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(Page 91)  
Open, One of the Second World War

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The best, the summer, period for conducting operations begins from the middle of May. Usually at that time, the spring freshets and warm weather begins, and the rains are, although heavy, infrequent, and most important, the roads and the ground finally dry up.

The end of the best period extends usually to the middle of September or to the end of September. It is marked by the beginning of the rainy period, by the gradually increasing impassability due to the mud in the roads, and the soaking of the ground in the locality. Gradually the situation all the time becomes worse, up to the first strong frosts.

The experience of the fall of 1941 demonstrates that the autumn period of growing impassability due to mud gives a great advantage to the army which possesses the more practicable transport. The combination of this transport with intense air supply can give absolute superiority over an adversary, and it is maintained in any type of operation. In particular, the Germans possessed transport of great practicability in very limited quantity.

Obviously, in the strength of the latter circumstance, all operations on the eastern front undertaken by the Germans were developed in the summer period and only against their wills were prolonged into the autumn and even the winter period.

The Kiev encirclement of 1941 and the Kharkov encirclement of 1942 can serve as examples of operations in which climatic and topographic conditions decided the development of operations.

The Kiev operation was begun 1-2 September ~~and~~ actually was ended

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12-13 September. On the north as a line of departure the Germans chose the line of the Kiev-Moscow Railroad. That is, they took and secured the road along the swampy Chernigovshchina. On the south, Cherkassy and Kremenchug served as departure points. Here the right, the steep, bank receded far from the Dnepr and here the Germans made ferries. Both points have railroads running from the west.

From these two departure points they made two rings: Nezhin-Priklad-Cherkassy and Lenotop-Romny-Kremenchug. The huge swamp, Trubezh, which extended in that very same direction, was left between the rings.

The encirclement to the south of Kharkov also is very significant. The Red Army began the attack on Kharkov 20 May 1942 by blows to the north and to the south of the city. The penetration on the south was successful and was developed in the direction of Lozovaya. Due only to the steep bank of the Northern Donets, the penetration was not successfully widened. Two Soviet armies actually penetrated into the pocket and occupied Lozovaya. Again due only to the steep bank of the Northern Donets, the Germans were able to direct their wedges from the south and from the north on the closing of the penetration of their front, moving by the flank along the front. Both Soviet armies found themselves cut off. The operation was ended 2-5 June. (page 93)

The General Characteristics of the Ukrainian Theatre of Military Operations

Territorially, the Ukrainian Theatre of Military Operations includes the zone bounded on the north by the southern border of Polesya (the line Chernigov, Ovruch, Sarny, Kovel and further, Lublin, Radom, Breslau); on the south by the northern coast of the Black Sea and the further line: Izmail, Budapest, Vienna; on the east by the meridian Kharkov, Mariupol; on the west by the line Breslau, Brno, Vienna.

The total extent in depth equals approximately 1500 kilometers, and the width is from 400 up to 700 kilometers.

According to the Soviet Military District Division, the Ukrainian Theatre includes: the Kiev Military District (Headquarters, Kiev); the

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Odessa Military District (Odessa), the Tavriz Military District (Simferopol), and the Precarpathian Military District (Lvov).

The Ukrainian Theatre of Military Operations, in combination with the southern part of the Prebaltic, Eastern Poland, Eastern Austria and Hungary, in military literature takes the name "The Eastern European Theatre of Military Operations."

This single Eastern European Theatre of Military Operations along its middle and in the center is divided by the thick forest--swamp zone of Polesya into two independent theatres: the White Russian and the Ukrainian.

#### The General Significance of the Theatre

##### A. During Offensive Operations from the East to the West -

1. The central part of the theatre, from the present-day Soviet-Polish border and up to the line Korostin-Vinnitsa, is a region of concentration and deployment of Soviet troops.

2. Along the Ukrainian Direction lies the shortest way to the central part of the Western-European Theatre along the line Kiev-Lvov, Prague, Murnberg, Saarbrucken.

3. Operations in the western direction lead to the exposure of a series of political and economic centers such as: Krakow, Katowice, the Chenstokhov hard coal region, Prague, and others.

4. During slowed down operations in the White Russian Theatre, conditions are created by a blow on Poznan and Berlin so as to attain a deep strategic encirclement of the armies of the adversary operating in the White Russian Theatre.

5. The armies of the Ukrainian Theatre, with their movement forward, all more and more overhand the territories of the Balkan Peninsula, which in the future war will become an independent theatre, in which the Soviet General Staff will strive for the fixing of its left flank by way of an attempt at overrunning the Straits.

##### B. During Offensive Operations from West to East -

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1. The strategic defense of the east (Soviet) side in the Ukrainian Theatre guarantees:
    - a. The possession for itself and the utilization of the Ukrainian bread, which in the total bread balance of the USSR holds one of the first places.
    - b. The covering of the powerful metallurgical industry of the Ukrainian SSR and the Don coal basin; the possession of the Drogobych petroleum region.
  2. The penetration of the western armies, even though only to the line Sarny-Proskurov, the Prut (it flows into the Danube at the city of Galati) cuts off Romania, Bulgaria, and all the remaining parts of the Balkan Peninsula from the south-western part of the USSR, which with the presence of superiority of Allied air forces in the Black Sea will force the Soviet Union to refuse from further active operations in the Balkans and in Minor (Turkish) Asia. (Page 93a)
  3. Further penetration, say in the direction of Lvov, Kiev and Kharkov, cuts the unified Ukrainian Theatre into two parts, placing in an isolated situation first the Odessa Region, then the Crimea, which actually also took place during the Second World War.
  4. Penetration to Kharkov severs almost all routes of communication which connect the central part of the USSR with the southern parts.
  5. Debouche into the region of Poltava and Kharkov creates the prerequisites for the development of blows:
    - a. In a northeasterly (Moscow) direction.
    - b. In an easterly and in a southeasterly direction to the middle and lower Volga.
    - c. Debouche into the middle Volga creates the prerequisite for a blow to the rear of the Moscow (central) region.
- The peculiarity of the Ukrainian Theatre of Military Operations is characterized by two circumstances:

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1. The southern flank of the Soviet part of the theatre must coordinate closely with naval forces both during an offensive, and also during defense:

In equal measure also the adversaries of the USSR will be obliged to reinforce the operations of ground troops which are operating on the shore of the Black Sea with the operations of naval forces.

2. The land part of the whole Ukrainian Theatre, according to its geographic and topographic qualities, is not homogeneous. If up to the line: Przemysle, Stanislaw, Chornovtsy, the Seret River, the locality permits employment of all types of troops, then further movements are dependent on overcoming the Carpathians. And it is not by chance that the troop units of the Precarpathian Military District consist mainly of mountain-rifle units.

The Soviet General Staff, under present conditions, is in a more advantageous situation than its probable adversaries.

a. Romania is still a satellite of the USSR and the Soviet Union will not permit a repetition there of events similar to Yugoslavia.

b. The border of the Transcarpathian District are drawn so that the Soviet Armies are already located in the Transcarpathia, in the Hungarian Valley. At the beginning of war not only units of the Precarpathian Military District, but also of the Kiev Military District will be moved to Hungary.

Speaking about the fact that in the northern half of the Ukrainian Theatre there is no particularly hindering condition for employment of all types of troops, it follows to make a remark on the spring and autumn periods when thanks to rains the roads of the Ukrainian Theatre "evaporate" and become almost impassable.

The Ukrainian Theatre has a sufficiently dense net of railroads to support the supply of a minimum of 50-60 infantry divisions reinforced by tank and artillery divisions and like support units. (page 94)

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The Lublin Operational Direction:

{The operational line: Chernigov, Ovruch, Sarny, Novel, Chelm, Lublin is called the Lublin Direction.

With offensive operations from the west to the east, the Lublin Direction receives the name Chernigov Direction.

{The supply artery of the Lublin Operational Direction is the railroad: Chernigov-Ovruch-Belokorovich-Sarny-Novel-Lublin, or Kiev-Korosten-Sarny. It is in its entire extent, from Chernigov and up to Lublin, single tracked with a maximum through capacity of 24 pairs of trains a day which supports the supply of two medium armies (8-10 divisions with support units).

This quantity of troops also constitutes the operational capacity of the Lublin Direction.

The operation significance of the Lublin Direction consists in the following:

1. It extends from the south to Polesye and simply by this the practical coordination between the left flank of the White Russian Theatre and the right flank of the Ukrainian Theatre is accomplished.

During the war, in 1944, the Lublin direction was assigned to the White Russian Theatre; the armies of the First White Russian Front operated here.

This was not done by chance. The matter is that Polesye cannot be an independent direction. In order to tie together the armies operating to the north of Polesye with the armies operating to the south of Polesye, a single direction/<sup>(command)</sup> is necessary.

A similar solution of the question about Polesye and about its connection with the White Russian and the Ukrainian Theatre is the most reasonable.

2. With debouche of the eastern (Soviet) troops into the region of Lublin their further operations, in dependence on the general operational situation, can be developed along three directions:

a. To Warsaw, along the right bank of the Visla without

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crossing it. This direction is more simply fulfilled since between Lublin and Warsaw there is not a single hindering condition for the employment of all types of troops.

b. An offensive to the west in the general direction Radom-Piotrkov-Lodz. This direction leads to the deep operational flanking of the Warsaw Fortified Region. Besides this, a strike in the direction of Lodz separates the Warsaw Region from the Krakow-Czestochowa Region.

An offensive toward Radom-Lodz is tied with the necessity of forcing the middle Visla in the region of Deblin (Ivangorod) and to the south of it, and then forcing of the Pilits River. The Visla to the south of Deblin is 200-250 meters; for forcing it army and front pontoon units are required.

Both the indicated directions pursue the purpose of the creation of coordination with the White Russian Theatre.

c. The development of a strike on the front Krakow-Tarnow to the deep rear of the Peremishlyansk Fortified Region, as well as along the right bank of the Visla River, without a crossing to its left bank, but with obligatory forcing of the right tributary of the Visla -- the San River, which in its lower course presents a very serious obstacle; the strike may be directed on the front Czestochowa, Katowice with the purpose of seizing the Dombrowski coal basin with simultaneous debouche in the rear of the Krakow Region.

(Page 94a)

It follows to examine the Lublin Direction together with the Vladimir-Volinski (or Rovno) Direction, especially in the event that the Lublin Direction shall be subordinated to the operational plan of the White Russian Theatre when the troops of the Lublin Direction will coordinate with the White Russian Armies. In this instance the Vladimir-Volinski Direction acquires an independent significance. Thus it was in 1944 when the armies of the First Ukrainian Front operated in the direction Rovno-Vladimir-Volinski-Zamostya by which scheme it was

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successful in forcing the rivers San and Visla at Sandomierz and in creating the Visla (or Sandomierz) bridgehead from which, after build-up of strength, still a further offensive began in January 1945.

Speaking about the topography of the locality of the Lublin Direction, it can be said that there are no absolutely difficult to traverse "narrow" places for the utilization of all types of troops. For infantry and its equipment, there is no limitation; for the employment of tank and motorized units, there are limitations in individual regions, mainly on the river lines about which it will be told below. For aviation, there is also no special limitations, but under the condition that the main aerodromes shall be located south of the line: Ovruch-Sam y and Kovel.

The most favorable conditions of locality are located west of the Western Bug. In comparison with the Vladimir-Volinski (Rovno) Direction, the Lublin Direction is less suitable for the employment of all types of troops. As to this, it is possible to judge even by the fact that one of the main paved highways runs from Kiev through Zhitomir, Novograd-Volinski, Rovno, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volinski; along that very line, the main aerodromes are located.

The Lublin Direction, lying on the south border of Polesye, is enclosed by it, and here there are relatively many swampy areas, especially in spring and autumn.

Sluggish rivers, the right tributaries of the Pripjat, flow through these swampy areas. Due to the swampyness, these rivers, not wide in themselves, present not only simply a tactical but also an operational significance as defensive lines during offensive operations both from the east and from the west.

The following can be cited from the number of these rivers:

- a. The Turiya on which the city of Kovel stands.
- b. The Stir on which the city of Lutsk stands.
- c. The Gorin, with its tributary the Sluch.

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d. The Ubort and several others, more minor.

From the number of other river lines, it follows to remark on:

a. The Varta, in its upper reaches.

b. The Visla, with its tributary the San.

c. The Western Bug.

d. The Dnepr and the Pripjat (in the vicinity of Chernigov).

The following regions constitute separate fortified regions:

a. Deblin (Ivangorod), which has a system of forts on the west side.

b. The Kovel Fortified Region.

c. The Sarny Fortified Region.

d. The Ovruch Fortified Region.

e. The southern part of the Mazir Fortified Region (along the Ubort River).

The supply bases are: Kiev, Korostin, Ovruch, Zhitomir, Rovno, Lutsk, Kovel, Warsaw, Lublin, Lodz, Deblin, Radom, and Sandomierz.

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The Lvov-Krakov Operational Region

In the previous conference, we pointed out that the Lvov Direction in the main operational direction of the Ukrainian Theatre of Military Operations.

In comparison with the White Russian Theatre, the Lvov (Kiev) Direction is equivalent to the Smolensk (Moscow) Direction of the White Russian Theatre.

The Zone of locality to the north and to the south of the central axis line: Kiev-Lvov-Przemysle-Krakov-Katowice belongs to the Lvov-Krakov Operational Region. The Czestochowa Region, the Katowice, Krakow, Przemysle, Lvov, Tarnopol, Proskurov, Berdichev, Zhitomir and Kiev are included in this zone.

The general operational significance of the Lvov-Krakov Region for one or the other side will be included in the fact that:

1. The region Lvov-Brodi, Tarnopol and Proskurov for the one side;

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the Gzestochowa, Katowice, Krakow, Sanok, Yaroslav, for the other s<sup>50X1-HUM</sup>

will be the regions of concentration and deployment of troops.

2. During offensive operations from the east to the west, the shortest route to Southern Germany, Czechoslovakia and to Austria runs from the Lvov Region.

During offensive operations from the west to the east, the shortest routes to the political and economic centers of the Ukraine and to the southern part of the USSR run from the Lvov-Kiev Direction.

3. A strike from Lvov in the direction of Kiev severs the Ukrainian Theatre into two parts, cutting off the southern part into an isolated situation; in equal measure, a strike from Lvov on Krakow and further into Slovakia also severs the western part of the Ukrainian Theatre into two parts.

4. The attainment of success in the Lvov-Kiev Direction leads to the loss on the Soviet side of operational contact with the Balkan countries.

5. From what has been said, it is possible to make the general preliminary conclusions:

a. The operational directions of the Ukrainian Theatre have an independent significance, independent of the White Russian Theatre.

Coordination of the Lvov-Krakow Direction with the armies of the White Russian front pursues a purpose, not as much operational as much as strategic, directed to the attainment of coordinated operations not in the Eastern-European, but in the Western-European Theatre.

b. The Lvov-Krakow direction is aimed toward the central part of Europe; it skirts the Balkan Peninsula. This circumstance causes the Soviet side to have huge forces for operations in the Balkans to the south of this direction.

In the last war the armies of two fronts were directed to the Balkans: The Second Ukrainian Front developed a strike from Iasi,

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Cluj and also to Budapest, Bratislava-Vienna; the Third Ukrainian Front, on Izmil-Bucharest, then to Belgrade and around the southern extremity of Balaton Lake to Graz and Linz in flanking Vienna from the south.

In distinction from other operational directions of the Ukrainian Theatre and the Balkan Peninsula, the direction Lvov-Krakow-Cottbus-Berlin, or Krakow-Dresden-Leipzig, actually does not have hindering conditions for the employment of all types of troops. The locality between Lvov, Berlin and Leipzig is rich with a net of railroads and highways (Page 95a) routes of communication. Here, besides the Visla, there are no other water barriers, but even the Visla does not present a specially serious obstacle in that sector.

The Lvov-Krakow-Breslavl-Berlin direction is well equipped in the aviation sense. More or less, all the large populated points have aerodromes, and also points, as for example, Kiev, Shepetovka, Zhitomir, Proskurov, Zmerinka, Brodi, Kremenets, Peremishl, Yaroslavl, Novi Sonch, Krakow, Berestechko, Berditchev, Sambor, Grodek, Rzeszuv, Katowice, Opele, Breslavl, Ostrow, Gloguv, Lignits and many others have military aerodromes.

On the Soviet part, the sector Lvov-Zhitomir is the water divide between the river Pripyat and the river Dnestr. The rivers from the Kamenets-Podoloski plateau fall, some into the Pripyat (the Turya, Styr, Gorin, Sluch and others) and others, into the Dnestr; in such a manner the head waters of these rivers, flowing in large, relatively high, valley banks are not obstacles for troops.

The cities, especially in the western part of the examined theatre, are much more serious defensive regions.

The cities Lvov, Peremishl, Krakow, Breslavl and more to the south, Budapest, Bratislava and others, are strong defensive points. Of these, only Peremishl, then Breslavl, have a fort system, but never-the-less the battles at Budapest, Lvov, and Bratislava were prolonged for the

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course of three and more weeks. The defensive possibilities of the indicated cities lies in the fact that they occupy a large area built up with solid buildings; in this area an army of several tens of thousands of troops can operate.

The Second World War is surfeited with examples of the defensive capability of a whole series of cities which are not fortress cities (Odessa, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and others).

In individual sectors of the Lvov-Krakow direction, the operations of ground troops must be coordinated with river naval flotillas.

Such sectors are:

- a. The region of Kiev (the Dnepr Naval Flotilla).
- b. The region to the southeast of Lvov (the Dnestr Naval Flotilla).
- c. The region to the northeast from Krakow (the Visla Naval Flotilla).
- d. The region of Berlin - the rivers Oder and Shpee.

Out of the number of main supply bases, it is possible to cite the following:

- a. Close: Lvov, Shepetovka, Proskurov, Zhmerinka; Rzheshuv, Tarnobrzeg, Krakow, Sandomir and Katowice.
- b. Distant or deep: Korosten, Zhitomir, Berdichev, Fastov, Kiev; Lodz, Breslavl, Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, Dresden, Berlin, and others.

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The Uzhgorod Direction and the Chernovitsy-Iasi Operational Region

The title, "Uzhgorod Direction" (or the Mukachevo Direction), is thoroughly treated in the prewar descriptions of theatres of military operations; today this title does not completely accurately reflect the truthful situation of the future.

The Uzhgorod Direction is considered to be the zone of territory from the central operational line: Lvov-Sambor-Uzhgorod (in Hungarian, Ungvar), or, Lvov-Stri-Mukachevo and further, Budapest.

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The extreme right boundary of this zone is the line: Tarnov-Rovi Jonch-Koshitze and further, the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary; the left boundary: Tarnopol-Kolomiya, the Yablonitse Pass and further along the Romanian border to Khust, Debrechen, Oradea-Mare, Saged.

The Uzhgorod Direction correctly could be entitled the Budapest Direction: it encompasses the whole Hungarian plain and the closest operational target is the seizure of the Budapest region.

The Uzhgorod Direction runs in the beginning from north to south with a subsequent turn to the west toward Budapest.

A proper analysis of the Uzhgorod Direction is conditioned by three conditions:

- a. The penetration of the former Polish-Czechoslovakian state borders, located exactly on the crest of the forested Carpathians;
- b. The topographic conditions of the Carpathian Mountains to the south and the southeast of Lvov where it has several completely passable passes to the Hungarian plain;
- c. The latter determines the trace of the railroad net leading from Poland to Hungary through the extreme eastern reaches of the former Czechoslovakia territory.

The offensive of the Soviet armies in 1944-45 was organized according to that. To this condition, specifically the concrete circumstance, the fact contributed, that Romania, at the moment of the offensive operations of the armies of the Ukrainian Fronts, actually did not show any serious resistance. Bulgaria did not show any resistance. Yugoslavia was already under the control of the partisan armies of Tito.

Chernovitsi and Iasi are united in one region not only because these points territorially are close one to another, but also because the operations of troops there have an operational community.

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The Chernovitsi-Iasi-Kishinev operational region includes the Chernovits District, the northern half of Romania and the northern part of the Moldavian SSR (Bessarabia).

The operational significance of the region is included in the following:

1. The Uzhgorod (Mukachevo), Cernovista and Kishinev-Iasi Directions are the Carpathian Directions, which in their turn stipulate:

a. The necessity for the western armies to overcome the Carpathians with limited strength in the presence of stubborn defense from the east side.

b. The operations of the western side inevitably are ramified by:

(1) The overcoming of the Carpathians.

(2) The building up of forces to the east of the Carpathians for development of further operations.

2. For the eastern side, the loss of the Carpathians means a direct and immediate threat of a debouche of hostile armies in the rear:

a. Of the Odessa Region.

b. Of the Lvov-kroskurov-Shapetovka-Rovno Regions (a blow on Zhmerinka-Vinnitsa-Zhitomir, or more deep, Beltsi-Uman-Kanev).

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Together with this, southern Romania and Bulgaria, with their Black Sea ports, are lost; the petroleum fields of Ploesti and Drogobych are lost.

For the eastern side, as already demonstrated in previous conversations, the operational situation at the present time is somewhat simpler since the USSR can, in the premobilization period, dispatch its troops into Romania and Hungary and also into Bulgaria.

The operational tie of the Uzhgorod Direction with the Iasi-Kishinev

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Region for both sides consists of the fact that these regions mutually aid and support one another.

It is impossible to wage offensive operations in one direction (Uzhgorod or Kishinev-Iasi) while not waging at the same time active operations in the other. With the development of Soviet operations toward Budapest, the western side, covering with minor forces in the Eastern Carpathians and the northern spurs of the Transylvanian Alps, may be able to mount a blow from Belgrade through Arad, Debrechin.

In equal measure, with offensive operations of the western armies in the Uzhgorod Direction, the eastern side, covering the Danube and those same spurs of the Transylvanian Alps, may be able, from the region of Dezh-Cluj to mount a blow through Oradea-Iare and Arad on Solnok, Seged and further on Budapest.

Exactly such a situation is created if active operations are developed in Romania, and passive operations shall be carried out in the Uzhgorod Direction.

3. The third general significance of the described regions for both sides consists of the fact that he who shall control Hungary and Romania, and by that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, then that one shall be the proprietor of the situation in the Balkans in general, and the approaches to northern Italy, in particular.

4. As for one, so also for the other side, the closest aim of operations will be to seize (the holding, for the other side) Budapest, Belgrade and Bucharest.

The eastern side, after overcoming Budapest, acquires freedom for the development of a blow on Vienna, and with overcoming Belgrade and Bucharest, will attempt to debouche on the shores of the Adriatic, Aegean, and Marmora Seas.

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In the future war, Turkey cannot under any conditions remain neutral. Thus, the eastern side cannot terminate in Romania and Bulgaria with the operations of three to four armies as took place in 1945.

The routes of communication of the examined part of the Ukrainian Theatre of operations are weakly developed.

[The railroads of the Uzhgorod-Budapest Direction are in somewhat better condition due to their routes:]

- a. Lvov-Sambor-Uzhgorod-Chap, Miskolts-Budapest.
- b. Lvov-Stri-Veretski Pass-Mukachevo-Chap-Debrechin-Solnok-Budapest.
- c. Lvov-Stanislovov-Yablontse Pass, further along the border to Khust, Satu-Mare, Oradea-Mare, Seged.

Supplementary roads run from Krakow and Tarnov.

[Up to Transcarpathia, that is up to the descent to the Hungarian plain, these roads have a minor through capacity, not more than 12-15 pairs of trains. In winter, thanks to the snow drifts, the transport capacity falls two three times, that is to four-six-eight pairs a day.

In all, there are five through roads. They, with the most unfavorable conditions of winter time, can provide 30-40 trains, but in summer 60-75 trains,] which completely supports the supply of five-eight divisions.

[The Chernovitsa and Iasi region is in a more worse situation.

[Tortuous and more long routes run through there.]

- a. Tarnopol-Chernovitsa-Dezh. (Page 96b)
- b. Vinnitsa-Zhmerinka-Mogilev-Podolsk-Lipsani and further, either Chernovista, or to Dorokhaya, and again to Dezh, by the very same road.
- c. Pervomaisk-Balta-Beltsi, Iasi, Pashkani, and further around

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to the north and on the very same road running to Dezh, or going around through Adzhud to Alba-Ulya and Arad. The entrance to Alba-Ulya can be done from Kishinev through Tekuchi, Rimnik, Brashov, Sibiu. However, as to this road, it is hard to estimate in the future since it is intended for the supply of armies operating in the Bucharest, Sofia Directions.

[ The enumerated single track roads and their transport capacity are not higher in comparison with the roads of the Uzhgorod Direction. ]

According to the possibilities for utilization of troops, the Uzhgorod-Budapest Direction is more suitable.

The western Beskids, the Tetry Mountains, the eastern Beskids, combined in the general term, the Sylvaniaian Carpathians, are more passable, their average altitude is 4500-5000 feet at the same time that the average altitude of the Eastern Carpathians is 6000 feet, and the Transylvanian Alps, 7500-8000 feet. Thus, it is not by chance that the operations of the Third Ukrainian Front went in flank of the Transylvanian Alps from the south.

From what has been said, it follows that during the development of offensive operations in central Romania special mountain troops obligatorily are required, employed in not very large independent detachments with the presence of light (mountain) artillery, light infantry weapons, supplied with a great quantity of radio equipment, and having its own independent mobile mountain (pack) transport.

Tank troops, especially in large formations, up to passage of the northern spurs of the Transylvanian Alps can be utilized to very limited extents.

The military operations of troops will aim for the seizure of the mountain passes, the mountain valleys through which the highways run and the commanding heights from which to cover these valleys.

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From the point of view of the utilization and employment of aviation, there 50X1-HUM are no actual, especially hindering conditions. However, the Carpathian Mountains are difficult in that here there is an extremely limited quantity of not very large aerodromes and landing areas in the Intercarpathian Plain (the center of Romania).

The basic aerodromes are located in Hungary, south Romania and in the western Ukraine. Of the number of Soviet aerodromes, the following can be cited: Lvov, Furovich (to the east of Lvov), Sarnbor, Grodok (east of Sarnbor), Uzhgorod, Zhukavitsa (east of Stril), Stanislavov, Brodi, Proskurov, Chernovitsa, Navograd-Volinski, Zhitomir, Bordichev, Vinnitsa, Zhmerinka, Uman, Balta, Pervomaisk, Tiraspol, Kishinev. In addition, on this territory, there is spread around a great quantity of temporary and civil aerodromes.

In the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian territory, there can be pointed out the following aerodrome bases: Kresno (west of Peremishl, Prozov (north of Foshitse), Nova-Ves (northwest of Foshitse) Koshitse, Mishkolts, Budapest and its environs (eight aerodromes),<sup>Keskemet,</sup> Segod, Arid (two aerodromes), Debrechin and others.

The majority of the above enumerated points are not only air bases but also bases for ground troops.

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Izmail-Bucharest Region

The Izmail-Bucharest Region should be examined in combination with the Maritime Operational Direction since between them is an inseparable unity. Along with that, between these two sectors of the theatre, there are also differences in operational aims. Thus, it is best of all to consider them separately.

To the make-up of the Izmail-Bucharest Operational Region belong:

- The Odessa District
- The southern part of Moldavian SSR
- The Izmail District
- The region of Fokshan, Rimnik, Galats, and Braila, and
- The regions of Flocsti and Bucharest

The Danube River, from its mouth and up to Bushchuc (south of Bucharest) with its

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great number of large and small branch channels, with the exception of the railroad bridge at the village of Chernovod, does not have a permanent bridge crossing, and forcing the river in this section is extremely difficult.

The Danube River divides the Maritime Direction (the right bank zone of the Danube) from the Bucharest Direction.

If the operations of ground troops on the Bucharest Direction are poorly coordinated with the operation of naval forces, then the operations of ground troops in the Maritime Direction are in general senseless without a naval fleet.

As the main operational line of the Izmail-Bucharest Region, it is necessary to consider the line: Tiraspol, Remenesht, Galats, Bucharest, Kraiova; as the supplementary:

- a. Kishinev, Fokshan, Rimmik, Ploesti.
- b. The Danube: Galats, along the left bank of the river Georgiu (Dahardzhiu).

The nearest operational target is the overrunning of the political-economic regions of Ploesti-Bucharest with the development of subsequent operations: either in the direction of Kraiova-Belgrade or along the front Sofia-Plovidiv.

With offensive operations of the eastern side, it is necessary to assume that from Bucharest, the operations will be developed namely in the direction of Belgrade, and the operational aims towards the Bulgarian territory and southern Yugoslavia will be to take the maritime armies as prisoners.

With offensive operations of western armies from the region of Belgrade, their operational purpose also will be the mission of seizing Bucharest and Ploesti.

The seizing and holding for itself of the region Ploesti-Bucharest is a vital necessity as well as for one, so also for the other side.

Both sides, with operations on the northern Danube (up to the sharp bend of the river) to the north of Chovna-Voda, will screen the left of the Danube, leaving sufficiently strong garrisons at several points.

Further offensive of the western armies, it appears, must be developed in a northeasterly direction and after debouche on the line Galats-Fokshan, this direction becomes the principle one, since the Maritime Direction along the right bank of the Danube runs into the swampy delta of the Danube with its three wide

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channels (bays): The Georgiev, the Sulina, and the Kilijska.

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Speaking about the differences of the operational purposes of the Bucharest-Balgrade and the Maritime Directions, we point out that the first will be greater conducted with the operational and strategic coordination with the armies operating in the central and south part of Europe, and the Maritime Direction will be completely connected with the Balkan and Asia Minor Theatre.

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Thus, the problems of combat with landings from the sea (which certainly will be attempted by both sides) must be carried out by the maritime groups.

The development of operations in the future war in southeast Europe to a great extent predestines the positions of Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece.

With operations along the Danube, the Soviet armies will be in a better position because of the Soviet General Staff has disposed of the powerful Danube Flotilla here which can be reinforced by the Dneestr and Dnepr River Flotillas. The western armies are obliged to use improvization.

The bases of the Danube River Flotilla are considered to be points in the Kiliiski Channel of the Danube and in particular Izmil, Chilya-Nova, Kiliya, and others.

It is relevant to say, the Kiliiskii channel is completely in Soviet hands and at the present time strong shore fortifications are being constructed there. All river transit of the USSR upward along the Danube goes not through the International Sulina Canal, but through the Kiliiskii channel.

Izmil and the region north of it are covered by the Danube, the Prut and the Seret which gives to that region the possibility of becoming the region of concentration and deployment of the Soviet Balkan Armies.

Routes of communication are:

- a. Kishinev-Birlad-Tekuchi-Buzeu-Illoesti.
- b. Tiraspol-Romaneshti-Galats-Buzeu.
- c. The branch line to Izmil from the Aldexman-Romaneshti railroad.

The Danube, which freezes in its lower course for 6-7 weeks will be utilized in the form of a communication route by the Eastern Side according to the need for movement.

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It is necessary also to add the sea communication lines to the number of supply routes.

To the number of supply bases belong:

a. Close: Kishinev, Tiraspol, Altkerman, Beltsi, Ribnitsa (on the Dnestr), Nogilev-Podolskii.

b. Distant: Uman, Balta, Pervomaisk.

c. Sea: Odessa, Nikolaev, Altkerman, and the Crimean ports.

One of the complicating problems requiring solution by the Soviet General Staff is the mission of covering the supply bases, the railroad centers, the river and the seaports from the air, keeping in mind that the aviation of the adversaries of the USSR will be more powerful.

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The Maritime Operational Region

The Maritime Operational Region is termed the shore zone of the Black Sea up to the right bank of the Danube.

Sharp differences in purposes and missions which will confront the troops exist between the Bucharest region and the Maritime Direction.

The differences are explained by the following:

1. The Danube River.

The Danube, from its mouth and farther north, almost up to the so-called "Iron Gate" (west of the city Turnu-Severin) is difficult to force. Particularly impassable is the section of the river from Ruchchuk and up to the mouth where the Danube with a great number of channels, flooded basins, pools, and so forth, does not permit neither tactical, nor operational coordination.

If, along the left bank of the Danube, the operations of the Western armies can be developed to any depth, right up to the Inepre, and those of the eastern armies, up to Belgrade and further to the West, then the Maritime Direction, for the Eastern Side begins from the line: Galats, Isakcha, Tuocha, Georgievskii Channel, and for the Western Side this line is the final line of the Maritime Direction.

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2. The development of operations by the Eastern armies on the Bucharest 50X1-HUM direction, up to debouche on the line Polesti-Bucharest, will be to go farther in the western direction retiring from the sea, — that on the Maritime Direction operations will be developed simply along the . . . shore.

3. The closest operational aim of the Maritime Direction is the seizing of the Romanian and Bulgarian port bases (Constanta, Varna, Burgas) as initial concentration points for organization of a campaign for the sake of seizing the straits.

For this is required the initial seizure of the lower course of the Danube and its mouth since without that the Maritime armies will be cut off in isolated battle, not receiving assistance while operating beyond the Danube.

As has been mentioned frequently, the USSR, in contemporary conditions, is in a more advantageous condition, in the concept of the possibility of utilizing the indicated ports, in comparison with the western armies. However, this circumstance is not permanently operating. It may turn out thus, that with the first days of the war, these port bases will become not Romanian-Bulgarian and not Soviet.

4. From the very name "Maritime Direction" it is obvious that operations in it obligatorily take place in a conjunction of ground and naval forces.

5. The peculiarities of the Maritime Direction are:

a. Up to the border between Romania and Bulgaria, that is up to the line Rushchuk-Shumla-Varna, only one army group can operate along the Maritime Direction. For this reason this army group, most likely, will be marines;

b. Further operations will take place in divergent directions.

(1) To the borders of Asia-Minor and to the borders of Greece with the purpose, if still not the seizure of the straits, then the seizure of European Turkey.

(2) To Sofia and further to the Adriatic Sea.

c. After debouching in the region of Sofia, the Sofia Direction again subdivides into:

(1) The Nish-Sarajevo Direction.

(2) The Skopje-Tiran Direction.

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
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In other words, the future war in the Balkans will not be like the pas50X1-HUM war. This is explained by the fact that Yugoslavia fell out of the Soviet bloc and under all circumstances she cannot return again to its makeup; as to the im-possibility of neutrality of Turkey, we already spoke.

Bulgaria, which must defend herself against Yugoslavia on the west, against Greece and Turkey on the South, may find herself in a serious position. And it may happen that the Bulgarian army at once after the beginning of the war will be thrown across the Danube.

One may not be a prophet but maintain that at the time when the question of the terms of the war unconditionally can be determined, that the western armies will put their troops in Northern Italy, in Austria, Yugoslavia, and Greece; and will occupy Albania; the Soviet troops in their turn will seize Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Then will be the campaign of the struggle for the Balkans.

There is, it is true, one condition, which speaks in favor of the Soviet army. The Soviet troops, with the exception of the Navy and the Air Forces, in the initial period appear to be stronger and they may outstrip the western armies in seizing Western Europe and the Balkans inasmuch as the Allied troops in western Europe are "nothing to speak of". The strong point of the western armies is that they, utilizing their superiority in naval and air forces, will create in the Balkans "a desert zone", where in general for a long time no army can be able to operate.

The offensive of the western armies, and as well of Turkey and of Greece, obviously will go along just these operational directions:

- a. From the front Belgrade-Novı Sad in the direction Arad-Desh.
- b. To the South of the Transylvanian Alps along the Balkan plain to Bucharest.
- c. From Nish to Pierna-Shumla-Yarna.

The operations of the Turkish army and the Greek army will be combined in the latter direction.

The western armies in their offensive in the northern and northeastern direction collide with the powerful natural defensive barrier, the Danube.

To what has been said, it is necessary to add only that the south (right) bank of the Danube is mountainous, and the left is low and swampy. Thus, the

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Danube is more favorable for the western armies, and not for the eastern. Beside: 50X1-HUM

this, all the Danube fortresses, except Izmall, although aged (Silstov, Rusichuk, Turtukai, Silistriya, Chernovoda, Isakcha and Tulcha), are located on the raised right bank and thus they cannot be serious obstacles for the western armies; at the same time during an offensive of the eastern armies, these fortresses become very serious hinderances.

When we spoke about the fact that the offensive of the Soviet Armies, at least during their thrust into Bulgaria, disintegrates into several independent directions (the Maritime - to the straits; the Sofia and Aleksandropolic ), we did not stimulate an interest in the question of supply of the troops of the directions. And it is necessary to have in mind that the railroads running from Soviet territory do not cross the Danube anywhere. This signifies that the supply routes are tied to sea ports which undoubtedly will become objectives for air attacks and objectives for landing from the sea which, in the end, may eliminate the present superior position of the satellites of the USSR, Romania and Bulgaria.

The most accessible places for making landing operations from the sea are in the region of Constanta (to the north and to the south) and the region of the ports of Varna and Burgas. In the remaining sectors, landing operations are complicated due to the steep shores where it is possible to organize a two- or three tiered system of fire. (Page 98b)

The Soviet General-Staff anticipates the possibility of landing operations from the sea by western armies on the Balkan shore of the Black Sea and is doing all necessary for the organization of defense.

The majority of the points, not to mention the port areas, are strengthened by shore fortifications beginning from Odessa up to the conjunction of the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

Strong defenses have been made in the Dnestr estuary, then around Volkov, in the Port'usa Strait, on Cape Nidriya, around Mangaliya, on the Serebryanii Shore, near Staro-Opekhor, on Cape Palokastro and at other places.

Since the railroads from the region of Kishinev do not cross to the right bank of the Danube, this means that the main supply bases of the Soviet Armies must be the sea bases: Odessa, Alderman, (Belgorod-Dnestrovskii), Constanta and Varna.

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which, as was said above, may be destroyed.

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The problem of bases and the supply of troops becomes, in such a fashion, almost the main problem in that theatre for the Soviet armies of the Balkan Peninsula (Page III).

The Crimean Theatre of Military Operations

It is necessary to consider the basin of the Black Sea as an independent theatre of military operations despite the fact that it is the left flank of the general Eastern-European Theatre.

The Black Sea is closely connected with the Balkan sector and the Zairavkaz Theatre. In the future war, when the Balkan countries, Turkey, and the Near East shall be the arena of a frightful battle, the significance of the basin of the Black Sea will become exceedingly important.

Already today, articles appear in the Soviet military press demonstrating that the Black Sea is a "Russian Sea" which the Russians owned two thousand years ago.

This present conference is dedicated to the Crimea as the main Black Sea region of the Soviet seaboard.

For waging operations, the Soviet Union possesses a series of sea, air, and ground bases on the Crimea Shore, in Sea of Azov and at other points of the Black Sea, including bases on the shores of Romania and Bulgaria, the like of which the western armies do not have.

The main base for naval forces is Sevastopol, a natural closed anchorage with accommodations for the defense of this region.

There are, practically speaking, no other good naval bases on the Crimean Shore. Small naval units of defensive significance can be based at: Bypatoriya, Feodosiya, Kerch and Yalta.

In the number of other naval bases of the Soviet seaboard of the Black Sea, it is necessary to indicate Odessa, Novorossiisk, then Alderman (Belgorod-Dnestrovskii), Ochakov, Nikolaev, Thapse, Sochi, Sukhumi, Poti, and Batumi.

The latter five points cannot be considered as naval bases; they must be added to the series of defensive regions for defense of the territorial waters of the

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Black Sea.

In the Sea of Azov, it follows to mention: Taman, Berdyansk (Osipenko), Temruk, Bisk, Taganrog and Rostov-on-the-Don.

Resulting from what has been said, the main naval operational directions can be mentioned: the ports of Romania and Bulgaria: Constanta, Varna, Burgas; Constantinople (Istanbul); Zonguldak (the main coal region of Turkey) and the closest region to the straits from the east; Sinop and Samsun, as the initial points for a campaign into Anatolia; Trapezund; as auxiliary, cooperating with the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military operations.

From the point of view of the western armies, the following missions can be set as the main operational tasks:

- a. Holding the straits in their own hands.
- b. Strengthening of the south (Turkish) shore of the Black Sea.
- c. Seizure of Constanta, Varna (Stalin) and Burgas in order to protect their operations from the area of these points.
- d. Isolation of the main Soviet naval base, Sevastopol, and then Odessa, and
- e. Initiation of landing operations.

Relative to the execution of landings from the sea, the region: Odessa, the northern shore of the Kirkinitchkii Bay and the sector between Akkerman and the Kiliya channel of the Danube, arouse the most interest.

The Soviet General Staff anticipates the possibility of such operations (Page of their adversaries, and does all in order that such operations (Page IIIe) cannot be accomplished. The main measures are connected with the creation of a tough defense.

On the Crimean Shore, landing operations, with suitable conditions of the operational situation, are possible in the regions: Yevpatoriya, Feodosiya, Kerch and Sevastopol.

At these points, with the exception of Sevastopol, there were landing operations during the war.

On the Crimean Peninsula and on the approaches to it, there are the following fortified regions: the Sevastopol, the Kerch (opposite Taman), the Yevpatoriya, the Feodosiya, the Yalta, the Kop-Takil, the Perekops of three lines of fortified

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positions - Perikops, Amnyansk and Ushchun; and the Ak-Monsai Feodosiya.

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To the number of natural fortified lines, covering distant approaches to the Crimean throat (the Perikops), belong:

- a. The lower course of the South Bug.
- b. The Dnepr River in the sector Kherson-Mikopol where there are no bridge crossings.

The Crimea is poor in railroad routes. It is connected with the center by two railroad lines:

- a. Kherson-Perikops-Dzhankoi-Simferopol-Sevastapol;
- b. Melitopol-Dzhankoi-Kerch.

The Kerch Peninsula, the supply of which can be assigned to the Azov Flotilla, is in a somewhat better situation.

The Crimea is also poor in highway routes, but their absence is not a hindering condition since the Crimean steppe permits movement by all types of transport off the roads.

Evolving from what has been said, it is possible to point out the ground operational directions:

- a. The Crimean: (1) The Kerch (Kerch-Dzhankoi),  
(2) The Simferopol (Simferopol-Dzhankoi).
- b. On the approaches to the Crimea:
  - (1) The Kherson,
  - (2) The Melitopol.

If it is impossible to say about the Black Sea, naturally, that it is "a Russian Sea", then it is possible to say this about the Sea of Azov.

The entry into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait is closed by the Kerch and Taman fortified regions which present themselves as a system of shore batteries along the whole extent of the strait.

With a penetration into the Sea of Azov initial seizing of Kerch and Taman or one or the other of the shores of the Kerch Strait is required.

There are no specially good sectors for carrying out landing operations in the Sea of Azov. It is almost impossible to land on the sector between Teyruk

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and Kamishevát, thanks to the exceedingly swampy locality; also landing is difficult in the region of Azov, Taganrog and Rostov which present themselves as fortified points, mutually covering and supporting one another. The northern shore of the sea between Stepanovka (south of Melitopol.) and Taganrog presents itself as much more possible.

The operational directions of the Azov sector are:

- a. The Krasnodarsk, with further development of a strike,
  - (1) Either through Tikhovets<sup>k</sup>aya-Salsk to Stalingrad,
  - (2) Or through Kropotkin-Armavir to Grozny,
- b. The Rostov-Stalingrad, and
- c. The Dnepropetrovsk. (Page 111b)

Several through railroad routes run to the northern shore of the Sea of Azov, and in this relation the sector Melitopol-Rostov is in a more favorable situation.

Of the air bases (aerodrome centers) in the considered sector, the only main ones are: Odessa, Pervomaisk, Kirovograd, Apostolovo (southeast of Krivoi Rog), namenka (south of Nikopol), Berislav (opposite Kaldiovka), Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Melitopol and Fedorovka, Lozovaya, Slavyansk, Gorlovka, Stalino, Rostov, Taganrog, Eisk, Berdyansk (Osipenko), Krasnodar; stations: Timoshevskaya, Gribenskaya, Gostagaevskaya; Taman, Perikop, Amyansk, Dzhankoi, Ak-Monai, Sarabuz, Kacha, Koktebel, Yevpatoriya, <sup>and</sup> Saki. (Page 112)

#### The Significance of the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations

Under the title "Zakavkoz Theatre of Military Operations", the Soviet General Staff understands the zone of locality lying between the Meridian of Kerch-Damassk (37 degrees of latitude) and the Meridian of Teheran (the 51<sup>st</sup> degree of latitude), bounded on the north by the main Kavkaz Range, and on the south by the line of the north shore of the Persian Gulf - the port of the Haifa on the Mediterranean Sea. We will put the north border along the line Rostov-on-the-Don-Astrakhan.

The territory of the theatre is up to 1000 kilometers in width and up to 1500 kilometers in length. It flanks the states: in the event of a local conflict, those adjoining the border of the Zakavkaz, the northwest corner of Iran, and the eastern part of Persia; in the event of the development of the more wide

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conflict of a world war, also the territory of Irak and Syria on the south and to the north. Pre-kafkase from the right bank of the Danube on the North.

The theatre has three peculiarities which distinguish it from the other theatres of military operations and impose its imprint not only on the tactics of troops but also on their organization.

The first peculiarity is its clearly defined mountain character which excludes the massive employment of heavy military technical equipment of ground troops and in general the execution of large operations, splitting them into separate directions, sometimes not connected one to another. The southwest territory is desert expanses which force, in addition, the employment of special tactics, and even the organization of the troops operating there.

The second peculiarity is the hot, and in places the unhealthy malarial climate which hinders the operations of troops, and temporarily completely excludes them.

The third peculiarity is the presence of great water expanses (the Black and Caspian Seas, Urmia and Vanskoje Lakes) which cause the operations of the ground troops to be combined with the operations of fleets and flotillas, and permits the execution of combined operations.

Operations, speaking about those which transpired in the given theatre during the past war, give to us an impression about the role which the given theatre played in the general system of the remaining theatres of military operations, and as well about the character of the operations possible in it, and thus, we briefly pause on their description.

During the first world war, the theatre played a secondary role for Russia (the main one was the Western Theatre of Military Operations), but it fulfilled one of the responsible operational-strategic missions. It was the mission of strategic encirclement of the group of countries of the adversary (Germany and Turkey), the severing of her from the east and in particular, depriving the adversary of strategic raw material, such as oil.

The military operations which developed, chiefly on Turkish territory, attracted up to 20 Russian and up to 30 Turkish divisions. The most active operations developed

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on the Pre-Black Sea and Erzerum Directions. The most characteristic is the Sarikamish (Turkish), the Erzerum and Trapezund (Russian) Operations. The details about them can be read in the books:

- a. "The Maneuver Period of the First World War", Professor Kalinkovski, and
  - b. "The World War", Zaionchkovski (both are in the school library)
- ..... The Sarikamish operation gives to us an example of how three corps of Turks which were drawn into the conflict, in the course of 30 days lost 70 per cent of their personnel and did not fulfill the mission (seizing Sarikamish) because of poor preparation for operations in mountains in the cold season of the year (the main losses were those who froze in the passes), because of the erroneous estimate as to the utilization of local resources by the troops, and because of the loss of control of the disunited columns.

On the other hand, the Erzerum Operation affirms the complete possibility of successful operations under such conditions with sufficiently thoughtout preparation of operations and with good endurance of the troops (Page 112a). The seizure by the Russians of the city Trapezund (The Trapezund Operation) is an example of coordination of ground troops and a navy.

The result of the campaign -- the debouche of the Russian troops on the front Trapezund, Erozinzhan, Mush, Rayat, and of the English in the region of Bagdad -- completed the mission assigned to the theatre of military operations -- the encirclement of the countries of the adversary. And only the revolution in Russia and the necessary withdrawal of the troops from the front did not permit the Allies to seize the Mosul oil region.

After the revolution of '17 the events in the theatre transposed themselves to the territory of the Zakavkaz. The Russian Army was withdrawn from Turkey and Persia. The Turkish troops occupied the previously lost territory without combat and even entered into the

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Zakavkaz and occupied Baku. While aiding the newly formed Zakavkaz Republics to suppress the attempts of the communist uprising, they at the same time carried out the destruction of the Armenian population. Well known is the three day massacre of the Armenians in Baku, the complete destruction of the city of Shush with its Armenian population and the murder and driving of the Armenians inland out of the territory in Armenia occupied by the Turks (the Kars District). This period is characterized also by internal wars and mutual destruction to a man of all the nationalities of the Kavkaz that also continued later during the German and English occupations of the Zakavkaz. The main purpose of these occupations was once again the seizure and the holding in their own hands of the Baku oil-bearing region.

It follows to recall that the Kavkaz in general and the territory of the Pre-Kavkaz in particular was a base and concentration area for for the development of the Anti-Communist movement led by General Denikin. The conditions of the concentration area permitted the seizing of Eastern Ukraine and the movement to the north up to Tula.

The events of the Second World developed only on the territory of Iran. The chief purpose of the Soviet-English occupation of Iran was the cutting off of the group of adversaries from the East, the creation of a threat to Turkey by way of a strategic encirclement of it in the event of violation by it of neutrality, and the establishment of a physical junction of the Allies and guarantee of the communications which were feeding the USSR, and a more strong guarantee of the oil regions of Irak and Iran.

The entry of troops on to the territory of Iran did not encounter resistance from the side of the latter. The occupation completely fulfilled the mission assigned to it. The desire of the Soviet state on the sly to carry out a campaign for a reunited Azerbaidzhan (naturally under Soviet control) finished with complete failure in view of the negative attitude of the Turkish Azerbaidzhanians toward the Soviet system.

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From a military point of view, it is interesting to note the following moments:

- a. The main operational direction was the Tabriz.
- b. The Pre-Caspian operational direction operated jointly with the Caspian flotilla which executed a landing at the port of Bekhlevi.
- c. The Zakavkaz front mounted a blow jointly with the troops of the Central Asiatic Front.

In order correctly to define the contemporary significance of the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations, we must consider the two variants of military operations. The first variant is the breaking out of a local war, a personal conflict between the USSR and its neighbors (Turkey, or Iran or their bloc). The second variant, and which the current political situation dictates to us, is the most likely variant -- the next world war in which the adversary of the USSR is the bloc of the majority, if not all, of the remaining countries of the world.

In the event of the first variant, the superiority of strengths shows itself to be unconditionally on the side of the USSR and she will be in condition to accomplish the mission of seizing a sufficiently large territory of Turkish Armenia and Persian Azerbaidzhan. From this, besides the territorial conquests, and the transfer of the border from the vital object -- Baku, there will be no gain, but the successes of it undoubtedly will call forth aggravation of relations with England who will not contemplate the approach of Soviet troops to her Iranian and Irak oil without participation. (Page 112b)

For the opponents of the USSR in this variant the theatre assumes a more important significance since, besides the possible territorial annexations, the seizure of Baku, which brings a very serious economic loss to the USSR, unconditionally interests them.

The military operations will be accompanied by engagements between the individual national groups, and as well by the struggle of all of them with conquerors -- that is, by a wide wave of partisan movement.

In the event of the second variant -- the outbreak of a world war

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-- the significance of the theatre immeasurably grows for both sides.

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On the side of the Soviet Union, this is explained by the fact simply that in the given theatre it will solve the mission of separation of the forces of the adversary into Eastern and Western groups. For this, it will employ all forces to push forward a front at least on the line Samsun-Kaizeri-Merzin on to Turkish territory and on the line Meshkhed-Isfagan-Persian Gulf on Persian territory -- by this to separate the territory of Turkey from India.

Besides this, the strategic encirclement of India (jointly with the forces of Communist China) is attained by the given operation, and consequently the transfer of India to its side or the forceful occupation of this very rich country.

But in the event of such a conflict, the military operations in the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations cannot be confined to the territory of Turkey and Persia, and unconditionally will be transferred to the territory of Irak since seizure of one of the powerful sources of supply of an army; oil -- is an important strategic victory and puts in the hands of the USSR all the advantages connected with possession of this raw material.

This "démarche" best of all guarantees also the personal oil-bearing region of the USSR -- Baku -- since it boundlessly pushes back the border from it.

For the Allied Anti-Communist Bloc, the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations also may play one of first degree significance. In the first place, from the point of view of preserving for itself the useful routes of communication of Europe with Asia (and in the first rank with India); in the second, from the point of view of preserving for itself the oil-bearing regions of Irak and Persia; in the third place, in view of the extreme importance of disrupting the supply of oil to the Soviet Army (Baku yields about 75 per cent of all the oil extracted in the USSR). In addition to all the rest, the Zakavkaz can

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be considered as the territory from which to open the shortest and the most satisfactory route to the vital and strategically important objects of the U.S.R.

The Kavkaz-Samara Direction cuts off the European part of the Soviet Armed Forces from the Asiatic part and at once disrupts the normal supply of one and the other. By a debouche in the region of Samara, the administrative-economic center of the country -- Moscow -- is placed under a threat, and in event of the prompt transfer of the stavka of the supreme command from Moscow to Samara, that also in general disrupts the complete direction of the fronts and the coordination of their operations.

This "demarche" delivers into the hands of the allies the very rich bread regions of the Kuban and the Don, the very rich sources of coal of the Donbass and in general can be looked on as a completely advantageous and suitable "place de arms" for the final destruction of the forces of the Soviet Army with transposition of the operation beyond the Urals and in an eastern direction, and into the Ukrainian a westerly direction.

This latter circumstance becomes still more important in view of the possibility of the Allied Navy to coordinate with the ground armies (the Black Sea) and furthermore to supply them.

Such is the significance of the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations at the present time and such operations in it may unfold during the possible future war. (Page 121)

The General Description of the Theatre of Military Operations

A. The Soviet General Staff under the Central Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations understands the territory, bordered on the north by the line Balkhash -- Aral Sea, on the south by the shore of the Arabian Sea, and on the east by the line Urumchi -- Delhi and on the west by the meridian of Teheran.

On the Soviet side, this territory belongs to the Turkistan

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Military District, including the Turkmen, the Uzbek, the Tadzhik, the Kirgiz and a part of the Kazak SSR.

Beyond the limits of the USSR, the theatre of military operations includes the territory: the eastern half of Iran; Afghanistan; Pakistan; the northwest corner of Hindustan and the eastern part of the province of China--Sinkiang.

The extent of the theatre is about 2500 kilometers in length and the same in width.

B. The theatre has several peculiarities which influence the organization of troops and the character of military operations.

1. The mountainous-desert locality. More than 60 per cent of the state borders of the USSR traverses mountains which attain an altitude of from four up to six thousand meters. Approximately 50 per cent of the territory of the theatre of military operations is occupied by mountains and highlands, among which is located the highest summit in the USSR (Stalin Peak, 7495 meters, in the Pamir Mountains) and the highest mountains in the world--the Himalayas and the Karakorum (with summits, Godwin Austin, 8620 meters and Everest, outside of the theatre, 8882 meters).

The second half of the territory is almost completely occupied by deserts. The most significant of them on the territory of the USSR are: The Kara-Kum, the Kizil-Kum, the Hungry Steppe, and beyond the limits of the USSR, the Takla-Makan (in Sinkiang), the Tar (in Hindustan), the Registan and the Dasht-i-Margo (in Afghanistan), the Desht-i-Lut and the Kevir (in Iran).

Only a small extent of the territory of the theatre of military operations is occupied by oases, which are located along the banks of rivers and present themselves as suitable for settled places. In them is concentrated the main mass of the population, the density of which here attains 100 (in the valleys of the Murgab, the Zeravshan and the

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Gergan) and even 300 persons per square kilometer (in the valley of the Indus), at the same time as in the mountains and desert regions it falls to 0.1 persons per square kilometer and still less than that.

2. The severe continental climate. The northern part of the theatre of military operations lies about 45 degrees north latitude, and the southern part at the 25th parallel, that is, it is located almost in the tropics. This determines the unusually severe climate of the theatre of military operations. The temperature of the air in the deserts rises in the shade up to 50 degrees centigrade, and the soil heats up to 70 and more degrees (the steady temperature of the sand in the Kara-Kum in June is 79.4 degrees). To tread barefooted on the soil is absolutely impossible, and eggs placed on the sand are cooked.

The presence of high mountain regions gives powerful contrasts in temperature. The highlands have a mild temperature, and many mountains are covered with perpetual snow (the temperature on the summits of the Karakorum does not rise higher than minus 40 degrees Centigrade).

The remoteness of a great part of the theatre of military operations from the sea and the enclosure of the territory by mountains which do not permit moist winds determine the continentality of the climate. The completely cloudless sky in the course of the great part of the year permits the above-noted elevation of the temperature, and on the other hand, the severe chilling at night and in the winter. The daily amplitudes of the ground attains 60, and the yearly - 100 degrees.

The quantity of precipitation varies from 100 kilometers (the deserts) up to 1200 centimeter (the southwest foothills of the Himalayas, the place most rich in rain in the world).

3. The disjunction of separate sectors. The huge territories

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of the theatre of operations are occupied by localities difficult to traverse and even completely impassable for movement and the waging of military operations. To these belong: (Page 121a)

- a. The Takla-Makan Desert with a breadth of up to 300 kilometers,
- b. The mountain system of the Pamir, the Karakorum, and the Himalayas, with an average breadth of up to 500 kilometers,
- c. The difficult-to-traverse region, the Hindukush, with a breadth up to 200-300 kilometers, and
- d. The Dasht-i-Lup and Kevir deserts with breadths of 300-500 kilometers.

Military operations in the directions disconnected by these natural obstacles will take place without operational communication, and the Himalayas and the Karakorum divide the theatre of military operations into two strategic independent sectors: the eastern or Chinese, and the southern.

4. The relatively poor railroad nets of Central Asia and India are separated one from the other by 500 kilometers along the line Herat-Peshavar; 800 kilometers along the line Jutta-Kushka. In the Sinkiang Sector, this distance is increased up to 2500 kilometers; in the Iranian Sector, it is shrunk to 350 kilometers. In this expanse the supply of operations can be carried out only by the net of roads or by aviation, which abbreviates the quantity of troops which can be employed in an operation.

C. The Central Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations is not a main theatre for the USSR; however, its role recently has been raised. It is a "place de arms" from which, in due course, communism was introduced into Sinkiang and extended finally to the whole of China. The very same thing is being attempted with Afghanistan by armed forces supporting the coming to power of Ammanuly-Khan. At present, the target of influence is India with its millions of impoverished population.

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The shortest distance to India from the USSR lies right on the territory of the given theatre of military operations. For the USSR, the territory of the theatre of military operations is important as almost the sole source of cotton.

D. Examination of the military events of the past which took place on the territory of the theatre is important to us from the point of view as to which directions on which they developed. Recalling several of these:

1. The campaign of Alexander the Macedonian (327 B.C.).

From Central Asia, he penetrated into Kabul, crossed the Hindukush by the Bamian and Khavak passes, and by the Khaiber passage debouched into the valley of the Indus, and moving along the southwest foothills of the Himalayas, approached the valley of the Ganges.

2. The Arabian Invasion (712). The Arab Achmed Ben Kasima penetrated mainly through Zenedan (Persia) and particularly through Kandagar in the region of Quetta and expanding, cut along the whole lower Indus to Multan.

3. The Kushman Invasion (977-1030). From the region of Gazna (Afghanistan was the center of the Gaznavidskii Kingdom) Lakhmud penetrated through the Khaiber passage, and also through the Gumal passage in the Sullimar Mountains to the Valley of the Indus and to Pyandzhab (15 Indian campaigns).

4. The Mongolian Invasion. (1217-20) The invasion of the Mongolians under the leadership of Ghengis Khan through "the Dzhungarskii Gate" (the valley of the river Ili) into the basin of the Aral Sea.

The Persian campaign of the Mongols by the son of Ghengis Khan, Tulya, through Meshkhed-Shanrud.

The Afghanistan campaign of Ghengis Khan through Herat and Khanabad to Kabul.

The India campaign of Babur (descendent of Ghengis Khan, 1504) through Kabul and the Khaiber passage into the valley of the Indus to Delhi.

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## 5. The Persian Invasion (1738) through Quetta.

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The above indicated directions of invasions also at the present time are almost the sole suitable directions for carrying out massive military operations. (Page 122)

The Central (Afghanistan) Sector

A. The Central Sector of the theatre which is being studied by us will be the zone of locality with the borders: on the west, the Iranian-Afghanistan Border - the Aral Sea; on the east, the western shore of Lake Balkhash-Delhi. In view of the fact that in the indicated zone, Afghanistan, the territory of which is the "place de arms" for close operations, borders on the USSR, the sector may be called the Afghanistan Sector.

For the whole theatre of military operations, this is the main sector. In it will be resolved the basic mission of the whole theatre of operations -- penetration into India.

It follows to direct attention to the fact that to the three southern sectors -- entrants to the Soviet-Afghan borders -- run strategic through routes: to the region of Kushka, the single track railroad from the station of Merv on the Central Asia Railroad which is joined with Krasnovodsk; to the region of Termez, the single track branch line from the station Kagan (Bukhara), which is joined by a double track railroad to the deep rear of the country; and to the southern part of Pamir, by the roads which are good for automobile transport from the railroad station of Osh and Stalinbad. It follows to consider the rivers Sir-Darya and Amu-Darya, passable for small craft for a great distance, as supplementary through routes.

The locality on the other side of the Soviet-Afghanistan border presents in itself three completely different zones:

1. The Afgano-Turkistan lowland with a breadth of 50-150 kilometers stretches along the border from Faizabad up to joining of the Iranian, Afghanistan, and Soviet borders. This plain gradually

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rises on the south and is transformed into the foothills of the Hindukush plateau with a continentally severe and dry climate. The road net of the lowland is represented in a main artery--the automobile road Faizabad, Khanabad, Mazar-i-Sherif, Maimene, Herat and further to Meshed (Iran) with many branches running to the south to the foothills of the Hindukush and on the north to the Soviet border. Most important are two junctions: Mazar-i-Sherif, with roads to Termez and to the passes of the Hindukush, and Herat, with roads to Kushka and Farak-Kandagar, in circumlocation<sup>of</sup> the Hindukush from the west.

An obstacle is represented in the river Amu-Darya, which for a distance of 450 kilometers (from the region of Kulvaba to the village Basago) is a border river and having up to 1.5 kilometers width and up to 3 meters depth, a swift current with absence of fords, and presents itself as a serious defensive line for both sides.

In the summer months a great difficulty for operation of troops is the "Afghanets", a wind of southernly direction, which regularly rises in the second half of the day and carries with it masses of dust.

2. The mountain system of the Hindukush with a length up to 700 kilometers and breadth to 200 (on the east) to 600 (on the west). On the eastern part, it has an altitude up to 7750 meters (the summit of Pirach-Mir) and passes to 500 meters. Only the Berogil Pass (from the valley of the Vakhsh-Dara to the valley of the Yazina) has an altitude of 3800 meters and is the most passable. A great part of the year, the passes lie under snow and do not permit passage even by pack transport.

The western part of the Himalayas has a lesser altitude. The numerous ranges drop away in fan shape and gradually diminish to the southwest. Between them are desert valleys, covered with stones. The road net is also poor. For movement in a meridian direction in the foothills, there is only the pass Khavak (3550 meters, an historic route between Kabul and the valley of the Amu-Darya) and the automobile road through the Bamian Pass (from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sherif). The road

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from Kabul to Herat surmounts a large number of passes, passing through them on pack trails, passable only a few months of the year. 50X1-HUM

The road Kabul-Kandagar is suitable for automobile transport. (Page 122 a)

3. The valley of the Indus and Fundjab is an oasis with subtropical vegetation, a harsh climate, and on the southeast is transformed into the sand desert, the Tar. The approaches from the northwest are the passages:

Khaiber (from Kabul to Peshavar), Bolans (from Kandagar to the lower course of the Indus), and several passes through the Buleimanov mountains, passable to pack transport (among them the most useful is the Gumal Pass).

The Ind River and its tributaries (the rivers, such as the Pyandzhad) are serious defensive lines and obstacles for movement. In the drought period of the year, they, in their middle course, have breadth of 250-300 meters and depth of 3-4 meters, and in its lower reaches the Ind covers several kilometers and forms several channels. In the rainy time, often the rivers overflow and flood huge areas.

The net of unpaved roads-caravan routes and wagon roads-are little suitable for automobile transport. The railroad net is well developed.

B. The Central Sector has the following operational directions:

1. The Gilgits. From Murgab through the Barogil Pass to Gilgit and further along the valley of the Ind River to Mervalpinda. It permits the operation only of mountain troops, not more than a division, and that only in the summer months when the passes are open. The trails do not permit normal transport of supplies, and thus the supply of personnel will have to be carried out at the expense of local resources. The employment of mechanized troops is completely eliminated and aviation is seriously curtailed. The sole mission of the direction can be a debouche on the flank and the rear of the Peshavar group and disruption of the communication line Iakhar-Peshavar.

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2. Faizabad. From the region of Kulgab to Faizabad and further through the Dara Pass and along the valley of the river Svat to Peshavar. The capacity is not more than one division of mountain troops without wheeled transport. The Dara Pass, 4500 meters, is open only in the summer months. The mission is a debouche on the flank of the Peshavar group.

3. The Kabul - the chief one in the sector. It has two departure regions: Kirovabad and Termez. From the first: movement is possible along the roads through Khanabad, the Khavak pass to Kabul. From the second, along the road through Mazar-i-Sherif, the Bashin Pass to Kabul. The total capacity is up to four divisions of mountain troops. The mission is the seizing of the capitol of Afghanistan, Kabul. Further operation will depend on the general purpose of the military operations. In the event of personal conflict with Afghanistan, the main group would be directed through Ganzito Kandagar for final occupation of the country and covering to the side of the Khaiber Passage. In the event of conflict with India, the main group will be directed to the southeast with the mission of penetrating to Pundjab and threatening Delhi. With fulfillment of this mission, part of the forces from the Kabul region will be directed to Kandagar for covering the right flank and communication with the Kandagar Direction, and on the other hand with debouche in the valley of the Ind, the troops of the Gilzit and Faizabad Directions will be joined.

4. Parapamir. From the region of Kerk to the south. It permits the movement of all types of troops. The mission is limited-seizing the Afgan-Turkistan Lowland to link the Kabul and Farakh Directions, later to serve as their reserve. Only up to one mountain division can penetrate further to the interior of the Himalayas along the valley of the upper course of the river Geri-Rud in the region of Davlat Yar for further cooperation with the Kabul or Farakh Directions.

5. Farakh. The most roomy of the directions of the Afghanistan Direction. It permits the movement of up to five divisions of all

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type troops. The close mission is the deep invasion and occupation of Afghanistan with debouche of the troops in the region of Kandagar. From the region of Herat and Farakh, it permits the penetration of troops on to Iranian territory. The later mission is the forcing of the Suliman Mountains in the direction of Quetta and debouche into the valley of the middle Ind, from which part of the troops can be directed for occupation of the lower Ind, and part in the direction of the fort of Sandeman or Multan for union with the adjacent directions in the seizing of Pundjab. (Page 123)

The Flank Sectors

To the west and northeast from the Central Sector are located two flanking, completely independent sectors of the theatre of military operations. The first of these is the Iranian which permits operational-strategic cooperation with the central sector, the second, the Chinese or Sinkiang, is completely operationally isolated and operations in it can take place only with strategic inter-communication with the central sector.

A. The Iranian Sector.

Under the Iranian Sector of the Central-Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations is the zone, bordered on the east by the line Aral Sea-Iran-Afgan border; and on the west, the meridian of Tehran. The width of the zone which is 800 kilometers to the north of the Soviet-Iranian border, attains 1000 kilometers to the south of it. On the territory of Iran, it includes its eastern half.

The basic significance of the sector for the Soviet side is the coordination with the Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations in seizing the oil sources of Iran and thus the basic operations develop in the Tehran Direction. The supplementary significance of the sector is penetration into the southeast part of Iran for debouche on the shore of the Persian Gulf.

From the Soviet side, two main direct routes on which the

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supply of troops operating in the sector is carried out run to the border: the railroad route Bukar<sup>3</sup>-Dushak, with branches from Tedzhen to Saraks (not confirmed) and the railroad route from Krasno<sup>o</sup>sk to Ashkhabad (with the facility of connecting Krasno<sup>o</sup>sk by sea transport with Gurev and Astrakhan). (Pas to the peculiarities of the locality located on the territory of Iran which influence the operations of troops, it follows to bring out the following:

1. Two parallel ranges: the Kopet-Dag and the Turkmen-Kharasan stretch for 400 kilometers along the border and have only two good through routes: Dushak-Meshkhed and Ashkhabad-Kuchan-Soltanabad.
2. The eastern part of the Elbrus, dividing the Pre-Caspian Lowland from the remaining territory of the country.
3. The waterless sand deserts, Kevir and Lut, disconnecting the central part of Iran from its eastern borders.

The roads in the indicated sector are caravan routes, little and especially automobile adapted for wheeled transport. The main route is Meshkhed-Shanrud (the terminal station of the railroad).

The operational directions are:

1. The Zakhedan. From the line Zalekhabad-Saraks to the south. The capacity is up to two divisions of mountain troops. The mission is the seizing of the eastern edge of Iran, and after debouche in the region Zakhedan, the penetration to ports of the Persian Gulf (especially to Bender-Abaza) or invasion on the territory of India and debouche to the Lower Ind.
2. Shanrud or Tehran (frequently called Meshked for the main road junction) is the main direction of the sector. From the line Zalekhabad-Saraks-Dushak through Meshkhed-Shanrud to Tehran<sup>e</sup>. The capacity is up to five divisions of all types of troops. The mission is the seizing of the northeast part of Iran and a union with the Zaka kaz Theatre of Military Operations and seizing of Tehran.
3. Kuchan. Supplementary to the first. The capacity is one

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division of mountain troops. The mission is the seizure of Kuchan and further, Soltanabad and by the establishment of operational communication between the Shanrud and Maritime Directions.

4. The Maritime. From the region of Kizil-Arvat along the shore line of the Caspian Sea to Chaluz. The capacity is up to two divisions of mountain troops. The mission is seizing of the ports of Kaspia, especially the terminal point of the Trans-Iranian Railroad-Bender-i-Shakh and the establishment of communication with the troops of Zakavkaz Theatre of Military Operations. Operations in it can be joined with operations of a fleet (Page 123a).

#### The Chinese or Sinkiang Sector

The Sinkiang Sector of the Central Asian Theatre of Military Operations is the zone of locality stretching from the west to the east within the border on north of Lake Balkhash-Urumchi, on the south, the Aral Sea-Karakorum Range.

The peculiarity of this sector is defined from one side by the presence of an almost unpassable barrier in average width of kilometers (the system of the Himalaysa, Karakorum, and the Kuz'N-Lunya), which isolates operations in the Central and Sinkiang Sectors, and on the other hand, the completely independent strategic mission which stands before the given sector. Its main significance is the carrying of Communism to the countries of China, it is relevant to say, with the present political situation, not an actual mission.

As main through routes on the territory of the USSR, it follows to consider: railroad routes: Semipalatinsk-Alma-Ata, Aris-Frunze, Ursatevskaya-Osh. Each of the three terminal stations are joined to the border by dirt, improved roads, altogether suitable for utilization of auto-transport.

The obstacles for operations of troops against the neighbors of the USSR are:

1. The desert of Dzhelelsun, located in the center of the

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Dzungariya.

2. The eastern spurs of the Tyan-Shan with an average altitude of about four thousand meters, however, give the possibility of operations by the two parallel longitudinal valleys from Kuldzh to Urumchi and from Przhhevalsk to Karashar.

3. The deserts of Takla-Makan, with a breadth up to 400 kilometers, located in the center of the Kashgariya, the dried-up river Tarimon, along the banks of which is located an almost continuous oasis.

The sector has the following operational directions:

1. Chuguchak. Located along the continuation of the road to Shikho from Ayaguz (a station on the Turksib) to Chuguchak. The capacity is one division. It permits the operations of all types of troops. The mission is a debouche into the region Shikho to threaten the rear of the Kuldzhin group. Later, to participate in operations in the Urumchi Direction.

2. The Urumchi, the main direction of the sector. From the region of Dzharkent to the east along the northern spurs of the Tyan-Shan. the capacity is up to three divisions; operations of all types of troops are permitted. The mission is a debouche into the region of Urumchi to seize the central operationally, favorable region for continuation of the offensive to the east, to the interior of the province.

3. The Tyan-Shan. Along the Ili Valley and the Karashar Valley, the general capacity is up to two mountain divisions. The mission is a debouche in the region of Karashar and finally to seize the operationally, favorable central region of the province.

4. The Ak-Su. From the region of Przhhevalsk through the Bebel Pass. Operations are possibly only in the summer months and with forces of not more than one mountain division. The mission is a debouche in the operational rear of the Kashgar group; later, participation in operations on the Karashar Direction.

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5. Kashgar. Operations for fulfilling the close mission, the seizing of the region of Kashgar, develop along three mountain roads: 50X1-HUM

- a. From Mirin through the At-Bash Range, from the northwest;
- b. From Osh through the Alai Range and the Karabel Pass, from the west;
- c. From Jurgat Temir through the Karasui Pass, from the southwest.

The total capacity is up to four mountain divisions; the two latter passes are the less suitable. Further operations must take the character of a two-pronged flank of the desert Takla-Makon and develops along two roads: (a) Kashgar-Ak-Su-Karashar with the mission of a debouche in the vital region Brumchi-Karashar; (b) Kashgar-Shotan-Miran with the mission of seizing the southern oases of Kashgar. The capacity of each of the directions is two-three divisions. The operations of all types of troops are permitted (Page 124).

Operational Directions on the Territory of the USSR

A. The locality on the territory of the Central-Asian Theatre of Military Operations has the following peculiarities, favorable for the Soviet side:

1. The huge pre-border regions are occupied by natural barriers having a strong defensive nature. Such are: the Dzhungar Alatau Range, the mountain system Tyan-Shan and Pamir, the headwaters of the Amu-Darya, the Kopet-Dag Range, the Ire-Caspain sand deserts of the Kara-Kum.

2. The huge expanses on the territory of the neighboring countries, which do not have railroads and a weakly developed net of little suitable dirt roads.

3. The huge expanses on the territory of the rear of the theatre of military operations, occupied by the hard-to-surmount deserts, the Kara Kizil-Kum<sup>and</sup> and the Hungry Steppe.

The vital regions on the territory of the USSR are: Semireche (to the northeast of Frunze and Alma-Ata), the region Dzhambul-Turkistan-

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Tashkent, the Fergana, Zerabshan, Murgab, and Khorezm Oases. All these, with the exception of Semireche and the Murgab Oasis, are covered by natural barriers. 50X1-HUM

In view of what is said above, the military operations on the Soviet territory of the theatre of military operations will be distinguished by the following peculiarities:

1. The theatre will be weakly manned with troops; the employment of massive armies is impossible. The unusually suitable use in the theatre of formations of the local nationalities in view of their familiarity with the locality and greater acclimatization.

2. Supply of the soldiers will be hindered, thus it will be opportune to use products of supply from local resources, and to use the road net only to haul loads of ammunition and fuel.

3. The most expedient strategic maneuver is a two-pronged flank of the main group of vital regions in the directions: from the north: Kuldzha-Alma-Ata-Aris, from the south: Iderat-Dukhara-Tashkent, with the covering of the right direction on the right on the barrier Lake Balkhash and with joining of the left flank of the second direction by operations in the region Asukhabad-KrasnoVo sk.

4. The characteristic operational-tactical maneuver will be the encirclement of separate vital regions (oasis), crushing them with wedges into parts and subsequent destruction of the knots of resistance.

5. The tactical operations are in strong dependence on the local conditions of climate and locality. The mountain and desert regions compel the employment of troops with special organization and in the main, with pack transport. The hot climate requires great preliminary preparation and training of troops.

B. The northern sector is the territory, located to the north of the line Kashgar-Tashkent. It has the following operational directions.

1. Chuguchak. From the region Chuguchak to the station Ayaguz.

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The capacity is up to two divisions, permitting the operations of all types of troops. The mission is the severing of the Turk-Sib Railroad<sup>50X1-HUM</sup> Line and support of the right flank of the Ili Direction.

2. Ili is the main direction of the sector. From the region Kuldzh to Alma-Ata and further in the direction of the station Aris. The capacity is up to four divisions. It permits the operations of all types of troops. The mission is the seizing of Semirech; further, debouche in the region of the station Aris, to cut off the Tashkent group from the north. This direction decides one of the main missions of the theatre of military operations. It requires the constant reinforcement of troops and strong covering of the right flank (Page 124a).

3. The Issik-Kul. From the region Ak-Su through the Bebel Pass to Przhevalsk, The capacity is not more than one division of mountain troops. Operations are possible only in the summer time. The mission is limited--to seize the basin of the Issik-Kul Lake and by this to support the left flank of the Ili Direction and to enter into the rear of the Marin Group

4. The Marin. From the region of Kashgar in the direction of Frunze, the capacity is one division of mountain troops. The mission is to seize Frunze, to aid the Ili Direction in fulfilling its close mission; further, the junction with its troops for joint operations.

C. The Central or Pamir Sector is that territory in the triangle Kashgar-Tashkent-Ishkhab--the mountain shield of the Mergana Oasis. It has the following operational directions:

1. The Alai. From Kashgar to the west to the valley of the river Kizil-Su, from there the main operations will be directed through the Taldik Pass to Osh with the aim of tying up the Mergana group; supplementary directions are the Kizil Art Pass and the valley of the Kizil-Su with the aim of complete blockade of the Pamir. The capacity is up to one division of mountain troops. Operations are possible only in summer months.

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2. The Murgab. From Keshgar through the Karesul Pass to Murgab. The capacity is up to one division of mountain troops. The aim is on invasion to the interior of the Pamir spurs and the liquidation of its garrison. 50X1-HUM

3. The South Pamir. From the region of Gilgit through the Barogil Pass to Murgab. The capacity is not more than a division of mountain troops. The mission is that of the Murgab Direction. Operations on both directions are possible only in the summer.

4. The Kulyab. From the region of Faizabad-Khanabad to Kulyab and Garm. The capacity is two divisions of mountain troops. The mission is the seizing of the Vakhsh Valley; further, the creation of a threat to Stalinabad from the east and blockade of the Pamir from the northwest.

D. The southern sector is that zone of locality, located to the north from the line Khanabad-Caspian Sea, with exclusion of the Fergana Oasis. If the Ili Direction of the northern sector fulfills one of the basic missions of the theatre of military operations--cutting it off from the deep rear of the country--then the southern sector fulfills the main mission of the theatre of military operations--the seizing of the territory of the theatre and the destruction of the forces of the enemy cut off in it by the Ili Direction. The southern sector has the following operational directions:

1. The Stalinabad. From the region of Termez, between the Kafirnigan and the Sukhan-Darya Rivers. The capacity is up to two mountain divisions. The mission is, with coordination of the Kulyab Direction, completely to seize the southern foothills of the Gissar Range; further, the troops of this direction can be utilized for reinforcement of the Samarkand Direction

2. The Samarkand. From the region of the approach of the Soviet-Afghanistan border near the village of Basago to Karsh-Samarkand-Tashkent. It is the main direction of the sector and the theatre. The capacity is up to five divisions of all types of troops. The mission is,

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jointly with the Chardzhui Direction, the seizing of the Zeravshan Oasis  
further, jointly with the Ili Direction, the liquidation of the Tashkent  
group.

3. Chardzhui. From the region of Herat to Kushk -Merv-Bukharo,  
the second direction in importance of the sector, supplementary to the  
Samarkand Direction. The capacity is up to five divisions (increase is  
hindered only by the absence of a sufficient quantity of water). The  
mission is the seizing of the Murgab Oasis and the severing of the  
railroad in the region of Merv; further, by a blow on Bukhar to join  
the Samarkand Direction and the seizing of the Zeravshan Oasis, after  
which to operate jointly with it.

4. Ashkhabad. From the line Saraks-Meshked in the general  
direction Dushak-Ashkhabad. The capacity is up to four divisions of  
all types of troops. The mission is the seizing of the Tedzher Oasis;  
further, the liquidation of the Ashkhabad group.

5. Kopet-Dag, supplementary to the Ashkhabad Direction. From  
the region of Rudan through the Gaudan Pass to Ashkhabad. The  
capacity is one division of mountain troops. The mission is the tying  
up of the Ashkhabad group.

6. Kizil Arvat. From the region of Bender Shakh-Kizil Atrek on  
flank of the Kopet-Dag from the west to Kizil Arvat-Kazandzhik. The  
capacity is three divisions of all types of troops. The mission is the  
severing of the railroad in the regions of Kizil Arvat-Kazandzhik;  
further, cooperation with the Ashkhabad Direction in seizing Ashkhabad  
and a debouche on the shore of the Caspian Sea in the region of  
Krasnovodsk. The latter mission can be solved in coordination with a  
fleet which must blockade Krasnovodsk port and can carry out a landing  
in the region of Krasnovodsk.

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SUBJECT

Military Economic Geography, USSR, Part II, Crimea

(Page 7)

CRIMEA (Operational Characteristic)

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5A. CRIMEAN THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

a. General Characteristic

(1) It is necessary to consider the basin of the Black Sea as an independent theatre despite the fact that this sea is the left flank of the general strategic Eastern-European Theatre.

(2) The Crimean Peninsula for the Soviet side is the chief region of the Black Sea Theatre.

(3) The Crimea, apart from the purely naval significance, has this significance: that it covers the Ukraine from the south, and covers the rear of the Odessa-Kishenev region.

(4) The Crimea is the chief "place de arms" for initiation of operations against the Black Sea straits, and, as well, operations in defense of the Romanian and Bulgarian seaboard.

(5) The Kerch Peninsula, in conjunction with the Taman Peninsula, closes the entrance to the Sea of Azov and by this covers the rear of the Ukrainian Theatre and the approaches to the Northern Cavkaz. (Caucases).

b. Operational Directions.

(1) Sea: The Constantinople, with the missions of seizing the Black Sea straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles in cooperation with ground troops of the Maritime Direction and with the air forces;

The Zonguldak, with missions of seizing the Zonguldak region (coal mining region) with subsequent debouch in the rear of the Constantinople region;

The Sinop, with the mission of a debouch into central Anatolia;

The Trabzon, with the mission of cooperation with the Zakavkaz

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The Bulgarian-Romanian Cities, with the mission of the defense of the Black Sea shores of these countries.

(2) The air operational directions coincide with the sea directions during operations, the naval forces and the air forces will be coordinated.

(3) From the point of view of the Western Armies, the main operational directions can be set as the missions:

- (a) Holding the straits in their own hands,
- (b) The strengthening of the southern (Turkish) shore of the Black Sea,
- (c) The seizing of Constanta, Varna, and Burgas,
- (d) The isolation of the main Soviet naval base, Sevastopol,
- (e) The initiation of landing operations.

(4) Relative to landing operations, the greatest interest is called forth by the regions: Odessa, the north and south shores of Karkinitzki Bay, Yevpatoriya, and Feodosiya; on the Kerch Peninsula, the region of Kop-Tak.

(Page 8)

## CRIMEA (Operational Characteristic)

## 54 The Crimean Theatre of Military Operations (Continuation)

(5) In the Sea of Azov, landing operations are more possible on the sectors to the east of Berdyansk, to the east of Mariupol. For the execution of landing operations in the Sea of Azov, vessels with slight draught, thanks to the presence of shallow off-shore depths, are required.

(6) The ground operational directions of the Crimea converge at the Perikops Isthmus. These can be: Yevpatoriya-Perikops, Sevastopol-Dzhankoi-Perikops, Feodosiya-Dzhankoi-Perikops; later, after debouch beyond the Perikops Isthmus, the operational directions run to Kherson and to Melitopol.

(7) The operational directions of the Azov Sector are the Krasnodar, with later development of a strike through Tikhoretsk-Salsk to Stalingrad, or through Kropotkin-Armavir to Grozny.

## c. Defensive Fortifications of the Crimea.

(1) The Sevastopol Fortified Region, consisting of a system of various

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shore fortifications.

(2) The Perikops Fortified Region, consisting of three defensive positions; the Perikops position, the Armyansk position, and the Ushunsk position.

(3) The southern course of the Dnepr from Kherson to Nikopol.

(4) The Kerch Fortified Region, coordinated with the Taman Fortified Region.

(5) The Ak-Monai Fortified Region (or Ak-Monai position) at the narrowest part of the Kerch Peninsula along the line Ak-Monai-Feodosiya.

d. The Main Bases of the Crimea.

(1) Sevastopol, the chief naval base.

(2) Kerch, a light fleet base.

(3) Yalta, Yevpatariya, Feodosiya and others, are the supplementary bases.

(4) Kacha, the main air base (there is a flying school located in Kacha in peace time).

e. Vocabulary: (omitted, since translated in text).

UKRAINE (Topography) (Page 17)

#### 59. OPERATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

a. The best time for operations.

(1) The beginning of this period approaches at the beginning or middle of May, when actually the spring high water ends, the roads and ground dry up and warm weather begins. The rains in this period fall although heavy but fairly seldom.

(2) The end of the best period usually approaches at the middle or at the end of September. Usually at this time the fall rains begin and gradually the muddy period on the roads, and the ground is saturated. The condition of the roads all the time worsens right up to the first freezes.

(3) In individual years the beginning and the end of the best period can fairly significantly vary. Especially often dry and warm <sup>fall</sup> months occur when the rains begin only in the second half of October.

(4) Generally, during unescapable use of unaved roads, a great significance is attached to the meteorological service, and especially long-term

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forecasts of the weather. 50X1-HUM

(5) The experience of fall operations indicate that the autumn period presents (despite the appearance of huge difficulties for all) huge advantages to the army possessing the more maneuverable transport and prepared for movement in conditions of the muddy season.

(6) However all the chief operations of the Second World War developed in the best, the summer period, and only were prolonged into autumn and even into the winter period.

## b. The Kiev Encirclement.

(1) It developed at the very end of the best period (it began 1 September and ended 11-13 September) and completely reflects the topographic peculiarities of the given region.

(2) The Kiev Encirclement was made by two rings along the lines: Chernigov-Nezhin-Priluki-Cherkassy and Chernigov-Konotop-Romni-Kremenchug.

(3) As an initial point for the breakthrough from the north were Nezhin and Konop, which lay on the southern boundary of the swampy district. In addition, both points are huge strategic railroad junctions.

(4) The southern initial points were located in such places where the right, the high bank of the Dnepr significantly recedes from the river and here it is convenient to make a crossing by any kind of means.

(5) The directions themselves were chosen so that the flanks of the moving wedges were covered by the difficult to traverse swamps and the rivers with swampy river valleys.

(Page 18) UKRAINE (Topography)

## 59. OPERATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (Continuation)

## c. The Kharkov Encirclement.

(1) The beginning of the Soviet offensive was 20 May 1942, and the end of the whole operation was 2-5 June.

(2) One blow was mounted between Kharkov at Lozovaya Station.

(3) The high, well fortified, bank of the Donyets interfered with the

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broadening of the breakthrough and the territory of the breakthrough developed the form of a pear. Two armies entered the breakthrough.

(4) German wedges closed the breakthrough by moving along the front and the Red Army, due to the conditions of the locality, was not in position to mount their blows on the flank.

d. Vocabulary: (not translated as already in English).

(Page 59) The Ukraine (Operational Characteristic)

E1. General Description of the Ukrainian Theatre of Military Operations.

a. Territory, borders, and general significance of the theatre.

(1) Borders: on the north, Chernigov, Ovruch, Sarni, Kovel, Lublin, Radom; on the south, the northern seaboard of the Black Sea, then the line Izmail, Budapest, Vienna; on the west, the line Brotslav, Brno, Vienna; on the east, the meridian of Kharkhov-Mariupol.

(2) The total extent in width is from 400 to 700 kilometers, in depth up to 1500 kilometers. In a general strategic plan, it is necessary to assign to the Ukrainian Theatre the Balkan Theatre which we will consider simultaneously.

(3) According to the military division of the USSR in the Ukrainian Theatre are the military districts: Kiev (Kiev), Odessa (Odessa), Precarpathian (Lvov), and Tavricheskii (Simferopol).

(4) The Ukrainian Theatre together with the Belorussian, the southern part of the Prebaltic, East Prussia, Eastern Austria and Hungary is called in military literature "The Eastern European Theatre of Military Operations".

(5) The general significance of the theatre is included in the following:

(a) The central part is the region of concentration of the mobilized Soviet armies,

(b) From the Ukrainian Theatre run the shortest routes to the central part of the Western European Theatre for the seizure of the great economic and political centers,

(c) With slowed-down operations on the Belorussian Theatre conditions for a deep strategic flanking movement by a strike on Berlin (Warsaw

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or on Voznan),

(d) With displacement forward the armies of the Ukrainian Theatre all the more and more hangs over the Balkan Theatre,

(e) The holding for themselves by the Soviet troops of the Ukrainian territory is a vital necessity from the economic, strategic and political point of view; with the movement of the Western armies forward one after another the Balkans, and then the Odessa region and afterwards the Crimea are overrun, further movement gives the possibility to develop a blow either on the Kavkaz, or with a pivot to the north, to the central regions of the USSR.

b. The General Geographic Conditions of the Theatre.

(1) The absence of limiting conditions for the employment of large troop units including also mechanized units.

(2) In favorable years combat operations can be carried out in any time of the year.

(3) In the periods of the spring and autumn, the seasons of bad roads may create a difficulty during operations in the northern part of the theatre adjoining Polesiya.

(Page 60) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

#### 81. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE UKRAINIAN THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

(Continuation).

(4) The southern half of the theatre is tied necessarily to joint operations with naval forces; in addition to this the Carpathian Mountain region requires special organization of troops.

(5) The water barriers (the rivers), which can be an operational obstacle: the Dnepr, Dniester, Prut, Seret, San, and the Visla; in addition to this, in the periods of freshet the rivers emptying into the Pripet can become such operational obstacles.

c. The Economic Significance of the Theatre.

(1) Ukrainian bread; the Ukraine is the breadbasket of the USSR.

(2) The coal-metallurgical Donbass, the Silesian coal region.

(3) The Drogobitch and Ploesti oil.

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(4) The success or failure of operations in the Ukrainian theatre in significant measure predestines the general success or failure of the war.

(5) Czechoslovakian industry.

d. Routes of Communications and Communications.

(1) The Ukrainian Theatre has a sufficiently developed railroad net which can support the maneuver of troops and their supply (a minimum of 50-60 divisions, reinforced by tank and artillery divisions and like support units).

(2) The telephone-telegraph communication is well developed; the junctions and lines of communications of local significance will have a great significance.

e. Vocabulary. (Not translated since already in English. However, the latter five phrases are not properly keyed to Russian equivalents.

(Page 61) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

## 82. THE LUBLIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

a. Operational Significance.

(1) The Lublin direction is the line Chernigov, Ovruch, Sarni, Kovel, Khelm, Lublin; during an offensive from the west to east it will be entitled the Chernigov Direction.

(2) The supply artery is the railroad line: Chernigov-Ovruch-Belokorovichi-Sarni-Kovel; the road in its whole extent is single-tracked with a traffic capacity of 24-30 pairs of trains per day which supports the supply of 3-10 divisions.

(3) The special significance of the Lublin Direction consists in that simply on it can be organized coordination between the Belorussian and Ukrainian Theatre; Polese cannot be a connecting link; the Lublin Direction, together with Polese must be assigned either to the Ukrainian Theatre or to the Belorussian.

b. Particular operational aims of the Lublin Direction.

(1) The close-in aim: debouch in the region of Vlodav, Lublin, Khelm, Kovel, and then, in dependence from the situation, the development of blows:

(a) To Warsaw along the right bank of the Visla, which is the most easily fulfilled insofar as here there is no specially hindering conditions,

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(b) An offensive to the west in the general direction Radon-50X1-HUM Petrokov, which leads to the deep flanking of the Warsaw region,

(c) A strike on the front Crakow-Tarnov to the deep rear of the Peremishlyansk region.

In any event, the Lublin Direction is assigned either with the Belorussian armies, or with the Ukrainian.

(d) In the latter two instances, the development of operation is tied to the necessity to force the river San (a tributary of the Visla) and the Visla.

c. The Conditions for Employment of Troops.

(1) For infantry and its equipment there are absolutely no impassable localities; tank troops and heavy artillery, and motorized units may encounter difficulty in the spring and autumn periods in sectors adjacent to the Pripet River.

(2) For aviation there are no special limitations; the Ukrainian Theatre has a developed net of aerodromes and their construction with the presence of means of mechanical labor does not present difficulty.

(3) However, it follows to consider that in the periods of muddy roads, the Ukrainian roads somewhat "dissolve" (evaporate) so that it is almost impossible to move about on them.

THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

82. THE LUBLIN OPERATIONAL DIRECTION (Continuation) (Page 62)

d. Operational Bases of the Ukrainian Theatre

(1) On Soviet Territory:

(a) Kiev, Korosten, Zhitomir, Pervomaisk, Odessa, Vinnitca  
main.

(b) Rovno, Lvov, Proskurov, Chernovitsi, Kishinev, Bratslov-  
second category.

(2) On the territory of other countries:

(a) Warsaw, Lodz, Radov, Petrokov, Chenstokhov, Cracow,  
Bucharest, Budapest,

(b) Keltai, Mishkolts, Debrechin, Lublin, Sandomir and others.

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## e. Defensive Barriers of the Lublin Direction.

(1) Rivers: Varta, Visla, Western Bug, which always present themselves as serious obstacles.

(2) The Turuya, on which stands the city of Kovel, the Styr (on which stands the city of Lutsk), the Gorin with its tributary, the Sluch; the Ubort and several others more shallow, but swampy.

## (3) Fortified Points and Barriers:

(a) The Kovel Fortified Region;

(b) Demblin (Ivanograd), which has a fort system;

(c) The Sarna Fortified Region;

(d) The Ovruch Fortified Region which was constructed in 1930-32;

(e) The south part of the Mozir Fortified Region along the Ubort River and others.

## f. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

(Page 63) THE UKRAINE (operational characteristic)

## 83. LVOV-CRAKOW OPERATIONAL REGION

## a. Territory and borders of the region

(1) In the composition of the considered region, it follows to include Chenstokhov Region, Kattovitsa, Crakow, Peremishl, Lvov, Tarnopol, Proskturov, Berdichev, Zhitomir and Kiev.

(2) To the Lvov-Crakow Region belongs the zone of locality to the north and south of the axis line: Kiev-Lvov-Peremishl-Crakow.

## b. Operational Significance and Operational Aims

(1) The described zone can be called "The Kiev Direction" (with an offensive from the west to the east) and "The Crakow Direction", with an offensive from the east to the west.

(2) The Crakow direction is the chief operational direction of the Ukrainian Theatre exactly the same, as for example, as in the Belorussian Theatre the main direction is the Smolensk (Moscow) direction.

(a) The region Lvov-Brodi-Tarnopol-Proskurov will be the region of concentration of the mobilized Soviet armies, and the region Crakow, Chenstokhov,

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Kattovitsi is the region of their deployment,

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(b) For the western armies the region Crakow, Chenstokhov is the region of assembly and regrouping of forces for a decisive offensive in the Kiev Direction,

(c) Through the direction Lvov-Crakow run the direct routes to the region of Breslau, Leiptsig, Prague, and also to the region of Berlin in flanking it from the south,

(d) An offensive of the western armies in the Kiev Direction is intended to lead to depriving the Soviet side of the Ukrainian bread, coal, and metal,

(e) Under these conditions the Ukrainian Soviet Front is severed into two parts, by which the southern part from Odessa Region and the Crimea is cut off into an isolated situation,

(f) Simultaneously communication with the Balkan Sector is lost, which, with the superiority of aviation of the western side, is equivalent to forbidding further campaign for the Balkans; the possibility to make a campaign for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles disappears as well.

c. Operational Capacity of the Region

(1) In the past war the First, Second, Third and then also the Fourth Ukrainian Fronts operated in the Ukraine; in the body of the first was not less than 15-20 divisions.

(Page 64) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

83. LVOV-CRAKOW OPERATIONAL REGION (Continuation)

(2) The First Ukrainian Front of 18-20 divisions was on the Lvov-Crakow Direction; this quantity also is the capacity of the Lvov-Crakow Direction.

(3) The Lvov-Crakow Direction actually does not have any kind of limiting conditions with the exception of the region of Lvov where there is a strongly dissected locality, then the Peremishl sector (a fortified region) and the upper course of the Visla near Crakow.

(4) The Lvov-Crakow Direction is the best supported with railroad and paved highway routes of communications which, normally can supply the operating

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armies.

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(5) There are no difficult sectors for the employment of large tank units (an army) in this direction; there also is no difficulty for employment of aviation.

(6) Geographically, the Lvov-Crakov Direction is the water divide between the Pripet and Dnester, the so-called Volinsk-Podolsk Plateau along which the main routes extend.

d. Defensive Barriers of the Sector

(1) Rivers: The San (tributary of the Visla) has a wide swampy valley; during a freshet it is difficultly accessible for forcing; the upper Dnester and Stir have deep ravines (gullies) with steep banks.

(2) Fortified Regions: Peremishl (an old fortress, many times destroyed and again restored), Lvov, and Crakov.

e. Operational Bases:

(1) General: Lvov, Peremishl, Proskurov, Shepetovk, Zhmerinka, Crakov, Tarnopol, Tarnov, Novi Sonch and others.

(2) Air: Proskurov, Vinnetza, Zdolbunovo, Berdichev, Lvov, Brzezhan and others.

f. Coordination with River Flotillas

(1) Operations of ground armies on the Lvov-Crakov Direction will proceed in individual sectors with the operations of river flotillas: The Dnepr Flotilla, the Dnester and the Visla.

g. Vocabulary. (Not translated since already in English)

(Page 65) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

84. THE UZHGOROD DIRECTION AND THE CHERNOVITSI-IASI OPERATIONAL REGION

a. General Characteristics of the Region

(1) The title "Uzhgorod Direction" is maintained in the pre-war descriptions; it would be more correct to call it the Budapest Direction:

(a) The Uzhgorod Direction is the zone of locality from the central operational line: Lvov, Sambor, Uzhgorod (in Hungarian, Ungvar), or Lvov, Strii, Mukachevo-Budanest,

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(b) The Uzhgorod (Budapest) Direction brings out the troops to the so-called Hungarian Plain: It runs in the beginning from north to south and then turns to the west to Budapest.

(2) The Chernovitsi-Iasi Region is the connecting sector between the Uzhgorod Direction and the Maritime Region; it is impossible to wage active operations on the Uzhgorod or on the Maritime Directions without seizing the Chernovitsi-Iasi Region, and then also the central part of Romania (Transylvania) because of the danger from flank blows.

(3) The Uzhgorod Direction and the Chernovitsi-Iasi Region are mountainous sectors which present special requirements for the organization of troop units and hinders the employment of large tank units and heavy artillery.

(4) At the present time the Soviet side is in a more favorable operational situation:

(a) Romania and Hungary are the protectorate of the USSR; the Soviet official border traverses Zacarpathia, (Transcarpathia),

(b) The western armies must overcome the Carpathians, the protection (defense) of which is simple, and then assemble forces to the east of the Carpathians for the development of further blows.

b. The Operational Targets of the Sides

(1) The side which shall possess Hungary and Bulgaria will be the proprietor in the Balkans.

(2) For the east (the Soviet) side the chief operational targets will include holding for itself the Hungarian Plain, the passages (passes) through the Carpathians and Wallachian Lowland (the locality between the Danube and the Transylvanian Alps):

(a) The loss of the Carpathians to the east side signifies the loss of the Balkans as a whole and further threat of loss of the Odessa Region,

(b) Under condition of holding the indicated regions in its own hand it has a favorable situation for developing thrusts to Austria and southern Germany.

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(Page 66) THE UKRAINE (Operational Characteristic)

## 84. THE UZHGOROD DIRECTION AND THE CHERNOVITSI-IASI OPERATIONAL REGION

(Continuation)

(3) For the western side the close target is the seizure of the regions of Budapest and Bucharest in order to flank the Carpathians from the south, and to cross them in the most passable part, in the Mukochevo-Uzhgorod region.

## c. Defensive Barriers Which have Operational Significance

(1) Mountain ranges: The Romanian (western) Mountains, The Sylvan Carpathians, the Eastern Carpathians consisting of three parallel folds: the Vulcan Range, the Moldavian Carpathians, and the Sub-carpathians.

(2) Rivers: the Seret, Prut, Dneestr, and the South Bug.

## d. Routes of Communications and Bases

(1) As a whole the region is poor in routes of communications; the Sylvan Carpathians, through the passes of which six through railroads run, is in the most favorable situation.

(2) Through the Eastern Carpathians/<sup>there</sup>are only two railroad lines, which lead out at the city of Dezh and at Alba-Ulya.

(3) In the initial stage of operations the Dneestr River can serve as a supply route, and with debouch in the region of Budapest, the Danube River; for the Western Armies, on the other hand, at the beginning the Danube, then the Black Sea and the Dneestr.

(4) The chief bases on Soviet territory: Kishinev, Tiraspol, Rimnitsa (on the Dneestr), Mogilev-Podolskii, Odessa, Chernovitsi, Stanislavov and others.

On Romanian territory: Dermeneshti, Brashov (Stalin), Dezh, Kluzh, Alba-Ulya, Aradea-Mare, and Arad.

On Hungarian territory: Budapest, Solnok, Miskolts, Seged, and Debrecen.

## e. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

(Page 67) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

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## 85. THE IZMAIL-BUCHAREST REGION

## a. Territory and Borders of the Region

(1) Includes the locality between the Danube and the Transylvanian Alps, that is, the Province of Wallachia:

- (a) The southern part of the Moldavian SSR,
- (b) The Izmil District UCSR,
- (c) The Odessa Region,
- (d) The Region of Bucharest and Floesti.

(2) The Izmil Bucharest Region and the Maritime Region are abruptly divided into independent operational sectors by the Danube River, the valley of which to Slistria has an innumerable quantity of arms, channels, bays and lakes with a total width of 20-30 kilometers (Balta);

(a) Besides the railroad bridge at Chernovoda and the ferry crossing at Rushchuk there are no other crossings over the Danube,

(b) The right elevated bank of the Danube presents a strong natural defensive line.

## b. Operational Targets of the Sides

(1) The main operational direction: Tirasool, Romaneshti, Galats, Bucharest, Kraiova.

(2) Supplementary directions: Kishinev, Fokshani, Rimnik, Floesti and Galats, farther along the left bank of the Danube to Dzhur'zhu.

(3) The closest operational target for the western side: the seizing of the region of Bucharest and Floesti as the political and economic center. For the eastern side, the holding of this region.

(4) The deep missions for the western side - the development of blows to Galats - Kishinev, and for the eastern side - to Belgrade or through the passes of the Transylvanian Alps and in circuit of them from the south to Arad.

(5) Both sides, that is the eastern and the western, in operations to the north of the Danube will be covered by this river.

(6) The eastern side in displacement to the west finds itself in a more serious situation thanks to the difficulty of forcing the Danube, and thanks

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to the fact that the Danube on the right bank has a series of fortress regions, as for example, Silistria, Turtukai, Rushchuk, Eistov, and in the interior - Shumla, Plevna, and Tirnovo.

(Page 68) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

## 85. THE IZMAIL-BUCHANEST REGION (continuation)

## c. The Special Significance of Izmail

(1) Izmail and the Izmail Region does not belong to the Moldavian SSR but belongs to the Ukrainian SSR. The reason for this is the necessity for the establishment of a special regime at the mouth of the Danube.

(2) Izmail, the ancient Turkish fort, erected at a good geographic point, closes the entrance to the Danube.

(3) The USSR, in counter-balance to the Sulina Channel of the Danube which is considered an international zone open for navigation, constructed a navigable route through the Kili arm.

(4) The Kili arm from Izmail and up to Cape Vilkov today is a continuous defensive zone inaccessible for attack either from the land or from the river.

(5) Strong fortifications in the region of Belgorod-Dnestrovskii (formerly Akkerman) have been constructed.

(6) The region of Izmail for the Soviet side is a region for concentration of forces operating in the direction of Galats and on the Maritime Direction.

(7) Thanks to the presence of the Danube River Flotilla, the Soviet side is in the better situation; the western side will be forced to improvise a river available vessels flotilla assembling for this purpose.

## d. Routes of Communication and Bases

(1) Railroads: Kishinev - Birlad - Tekuchi - Buzeu, Floesti. Tiraspol-Romaneshti, Galats - Buzeu. A branch from Izmail from the Akkerman railroad station.

(2) Also unpaved roads, the paving of which in combat conditions would not present a special difficulty, run along these railroads.

(3) The most difficult sectors are the crossings (bridge crossings) over the Prut and the Seret.

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(4) The Danube will be utilized (especially by the western side) in the form of a supply route. The Danube in its lower course freezes for 6 - 7 weeks.

(5) The chief bases on the routes of communication: Kishinev, Tiraspol, Akkermen, Beltsi, Ribnitsa (on the Dnestr), Mogilev-Podolskii and others.

More distant bases: Uman, Balta, and Pervomaisk.

e. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

(Page 69) THE DANUBE (Operational characteristic)

#### 86. THE MARITIME OPERATIONAL REGION

##### a. The Territory and Borders of the Region

(1) The seaboard zone of the Black Sea up to the right bank of the Danube to the depth of Rushchuk-Varna (Stalin).

(2) Further, the Maritime Region is divided into independent directions:

(a) To European Turkey: Burgas-Constantinople,

(b) The Sofia Direction.

(3) The Maritime Region encompasses the Northern and Southern Dobruja.

##### b. The Operational Characteristics of the Region

(1) Combat operations in the Northern Dobruja will be operations of naval forces and marines in coordination with airborne landings.

(2) The USSR will strive to hold the Romanian and Bulgarian seaboards as initial "place-de-arms" for the development of operations to the side of the Black Sea Straits.

(3) The western armies will set a mission of the seizure of the chief points of the seaboard: the Danube channels, and the cities - Constanta, Varna (Stalin), Burgas and others.

(4) The Northern Dobruja can accommodate not more than one operating army; the western side by a debouch to the Georgiev arm of the Danube fulfills its mission; on the other hand, the eastern (Soviet) side with a debouch on the line of the Bulgarian-Romanian border will be forced to split its offensive operations: to the south, to the Straits and to the west, to Sofia.

(5) The peculiarity of the Maritime Operational Region is that in the

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future war it is impossible to wait if Turkey and Yugoslavia will remain neutral; it can be assumed that with the first days of the war the Bulgarian-Soviet Armies will be forced to recoil to the north beyond the Danube.

(6) It can be assumed as well that in the pre-war period, allied armies will be out in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey; the USCR will put its troops into Romania and Bulgaria.

(7) The success or failure of the operations of one and the other side will depend on the character of the operations on the left bank of the Danube, in Wallachia.

(8) The operations of the western armies in the Maritime obligatorily must be reinforced by operations from the sides of Sofia and from the Greek seaboard.

(9) The most suitable sectors for landings are the regions to the north and to the northeast from Varna, the seaboard of the so-called "Serebryanii Bereg" (The Silver Shore), and then the region of Mangalia and the sectors to the south of Burgas.

(Page 70) THE UKRAINE (Operational characteristic)

86. THE MARITIME OPERATIONAL REGION (Continuation)

c. Operational Directions

(1) For the eastern side: the Shumla (the city Shumla, today Kolarovgrad), which then is subdivided into: the Plevna, the Sofia, and the Plovdiv.

(2) For the western side: from the south - the Burgas-Varna; from the west - the Shumla, then the Constanta.

(3) The Naval for one and the other side: The Danube (the channels of the Danube), the Constanta, the Varna, the Burgas.

d. The Routes of Communication and Communications

(1) One railroad traverses the Maritime Sector: Tulcha, Madzhidia, Dobruj (today Tolbukhin), DolgonoI.

(2) A railroad to Bucharest leaves from Constanta; from Varna to Shumla-Rushchuk and from Burgas to Zagora and Plovdiv.

(3) Paved highways run parallel to the railroads; only one railroad running from Tirnovo to Plovdiv runs through the Balkan Range.

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e. Bases

(1) Naval: Constanta, Varna, Burgas, Akkerman, Izmail, Odessa, Sevastopol.

(2) General significance: Odessa, Tiraspol, Izmail, Galats, Chernovodi, Shumla and others.

(3) Air (aerodromes and depots): Balta, Odessa, Per romaisk, Kishinev, Bucharest, Kraiova, Plovdiv and others.

(4) A special worry of the Soviet General Staff is the question of air cover of the listed bases, in first order, the naval.

f. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

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Military Economic Geography USSR, Part IV

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SUBJECT

"Caucasus, Turkestan and Middle Asia"

**THE CAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS**

**1. THE TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE**

**a. The location and peculiarities of the theatre**

(1) Under the Transcaucasus Theatre of Military Operations, the Soviet General Staff understands the zone of locality lying to the south of the Caucasus range. The theatre on the north by the line Rostov-on-the-Don-Astrakhan on the east by the meridian of Tashkent, on the west by the meridian of Samarkand, and on the south by the line Haifa - the north shore of the Persian Gulf.

(2) This territory is in the form of a rectangle with a width of 1000 kilometers and a length of 1500 kilometers.

(3) The territory of the theatre of military operations occupies, on the Soviet side, the North Caucasus and the Transcaucasus, on the other side of the border, the eastern half of Turkey, the northwestern part of Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

**(4) The theatre is characterized by three peculiarities:**

(a) The sharply contrasting mountainous and desert character of the terrain.

(b) The unusually hot climate with regions of tropical malaria.

(c) The presence of large water expanses (The Black and Caspian Seas, and the Aral and Balkhash Lakes).

**b. The significance of the theatre in past wars.**

(1) In the period of the First World War the theatre played a secondary role for Russia (the chief theatre was the Western Theatre of Military Operations), but fulfilled a responsible operational-strategic mission: it accomplished the strategic encirclement of the countries of the adversary (Germany and Austria-Hungary), severed them from the East and deprived them of petroleum.

(2) In the period of the Civil War, operations in the territory of Soviet Russia had the aim of the occupation of the Transcaucasus.

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of the ship, its cargo (city) and confiscation of the...

...with the second World War, the theatre...

...mission similar to the...

...adversary from the East, support...

...and firmly supported the safe...

...of the Theatre

...theatre cannot remain...

...war.

...the following operational strat...

(a) For the disconnection of the East and West,

...of the petroleum sources of Iran and Iraq...

**OPERATIONAL STRATEGY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS**

...OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE...

...source of petroleum, the Sovietists...

...in particular, the strategic...

...of the USSR: the preservation...

...and the West, guarantee of...

...the deprivation to the USSR of the...

...approximately 75 per cent of its...

...a "place de arms" (The North Caucasus)

...the territory of the USSR.

(The distance in points "c" (2) (b) cannot be...

...to the USSR, and require active...

...powerful allies

...Vocabulary (Not translated since already in English)

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## 109. ANIMALS, MATERIAL RESOURCES AND ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION

The territory of the USSR

(1) About 12 million people, which permits the mobilization of up to 2 million people, live on the territory of the Transcaucasus and the North Caucasus.

(a) The chief peculiarity of the population is its ethnically national makeup (numbering up to 30 nationalities) and membership in different religions which call forth continuous butchery leading to massacres to the last man.

(b) The population is distinguished by great physical weakness under local conditions.

(c) The best utilization of the population is the organization of local formations for waging partisan warfare.

(2) The economically important regions which could become targets

are:

(a) The petroleum extraction and petroleum distilling regions: Baku, Grozny, Maikop, and Batumi,

(b) The metallurgical and machine building: Kirovabad, Tbilisi, Gruzisi,

(c) The coal: Ochenchiri,

(d) The bread: the North Caucasus,

(e) The cattle raising: the mountainous and steppe regions.

(3) The routes of communication consist of:

(a) Railroads, of which the chief through routes are the lines: Moscow-Baku-Astara and Rostov-on-the-Don - Tuapse-Batumi and Tbilisi lines: Armavir-Grozni, Samtredi-Alyatl and Lenin Gruzskiy,

(b) Unpaved highways, of which five-ten are through and three-five are lateral,

(c) The sea routes of the Caspian and Black Seas.

(4) The territory of Iran and Turkey

(1) Each of the countries number 15-20 million people which permits sending in personnel from 1.5 up to two million men each.

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(a) Nationality also has a place, as it leads to national and religious discords as also in the Caucasus,

(b) Armies formed from the local peoples can be only armies for screening during the first period of military operations.

## TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

## 129. HUMAN RESERVES, MATERIAL RESOURCES AND ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION

(Continuation)

(2) It follows to include in the economically valuable regions:

(a) The Urmii deposit of petroleum (Iran) and the Artvin deposit of copper (Turkey), but the exploitation of one and the other is not carried out to a sufficient degree,

(b) The great deposits of petroleum of the south of Iran,

(c) The cattle raising mountainous regions.

(3) Routes of communication are still more poor than in the

Transcaucasus.

c. The territory of Irak and Syrie

(1) The human reserves of the countries are a population of about eight million people, homogenous in nationality and exceptionally qualified for operations under local conditions.

(2) Economically important regions are the Mosul and Kirkuk petroleum deposits which have world significance.

(3) Routes of communication are the single railroad (the Bagdad) and mainly the caravan routes of the desert.

d. Vocabulary: (Not translated as already in English)

## TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

## 130. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF IRAN

a. The locality of Iran

(1) The central part of the border zone to a depth up to 150 kilometers is occupied by three parallel ranges: the Kara-Dag (Black Mountain, 2500 meters), the Savelan-Dag (up to 4800 meters), and the systems, the Kun-i-Sakend, and the Kun-i-Bazaish (3500 meters).

(2) Along both sides of these ranges in a meridian direction

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stretch two obstacles: on the east, the Bagrov-Dag Range (3000 meters), and on the west, Lake Urmii. Still farther to the west lies the Kurdistan Range - a strategic barrier between Turkey and Iran.

(3) To the south of the 37th parallel stretches the Iranian Plateau, suitable for operations of all types of troops.

(4) To the south of the parallel of Khamadan, the ranges of the Zagros mountain system stretch in a general east-west direction.

b. The Operational Directions of the Close-in Theatre.

(1) Under the term "close-in theatre" is understood the territory from the Soviet state border to the line Teheran-Khamadan-Kermanshakh, along which must be solved the close strategic missions which face troops which attack in a southerly direction.

(2) Here the following operational directions are established:

(a) The Pre-Caspian (Resht) from Astar in three directions: to Resht, to Sarab and to Agar. The total capacity is up to three mountain rifle divisions,

(b) The Karadag, from Karyagino. The capacity is one mountain rifle division,

(c) The Tabriz, from the capitol Dzhulfa, the chief direction in the sector. The capacity is up to six-seven rifle divisions. The missions are the seizing of Tabriz and an offensive in the direction Khamadan-Kermanshakh,

(d) The Urmii, from Nakhichevan. The capacity is up to two rifle divisions. The mission is tactical coordination with the Turkish sector.

(3) Operations in the close-in theatre will be tied in with the operations of troops attacking in the general direction of Teheran from Central Asia.

c. The operational directions of the deep theatre.

(1) Under the term "deep theatre" is understood the remaining territory of Iran up to the shores of the Persian Gulf. In it will be decided the deep strategic missions of the theatre.

(2) Here two basic operational directions are noted:

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## 130. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF IRAN (Continuation) 50X1-HUM

(a) The Isfagan, from Teheran. The capacity is up to five rifle divisions. The mission is to support intercommunication with the troops of the Central Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations,

(b) The Abadan, from Khermanshakh, the main (direction) of the deep theatre. The capacity is up to six rifle divisions. The mission is the final seizure of the petroleum regions of Iran.

## d. The Character of Operations

(1) In view of the mountainous character of the great part of the territory of Iran, military operations in it will have the character of isolated operations in separate operational directions.

(2) Operations on the Resht direction in the initial period can be combined with landing operations by the Caspian Flotilla.

(3) During penetration to the close-in theatre the troops of the Tabriz and Urmii directions can be based on transport over Lake Urmii.

e Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

## THE TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

## 131. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF TURKEY

## a. Locality

(1) The Armenian Upland occupies all the northeastern corner of Turkey, stretching to 400 and more kilometers from the Soviet-Turkish Border. Its average elevation is 1000-2000 meters. A series of ranges rise up to 4000 meters.

(2) From the south, the Armenian Upland is bordered by the Armenian Tavr, which has only a few passes and rises to three-four thousand meters.

(3) The territory of Irak is occupied by the Mesopotamian Lowland, cut from north to south by two significant rivers: The Tigris and the Euphrates, in the lower courses of which huge swampy regions are formed.

(4) To the west of the Mesopotamian Lowland stretches the borderless expanses of the semi-deserts and deserts of Syria.

## b. Operational Directions of the Close-in Theatre

(1) Under the term close-in theatre is understood the territory of the

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whole of the Armenian Upland.

(2) Here the following operational directions are defined:

(a) The Ban, from Erzerum. The capacity is two rifle divisions. The missions are the seizure of the northern seaboard of Lake Ban and an offensive on Erzerum or the Bitli Pass,

(b) The Erzerum, from Leninakan, the main direction in the close-in theatre. The capacity is six-seven rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the region of Erzerum and an offensive either to the interior of Turkey or in the direction of the Mesopotamian Lowland through the Armenian Tavr,

(c) The Oltin, from Barzhoma. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is to cooperate with the Erzerum Direction by a strike on Erzerum from the north,

(d) The Pre-Black Sea Sector, consisting of the Pre-Black Sea and the Chorokh Operational Directions. The total capacity is up to two mountain rifle divisions. The main mission is the seizing of the ports of the Black Sea: Trapezund, Orda and Samsun. Operations are coordinated with the sea landing operations of the Black Sea Fleet.

c. Operational Directions of the Deep Theatre

(1) Under the term deep theatre of the Turkish Sector is held the territory located to the south of the Armenian Tavr.

(2) The following operational directions are defined here:

THE TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

131. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF TURKEY (Continuation)

(a) The Rayat, from the territory of Iran. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is a debouche in the rear of the Kirkuk Petroleum Region,

(b) The Mosul, from the Diyarbent Lowland, is the main direction in the deep theatre. The capacity is up to eight rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the petroleum region of Mosul-Kirkuk and an offensive on Bagdad,

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(c) The Damascus, from Mardin. The capacity is up to two brigades of desert troops. The mission is a deep invasion into Syrie,

(d) The Bairut, from Kilis. The capacity is up to five rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the ports of the Mediterranean Sea and the creation of a threat to the Suez Canal.

d. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

THE TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

132. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR.

a. Locality.

(1) A great part of the border territory is occupied by the Armenian Plateau with an average elevation of one-two thousand meters. On the north it is bordered by a series of mountain chains - the Minor Caucasus - which rise to 3.5 thousand meters.

(2) The Rion and Kurin Lowlands, which are disconnected by the small Curam Mountains, divide the Minor Caucasus from the Main Caucasus.

(3) The Main Caucasus Range is a barrier of strategic significance. It is almost impassable and has only 3-4 passes, of which only one is suitable for the movement of auto transport.

(4) The territory, located in the triangle Caucasus-Volga-Don is a plain permitting the movement of all types of troops.

b. The Operational Directions of the Close-in Theatre.

(1) Under close-in theatre is understood the territory from the state border to the Main Caucasus Range.

(2) Here the following operational directions are cited:

(a) The Pre-Caspian (The Baku), from the line Argebil-Agdash. The capacity is up to three rifle divisions, cooperating with the fleet. The mission is the seizure of Baku,

(b) The Stepanaker, from Medivan. The capacity is up to two rifle divisions. The mission is the seizing of Stepanaker and cooperation with the Baku Direction,

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(c) The Erevan, from Tabriz. The capacity is up to five rifle divisions. The mission is the seizing of Kazakh and an attack on Kirovobad or Tbilisi,

(d) The Tbilisi, from Kars. The capacity is up to five rifle divisions. The mission is the seizing of Tbilisi and debouch on the passes,

(e) The Borzhom from Ardagan. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is the seizing of the Suram Pass.

(f) The Pre-Black Sea (Batumi), from Khop. The capacity is up to three rifle divisions, coordinating with a fleet. The mission is the seizing of the region of Samtredi-Kutaisi.

(3) The chief operational directions in the close-in theatre are the Erzerum and Tbilisi.

c. Operational Directions of the Deep Theatre

(1) Under the term deep theatre is understood the territory to the north of the Main Caucasus Range.

(2) Here are cited the following operational directions:

TRANSCAUCASUS THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

132. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR

(a) The Grozny, from Makhach-Kala. The capacity is up to two rifle divisions. The mission is the seizing of Grozny and an offensive on Astrakhan-Elista,

(b) The Central Caucasus, from Tbilisi. The capacity is up to two mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the fixing of the Grozny group of the adversary,

(c) The Nevinnomis, from Sukhumi. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is the fixing of the Maikop group of the adversary,

(d) The Kuban, as the development of a landing operation on the shore at the sector of Novorossisk-Tuapse, the chief direction in the deep theatre. The capacity is up to 10 rifle divisions. The mission

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is the destruction of the Krasnodar group of the adversary and de-  
bouch on the line of the Don. 50X1-HUM

d. Vocabulary. (Not translated as already in English)

## CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

## 145. CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

## a. General Data

(1) Under the Central Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations is here taken into consideration the territory bordered on the north by the line Balkhash-Aral Sea, on the east the line Urumchi-Delhi, on the South the shore of the Arabian Sea, and on the west the meridian of Tehsrar.

(2) This territory is an irregular quadrangle with sides of 2500 kilometers.

(3) Within the limits of the theatre on the Soviet side are located the Turkman, the Uzbek, the Tadzhik, the Kirgiz and the Kazakh SSR, and on the other side of the border, the eastern part of Iran, Afganistan, Pakistan, the northwest corner of Hindustan and the eastern province of Sinkiang.

(4) The theatre has several peculiarities distinguishing it from other theatres. They are these:

(a) A mountainous-desert locality with a small quantity of water sources,

(b) A hot continental climate with a temperature of 50 degrees Centigrade in the low regions and with cold to minus 40 degrees Centigrade in the mountains,

(c) The dissection of the operational directions by the mountain massifs and deserts, the distance between which is hundreds of kilometers,

(d) The absence of a railroad net in the states bordering the USSR.

## b. The Significance of the Theatre

(1) For the USSR in this theatre will be solved the problem of carrying Communism to the countries of the East, and in first turn, to India.

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(2) For the adversaries of the USSR the missions which can be solved in the theatre are:

(a) Carrying out of air attack on the regions of military raw materials and industry - the Ural - Kuzbass (the most short distance),

(b) Depriving the USSR of its main source of cotton.

c. Historical Data on Military Events in the Theatre

(1) At present we first of all are interested in those operational directions on which military events developed in past centuries. They are these:

(a) The Campaign of Aleksander the Macedonian (before the birth of Christ) erupted from Central Asia through Katul and the Khaiber Pass into India,

(b) The Arabian Invasion (712) from the west through Kandagar to Quetta and towards the Lower Indus,

145. THE CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (Continuation)

(c) The Musselman Invasion (the tenth century) from the west through the Khaiber and Humal Passes,

(d) The Mongolian Invasion (the thirteenth century) through the "Dzhungar Gate" into the basin of the Aral Sea, and further through Meshkhed into Persia and through Kabul into India.

(2) The directions enumerated above are also at the present time almost the sole routes suitable for the operations of troops.

d. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

THE CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

146. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CENTRAL (AFGANISTAN) SECTOR

a. The Definition of the Sector

(1) Under Central (Afganistan) Sector of the Theatre of Military Operations we have in mind the territory bordered on the east by the line of the western shore of Lake Balkhash - Delhi, and on the west the Aral Sea - Iranian - Afganistan border. The width of the zone is about 1200 kilometers.

(2) This territory occupies the great part of Soviet Central Asia, all of Afganistan (from whence also the second significance of the sector) and the

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northwest part of India.

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(3) For the whole of the theatre of operations it is the main sector.

## b. The Locality

(1) On the territory of the USSR, the locality has a mountainous-desert character:

(a) The mountain country, the Pamir, plays the role of a barrier.

There are only dirt roads and the greater part of them are trails,

(b) The western foothills of the Pamir go up to the valley of the Amu-Darya River which is an oasis,

(c) The remaining territory is deserts where it is possible to find only a single oasis, the Murgab,

(d) The single railroad is the Central Asiatic Railroad.

(2) The remaining part of the sector is mountainous on the north; to the south it gradually transposes to deserts.

(a) The Afgan-Turkestan Lowland, with a width of about 150 kilometers, stretches along the Soviet-Afgan border,

(b) The mountain system, the Hindukush, up to 600 kilometers in width, occupies the central part of the sector. It is accessible for movement only in certain directions,

(c) The valley of the Indus runs through the Tar Desert. Here it has a more developed railroad net.

## c. Operational Directions

(1) In evaluation of the operational directions the movement of troops from north to south is held in view.

(2) In the sector the following operational directions are noted:

(a) The Gilgit, from Murgab (the Pamir). The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is a debouch into the rear of the Peshevar group of the adversary,

## 146. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CENTRAL (AFGAN) SECTOR (Continuation)

(b) The Faizabad, from Kulyab. The capacity is one mountain

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rifle division. The mission is a debouch on the flank of the Peshevar group of the adversary,

(c) The Kabul, from Kirovobad and Termiz. The main direction on the sector. The capacity is up to four mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Kabul and penetration into the Pundjab,

(d) The Paranamir, from Kerk. The capacity is in places unlimited. The mission is to serve as a reserve for the neighboring directions,

(e) The Farakh, from Kushka. The most roomy in the sector, accommodates up to five divisions of all types of troops. The mission is a deep invasion into Afghanistan and penetration to Central India.

e. Vocabulary: (Not translated since already in English).

#### THE CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

#### 147. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FLANK SECTORS

##### a. The Iranian Sector

(1) The definition of the sector.

(a) Under the Iranian sector is understood the belt of the Central Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations in the borders from the east of the line Aral Sea - Iranian - Afghanistan Border, from the west, the Meridian of Teheran. The width of the belt is from 800 to 1000 kilometers,

(b) From the Soviet side this territory occupies almost all the Turkman SSR and on the other side of the border, the eastern half of Iran,

(c) The chief significance of the given sector is cooperation with the Transcaucasus Theatre of Military Operations in fulfilling its close-in mission; the secondary significance is the debouch of Soviet troops on the shore of the Persian Gulf.

(2) The locality of the sector is mountainous, with huge desert

expanses.

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(a) On the Soviet side there are two through routes: the 50X1-HUM railroads from Bukhar-Dushak and Krasnovodsk-Ashkhabad which put the Soviet troops in a more favorable situation,

(b) On the territory of Iran it follows to mention the barrier mountains, the Kapet-Dag and the Elbrus and the huge deserts, the Kevir and the Lut.

(3) The Operational Directions.

(a) The Zakheden, from Zakhkhabad. The capacity is two mountain divisions. The mission is the seizure of Zakheden and penetration to the ports of the Persian Gulf,

(b) The Shanrud (Teheran), from Saraks. The capacity is five rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the northeastern corner of Iran and an offensive on Teheran,

(c) The Kuchan, from Ashkhabad. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is cooperation with the Shanrud direction,

(d) The Pre-Caspian (The Bendar-Shakh), from Kizil-Arvat. The capacity is two mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the Caspian ports.

b. The Sinkiang Sector

(1) Definition of the Sector.

(a) Under the Sinkiang or the Chinese Sector, is understood the zone of the Central Asiatic Theatre of Military Operations extending in a latitudinal direction in the boundaries on the north, Lake Balkhash-Urumchi, and on the south, the Aral Sea - Karakorum Range. The width of the sector is more than 1000 kilometers,

THE CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

147. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FLANK SECTORS (Continuation).

(b) On the Soviet side within the limits of the sector are located the Kazak and Kirgiz SSR, and on the other side of the border, the eastern province of China - Sinkiang,

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(c) This sector is completely separated from the remaining territory of the theatre and operations in it will be developed only in strategic coordination with the operations on other sectors.

(2) The Locality. side

(a) On the Soviet side, the territory on the south is mountainous, on the north, steppes. It has three lateral railroads: Semipalatinsk-Alma-Ata, Aris-Frunze, Ursatevskaya-Osh,

(b) On the territory of Sinkiang there are three serious obstacles for troop operations: the Dzhelisin desert, the eastern spurs of the Tyan-Shan (up to 4000 meters) and the Takla-Makan desert.

(3) The Operational Directions

(a) The Chuguchak, to Shikho. The capacity is one rifle division. The mission is a debouch in the rear of the Kuldzhin group of the adversary,

(b) The Urumchi, from Dzarkent. The main direction of the sector. The capacity is up to three rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Urumchi;

(c) The Tyan-Shan, along the Ili and Karashar valleys. The capacity is up to two mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Karashar,

(d) The Ak-Sui, from Przhevalsk. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is a debouch in the rear of the Karashar group,

(e) The Kashgar, from Narin, from Osh and from Murgab. The total capacity up to four mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Kashgar and an offensive in flanking the Takla-Makan Desert.

c. Vocabulary (Not translated since already in English).

THE CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

148. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR

a. General data.

(1) The locality of the theatre of military operations, in the event

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of an offensive of troops toward the side of the USSR, unusually handicaps operation.

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(a) The pre-border regions are occupied by barriers: the Dzhungareki Ala-Tau, the mountain systems of the Tyan-Shan and the Pamir, the headwaters of the Amu-Darya River, the Kapet-Dag Range and the Pre-Caspian Kara-Kum Desert,

(b) Further, on the territory of the USSR are located deserts, the Kara - and Kizil-Kum, and the Hungry Steppe,

(c) The neighboring countries of the USSR have the closest railroad points in remoteness from 500 up to 2,500 kilometers from the borders of the USSR.

(2) The above indicated peculiarities of the locality dictate the following measures to the operations by troops operating there:

(a) The separation of operations into separate operational directions,

(b) Basing to the greatest extent on the local resources in view of the difficulty of transport,

(c) The form of strategic maneuver must be the flanking and encirclement of separate inhabited important regions, and the tactical, the subsequent liquidation of the groups in the individual oasis.

b. Operational Directions of the Northern Sector.

(1) Under the term Northern Sector is understood the territory located to the north of the line Kashgar-Tashkent.

(2) With an offensive toward the side of the USSR the following operational directions are mentioned:

(a) The Chuguchuk, in the direction of Ayaguz. The capacity is two rifle divisions. The mission is to cover the right flank of the Ili Direction,

(b) The Ili, to Alma-Ata, the main direction on the sector. The capacity is up to four rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Semirech and an offensive on Aris,

(c) The Issik-Kul, from Ak-Sui. The capacity is one mountain

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rifle division. The mission is the support of the left flank of the Ili Direction,

(d) The Na'in, from Kashgar. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is the seizure of Frunze.

c. The Operational Directions of the Central Sector.

(1) Under the Central Sector is understood the territory within the triangle Kashgar-Tashkent-Kulyab.

(2) The sector has a secondary, a fixing, significance.

THE CENTRAL ASIATIC THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

148. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR (Continuation)

(3) During an offensive toward the side of the USSR, the following operational directions can be utilized:

(a) The Alai, from Kashgar. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is the blockade of the Pamir from the northeast,

(b) The Murgab, from Kashgar. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is the occupation of the Pamir,

(c) The Southern Pamir, from Gilgit. The capacity and mission are the same as for the Murgab Direction,

(d) The Kulyab, from Faizabad. The capacity is two mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the blockade of the Pamir from the northwest.

d. The Operational Directions of the Southern Sector.

(1) Under the term Southern Sector is understood the zone of locality to the north of the line Khamadan-Caspian Sea.

(2) This is the main direction in the whole theatre.

(3) Here the following operational directions can be utilized:

(a) The Stalinabad, from Termiz. The capacity is two mountain rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Stalinabad and cooperation with the Samarkand Direction,

(b) The Samarkand, from the village Bassaro. This is the main direction of the given sector and of the whole theatre. The capacity is up to five rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure

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of the Zaravshan Oasis and an offensive on Tashkent,

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(c) The Chardzhuï, from Herat. The second in importance in the sector. The capacity is up to five rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the Murgab Oasis and an offensive to Tashkent,

(d) The Ashkhabad, from Seraks. The capacity is up to four rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of Ashkhabad,

(e) The Kopet-Dag, from Kuchan. The capacity is one mountain rifle division. The mission is to cooperate with the Ashkhabad Direction,

(f) The Kizil-Arvat, from Bender, Shakh. The capacity is three rifle divisions. The mission is the seizure of the Kizil-Arvat and an offensive to Krasnovodsk or Ashkhabad.

## e. Vocabulary:

- (1) the upper reaches (of a river)
- (2) encirclement
- (3) support
- (4) Central Asiatic Mountain village

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Police System (Including Labor Camps)

TRANSLATION OF OR FROM

Russian

REFERENCES

Reading File of same title

SUBJECT

Police System (Including Labor Camps)

THE SOVIET POLICE

## 1. Purposes and Principles.

In this synopsis the short term "police" signifies the whole police system of the USSR, consisting of the secret police, the prison-camp police, the police troops and the militia.

## a. The purposes of the Soviet police.

(1) The apparatus shadows the people and informs the government as to the moods of the people. Control over the ideas of the peoples under the Soviets is accomplished by means of secret surveillance of them. The police support a multiplicity of informer nets and spies permeating the Soviet life at all times and coming into contact with practically all people in the territory of the USSR. Through reports the police compile card files on "enemies" who eventually are subjected to liquidation.

(2) The apparatus of physical force ("liquidation of the enemies"). It serves for the removal from Soviet society of elements objectionable to the regime by means of enslavement or their destruction. The objectionable elements are: people who oppose the Soviet regime, people suspected of opposition and people potentially capable of opposition.

(3) The apparatus for support of the dictatorship (terrorizing the population). Any dictate of the government is fulfilled by the population under the Soviets out of fear of the police. Every man subject to the Soviets knows that if he does not submit to the most mild measures of Party suppression severe police repression awaits him.

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(4) The apparatus for guaranteeing the personal safety

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of members of the government ("guard of the leaders"). The personal safety of the "leaders" is permanently under a real threat from the side of the population who hate these "leaders". The police partition off the leaders from the people and defend their lives.

(5) The apparatus for exploitation of slave labor. The greatest and most labor consuming constructions are accomplished in the USSR by means of slave labor. The police look on prisoners as cheap slaves, the labor of whom is subject to every kind of exploitation and part of the slaves themselves are destined for destruction by means of this exploitation. The labor camps and labor colonies cover the whole of the USSR. By sacrificing an immeasurable quantity of lives of slaves, the Soviet government masters the rich uninhabited regions of the country. The slaves are exploited both directly by police organs and by Soviet economic organizations through contracts with the police.

(6) The apparatus of secret control and direction of vassal countries which belong to the Soviet bloc: the Eastern European countries, East Germany, China and so forth. In all these countries the Soviet police with the support of the local Communists fulfilled the first phase of their Sovietization: the destruction of the democratically thinking part of the population, in particular the intelligentsia and representatives of the property classes; the terrorization of all the remaining population; several measures for plundering these countries. In these countries, the Soviet police train the local secret political police into its own likeness. In these countries, the Soviet police deals with the militarization of production, the training of the local armies, the laying of strategic roads, the construction of military strategic works, and any other measures and works which have the purpose of preparation for war. The Soviet police also ceaselessly continue recruitment of slaves for the Soviet camps from the ranks of the liquidated "anti-Soviet-inclined elements" in the vassal countries.

(7) The apparatus for the Communist espionage-undermining and terrorist activities in all the free countries of the world. The Soviet police conduct the very widest espionage, the organization

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of wrecking groups, abduction and murder in all countries.

b. The principles of the Soviet police.

(1) Political expediency is the first directing principle of the Soviet secret political police. This police arrests and reduces to slavery any man when it becomes, from a political point of view, inexpedient to exploit this man as "a free citizen. This police, as a preventive, exiles, arrests, enslaves, and destroys persons or whole communities on orders of the Politburo which again is directed by political expediency. The police "cleanse" whole districts, regions, territories and republics from the "politically unreliable element", or resettle whole peoples. Such "purges" are carried out by the police on the very widest scales in the territories again reunited to the USSR and in the vassel countries.

Directed by political motives the Soviet police almost always bring economic loss to the Soviet State through arrests.

Any Soviet specialist, no matter how high his qualification, and how responsible a post he occupied, immediately was arrested, and is arrested by the Soviet police just as soon as the indications of his political unreliability are displayed. The economic loss for the state from his arrest can be any amount; the police disregard this.

(2) Inhumanity is the second principle of the secret political police, logically connected with the first principle. Inhumanity is necessary for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the work of Stalin's police. Compassion or simply a human relationship to the political prisoners inevitably would place the prison guards under danger of political influence from the side of the prisoners. The cruel inhuman relationship prescribed by Stalin ("mercilessness to the enemy") creates an hostile atmosphere between the political prisoners and the prison guards which is necessary for

1. Purposes and Principles (Continuation)

Stalin.

An MGB member is trained so that he looks on each "free" Soviet citizen as a candidate for slavery, according to official terminology as "an unexcused enemy of the people". An

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examining magistrate is placed under conditions which make him the deathly enemy of the person under investigation. He tortures the person arrested by any method necessary for fabrication of "business".

The prison guards, the convoy troops and the guards ~~cannot~~ bear strict personal responsibility <sup>for seeing</sup> that the arrested person arrives at the prison. Under no circumstances do they have the right to free an arrested person or even to ease his conditions of imprisonment. A seriously ill person or a woman with a nursing baby is not set free; they are not even put in a prison hospital if being transported. The chief of the transport must deliver them to the "prescribed place" dead or alive. During the retreat from the Germans during the Second World War, the Soviet police usually shot, burned to ashes, or transported the prisoners under inhuman conditions (instances of setting free were dictated only by military considerations).

From the moment of "conviction" the prisoner ceases to be a man in the eyes of the Soviet police. He is transformed into human material which, together with clay, sand and steel, is to be consumed most expediently for the construction of Stalin's "socialism".

The co-worker of the police actually is not responsible for the death of a prisoner from torture or the prison regime. And on the other hand, he is subjected to the most severe repression if it was noted that he displayed compassion, condescension or made any indulgence to the arrested "enemy of the people".

(3) Conspiracy (in Russian means "Observa<sup>nee</sup>- of Secrecy") is the third principle of the Soviet police. Conspiracy is the aggregate of methods, of rules and modes which guarantees the preservation of secrets for the longest possible term. All the work of the Soviet police is secret; the primary responsibility of police members is to keep the contents and aims of their functions in secret from the population.

The Soviet police is acquainted with two forms of conspiracy--active and passive.

The active form is disinformation ("DEZA"), that is

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deliberately disseminated false information by the police members.

The passive form is the preservation of service secrecy.

c. Vocabulary:

(1) "Chekist" is a member of the ChK (Extraordinary Commission). The name has been reserved and the workers of the MVD--MGB are given the very same title.

1. Purposes and Principles (Continuation 3)

(2) NKVD, the Peoples' Commissariate of Internal Affairs.

(3) MVB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

(4) MGB, the Ministry of State Security.

(5) chairman.

(6) concentration.

(7) recruitment.

(8) abduction.

(9) expediency.

(10) conviction.

(11) inhumanity.

(12) secrecy.

2. The Structure of the Police -- The Apex.

The exact structure of the Soviet police is unknown to us. However, on the basis of the quantity of information provided by the new emigration and published in the West and also of several personal observations by the author of this synopsis, it is possible to put together a certain approximate impression as to the structure of the Soviet police.

a. Stalin.

(1) Stalin is the supreme Communist policeman. Already during the life of Lenin he began his intrigues, leaning strongly on his people in the ChK-GPU. Later Stalin hunted down and destroyed all his political rivals by means of his police. The Yezhov Purge with its open slogan, "Long live Comrade Yezhov, the closest friend and companion of Comrade Stalin", uncovered to the whole world the apex of the police.

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(2) Stalin set the principles of the Soviet police, worked out its structure and orientation, and actually carries out the supreme direction of this police up to this day. Many characteristic features of the Soviet police are due to the criminal storehouse of the mind of Stalin.

At the present time, the Soviet police are so organized that on any of its levels the members are subject to secret surveillance from the side of other more trusted workers. Over the more trustworthy is fixed the surveillance of some still more trustworthy and so forth up to the very top. All the threads of direction and internal-political surveillance finally are concentrated in the hands of Stalin.

By means of such a system Stalin directs the police and possesses the capability to carry out within the police, and also amidst his own "rivals", any kind of purges and "liquidations".

b. Beria.

(1) Beria represents the next stage. Officially he is the "deputy" of Stalin in the Soviet of Ministers, and the member of the Politburo who heads the so-called "Beria Commission". In actuality he is the chief of the world Communist police. His functions are crucial and multiple. Within his province are found:

The Ministry of State Security, the MGB of the USSR;

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, MVD of the USSR;

The Ministry of State Control of the USSR;

The Supreme Court and all jurisprudence of the USSR;

Atomic Matters in the USSR;

The Ministries of Police in the vassel countries;

The supreme direction of the espionage-subversive activity in the free countries.

(2) From a single one of this list it is clear that Beria enjoys the special confidence of Stalin and is in charge of all the especially secret Soviet affairs and also of the fulfillment of the

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secret criminal machinations of Stalin. Beria sometimes <sup>goes in person to</sup> personally oversees

## 2. The Structure of the Police--The Apex (Continuation)

the vessel countries for conducting the reorganization of police there, ~~for~~ mass repressions and the like. (For example, in the beginning of 1951, Beria directed the liquidation of the remainder of the Communist "idealists" in Czechoslovakia, the type of Clementis, Khusak, Svermovaya, and replacement of them with Communists of the more criminal "Stalin" stamp).

### c. "The Special Sector" of the TsK of the VKP (b).

(1) Beria is closely connected with the "Special Sector" of the TsK which represents itself as if a broad operational secretariate of Stalin. He heads the secretariate of Stalin with General Poskrebishev. The sector controls all secret official correspondence of the TsK, reports the information summaries to Stalin, conducts the state secret communication service; and through the police line transmits and elaborates the orders of Stalin and Beria. In addition, Poskrebishev, according to all information, commands the personal guard of Stalin.

(2) The Special Sector regularly receives the summaries of the MGB which consist of two parts:

(a) The most important reports on the operational-surveillance activities of the MGB (the character of repressions, the testimony of those arrested and the like).

(b) Reports of the actual moods in the various strata of the Soviet society according to the agent data of the MGB.

The Special Sector immediately receives summaries of extraordinary events (mass movements, uprisings, terrorist acts and the like).

The Special Sector receives for Stalin the especially secret reports of the MGB on the conduct and personal life of the Soviet top responsible workers (not excluding even the members of the TsK).

The Special Sector formulates and transmits downward



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the various secret orders of the Politburo including also the orders pertaining to the police.

The Special Sector coordinates the Soviet espionage subversive activity abroad (coordinates the work of the "closed organs").

The Special Sector coordinates the work of the police in the vessel countries.

## 2. Vocabulary:

- (1) to persecute.
- (2) to expose.
- (3) surveillance.
- (4) subversive.
- (5) criminal.
- (6) communications system.
- (7) to be in charge of.
- (8) testimony.

## 2. The Structure of the Police--The Apex (Continuation 2)

- (9) summary.
- (10) report.
- (11) important worker.
- (12) coordinate.

## 3. The Structure of the MGB

a. The chief organs at the apex of the Ministry of State Security (the MGB of the USSR) are the following:

The Minister of State Security, Merkulov.

The Party Committee of the Ministry.

The Special Plenipotentiary of the Minister.

The Secretariate.

The Special Panel.

(1) The Party Committee of the MGB is distinctive in that it limits its activity to a purely Party "instructive" function. The MGB Party Committee does not concern itself in the substance of that function and does not control it since it is a secret organ. In the lower administrations of the MGB, the Party Committees also have a secondary significance.

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(2) The Special Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of the MGB with his apparatus, represents "an MGB within the MGB". In view of the conspirative functions of the police, the delinquencies and offenses, committed by the very members of the MGB, cannot be investigated by just any court. The Special Plenipotentiary investigates them: he conducts the investigations according to which the supreme leadership of the MGB determines the measure of punishment for the guilty member of the MGB. Special plenipotentiaries also are found in many lower organs of the MGB.

(3) The Special Panel is the Chief "judicial", more correctly, sentencing echelon of the Soviet police. The Special Panel consists of the Deputy of the Minister of State Security, the chiefs of operational departments of the MGB, the representative of TsK of the VKF and a representative from the prosecutor for special affairs. The mission of the "CS" is to sentence people who have been arrested during the process of preventive repression, that is, people who have done nothing against the Soviet power, but "can do" something. The sentences of the "CS" are up to eight years in the camps. The overwhelming majority of those arrested by the Soviet police are sentenced ~~by~~ by the Special Panel.

The Special Panels exist in the union-republic MGB's.

As far as it is possible to judge, the MGB of the USSR at the present time consists of 12 chief administrations and departments. According to ~~several~~ <sup>certain bases, convenient</sup> ~~several~~ <sup>several</sup> ~~convenient~~ <sup>convenient</sup> ~~for the police~~, the whole country is divided into strata and sectors, and each sector is under the surveillance of an appointed administration of the MGB. Several departments serve the specific requirements of the MGB itself.

(4) "The First Special Administration" is in charge of the roster of agents and the anti-Soviet element (ASE). A service "dossier", kept in this administration, is maintained on every agent, secret collaborator or informer.

The informer nets continuously deliver the police

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"material" on all, no matter how many, "observed people". All the "potential enemies" revealed in this manner are entered on the card files of the "First Special Department" of central, republic and district organs of the MGB. Such files are made on all people who are suspicious through origin, connections or their past.

### 3. The Structure of the MGB (continuation)

(5) "The Second Special Administration attends to the so-called "operational technique"; that is, the technical equipment and methods necessary to the police for surveillance of the people, for "exploitation of figurants", for investigation, for communications, and for other police functions.

To such belong--the equipment for listening to conversations in hotels, in foreign embassies and telephone conversations between Soviet citizens; photo apparatus and radio apparatus for various espionage purposes; ciphers and methods; preparation of false passports and other documents for Soviet spies; people, means of transportation, and communication apparatus for surveillance of "figurants" outside of living quarters; other like means.

(6) "The Third Department", working for the GULAG, keeps under control all prisoners and service personnel of the camps (ITL).

(7) The Department for Guard of the Leaders attends to the guarding of Stalin and the members of his "government" in Moscow, during movement and at the summer homes for the "members of the government" outside of Moscow.

(8) The Economic Administration (EKU), likely the largest in the system of the MGB, controls the economy of the country, mainly industry and agriculture.

Each Soviet enterprise or administration (factory, plant, trust, handicraft and agricultural organizations and so forth) have "Special Departments"; "Special Sections" or "Special Units". This is the open affiliate of the police in the given administration. It is subordinate to the EKU. The special department has its own semi-undercover agents in all departments of administration. These,

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in their turn, are connected with the better camouflaged informers distributed amongst the lower rank workers of the administration.

In essence the EKV fulfills three important functions for the Soviet government:

- (a) It controls the people who work in the economy of the USSR (surveillance, repression, terrorism);
- (b) It controls the economy of the USSR;
- (c) It institutes and keeps the mobilizations plans of Soviet economic enterprises during peace time.

The majority of the population of the USSR is under the control of the EKV.

### 3. The Structure of the MGB (continuation 2)

(9) The Secret-Political Administration (the SPU) keeps under its control all Party, Soviet, religious, cultural-educational and other like administrations and organizations in the USSR. The agents, secret collaborators and informers of this administration shadow the organizations of the VKP and the Komsomol; the district and republic Soviets and members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; the central bureaucratic administrations including the Glavkas, Administrations, Ministries and the Soviet of Ministers; the scientific laboratories, stations and institutes including the Academy of Sciences; the theatres, cinema, and radio; the unions of Soviet writers, artists, composers and the like; the technical schools, conservatories, institutes, and universities; the churches and religious administrations including the Patriarch; and all other like administrations.

(1) The Foreign Administration (INU) recently become well-known to the western world, thanks to the Gusevko Affair in Canada, Kravchenko's book, the investigation of espionage by Communists in the USA, Foote's book ("Handbook for Spies"), and the plethora of articles and essays published in the Western press. Now all know that the INU is a huge entity of Stalin's police which has available huge means, and which works on propaganda, espionage, subversion, and diversion practically in all countries of the free world. In this

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activity the INW depends on the local Communist parties and is connected with other organs of Soviet espionage.

(11) The Counter Intelligence Administration (KRU) attends to counter-intelligence on the territory of the Soviet Union in those places which naturally are objects of interest to foreign intelligence. While preparing for war and conducting espionage in all countries, the Politburo is afraid even of the phantom of espionage by foreigners in the USSR. Because of this, a distinguishing feature of the function of the KRU is a huge percent of "trumped-up" affairs. Thousands of people have been destroyed and are destroyed in the Soviet Empire at the slightest suspicion of espionage. The MGB employs the most beastly tortures against such suspects.

(12) The Special (Military) Administration of the MGB directs the so-called "Special Departments" in the Soviet armed forces. The OO is the affiliate of the MGB in the Army, the air forces and the navy. They work in close collaboration with the political workers (the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army, the commissars and the political directors) and the party organizations in the armed forces.

(13) The Chief Administration of Border Guards and Troops of the MGB (GUPVO MGB) directs the "special troops", that is, the huge army of police which the Politburo uses in peace and in war time against the peoples subject to the Soviets and which, in a sense, is in opposition to the regular Soviet Army.

The border troops perform guard of the borders (posts, sectors, patrols, dogs, and signaling), conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance in the border zone, and escort Soviet agents across the border.

### 3. The Structure of the MGB (continuation 3)

The guard troops perform guard of industrial enterprises, strategic structures and important military warehouses. The latter circumstance is indicative of the Politburo's mistrust of the regular army.

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The special purpose troops serve for suppression of riots and uprisings, for resettlement and mass repressions.

The convoy troops serve for conveying and guard of prisoners.

(14) The Transport Administration (TU MGB) directs police control of all types of transport in the USSR: railroads, automobile transport, the civil river and sea fleet and civil air transport.

(15) The Chief Administration of Militia (GUM) has now been transferred to the MGB ("The Records of the Supreme Soviet", 15 November 1950, page 3).

It conducts the maintenance of good order, the regulation of street traffic, the struggle with the criminal element and, that which is especially interesting to the MGB, the issue of passports and residence permits, and maintains nets of apartment house informers. ]

b. Vocabulary:

- (1) Special Plenipotentiary.
- (2) Special Panel.
- (3) judicial.
- (4) sentencing.
- (5) informer.
- (6) listening.
- (7) affiliate.
- (8) to deploy.
- (9) diversion.
- (10) "trumped up" affair.
- (11) torture.
- (12) transport (of prisoners).
- (13) issue of passports.
- (14) residence permit.

4. The Structure of the MVD.

a. The chief organs at the apex of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the MVD of the USSR) are the following:

The Minister of VD.

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The Party Committee of the Ministry.

The Special Plenipotentiary of the Minister.

The Secretariate.

The Social Design Bureau.

(1) The Party Committee plays in the MVD almost the very same modest role as in the MGB for the very same reasons.

(2) The Special Plenipotentiary of the Minister of VD with his apparatus plays the very same role as in the MGB.

(3) The Special Design Bureau (perhaps lately has been renamed) is a design-engineering organization where highly qualified scientists and engineers--prisoners--develop the designs and construction of various constructions, structures, machines, apparatus and the like. At one time it was not even concealed that the Ramzin forced circulation boiler, the Tupolev airplane, and many other designs were developed in the "OKB". There is no doubt that the "OKB" now conducts most important functions of a military character and participates in atomic research. It is ~~very~~ easily possible that German specialists, both the arrested and prisoners and also "voluntary" workers, work in the "OKB".

According to the sum of available information, the MVD of the USSR at present consists of nine Chief Administrations, the chiefs of which are deputies of the Minister and generals in the MVD.

(4) The Chief Administration of Civil Vital Statistics (GU ZAGS) conducts registration of births, marriages, divorces, deaths and so forth. This permits providing true strategic data about the population of the USSR which the apex of the police and the Politburo use.

(5) The Chief Customs Administration conducts custom control of the borders of the USSR. We will note here that the function of the Soviet customs is highly exacting.

The custom police search Soviet workers ordered abroad as the arrested persons in the prisons of the MGB are searched: they turn

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pockets inside out, feel through linings and seams, examine note books and so forth.

(6) The Chief Administration of Places of Confinement (GUMZ) looks after general "city" prisons and transient prisons. The "internal prisons" of the MGB, in which those undergoing investigation are confined, do not belong to the GUMZ.

(7) The Chief Administration for War Prisoners and Internees Affairs (the GUPI) manages the special camps for foreigners which were specially developed for war time. German and American literature contains a great amount of description of such camps.

4. { The Structure of the MVD } (continuation)

(8) { The Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps (GULAG) manages the whole grandiose system of Soviet "labor camps" and "labor colonies" in which millions of slaves are exploited. A great and still growing literature in all languages <sup>the</sup> at present time is devoted to descriptions of the GULAG system. }

(9) { The Chief Administration of Fire Guards (GU PO) directs the organizations for extinguishing and prevention of fires in cities, in industrial enterprises and so forth. The fire fighting measures ~~also~~ require ~~concessions~~ the access of firemen to all living quarters and ~~there~~ for that reason the fire guard in the USSR must belong to the police. }

(10) The Chief Geodesic Administration makes aerial photo maps of the territory of the USSR. Exact and detailed maps of any locality in the Soviet Union always were considered as a state secret.

(11) The Chief Administration of Highways (GUSHosDor) manages the repair and use, and particularly the construction of, automobile roads. In the laying and use of roads in the USSR, strategic considerations often override popular economic considerations.

(12) { The Chief Administration of Railroad Construction manages the construction and reconstruction (after the war) of railroads. As also other administrations of the MVD it utilizes the labor of slaves. }



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(13) In addition to the above enumerated chief administrations, the MVD manages still many other important institutes and offices. All the metrology of the USSR, with the institutes and laboratories for keeping and developing specifications and standards, including the Chief Board of Measures and Weights, are in its hands. The prominent role of the MVD in conducting atomic experiments and in production of atomic materials in the USSR is indubitable. The mining of uranium ore even in Germany is carried out by the MVD as the German press has many times reported.

(As is clear from the official Soviet press, in accordance with the 1936 Constitution, besides the central MVD of the USSR and the MVD of the USSR, all union republics and several large autonomous republics have their own Ministries of the MVD and the MVD. Krais and districts have "District Administrations" of the MVD and the MVD; and in regions there are "Regional Sections". The actual structure, size, and rights of the lower organs of the police depend on the size and significance of the territory "served" by them.

## b. Vocabulary:

- (1) construction (structure)
- (2) development
- (3) transient prison
- (4) fire-fighting
- (5) uranium ore
- (6) customs administration
- (7) person undergoing investigation
- (8) Board of Measures and Weights

## 5. Surveillance and Informers.

## a. General.

As was indicated in the preceding lectures, the whole USSR, with all the productive, community, cultural, and personal life of its citizens, is divided into sectors, each of which is under the control of a designated Administration of the MGB. The EKV controls the productive life; the GPU, the community-cultural; the MO, the military; the GUM, the personal life in living quarters; and so forth.

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The first task of political control in the USSR is control over thought, over the "disposition" of the people. This control is necessary for the curtailment of the ever existing anti-Soviet tendencies in the broad masses.

b. The nets of secret informers.

(1) The net of interior espionage of the Soviet police intrudes into Soviet life at all times. The informers report about all people, events, and facts worthy of the attention of the Party and the police. The net of police surveillance is uneven: it is thick and consists of several overlapping nets in the large cities and in the installations which are important from a political, an economic or a military standpoint; it is sparse in kolkhozes.

The Soviet police place the basis of the successes of surveillance work not in the quality of the informers but in their numerical strength. Many indications point to the fact that in important Soviet organizations every fifth employee is a police informer. The proportion of one informer to every 10 men is not considered a rarity. The number of informers in the USSR undoubtedly attains several million men.

(2) There are <sup>why</sup> various reasons ~~that~~ the Soviet police strive for the largest possible number of informers:

(a) The effectiveness of this method under Soviet conditions. The recruited informers answer with their heads for those under their surveillance and know this. The smaller the group under surveillance, then the more successful will be the surveillance over it.

(b) The police (as a result of the constant process of self-destruction conducted by Stalin--"none will be the wiser") is extremely poor in qualified personnel capable of training informers in their "art". <sup>The informer is an</sup> ~~Mass surveillance requires~~ untrained and uneducated man. The quantity must displace the shortcomings of quality.

(c) Great terrorization of the people. The plethora of informers is well known to the people. Due to this the people, who are in the mass of an anti-Soviet disposition, are afraid to display

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any anti-Soviet activity. The development of minimal anti-Soviet political cells, say even of three men, is handicapped by mutual distrust: each person suspects that the other may be an informer.

5. Surveillance and Informers (continuation)

d. It is easier to support the impudent political propaganda that "the whole of the people support us". Not only those arrested through surveillance, but also "free" citizens who come in contact with the organs of the police frequently hear this phrase. The government in every way possible encourages mutual spying and reporting between citizens.

e. Each informer recruited by the police is a forced collaborator of the regime. Even though he may hate the Soviet power he does nothing against it.

f. The overwhelming majority of the informers work without pay.

(3) In each Soviet administration, enterprise, means of transport and so forth, and even in a labor camp, there is a Special Department, Special Sector, or Special Unit. In military units it is the Special Department. This is the lowest affiliate of the MGB with an administration. Its chief has a local net of secret collaborators and informers observing the employees of the administration. In large enterprises where hundreds of informers work, the net has a two-and three-tiered structure. The "informers" are grouped around their "residents", and the latter are subordinated to the operational employees of the MGB. All the USSR is covered with such local nets, in total forming a grandiose net, belonging to the EKU, the SPU, the TU, the OJ and particularly, the KRU.

Besides it there is a lot of "special nets", looking after especially important territories, objectives or people (the border zone, railroad transport, scientists engaged in military problems and the like).

Each Soviet Administration has a "cadre department" or a "personnel desk". The chief of it is either a former secret

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police member or a "trusted party comrade". In both instances he is connected directly and closely with the police: all that becomes known about the employees of the administration is reported.

The "secret unit" which guards the secret documents of the administration and conducts the secret census, usually is manned by officials of the MGB or by those closely connected with the MGB.

Each man, regularly coming in contact with foreigners within the USSR (the employees of "INTOURIST", the personnel of hotels, the service personnel of embassies and consulates, translators, guides, chauffeurs and so forth) is an agent, secret collaborator or informer of the police.

Each military unit or military administration has a "Special Department", that is, a group of collaborators belonging to the Special Department (OO) of the police. This department of the police keeps under observation all employees of military administrations and also administrations having business with reservists.

Employees of transport (railroad, automobile, river, sea, and air) are under the surveillance of the transport "Special Departments" and the "Line Sections" which belong to the Transport Administration (the TU) of the police.

Employees of Party administrations, Komsomol organizations, Soviet offices, the press, educational institutes, cultural and scientific societies, and also persons participating in religious activity, are "served" by agents of the Secret Political Administration (EPU) of the police.

Foreigners in the USSR and persons connected with them are under the surveillance of the nets of the KRU (the Counter-intelligence Administration).

(4) The "free Soviet worker" is under such surveillance at work. But also at home he remains under the surveillance of the police. There the GUM--the Chief Administration of Militia--watches over him.

The Stalin regime, by reducing the housing conditions of the workers to the limits of congestion and overcrowding,

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does not have a tendency to improve them. These conditions are not only economical for the regime, but also extremely useful for police surveillance. All janitors (dvorniki), "passport inspectors", apartment house managers, commandants of living quarters, and so forth, must be informers of the police "according to table of organization". Many apartment service personnel also fulfill informer functions. Communist or Komsomol, living in an adjacent room, are obliged to spy and to report. Under these conditions, there cannot be any question about free listening to the Voice of America or BBC.

(5) In addition to the lower nets there is a net of collaborators of the MGB which consists of operators, agent-specialists\*, agent-couriers, residents, proprietors of conspirational apartments and secret collaborators. Also the so-called "NN" (overt observation) -- a special service observing the movement of "accomplices" on the streets and for contacts of the "accomplices" with other people outdoors belongs to this net. This net is subordinate to the Second Special Administration of the MGB.

Operators are occupied mainly with concrete "matters": the "development of accomplices", and also clear up various circumstances about the affairs of those already arrested.

c. Informers.

(1) Since the police must shadow all circles of the population subjugated to the Soviets, informers are recruited from all strata of society, Party and non-Party, from the obscure kolkhoz worker to the prima-ballerina of the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow, although the basic mass of informers consists of common laborers.

5. Surveillance and Informers (continuation 3)

"Activists" constitute a small portion of the informers, that is, persons who formerly voluntarily worked in the police through ideological or motives of a career. Persons, the official position of whom requires them to function as informers (chiefs of personnel sections, personnel boards, commandants of societies, directors of enterprises

\* For example, criminals who carry out robberies, abduction, and murder on assignment of the MGB.

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apartment house managers, and directors of hotels), constitute a certain part. People with a "tainted" past (from the point of view of the Soviet police) constitute a certain portion: former servicemen of the White Army, those connected with non-Communist parties, those having connections abroad, and those descendant from the clergy, merchants, and other "has-beens" and "disfranchised". Those prisoners who have been freed after serving a term belong to this group.

(2) Excluding the case of volunteer-activists, the recruiting of informers is carried out mainly by the Stalinist method<sup>f</sup> of terror. The great or minor degree of deceit or inducement employed for this does not change, and only the method varies. To the "tainted" they say, "Wash out your guilt and rehabilitate yourself."; to persons with higher education they say: "The Soviet state educated you free; you now must aid the state."; and to Party members and Komsomols they say: "This is your Party duty.". They say to people still more simply, "We need your aid; don't you wish to aid us?" A man does not risk "I do not wish to.", and strives to show that he "cannot". Then begins "He who is not with us is against us", "You, it seems, are against the Soviet rule" and the like. They ask a man "to think it over" in the corridor for an hour, two, three, ten, or twelve. They proceed to more direct threats, hinting that in the event of refusal, it would be easier to depart for a camp than to return home ----.

Each former prisoner, arriving in a "regulated locality" (the western territories; the 100-kilometer border zone; Moscow, Leningrad, other great cities, and Sochi, with their 100-kilometer or 50-kilometer belts; the Urals and other localities) are required to report to the regional unit of the police. The chief of the passport office of the police registers a former prisoner only in the event of the latter's agreement to work as an informant.

## d. Vocabulary:

- (1) spy
- (2) lack of qualification
- (3) without pay
- (4) intimidation

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- (5) disfranchised person
  - (6) crowdedness
  - (7) subordinated
  - (8) tainted
  - (9) recruiting
  - (10) card file
  - (11) shocking
  - (12) overlapping
  - (13) under supervision
  - (14) self-destruction
  - (15) motivation
6. Political Statutes of Soviet Laws.
- a. Articles 58 and 59 of the UK (criminal codex) of the RSFSR
- (1) The characteristics of crimes, Article 58.1.
    - Article 58.1a.
    - Article 58.1b.
    - Article 58.1d.
    - Article 58.2.
  - (3) The hostage system and repressions against the fully innocent.
    - Article 58.1c.
  - (4) Connection with the international bourgeoisie.
    - Article 58.3.
    - Article 58.4.
    - Article 58.5.
  - (5) Espionage and sabotage.
    - Article 58.6.
    - Article 58.7.
  - (6) Terrorism and diversion.
    - Article 58.8.
    - Article 58.9.
  - (7) Propaganda and agitation.
    - Article 58.10.

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- (8) Anti-Soviet organization and sabotage.

Article 58.11.

Article 58.14.

- (9) Failure to report and like activity.

Article 58.12.

Article 58.13.

- (10) Riots and banditism.

Article 59.

(a) Actual disorders and banditism are extremely rare phenomena.

(b) Political uprisings of the people against the Soviet power are qualified as "disorders and banditism", since the power cannot recognize their political origin.

b. Articles 84 and 193 of the UK (Criminal Codex), the Law of 7 July 1932, and others.

- (1) Illegal transit of the border, Article 84.

(a) - Illegal transit is usually qualified as espionage, Article 58.6.

(b) Mass prosecution according to Article 84 after the partition of Poland and the seizure of the Pre-Baltic.

(2) Military offenses, Article 193. The characteristics of the 31 points of this Article.

- (3) The Law of "Guarding Social Property".

(a) The reasons which called forth this proclamation.

(b) Its purposes.

(c) Its contents.

- (4) Later supplements to the Law of 7 July 1932.

(5) The declaration of outlawed "non-returnees to the USSR" (the Decree of the TsIK of the USSR of 21 November 1929).

(a) The Edict of 15 November 1943.

(b) Later supplements.

c. Vocabulary:

- (1) failure to report

- (2) disorder



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- (3) illegal transit
- (4) outlawed
- (5) "non-returnee to the USSR"
- (6) hostage system
- (7) fully innocent

## 7. Investigations of Political Matters.

## a. The term "political offender".

The term "political offender" or "political prisoner" is absent in the Soviet Union. Such a term is inadvisable for the power. It would lead the people under the Soviets to the idea that a man did nothing evil but simply had a political disagreement with the power. But everyone has such disagreements. From this, sympathy towards the prisoner would grow in everyone. And such a term would place the Communists abroad in an unfavorable position--since there is "freedom" in the USSR, no one there is prosecuted for that idea!

Thus, the heavy Stalin term "enemy of the people" is employed.

## b. Soviet investigation in general.

(1) Only in the instance of criminals (who constitute less than 10% of all prisoners) is Soviet investigation conducted as investigation usually is conducted in any country of the world, that is, investigation has a purpose and attempts to clarify the true circumstances of an occurrence.

(2) As to investigation in the instance of offenders against society (the majority of whom are constituted from the so-called "UKAZNIKI", that is, persons who have violated the laws on "labor") it is ridiculous to speak. They enslave these people as a method of conducting the open terror of the power against the workers who are resisting exploitation.

## c. Investigation of a Political Matter.

Soviet investigation of a political matter depends first of all on how the matter arose. The matter arose either, so to speak, from below, or from above. Below--if any man or group prepares any act

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having an anti-Stalinist political idea (Trotskyites, the plot of Tukhachevski, listeners to the "Voice of America" and the like). Above-- if Stalin issues an order to preventively repress a designated social strata or group (the old intelligensia, "wreckers", "kulaks", "church goers", repatriates, or the democratic intelligensia of the Satellite countries and East Germany). At the present time a powerful and stable political system gives Stalin the possibility of liquidating strata of resistance in a planned sequence. The periodic reports of the MGB on the "political moods" point out for the Politburo the layers of those most resistant to Communization or Sovietization at the given moment, and periodic decrees on repression liquidate these layers.

(1) In the instance of an actual anti-Stalinist act, Soviet investigation strives to clarify the true circumstances of an occurrence and also the true perpetrators and the instigator. But such instances even earlier were few, and now, obviously have become extremely rare.

(2) In the instance of a broad campaign of preventative liquidation instigated from above, Soviet investigation often is practically absent. They simply arrested thousands of "kulaks" or the intelligensia of the Eastern-European countries in a single night, according to rosters drove them into railroad cars and hauled them to Siberia. Such campaigns are transpiring at the present time.

#### 7. Investigation of Political Matters (continuation)

(3) The normal instances of a planned political repression is most interesting. All the varieties of Soviet investigation set forth below are related to this instance.

d. The real purposes of "investigations" in instances of a planned political repression.

(1) The forming of a repression: the creation of "objective" documents, protocols of "confrontations", letters, material evidence, "confessions" of the arrested one, and the like. It is completely unimportant that these "evidences of guilt" are made

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one-sided, that they have little in common with the truth, and that they by their character show themselves to be the bungling fabrications of the ignorant police. The documentation consists of a few standard types. It is necessary in the form of a record for the chiefs as to the fulfillment of the order on the regression. It is necessary in the form of a paper on which the "judicial", more truly the sentencing, instance can place its stamp. It is necessary in the form of a defense from attempts by "influential persons" to free the arrested one. It is necessary for derogatory propaganda among the "free" citizens subject to the Soviets. It formally transposes the "suspect" into the "guilty".

## (2) Investigation of the environment of the arrested one.

By interrogations the police always attempt to clarify the "connections" of the arrested one with people surrounding him and through this to clarify the mood of these people. In the instance of any anti-Soviet soul, they enter these people in the card files of the "ASE", or supplement the card files already established on them.

## (3) The psychological processing of the arrested one.

This is the most important of the aims of Stalinist "investigation". A fresh man, picked "at will", even raised under Soviet conditions, does not have that degree of a slave's psychology which is necessary in order to work in Hell, the so-called Soviet "labor camps". He would protest, revolt, flee or fall into despair, and would work poorly. Obviously his living juices would not have been squeezed out to the degree necessary for a Stalin prisoner.

It is necessary preliminarily to break the enslaved one psychologically. It is necessary to inoculate him with the psychology of a slave which is necessary so that he will work better in the form of a slave.

For this purpose, they inject at least three ideas into the person who is arrested:

(a) The idea of guilt. The arrested one violated some Soviet law which he as a citizen was required to know and to observe. Thus, all the possible contrivances, the chicanery and the

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exaggerations, all the casuistries, by which the investigator strives to disturb the mind of the prisoner.

(NOTE: Translation of a small part of Chapter 7, and Chapters 8-12, inclusive, have been omitted).

13. The Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps, The GULAG of the MVD

a. Purposes.

(1) The exploitation of slave camps.

In addition to the isolation of a dangerous element to the Soviet power, the camps exist as sources of slave labor for utilization in any places throughout the country. Two important circumstances exist with the utilization of prisoners:

(a) The possibility of mass employment in any localities with the minimal support of the slaves with the necessities for life and for work.

(b) The necessity of supporting masses of people, not only masses who are capable for work and working in factories, but masses who, to a great degree, have lost the capability to work, and also shirk work and are incapable of work for one or another reason.

(2) The construction of camps:

Camps are organized in those places where some great construction or other is planned.

Neither climatic conditions, nor the degree of civilization of a locality, nor the possibility of supplying all which is necessary for the reception of and the life of the masses of people has significance for this purpose. The most primitive living quarters are considered acceptable for the existence and work of the slaves.

The camps can be expanded and contracted. The size of the labor force is dependent on the plans of construction.

(3) The transfer of prisoners.

A transfer of prisoners is:

(a) Stage--recurrent, with large parties of one, two,

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or three thousand men in a stage over a long distance.

(b) Local--with large or small parties over a short distance.

(c) Main line--throughout the whole railroad net, almost on each train there is a car for transfer of prisoners. It runs independently of the presence of prisoners for transfer according to plan and permanently on appointed routes.

(d) Special transfer--small parties for special, previously unforeseen ~~unforeseen~~ and unplanned details. Special transfers occur over various distances and by various means, right up to and including airplanes.

Transfers of prisoners are provided for: by railroad; automobiles; steamships; horseback; on foot; and in special instances, by airplanes.

### 13. The Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps (Continuation)

At the moment of transfer of prisoners they are dropped from the roster of the previous places, but are still not placed on the roster at the appointed place. In the GULAG they are accounted for on a special account form--"en route".

(4) Sale of manpower--contract laborers. During those periods of time when work in the camps is curtailed and a surplus of manpower appears, the camps have the right to release such surpluses for use by various Soviet manufacturing and industrial enterprises.

The enterprises are required to remit for each laborer approximately six to ten times higher than its net cost to the camps. In addition, these enterprises must provide, at their own expense, furnished quarters for the prisoners, for the guards, and for the offices, warehouses, kitchens and the like. They are required to remit the cost of transportation and the cost of each individual guard and of the administration.

This costs the enterprises dearly, but because of the universal shortage of manpower, the poor conditions of support for voluntary workers, sometimes the remoteness and the sparse population

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of the locality, enterprisers are forced to resort to these conditions in order to fulfill their production plans.

b. The structure of GULAG.

(1) General outline.

The GULAG. It is the planning, organizing, directing, and accounting organ and the directing installation of the Party for exploitation of slave labor.

In the make-up of GULAG are directing organs:

(2) Punitive Organs:

The III Section of the MGB (the Operations Section).

The Prosecutor.

The Court.

(3) Regime Organs:

Guard and Regime Section, the VOKhK.

Accounting-Distribution Section--the URO.

Cultural-Pedagogical Section--the KVO.

(4) Production Organs:

Planning Section.

Construction Section.

Lumber Section.

Mining Section.

Agricultural Section.

Highway Section and like sections in all the fields in which the camps are engaged. They regulate the entire internal life of the prisoners in the camps and influence the activity of all the like camp sections.

13. The Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps, the GULAG of the MVD (Continuation 2)

(5) Administrative-economic and supplementary:

Cadre Section.

Administrative-Economic Section.

Medical.

Veterinary.

Communal Quarters.

Transport.

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Chief Bookkeeper.  
Finance Section and the like.

The Political Section--an organ of the TsK of the VKP (b)-- occupies a special place among these organs. It is impossible to list it with one of these groups. It constitutes the political direction and control, the direction of the party and educational work of the personnel of camps, and through the KVO, the Cultural-Pedagogical Section which is subordinated to it, "educates" the prisoners, that is by raising the intensiveness of their work.

The Chief of the GULAG is the Deputy of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR; in such a fashion all camps existing in the country escape subordination to the republic Ministries of Internal Affairs. No matter where they may be they are subordinated directly to Moscow.

c. The Functioning of the GULAG.

(1) On isolation.

In the camps it is accented as a law that two missions, production and isolation of prisoners, must be fulfilled as one whole.

Actually these missions contradict one another. The interests of production radically diverge from the interests of the regime on the isolation of prisoners. The functioning of the camps, their directors and the camp administration are evaluated first of all by the fulfillment of the production plans. It is not inquired of the direction of the camp by what cost and by what means they attain fulfillment of these plans. Simply that they shall be fulfilled.

There can be counted in the construction and production activities of the camps such constructions and productions as:

(a) The White Sea-Baltic Canal, which was placed in operation in 1934.

(b) The polar Tuloma Hydro-electric Station near Murmansk.

(c) Construction of the Volga-Moscow Canal.

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- (d) Construction of the Moscow Subway (partially).
- (e) Construction of the Moscow-Saratov gas pipe line.

1945-48.

(f) The construction of many railroad lines in Siberia and in the Far East, the exploitation of ore deposits and mines and like "Socialist constructions" of grandiose scale. They were built literally on the bones of prisoners and publicized by Soviet propaganda as "the pure attainments of the Soviet people under wise leadership" and so forth.

Such conditions are established for the prisoner so that they themselves enforce their isolation. For this purpose, unusually strict laws, according to which repressions, up to and including shooting and even mass shooting of prisoners who violate the regime, are employed.

For example, escape from a camp is considered as counter-revolutionary sabotage -- Article 58, from 14 up to 25 years. Escape, committed by an individual sentenced previously under Article 58 -- shooting.

Refusing to work committed three times in succession is looked on as counterrevolutionary sabotage -- Article 58, 14 up to 25 years. Sabotage, committed by one sentenced earlier under Article 58 -- shooting.

Such laws uphold the regime and isolation to a greater degree than the militarized guard of the camp.

- (2) In exploitation of the slaves.

The production plans are passed down to camps in accordance with the roster of the slaves capable of work who are present. The capability of a slave to fulfill production norms is significantly lower than normal and continuously and steadily declines through labor beyond his strength and through poor food. The plans though have to be fulfilled!

- (3) In the extermination of the "potentially dangerous element"

The Operations - "Chekist" Section, the court and the prosecutor systematically occupy themselves with the uncovering of "crimes" committed by prisoners, through making them accountable to a court, and in the majority of cases, by shooting the prisoners.

This systematic extermination of people is conducted methodically and continuously. It is necessary for the power in order to maintain discipline among these people who are being exploited until death.



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Besides this, campaigns of mass extermination of the "objectionable" occur. Such campaigns are conducted every two to three years and not only people who have committed "crimes" <sup>are</sup> /subjected to them but also those who have not committed crimes but who "are capable of committing them", which people are designated by the Operations "Chekist" Section through agents' data.

During such mass campaigns the "affairs" are not examined by a court but examined by "trios" throughout the district administrations according to the instructions of the Chief of the Operations "Chekist" Section of the camp. The GULAG sets the imposition of orders of "purges" of the camps right up to indicating the

13. THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIVE LABOR CAMPS, THE GULAG OF THE MVD  
(Continuation 1)

percentage norms of those subject to extermination.

(4) Examples:

- (a) The mass murders of prisoners, up to ten per cent, in 1939;
- (b) The mass murders of prisoners, up to five per cent, in 1940;
- (c) The mass murders of prisoners, in 1941, and
- (d) The extermination of prisoners in the evacuation of the western

Districts during the German offensive.

d Vocabulary:

- (1) extent of work
- (2) growth of work
- (3) voluntary contract laborers
- (4) punitive
- (5) extermination
- (6) graph

14. OTHER ADMINISTRATIONS AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE MVD

a. The Chief Administration for Civil Vital Statistics (GUZAGS) conducts registration of births, marriages, divorces, deaths and the like. This permits providing true strategic data on the population of the USSR which the work of the police and the Politburo employ.

b. The Chief Customs Administration conducts customs control at the borders of the USSR. We note here in passing several specific Soviet traits in the functioning of customs.

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The customs police search Soviet workers ordered abroad as the arrested persons in the prisons of the MGB are searched: they turn pockets inside out, feel through linings and seams, examine notebooks and so forth.

After the war it was permissible for Soviet occupation personnel traveling from Germany to bring with them as many things as they wished. In Brest-Litovsk, however, the customs officials examined all items very carefully, left to the owner a small quantity of items according to a "legal" list, and confiscated all the remaining items. The scheme was that the occupation personnel would plunder Germany just a little more, and the proceeds would fall, on a "legal" basis, into the hands of the MVD.

On the border of Iran the Soviet customs officials busied themselves (and likely also now busy themselves) with all possible machinations: deliberately drawing up false documents, passing propaganda literature and even weapons under the guise of some kind of inoffensive commercial wares and the like.

c. The Chief Administration for Places of Imprisonments (GUMZ) looks after the general "city" prisons and the transient prisons. The "internal prisons" of the MGB in which those undergoing investigation are confined are not in this administration.

d. The Chief Administration for War Prisoners and Internees Affairs (GUPI) manages the special camps for foreigners which were especially developed during the war. A huge amount of descriptions of such camps exist in German and American literature.

e. The Chief Administration of Fire Guards (GU PO) manages the organizations for extinguishing and preventing fires in cities, at industrial enterprises and so forth. Anti-fire measures <sup>require</sup> ~~are organized~~ the access of firemen ~~to~~ all living quarters, and simply for this one reason the fire guard in the USSR must belong to the police.

f. The Chief Geodesic Administration is in charge of aerial photo maps of the territory of the USSR. Accurate and detailed maps of any locality in the Soviet Union always were considered a state secret.

g. The Chief Administration of Highways ( ) manages the repair and exploitation and particularly the construction of automobile roads. Strategic considerations often override popular-economic considerations in the location and exploitation of roads in the USSR.

h. The Chief Administration of Railroad Construction manages the construction and restoration (after the war) of railroads. Like other administrations of the MVD it utilizes the labor of slaves.

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## i. Other Organs

- (1) Fire Inspection
- (2) Sanitary (Medical) Inspection

## 14. OTHER ADMINISTRATIONS AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE MVD (Continuation)

- (3) Automobile Inspection
- (4) Institutes and Bureaus for Meteorology
- (5) "Goznak", (State Administration for Issue of Banknotes), "The Coin

Bureau" and the like.

- (6) Organizations for Atomic Projects

## j. Vocabulary:

- (1) to feel through
- (2) forestalling
- (3) to turn inside out
- (4) in passing

## 15. THE SOVIET SLAVERY SYSTEM

## a. Purposes.

- (1) The isolation of the politically "unreliable".

This is the first and the main reason which causes the Soviet government to have concentration camps and to keep millions of slaves in them.

- (2) Exploitation of the Slaves.

The maintenance of millions of people in isolation without utilizing their manpower would be impossible for the government. The camp slaves, from the Soviet point of view, are excellent manpower. This manpower is not exacting, uncomplaining, can be maintained half-starved, unclothed and shoeless, can be thrown into any place in the country under conditions of any kind of climate and any privations. This manpower will work submissively and at the cost of their lives create and construct that which is necessary for the Stalin gang.

The attitude toward these slaves is significantly worse, more inhuman and more cruel than toward the draft cattle and than toward the dogs which are employed in the work of the camp. This assertion is easy to demonstrate with facts; there is no exaggeration in it.

- (3) The extermination of the politically dangerous.

The Soviet camp practice bears witness that: the more politically

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dangerous a prisoner then the more chances will be presented to him to die in the camps.

This policy is deeply thought out and is put into practice in the camps by way of:

the regime established for such category of prisoners;

increased administrative and judicial responsibility of this category of prisoners for misdemeanors, violations and crimes committed by them in camps; and

periodic campaigns of mass extermination of this category of prisoners ("repressions of the first category").

b. [Statistics on Prisoners]

(i) [The probable number of prisoners.

People deprived of freedom in the USSR are maintained:

(a) in camps;

(b) in corrective labor colonies of which there are on an average probably about two or three in each district;

(c) in prisons (those serving fixed terms, under investigation, and in transit);

(d) in numerous isolation prisons which are under the Administration of the MGB in each city;

(e) in plant colonies in which war prisoners, repatriates and Vlassovites are kept;

15. THE SOVIET SLAVERY SYSTEM (Continuation)

(f) In special reconstruction camps (cities and industry, destroyed during the war);

(g) In special isolation camps for war prisoners and internees;

(h) In special settlements;

(i) In labor settlements;

(j) In resettlement settlements where the peoples of former republics, resettled because of their political unreliability, are maintained: the Checheno-Ingushkaya ASSR, part of the Kabardino-Balkarskaya Autonomous District, the Karachaevskaya Autonomous District, the German Povolzhya and others;

(k) Finally, the prisons and colonies for minor offenders.

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What number of people who have been deprived of freedom are to be found in all these places of actual imprisonment, even the Soviet government itself apparently does not know exactly. A figure of about 15 millions is considered to be the most likely ]

## (2) Mortality and extermination of the slaves.

The mortality is great, this is obvious, but this is not manifest in the camps. In the camps the prisoners who are approaching the extreme limits of exhaustion are not to be found among the strong prisoners. They take them to special "medical camp points", of which there are sometimes several in each camp. In these the mortality is up to 50 per cent a year.

Up to 10-15 per cent of the prisoners of the whole camp are maintained in the medical camp points. This is those who have approached complete exhaustion.

The mortality from sickness, from premature age, from freezing to death, from mishaps and other accidents, which is apparently one to two per cent a year, should be added to this figure.

The systematic massacres of the slaves conducted by the Soviet power are described above, see paragraph a. (3).

## (3) The make-up of the prisoners

The so-called "counterrevolution", that overwhelming majority of the camp slaves, on the average is apparently up to 70 per cent of the whole make-up.

Up to 20 per cent of the prisoners must be placed in the category of those who have committed official (service) and moral offenses, and up to ten per cent are criminals.

## c. The Location of "Labor Camps".

(1) The largest camps

(2) Map of the camps

## 15. THE SOVIET SLAVERY SYSTEM (Continuation 2)

(3) The types of camps (categories) and the known places of confinement (analysis of the Map of the Concentration Camps of the USSR at the lecture. See "GULAG", Slavery Incorporated, Map, American Federation of Labor, 1951).

## d. The Economic Significance of the Slavery System.

The cost of maintenance of a slave.

According to some data maintenance of each prisoner costs from two rubles 40 kopecks up to five rubles 50 kopecks per day. However, the maintenance of guards,

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the camp apparatus, the prisons, the colonies, the Central Administration, the highly paid numerous staff of officials, the transport of prisoners with the use of expensive troops and the like significantly raises the cost of maintenance of a slave.

In order to have one working prisoner the system must put up with "ballast", that is, with prisoners who cannot, do not wish to or are not allowed to work

Besides, it is necessary to consider that not only the simple people, the unskilled workers, or the peasants are isolated, but also specialists, and frequently also great specialists, who are not utilized in the camps. Often the specialists are found at common labor with a wheelbarrow and shovel. The productivity of their labor is extraordinarily low. Years are necessary in order to retrain specialists for the national economy and it costs a great deal. The withdrawal of specialists from the national economy and their isolation in camps brings great damage to the economy of the country.

It should be taken into consideration as well that a significant percent of the manpower is utilized for the servicing of the camp itself.

The labor productivity of the prisoners is exceptionally low. The slavery conditions of labor create as well a slaves' attitude toward labor.

On the other hand, the <sup>putting to use</sup> ~~exploitation~~ of the unsettled and wild regions (the North!) with their huge riches (petroleum, coal, ores, and gold) costs the Soviet government little, thanks to the employment of slave labor. With free labor, well constructed cities and colonies for workers and their families, raising of the scale of wages and medical service, exceptionally alluring conditions for specialists and well-constructed transport would be demanded. None of this is necessary for slaves under the Soviet method of their exploitation.

The final economic gain from the exploitation of masses of slaves in the USSR is unclear. One thing only is clear: the system of slavery was introduced by the Soviet government not for economic but for political motives. The more or less economic effect from it is a phenomenon, perhaps even of great dimension, but an accessory.

## e. Vocabulary:

- (1) undemanding
- (2) uncomplaining
- (3) shoeless
- (4) misdemeanor
- (5) violation

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- (6) crime
- (7) mortality
- (8) exhaustion
- (9) freezing to death
- (10) specialist
- (11) gang

## 16. A TYPICAL LABOR CAMP.

## a. The Administrative Structure of a Camp

- (1) The director and his deputies.

The camp director is the sovereign camp proprietor, accountable only to the Chief of the GULAG in Moscow. The camp director without fail must be a "Chekist" of long service and is often of general rank. Actually they are former high "Chekists" who have made slips but not so great as to be repressed.

Only the Operations - "Chekist" Section and the Political Section do not belong in subordination to the director of the camp either formally or actually.

The Prosecutor and the Court do not belong formally in subordination, but actually are subordinated completely.

In the camps there are deputies of the Director of Administration. The Deputy for the Regime is in charge of the Accounting - Distribution Section, the Cultural - Educational, Supply, and Medical Support - in total the "camp sector". The other deputy, for the production part, is in charge of all production sections.

The directors of great projects, in accord with plurality of responsibilities may be deputies of the director of administration.

An example: In the "Belbaltlag" until 1934 there were the Construction Director of the Tulema Hydroelectric Station, the Canal Director, and the Director of the Sorok Shipyards. All these were deputies of the Director of Camp Administration.

In Sevostlag (Northeast Camp); the Deputies of the Director of Administration were: the Director of Road Construction, the Director of the Gold Producing Region, the Director of Steamships and so forth.

The Director of VOKHR, the guards, in each camp is always a deputy of the Director of Administration.

(2) The Political Section - - it conducts the political and Party work among the voluntary contract employees. It is the organ of control in accord with the Party line for all camp life.

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(3) The Personnel Section - - it controls the records, appointments, transfers and like matters on the voluntary contract employees of the camp (except the Political Section, the Operations - "Chekist" Section, the Guards, the Prosecutor and the Court).

(4) The Third Section - - it is the Operations - "Chekist" Section. It fulfills the functions of the secret police of the MGB in the camps relative to the prisoners, to the voluntary contract employees, and to the productive activities.

(5) The VOKhR - - the guard.

The guard concerns itself with: the guard of the prisoners in barracks and at work; the escort of prisoners during transfers over great or minor distances;

16. A TYPICAL LABOR CAMP (Continuation)

the guard of installations (warehouses, structures and buildings);

search for escapees; and

the issue of passes to prisoners for unescorted movement throughout the camp

(6) The Accounting - Distribution Section, the URO.

The employees in this section are only voluntary contract employees; expulsion is brought about by violations.

This section keeps account of the prisoners according to distinguishing features, periods of imprisonment and arrival in the camp, and by labor capability and by specialty. It conducts the distribution, transfer and record of the necessities for the prisoners of the camp.

It is the Main Regime Section of the camp.

(7) The Cultural - Educational Section under the direction of the Political Section, conducts the "education" of the prisoners - increasing the intensity of labor through the "education" of these prisoners.

In addition it conducts the entertainment - propaganda arrangements (the club, stage plays and the cinema) as encouragements for high productivity

(8) The construction and productive sections.

In dependence on the kind of construction in which the camp is engaged (canals, railroads, roads and highways, military and industrial works and the like) and also on what kind of production or mining they are engaged in (lumbering, coal mining, agriculture, factories, plants and others), corresponding sections exist in the Administrations of the Camps.



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These sections carry out their functions as they would carry them out under civilian conditions outside a camp. Both volunteer contract specialists and prisoners participate in the work of these sections. Often, prisoners who are great specialists, after an appropriate verification, are appointed directors of sections or assistants in the sections. In the latter instance the director may be a commonplace specialist, but his consultant, advisor and simply speaking, his head, will be his assistant - the great specialist who has been imprisoned. In this case, the prisoners work under the strict covert control of the agents of the Third Section.

The Plans Section which plans all the productive activities of the camp naturally is an important section.

The Chief Bookkeeper plays a great role. He, while accounting for the expenditures, incomes, utilization of resources and the like, is at the same time the organ of the State Control.

#### 16 A TYPICAL LABOR CAMP (Continuation 2).

The role and significance of the productive sections of the camp, especially, should be noted. They set the whole life of the camp; and the regime, and punitive and supplementary sections all organize their work in conformance with the work of the productive sections.

The frequent practice of raising the norms of food during periods of accelerated construction, better support of the prisoners who give high production results, transfer to better living conditions, lowering the requirements of the regime, and a series of privileges and property to "shockworkers", can be pointed out. The characteristics of the prisoners are <sup>determined</sup> ~~based~~ on the basis of their attitude <sup>towards</sup> ~~to~~ work. Encouragements are employed right up to and including curtailment of the terms of imprisonment and early release from the camp (seldom).

#### (9) Supplementary sections:

The Medical, Veterinary, Finance, Transport, Communal-quarters and like sections.

#### b. The structure of a camp.

Camps usually are disposed over a large territory. Some of these occupy territory on which other citizens are not permitted to live.

(1) The camps are divided into branches. Each branch may have in its makeup: 10, 20, or 30 thousand prisoners. Seldom more.

(2) Branches in their turn are divided into Camp Points. In each "lagunkt"

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there may be: 2, 3, or 5 thousand prisoners. Seldom more.

(3) Camp points are divided into camp sections. The makeup of each camp section is: 500, 1000, or 2,000 prisoners. Seldom more.

The organizational structure of camps are limited by the above.

(4) Each camp point during the necessity to pick out a group of prisoners for a prolonged period of work at a great distance (5 and more kilometers), with the absence of the possibility for daily transport of prisoners, separates into camp missions numbering 100, 200, or 300, seldom more, prisoners. But this is not a permanent organizational entity.

(5) All the manpower of a camp is subdivided into brigades of 10, 20, or 30 men in makeup.

c. The Regime of the Camp.

(1) The general regime is established for all prisoners assigned to common labor (except specialists) in the camp.

The general regime provides for the guard of the prisoners both in barracks and also at work and during movement.

16 A TYPICAL LABOR CAMP (Continuation 3)

(2) The strict regime excludes the use of prisoners in their specialties. A prisoner constantly is under armed guard and strictly limited in contacts and movement.

(3) The punitive regime. An armed guard, isolation from all other prisoners, deprivation of the right to work, decreased food, deprivation of clothing allowance, cold living quarters, and always behind barbed wire.

(4) The isolation regime is the locked cell and isolation cell. The solitary confinement cells and the common cells. A walk of 20 minutes per day. The food, dependent on the purpose of isolation, is right up to and including 200 grams of bread and a half liter of water per day and after two days, a half liter of "balanda" on the third.

(5) The free regime is allowed to especially valuable specialists. A pass for unaccompanied movement throughout the camp during the day and sometimes even for entire days is given to them. Clothing is issued to them in first priority and is better. An increased premium-remuneration up to fifty rubles a month. Premiums, rewards and the like.

d. Vocabulary:

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- (1) accountable
- (2) one who has committed "slips"
- (3) voluntary contract employee
- (4) thrown
- (5) common
- (6) punitive
- (7) plurality of responsibility
- (8) privilege
- (9) locked cell

## 17. THE EXPLOITATION AND MAINTENANCE OF SLAVES

## a. Categories of Prisoners

- (1) The first category is specialists and clerical personnel

The GULAG distributes specialists throughout the camps depending on the requirement of the camps for them.

The specialists are employed only within the limits of necessity.

Often a great specialist, through oversight of GULAG who has happened into a camp where his specialty cannot be employed, works at common labor.

The clerical workers are selected from the literate, intelligent people.

According to law all those sentenced under Article 58 "counter-revolution" , under Article 59b armed robbery , under Article 82 flight and also various "harmful" and "dangerous" elements are not permitted to work in a specialty or in offices; they can engage only in common labor. But this law is violated universally and continuously. The intelligent people and great specialists up to 99 per cent are sentenced specifically under the above listed articles. Actually they often are employed in office work and are utilized according to their specialties.

- (2) The second category is the lower administration. The lower camp administration consists predominantly of prisoners who have been sentenced for civil, official and criminal offenses.

In the Instructions of the GULAG, it is stated directly: "Undoubtedly the regime of the camp always should be oriented on the criminal element as those nearer to us in spirit and by class membership"

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These belong to the lower administration: the barracks overseers, brigade-leaders, foremen, timekeepers, order clerks, teachers and the like.

(3) The third category is the general category. All without distinction as to age, sex, statute or terms of imprisonment belong to this category

(4) The fourth category is those of limited use for work.

Those persons who have lost the capacity to work longer in the camps, the sick, the invalids and the aged.

They are found either among other prisoners and work as janitors, stokers, watchmen and on other light tasks, or are found in the medical and invalid camp points. There is a very insignificant number of them in the hospitals.

(5) The fifth category is those who refuse to work and those in strict isolation.

#### 17. THE EXPLOITATION AND MAINTENANCE OF SLAVES (Continuation)

The majority of this category are the recidivists. In the minority are the people who have become desperate about all, but mainly in the hope of preserving life, and who by their refusal to work express protest against slavery and injustice.

This category is 99 per cent of those doomed recently to a new sentence in the camps under Article 58-14 for "sabotage" and are 90 per cent candidates for "expenditure".

Isolation is the prelude to trial and in many instances to shooting.

b. Categories of fare. The "Cauldrons" (the latter seems to be a term equivalent to categories of fare).

(1) The special fare for prisoners occupying responsible administrative, economic, and industrial duties and individual prominent specialists. Official ration norms do not exist for them. They are fed better than the norm and often not worse but better than the volunteer contract workers of the camp.

(2) Engineer-technician fare, an increased diet for a limited number of engineer-technical personnel of the prisoners.

(3) Hospital fare, for the sick who are undergoing treatment in hospitals.

The ration norms are issued individually, reinforced, but are not expended completely since many sick are on a diet, and many who are in a serious condition cannot in general partake of food. This constitutes an economy and provides the possibility for a proper fare for those who are recuperating.

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(4) For shockworkers the fare is better than the usual. It is provided for prisoners who systematically overfulfill the norms of work and have been cited in an order as "shockworkers".

(5) Premium, for those who overfulfill norms of work. For each day of overfulfillment of norms on the following day a premium fare is provided.

(6) General, for those who fulfill the norm systematically.

(7) Reduced, for those who underfulfill the norms of work.

(8) Punitive, for those who are in punishment camp points for refusal to work or for crimes.

(9) Locked cell, for those who are in locked cells and in isolation cells.

The subdivision of the prisoners' food into "cauldrons" is truly a local art of the camp administration due to the regulations of the GULAG. The GULAG supplies camps according to one norm -- the general norm. In camps, at the expense curtailing the food for those who do not fulfill the norms, and for those who are

#### 17. EXPLOITATION AND MAINTENANCE OF SLAVES (Continuation 2)

undergoing punishment, an increased fare is produced for the privileged categories of prisoners.

#### c. Allowance.

Allowance provided for prisoners:

(1) Rations,  
 (2) Communal-quarters (this is quarters, fuel, and light),  
 (3) Clothing,  
 (4) Money -- "premium-remuneration" from three to 25 rubles a month. In special cases, for valuable specialists or for persons of the administration from the prisoners it is 50 rubles per person.

(5) Production -- this is special clothing and hand tools.

Depending on the size of the camps, their location, climatic conditions and the seasons, the cost of allowance for one prisoner varies from two rubles 40 kopecks up to five rubles a day

#### d. Vocabulary:

- (1) overseers
- (2) brigade-leaders
- (3) foreman
- (4) timekeeper

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- (5) order clerk
- (6) aged
- (7) stoker
- (8) one who refuses to work
- (9) one who has become desperate
- (10) allowance

## 18. THE LIFE OF THE SLAVES

## a. The Daily Schedule in a Camp.

- (1) Reveille, as a rule, is set at 0430 independent of the starting time of work for the various categories of prisoners
- (2) Morning tea and preparation for departure to work takes from 30 minutes to one hour.
- (3) At five-to five-thirty the prisoners are assembled in the yard in front of the barracks for receiving the work objectives and for assignment to one or another tasks (even those permanently working on single tasks). This is termed "posting".
- (4) Work. The time established by law is 10 hours a day, not considering the time for marching to work. For a distance up to five kilometers movement is prescribed as on foot. For a longer distance, it is by autotransport, railroad, barges, or by carts. This is only a law. Actually they go on foot for five to eight kilometers. For more distant permanent objectives they are divided into "detachments".  

With nonfulfillment of daily norms of work or with urgent work, work goes on more than 10 hours, for 12-14 hours. It thus occurs that with movement at both ends of the day, the prisoners are busy up to 16 hours a day.

  - (5) The dinner hour may be varied:
    - (a) A break of two hours with return to barracks for receiving dinner. This is with minor distances to the barracks;
    - (b) Dinner is brought to the place of work. The break is dependent on the food halt, 30 minutes or an hour. This is with great distances;
    - (c) A break in general does not occur and the prisoners receive dinner at five o'clock in the morning and work without a break;
    - (d) The prisoners receive dinner after return from work.
  - (6) The return to camp is by the same means as the march to work. It also happens that they may ride to work at a distance of five to eight kilometers but

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return on foot.

(7) Supper takes place immediately after return from work. With the varied quartering conditions of the prisoners, depending on the presence of transport, the kitchen and the like, the feeding schedule is varied not only in each camp but also in various camp points of the same camp.

(8) The evening roll-call and recall take place at 2200 hours. If the prisoners returned from work late or the camp administration held some kind of assembly of the prisoners, or if there was a cinema, then the roll call and recall is made later. But the time of reveille remains the same.

#### 18. THE LIFE OF THE SLAVES (Continuation).

During the evening roll-call the prisoners are assembled in the yard or in the barracks and they are accounted for by number and verified by name. After the roll-call, recall is announced and none of the prisoners has the right to leave the barracks. At night the duty administrator with the guard is required to count the sleeping prisoners in the barracks two or three times. If the number does not correspond with the prescribed figure, all the prisoners immediately are aroused and they are checked by name to determine the absentee. After determining who he is, an investigation is carried out as to where and why he is absent. With failure to find the absentee, the measures for a search are announced, and upon the discovery of an escape, this is reported to the Camp Center VOKhR Headquarters for action.

#### b. The Life and Moral Features.

##### (1) The life of the various categories of prisoners.

###### At common labor

The overwhelming majority of the prisoners are engaged in common labor. They exist in such a state that their whole life consists of marching to work, work, and return from work. In the time which is work free they receive food and, in a state of deep fatigue, they sleep.

For high labor productivity (frequently for faked figures of "high productivity" in the accounts) the camp administration employs the following types of encouragement: citation in an order and before an assembly, listing among the "shockworkers", increasing the food, improving allowances, transfer to better living and working conditions, raising the "premium-incentive pay", the right of extra attendance at the cinema and plays, the right to extra visits, receipt of letters and packages, extra utilization of personal funds drawn from the camp cashier, appointment

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to an administrative duty, early release (the latter is very rare, and for those sentenced under Article 58, absolutely is not used).

The quartering conditions are very poor - solid plank beds, in the majority of cases without bedding. Prisoners sleep on mats (mats) covered by sea jackets and sacks; instead of pillows there are sacks filled with hay.

In the barracks during winter the temperature is low, the stoves are insufficient, fuel and light are limited, and it is dirty and stuffy. The prisoners are eternally hungry and dirty; there are plenty of bugs.

Clothing quickly reaches a state of dilapidation; often the supply of the bare necessities for winter are absent; such as: mittens and warm foot wrappings. Footwear has wooden soles. In the North, felt boots are issued, but they do not last long. For protection from the cold old rags with which the prisoners wrap their head, feet and chest, are used.

#### 18. THE LIFE OF THE SLAVES (Continuation)

Rags have great value in the camp during the winter. They already lay them by in summer during the warm period; they hide them since during searches they are collected by the administration and thrown out as collectors of dirt and infection. Sanitary measures, baths and hair cuts, are carried out regularly three times a month. There is insufficient fuel for the bath, the hot water is in limited quantity, soap is short and oftentimes there is none at all. Prisoners often wash with sand.

##### (a) In the camp punishment points.

The condition of the prisoners is still worse. They eat worse, clothing is not issued and in extreme necessity old tatters are issued.

The quarters equipment is worse, sometimes prisoners sleep directly on a dirt floor. Those being punished in the majority do not work and for entire days during the cold period and in winter they lie pressed one against another in a half sleeping existence. Often even those who wish to go out to work do not go due to no footwear and no clothing.

Those undergoing punishment are not "manpower", thus the attitude towards them is more severe and rougher. For obtaining admission from them for offenses corresponding measures are employed: assault and battery (formally prohibited), solitary confinement in a locked cell, and trial with the most severe sentences.

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## (b) In medical and invalid camp points.

These camp points are distinguished by the silence and the immobility of their inhabitants. In them are concentrated either invalids or those who have been exhausted by labor beyond their strength and who are no longer in a condition to work.

They are not assigned to work and even if they are assigned, then only those who are in condition to perform it, and the very lightest tasks are assigned to them. For example: cleaning up the area, working in the kitchens, repairing the camp equipment, plaiting baskets, mats and the like.

The overwhelming majority of these prisoners are not in condition to work. They lie almost without movement and frequently die on the spot.

In summer during the warm season they slowly crawl out into the yard, fall to the ground and lie warmed by the sun, until they are roused and are ordered to go to the barracks.

The mortality in these camp points is extremely great.

The camp administration consisting of prisoners, the specialists, and the administrative and supply personnel live in incomparably better conditions. They have better, always proper, and clean clothing, bedding including bed sheets, warm quarters, and sometimes separate cubicles for one to six men.

## 18. THE LIFE OF THE SLAVES (Continuation 3)

The prisoners who are performing duties as directors of camp points, sectors, farms, and construction projects; the doctors, the foremost engineers and the like, live especially well. Their life is little different from the life of the voluntary contract workers, and relative to food, it happens that they are better provided than the voluntary contract employees (for example, the head of the dairy farm, the head of the slaughter house, the head of the handicraft shops, the head of the canning factories, the supply chief and so forth). Often even the lower voluntary contract employees ingratiate themselves with such prisoners in order to receive more than is permitted by the norms. Because of this these prisoners are illegally given bribes and small favors.

## (2) Moral Traits of Prisoners

Characteristic traits of the majority of the prisoners are: uncomplaining, ingratiating, often forced toadyism which the camp direction so loves.

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The fate of a prisoner can depend on a common guard, or on the most minor camp administrator. One or two denunciations, the most unjust, are sufficient for the Third Section to take stern measures, capable of crippling the life of a man. All prisoners know this.

The most uncomplaining, reliable and disciplined are the intelligentsia, who in the majority were sentenced under Article 58. Sometimes there are proud people, desperate, who do not bow to the camp management; they are not doomed to repression only in the event that they are valuable specialists and necessary to the camp. The high management puts up with them in the interest of the camp and they influence a great deal with their opinions.

The habitual offenders are in the majority the amoral element. Desperate and rough, they often take unreasonable risk to contrive incidents as an expression of their protests and dissatisfaction.

The exhausted and the sick, who are called, "the deadenders", are people who are almost humble in their half death, and they slowly die, speechlessly, uncomplainingly and motionlessly.

#### c. Violations of Camp Rules and the Disciplinary Practices

(1) The types of penalty are: reprimands, warnings, transfer to poorer food, transfer to worse conditions, transfer to the hardest work, deprivation of the right of correspondence, of receipt of packages, and of visits. Deprivation of the right to attend the cinema and plays for prisoners. Deprivation of the right to spend personal funds from the camp cashier, deprivation of premium incentive pay, arrest, transfer to a punishment camp, and trial.

(2) Subject to restriction are: the right to unguarded movement in the camp and contact with other prisoners; the right to submit complaints and other declarations; utilization on one or another work; receipt of one or another type

#### 18. THE LIFE OF THE SLAVES (Continuation 4)

of encouragement; the right of correspondence; receipt of packages and visits; sojourn in one or another camp (for example, have to serve punishment only in separate camps); employment by the administration; detail to labor and the like.

The curtailments are made not according to the offense committed but in view of the particular statute, the individual peculiarities of the prisoner and the make-up of his "crime".

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(3) The rights of prisoners formally includes: receipt of all types of supplies according to the norms established by the GULAG; defense during judicial processes, defense by the prosecutor, submission of complaints, claims, and applications; address of written applications personally to the Camp Director, the director of GULAG, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to the General Secretary of the TsK (Central Committee) of the VKP (b), Stalin. Along with that, according to law no one has the right to open a sealed package with the address of a prisoner. It is enough to say as to this that all this is not observed to any degree.

## (4) Typical offenses.

Altercations with the administration, insubordination, carrying and storing forbidden articles, cohabitation, illegal correspondence, and even visits, card playing, drunkenness, fighting, riots, stealing, murder, wilful absence, flight, refusal to work, waste of camp property, wrecking and sabotage (breaking of tools, below standard norms), anti-Soviet agitation, appeals for organization of mass insubordination, expression of protests, and uprising.

Amoral violations, peculiar to recidivists, and political violations, are "counterrevolutionary".

## (5) The court and punishments.

There are open trials with summoning of the accused and witnesses to court and secret trials, judgments - the troika (trio) under the MGB. Most often the maximum period of punishment provided for by the statutes of the UK (Criminal Code) is meted out to the prisoner.

Peculiarities of the classification of camp crimes:

Escape, Article 82 of the UK (Criminal Code) is considered in camps as counterrevolutionary sabotage under Article 58-14 (the Law of 1940)

Escape, committed by a person previously sentenced under Article 58 shooting.

Refusal to work is considered sabotage. Three refusals committed in succession --- trial under Article 59-14 (Sabotage).

## 18. THE LIFE OF THE SLAVES (Continuation 5)

Refusal from work committed by a person sentenced previously under Article 58 -- shooting

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## d. Vocabulary

- (1) daily schedule
- (2) reveille
- (3) to assemble
- (4) posting
- (5) roll call
- (6) recall
- (7) plank beds
- (8) peajackets
- (9) sacks
- (10) foot wrappings
- (11) to wrap up
- (12) state of dilapidation
- (13) tatters
- (14) small favors
- (15) ingratiating
- (16) toadism
- (17) denunciation
- (18) judgments
- (19) unshod
- (20) unclothed
- (21) waste

## 19. THE GUARDING OF A CAMP

## a. Organization

- (1) The organization of the guards.

Each camp has its own distinct organization of its guards in correspondence with the location and the make-up of the camp.

The guard of each camp is commanded by the guard commander; he is a deputy of the director of camp administration. The Commander of the VOKhR is not obligatorily a military man. In many cases "Chekists" are appointed to this duty.

There is a commissar of the VOKhR who heads the political unit of the guard and who is subordinated directly to the Director of the Political Section of the camp.

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The guard staff of the camp is headed by the chief of staff. He obligatorily must be a staff officer.

The Assistant to the Director of VOKhR for Material and Technical Supply heads the Material and Technical Unit.

The Administration of VOKhR consists of the following:

The VOKhR Staff has four sections: personnel, military training and service; operations (combat with escapees); and the regime.

The Political Unit consists of:

The Agitation and Propaganda Section;

The Party Section for Mass Work; and

The Party Buro

The Material and Technical Unit:

Ammunition; transport and clothing supply; ration supply; the chief bookkeeper; a finance unit; warehouses and shops

There can be the following units in the make-up of the camp guard.

Sectors, from 900-1500 troops; battalions, from 200 to 500 troops; platoons, from 60 to 120 troops; and squads, 20 troops.

In addition, there may be cavalry platoons, 25-35 mounted men, and cavalry squadrons, 120-150 mounted men.

The numerical makeup of the guard is determined depending on the number of prisoners in the camp.

The limit; from 2.5 to 5 per cent.

(2) The subordination of the guard.

Subordination runs through several channels.

- (a) Organizationally, through the guard and regime sections of the GULAG;
- (b) Administratively, through the Director of Camp Administration;
- (c) Politically, through the Chief of the Camp Political Section; and
- (d) Operationally, through the Third Section of the MGB.

19. THE GUARDING OF A CAMP (Continuation)

(3) The Rights and Duties of Guards.

The guard is required only to guard the prisoners and the camp installations. It does not have the right to interfere in the internal life of the

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camp and into the affairs of the prisoners.

The guard is required, through using all measures right up to and including arms, to maintain order in the camp, not to permit, and to eliminate, disorder among the prisoners. The guard is required to break up escapes and to search down escapees.

The guard is required under the direction of the Third Section to carry out searches and arrests of prisoners, and in instances of necessity, also of the voluntary contract personnel of the camp.

#### The Training and Duty of the Guard

(1) Training is carried out during two hours a day. Fifty per cent of the time is political training. Since the guard personnel have already undergone two years' service in MGB troops or in the Soviet Army, they are well trained. In the training program, in addition to firing, special training for camp duty is carried out.

#### (2) Types of Duty

Punitive, convoy, sentry, surveillance, operational, guard outside the camp, scout, and patrol.

#### (3) Service dogs.

Under the VOKhR staff there is a kennel for service dogs where dogs are bred and trained. German shepherds which have been trained for six to eight months are employed for tracking (one year old's are preferred). Caucasian shepherds, which have been trained two to three months are used for guard duty. For example, a camp with 100,000 prisoners has 500-600 guard dogs and 100-150 tracking dogs.

#### (4) Transport of Prisoners

There is internal and external transport. One is for distant and the other is for close distances. Prisoners are transported by railroad, on steamships and wooden barges, by autotransport, by carts and on foot.

During transport of prisoners in addition to the convoy troops (one to two convoy troops per ten prisoners) there is a search group of 15 to 20 riflemen with three to five tracking dogs for tracking escapees en route.

#### (5) Precautions against escape, and search.

Precautions: by way of agents; transfer of dangerous prisoners to conditions of strict guard; and separating prisoners who are friends.

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Search: Local, for a local escape.

General: Throughout the whole camp and surroundings.

Central: Throughout the whole of the USSR, directed by Moscow.

19. THE GUARDING OF A CAMP (Continuation 2)

c. The Political - moral Status of the Guard Personnel.

(1) The officers.

The typical moral status: service without prospects and moving about; confusion and difficulty due to the system of multiple subordination; constant danger as a consequence of deeds and words; extreme activity without rest days; life in a remote spot; absence of a personal life; and the impossibility of leaving the service when desired.

(2) The ranks.

The very same features as above and in addition: the deadening watchfulness toward the prisoners as a result of getting used to them; daily contacts with the prisoners even including secret cohabitation with women prisoners; subjugation to the influence of prisoners; frequent dependence on the prisoners due to fear of exposure by them of their frame of mind, or due to joint abuse, or due to unlawful employment of gifts. Physical and moral disintegration.

(3) Members of families.

The same as for the ranks up to and including cohabitation with men prisoners (minus those features which are typical of officers). Material privation. The unsatisfactory family life due to the constant (day and night) duty. The community of outlooks with and sympathy toward the prisoners, that is, up to 90 per cent of the women of the guards and up to 60 per cent of the women of the officers are former prisoners who became acquainted with their present men in the camp.

The Operations - "Chekist" Sections of camps give this characteristic evaluation of the guard: "The guard in the majority of its composition is politically unstable and in a military sense unfit for combat. With the springing up of serious disorders in camp the guard would not be capable of hindering them. Order among the prisoners and the regime in the camp is maintained only due to the repressions carried out by the Operations - "Chekist" Section.....". One must agree entirely with this formula.

d. Vocabulary:

OCS FORM  
1 AUG 52 200-1  
D 8086

DISSEMINATED TRANSLATIONS  
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- (1) ammunition
- (2) disorder
- (3) search
- (4) to disintegrate
- (5) blunting
- (6) become accustomed to
- (7) abuse

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**MILITARY ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY**

88 HOURS

**GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE**

The aim of this course is to give the topographical, economic and military operational characteristics of North European Russia, Siberia, Crimea and the Ukraine. The course is intended to familiarize students with the above characteristics. It is divided into three major parts: Topography, Economic Geography and Military Operational characteristics. The instructors who will present this course are specialists not only in the subject matter of the course but also are regional specialists. The course is documented with the latest data and is illustrated by photos, maps, and charts.

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РЕКОМЕНДУЕМАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА К ЧАСТИ "УКРАИНА"  
(экономика)

1. Баранский Н.Н. - Экономическая География СССР, Глава "Украинская ССР".
2. Кубийович В. - Атлас Украины.
3. Большая Советская Энциклопедия, т.55, статья "Украинская ССР".
4. Mirchuk - Ukraine and its People.
6. Большая Советская Энциклопедия, т. СССР, статья "Украинская ССР".

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## GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE COURSE

88 HOURS

## EUROPEAN NORTH AND SIBERIA

1. RELIEF OF THE EUROPEAN NORTH AND ARCTIC REGION OF SIBERIA
  - a. Karelian and Kolsky Peninsula
  - b. Dvina and Pechora lowland
  - c. North Ural
  - d. Western and North Siberian lowlands
  - e. Central Siberian Plateau
  - f. Region of North Eastern Siberia
  - g. Soils
  - h. Swamps
2. RIVERS AND CLIMATE OF THE ARCTIC REGION
  - a. Rivers of Arctic Region
  - b. Climate of Karelia and Kolsky Peninsula
  - c. Climate of Dvina and Pechora lowlands
  - d. Climate of North Western Siberia
  - e. Climate of the Arctic Region of Eastern Siberia
3. ETERNAL FROST
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Region of eternal frost
  - c. Eternal frost and relief
  - d. Building on eternal frost
4. ARCTIC SEAS AND COASTS
  - a. Coasts
  - b. Seas
5. WESTERN SIBERIAN LOWLAND
  - a. Character of relief
  - b. Soils
  - c. Rivers and swamps
  - d. Climate
6. ALTAI
  - a. Features of relief
  - b. Vegetation
  - c. Rivers
  - d. Soils
  - e. Climate
7. KUZNETSKI - MINUSINSKI REGION AND SAJANS
  - a. Kuznetski basin
  - b. Minusinski basin
  - c. Western Sayan
  - d. Eastern Sayan
8. PRIBAIKAL AND ZABAIKAL
  - a. Pribaikal
  - b. Zabaikal
  - c. Stenovoi range
  - d. Aldanskoie Plateau
  - e. Rivers and Vegetation
  - f. Baikal
  - g. Climate

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9. CENTRAL SIBERIA
  - a. Relief
  - b. Yeniseiski range
  - c. Viluiskaia depression
  - d. Lenskaia depression
  - e. Climate.
10. NORTH EASTERN SIBERIA
  - a. Relief
  - b. Vegetation
  - c. Climate
  - d. Bering Sea
  - e. Okhotsk Sea
11. KOLCHATEL AND THE KURILES
  - a. Relief of Konchatka
  - b. Vegetation
  - c. Climate
  - d. Kuriles Islands
12. AMUR REGION AND SAKHALIN
  - a. Relief
  - b. Soils
  - c. Vegetation
  - d. Waters
  - e. Climate
  - f. Sakhalin
13. REVIEW
  - a. Western Siberian Lowland
  - b. Altai
  - c. Pribaikal and Zabaikal
  - d. Far East
14. COMMUNICATION OF SIBERIA
  - a. Railways
  - b. Railway centers
  - c. Paved highways
  - d. Waterways
15. DIRT ROADS OF SIBERIA
  - a. Types
  - b. Condition of roads during different seasons
  - c. Types of transport
16. NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
  - a. Utilization during World War I
  - b. Activities of Soviet Government
  - c. Ice breaker fleet
  - d. Ice breakers
17. ARCTIC NAVIGATION
  - a. History of the development of navigation
  - b. Arctic lines
  - c. Ports
  - d. Strategic utilization

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18. ARCTIC NON-TRANSPORT AVIATION
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Reconnaissance aviation
  - c. Aero survey
  - d. Forestry aviation
  - e. Aviation to assist crafts and trade
  - f. Expeditionary aviation
  - g. Sanitary aviation
  - h. General conclusions
  
19. ARCTIC TRANSPORT AVIATION
  - a. Importance of transport aviation
  - b. Passengers and freight
  - c. Transport aviation lines
  - d. Fuel supply
  
20. OTHER TYPES OF ARCTIC AVIATION
  - a. Water transport
  - b. Railways
  - c. Other types of transport
  
21. ECONOMIC BASE OF THE ARCTIC
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. North European
  - c. North Asiatic
  - d. Labor resources
  
22. FUEL SUPPLY IN THE ARCTIC
  - a. General situation
  - b. Coal fields
  - c. Old sources of supply
  - d. New sources of supply
  - e. Sources of fuel
  
23. INDUSTRY OF THE ARCTIC
  - a. Ship building
  - b. Mining
  - c. Timber
  - d. Fishing
  - e. Local manufacture
  
24. REVIEW
  - a. Northern Sea Route
  - b. Arctic navigation
  - c. Non-transport aviation
  - d. Economic base
  - e. Fuel supply
  
25. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SIBERIA
  - a. Economic importance to the USSR
  - b. Population
  - c. Natural resources
  - d. Energetics
  
26. AGRICULTURE IN SIBERIA
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Agricultural regions of Western Siberia
  - c. Agricultural regions of Eastern Siberia
  - d. Agricultural regions of the Far East

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27. GRAIN AND TECHNICAL CROPS IN SIBERIA
  - a. Arable land
  - b. Grains
  - c. Technical crops
28. LIVESTOCK RAISING AND CRAFTS IN SIBERIA
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Livestock raising
  - c. Crafts and other economic activities
29. GENERAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SIBERIA
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Man power
  - c. Building industry
  - d. Housing
  - e. Supply of population
30. MINING INDUSTRY
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Coal and oil
  - c. Iron ore
  - d. Gold
  - e. Tin
  - f. Other minerals
31. METALLURGY AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Ferrous metallurgy
  - c. Non-ferrous metallurgy
  - d. Chemical industry
32. MACHINE BUILDING INDUSTRY
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Transport machine building
  - c. Agriculture machine building
  - d. Mining machine building
  - e. Other types of machine building
33. FOOD INDUSTRY
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Butter production
  - c. Meat industry
  - d. Other types of food industry
34. LIGHT AND LUMBER INDUSTRY
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Light industry
  - c. Lumber industry
35. TRANSPORT AND ECONOMIC TIES
  - a. General characteristics
  - b. Transportation
  - c. Economic ties (import and export)
36. REVIEW
  - a. General characteristics of Siberia
  - b. Agriculture
  - c. Mining
  - d. Metallurgy and machine building
  - e. Food industry

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## 37. A GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF THE ARCTIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS

- a. Strategic significance of the theater
- b. Problems of the Arctic theater for military operations
- c. Air operational directions
- d. Operative capacity and tasks of the branches of service
- e. Methods of travel to the Arctic

## 38. LANDS OF THE ARCTIC OCEAN

- a. General significance of the lands of the Arctic ocean
- b. Spitzbergen group
- c. Iceland and Greenland
- d. Franz Josef land
- e. Nova Zemlya
- f. Northernland, New Siberia Island, Wrangel Island

## 39. LURALASK ARCHANGEL REGION

- a. Operational characteristics of the region
- b. Defensive and offensive possibilities
- c. Military bases and their significance
- d. Operational directions
- e. Operation of the theater
- f. Communications

## 40. CENTRAL ARCTIC BASIN

- a. Central Arctic and its expenses
- b. Economic and military basis
- c. Communications

## 41. ARMDYR CHUKOT REGION

- a. A general description of the region
- b. Operational characteristics
- c. Main Soviet military bases
- d. Main operating directions
- e. Means for supply of troops

## 42. PECULIARITIES IN THE UTILIZATION OF TROOPS

- a. General conditions affecting the use of troops
- b. Organizational requirements for troops
- c. Arming and supplying troops
- d. Utilization of special troops

## 43. SELENR

- a. General characteristics of the Arctic theater of operations
- b. Main military bases and means of transport and peculiarities in the utilization of troops

## 44. KUNCHITKA AND THE KURILE ISLANDS

- a. Operational characteristics
- b. Operational directions (sea and air)
- c. Existing bases and bases under construction
- d. Means of supply and communication

## 45. COASTLINES OF THE OKHOTSK SEA AND SAKHALIN ISLAND

- a. General characteristics of the region
- b. Operational bases (existent and under construction)
- c. Operational directions
- d. Defensive possibilities
- e. Communications



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## 46. MARITIME MANCHURIAN THEATER

- a. General operational characteristics
- b. Main sea, air and ground force bases
- c. Sea and ground fortified areas
- d. Operational directions
- e. Operative capacities of the theater

## 47. MONGOLIAN TRANS BAIKHAL THEATER

- a. Characteristics of the theater
- b. Operational directions
- c. Operative capacity of the theater
- d. Operational bases and transport

## 48. EASTERN AND WESTERN SIBERIA

- a. General characteristics
- b. Communications
- c. Military and other bases

## 49. SEMINAR

- a. Maritime Manchurian theater
- b. The Mongolian - Baikal theater of military operations

## 50. EXHIBITION

## CRIMEA

## 51. GENERAL TOPOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

- a. Topographical regions and soils
- b. Rivers and climate
- c. Communications
- d. Sea coasts and ports

## 52. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND INDUSTRY

- a. Boundary, area, population
- b. Natural resources
- c. Energetics
- d. Heavy industry
- e. Light industry

## 53. AGRICULTURE, TRANSPORT AND HEALTH RESORTS

- a. Agriculture
- b. Transport
- c. Health resorts

## 54. OPERATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMEA

- a. General characteristics
- b. Operational approaches
- c. Defensive fortifications
- d. Main bases

## UKRAINE

## 55. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

- a. Relief
- b. Soils
- c. Forests and swamps
- d. Climatic characteristics

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## 56. RIVERS

- a. Rivers of Polesye
- b. Dnieper
- c. Rivers of Central Ukraine
- d. Crossings over the Dnieper

## 57. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. Railways
- b. Waterways
- c. Highways

## 58. DIRT ROADS

- a. Types
- b. Condition of roads
- c. Dirt roads during World War II

## 59. WORLD WAR II OPERATIONS

- a. Season for best operations
- b. Kiev encirclement
- c. Encirclement near Kharkov

## 60. SEASHORE AND PORTS

- a. Black Sea shore
- b. Asov sea shore
- c. Ports of Black Sea
- d. Ports of Asov Sea

## 61. REVIEW

- a. Relief
- b. Rivers
- c. Dirt roads
- d. Sea shores and ports

## 62. GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION

- a. General considerations
- b. Frontiers
- c. Territory
- d. Climate
- e. Soils
- f. Natural and historical regions

## 63. POPULATION

- a. General considerations
- b. Structure of population
- c. Density of population
- d. Movement of population

## 64. SOURCES OF ENERGY

- a. General considerations
- b. Coal
- c. Peat
- d. Brown coal
- e. Petroleum

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## 65. MINERAL RESOURCES

- a. Iron ore
- b. Manganese ore
- c. Non-ferrous metals
- d. Chemical raw materials
- e. Building materials

## 66. AGRICULTURE

- a. General considerations
- b. Forms of landowning
- c. Utilization of land
- d. Arable lands
- e. Grains
- f. Mechanization

## 67. INDUSTRIAL CROPS

- a. Sugar beet
- b. Sunflower
- c. Other industrial crops
- d. Fruit and vegetables

## 68. LIVESTOCK RAISING

- a. General consideration
- b. Changes in livestock
- c. Fodder crops
- d. Distribution of livestock

## 69. REVIEW

- a. General geographical description
- b. Sources of energy
- c. Mineral resources
- d. Agriculture
- e. Industrial crops

## 70. INDUSTRY

- a. General considerations
- b. Geographical distribution
- c. The metallurgical and mining regions

## 71. MINING AND METALLURGY

- a. Coal industry
- b. Iron ore mining industry
- c. Manganese industry
- d. Metallurgical industry

## 72. MACHINE BUILDING

- a. General considerations
- b. Heavy and light machine building industry
- c. Transport for machine building
- d. Agricultural machine building
- e. Electro-technical equipment

## 73. OTHER BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY

- a. Petroleum industry
- b. Coke-benzal industry
- c. Pure chemistry
- d. Agricultural fertilizers
- e. Production of electro energy
- f. Cement industry

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## 74. FOOD INDUSTRY

- a. General considerations
- b. Sugar industry
- c. Flour milling industry

## 75. OTHER BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY

- a. Distilling
- b. Canning
- c. Vegetable oil
- d. Fruits and vegetables
- e. Confectionary
- f. Tobacco

## 76. REVIEW

- a. Industry
- b. Mining and metallurgy
- c. Machine building
- d. Other branches of industry
- e. Food industry

## 77. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. General considerations
- b. Railroads

## 78. OTHER TYPES OF COMMUNICATIONS

- a. River communications
- b. Sea communications
- c. Highway communications

## 79. REGIONAL REVIEW

- a. Polessie
- b. Right bank forrest steppe
- c. Left bank forrest steppe
- d. Steppe
- e. Mountain region

## 80. REVIEW

- a. All material covered in the course

## 81. GENERAL OPERATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

- a. Territory, borders, general considerations
- b. Geographical condition
- c. Economic situation
- d. Communications

## 82. LUBLIK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE

- a. Operative aims
- b. Individual operative aims
- c. Conditions for employment of armies
- d. Bases
- e. Defensive lines

## 83. LIVOV-KRAKOV OPERATIONAL REGION

- a. Territory and borders
- b. Operative aims
- c. Operative capacity of the region
- d. Defensive lines
- e. Bases
- f. Cooperation with river flotilla

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84. UZHGOROD APPROACHES

- a. General character
- b. Operative aims
- c. Defensive lines
- d. Communications and bases

85. IZMAILSKI-BUCHAREST REGION

- a. Territory and borders
- b. Operative aims
- c. Particular significance of Izmil
- d. Communications and bases

86. MARITIME REGION

- a. Territory and borders
- b. Characteristics
- c. Operative directions
- d. Communications
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37. SEMINAR

- a. General characteristics of the Ukrainian theater
- b. Ferekappatsky and Zakarpatsky regions
- c. Izmil-Bucharest and maritime regions

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Military Economic Geography I

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Russian

Certain Sections of Military Economic Geography I

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THE EUROPEAN NORTH AND SIBERIA  
(Operational Characteristics)37. THE GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ARTIC THEATRE OF MILITARY  
Operations (Page 72).

a. The strategic significance of the theatre.

(1) The USSR and the USA, as the chief opposing military powers, are most close one to another across the Artic.

(2) The "Artic" question today very intently interests the General Staffs of the chief countries.

(3) Underestimation of the theatre is just as dangerous as overestimation. The huge technical progress in aircraft manufacturing calls for a new examination of the Artic.

(4) For the USSR, its artic districts present chief interest not from the economic side but from the side of the strategic; the economic mastering of the Artic is only a means of strategic mastering.

b. The main problems of the use of the Artic as a theatre of military operations.

(1) The mission of investigation includes answering the question: in what forms, by what methods, can war be waged in the Artic?

(2) What types of armed forces, in first order, can be employed: air, naval, ground?

(3) How must troops be organized, how to supply troops, what must be the transport, what technical equipment is necessary to have, what are the conditions of operation of the air forces, naval forces and the like?

(4) The Artic undoubtedly can be made a "place de arms"

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for operation in first order for air forces, then in a more limited measure for naval forces; ground troops can play a supplementary role: The guard and servicing of bases.

(5) The labor, carried out by the USSR in the Arctic, undoubtedly gave the proposed result; there were created military bases; the construction of routes of communication equipped in an aeronavigational relation is being carried out (meteorological stations, radio beacons and the like), and the pre-determined supplies of material and so forth are being created.

(6) The USSR can throw into the Arctic as many people and material means as necessary; at the present time, more than three million people are living in the Soviet Arctic (a significant per cent are prisoners).

c. The air operational directions.

(1) The main ones: across the north pole, across Kamchatka-Chukotsk Krai, across Greenland and Iceland.

(2) It is necessary to recognize that these directions are extraordinarily complex as well by meteorological reasons, (page 73) by the time of year (the Polar night), so also by the conditions of supply.

(3) The climate, the time of year, the "support routes" to the Arctic, are the most "narrow places" (bottlenecks).

(4) It is not excluded, and it is supposed, that the Soviet Arctic shore and the lands of the Northern Ice Ocean can become bases for radio-directed and rocket aviation.

d. The operational capacity and the missions of types of troops.

(1) The Arctic according to its expanse can accommodate, theoretically, any quantity of troops.

(2) Actually, in the strength of the above enumerated reasons, the capacity of the theatre is extraordinarily limited.

(3) Troops with special organization and support are required ("Arctic troops").

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(4) In the strength of the remoteness which decide the outcome of the war, it is difficult all the same to figure, that the Arctic will be a self-sufficient theatre of military operations.

e. Support routes to the Arctic.

(1) These routes are insufficient and unsatisfactory. The main routes are water: river and sea; the first for a long period have been in order. The air routes have limited capacity.

(2) The weakness of the support routes necessitates creating promptly huge supplies which all the same do not suffice for the waging of war.

f. Vocabulary.

- (1) Mastering the Arctic.
- (2) Narrow places (bottlenecks).
- (3) Air operational direction.
- (4) Self-sufficient theatre of military operations.
- (5) Opposing.
- (6) "Place de arms" of operations.
- (7) Operational capacity.
- (8) Support.
- (9) Support route.
- (10) Overestimation, underestimation.
- (11) Supplementary role.
- (12) Aero-navigational mastering.
- (13) Limitation of operations.

39. THE MURMANSK-ARKHANGELSK REGION (Page 76).

a. The operational characteristics of the region.

(1) Of all the Arctic regions, the most likely region for the operations of ground troops, not to mention, even of air forces and a naval fleet.

(2) Operationally, the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk Region is closely tied with Scandanavia, with the Leningrad Region and with the Center

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of the European part of the USSR.

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(3) The most liveable region in an economic and in a military relation.

(4) Rightfully, one can consider as the main operational region for the whole North-Western USSR, as well in a defensive, so also in an offensive sense.

b. The defensive and offensive possibilities of the region.

(1) If Russia (the USSR) and England in the past two huge wars went forth together, then for the future, this situation is changed and the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk Region acquires an exceptional significance also for the USSR and for her adversaries:

(a) The initial "place de arms" for the struggle for Scandanavia and the Atlantic.

(b) The initial "place de arms" for the struggle for Spitsbergen and Iceland.

(c) Covering the Leningrad Region from the North, not permitting the adversary to enter into the rear of the Leningrad Region.

(d) It covers the center of the country from possible landing operations on the shore of the White Sea.

(e) It is the base for naval forces and air forces during their operations in the Artic.

c. Military bases and their significance.

(1) Murmansk, the chief operational base; a huge naval port for ships of all classes; an air base with the presence in it of all means of servicing.

(2) Petsamo, the chief base for light forces of the naval fleet.

(3) Maryan-Mar is a huge air base through which run all the routes of the western port of the Soviet Artic.

(4) Arkhangelsk is an air and naval base, far lagging in its importance to Murmansk.

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(5) Similar bases: cities--Polyarni, Monchegorsk, Kandalaksha, Molokovsk, Kem. (Page 77)

d. Operational directions.

(1) Ground: Cape North Cape, Pitkya-Yarvinskoye (Finland).

(2) Air-naval, combined operations of air forces, parachute troops and naval forces: Cape North Cape, Spitzbergen, Port Narvik, Lofoten Islands, Trondheim and others.

(3) Air: Iceland, Greenland, the North Pole-USA, southern Scandinavia.

e. Operational capacity of the theatre.

(1) For ground troops, although also the best conditions, but all the same the terrain is difficult to overcome. In winter time special, separate ski detachments can operate; it is impossible to employ heavy artillery and tanks.

(2) The available naval bases permit employment of more ships than at the present time the Soviet Northern Fleet has.

(3) For massed employment of air forces, supplementary construction of air bases is required, which is being done.

f. Routes of communications and communications are more developed than in other parts of the Arctic.

(1) Railroads: Leningrad-Murmansk, Moscow-Vologda-Archangelsk, and the Vorkuta Railroad.

(2) Waterways: the Northern Dvina, the Pechora, the Mezen and other rivers, the White Sea Canal.

(3) Air routes of communication are well developed, but cannot be supply arteries.

g. Vocabulary.

(1) Departure "place de arms".

(2) Air route.

(3) Landing operation.

(4) Light forces of a naval fleet.

(5) Ski detachments.

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- (6) Available naval bases.
- (7) Operational base.
- (8) Difficult-to-overcome terrain.
- (9) Operational tie.
- (10) Massed employment.

42. THE PECULIARITIES IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND THE UTILIZATION OF TROOPS (Page 82).

a. General conditions influencing the employment of troops in the Artic.

(1) The opinion of experts on the possibility of employment of armed forces are varied; experiments, observation and so forth are in progress.

(a) In the Artic, air bases, as departure points for distant attacks, will be most completely represented.

(b) To a limited extent, naval forces can be employed, if first order not so much for combat offensive operations as much for defense of their shores and supporting the supply bases.

(c) Ground troops will be represented by separate detachments, assigned for service and guard of bases; these will be either ski detachments, or "reindeer" and "dog" cavalry.

(2) The time of the year (the change of the polar day and polar night) and the general climatic conditions undoubtedly sharply curtail every effectiveness of troops.

(3) The absence of routes--communication or their weakness--is the limit in the utilization of troops; the remoteness from the main (deep) supply centers increases the general difficulties.

(4) The sparse population of the Artic causes troop organisms to have with them everything beginning with weapons and rations and ending with living quarters.

(5) It is difficult to assume that the Soviet Command is decided on the launching by air and sea huge landings in Alaska or on the other hand, that from Alaska can be launched large units to



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Tiksi or to Dickson.

b. Requirements for organization of troop units.

(1) "Lightness"--that is, in quantity of people, small units, easily directed.

(2) "Maneuverability"--the quality quickly to move themselves long distances.

(3) The first two conditions are supported, apart from other considerations, by the system of organization of a rear organ; it must be light and maneuverable.

(4) "Tactical independence"--that is, the ability independently to solve tactical missions, not being attached to a higher echelon.

(5) In the Soviet Army, according to available information, in the makeup of the Arkhangelsk Military District are "polar units", the chart of which is given here.

42. THE PECULIARITIES IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND UTILIZATION OF TROOPS (CONTINUATION) (Page 83).

c. Armament and supply of troops.

(1) The requirement of "lightness", and "maneuverability" call forth the necessity to have "light" armament; automatics, light machine guns, light mortars, machine pistols, knives and so forth.

(2) Each subunit of a troop unit must be supported by the minimum transported supply of ammunition, rations and so forth.

(3) Articles of supply must have portable packaging which will permit the soldier to have all that is necessary with himself.

(4) Inasmuch as the employment, even of medium types of artillery; mortars and tanks are practically excluded, aerosled subunits and "full tracked vehicles", mounting machine guns and light guns will play the role of artillery and tanks.

(5) In the quality of transport means apart from aerosleds and full tracked vehicles, reindeer and dog teams find wide employment.

(6) For supply of troops, skis, ski mounts for weapons and

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snowshoes are obligatory.

(7) An extraordinarily important problem is the question of medical service and the evacuation of sick and wounded.

(8) Requirements for clothing: durability, lightness, well ventilated, windproof, waterproof and the like.

d. The employment of various types of troops.

(1) Exceptionally unfavorable conditions for large units.

(2) The necessity for the presence of large service elements for naval and air bases.

(3) The difficulty of operation of a submarine fleet in the majority of regions.

(4) The operations of separate vessels, separate ground units and separate groups of aviation--will be the basic type of operation.

e. Vocabulary.

- (1) Reindeer and dog teams.
- (2) Snowshoes.
- (3) Transported supply (ammunition).
- (4) Ski mount.
- (5) Difficulty of operation.
- (6) Attachment.
- (7) Aerosled, full tracked vehicles.
- (8) Windproof.
- (9) Committing.
- (10) Waterproof.

46. THE MARITIME-MANCHURIAN THEATRE (Page 89)

a. General operational characteristics of the Maritime.

(1) The Maritime is termed the zone of terrain, lying along the Sea of Japan and the Tartar Strait up to De Kastril Bay. We, in the examination, included Khabarovsk Krai and Amur District emphasizing by this the operational inseparability of this region from the Transbaikalian Region.

(2) Three main situations characterize the described region:

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the Maritime and Khabarovsk Krai is the main supply base of all of the Far East; this region is the main and final defensive region, the loss of which entails the loss of Manchuria and the Transbaikal. This region is the offensive "place de arms" on the Manchurian Directions and on the side of the Japanese Islands.

(3) The Far East presents today a great industrial (military) region with a great quantity of population and a sufficiently developed net of local routes of communication which support the maneuver of troops.

(4) Until the finish of construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, the weak point of the Far East is its connection with central regions of the USSR, and during active operations of aviation of an adversary on railroad junctions, this connection in general can be curtailed.

b. The main naval, air and ground bases.

(1) Naval: Vladivostok (Second Little River), Voroshilov (Mikolsk Ussuriisk), Iman, Spassk-Dalnii, Khabarovsk, Bikin, Sovetskaya Gavin, Barano-Orenburgsk, Grodekovo.


(2) Air: Vladivostok (Second Little River), Voroshilov (Nikolsk Ussuriisk), Iman Spassk-Dalnii, Khabarovsk, Bikin, Sovetskaya Gavin, Barano-Orenburgsk, Grodekovo.

(3) Ground (the presence of military garrisons and huge state warehouses): Vladivostok, Voroshilov, Khabarovsk, Kazakevichevo, Grodekovo, Spassk, Bikin, Blagoveshchensk, Stalinsk (The Hebrew Autonomous District) and others.

c. Naval and ground fortified regions of the Far East.

(1) All the pre-war years, beginning with the beginning of the thirties', the Soviet Far East was prepared, not for offensive operations, but in first order, to defensive. Thus was constructed also the Pacific Fleet.

(2) The Naval UP (Fortified Region) and shore separate fortifications:



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Vladivostok, Russki Ostrov, Putyatin and Poset Island, as a complex of defense of the Vladivostok Region; then on the shore of Tartar Strait and the Sea of Japan; De Kastri, Sovetskaya Gavn, Samarga, Plastun, Grosevichi, Olga.

46. THE MARITIME-MANCHURIAN THEATRE (CONTINUATION) (Page 90).

(3) Ground Fortified Regions: Kraskino (Poset), Grodekovo, Kamen-Ribelov, Iman, Kozakevich (Khabarovsk), Sungari, Blagoveshchensk (Sakalin).

d. Ground, naval, and air operational directions.

(1) Naval: South Korean Ports, Japanese Islands, Sakalin and Kurile Islands (in the event of operations of an adversary against them); distant cruise of submarines on the naval communications of the adversary.

(2) Air operational directions are sharply divided into two types: Naval air directions and ground air directions:

(a) Jointly with naval forces, and as well also independent operations through the center of Japan, the Philippines, the support of the resistance of the Kurile garrisons and so forth.

(b). The air directions leading into Manchuria and China.

(3) Operational directions for operations of ground troops: the Maritime-Korean, the Tumin-Girin, the Mulin, the Mishin, the Iman, the Lakhasus (the Sungari River Direction), the Keshan, and the Mergen.

e. The operational capacity of theatre is sufficiently limited by the mountainous character of the terrain in the Maritime Region and the Malii Khigan.

(1) The general number of troops in the initial period of a war is 3-4 armies with means of reinforcement.

(2) After entry into Central Manchuria, this quantity can be increased to 5-6 armies.

f. Vocabulary.



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- (1) Distant cruise.
- (2) Baikal-Amur Mainline.
- (3) Duality of mission.
- (4) River Operational direction.

47. THE MONGOLIAN-TRANSBAIKAL THEATRE (Page 91).

a. General description of the theatre.

(1) In the composition of the theatre is included the territory: Chita District, the Buryat-Mongolian Republic, Irkutsk District, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, western Manchuria and the Chinese province of Sinkiang.

(2) All the examined theatre should be divided into two basic sectors: the Transbaikal-Manchurian and the Mongolia-Chinese.

(a) Operations on the first sector is connected with the Manchurian Directions.

(b) Operations of the second sector are connected with directions in the north and north-western provinces of China.

(c) The Sinkiang Direction belongs mostly to the eastern part of the Central-Asiatic Theatre.

(3) The Mongolian Peoples' Republic, being by character an integral part of the USSR, fulfills the role of "place de arms" for Soviet troops operating in flank of Manchuria and simultaneously a barrier, blocking the route of entry into the region of Lake Baikal, which would lead to the cutting off of all of the Soviet Far East and the Transbaikal.

b. Main operational directions.

(1) Manchurian, in the general direction on the front Kharbin-Chanchun.

(2) Chinese, in the general direction on the front Sinkiang-Beipin.

(3) Tibet-Sinkiang:

(a) The Manchurian Directions: Khailar-Chita-Otpor,

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Khailar, Tsitsikar--as the main direction, then--the Solun Direction: Lake Buin-Mur--Solun-Taonan-Chanchun; Kailin Direction; Choibalsan-Tantsak-Bulak-Kailu-Mukden--as a supplementary, supporting from the south the two main directions.

(b) Chinese (or Mongolian) Directions: Kalgan-Beipin: Ulan-Ude-Ulan-Bator-Sain-Shanda-Kalgan--Beipin--as the main direction, leading into the region of Beipin and Tsyantszits; the Chifin Direction with entry into the important province of Zhekhe with the huge military-industrial centers of Zhekhe, Tszinchzhou, Chifin and others.

(c) The Tibet-Sinkiang Directions: the Kuldzhin, the Kashgar and the Sinin.

47. THE MONGOLIAN-TRANSBAIKAL THEATRE (Page 92).

c. The operational capacity of the theatre and the conditions of the utilization of troops.

(1) The greatest on the Manchurian Directions where not less than two reinforced armies can operate.

(2) The Mongolian (Chinese) can accommodate 5-7 divisions, that is, one army.

(3) The most difficult directions, the Tibet-Sinkiang, where separate detachments can operate.

(4) The difficulties of utilization of troops are included in a series of condition, such as: the necessity of overcoming the Great Khigan, the insufficiency of water on the Mongolian Directions, the semidesert and desert character of the terrain on the Tibet-Sinkiang Directions.

(5) For aviation, the construction of landing areas is not such a complicated business; in summer the passability of the terrain for transport is completely satisfactory; in winter time, it is necessary to reckon with the factor of great freezes.

(6) One of the difficulties of operations of troops is the question of transport of supplies because of the great extent of the

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routes of communication.

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d. Operational bases and routes of communication.

(1) On Soviet territory: Station Borzya, Olobyannaya, Chita, Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude.

(2) On Mongolian: Ulan-Bator, Choibalsan, Sain-Shanda.

(3) On Manchurian: Tsitsikar, Kharbin, Chanchun, Mukden, Zhekhe, Tszinchzhou and others.

(4) Sinkiang Province--Urumchi.

(5) Toward the former Manchurian-Soviet border railroad branches to the borders were laid by the Japanese and the Soviet Commands; Ulan-Bator and Choibalsan are united by railroads from the main Siberian Mainline; many paved roads are constructed in Mongolia.

e. Vocabulary.

- (1) Railroad branch.
- (2) Operational barrier.
- (3) Possibility of terrain.
- (4) Extension of routes of communication.
- (5) Flank.
- (6) Overcoming.
- (7) Transport of supplies.
- (8) Cutting off (of the Far East).
- (9) Landing area.

48. EASTERN AND WESTERN SIBERIA (Page 93).

a. General characteristics of the territory.

(1) In an operational relation, all Siberia presents interest not from the point of view of the possibility or impossibility of waging combat operations there, but from that point of view, that Siberia is now one of the most important regions of supply of a war as a whole.

(2) In a political plan, the presence of military operations in Siberia can mean a civil war between the people and the Soviet system.



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(3) In an operational-geographic relation, Siberia is characterized in the sense that:

(a) She is protected by its remoteness from the borders from active air attack; to fly to the Siberian centers, that make it necessary to traverse a long route over Soviet territory.

(b) Siberia gives, for an army, a large human contingent which is fine human combat material.

(4) The Soviet government already, long before the war, began to transfer industrial centers to the Urals and the Transurals, and also in Siberia.

(a) The creation of separate industrial centers for the support of each theatre of military operations separately transpired.

(b) Western, partly Eastern, Siberia together with the Urals are designated not for this or that separate and defined theatre.

(5) Siberia occupies one of the first places in support of a war by products of supply and thus her significance, as a granery, still more is rising.

(6) From the point of view of the waging of military operations, Siberia is characterized in that these military operations will develop only along roads; a continuous front, because of the roadlessness and the huge expanse, will not be.

b. Routes of communication and communications.

(1) The weakness of Siberia as a universal supply base includes that she is all the same weakly connected with the central part of the USSR. Eastern Siberia and the Far East are in a still more serious situation.

(2) Three railroads run up to the line Omsk-Akmolinsk in Siberia:

(a) Moscow-Molotov-Sverdlovsk-Omsk.

(b) Moscow-Kuibishev-Chelyabinsk-Omsk.

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(c) (Page 94) Moscow-Kuibishev-Magni-Togorsk-Akmolinsk  
(or Moscow-Saratov-Chkalov-Kartali-Akmolinsk).

(3) Further, to the border of Eastern Siberia only two lines run, although the second still does not function at full capacity:

- (a) Omsk-Krasnoyarsk-Taishet.
- (b) Akmolinsk-Barnaul-Abakan-Taishet.

(4) From Taishet the Bam begins, but it is not finished; practically to Chita runs one line where it splits: one runs to Kharbin, and the second, to Khabarousk.

(5) According to plan, the Bam must go from Taishet Station to Ust-Kut, further to Bodaibo, Tindin Village with final exit in Komsomolsk on the Amur.

(6) There are no main paved roads in Siberia. All paved roads (Shosse) and like dirt roads, practically, are roads of local significance; in the pre-taiga and in the taiga regions--horse and reindeer transport.

(7) Flanking railroad lines connecting Siberia with the Center, can be considered the lines running through Central Asia, as an example, from Semipalatinsk to Alma-Ata and from Akmolinsk to Dzhezkazgan and further to Dzhusali.

(8) River routes are predestined for supply of Siberia; in the center of Siberia they are routes of local and fairly limited significance.

c. Military bases and bases of general significance.

(1) All the bases of Siberia are located in first order along railroad mainlines:

(a) To the number of the military bases, one can count Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Novosibirsk which has a huge aerodrome for heavy aviation.

(b) To the bases of general significance can be counted almost all the more or less huge populated points, especially along the roads where there are great warehouses of state supplies.

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d. Vocabulary:

- (1) Region of supply of a war.
- (2) Split.
- (3) Human combat material.
- (4) Flanking railroad line.
- (5) Warehouse of state supplies.
- (6) Remoteness from the borders.
- (7) Industrial center.

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## CAUCASUS

## 118. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

- a. Chief Mountain Ranges
- b. Plateaus and Plains
- c. Caucasus

## 119. NATURAL OBSTACLES

- a. Soils
- b. Swamps
- c. Rivers
- d. Climatic Conditions
- e. Obstacles of Various Seasons

## 120. COMMUNICATIONS

- a. Rail Network
- b. Chief Rail Centers
- c. Highways
- d. Mountain Roads
- e. Dirt Roads

## 121. SEA COASTS

- a. Black Sea Coast
- b. Chief Ports of Black Sea Coast
- c. Caspian Coast and Ports

## 122. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

- a. Borders and Area
- b. Population
- c. Natural Resources
- d. Economy
- e. Sources of Energy

## 123. MINING, HEAVY INDUSTRY AND MACHINE-TOOL INDUSTRY

- a. Coal and Iron Ore
- b. Non-Ferrous and Rare Metals
- c. Metallurgy
- d. Non-Ferrous Metallurgy
- e. Machine-Tool Industry

## 124. OIL INDUSTRY

- a. Oil Fields
- b. Production
- c. World War II Damages
- d. Main Pipe Lines
- e. Refineries
- f. Radium

## 125. LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRY

- a. Textile Industry
- b. Canning
- c. Wine Production
- d. Tea Factories
- e. Resorts and Sanatoriums

## 126. AGRICULTURE

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