

~~Top Secret~~



**Thirty-Fifth Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

**(This report covers the period from  
17 October through 23 October 1973)**

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

25X1




~~Top Secret~~

26


25X1

24 October 1973



**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied



24 October 1973


Thirty-Fifth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from 17 October through 23 October 1973)

The Key Points

25X1



- Another Communist combat regiment has moved from Cambodia into South Vietnam's MR-3.

25X1



- Particularly severe rains and flooding have curtailed North Vietnamese logistic activity in the North Vietnamese Panhandle, northern South Vietnam, and south Laos.
- Communist rice shortages appear to be one reason for North Vietnamese plans for military action in GVN MR-3. Strictly in the economic sphere, they are increasing their efforts to obtain rice and other supplies.


25X1




- Combat activity remained at low levels in both South Vietnam and Laos last week.

---

\* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.




25X1



The Details



NOTE: This is the thirty-fifth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.



25X1  
25X1

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

25X1



25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1



3. Recent reports have confirmed earlier indications that the NVA 367th Sapper Regiment was leaving Cambodia.

25X1

25X1




25X1

The regiment, as well as other units, may have vacated former positions in Cambodia because of continued poor relations between KC-VC/NVA units. The deployment of the regiment also may be related to Communist plans to increase tactical activity in Tay Ninh Province.

4. The relocation of the unit--estimated at some 1,000 men--lowers VC/NVA combat strength in Cambodia to about 2,000, compared with an estimated strength of more than 7,000 at the time of the Vietnam ceasefire in January. In addition to the above, there may be as many as 2,000 VC/NVA operating as cadre, advisors and liaison with the KC. Similarly, VC/NVA administrative services strength has declined from around 30,000 in January to a present strength of about 18,000, as these units have also moved into South Vietnam. The remaining combat strength consists of the NVA 203rd Regiment and three artillery battalions.

25X1



25X1




25X1

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies


Indochina

7. For the second week in a row, heavy rains from an unusually high number of seasonal typhoons sharply restricted the Communist logistic effort throughout most areas of the North Vietnamese Pan-handle, South Vietnam, and south Laos.


25X1



25X1



25X1



25X1

25X1

501958 9-73 CIA



25X1

8. The particularly heavy rains and wide-spread flooding this month clearly have disrupted North Vietnamese dry season preparations and probably will interfere with the resumption of large scale supply shipments from southern North Vietnam to Laos. The length of the delay will be a direct function of future weather patterns and the intensity of Communist recovery efforts.

II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

A. South Vietnam

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (17-23 Oct) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January Ceasefire</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June Ceasefire</u>		<u>Last Week (17-23 Oct)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,402	4,905	377	1,546	24	111
MR 2	571	3,820	307	1,966	22	100
MR 3	570	4,139	168	1,563	8	94
MR 4	1,132	10,221	454	4,055	25	318
Totals	3,675	23,085	1,306	9,130	79 (87)	623 (557) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on



the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

B. Laos

11. There was no significant military activity in Laos last week.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Capabilities in Indochina

A. Communist Rice Shortages in GVN MR-3

12. The worsening Communist rice supply situation in southern South Vietnam



apparently is a prime cause of reported Communist intentions to increase significantly the level of military activity in western GVN MR-3 in the near future.

the purpose of the offensive actions will be:

--To force ARVN into a defensive posture so that the Communists can obtain rice crops.

--To protect rice crops in Communist controlled areas to insure an uninterrupted rice harvest.

--To take counter action against the GVN economic blockade which has had some effect.

In addition to their planned military efforts to alleviate the worsening rice availability situation, the North Vietnamese are also planning to expand their economic efforts (see B below.)



25X1

25X1


25X1

(See Reverse Side of Page)



# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)







# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)


**AUG**




**SEP**




**OCT**




**NOV**



**DEC**



**JAN**



[Redacted]

25X1

13. The rice shortage reportedly is the result of a poor rice crop in Communist held areas as well as the cessation of rice deliveries from the Khmer Communists in Cambodia to South Vietnam. In the past, Cambodian rice deliveries have met a significant portion of the rice requirement of VC/NVA forces in GVN MR-3.

14. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted] the Communists must ensure that internal supply problems in MR-3 are solved if they hope to achieve any substantial success. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese do have the option--although it would be unprecedented--of shipping rice from North Vietnam to GVN MR-3 if a severe shortage persists.

B. Communists Press Economic Activities Deeper into Southern South Vietnam

15. Communist political and rear services cadres are apparently undertaking a wide range of economic projects designed to strengthen their hold on the Ben Suc area of Binh Duong Province just 30 miles north of Saigon (see map). [Redacted]

25X1


[Redacted], the Viet Cong have formulated plans to build several mills and plants during the coming year and have already established a system of cooperative stores for Communist cadre and military personnel in the Ben Suc area. The Viet Cong also have been recruiting laborers to work on the nearby Michelin rubber plantation and are providing tractors, plows, and farm tools to rear service units and civilians along with instructions to increase food production. To facilitate economic trading and the flow of supplies into the area, the Communists have secured and improved roads linking Ben Suc with rear bases along the Cambodian border, and in early September reportedly initiated a regular ferry service across the Saigon River just north of the town.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]


25X1



25X1

17. The purposes of the Communists' economic program are to increase the quantity of supplies they are able to produce and collect locally and to generate political support among the South Vietnamese population by making them economically dependent upon the Viet Cong. Similar efforts to stimulate economic development in Communist controlled territory have been reported, particularly along the Cambodian border in northern MR-3. But aside from the purchasing of goods in GVN controlled territory and the distribution of small loans to Viet Cong sympathizers, the Communist economic activities around Ben Suc are the closest to South Vietnamese controlled territory and population centers in MR-3 reported thus far.

C. Communists Increase Coastal Infiltration of Supplies into South Vietnam's Lower Delta

18.  Communist coastal resupply deliveries to base areas along the western coast of South Vietnam's southern MR-4 indicate an increase in activity over the past several months. South Vietnamese officials claim that the Communists have shifted to sea transportation because ARVN units have interdicted the major overland corridor used to resupply the lower delta from stocks in southern Cambodia. Reports of coastal offloading usually surge at this time of year, however, as seasonal flooding restricts the Communists' mobility along the land routes.

19. The available reporting suggests that the coastal shipments originate in Cambodia, where the Communists control a substantial part of the southern coast. Deliveries are most frequently made by 5 to 15-ton fishing vessels which offload onto sampans about a mile offshore. The sampans reportedly carry the supplies to nearby inland waterways



25X1



for further transport to inland rear services areas. A large part of the cargo is apparently ammunition, but in some cases troops are also infiltrated by sea.

25X1




25X1

Because

the high volume of fishing traffic in this area makes detections of vessels carrying illegal cargoes extremely difficult, such activities are likely to continue.

25X1



25X1




25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Top Secret**



**Top Secret**