


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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 30 January 1971

NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.







For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1970

Weekly average for each month




OCTOBER 1970 - JANUARY 1971


Weekly data as reported




US BATTLE DEATHS dropped to 28 from the 50 reported last week.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS decreased from last week's 232 to 144 -- the lowest total since the week of 22 August 1970. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE continue at a low level with one battalion-size group and one small group being detected for a combined estimated strength of 600. The total number of infiltrators since 1 October 1970 is now an estimated 40,400 - 42,800.



ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS rose slightly to 472 from last week's 432.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION dropped sharply from last week's 5½ month high of 1,996 to 776, reflecting the lull in fighting in South Vietnam and the decreased ARVN presence in Cambodia.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces decreased to 76% from the 83% of last week.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam was at a low level during the past week and consisted of light, scattered attacks by fire and small ground actions. On 1 February (after the technical cut off date of this report), the tempo of Communist activity increased sharply. We have received preliminary reports on 58 enemy attacks by fire and ground probes on 1 and 2 February. Several major U.S. installations such as the Danang Air Base and Cam Ranh have been hit. No major units appear to have been committed in this current flurry of attacks, nor does the enemy appear to be capable of mounting large-scale offensive operations against major population centers in South Vietnam. Nonetheless, this surge of harassment is likely to continue over the next week or so and it may be augmented by rocket attacks against major population centers and/or attempts at headline-seeking actions by small terrorist or sapper units.

Communist-initiated activity in Cambodia during the week has been at a moderate level, following the dramatic attacks on the Phnom Penh airfield and a flurry of terrorist acts. Recent Cambodian military messages have reported large enemy concentrations all around the capital, but these, so far, are largely unconfirmed. Over the near future, the Communists probably intend to continue terrorist activity within Phnom Penh and to conduct small-scale attacks on its outskirts. Attempts to get petroleum supplies into the capital have met with mixed results. The first convoy from the oil refinery at Kompong Som to Phnom Penh along the recently reopened Route 4 was ambushed by the Communists 20 miles north of Veal Renh on 30 January, and lost over 10 trucks in the action. A Mekong River convoy, however, delivered a large shipment of petroleum products to the capital safely on 29 January after experiencing only minor harassment during the journey. In northwest Cambodia, the enemy conducted only light harassing activity against government positions and lines of communications.

In north Laos, friendly units (both Lao Army and irregulars) patrolling west of the Plain of Jars continue to search for enemy forces there. In the south Laos Panhandle, the government has begun a drive back toward Muong Phalane, which fell to the enemy on 26 January. Farther south and east in the SILVER BUCKLE area, irregular forces operating along Route 99 have not been attacked since 28 January. On 1 February, irregulars on the Bolovens Plateau successfully repulsed an enemy attack on one of their sites.

Enemy Infiltration

The lull in detections of infiltration starts in North Vietnam (NVN) continues, but recent intercepts from the Vinh area, though not providing the detail previously received, suggest that a realignment/relocation of infiltration-associated entities in southern NVN has been completed and that the southward movement of personnel may again be detected at the "Vinh Window." During the actual reporting week, however, one regular infiltration group and a special purpose group were detected in Laos with a combined estimated strength of 600. The designator number carried by the regular infiltration group observed in Laos strongly suggests that at least 10 other groups may have moved undetected through the system in NVN. Thus, it would seem that the apparent lull in starts in the recent past may have been more of a slow-down occasioned by the realignment of the system in NVN than a true stand-down. Acceptance of the above 600 personnel brings the total number of infiltrators to an estimated 40,400 - 43,800. These totals would be some 5,700 higher if the 10 gap groups were included. Meanwhile, the enemy continues to press on with what he terms his "crash program" and "general offensive" for moving supplies through the Laos Panhandle.

South Vietnam Developments

With the Tet celebrations in full sway, political activity last week was largely confined to maneuvering and planning for next fall's Lower House and Presidential elections. With Ky undecided whether to run for the Presidency, and given only a slim chance even by his own entourage, the prospects of a basically two-man race between Thieu and Big Minh seem to be steadily increasing. The An Quang Buddhists, who helped produce 1.2 million votes for the Vu Van Mau senatorial slate last fall, met with Big Minh but remain uncommitted to him because of

uncertainty over his chances. None of the three potential Presidential candidates has selected a running mate. A Ky aide floated a report that Big Minh has sounded out Ky as a possible running mate, but this may be a ploy to encourage Thieu to sign him up again for a Thieu-Ky ticket. Meanwhile, Thieu is continuing to gear up the governmental machinery on his behalf, e.g., quietly arranging for the Ministry of Information to organize seminars for local officials and institute other promotional activities. Our Saigon Station believes that Thieu's success in containing domestic unrest and in providing at least temporary economic stability has given Thieu the edge over Minh, although this situation could change in the coming months.

25X6A

Communist Developments

25X6A

Although the Communists in Paris have suggested in the past that they could do business with a Big Minh government, they appear now to be taking the line that the outcome of South Vietnam's Presidential election is of little concern to them. A senior Viet Cong negotiator, Nguyen Van Tien, in the unlikely event of a Minh victory, Minh might not be able to settle the war. Tien implied that Minh was tainted in Communist eyes because many of his Buddhist supporters were under some degree of American influence. Tien's remarks jibe well with those of his superior, Xuan Thuy, who recently came close to a public assertion that the Communists would not deal with the 1971 Presidential election winner no matter who he turned out to be. Both Thuy and Tien stressed that the war was going to last a long time and that the Communists were prepared to see it through.

For several years Hanoi has not publicized meetings of the Party's Central Committee -- the last meeting publicly acknowledged was the 12th Plenum in December 1965. It is thus interesting that Hanoi news media have announced that the Central Committee's 19th Plenum was recently held. The wide publicity being given to this plenary session and its associated communique is probably a device for emphasizing the Party's determination to carry on with current policies relating to both the war and to domestic programs.

~~Top Secret~~