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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY	USSR (Gorkiy Oblast)	REPORT		50X1
SUBJECT	1. Ammonium Sulphate Plant at Zavod No. 96	DATE DISTR.	10 March 1954	
	2. Installation Under Construction at Rulon	NO. OF PAGES	3	50X1-HUM
DATE OF INFO.				
PLACE ACQUIRED				

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THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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STATE	#	ARMY	#	NAVY	#	AIR	#	FBI		AEC				
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REPORT [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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COUNTRY : USSR

DATE DISTR. 19 JAN 54

SUBJECT 1. Ammonium Sulphate Plant at Zavod No.96
2. Installation Under Construction at Rulon

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO 50X1-HUM
REPORT NO.

[redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

[redacted]

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1. Information [redacted] has indicated a synthetic ammonia installation was being constructed in 1950 at Zavod 96 (Zavod Stroy) near Dzerzhinsk from equipment from the Leuna plant. [redacted]

[redacted] there was no synthetic ammonia installation in existence at Zavod 96. [redacted] therefore [redacted] the subject [redacted] concerned the ammonium sulphate plant, a plant the existence of which is definitely known [redacted] information concerning this plant [redacted] is described below. [redacted]

[redacted] raw materials for this plant, such as nitric acid, possibly ammonia, and other basic chemical elements were presumably supplied by the neighboring plant Kalinin.

In 1948 a group of German specialists, including KROEGER, TROESTRUM, [redacted] were assigned the development of an ammonium sulphate project. The plans and designs for this installation were based on documented records of machinery and equipment dismantled in Leuna and brought to the USSR in 1946-1947 [redacted]

The entire equipment for this installation was of Leuna origin. The redevelopment of this project took place during the period from 1948 until the spring of 1951.

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Production plans and building designs, also based on records documented in Leuna, were prepared by the Project Institute No.3 in Moscow. (This institute functions as a planning and design department of the Ministry for Chemical Industry)

The plant was finally completed and put into operation in the spring of 1951. It was equipped with four converters with a total productive capacity of 250 tons per month

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The considerable delay in the final construction of the plant was largely due to the Soviet system of shifting prepared plans and designs from one responsible department to another, where new suggestions, modifications, alterations, etc. were added. These revisions were designed primarily to correct the inaccuracies and mistakes made by the Soviet engineers during the long period of planning. It was also an attempt to adjust the prepared materials to Soviet technical requirements and building facilities.

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Originally the Soviets intended to remove the finished products in sacks. However, they had a plan proposing the shipment of the produce in loose form which would simply be dumped into railroad cars. It is generally known that when transported in loose quantity, ammonium sulphate eventually forms a hard compressed mass. As such it cannot be used for spreading as fertilizer when needed on the spot. the produce was not shipped out to be used as fertilizer, but intended for further treatment and/or development at other Soviet plants.

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2. An unidentified large installation was under construction either adjacent to or within the confines of the "Rulon" Plastics Plant, No.148. all known details regarding this installation.

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In 1947-1948 of the construction of a synthetic gasoline plant at Rulon. This plant was supposedly constructed with equipment brought from Leuna unable to obtain information concerning the production capacity or any other concrete technical details

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In connection with the construction of new plants in the Duerzhinsk area a large central storage dump containing immense quantities of dismantled equipment and machinery from the Leuna, Bitterfeld, and Rodleben plants in Germany was in existence in the vicinity of the OKA plant

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The story circulated among the German specialists was that this equipment was destined for the expansion of old or construction of new installations at the plants Savod 96, OKA, and Rulon.

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INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET

COUNTRY	USSR (Gorkiy Oblast)	REPORT	<input type="text"/>	50X1
SUBJECT	Technical Control Section at Zavod 96, Igumnovo	DATE DISTR.	10 March 1954	
		NO. OF PAGES	3	50X1-HUM
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Comments: 50X1-HUM

1. For main department in Paragraph 2, read chief directorate.
2. For Main Nitrogen Department (Glavasot) in Paragraph 2, read Chief Directorate for Nitrogen (Glavazot).

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REPORT [redacted]

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COUNTRY : USSR

DATE DISTR. 19 JAN. 54

SUBJECT : Technical Control Section at Zavod 96, Igumovo

NO. OF PAGES 2

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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Organizational Structure of Technical Control Section

1. The administrative and supervisory functions of the zavod's OTK system falls within the controlling domain of the plant's chief engineer, KHRULOV

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The operational and controlling functions for this section were performed by the Central Laboratory Department, which in turn supervised technical control work of its subsidiary laboratories and of the individual inspectors assigned to the various production departments of the plant.

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Technical control work was performed by the plant's engineers, chemists, laboratory workers, and similar personnel qualified for OTK functions. no information concerning the number of personnel performing inspections in the laboratories and the individual production units of the plant.

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OTK on the Ministerial Level

2. [redacted] the Ministry for Chemical Industry in Moscow has a main department controlling OTK activities. This department presumably controls the individual plant OTK systems through the various main departments of the parent ministry. In this instance the Main Nitrogen Department (Glavasot) was supervising the functions of the subordinate chemical plants in the Dzerzhinsk area as well as those of similar plants existing throughout the USSR.

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
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Periodic Inspections

- 3. [redacted] the zavod's OTK is subject to periodic inspections by representatives designated by the parent ministry. During the period [redacted] at Zavod 96 [redacted] observed the existence of various teams performing audits and inspections of the plant's activities including those of the OTK. [redacted] one of these inspections lasted once for as long as six months. Presumably these rigorous inspections were a result of the increasing number of complaints registered with the ministry concerning shipments of products which did not meet the required technical or quality standards of other departments. In several instances Party functionaries participated on the investigating commissions. These commissions were empowered with authority to effect transfers or to reshuffle personnel as well as to recommend changes in the technological processes and testing procedures.
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Technical Control Functions

- 4. The laboratories as well as the individual inspectors were primarily responsible for the control, analysis, quality testing, and the verification of chemical compositions of all incoming raw and semi-finished materials and the inspection and release of the finished products. The Central Laboratory Department, in addition to its supervisory functions, was charged with the formulation of inspection procedures, development of material testing and quality control methods, and the preparation of technical documents and reports on the inspection findings. The type of the technical documents varied in their form according to the particular product under evaluation. The one feature they had in common was that these documents were lengthy and contained many signatures. In instances when a re-evaluation of a certain product is initiated by the plant's central OTK, the inspector who signed the product's quality release is held responsible. For this reason the rank and file of OTK inspectors welcome the Soviet system of group responsibility.
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[redacted] observed a number of stamps and identifications on metal and glass containers as well as wooden crates and boxes. However, [redacted] unable at this time to furnish any satisfactory description of these markings. 50X1-HUM

Inconsistency in Documentation

- 5. Three of the German specialists, HENNIG, KRASEL, and STRIEGLER reported an identical story according to which it was said that at one time a testing laboratory prepared a quality control document based on a faulty or inaccurate material analysis. The results of this method were used at the plant for years. Although the mistake was eventually discovered, everybody concerned remained silent about it inasmuch as many of the plant's high officials had their signatures affixed to this document. It was said further that even at the ministry no one noticed the inaccuracy since its main technical control department, at one time or another, also utilized the analysis findings reported in the faulty document.

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