War.

Gero, Erno, leading Communist Minister of Commerce.

Gyongyossi, Istvan, Secretary General of Smallholders Party.

Harrer, Ferenc, leader of Hungarian Radical Party.

Hollos, Ervin, Secretary General, The Peoples Youth Union of Hungary.

Joboru, Magda, leader of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarian Women.

Kadar, Janos, Communist Party Minister of Interior.

Kossa, Istvan, Communist Party leader of Trade Union Council.

Lukacs, Gyorgy, Professor, leading Communist Party ideologist.²

Munnich, Ference, Communist Party Police Chief.

Nonn, Gyorgy, leader of Hungarian Democratic Youth Alliance.

Ortutay, Gyorgy, left wing Smallholders Party leader, Minister of Culture.

Racz, Gyula, leader of the "Alliance of Working Peasants and Agricultura' Workers".

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Rakosi, Imre, Deputy Prime Minister, Member of the
Hungarian Communist P.S.

Rovai, János, Hungarian Representative in the Cominform,
Editor in Chief of Communist Party Daily,
Szabadnap.

Révai, István, Minister of Justice.

Széchenyi, Arpad, President of Hungary.

Vas, Zoltan, leading Communist Party economic executive.

Veres, Peter, leading Hungarian National Peasant Party
politician.

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