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28 FEB 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director for
Planning and Coordination

ATTENTION: Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

SUBJECT: War Documents Project (WDP)

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, dated 11 February, Same Subject

Captured German documents of World War II have been exploited at great length by the Office of Operations (FDD) against the requirements of the Department of Defense and offices of CIA. No requirements are on hand at this time which can be satisfied by information contained in these documents. In view of their age, the extensive work done in them, the volume of current information available and the lack of current requirements, this Office has no pending interest in this material.

SIGNED: GEORGE G. CAREY

GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

FDD/00:JBagnall/jaa (24 Feb 55) *jm*

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, FDD
2 - OO - Subject
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Nazi/Japanese War Crimes Task Force review completed

ARMY, DOS and USAF review(s) completed.

TAB

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27 January 1955

WAR DOCUMENTS PROJECT

PROBLEM:

1. To determine the scope of continued research in captured German and Russian war documents to meet the needs of psy-war, information and related programs.

BACKGROUND:

2. **Definition:** The term "war documents" as used here refers to those documents captured by the Germans in World War II and now housed in the Captured Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, AGO/Army, in Alexandria, Virginia. Included in this collection are about 23,000 linear feet of German and 178 linear feet of Russian documents, together with papers in French, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Croat and other languages seized by the Germans in occupied territories. Captured Japanese documents, and collections of captured German documents housed in private collections -- e.g., the Hoover Institute Library -- are not considered in this discussion.

3. **Past Exploitation:** Since 1946 the war documents have been exploited by the State Department for political intelligence; by the Department of Defense for military intelligence and military history; and by CIA (the Foreign Documents Division/OO, on requirement from ORE and ORR) for economic intelligence.

4. In 1951 the War Documentation Project (WDP) was established by an Air Force contract with Columbia University. In the following two and one-half years the WDP, with Philip Mosely as senior consultant, catalogued (on 30,000 cross-indexed cards) those documents which

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recorded psychological and related operations on the German-Russian front, at a cost of \$145,000; and produced a 14-volume study of Soviet partisan warfare, at a cost of \$115,000. (Of these 14 volumes, only four have been printed and disseminated; the additional volumes, delayed in publication because of administrative difficulties in the Air Force, are now being printed.)

5. Current Exploitation: The Air Force contract with Columbia University for WDP terminated 31 March 1954. Inasmuch as the contract required one month's notice for termination, a decision to continue Government sponsorship actually had to be made by 28 February. Until a few weeks prior to this date, Air Force had indicated its intent to continue WDP for production of two research studies: "Soviet Psychological and Counter-Psychological Warfare" and "The Soviet Communist Party: A Case History."

6. CIA/DDP had long-standing requirements for operational research which, it was anticipated, could be included in or added to the terms of reference for these two studies. When Air Force plans for extending the project were vetoed at the Defense level, crash evaluation of WDP's research products and potential was made by CIA. The evaluation was favorable; whereupon CIA/DDP recommended to DCI that the WDP research staff be kept in being.

7. The OCB on 10 February 1954 approved DCI's recommendation that WDP be continued for one year at a cost of [redacted] to produce the above-cited studies as a matter of common concern to the Department of State, USIA and CIA. On 25 February the DCI approved an authorization of [redacted] in FY 1954 funds to contract with [redacted] for this purpose. The contract effective 31 March 1954, provided that WDP undertake such other tasks as might be suggested by the further screening of documents and the requirements of the sponsor.

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8. An informal committee, representing State, USIA and CIA, was formed to monitor the progress of research. When the committee met to define requirements in detail, it concluded that the terms of reference drawn up by the Air Force must be altered to take cognizance of the following facts:

a. Although Defense representatives on the OCB put the Defense Department on record as having no further interest in war documents, the RAND Corporation had independently arranged for production of the study on "The Soviet Communist Party" to be made by Professor Merle Fainsod of Harvard. RAND had also secured the declassification of the so-called "Smolensk" documents on which this study was to be based. Upon the assurance of RAND representatives that this study was in fact going forward, the "Soviet Communist Party" project was dropped as a WDP research task.

b. Although the committee accepted "Soviet Psychological and Counter-Psychological Warfare" as a general description of the principal research task to be accomplished, it construed this title broadly as covering the whole impact of the German military and psychological attack on the Soviet control system. None of the three agencies represented was interested in research on the doctrine, strategy, tactics and media of combat psywar (although as noted in paragraph 2d, OCPW was and is interested in those topics). Each expressed a requirement for detailed research on Soviet vulnerabilities and the Soviet countermeasures to operations which attacked those vulnerabilities. The committee, with an OCB

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representative concurring, approved three research sub-tasks to meet this requirement, the details and scope of each sub-task being governed also by the nature of the documentary materials uncovered. These sub-tasks are as follows:

(1) "Political and Police Control of the Red Army." This is the largest and most complex of the studies under way. The emphasis is on the Red Army as a training ground for loyal Soviet citizens. The study deals with indoctrination techniques, the political and police apparatus, and with Soviet vulnerabilities as shown by the functioning of this apparatus and the response to it of Soviet soldiers and officers. This study, in five volumes, is scheduled for completion in draft by 1 March.

(2) "The Peasantry: An Achilles Heel of the Soviet System." This study focusses on the response of the Soviet rural population to the German occupation. A research draft for review and evaluation should be ready by 15 February.

(3) "Soviet Espionage, Sabotage and Subversion." This study was approved by the Interdepartmental Committee in October, following a report by the WDP director that rich documentary materials -- including about 550 complete German interrogations of captured Soviet agents -- had been uncovered. Two volumes will be completed in draft by 1 March.

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DISCUSSION:

9. Requirements for future research:

a. On 18 January 1955 the Research and Development Coordinating Committee, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, approved a proposal by the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Army, that 30 man-months of research by WDP be authorized to produce a study of Soviet psychological and counter-psychological warfare, emphasizing themes, media, doctrine, training, techniques and other aspects of combat psywar operations which are not targets of research under the current CIA contract. (It should be noted that OCPW has been kept fully informed of the research in progress under the present CIA contract. The OCPW requirement for research in "Soviet Psychological and Counter-Psychological Warfare" in no way duplicates research in progress under that heading. See paragraph 8b above). It is understood that this Army psywar research will be budgeted for

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[redacted]

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b. [redacted] has informally requested CIA to authorize two to three man-months of WDP research for screening and selection of documents relating to the siege of Leningrad. [redacted] would use these documents to produce a case study of the Soviet response -- official and popular -- to a crisis situation. [redacted] has been informed that this requirement cannot be accepted under the present contract but will be considered if the contract is renewed.

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c. The Operations Research Office (ORO), Army, has asked the WDP director to outline proposals for research in German military government and partisan warfare.

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It is believed that Army procedures permit ORO to contract with WDP for these studies without previous coordination with Defense R & D.

d. CIA/DDP requirements for further research have not been determined, pending an evaluation of WDP research studies now nearing completion and dissemination.

10. Argument Against Continued WDP Research: The arguments against further expenditures for WDP may be summarized as follows:

a. The documents are dated; they relate to events of World War II or earlier.

b. The intelligence potential of the documents has been largely exhausted by the exploitation in research cited above.

c. The operational research potential of the documents may have reached a point of diminishing returns which would make further Government expenditures for this purpose uneconomical.

11. Arguments for Continuing WDP are as follows:

a. The documents, while dated, constitute a unique record of the only instance in which a major penetration of the Soviet state has been achieved and its operations clearly exposed on a large scale.

b. There undoubtedly remains an historical by-product of particular interest. For example, chapters from the past of many a Soviet and non-Soviet European official lie buried in the war documents. The potential value of

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such intelligence as a by-product of WDP research, while not in itself justification for continuing the project, is at least an argument for keeping the WDP research staff in being.

c. Whole document collections of potential interest to psychological warfare and counterespionage operatives are as yet virtually untouched. In addition to the research of operations on the Soviet-German front, there is, for example, a unique record of events in Yugoslavia during World War II.

d. A staff of competent persons is now available to exploit the documents. It might be difficult to assemble the same competence again.



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CONCLUSIONS:

12. That it is desirable to continue the WDP for at least one more year.

13. That the interested agencies should now thoroughly canvass their needs in order that the work at WDP can be planned for early completion.

RECOMMENDATION:

14. That, because of the contract termination date of 31 March, 1955 with WDP, the interested agencies be prepared to report their research plans at a meeting by 1 March.

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11 February 1955

SUBJECT: Proposals for further topics of research for the War Documentation Project.

1. Given below are some suggestions or proposals for future research to be undertaken by the War Documentation Project in behalf of the present Sponsors of the Project. As a matter of convenience, these topics have been grouped according to major geographic sections. Detailed outlines are supplied only for a few topics which, because they are closely related to past and present WDP projects (and also to the proposals drafted for OCPW, U. S. Army), could be readily defined. Other proposals must be accepted as highly tentative and mainly suggestive; in many cases knowledge of the source material by the WDP is, as yet, too incomplete to permit more detailed organization of such topics or very realistic estimates of work-time required. It is sincerely hoped that the topics here listed will, in turn, provoke and stimulate discussion of topics of specific relevance to the Sponsors, but unknown to the WDP.

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SECTION I:

THE SOVIET UNION

Proposals 1 and 2 are indicated here in some detail, since they are closely related to work tasks under the present contract and thus reflect the staff's continued thinking about and concern with a group of rather homogenous substantive ideas and problems. Though both proposals, on the surface, appear to deal with predominantly military problems, they are designed primarily to bear on experiences and vulnerabilities which are believed to be of primary concern to U.S. civilian agencies. Military problems and events form, as it were, merely the point of departure -- largely dictated by the nature of the sources -- for such research.

Both proposals can, but need not, be viewed as extensive research tasks, being made up of a considerable variety of smaller studies, most of which could be undertaken independently, though normally at somewhat greater cost in time than is indicated. Once again, all estimates must be accepted as the best guesses at this time; once again an ambitious, most completely inclusive, approach has been suggested here, which can be pared down to small size and which may have to be modified both for the initial work-statement and, in the light of the actual source-material assembled, for the final working outline.

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NO. I: PROBLEMS IN SOVIET VULNERABILITY: MORALE
AND LOYALTY IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.

A. Red Army: Aspects of Morale and Command.

1. A study of Red Army morale in the period June-December, 1941.

Such a study would center on the functioning of the Red Army in a period of crisis. It should tackle the problem at all levels: the relationship of the Army and the State at a time when the system is threatened, the controls and their functioning, the reactions at the command level, and the morale and reactions of the rank and file. The greatest emphasis will be placed on an effort to discover the forces released or generated by the crisis: on the positive side -- loyalty and patriotism; on the negative side -- inertia, indifference, defeatism, surrender, defection, and active opposition to the regime. An effort would be made to determine the crucial elements in the relationship of the State and its system with the Army and with the groups and individuals forming the military forces, isolating those elements favorable to the system and those actually or potentially contributing to disintegration.

/25-40 man-months/

Case Study (1): A study of the behavior of Soviet military personnel in one or more of the great battles of encirclement (Uman, Bryansk, Volkhov, etc.).

Such a case study will contribute directly to the solution of the main problem (I A above). The reactions of Soviet forces in the encirclement battles will be studied to determine their behavior under conditions of extreme crisis and disaster. (To this extent the case study will probably also contribute to the study proposed in B, I, b.) This case study will be particularly revealing with regard to Soviet troops operatin in isolation under adverse conditions.

/10-12 man-months, if done independently/

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Case Study (2): A study of significant features of problem I, A, on the basis of evidence taken from captured diaries of Soviet military personnel.

This study will be most effective if enlarged in time scope to cover the entire war. For that period there are available an estimated thirty-forty diaries by writers in most of the ranks up to field grade, and including a number of diaries by political officers. The possible range of information to be secured cannot be determined in advance. The diaries should furnish a number of first-hand insights into the personal reactions of Soviet soldiers and officers under a wide variety of conditions.

/8 man-months, if done independently/

2. The performance of the Junior and Intermediate Command Levels of the Red Army in World War II.

This study would be related to I, A, 1, but extended in time to cover the entire war. It would deal with company and field grade officers of the Soviet Army, analyzing those groups from the point of view of military competence, composition, initiative, effectiveness. The effort, again, would be to single out effects of the system and its operation of the groups studies.

/12-15 man-months, if 1 is done/

B. Civilian Population.

1. Soviet-side conditions in World War II:

- a. Leningrad: Case-study of a city under siege, a micro-cosm of Soviet institutions, controls, and indoctrination under crisis conditions. (Note: This study, suggested along the lines of the [] Moscow study will not be undertaken if [] itself should initiate it.)

/8 man-months/

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- b. Reaction of the Soviet population to disaster: An attempt to gather the evidence available from German sources on (primarily urban) reactions of individuals and officialdom to sudden disaster situations, such as bombing, natural calamities, etc. A subject with relatively sparse evidence, it is suggested merely because of the presumed interest in it of Government agencies.

4 man-months if in conjunction with other related surveying tasks

2. Conditions on both sides of the front-lines in the USSR:

The Church: a study of the forms and relative intensity of religious feeling; the response of the population to changes in religious policy introduced by the Soviet regime and by the Germans in the occupied areas; political repercussions psywar exploitation of religious sentiment; problems of autocephaly in Ukraine and Belorussia; the church as an ersatz "third force" and a communal focus.

6-8 man-months

3. Transnistria under Rumanian rule: Case-study of the Odessa area, to be compared with German occupation policy and its effect -- the hypothesis being that a relatively lax occupation policy provoked less political resentment on the part of the population, though it inculcated less respect and fear for the new authorities.

3-6 man-months

4. Civilian Morale and Loyalty in the German-Occupied USSR:

- a. Evacuation and escape as an index to loyalties.

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- b. Willingness to break with the Soviet regime; proclivity to collaborate with an alternative system; variations by sub-groups (age, sex, occupation, ethnic, social, political, urban/rural).
- c. The meaning and the forms of collaboration.
- d. The gap between attitudes, judgments, and overt behavior.
- e. Factors influencing performance and loyalty decisions, such as material conditions, political reality and promises, psychological warfare, inter-personal relations of ruler and ruled, perception of change, hope and fear, impact of military victory, bandwagon effect, partisans and Soviet agents, grievances, frustrations, and ego satisfaction.
- f. Active Civilian Collaborators: who, how, and why; background, composition, motivation, performance.
- g. Implications, in terms of Soviet vulnerabilities.

/For the above study, existing WDP papers under Projects "Alexander" and "Ceres," as well as the study produced for ORO on police collaboration, will be utilized, in addition to the vast available materials in the German records.7

/Flexible: 6-18 man-months7

C. Summary and Conclusions

1. The Soviet citizen in a crisis situation: lessons of World War II.
2. Soviet controls and institutions in a crisis situation: lessons of World War II.
3. Areas of vulnerabilities in a crisis situation; e. g., nationality problem, peasantry; Army vs. civilian; material and quasi-political grievances.
4. Recommendations.

/4 man-months7

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No. II: "OSTTRUPPEN"--AN INQUIRY INTO THE USE
OF RUSSIAN MILITARY COLLABORATORS
BY GERMANY IN WORLD WAR II.

A study of military collaboration by Russian nationals with German forces during World War II can be expected to throw considerable light in several subjects and problems.

1. An analysis of the motives for collaboration could serve as a guide to Soviet vulnerabilities and tensions within Soviet society. The mere existence of large-scale collaboration per se points toward definite weaknesses in the Soviet state.
2. German experiences with military collaborators may indicate which groups, ethnic, social, or political, are most likely to cooperate in the future with an adversary of the Soviet Union. Any occupying power needs the collaboration of indigenous personnel, in one capacity or another. It would therefore seem desirable to analyze the state of mind of anti-Communist collaborators, and to determine the factors tending to increase or impair their eagerness to work against the Soviet state. Such questions as inter- and intra-tribal and racial cleavages and taboos of Soviet racial and national groups and their willingness to cooperate in a larger anti-Soviet framework could be meaningfully analyzed in the light of German experiences. Some of the factors affecting morale and loyalty during the World War can never be expected to recur, but others indicate general problems which are not subject to change except over very long periods of time.

3. The effectiveness of military collaborator units during the war depended on a great many variables. Some of them were of a purely military nature, others are found in the geographic location of the unit, its ethnical and social composition, the size of the unit and the leadership and treatment provided.

The conclusions to a study of military collaboration may thus be expected to answer some questions regarding the possible employment of Soviet-national defectors in a military or semi-military capacity under wartime conditions, as well as to illuminate the general mentality of nationalists groups in the Soviet state.

25-40 man montns

Suggested Approach

- I. A brief survey and historical analysis of military collaboration during World War II:
 - A. German policy and attitudes.
 - B. Types of units created (Hiwis, police, anti-partisan, national legions, Ostbatallions, intelligence teams, Cossack Corps, Moslem units, Vlasov Divisions).
 - C. Employment of Military Collaborators:
 1. German Army.
 2. SS.
 3. Anti-partisan and Security.
 4. Front-line combat.
 - D. Recruitment Policies:
 1. Prisoners of war.
 2. Indigenous Civilians.
 3. Ostarbeiter.
 4. Nationalities
 - E. Disintegration of Military Collaborator units:
 1. Transfer to the West (Italy, Yugoslavia, France).
 2. Effect of Soviet psychological warfare.
 3. Rivalry of nationality groups.
- II. Motivations of military collaboration: their relative importance:
 - A. Material motives.
 - B. Political Motives (Anti-Soviet history--Nationalities--Political Idealism--Separatism etc.).

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C. Personal Motives (ambition--difficulties with superiors, etc.).

D. Others.

III. Factors Affecting Morale and Allegiance of Military Collaborators:

A. German Policy and Treatment:

1. German Officers vs. Indigenous Officers.
2. Type, Quality, and Functions of German Rahmen personnel.
3. Special Privileges--equality or discrimination.
4. Effect of German attitudes and high-level policy.
5. Presence or absence of political inducements (large scale, e.g., Vlasov; local, e.g., Kaminsky).

B. Recruitment:

1. Prisoners of war.
2. Deserters.
3. Indigenous.
4. Ostarbeiter.

C. Composition:

1. Ethnic (mixed or uniform--separate vs. Great Russian).
2. Religious affiliation (Moslem, Orthodox).
3. Geographic Origin (occupied, unoccupied, or emigre).
4. Social Composition (rural vs. urban--intelligentsia vs. farmers and workers).
5. Political (kulak, Party or Komsomol member, etc.).

D. Geographic Location of Units: (within home-territory--within Russia--outside Russia)

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IV. Military Effectiveness (Same organization as III, plus):

- A. Size of Units (Incorporated into German units--companies--battalion--brigade division).
- B. Stationary or Mobile (Kaminsky--Rodionov00local anti-partisam units--Ostbatl.).
- C. Anti-Partisam or Security vs. Front-line Combat.
- D. Incorporated into German Army, SS, or Semi-Independent.
- E. Terrain.

V. Soviet Countermeasures and German Security:

- A. Psychological Warfare and Infiltration.
- B. German Security Measures.

VI. Conclusion:

- A. Assessment of German Experiences.
- B. Military Collaboration as a Mirror of Soviet Vulnerabilities.

Appendix (Optional): Case Studies of different types of military collaboration (Kaminsky, Graukopf, Rodionov, Ostbataillone in the West: 1944; Cossacks in the Balkans, Schutzkorps; the 162d Turkic Division).

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NO. III: MISCELLANEOUS SHORT PAPERS.

These are usually suggested directly by the captured records as they are being screened for established major research tasks. The list given below is therefore suggestive rather than exhaustive, consisting in part of probable left-over portions, e. g., of WDP Project "CAESAR" (for which singularly rich documentation, exceeding the scope of the present project under the present contract, was collected,) of other small caches of records which have been collected or noted, and of topics which have suggested themselves during the current contract and on which good documents are known to exist. It can therefore also be expected that future work on major topics will, almost automatically, produce material for other short papers which cannot now be anticipated.

Normally 2-4 man-months each

- A. Russian emigres and emigre movements [as utilized by the Germans during World War II] (Summary or various selected papers; emphasis on aim, composition personnel, history of these movements rather than on German policy and manipulations of such movements.)
- B. Marshall Kulik.
- C. Studies in the Nationality Policy of the Red Army. (Further study of subject suggested and partly covered under WDP Project "CAESAR".)
- D. Red Army Justice. (Formerly suggested as a possible topic under WDP Project "CAESAR".)
- E. The "OO" Section of the Minsk Cartographic Institute.
- F. Personality types among Soviet defectors to the Germans.
- G. Performance of the "Ostarbeiter" (Soviet forced labor) in Germany.

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SECTION II.

THE SATELLITES

In the original "survey" state of the WDP, from 1951 to 1952, the Satellite areas were included, along with the USSR, in the over-all screening process. The WDP, therefore, has a fairly accurate knowledge of the material (especially of the more high-level documents and policy-oriented record groups) pertaining to such countries, and a great many McBee File cards in its catalogue. The WDP's working knowledge on these areas can, of course, in no way be compared with its insights into Soviet documentation and research problems, since only in the course of almost three continuous years of work did the staff arrive at the present -- cumulative -- knowledge of documents pertaining to the USSR (this is particularly true of documents found at lower levels, e. g., Division and Corps, which frequently turn out to hold the best original non-German documents). But even on the basis of the WDP's very imperfect knowledge of documentation on Satellite areas, the following statements can be safely made.

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NO. I: YUGOSLAVIA (approximately 1939-1945).

Among all the records in the CRS/DRB perhaps no group of documents -- other than those pertaining to the Nazi regime -- appears to be as complete, as rich and as relatively unique as those relating to Yugoslavia during World War II. There can be little doubt that the true and inside story of developments in that country during this critical period will be found in these documents -- perhaps in them alone. Thus many research topics dealing with Yugoslavia can probably be most satisfactorily undertaken, e. g., studies in partisan warfare, in the country's political evolution in the rise and ascendancy of Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party, in selected personalities (also biographical surveys and data-gathering), in Intelligence and Psychological or Political Warfare Operations by, in, or against Yugoslav groups, etc. It is also more than likely that such researches would shed very significant light on the controls, methods, and operations used by Moscow to support the Yugoslav Communist movement.

NO. II: ALBANIA.

Comparable, and similarly excellent, documents are known to exist on Albania, and although -- because of the relatively much smaller sizes and less intricate development -- studies in this area are likely to be much smaller and more manageable in scope, the topics of investigation would probably be similar to those suggested for Yugoslavia. Quite similar studies are probably possible on Greece also, which is grouped here with other Balkan countries, though the documentation is perhaps a little less known for that area.

NO. III: POLAND.

Records on this country are again rather copious but scattered, since many German military units operated in the area at different times and under very different conditions. Some topics have been touched upon under the heading of "Anti-Soviet Partisan Warfare" in the proposals for OCPW, but other smaller studies on the

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Polish underground and on Communist activities in Poland could probably be usefully undertaken. A case-study on "The Warsaw Uprising in 1944" also might be of more than historic interest.

NO. IV: CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Some good scattered materials have previously been surveyed and carded, but a unique collection, just lately added to the holdings of the CRS/DRB, has only most recently been subjected to a sample screening. This, to the best of our knowledge, is the only almost (or entirely) complete collection of records of the SD, the main German organization for foreign non-military intelligence. The records of the "SD Oberabschnitt Donau" comprise 315 neatly-arranged and beautifully-kept files or folders dealing with almost every conceivable aspect of life and activity in Slovakia for the period from approximately 1939 to 1945. Very detailed and most extensive SD-Gestapo personnel folders on thousands of important and less important Czech officials and personalities form part of that collection and would therefore permit a wide range of topics to be investigated, and perhaps allow valuable biographical and other intelligence data to be collected. At the same time, for more ambitious research studies, other sources would undoubtedly also have to be utilized, since the SD must be considered as a most biased German source. "The Slovak Uprising in 1944" would probably lend itself to a most interesting first case study for this area, which might permit the Project to get more intimately acquainted with the full range of further topics.

NO. V. THE BALTIC STATES.

Very extensive materials on these areas are known to the WDP staff and have been carded in the original survey. However, due to the very extensive changes in these countries since World War II, the usefulness of such researches for other than purely historical purposes has always seemed dubious to the WDP staff.

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SECTION III:

GERMANY

NO. I: THREE PROPOSED STUDIES ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN PREWAR GERMANY.

This proposal is made after screening a very small section of the holdings of the CRS that are most likely to contain materials on the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in Nazi and pre-Nazi Germany. The files of the SD include a large number of boxes and folders compiled of material obviously seized from KPD headquarters in the first days of Hitler's power. These consist of printed propaganda, of correspondence between functionaries at various levels of the Party (mainly on propaganda matters), and of some minutes of closed committee meetings, including at least one report of a meeting of the national Agitprop. In addition, there are rich police files on a whole spectrum of Communist-front organizations.

The published works on the KPD are few, and almost all are limited in their scope to changes in leadership and policy at the very highest level. The sources held in the CRS/DRB may add some details to this story, but they could probably be better used to provide a picture of organization and operation -- on the middle and low levels -- of what was then the largest Communist party outside the Soviet Union. This is of more than merely historical interest, since it could serve as the basis for comparison with the large postwar Communist parties, to discover why their methods have changed and in what direction, and to project changes in the future. Such a project might take one man three months.

There are two related topics on the KPD which may seem to be of more immediate practical interest. These are: (1) KPD attempts to subvert the armed forces and the police and (2) the Communist underground during the Nazi period. There are fairly good police and army files on propaganda relating to the first topic, both for the Weimar era and later, when penetration of the army was obviously one of the important tasks of the underground. There are quite a few files on the underground itself, but they do not probe very deeply into organization and in no case do they

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touch the very highest level. Still, they should provide insight into the workings of a Communist illegal apparatus under a regime of maximum suppression. The study on subversion of the armed forces and the police might have its uses because of certain obvious parallels with the situation in the present-day Federal Republic. But one hesitates to say how close these parallels may become.

Because these studies are so closely related, they should be done together by one man in, perhaps, three months.



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SECTION IV:

THE WEST

Unlike the documentary holdings of the CRS/DRB, discussed under the other Sections above, materials relating to western countries (especially France, Belgium, Holland and Italy) were not included under the original survey stage of the WDP, have therefore not been carded, and are largely unknown to the staff. Some very superficial and quick sampling during the last week appears to indicate that these records deal overwhelmingly with purely military or administrative matters, which is not surprising since it was predominantly the SD and Gestapo that dealt with Communist undergrounds, partisans and political activities in these countries. Files pertaining to such problems are known to exist at the CRS/DRB, but, by and large, they are very scattered and incomplete. In order to arrive at a more accurate assessment of possible source materials, a quick and intensive survey stage (of perhaps one or two months' duration) would therefore probably have to be initiated. Since it is also known that good records (especially of the SD and Gestapo) are held by

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the Dutch and the French themselves (e. g., in the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation and the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, with whom the WDP has previously been in touch and who even invited the WDP's cooperation), a survey of such foreign-held materials must also be made. This might partly be achieved by correspondence and subsequent acquisition of microfilms or photostats, but might also well involve a personal tour of inspection and research-reconnaissance.

It is felt that only on the basis of such further knowledge, and of rather specifically stated requirements, can a final judgment be made on whether or not the captured records on these countries still hold sufficient materials of interest (as compared to the volume of open source and current intelligence, which must be considerable, since these are, after all, allied or neutral-friendly countries) to warrant WDP expenditure of time and personnel for such purposes. It is at least possible that a number of small papers or topics of considerable value could be developed on the Communist underground and on various personalities in these countries.

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Finally, precisely because these countries are allied or friendly to the U. S., unique research opportunities may be present. An example would be a type of "confrontation study" on selected intelligence or underground operations in a western country (Holland, France?) during the last war, for which the captured records would only provide partial source material. Open sources and other archives (including, if possible, the OSS files) would be used and a major portion of the project would involve field work, e. g., in interviewing survivors of such an underground movement. On the basis of such near-total knowledge of both sides in such past operations it might be possible to arrive at a picture of interpenetration, interaction, and degrees of knowledge and ignorance on each of the opposing sides which is perhaps never available to the historian or to the intelligence operator who wants to profit and learn from the past. The final purpose of such a study would be neither primarily historical nor informational, but would seek to analyze basic processes and problems, e. g., of intelligence or subversive (or underground) operations, trying to see the problem as a whole and from both sides, as perhaps the umpire in a war-game might see them.

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SECTION V:

THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

Since the Germans had considerable interest in these areas, and especially in those which were of strategic or economic importance to the German war-effort, some materials -- e.g., on Iraq and Iran -- are known to exist at the CRS/DRB. These also, however, have not been thoroughly surveyed in the past, though it is believed that there might be sufficient material for a number of very small papers.

IN CONCLUSION:

Once again it must be stressed that the list of projects and topics suggested here ranges from those which are considered firm proposals to those which are merely suggestions and which may or may not turn out to be of great interest or value to the Sponsors. It is hoped that they will at least serve to indicate the broad possible scope of research and intelligence-gathering possible on the basis of the captured records, and that they will stimulate the formulation of specific requests and requirements which the WDP should consider for the future, and which would lead to a new and more detailed examination of pertinent record groups.

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