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Divisions Within the Cuban Leadership: A Simulated Poll

A Research Paper

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*Research for this report was completed
on 1 February 1979.*

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Preface

This study is an experimental approach to the analysis of political groupings in a closed political system. The technique, called simulated polling, was developed to communicate—in an understandable manner—the combined judgments of a group of analysts concerning a wide range of complex political relationships. As a first step, we identified seven key individuals or groups that make up the Cuban decisionmaking elite. Next, we selected 24 policy issues that confronted the Cuban leadership during 1978. Since it was not possible to poll the Cuban leaders directly, we relied on a panel of six analysts who have considerable knowledge of Cuba. In essence, the panel members responded to an opinion poll as surrogates for Fidel Castro and his associates. Finally, the panel's responses were converted—using a mathematical technique known as multidimensional scaling—into visual models of the policy differences within the Cuban elite. The methodology is explained in greater detail in appendix A.

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**Divisions Within the
Cuban Leadership:
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Key Judgments

The Cuban leadership, although dominated by Fidel Castro, consists of several identifiable opinion groups. But the political relationships in the Cuban elite are highly complex. The group alignments do not remain constant across all policy questions, and coalitions that exist on certain issues break down on others.

Participants in this study identified the question of providing support for Latin American revolutionary movements as the most divisive issue facing Cuba today. They found that other issues, such as the Cuban military role in Africa, Cuban-Soviet relations, and Cuban-US relations, involved a relatively broad range of opinions rather than sharp dichotomies.

Raul Castro, the younger brother and heir apparent of the Cuban leader, was identified in the analysis as an aggressive hardliner on virtually all issues. Raul Castro differs from Fidel on such issues as the desirability of a more aggressive military policy in Africa, the degree of cooperation with the USSR, and the wisdom of better relations with the United States.

Fidel Castro was seen as occupying a relatively centrist position on all policy questions with a single exception—the issue of Cuban-Soviet relations. The other key actors in the Cuban leadership never coalesce as a single group against him. Fidel's central position on the issues apparently facilitates his ability to act as a unifying force in a highly diverse leadership. Given Raul's extreme position on almost every issue, he would be unable to perform the same role should his brother suddenly pass from the scene. Unless a major realignment of policy attitudes occurred, Fidel's absence could lead to the development of a bitter split in the Cuban hierarchy.

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**The Cuban Leadership
And Decisionmaking**

The Cuban regime is not a monolithic structure. It is a hierarchy consisting of various groupings, factions, or coalitions with differing viewpoints and interests over which Fidel Castro has exercised unifying authority. The existence of these groups has been overshadowed by Fidel's dominant role since 1959.

The key members of the current Cuban leadership have a common base—they were all participants in the 1956-58 guerrilla struggle against President Batista. But the restructuring of the Cuban economy following the disastrous 1970 sugar harvest and Cuban military involvement in Africa, particularly Angola and Ethiopia, have spawned new actors in Cuba's ruling coalition. Former leaders of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the pre-Castro Communist party, new technocratic-administrative civilians and military officers in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the armed forces themselves have become important elements in Cuban decisionmaking. The influence of the technocrats and younger military officers is likely to rise as Castro becomes more willing to listen to expert advice and less prone to rely solely on his personal instincts to make spontaneous political, economic, and social decisions. Nonetheless, the dominant forces in the Cuban leadership still consist of the ex-guerrilla elite led by Fidel and Raul Castro.

The seven actors listed below constitute the significant elements of the Cuban leadership today. Three of these actors are individuals (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez); the remaining four represent major political groupings whose similar origins or institutional affiliations are presumed to have produced similar policy views.

Fidel Castro

Regardless of what official title Fidel Castro has held during his 20-year reign in Cuba, his hold on the Cuban people has made him the linchpin of the revolutionary process he has dominated from the outset. He is likely to remain the center of power in Cuba as long as he is in good health. His leadership is unchallenged, and his authority is supreme despite the extensive institutional changes Cuba has undergone. Opposition to Castro, which was more evident in the early days of the regime, has been diluted or eliminated. Today, Fidel owes his strong position to the loyalty of ex-guerrilla combatants (the "fidelistas" who are described below) who control the Cuban security forces and hold key positions in the government and party and to his immense popularity with the Cuban people.

Raul Castro

Raul is the undisputed number-two man in Cuba. He is the adviser Fidel trusts more than any other and is steadily expanding his influence in decisionmaking. He has attained authority by virtue of familial and revolutionary ties and also by his institutional positions; he is first vice president of the Councils of Ministers and State and second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Political Bureau and Secretariat. He enjoys a relatively free rein in fashioning the military establishment. Many of the guerrillas who fought under his command in the Sierra Cristal now hold important positions in the military and government. This, along with his good working relations with Moscow—upon whom the Cuban military establishment is dependent for virtually all of its military equipment—has provided him with his own power base. Although in the past he devoted himself almost exclusively to the armed forces, Raul has become increasingly involved in domestic and foreign policy issues that technically fall outside his purview as head of the military establishment.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez

Third in influence in the Cuban leadership, Rodriguez provides a bridge between the "old Communists" and the "technocrats" that eases the relations of both with Castro. He is in charge of much of Cuba's foreign policy apparatus and is a major government spokesman at international gatherings. He is the only economist among the top leaders and, as such, is a key figure in the formulation of economic policy in both the foreign and domestic realms. Rodriguez is one of the few members of the PSP (the "old Communists," who are described below) to emerge unscathed from the purges directed against the party, and he is the only former PSP leader to have strengthened his position within the regime. He publicly expressed his differences with the late Che Guevara's emphasis on moral incentives, centralization of administration, and the elimination of money during the economic debates of the mid-1960s, arguing instead for orthodox economic planning techniques. The failure of the Guevarist model and the subsequent setbacks caused by the 1970 sugar harvest strengthened his position within the leadership. While he is not a member of Fidel's inner circle, his professional expertise and his close links with many of the technocrats, along with his connections to Moscow, have enabled him steadily to expand his influence.

The Fidelistas

This group which is made up of a major part of the PCC Central Committee, and constitutes the stable inner circle around Fidel. Its loyalty to Fidel derives from a variety of sources. Some members of the group have been associated with Fidel since the days of the Moncada attack and the guerrilla struggle; others were members of the Student Revolutionary Directorate during the anti-Batista struggle; still others were involved in the urban underground of the 26th of July Movement during the years of the insurrection. Political Bureau members generally presumed to fall in the category of "fidelistas" include Juan Almeida, Ramiro Valdes, Armando Hart, Sergio del Valle, Guillermo Garcia, and Pedro Miret. They have a strong interest in preserving Castro's commanding role in the regime and protecting the present distribution of power against encroachment from newcomers. They are very nationalistic and anti-American; their entire adult lives have been spent in the shadow of what they see as aggressive US actions.

The Technocrats

This group consists primarily of younger individuals distinguished by their technical-administrative competence rather than their revolutionary or ideological ties. Many have little or no personal recollection of the Batista era. Their first concern is the maximization and rationalization of production and distribution through administrative reform. Their influence has been rising since the late 1960s, when the deteriorating economic-political situation in Cuba forced a reorganization in the Cuban Government and a reorientation in its economic policies. The ability of this group to affect policymaking is likely to increase as the Cuban Revolution becomes more institutionalized and the economy more complex. The most influential representative of this group is Humberto Perez, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister-President of the Cuban central planning agency.

The New Military

Cuba's military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia has created a second generation of combat-tested veterans who are beginning to assume increasingly important positions in the military establishment, though still behind the first line of "fidelista" commanders. Trained and equipped by the Soviets, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) possess a disciplined coercive capacity unmatched by other organizations. A growing number of junior officers were born in the 1940s and their formative political experiences are very different from those of the "fidelistas." They have gone through military academies and have received technical education in the management of sophisticated weaponry, logistics, engineering, and military organizations. Consequently, their military skills are far more advanced than most of the ex-guerrillas. In addition to their role in the military establishment these younger officers have since 1968 played an increasingly important role in the economy. This is reflected in the rising number of former military officers serving in technical and economic planning positions.

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The preeminent position of the military in the Castro regime is likely to continue as some of the more pragmatic elements of the leadership—particularly the aged hierarchy of the pre-Castro Communist party—die out. The Cuban combat role in Angola and Ethiopia provides justification for military priorities, and the return of war veterans from Africa introduces new blood into the upper echelons of the military establishment.

The Old Communists

These veterans of the pre-Castro Communist party lend the Cuban leadership a certain element of seasoning and experience and are more likely to seek compromise than confrontation in settling policy disputes. They are prone to represent Soviet interests in the formulation of Cuban domestic and foreign policy, and are, in fact, Castro's main link to Moscow. A generation older than the guerrilla elite, they have a more solid background in politics and administration and have helped the country stave off economic collapse. Their influence today is at a high point, but is likely to wane over the next few years because of their advanced age. Since they have no power base of their own, they have had to rely heavily on Soviet backing and Fidel's sufferance. Inclined toward cooperation and avoidance of internal strife, they experienced a resurgence of importance in the late 1960s when Fidel realized that he would have to move Cuba closer to Moscow. The principal representative of this group in the Political Bureau is Blas Roca. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, described above, and Arnaldo Milian are former members of the PSP, but both have strong links to the "technocrats" as well.

The Issues

In our analysis of attitudinal differences within the Cuban leadership, 24 major policy questions were selected.¹ These issues are not intended to be a comprehensive catalog of every topic discussed by the Cuban hierarchy; rather they are representative of the five basic decisions that confronted Cuba's top policy-makers during 1978:

- Expansion or reduction of Cuba's military role in Africa.

¹ The 24 issues are listed in appendix B.

- Level of support for Latin American revolutionary movements.
- Relations with the USSR.
- Relations with the United States.
- Domestic economic priorities.

The questions were designed to highlight differences of opinion within the leadership. Each was phrased in terms of a possible policy option to be undertaken by the Cuban Government. In a number of cases, several policy options were presented in a series of three or four questions. This permitted the panel members to specify with greater precision the policy preferences of the seven leadership groups or individuals. Moreover, an effort was made to select controversial issues. Those questions on which there is near complete agreement would tell us little about cleavages within the elite. Therefore, the results of this analysis tend to emphasize differences within the elite.


Figure 1 provides a representation of the attitudes ascribed to each of the seven actors by the panel on the questions relating to Africa (Questions 1 to 7).² Each of these questions revolved about the larger issue of whether Cuba should pursue an even more aggressive policy in Africa than is now the case. It was expected that the wording of these questions would produce a relatively straightforward "hawk-dove" dimension. The solution produced by a multidimensional scaling technique confirmed this expectation. Raul Castro and the new military, whose prestige and influence have been considerably enhanced by the performance of the Cuban armed forces in Africa, were seen as holding the most aggressive positions. Although the "technocrats," apparently concerned about the economic disruptions that could result from further African adventures, looked less favorably on a significant expansion of Cuba's military activities, Raul and the new military made up the only clearly separate and cohesive opinion group. None of the other actors showed a close affinity

² This representation is a visual model derived from the responses of the panel on the seven questions concerning Africa. The mathematical program utilized to produce these models operates on a simple basis: the distance between the actors is directly related to the similarity of their views. The greater the distance between two actors, the greater their disagreement on the issues.

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Expansion or Reduction of Cuban Military Role in Africa

Figure 1



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for any other. The existence of this broad range of opinion rather than a sharp dichotomy suggests that a highly divisive debate over the policy of military intervention in Africa is unlikely to develop within the Cuban leadership.

The questions relating to the support of Latin American revolutionaries (Questions 8 to 11) were expected to produce another "hawk-dove" dimension similar to that shown in Figure 1. An inspection of figure 2 shows again a unidimensional configuration, but this one differs significantly from the African dimension. Most important is the apparent existence of an incipient dichotomy within the leadership on the Latin American issue. There is a fairly broad gap between the more cautious group (consisting of the "technocrats," Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and the "old Communists") and the rest of the leadership. Although the lack of cohesion on the two sides indicates that a dichotomy has not yet formed, it is possible that given the right circumstances, in Nicaragua or some other nation, a schism could develop within the Cuban Government.

The differences between figures 1 and 2 indicate that the seven key actors react in different ways to the two issue areas. Thus an attempt to combine the results into a single "hawk-dove" continuum would distort some of the relationships between the actors. For example, Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas" are located closer to Raul Castro and the "new military" on the Latin America dimension, and greater separation between Rodriguez and the "old Communists" is shown on the Africa dimension.


To meet these problems, we present a two-dimensional solution, shown in figure 3. The horizontal axis represents the Africa dimension and runs from the more cautious positions on the left to the more aggressive on the right. The order and relative distances shown in figure 1 are retained along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the Latin America dimension and runs from the more cautious positions at the top to the more aggressive at the bottom. In this case the order shown in figure 2 is duplicated, although some minor differences in the relative distances are apparent.

The two-dimensional presentation permits several conclusions about the policy positions of the Cuban leadership on these two issue sets. First, it can be seen that three general opinion groups exist within the elite. The most cohesive cluster consists of Raul Castro and the "new military." Both are located in the quadrant occupied by those who tend to be aggressive on African and Latin American issues, and their proximity shows that they hold very similar views on the two issues. In the opposite quadrant—occupied by actors who tend to be cautious on both the Africa and Latin America questions—a second cluster is apparent. This group (Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the "technocrats," and the "old Communists") is less cohesive than the Raul Castro—"new military" group. Rodriguez and the "old Communists" have nearly identical views regarding Latin American policy but have some differences on the Africa questions. Rodriguez, who has strong links to both the "old Communists" and the "technocrats," is located between them on both dimensions.

The third opinion cluster consists of Fidel Castro and the "fidelistas." Although their positions are relatively close, they occupy different quadrants. The "fidelistas" are located just inside the quadrant occupied by those actors favoring the more aggressive policy options in both Africa and Latin America. Despite their positions in different quadrants, Fidel and the "fidelistas" show—as expected—fairly close agreement on both issues. Fidel Castro, interestingly, is the only actor occupying the lower left quadrant, but more important is his centrist location on both issue dimensions. Although his overpowering influence is sufficient by itself to dominate the decisionmaking process, his position relative to the other actors undoubtedly facilitates the achievement of consensus. Without the powerful attraction of his charismatic leadership, there would be far less incentive for either of the other two clusters to abandon their positions on a given issue in order to achieve a consensus within the leadership.

Support for Latin American Revolutionary Movements

Figure 2




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Intervention in Africa and Latin America

Figure 3



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Figure 4 represents the policy positions of the seven actors on two other dimensions: relations with the USSR (Questions 12 to 15) and relations with the United States (Questions 16 to 19). The horizontal axis represents the US dimension and runs from a "pronormalization" position on the left to an "antinormalization" position on the right. The ordering and the relative distances along this dimension are fairly similar to the alignments shown in figures 1 and 2. The "technocrats," Rodriguez, and the "old Communists" are again located on the opposite side of the continuum from Raul Castro and the "new military." Fidel Castro is again located in a centrist position. The "fidelistas," torn between their loyalty for their leader and an ingrained hostility toward the United States, are situated midway between Fidel and the extreme positions of Raul and the "new military."

The vertical axis represents the USSR dimension and runs from a "closer cooperation" position at the top to a "less dependence" position at the bottom. The alignment along this dimension shows a completely different orientation from figures 1 and 2. Here the "old Communists" and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez join forces with Raul Castro and the "new military." The "technocrats" depart from their usual extreme position and are located in a centrist position fairly close to Fidel. The "fidelistas" are essentially isolated on this issue, apparently as a result of their instinctive opposition to dependence on any foreign power. This alignment suggests that should Fidel Castro disappear from the political scene, Cuba might well lose all motivation to attain some semblance of independence from the USSR.

Figure 5 represents the policy positions of the seven actors on the single dimension of domestic economic priorities (Questions 20 to 24). These questions were concerned with whether Cuba should continue its emphasis on economic development that would require continued consumer austerity. The results show that this issue is almost as divisive as the question of support for Latin American revolutionaries. This is not surprising; acrimonious debates over economic policy have been a regular feature of the Castro regime. The most notable example was the public debate during the mid-1960s in which Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and others vigorously opposed the unorthodox theories espoused by Che Guevara. The configuration shows that Raul

Castro, the "new military," the "fidelistas," and to a lesser extent Fidel Castro all favor continued consumer austerity in order to maximize investment in Cuba's overall development plan. The "technocrats," Rodriguez, and the "old Communists" generally oppose this view, but there is a fairly substantial distance between the "technocrats" and the other two actors.

The domestic economy is of considerable significance to the Cuban leadership. The low price of sugar on the world market has severely hampered Cuba's ambitious economic development plans. Given its limited hard currency income and its heavy economic requirements, some sectors of the economy must be ignored, and compromise solutions are difficult if not impossible to achieve. Consequently, each decision on resource allocation has wide-ranging repercussions.

It is possible that a second dimension underlies some of the questions posed in this group—ideological underpinnings of Marxist economic theories. This possibility was explored in a two-dimensional configuration, but because of the limited number and scope of the questions on economic policy, the results were inconclusive.


Outlook

The relative policy orientations of the Cuban leadership have certain implications for the future. For example, Fidel Castro's centrist position suggests that his absence could produce a schism in the leadership on many issues, particularly on the questions of support for Latin American revolutionary movements and pursuing closer ties with the United States. The extreme positions of Raul Castro indicate that he would be unable to play a similar unifying role. Moreover, he lacks the influence possessed by his charismatic brother.

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Relations with the US and USSR

Figure 4



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Nevertheless, Raul Castro and his supporters—along with the “fidelistas”—control the organs of power in Cuba: the military and the security forces. Without a major realignment of policy attitudes, Raul seemingly would have to rely on raw power in order to dominate the decisionmaking process. Any such forecast, however, is highly tentative since the sudden death of Fidel, or other traumatic events, could cause a realignment of attitudes within the leadership.

Because of their age, the “old Communists” and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez are likely to leave their positions well before Fidel Castro or any of the other key actors. For example, Rodriguez is 66 and Fidel Castro is only 52. Rodriguez has recently been relieved of some of his less important duties, and there are some indications that his age may have been a factor in those changes. An examination of the policy positions ascribed to the “old Communists” and Rodriguez suggests that their absence would eliminate the primary forces in the Cuban Government that prefer a less aggressive policy in Africa and Latin America and favor improved relations with the United States. Although the “technocrats” were seen in our analysis as holding stronger opinions on these subjects, they currently occupy less influential positions than Rodriguez or the “old Communists.” While the precise impact of the disappearance of Rodriguez and the “old Communists” cannot be predicted, one thing is certain—the decline of these key actors has already begun.


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Domestic Economic Priorities

Figure 5



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Appendix A

Methodology

The standard procedure for measuring political attitudes is the opinion poll. But when the objective is to measure the political attitudes of foreign leaders rather than of the general population there is a problem of access. Most leaders have neither the time nor the inclination to complete questionnaires.

Simulated opinion polling is one way of getting around this problem. Instead of giving the questionnaire to foreign leaders, we give it to a number of people specializing in that country, and ask them to respond to the questions as they think the foreign leaders would respond. This combines two techniques: opinion polling and role playing. It provides a large body of data that can be analyzed to identify potential cleavages and coalitions on diverse issues within a foreign leadership group. It can also serve to identify differing assumptions and judgments among a group of analysts on a given country or subject.



The seven key individual leaders or leadership groups in the Cuban Government were first identified. We then formulated 24 statements concerning Cuban foreign and domestic policy and asked six Cuban experts to indicate the extent to which they felt the seven leaders or leadership groups agreed or disagreed with these statements. Figure 6 illustrates the format of the questionnaire.

The six analysts, each judging the position of seven leaders or leadership groups on 24 issues, provided over a thousand judgments about the Cuban leadership views. We summarized this data to present it in such a manner that the significant conclusions—differences among the Cuban leaders as well as the differences among our experts in assessing the Cuban leadership—would be graphically apparent. For the bulk of this work, we selected a statistical program called multidimensional scaling.

Multidimensional scaling requires measurement of the similarity between every pair of objects (in this case, key actors in the Cuban hierarchy). The measurements used in this study are euclidian distance matrices. Figure 7 is an example of such a matrix. It shows the computed euclidian distances between each pair of actors on the questions relating to Africa. The distances in the matrix represent degrees of similarity between each pair of actors.

The smaller the distance value, the greater the similarity between the two actors on the policy issues in question. Thus, Raul Castro and the "new military" show the greatest similarity (0.080) on the African questions. Conversely, the "technocrats" and the "new military" show the least similarity (1.000). The multidimensional scaling program takes this information and depicts it graphically in terms of distances between the objects. Thus, the data shown in figure 7 are depicted visually in figure 1. As in the euclidian distance matrix, the "new military" group is closest to Raul Castro and the "technocrats" are the most distant from him.

The program produces the graphs by first placing the objects in a space of N dimensions and replicating the distances between each pair of objects as shown in the euclidian distance matrix. It finds the most satisfactory configuration by starting with a random configuration and moving all the points a bit to decrease the "stress," a measure of the "goodness" of the solution. This stress value is at a minimum for the best solution and increases sharply when too few dimensions are used. This procedure is repeated over and over again until some stopping criterion is reached.

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Figure 6

Cuban combat forces should cross the border of Somalia along with Ethiopian troops to administer a complete defeat to the Somali army. (Make your assessment as of February - March 1978 rather than the present time.)





Figure 7

Euclidian Distances on African Issues

	Fidel Castro	Fidelistas	Raul Castro	New Military	C. R. Rodriguez	Old Communists	Technocrats
Fidel Castro	0.0						
Fidelistas	0.131	0.0					
Raul Castro	0.558	0.444	0.0				
New Military	0.6111	0.500	0.080	0.0			
C. R. Rodriguez	0.303	0.421	0.827	0.868	0.0		
Old Communists	0.181	0.295	0.705	0.749	0.138	0.0	
Technocrats	0.470	0.581	0.964	1.000	0.191	0.298	0.0

The chief output from the technique is a spatial arrangement of points. Each point on the paper represents one of the objects in the distance matrix. The best and certainly easiest method for interpreting the output is simply to look at the configuration and see which points are close together and which are far apart. The question of dimensionality requires that the analyst suggest substantive interpretation to the meaning of the relative distances between the items. In this study, this was accomplished by a careful examination of the responses given by the panel of experts on each question.



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Appendix B

Policy Issues

1. Cuban combat forces should cross the border of Somalia along with Ethiopian troops to administer a complete defeat to the Somali Army. (Make your assessment as of February-March 1978 rather than the present time.)
2. Cuban combat forces should give complete and full support to the Ethiopian military campaign against the Eritrean separatists. This would include the utilization of mechanized infantry, artillery, and armored units in combat against the Eritreans. (April 1978)
3. Cuban military personnel should provide heavy advisory and logistic support for the Ethiopian campaign against the Eritreans. Cuba should also perform various combat support missions such as MIG pilots, helicopter pilots, and artillery support. (April 1978)
4. Cuban military personnel should provide only limited advisory and logistic support to the Ethiopian campaign against the Eritreans. This would exclude even indirect combat support such as artillery fire and pilots. (April 1978)
5. Cuba should begin a gradual withdrawal of its combat forces from Ethiopia in order to undercut criticism from moderates in the nonaligned movement and to remove bilateral tensions with the radical Arab nations sympathetic to the Eritreans. (December 1978)
6. Cuba should significantly expand its combat role in Angola to suppress, once and for all, the UNITA guerrillas. This would involve increasing the number of Cuban combat troops by another 10,000 men if necessary. (December 1978)
7. Cuba should make partial troop reductions in Angola and Ethiopia to free some of its troops for use in the struggle to achieve a black nationalist government in Rhodesia. (December 1978)
8. Cuba should provide political support (propaganda) to the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), provide safe haven for FSLN guerrillas in Cuba, and train FSLN guerrillas in Cuba. No other support should be provided in order to avoid provoking a US intervention. (August 1978)
9. Cuba should, in addition to providing the above support, provide limited covert assistance to the FSLN (through third parties) including funds and weapons. (August 1978)
10. Cuba should, in addition to providing the support described in the above two questions, also send a small number of advisers (five to 10) to provide tactical guidance to the FSLN in Nicaragua. (August 1978)
11. Cuba should intervene militarily (combat troops) in Nicaragua if the following scenario occurs: The FSLN is able to seize and occupy a significant portion of territory, including some cities, declare itself the legitimate Government of Nicaragua, obtain recognition from one or two Latin American nations, and request the assistance of Cuban troops. (August 1978)
12. Cuba should attempt to demonstrate greater independence of the USSR on certain foreign policy issues. This should be accomplished by voicing mild criticism of the Soviet positions on Law of the Sea (LOS) matters. For example, the Soviet positions are in conflict with the needs of underdeveloped nations. (December 1978)
13. Cuba should attempt to demonstrate greater independence of the USSR on certain foreign policy matters. In addition to criticizing the Soviet positions on LOS as described above, Cuba should also criticize Moscow's position in the United Nations opposing military budget reductions. (The Soviet position is essentially the same as the US position. Criticism by Cuba could be accomplished without naming Moscow directly, but merely castigating the selfish attitude of the big powers.) (December 1978)

14. Cuba should attempt to demonstrate greater independence from the USSR by making some symbolic purchases of a small number of non-Soviet weapons, such as armored personnel carriers, antitank weapons, and so forth. (December 1978)

15. Cuba should attempt to gain a greater measure of independence from the USSR. This should be accomplished by seeking alternative sources of petroleum from the radical Arab nations and reducing the percentage of trade between Cuba and the USSR/ East Europe. (December 1978)

16. Cuba should temporarily abandon its efforts to improve relations with the United States by announcing that no further gestures will be made until the United States agrees to lift the economic embargo. (December 1978)

17. Cuba should attempt to give new momentum to the process of normalization by releasing one or two US political prisoners. (December 1978)

18. Cuba should continue the process of normalization with the United States. New momentum should be instilled in the process by reducing the level of Cuban rhetoric and diplomatic activity aimed at achieving Puerto Rican independence. (December 1978)

20. Cuba should shift some of its construction resources from investment to consumption, including housing. (December 1978)

21. Cuban peasants should be allowed to market their products in the city in order to raise productivity and reduce shortages. (December 1978)

22. The concept of "cottage industries" (small family businesses) should be liberalized to permit limited sales of their products on an open market. (December 1978)

23. The government should expand the selection and quantity of goods available on the so-called "parallel market" (special government outlets where items are sold outside the rationing system for much higher prices). (December 1978)

24. The government should begin an energetic campaign to force small farmers (who currently own their land) to join cooperative farms in order to increase agricultural efficiency. (December 1978)



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