


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Thirty-Sixth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

(This report covers the period from
24 October through 30 October 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

DIA REVIEW COMPLETED

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31 October 1973




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31 October 1973

Thirty-Sixth Report


COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
24 October through 30 October 1973)

The Key Points

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- The cessation of the heavy rains in the North Vietnamese Panhandle has been followed by stepped up logistic activity, but routes in northern South Vietnam remain flooded and closed to traffic.
- For the first time in over six months, substantial cargo shipments destined for northern Laos have been detected. To the south in Laos, the Communists are preparing for heavy vehicular activity in mid-November.
- Indications suggest that COSVN may be expanding its command responsibility into the northern half of South Vietnam.
-  extensive construction activity within Communist controlled areas of South Vietnam, Laos and eastern Cambodia. Roads are being extended, and airfields repaired.
- Combat activity remained at low levels in both South Vietnam and Laos last week.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.



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The Details

NOTE: This is the thirty-sixth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam

2. The heavy rains which had virtually halted traffic in North Vietnam's Panhandle for the past month abated during the reporting period. Small amounts of cargo [redacted] were detected moving both in the Vinh area and in southern Quang Binh province. [redacted]

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


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4. In the area between Quang Khe and the DMZ, significant cargo shipments also were detected after about a one-month lull. [redacted]

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


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
Laos

5. For the first time in over six months, substantial cargo shipments were detected destined for northern Laos. [redacted]


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


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




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Route 7, although wet and muddy, was indeed capable of sustaining such a supply flow. Historically, POL shipments at this time are not unusual, as the North Vietnamese prime their logistic system in preparation for higher levels of activity during the dry season.


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6. Although no large supply shipments were detected in southern Laos,

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


portions of the two major supply routes in the Panhandle were now capable of handling a light volume of traffic--after being unserviceable for most of the summer rainy season.

South Vietnam

7. South of the DMZ rains continued to hamper logistic activity. Parts of Route 9 and Route 14 were reported flooded and closed to traffic, and little activity was noted in other areas of northern South Vietnam.

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


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II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

A. South Vietnam

8. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (24-30 Oct) are shown below:



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<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January Ceasefire</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June Ceasefire</u>		<u>Last Week (24-30 Oct)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,410	4,989	385	1,630	8	84
MR 2	585	3,934	321	2,080	12	114
MR 3	575	4,227	173	1,651	5	88
MR 4	1,177	10,547	499	4,381	39	326
Totals	3,747	23,697	1,378	9,742	64 (87)	612 (623) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

9. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

B. Laos

10. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Capabilities in Indochina

A. Expansion of Central Office for South Vietnam's Command Responsibility


11. The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and its military arm, the South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA) may be expanding their command responsibility into the northern half of South Vietnam. Such

(See Reverse Side of Page)



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF



(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)





a development, if true, would be the most far reaching high echelon Communist command reorganization in South Vietnam in recent years. Historically, COSVN/SVNLA has been responsible for directing military and political operations in GVN MR's 3 and 4, while Hanoi has assumed the command responsibility for the northern half of the country.

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
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Therefore, additional evidence will be required before any definitive judgement on the extent and scope of this possible expansion can be made.

B. Recent Communist Construction Activity

12.



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
The building of new roads and the upgrading of others still appear to be of first importance to the North Vietnamese, although improvements to some airstrips and further building of permanent structures/shelters in major base areas and along the major logistic routes.

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Roads

13. North Vietnamese engineers are continuing to move toward completion of their two new north-south dual lane road networks, one leading through the Panhandle of Laos and the other in South Vietnam along the western GVN border. Although late wet season storms have slowed the pace of construction along the Laotian corridor, several gaps in the central portion have been cleared and graded in recent weeks, and its dual lane terminus was extended another 15 to 20 miles south. The recent extension of this roadway into the tri-border area now indicates the

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[redacted]

new system will probably link up with the Route 14 corridor in South Vietnam, thereby providing the North Vietnamese with two independent supply routes to their southern bases in South Vietnam. When connected, this road network would substantially reduce the effect of the rainy season on the Communist logistic system.

14. In South Vietnam, wet weather has forced some slowdown in the construction of sections of Route 14. Current motorable limits of this route can be traced from the DMZ south some 150 to 170 miles to the vicinity of Kham Duc in Quang Tin Province. From there, construction gaps totaling about 20 miles must still be connected before the northern and southern halves are joined. This 20 mile section of road is being cut through extremely difficult mountainous terrain and probably will take at least another month to complete. Although the lower half of Route 14 is still in the early to mid-stages of construction, most of the major clearing work has been done. Dual lane construction now extends some 80 miles, including several small gaps, south of Duc Co into Quang Duc Province. This includes about 6 miles of GVN Route TL-6B which the North Vietnamese have widened and which also forms the present southern terminus of the system at the Cambodian border (see the map).


15. [redacted] revealed traces of recent single lane clearing to the southwest of the above dual lane terminus--apparently the initial work on a further extension of Route 14. The clearing activity begins some 12 miles to the southwest inside Cambodia and extends southward 10 to 15 miles before ending about a quarter mile from GVN Route 309. This circuitous alignment through Cambodian territory probably is an effort to bypass the ARVN outpost at Duc Lap, much like the earlier bypassing of the ARVN-held Dak Pek farther north in Kontum Province. [redacted]

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[redacted] some of this single lane clearing was present, but no correlation between it and Route 14 was apparent then.

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Airfields

16. [redacted] re-
 pairs and improvements have recently been made to
 several Communist-held airfields in South Vietnam and
 Laos. With the exception of the Khe Sanh airfield,
 improvements made to some half dozen former US and
 ARVN airstrips in South Vietnam have been modest;
 limited mostly to filling of craters and general
 cleanup work, since most all of these airstrips were
 more or less serviceable when occupied by the Commu-
 nists. At the Thien Ngon airfield in Tay Ninh Prov-
 ince, for example, repairs made since mid-July have
 included the painting of a white guideline down the
 center of the runway, the building of a detour road
 around the field, and the construction of some 30
 buildings just north of the airfield. Similar repair
 activity [redacted] was
 noted at LOC Ninh Airfield in Binh Long Province and
 at Bu Dop Airfield in Phuoc Long Province. Bu Dop
 remains unserviceable, however, with one unfilled
 crater at the south end of the runway. To date, we
 have no categorical evidence that the Communists'
 aircraft have used any of their serviceable airfields
 in South Vietnam.

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
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17. In Laos, airfield construction and repairs
 have been more pronounced. The North Vietnamese
 have reopened the Sam Neua Airfield and built a new
 dirt strip nearby at Muong Nga (Ban Nakay Neua) [redacted]

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[redacted]
 [redacted] indicates that repairs earlier observed being
 made on the Xieng Khouang Airfield on the Plaine des
 Jarres have been completed.


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