OCT 12 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Intelligence
                   Headquarters, United States Air Force

SUBJECT: Project Treasure Island (Exploitation of Open
                   Source Slavic Publications)

1. Reference your memorandum, same subject, dated 20 September,
the Treasure Island project has been reviewed as requested.

2. Although your three questions are concise and logically
addressed to this Agency, the proposed plan of operation, as contained
in your enclosure, is not sufficiently specific to permit either brief
or categorical replies to your queries. The comments attached as Tab A
point out certain inconsistencies in the project, and some of the
problems which would arise if the plan were implemented in its present
form.

3. The following provisional answers are submitted for your
consideration, subject to the qualifications of paragraph 2, above.

    a) "Will the Air Force be duplicating similar projects
being conducted by other agencies?"

    If the scope of the project is as extensive as paragraph
4f, page 10 of the brief would indicate, the answer is in the
affirmative. If the definition of the pertinent information to
be extracted is limited, as stated in paragraph 4e of the brief,
to "the fields of economic and industrial information related to
strategic vulnerability, technical air information and air arm
and civil air information, biographical air information and air
geography, "the answer is still in the affirmative since Foreign
Documents Branch, CIA, is presently extracting from current
Russian newspapers and periodicals information which falls into
these categories.

    If it were presumed that the Treasure Island Project
would, on the other hand, make use of Foreign Documents Branch
Press Extracts and the Joint Press Reading Service Press Summary
as exploitation of the Soviet press, although not under Air Intell-
igence control, then duplication would still exist in the proposal
(paragraph 5) that the Army Library handle current periodicals and
that the Library of Congress handle "government periodicals."
Inasmuch as all Soviet periodicals are government periodicals, the
distinction is somewhat illogical. Nevertheless, since Foreign
Documents Branch is at present abstracting all periodicals that it
is possible to get from the USSR, duplication would necessarily
result.

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Although the extent of air geography is not clearly defined, it is believed that in the exploitation of basic information on this subject there would be some duplication with the work done by the Army Map Service.

It is possible that processing of the backlog might duplicate some of the work done by the Inter-departmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications and the Foreign Economic Administration during the war, and that which was done by the Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce, and the Intelligence Division, WDGS, especially as contained in the latter's war-time publication entitled "Information from the European Press." German material, already processed by CIA, also contains the results of exploitation of pre-war Slavic publications and captured documents for industrial and economic information.

Finally, it is assumed that the proposed project would be coordinated with Project 307-1 of the Aeronautical Chart Service and with the extensive abstracting of foreign air technical publications as carried on by T-2, AMC (Wright Field), to avoid duplication within the Department of the Air Force.

b) "Will the Air Force be operating in its field of dominant interest?"

In answer to this, it must be stated that the exploitation of open source material involving the selection and extraction of such basic information as exists in foreign publications cannot, with certain technical exceptions, be said to lie within any one field of dominant interest. A published item on the construction of new steel factory in the USSR is of interest to CIA and other intelligence agencies as well as to the Air Force. Dominant or departmental interest lies in the interpretation, analysis and use of the raw information. Accordingly, it can only be stated that by its very nature, this type of operation must be of concern to all the IAC agencies.

c) The final question asks: "Will such a project lead to unhealthy competition for translators?" This is modified by a statement in paragraph 3 that only low order, non-technical translators are envisioned.

In connection with the latter, a question arises as to how technical air information (paragraph 4e of the brief) will be extracted by non-technical translators. It is believed that experience will show that the employment of really low order translators is inefficient, time-consuming and costly. This has been recognized in the preparation of the tentative T/O (Annex I) which calls for 22 P-4's, 14 P-3's, etc. Translators of such grades are considered by CIA and the Civil Service Commission to be of extremely high calibre. Thus, the administration of the proposed project would be recruiting the best-trained linguists it could find, which then put

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in the field another competitor for experienced and qualified linguists and translators. Experience has shown that for every low grade translator (i.e., CAF-5), one qualified and experienced translator is needed to check and correct the work, and in the end less time would be spent if medium grade translators were hired.

The answer is therefore mainly affirmative, in that "competition for translators" would result. Whether or not this competition would be "unhealthy" would depend on whether a coordinated recruitment plan could be worked out with other agencies.

It is believed that the competition for translators might be less serious than the competition for sources and source materials, in view of the difficulty of obtaining even one copy of many current USSR publications in Moscow.

4. The opportunity to comment on the proposed project is appreciated by this Agency, and if you should desire further discussion or clarification of any of the points mentioned above, a conference between the appropriate branch chiefs of the CIA and the Directorate of Intelligence can be arranged at your convenience.

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Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant Director for Operations

Air Force Project "Treasure Island" (Exploitation of Open Source
Slavic Publications)

1. The "Treasure Island" project, as proposed by the Department of
the Air Force and forwarded by memo of the Director of Intelligence, USAF,
dated 20 September 1948, has been studied by this Office and Foreign Docu-
ments Branch.

Although the memorandum of transmittal limits the project to "a
program to extract basic air intelligence information from Slavic publications
in the Library of Congress", and proposes "not a super extracting agency,
but a modest effort in the air intelligence field", the Treasure Island brief
discusses the larger problems of coordinating the proposed effort with other
government agencies which are active in the field of processing foreign
publications for intelligence information. It also suggests an allocation
of sources and division of labor between the Library of Congress, the Army
Library, and CIA, and mentions other organizations, such as the Aeronautical
Chart Service and the British JIB as possible participants in the over-all
program. It recommends the establishment of a Basic Information Section
in the Directorate of Intelligence USAF, to supervise a service for the ex-
traction of information from Slavic open source materials, authorized to
negotiate a contract with the Library of Congress for the processing of
current and backlog material. In addition it states: "this administration,
to be located in the Library of Congress, would control procurement of
materials, maintain Liaison with the Acquisitions Division in the Library,
keep a central file, and publish the extracts. The administration would
control the various extracting units, located in the Library of Congress
and in other government agencies. The work would most advantageously be
divided up in such a manner that each participating agency would handle
one major category of open source materials."

It is felt that the functions of coordinating and controlling the
various abstracting and publications procurement programs already under-
taken by the IAC agencies and other government departments cannot properly
be assumed by a new and subordinate unit of the Department of the Air Force.
The complex problems of inter-agency coordination, control of procurement,
and allocation of effort in regard to open source material require planning
and action on a higher level. Under the provisions of Section 102 (d) 2
of the National Security Act and NSCID 3, Para. 1 a (Basic Intelligence)
such action could more appropriately be taken by CIA.

2. Considered from the point of view of an operating unit (omitting
the function of coordination), the mission of "the Treasure Island" project
is not clearly defined. It discusses air intelligence requirements (para

4e, p. 10) and yet mentions the advisability of indexing all information in order to achieve complete coverage so that this would be available to another agency which might wish to participate in the program in the future (para 4f, p. 10). It suggests an organization of 76 people to accomplish this uncertain mission within five years, without relating the proposed workload to the figures quoted for the present backlog of publications and the current and future accessions of Slavic material. It does not define certain terms which it employs, although any estimate of workload depends upon the accurate definitions of such terms. For example, it uses "abstracting" and "extracting" apparently interchangeably and without differentiation. It also speaks of Slavic publications of all kinds without clarifying whether this includes material from all Satellite countries or Slavic countries only (omitting Hungary and Finland). It further mentions intelligence exploitation throughout, yet would place the major portion of the operation under contract with the Library of Congress, a non-intelligence agency and the second largest share of the operation under the Army Library, also a non-intelligence unit.

3. Accordingly, before an estimate of the work load can be made, the following premises must be established in line with the general tone of what accomplishment is desired:

a. That all intelligence material will be extracted except political and sociological.

b. That extracting or abstracting as used in the study means the reporting in English of all information of intelligence value appearing in all available Slavic language publications.

c. That Slavic publications are presumed to include only Polish, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Slovak and Bohemian in addition to Russian, and will exclude publications in the some one hundred and ten (110) non-Slavic languages used in the USSR.

d. That all information of intelligence value will be indexed, cross-indexed and filed.

e. That backlog figures as given in the study are accepted.

f. That all information extracted will be published and disseminated.

g. That uncleared personnel would be authorized for use in the operation.

4. Based on the above premises, the following figures can then be computed for the work involved:

a. Backlog (5-year plan)

(1) Newspapers (100,000). Experience has shown that the average extractor can cover five Slavic language newspapers per day. Therefore, for 100,000 newspapers over a five-year period 17 people would be required.

(2) Periodicals (30,000). The average Slavic periodical is estimated to contain 80 pages. To read and extract the intelligence information from the average periodical would require eight days on the basis that the extractor can cover 10 pages a day. For the backlog of 30,000 periodicals then 200 extractors would be required.

(3) Books and other publications (20,000). Experience has shown that probably only 10% or 2,000 of this backlog would be of intelligence interest. Since the average book must be considered to have 250 pages and for the books selected approximately 50% on the average is worth extracting, the average linguist should cover a book in 25 days. Therefore, 44 translators would be needed for this phase.

b. Current publications

(1) Newspapers: For an estimated 80 current Slavic newspapers on the basis of five newspapers per day per person, 18 extractors would be required.

(2) Periodicals: It is estimated that at least 140 Russian and 100 other Slavic language periodicals would be processed of which 25% would be bi-monthly. On the same basis as used in 4a(2) above 76 linguists would be required.

(3) Books and other publications: An estimate of current available Slavic books and publications of intelligence interest would place the figure at 75 a month. On the basis used in 4a(3) above this phase would require 85 people.

c. For the other phases of the operation, experience has shown that the following numbers of personnel would be required. Supervision and direction - 59 intelligence officers. Rough-draft typing - 50 typists. Screening analysts to sort all publications - 20. Editorial and reproduction - 104. Indexing, cross-indexing, filing and searching - 80. Administration - including personnel, supply and services and correspondence files - 25.

d. In summation, the following figures show that a total of 778 people would be required:

Linguist - extractors	440
Supervisory	59
Editorial	104
Typists	50
Files	80
Screeners	20
Administrative	25
	778

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

AFOIR-CO-6   WASHINGTON   20 Sep 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Project Treasure Island (Exploitation of Open Source
             Slavic Publications)

1.   Considerable preliminary discussion has taken place in
connection with a program designed to extract basic air intelligence
information from Slavic publications in the Library of Congress. The
Air Force has assigned the name "Treasure Island" to this project.

2.   Informal discussions have given rise to the following
     questions:

     a.   Will the Air Force be duplicating similar projects being
conducted by other agencies?

     b.   Will the Air Force be operating in its field of dominant
interest?

     c.   Will such a project lead to unhealthy competition for
translators?

3.   In view of the fact that this project is designed for the
procurement of air information it is believed that the answer to 2 b.
above is in the affirmative. However, it is considered that the Central
Intelligence Agency is the proper medium through which to arrive at
answers 2 a and 2 c. In this connection, only low order, nontechnical
translators are envisioned. This nucleus of translators would tend to
broaden rather than narrow the field. Moreover, the intent is to set up
not a super extracting agency but a modest effort in the air intelligence
field.

4.   A brief of the proposed project is inclosed. It is requested
that such comment be made, as you consider appropriate, in connection
with paragraph 2 above.

/s/

1 Incl
  Treasure Island Brief

C. P. CABELL
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Office of
  Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

5.   It is apparent from the above computations that the 50 abstractors proposed for the project (para 4e) or the tentative T/O of 76 persons (Annex I) would be inadequate for the task. The 50 abstractors could scarcely do more than make bibliographies and translate headlines and tables of contents in five years, and to expect them to handle current books and government reports simultaneously would be unrealistic.

6.   It must be concluded that the project would be limited to "the fields of economic and industrial information related to strategic vulnerability, technical air information, air arm and civil air information, biographical air information, and air geography," although the next paragraph (4f, p.10) indicates a much wider scope of subject matter. With regard to the statement "It would be a good selling point to have all the information indexed and cross-indexed so that extracts of any kind can be made", two questions arise:

    a.   Does this mean that information would be indexed previous to the extracting, ie., using linguists for indexers?

    b.   Does "all the information" mean

        (1)   all information from the limited categories above?
        (2)   all information of intelligence value?
        (3)   all information?

7.   The following minor points in the Treasure Island study seem worth mentioning as contradictory, inaccurate, or open to disagreement:

    a.   Para 2b, (P. 6) mentions the lack of flow of information on open sources, but para 2c (3), p. 6, complains of the volume of the "uncoordinated digests" at present issued by various agencies.

    b.   Para 2c(2), (P. 6) states that "Most of the extracts are actually made by people unfamiliar with air intelligence requirements. Many digests, especially the Daily Reports on Foreign Radio Broadcasts, attempt to reproduce current news and propaganda, but consistently omit intelligence data." Monitored industrial and economic information is invariably included by FBIB in this publication within the limits of space and with regard to the relative importance of the information. FBIB is at present providing all "discards" containing such material not published in the Daily Report direct to the Strategic Vulnerability Branch. The Foreign Documents Branch, CIA, which abstracts foreign periodicals and newspapers on request, has not received any collection directives from the Strategic Vulnerability Branch stating air intelligence requirements in this field.

    c.   Para 2c(4), P. 6) does not take into account the recent activities of Foreign Documents Branch, CIA, with regard to books, maps, etc.

d. Para 4b,(P. 9) is incorrect in stating that the Library
of Congress is the "government's purchasing agent for foreign publi-
cations", since procurement of such material abroad is handled by
the State Department.

e. Para 4d, (P. 9). The method of extracting by entering the
information on check sheets with a limited number of pertinent ques-
tions is thought practicable only for target data and by no means
applicable to the wider field of intelligence. At least 3/4 of the
effort used in exploiting these documents would be wasted by this
method. A steady stream of information reports flowing into the
hands of well-qualified analysts as the result of definite collec-
tion directives is believed to be the most efficient method of
handling foreign published material.

8. Conclusions:

a. The necessity for adequate intelligence exploitation of
foreign publications to meet the specialized requirements of the
Department of the Air Force, and especially those of the Strategic
Vulnerability Branch, is demonstrated by the "Treasure Island" paper.
It is evident that the situation has hitherto been unsatisfactory.
If such requirements had, however, been submitted to CIA and the
desired form indicated, it is possible that the criticism implied
in para 2b and c of the brief would not be valid.

b. The study attempts to find a solution which "1) avoids the
setting-up of one independent super-extracting agency; 2) achieves a
maximum of cooperation from existing agencies; 3) provides facilities
for the carrying-out of such extracting services as are necessary if
a complete coverage of open source materials is to be achieved."

c. It assumes the function of interagency coordination and
postulates a preliminary survey of sources and source materials which
must be made before a satisfactory plan for division of labor between
participants can be evolved. It states "Such a preliminary job must
needs be done by the Library of Congress which would have to be given
a contract in order to enable them to complete their index of Slavic
materials and to make full use of the Union Catalogue".

d. It confuses the results to be produced by this preliminary
survey group in the Library of Congress with the body of extracted
basic air intelligence information required by the Strategic Vulnera-
bility Branch, and with the solution of the problem as indicated in
Para 8c above.

e. In view of the backlog figures and workload calculations
outlined above, it is believed that the proposed Table of Organization
of 76 people for the Library of Congress Unit is unrealistic.

GGC/JJB/LAD:BC/HED
cc: FDR

OR G. CAREY

TREASURE ISLAND

THE PROBLEM

1. To organize an extracting and digesting service to exploit for
Air Intelligence purposes open sources, including Slavic publications of
all kinds.

HYPOTHESIS

2. The need for intelligence materials and open source information
will become increasingly acute.

DISCUSSION

3. A very large portion of information pertinent to the mission
of the Air Intelligence Division is available in open source materials.
The intelligence mission cannot be accomplished in a satisfactory manner
without a systematic and thorough exploitation of unclassified publi-
cations, such as books, periodicals, newspapers, foreign government
handbooks, broadcasts, atlases, etc. At present, little exploitation
is being carried out although the source materials are available in
the United States. Consequently, a great deal of pertinent information
is unavailable for purposes of air intelligence analyses. (See
Appendix A).

4. The extracting service would have to be financed, yet cost re-
quirements cannot be estimated at this juncture, because it is not known
which of the existing facilities can be brought into the scheme. It is
clear, however, that the investment required to finance Treasure Island
will be small, at least in relation to its usefulness. It is believed
that, within a few years, it will be possible to say: "Never before was
so much intelligence gained from so small a cost."

CONCLUSIONS

5. At the present time the Air Intelligence Division does not
receive basic information from open sources either in sufficient
quantity or in a quality suited to its needs.

6. The satisfactory accomplishment of the air intelligence
mission requires a coordinated effort by the Directorate of Intelligence
and other agencies for the exploitation of open source materials.

7. The organization of such an effort requires the setting-up
in the Directorate of Intelligence of a special unit, tentatively called
Basic Information Section. The extracting service can best be started
through a contract with the Library of Congress.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That a Basic Information Section be set up in the Directorate
of Intelligence.

9. That the Basic Information Section be instructed to set up and
supervise a service for the extraction of pertinent information from
Slavic open source materials.

10. That the Basic Information Section be directed to negotiate
a contract with the Library of Congress in order to have the Library
do preliminary indexing and searching, and in order to start the unit
processing current books and the backlog.

APPENDIX "A"

INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS

INDEX

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ANNEXES

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APPENDIX "A"

INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS

SUMMARY

1.   Open source materials are of great value to intelligence.
A great deal of valuable air information can be culled from publica-
tions, such as books, periodicals, newspapers, broadcasts, and gov-
ernment reports.

2.   At present open source materials are inadequately exploited.
The Air Intelligence Division does not obtain the information con-
tained in such materials nor is there an organization which is
extracting air intelligence data that are available in such materials.

3.   There is a great need for reorganizing methods and procedures
for the procurement of open source intelligence. Such a reorganization
requires the setting-up of a Basic Information Section in the Direct-
orate of Intelligence; the setting-up of an Administrative, Filing
and Publishing Section in the Library of Congress; the establishment
of procurement units in the Library of Congress; the creation of an
extracting unit in the Library of Congress; and a coordination with
extracting and abstracting units in the army, the CIA, and other
government agencies.

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APPENDIX "A"

INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS

DISCUSSION

1. **The Value of Open Source Materials**

   a. Intelligence work is based on two different types of materials: open and classified. Classified materials include those which are originated or processed by United States governmental agencies and which are kept under strict security restrictions. Some of these materials are obtained by secret means. In most instances, they report on facts and developments which foreign nations want to keep secret. Among the open sources are those which are originated by forei governmental or non-governmental agencies, to which the originator does not attach security restrictions. These materials can usually be bough in the open market or obtained without too many difficulties. They in- clude magazines, newspapers, books, government reports and documents, broadcasts and news pictures.

   b. In customary intelligence routine, great stress is laid on working with classified materials. The importance of the classified materials cannot, of course, be minimized in any manner; a large per- centage of significant facts cannot be gathered except through secret sources. Yet, the two types of source materials complement and supple- ment each other; taken singly none of them gives the complete picture. Despite the fact that classified intelligence documents will be most profitable if they are correlated with open source materials, the value of the open sources is often underrated. Only small efforts are made to procure and exploit the unclassified type of intelligence source materials.

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c. It is sometimes felt that open sources do not contain
any materials that are worth gathering. At least, this is supposed
to be true with respect to the open sources published by dictatorial
countries, the censor allegedly cutting out anything that may be of
use to foreign intelligence services. However, experience with the
German censorship during the war showed that even very important
military information can be collected from newspapers. For example,
it was believed that German P/T boats were armed with 20mm guns.
Interpretation of a photograph published in a German newspaper showed
that these boats actually carried 40mm guns. On the authority of
General Donovan, it appears that most of the information about the
German oil industry was gathered from newspapers. It may be added
that strategic and tactical doctrines, too, were freely discussed in
German technical publications. For example, the joint employment of
aircraft and tanks was described as early as 1934 by a German General
in a book which was easily obtainable all over the world for $2.50;
the tactics which he had outlined were applied by the Germans through-
out the early campaigns of the second World War.

d. However severe, censorship is never fool-proff. Censor-
ship personnel is rarely too intelligent, and almost never well in-
formed. Very often items are published of which the significance
escapes the censor. Descriptions of cities and plants usually give
away some good clues. Obituaries often contain inadvertent references
to a person's place of work; advertisements or propaganda indicate the
output of a given plant; technical discussions of production processes
sometimes permit deductions as to locations, quality and output. The
Russian press offers, moreover, the specific advantage that (1) the
labor crews of factories frequently send telegrams to Stalin; (2) praise

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is given to specifically named plants which exceeded their output
assignment; and (3) criticism is often voiced of production achieve-
ments in named factories. Although many of these items are camouflaged,
and incompletely reproduced, additional information from classified as
well as open sources usually permits the completion of the story.

e. Censorship requirements are changeable. Items that are
secret now were freely revealed a few years ago. From time to time,
facts, such as locations and types of factories, remain more or less
constant; present-day censorship is not necessarily an obstacle to
collecting pertinent information. For example, the Russians do not
now publish information about uranium deposits. Yet the literature
contains many references to uranium deposits in the Soviet Union. Time
and again, it was possible to evaluate classified reports on the dis-
covery of uranium on the basis of previously published geological re-
ports; in some instances, it was forecast where the Russians would soon
start digging for the uranium in Czechoslovakia. For that matter,
current Russian publications occasionally contain references to "rare
minerals" which, sometimes, turn out to be uranium.

f. In the specific field of EV intelligence, there are
several target categories which must needs be worked up on the basis
of open materials. It is not implied that now useful information on
these categories is being obtained from classified sources, but the
fact remains that the over-all picture of these categories has been
gained through open sources, including those German-captured documents
which had been worked up from Russian open publications.

g. In the railroad category, rail lines, trackage, stations,
bridges, marshalling yards, over-all tonnages carried, types of com-
modities carried, types of rolling stock used, capacity of locomotives
and freight cars were obtained from open sources. There is also avail-

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able a great deal of information about railroad operations. There
is no information on a few secret rail lines, nor on freight train
time tables, but open information is adequate to list most of the
important rail targets and, if necessary, to permit the SV Branch,
without benefit of classified information, to set up rail targets
the destruction of which would greatly impair Soviet rail capacity.

h. An estimated 75 per cent of the electric power stations
listed in SV files were identified on the basis of open materials.
At the present time, the Soviets do not seem to censor news about
power stations, with the exception of information on grid systems.
The Soviets, usually, announce when a power station starts operations;
in some instances they go as far as revealing details about generators,
including the places of production, capacity, plant layout, etc. Neg-
ative clues can be obtained about areas which are not mentioned. For
example, the Chusovoy hydro-electric program which figured prominently
in the news up to about two years ago, apparently is no longer commented
upon. Since there is information about various important atomic develop-
ments in that area, Soviet silence provides some kind of a confirmation.

i. It is most surprising that a great amount of open source
information is obtained on highly classified industrial categories.
The discovery of new oil fields is usually reported in the Soviet press.
The British, by patient research in papers and periodicals, were able
to identify about 40 aircraft plants, including their locations and
numbers.

j. Soviet papers contain frequent mention of new cities. It
will be recalled that, according to Marshal Rundstedt, the German army
was greatly handicapped because their maps failed to show newly erected
cities. If the Germans had sufficiently exploited the open sources of
information, most of the gaps in their knowledge of Russian towns would
have been closed.

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k.   A good illustration of the value of open source materials
is provided by the work done by John Scott, the American engineer who
spent many years in Russia. Early during the war the Board of Economic
Warfare put him on the job of collecting open source information on
Russia. With only four female assistants, Scott produced an 815-page
volume "Russia East of the Volga". Practically every industrial cate-
gory and all minerals were covered in the document, which also listed
dozens of new cities. Even today, the Scott Report is often used to
great advantage. It contains information about many plants and places
concerning which no other data are available in SV files.

l.   Open sources are indispensable for over-all economic and
industrial analyses. Misleading and incomplete though Russian statis-
tics are, they are nevertheless the only available basis for statistical
evaluations of the Soviet war potential, the productivity of individual
industries, and the general organization of the Soviet economy. With-
out the periodic reports on the progress of the Five Year Plans, no
over-all picture of Soviet capabilities and vulnerabilities could be
obtained, despite the fact that no Russian statement can be accepted
at face value, but must be thoroughly analyzed and checked with other
data.

m.   Open materials are equally needed for the analysis of
strategically vital categories. For example, without unclassified
basic geographic data, such as climate, freezing conditions of rivers,
water depths, chemical content of water, elevations, roads, geology,
etc., it would be very difficult to crack the secrets of the Soviet
atomic program.

n.   Russian open sources contain a great number of photographs
and other pictorial materials, including plant layouts. There are
quite a few industrial pictures which could be used for target folders.
There are also pictures of Russian products which would give clues as

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to output of specific plants and quality of Russian technology. There
are numerous pictures of outstanding architectural structures which
would be very valuable as identifiable landmarks.

     c. It is concluded that the exploitation of open sources is
not only a very valuable but actually an indispensable part of air in-
telligence operations.

  2. <u>Current Exploitation of Open Source Materials</u>

     a. Preliminary surveys have shown that a very large percent-
age of total Russian open-source materials are available in the United
States. In the Washington area alone, the Library of Congress plus
various other government agencies, such as the CIA, Army Library, and
State Department have been receiving, during the past five to ten
years, at least one-half, or more, of the Russian output in publica-
tions. Large university libraries, such as Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley,
and the New York Public Library also posses considerable collections
of Russian materials. There are innumerable small but nevertheless
valuable Slavic libraries in the hands of minor universities, special
research organizations, industrial firms and private individuals.
The Library of Congress is now trying to obtain all current Soviet
publications on a regular basis.

     b. Several agencies have been set up to produce bibliogra-
phies, abstracts and digests from these materials. The Strategic
Vulnerability Branch receives about a dozen of such publications, not
including technological abstracts produced by private agencies. Some
information is extracted by SV analysts from English-language publi-
cations issued by the Soviet government. From time to time, additional
information is culled from the digests published by the British Joint
Intelligence Board. Recently, the CIA started the Soviet Press Ex-
tracts which hold out some promise, but, notwithstanding this seemingly

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large quantity of open source materials there is no _flow_ of information;
there is, at best, a trickle.

        c.   The reasons for this highly unsatisfactory state of affairs
are the following:

        (1) The extracts and digests are mostly made for purposes
which are totally different from the mission of the
Air Intelligence Division.

        (2) Most of the extracts are actually made by people
unfamiliar with air intelligence requirements. Many
digests, especially the Daily Reports on Foreign
Radio Broadcasts, attempt to reproduce current news
and propaganda, but consistently omit intelligence
data.

        (3) The confusion in the abstracting field has had the
deplorable consequence that, while many items are re-
produced in most of the publications, there is not,
by a long shot, a _complete_ coverage of _all_ the materi-
als that are actually available. Nevertheless, the
sheer volume of these unorganized and uncoordinated
digests is so large that it is very idfficult for the
SV Branch to handle them properly.

        (4) While every abstracting service tries to include repre-
sentative Soviet publications, such as _Pravda_ and
Izvestiya, little attention is given to books, govern-
ment publications, (for example directories), pictures
or maps. Hence, a great many of the valuable sources
are not exploited, while other sources are exploited
several times over, but each time in a manner not
suitable to the Air Intelligence Division.

3. **Remedies**

        a.   A preliminary survey of the situation as well as discussions

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with specialists in the abstracting field have shown that it would

not be practical to organize one big independent super-abstracting

service which could serve all the interests of all the agencies. Even

if such a service were practical, the setting-up of a special agency

would require a very long time. Moreover, there would be no certainty

that air force intelligence requirements would be satisfied unless,

of course, the air force would be able to exert control over operations.

b. It would, therefore, be necessary to make use of the ab-

stracting units that already exist. An arrangement with such units

would be profitable not only for budgetary reasons but also because

some of these units have control over source materials.

c. At the same time, since present extracting staffs are

small and overworked, and since a great deal of the required work is

not being done, the establishment of new extracting units cannot be

averted.

d. Hence, a solution must be found which (1) avoids the

setting-up of one independent super-extracting agency; (2) achieves a

maximum of cooperation from existing agencies; and (3) provides facili-

ties for the carrying-out of such extracting services as are necessary

if a complete coverage of open source materials is to be achieved.

e. Before a satisfactory plan for the division of labor among

the various would-be participants in the program can be evolved, it is

necessary as a preliminary, to determine which sources ought to be pro-

cessed and to locate the source materials not now in Washington but

available elsewhere in the United States. Such a preliminary job must

needs be done by the Library of Congress which would have to be given

a contract in order to enable them to complete their index of Slavic

materials and to make full use of the Union Catalogue.

4. Results of Discussions with the Library of Congress

a. In informal discussions with representatives of the Library

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of Congress, it was determined that an extracting service could not function satisfactorily without a searching unit permanently operating in the Library, or without a routine channel to the Acquisitions Division.

b. It was thought advisable that the Library of Congress participate in any extracting scheme that might be evolved. The Library is the government's purchasing agent for foreign publications and it possesses what is probably the country's largest Slavic collection. The Library is the organization most suited for locating and loaning operations and it is the best medium for the camouflage of the entire undertaking.

c. There was no argument about the need for a new unit if the backlog of books and other publications as well as the current accessions of books are to be handled. The backlog is estimated to comprise 20,000 books, more than 30,000 periodicals and more than 100,000 newspapers, not to mention the backlog of other materials, such as broadcasts, for example. It has been tentatively estimated that such a unit would require about 50 extractors and indexers and 10 CAF's. A unit of that size could process the backlog in 5 to 6 years, and also handle current acquisitions of books and government reports. Such a new unit would work most efficiently in the Library of Congress. (see Annex I).

d. With respect to the actual processing of the materials, it would be most effective if extracts were done on check sheets listing a limited number of pertinent questions, such as those on the target information sheets. At the end of each check sheet a short digest of the processed material would be appended. The extract sheets would then be collected and consolidated and put into a publication, to be issued at regular intervals, preferably weekly. The information would also be

maintained in a central file.

e. The discussions suggested the advisability of limiting
the scope of the extraction effort. If, for example, political in-
formation were processed, the entire project would have to be very
large in size, while the expenditure would not be worth the result,
certainly not in so far as the Air Intelligence Division is concerned.
The extracting service could be profitably limited to the fields of
economic and industrial information related to strategic vulnerability,
technical air information, air arm and civil air information, bio-
graphical air information, and air geography.

f. It was recognized that even within this "limitation"
economy of effort could be practiced. For example, a great deal of
information may be available on the paper industry, but there might
be no current need for this information; hence, it would be wasteful
to process and reproduce it. However, since intelligence needs can-
not be anticipated, and since it is conceivable that, for one reason
or another, even the paper industry may assume importance, a central
file would have to be maintained in such a manner that, at a moment's
notice, any inactive category can be worked up. It might even be ad-
visable to maintain the file for subjects which hardly ever will become
of interest to the Air Intelligence Division, simply because another
government agency may want to participate in the program at a later
date. It would be a good selling point to have all the information
indexed and cross-indexed so that extracts of any kind can be made.

g. For various technical reasons, it is believed that the
Library of Congress would be the logical agency to put in charge
of both the actual publishing and the central file. In order to get
the extracting effort going it would simply be necessary for the air

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force to make a contract with the Library of Congress which then would
set up the various activities and units outlined above. It is believed
that once the extracting service has been started, cooperation from
other agencies will be obtained more easily.

5. Open Questions

a. Up to this point, there is not much room for disagree-
ment about the organization of the extracting services. Difficulties
arise, however, with respect to the ways and means by which other
government agencies and private abstracting firms could, or should,
be brought into the scheme. It is relatively easy to conceive of a
set-up by which the labor would be efficiently and equitably divided.
For example, if the Library of Congress would handle current books,
government periodicals, and the backlog of periodicals and newspapers,
the Army Library, which operates a periodicals abstracting service,
could handle current periodicals. The CIA, which already has made a
start in the field of newspaper abstracting, could take over current
newspapers. The CIA also has facilities for radio monitoring and for
the procurement of industrial documents. Contracts could be made with
private firms for the processing of technological and scientific ma-
terials. Specialized organizations, such as the Photo Library and the
Aero Chart Service, could profitably participate in the processing.
The extracting services would have to be coordinated with the Air Re-
search Unit at the Library of Congress. It would also be advisable to
arrange for a division of labor with the British JIB.

b. Although such an over-all organization can be conceived
in theory (See Annex I), it must be anticipated that various adminis-
trative and "political" obstacles will arise. It is obvious, at any
rate, that the setting-up of a coordinated effort on such a scale will
require a great deal of work. Lengthy negotiations will be required.

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Even after contracts will have been concluded, adjustments will be necessary quite frequently.

6. To sum up: in order to get a fully satisfactory service specializing in the extraction of intelligence from open source materials and, at the same time, to derive benefits from the research done at military and civilian schools, it is necessary to set up a Basic Information Section in the Directorate of Intelligence. This Section would maintain liaison with military and civilian schools and control the administration of the extracting services. This administration, to be located in the Library of Congress, would control procurement of materials, maintain liaison with the Acquisitions Division in the Library, keep a central file, and publish the extracts. The administration would control the various extracting units, located in the Library of Congress and in other government agencies. The work would most advantageously be divided up in such a manner that each participating agency would handle one major category of open source materials.

7. The total manpower and money requirements of the scheme cannot be estimated at this juncture, because it is not known which existing facilities can be brought into the scheme. An exact budgetary estimate must wait till the time when negotiations with various government agencies will have been engaged. It is clear, however, that the investment required to undertake the Treasure Island scheme will be relatively small and that the managerial difficulties and costs will be minor. The gain in terms of information obtained will, by contrast, be very large. It is more than probable, indeed certain, that within a few years it will be said that never before in the history of American intelligence was so simple and inexpensive an effort needed to produce so great and so valuable a return.