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# Iran After the Shah

An Intelligence Assessment

**Secret**

RP 78-10289  
August 1978

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## Iran After the Shah

*Central Intelligence Agency  
National Foreign Assessment Center*

*August 1978*

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### *Key Points*

The death of the Shah, whether by assassination or by natural causes, will be traumatic for Iran. This paper considers the persons, institutions, and other factors that will play a role in shaping the new government.

When Crown Prince Reza was born in 1960, the Shah for the first time since he assumed the throne in 1941 could see the likelihood that the Pahlavi dynasty would continue. In 1967 he established a Regency Council and designated Empress Farah as Regent to rule if it should become necessary before Reza is 20 years old. The chances are good that the transition to the new monarch will go as planned. Farah and the Regency Council—or Shah Reza after 1980—will almost certainly be supported by all significant elements of the power structure, including the Army and the Security Service.

Empress Farah will be a key figure in the new regime, whether as Regent or as Queen Mother. Although Farah's personal following is unknown, she seems to have been associated with several men who may favor a more restricted political role for any future monarch. If this is so, Crown Prince Reza as shah will share more power with the politicians than has Shah Mohammad Reza.

The Crown Prince is a normally intelligent and well-adjusted young man. There is no way to judge his leadership potential. No matter how much the Shah attempts to tutor his son on Iran's problems and the difficulties of ruling, the new Shah in the beginning will lack a personal following and be heavily dependent on those who surround him.

A few of the Shah's inner circle are probably too old to play a significant role over the next five years. Some, however, such as Minister of Court Hoveyda and Prime Minister Amuzegar, are likely to remain influential. The top military leaders and any others who are likely to move into important positions in the next few years are loyal to the present Shah and will transfer their allegiance to a new regime without great difficulty.

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The changing structure of Iranian society will have an impact on the eventual policies of a new regime, but popular attitudes are not likely to figure in the succession. A few from all strata of society will see the change of rulers as an opportunity to overthrow the monarchy or reduce it to a figurehead. The regime's ability to control such challenges without reverting to harsh suppression will be an early test of its ability to govern.

Most of the perceptions of the world held by the present Shah will probably be held by his successors. The main difference will probably be a change in style rather than content, but increased concern for social problems and an attempt to deemphasize military expansion are likely to be themes of a new government.

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PREFACE

This is not an assessment of what will happen when the Shah passes from the Iranian scene. It is instead an examination of the persons, institutions, and other factors that will play a role in forming the new regime. The paper assumes that at the Shah's demise there will be no warring groups competing to seize the throne but that those who have power, or hope to have power, will want to see a smooth transition.

The most important—and likely—combination to replace the Shah is Empress Farah, the Crown Prince, and the Regency Council supported by the armed forces and the Iranian Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK). The members of the Shah's inner circle, having no place else to go, will probably also support Farah and the Crown Prince. The major conflicts will occur within this framework, as individuals or groups of individuals maneuver for positions of influence. The extent of competition or cooperation among these elements will have an important bearing on the ability of the new regime to govern over the long run.

Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a "prerevolutionary" situation. There are substantial problems in all phases of Iranian life, but the economy is not stagnant and social mobility is a fact of life. There is dissatisfaction with the Shah's tight control of the political process, but this does not at present threaten the government. Perhaps most important, the military, far from being a hotbed of conspiracies, supports the monarchy. Those who are in opposition, both the violent and the nonviolent, do not have the ability to be more than troublesome in any transition to a new regime.<sup>1</sup>

In the discussion which follows it is assumed that whatever incident eliminates the Shah, whether it is illness, accident, or assassination, only he will be affected. If Crown Prince Reza or Empress Farah were also victims, chaos and the end of the Pahlavi dynasty would be the most likely result.

The time frame of the paper is 1978 to 1982, with the primary focus on the period from the demise of Mohammad Reza up to a year or 18 months later. Beyond this, the competitions and rivalries among those in power or seeking power will become sharper, but what form they will take is not within the scope of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> A more complete exposition of the problems facing Iran in the years ahead is found in *Iran in the 1980s*, PR 77-10124, August 1977, Secret NoforN-Nocontract-Orcon.

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## Iran After the Shah

### Background

The succession of a new Shah to the throne of Iran has in the past been attended by great confusion and uncertainty. This has been so because the succession has usually come about as a result of the assassination or abdication of the previous monarch. There is no precedent in recent Iranian history, however, that enables one to judge how easy or how difficult the transition will be from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Reza Cyrus Pahlavi. The present dynasty dates only from 1925, when Reza, the present Shah's father, was handed the crown by the Iranian Parliament. Reza had come to prominence four years earlier as a Cossack general who led a coup against a corrupt and ineffective government. The Shah of the time, Ahmad Qajar, who had

himself succeeded to the throne at the age of 12 when his father was deposed by the Constitution-  
alists, seemed almost relieved to shed the burden of the monarchy, and he and his 125-year-old dynasty passed quietly into history. Reza Shah ruled only 16 years. He abdicated in 1941 following the invasion of Iran by the British and Russians, who were anxious to secure a safe line of communication for shipment of military supplies to the Soviet Union. Mohammad Reza ascended the throne at the sufferance of the Allies, who had considered abolishing the monarchy.

Until 1960 there were only rudimentary arrangements for the succession. The Constitution states that the oldest son of the Shah is the heir to the throne, but Mohammad Reza had no son




Figure 1. Crown Prince Reza and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

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for the first 19 years of his reign. Although he would appoint an ad hoc regency council whenever he went abroad, he resisted efforts to persuade him to designate one of his half-brothers as Crown Prince. He anticipated, correctly, that to do so would increase the intrigues against him.

With the birth of Reza Cyrus in 1960 and his designation as Crown Prince, succession became less chancy. The prospects for a peaceful transition increased markedly when Empress Farah was named as Regent. At the same time, a regency council was designated to assist her. Finally, in 1974 it was widely reported that the Shah had drawn up a political "will" and had distributed it to trusted individuals. The only suggestion of its contents is the Shah's statement that "in it I underlined the importance of continuing the monarchy as well as the political and military setup envisaged by me."<sup>2</sup> Administratively, then, everything seems to have been done that can be done to ensure a smooth succession to the throne. The Shah's remaining task is to create the economic, social, and political conditions that will enable the administrative arrangements to function as they are designed to.

A basic assumption is made in this paper that all those in a position to be influential will try to make the transition to the new regime work as it is designed to do.

One cannot anticipate how the Shah may pass from the scene. Short of a fatal malady, of which we have no indication, he is not likely to abdicate in favor of his son. Abdication could be a more serious possibility in the late 1980s.

Assassination cannot be completely ruled out. The Royal Family is a prime target. In 1973 a plot to kill or kidnap members of the Royal Family was discovered, and in 1977 Princess Ashraf narrowly missed being killed in France when armed men attacked the car in which she was riding. Although the Shah is surrounded by tight security, he barely escaped death or serious injury in 1965 when a member of his guard force

<sup>2</sup> R. K. Karanjia, *The Mind of a Monarch*, London: 1977 p. 263, whether the "will" is merely a hortatory statement or an action document only time will tell.

shot up his office.<sup>3</sup> One of the civilians who was also implicated was sentenced to three years in prison. He was later involved in the 1973 plot.

One thing can be said with some certainty: even should the Shah die of natural causes, there will be a widespread belief that he has been assassinated.<sup>4</sup> What impact this perception would have on the ability of a successor government to establish itself cannot be measured.

Personalities play a more important role in Iranian society and government than do institutions. An individual's influence may be great, even though his official job is minor; conversely, a job that may seem to be influential may give the holder little real power.

No one on the scene today shows any potential for exerting the kind of power the Shah has attained.<sup>5</sup> The Shah recognizes this and has tried to create structures that will endure and substitute for his one-man rule. He probably anticipates that Reza Cyrus will have neither the time nor the opportunity to establish an overwhelming power position and that therefore institutional stability is the best guarantee of the continuation of the monarchy and his dynasty. When Mohammad Reza is no longer on the throne, a variety of individuals and groups will compete for power in the new regime.

The following discussion examines in detail some of the actors, both persons and institutions, that will play a role in the new regime. A note of warning. Although we are looking only toward the next five years, some of those in the running today might have left the scene before the five years are finished. Only a year ago two men would by all estimates have played an important role in the succession. Both former National Iranian Oil Company Chairman Manuchehr Eqbal and former Minister of Court Assadollah Alam have

<sup>3</sup> Primary responsibility for security rests with the Royal Guard, which also provides security during foreign travel of members of the Royal Family.

<sup>4</sup> The death in 1973 of the Shah's brother-in-law in a hang glider accident has now in some circles been transmogrified into a bombing by dissidents of an airplane in which he was riding.

<sup>5</sup> It was only after Mohammad Reza had been on the throne for 20 years that he began to acquire the power that he now has.



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died. Both derived their influence from their personal relationship with the Shah, which, in the case of Alam, went back 40 years. Their successors, Hushang Ansary as NIOC Chairman and Amir Abbas Hoveyda as Minister of Court, do not seem to have the same close relationship to the Shah, and their ability to act as middlemen for him with other elements of the Iranian social and political structure may be more limited.

When there is reason to suspect that any individual discussed in the following pages may not stay the course, this will be so indicated.

In the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Shah there will be a strong tendency by all those in positions of power to hang together in order to ensure a smooth transition. This will be more from a desire to protect the privileged position they have attained than from a principled support for the Pahlavi dynasty.<sup>6</sup>

#### **Empress Farah**

Farah will clearly be a key figure in the transition to a new monarch, whether as Regent or as Queen Mother.

She is 19 years younger than the Shah and appears to take a more liberal view of political activity than that of the Shah. There may have been some friction in the past between the Shah and Farah over her relatively relaxed view of dissent, but there has been no permanent rift.<sup>7</sup> Farah probably plays little if any part in the major issues that occupy the Shah—military and foreign affairs and economics. She has, however,

<sup>6</sup> If this seems excessively cynical, it can, I think, be supported. The monarchy has been a constant feature throughout Persian history and has been accepted by the majority for centuries. Individual monarchs or dynasties have not, however, been immune from challenge and have frequently been replaced when they became incapable of ruling. The elite have never had any difficulty in transferring allegiance and thus maintaining their positions, and support for the legitimate succession would be less immediately threatening to them than a completely new situation.

<sup>7</sup> It was once reported that three of those arrested in the 1973 plot against the Royal Family had been recommended for employment in Iranian television by Farah. It may be worth recording that Reza Qotbi, a relative of Farah, is Director of the Iranian National Radio and Television (NIRT) organization, and his wife is an employee there. Princess Sarvenaz, the Shah's niece, also works at NIRT.



Figure 2. Empress Farah Pahlavi

made official visits by herself to both the Soviet Union and China, giving her some exposure and experience independently of the Shah.

Farah has been frank about what she considers her limited ability to influence the Shah:

I try to talk to him, not as a queen talking to the king, but as a wife talks to her husband. Sometimes, though, I care so much about something, I get so excited that I can't breathe. But I have to be careful because if I'm not and I start raising my voice he will think I am blaming him for what's wrong and he'll get angry. So I try to be logical and cool instead of nagging. And sometimes I try to do it through ministers; try to talk to him through them. . . . I don't want to trouble him with my problems during the day, so the only time I can talk to him is at lunch or in bed and

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that's the worst time to talk about your problems. Once in a while I have him alone for five or 10 minutes in the car. But generally I write to him. If I talk to him he forgets. So I write little notes to him and send them to the office so he will read it with the rest of his papers.\*

She may be selling herself short. Farah has staked out women's affairs, health, and philanthropy as her areas of influence. She now appoints the Ministers of Health and of Women's Affairs. She is also interested in student-faculty relations and the honesty of government officials. The 17th point of the Shah's revolution, declaration of assets by government officials, may be attributable to her influence.

Farah is in good health and seems sure of her position and of herself. A recent observer commented that she speaks with more assertiveness than she did two years ago and demonstrates the will and toughness to rule if she should have to. She can be expected to play an active part in any new government, whether as Regent or as Queen Mother. Her effectiveness will depend, in part, on the network of personal support she has built up, and on this point there is practically no information. She has been associated with Minister of Court Hoveyda; Nosratollah Mo'inian, Chief of the Shah's Special Office; and Parviz Sabeti, Chief of Department 3 (Internal Security) of SAVAK. All of these men are reported to favor a monarchy with reduced pow-

ers. Farah would probably also be supported by the government's major propaganda agency through Reza Qotbi, who manages the National Iranian Radio and Television organization (NIRT.)

Farah would probably have popular appeal, but whether this could be translated into support for her as a regent is a question. In a similar context 20 years ago there was a semi-public discussion of whether Princess Shahnaz, the Shah's first daughter, would be acceptable as queen should the Shah designate her as his successor. The US Embassy commented:

It is evident that almost all Iranians would be reluctant to have a reigning queen. The Shia clergy is reported to be particularly opposed to this suggestion since they feel strongly that a woman ruler would be contrary to Islamic teaching and tradition. Even Western-educated Iranians tend to be conservative on this point; they point out that since no woman would be strong enough to impose her will, the monarch would soon become a puppet for other forces.<sup>9</sup>

Today educated public opinion would probably be willing to support Farah, especially as she would be only a regent and for a brief time. Religious and conservative opinion has probably not changed. Farah, however, exerting her influence behind the scenes as Queen Mother, would be well understood, even though the quality and type of her influence might be disputed.

*Minister of Court Hoveyda* is well known from his long tenure as Prime Minister—nearly 13 years. He was not close to the Shah until—as Minister of Finance—he was appointed Prime Minister to succeed his friend Hassan Ali Mansur who was assassinated by a religious fanatic in 1965. Two qualities apparently recommended him to the Shah: he had a reputation as an administrator of integrity, and he was number-two man in the group of Western-educated technocrats whom the Shah was count-

\* US Embassy, Tehran, Despatch 422, 21 November 1956 (C).

#### Empress Farah Career Highlights

1938	Born in Tehran
1944-56	Attended Jeanne d'Arc Primary School and Razi (French Alliance) Secondary School, Tehran
1957-59	Studied architecture in Paris
21 December 1959	Married the Shah
31 October 1960	Crown Prince Cyrus born
1967	Designated Regent
1967	Formal Coronation of Shah and Empress Farah
1970	Visit to USSR
1972	Visit to China

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Figure 3. Minister of Court Amir Abbas Hoveyda

ing on to carry out his ambitious "White Revolution."

Hoveyda turned out to be the right man for the job. A description of Hoveyda's administration by the US Embassy encapsulates his strengths and weaknesses:

Mr. Hoveyda is seen as the best example of what it takes to survive in contemporary Iranian politics. He is a manipulator of the system, finely attuned to the political realities of Iran and, most importantly, knows his position in relation to the Shah—a low-profile administrator with no overt pretensions of aggrandizing his power.<sup>10</sup>

During most of his premiership he was de facto leader of the Iran Novin Party, which dominated the government. Although Hoveyda never posed a threat to the Shah's supremacy, his extensive party organization provided him a network of supporters and influence that might, at

<sup>10</sup> Tehran, A-56, 22 February 1971 (S/NOFORN).

### Amir Abbas Hoveyda

Minister of Court

Career Highlights

1918.....	Born in Tehran
1936-42 .....	Educated in Damascus and Beirut; higher education in London, Brussels, and Paris
1942.....	Joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1942-51 .....	Served in Paris, Stuttgart, Washington D.C.
1951-58 .....	Served in various posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran and UN bodies
1958.....	Special assistant to chairman of National Iranian Oil Company
1960.....	Appointed to Board of Directors, National Iranian Oil Company
1959-64 .....	Associated with Hassan Ali Mansur in the Progressive Center and Iran Novin Party
1964.....	Minister of Finance in Mansur's Cabinet
1965.....	Appointed Prime Minister after assassination of Mansur
1977.....	Appointed Minister of Court

some point, have given him an independent position. In January 1975 at the party's biggest convention in history, Hoveyda was named Secretary General of the party. This was the first time in 10 years that the prime ministry and the top political post were held by the same man. Two months later the Shah pulled the rug out from under the party and the Prime Minister by peremptorily dissolving the Iran Novin and forming a new Rastakhiz Party.

Undaunted, Hoveyda with the aplomb that had become his trademark, announced that he had joined the Rastakhiz Party, and the next month at a massive Party Congress he was named its Secretary General. His previous influence was diluted, however, because now he was sharing power with other high-ranking party officials who owed him no personal loyalty.

Hoveyda's power position was further diminished when he was replaced as Secretary General by Minister of the Interior Amuzegar, a political rival, at the second Party Congress in November 1976. Finally, in August of 1977, the Shah appointed Jamshid Amuzegar as Prime Minister

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and moved Hoveyda to the post of Minister of Court.

There is no single reason for Hoveyda's replacement. The Shah's interest in reducing his independent political power was probably one factor; in addition, a series of economic problems made it convenient to replace a government that had not been able to solve them, and finally the Shah may have decided that a new government was needed to bring to fruition the Shah's programs which Hoveyda's government had commenced.

Hoveyda did not, obviously, fall into disgrace. As Minister of Court he is still in an influential position, but his influence grows directly out of his relationship with the Shah and depends on the tasks the Shah entrusts to him. Meanwhile, he is a useful counterweight to Prime Minister Amuzegar in the Shah's balancing act.

Hoveyda would seem to have an inside track with Empress Farah that could stand him in good stead during a transition to a new government. His extensive experience in both administration and politics would make him a useful ally in supporting the new government.

*Parviz Sabeti* and Hoveyda have a longstanding relationship going back to the time when both were involved in the Youth Center. At that time Hoveyda gave financial help to Sabeti, who was a law student. An additional bond might be Bahai membership. Hoveyda is almost certainly a Bahai, and Sabeti has been reported to be a member of that religion."

Sabeti appears to have the confidence of the Shah, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He also is said to maintain relations with a large number of Army officers and politicians, although details of these contacts are not on the record.

" Membership in the Bahai religion is difficult to determine. A few Bahais are well known, but because of persecution by conservative Shias the group maintains a compartmented organization and considerable secrecy.



Figure 4. Parviz Sabeti, Director of Department 3 (Internal Security), SAVAK

**Parviz Sabeti**  
Chief of Department 3, SAVAK  
Career Highlights

1933	Born in Semnan
1965-66	Chief, Communist Party Operations, Department 3, SAVAK
1966	Chief, Opposition Activities, Department 3, SAVAK
1969	Chief, Iranian Student Affairs, Department 3, SAVAK
1969	Chief of Operations, Department 3, SAVAK
1971	Deputy Director, Department 3, SAVAK
1973	Director, Department 3, SAVAK

One of Sabeti's more curious relationships is with Parviz Nikkhah, Director of Programs and Research for NIRT. Nikkhah, who was once a member of the Tudeh Party, was arrested in

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1965 for complicity in the attempt on the Shah's life. He was released in 1970 after he publicly recanted his Communist activities but was absolved of any responsibility for the actual shooting. During his imprisonment, SAVAK had exerted considerable pressure on Nikkhah to renounce his Communist views and affiliation. Five years later he appeared as a government official, close to Iran's chief Communist-hunter and reportedly, the ideologue of the Shah's Rastakhiz Party. In this case the wages of sin was a promotion.<sup>13</sup> Nikkhah's superior as manager of NIRT is Reza Qotbi, a relative of Queen Farah.

*Nosratollah Moinian* holds a sensitive position as chief of the Shah's personal secretariat, a post he has held since 1966. He works long hours and has little private social life. He established his position as a supporter of the Shah when as a newspaperman he supported the Shah against former Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953. He further commended himself to the Shah by personally supervising the Shah's anti-Communist campaign in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He served as a cabinet minister in 1963-64.

Practically nothing is known of his relatives, friends, or enemies. Former Minister of Court Assadollah Alam is said to have recommended him to the Shah for his present job, but the monarch and Moinian were certainly acquainted before then. Moinian is a possible candidate for Prime Minister should Amuzegar falter.

If Hoveyda, Sabeti, and Moinian are on her team, Farah will have a core of experienced men to draw on in support of the regency or the new Shah.

Much, however, remains unclear. The precise relationship between Farah and these three, what bonds they have in common aside from their



Figure 5. Nosratollah Moinian, Chief of the Shah's Secretariat

#### **Nosratollah Moinian**

##### **Chief of the Shah's Secretariat**

##### **Career Highlights**

1922.....	Born in Isfahan
1932-38(?) .....	Razi (French Alliance) Secondary School, Tehran
1944.....	Graduated from Tehran University Law School
1945-48 .....	Employee of Iranian State Railway Newspaper writer
1953.....	Assistant to Director of Publication and Broadcasting
1956.....	Director General, Publication and Radio
1958.....	Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Publication and Radio
1963.....	Minister of Roads
1963.....	Minister of Information
1964-65 .....	Ill
1966.....	Chief of Shah's Secretariat

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supposed predilection for a less imperial shah, and the extent to which each has a personal following are all obscure points but ones that are important in predicting their precise role in a new government.

### The Crown Prince

Reza Cyrus will be little more than a figure-head should he ascend the throne in the next five years. Little is known about Reza, but recent firsthand observations suggest that he is a confident, well-adjusted young man. His relationship with his parents seems to be normal. One report suggests that he is closer to his mother than to his father. Crown Prince Reza has been educated in a private school organized specifically for that purpose. His classmates are said to be children of high-ranking military and civilian officials, but their identities are not known.<sup>14</sup> The Crown Prince is receiving flight training in the United States.

Crown Prince Reza Cyrus will be of age to assume the throne in October 1980 when he is 20 years old. Until that time Empress Farah as Regent and a Regency Council would act for him. The Regency Council will be composed of the Prime Minister, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the Majlis, the Chief Justice, and four persons to be selected by the Regent. The current holders of those positions are:

Prime Minister ..... Jamshid Amuzegar  
Senate President ..... Ja'afar Sharif-Emami

Majlis Speaker ..... Abdollah Riazi  
Chief Justice ..... Nasser Yeganeh  
(Undesignated) ..... 4 individuals

The particular individuals now holding these positions will, of course, not necessarily still be there in 1980. They might or might not be influential in their own right, but representation of the major organs of government decreases the chance of bureaucratic opposition during the transition process.

One must assume that the Shah plays a role in his son's education. It seems likely, for example, that the Shah provides some on-the-job training for Reza Cyrus. Mohammad Reza records that his father, Reza Shah, used to discuss his plans, policies, and philosophy with him. The Shah would be following in his father's footsteps if he were to do the same thing. In addition, it seems unlikely that with his concern for Iran's future, the Shah would neglect to tutor carefully his chosen successor.<sup>15</sup>

Although Riazi and Sharif-Emami are both close to the Shah, both are over 70 years old and might drop from the picture at any time. Both could also theoretically fail to be reelected in 1979, but this is unlikely as long as the Shah still supports them. Sharif-Emami, in addition to his parliamentary position, has a personal following built up over the years which he can call on to back the monarchy, and he is also director of the Pahlavi Foundation, which has large investments in hotels and real estate among other things.

The prime ministership is the most important post on the Regency Council and if the Hoveyda example holds for the future, Jamshid Amuzegar will have a long tenure and may be the prime minister who presides over the transition.<sup>16</sup> After two decades of government service, Amuzegar has emerged as Iran's most important political figure aside from the Shah. He has, however, probably no significant following yet, deriving his power from the Shah. Amuzegar was in the

<sup>14</sup> No solid information is available on this point, and it is not possible even to say that the Shah spends X hours a week talking to his son. The Shah has said, "So far I have never tried to impress anything on my son. I have wanted him to grow up completely free and without my influence." *The Mind of a Monarch*, R. K. Karanjia, London: 1977, p. 196. He did go on to say, in answer to the statement that close association of the Shah and his son would enable the latter to gain expertise in the way the Shah handled problems, "This he will undoubtedly get, but ultimately the choice will be his."

<sup>16</sup> There will be frequent rumors of Amuzegar's imminent replacement, as there were for years concerning Hoveyda. Such a replacement would seem likely, however, only if the Shah is considering a major political change or suffers a substantial political defeat.

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Cabinet as early as 1958 and has held one post or another since 1965, the only man with that kind of continuity except for the Shah's brother-in-law.

Although Amuzegar has long been a favorite of the Shah, he got his start in a familiar manner. In 1955 at age 32 he was appointed an undersecretary in the Ministry of Health, primarily because his father was an influential senator whose backing the Ministry of Health needed in order to achieve its legislative goals.<sup>17</sup> He served subsequently as Minister of Labor and Minister of Agriculture. During his tenure in Agriculture he was entrusted by the Shah with the job of carrying out one of the earlier versions of land redistribution. Amuzegar was dropped from this post, apparently because he had lost so much personal support by his obvious ambition and his abrasive temperament that the Shah felt he could no longer be effective.<sup>18</sup> Amuzegar spent the next four years in private business and on the Economic Committee of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). He returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Health when Hassan Ali Mansur, a colleague in an earlier Cabinet, became Prime Minister, and has remained in the Cabinet ever since.

Amuzegar has stayed out of Iran Novin Party politics,<sup>19</sup> but he nevertheless came to be seen as a competitor not only of Prime Minister Hoveyda but also of Hushang Ansary, another ambitious Cabinet minister whose areas of interest—economics and oil—overlapped those of Amuzegar.

When the Shah formed the Rastakhiz Party, Amuzegar was required to join and became in succession the Chairman of the Executive Board, the leader of the Progressive Wing and then, as Prime Minister, Secretary General of the party.

<sup>17</sup> Another undersecretary was appointed at the same time whose father was speaker of the Majlis.

<sup>18</sup> In addition, Amuzegar had a reputation for being pro-US and was regarded by many veteran politicians as a young upstart. Land reform was regarded by many politically minded Iranians, including those in Parliament, as an American program, and the Shah may have felt that Amuzegar's removal would facilitate parliamentary support. It did not.

<sup>19</sup> Amuzegar had been on the Central Committee of the Meliyum (Nationalist) Party, one of the two parties the Shah encouraged between 1957 and 1961.




Figure 6. Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar

#### Jamshid Amuzegar

##### Prime Minister

##### Career Highlights

1923.....	Born in Tehran
1941-42 .....	Attended the University of Tehran
1943.....	To US for education
1951.....	Ph.D. in hydraulic engineering, Cornell
1951.....	Worked for Point IV in Iran
1955.....	Undersecretary, Ministry of Health
1958.....	Minister of Labor
1959.....	Minister of Agriculture
1960-64 .....	Private life
1964.....	Minister of Health
1965.....	Minister of Finance
1974.....	Minister of Interior
1976.....	Elected Secretary General of Rastakhiz Party
1977.....	Prime Minister

So, Jamshid Amuzegar has come up through the ranks of the bureaucracy, establishing a firm link with the monarchy and collecting his share of supporters and opponents. If he is still Prime Minister when the regime changes, he will

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almost certainly continue to support the monarchy. What relationship, if any, he has to the Crown Prince or Empress Farah is unknown. If he does not have or cannot establish a relationship, he may well be outflanked by those, such as Hoveyda, who are closer to the new centers of power.

The key roles in the Regency Council might well be the four persons to be chosen by the Regent.<sup>20</sup> In these appointments Farah would have the chance to put her stamp on the regime and ensure the positions to those in whom she has complete trust. It is difficult to identify prospective appointees, but they will probably hold other high-ranking positions, such as the Chief of Staff and/or the chief of SAVAK.<sup>21</sup>

#### The Military Establishment

The military—more specifically the Army—will play an important role in the transition. The military leadership would almost certainly support the legitimate succession, at least in the short term. In the subsequent jockeying for power and influence, the military might perceive threats to its favored position—such as a sharp slash in the military budget—that would persuade it to seek a dominant role. Under some conditions a handful of military leaders (or even one) could dominate the whole government.

Political generals have been prominent in Iranian politics for nearly 60 years. Reza Shah was the political general *par excellence*. He parlayed his post of commander of Iran's only organized military force—the Iranian Cossack Division—into the position of Minister of War, Prime Minister, and finally Shah. During the 20 years

<sup>20</sup> There is a possibility that if the Shah stepped down as a result of injury or a long illness, he might have the chance to name these four persons himself.

<sup>21</sup> Might it be too speculative to consider the appointment of a woman? Such an appointment could signal the new regime's dedication to the former Shah's goals and a continuation of the modernization of Iranian society, but it would certainly arouse the opposition of the religious and more conservative groups. Possibilities here might be Farah's longtime friend and schoolmate Lili Arjomand, Director of the Center for Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults and a member of the Rastakhiz Executive Committee; Minister of State for Women's Affairs Mahnaz Afkhami and a member of the party's Political Bureau; and Ambassador Mehrangiz Dowlatabadi.

of Reza Shah's predominance, 16 of them as Shah, his generals established themselves among the elite, attaining wealth and position.<sup>22</sup> None of them, however, challenged Reza Shah's political position, although some had political interests. During World War II several generals were involved in German-sponsored clandestine political activity; one—Fazlollah Zahedi—later became Prime Minister.

With the disappearance of Reza Shah and the emergence of Mohammad Reza as the new monarch, politically ambitious generals came into their own. The new Shah was seen as inexperienced and indecisive, and military officers were prominent among those who moved to fill in the gap. For the next two decades several of these generals had to be taken into account in any political assessment. Mohammad Reza has been able to eliminate the generals with political ambitions, but it is likely that if a new regime is unable to function because of rivalries, conflicting loyalties, and indecision, some officer will step forward to provide leadership. Indeed, if this follows a prolonged period of economic, political, and social turmoil, military intervention might be popular.

There appears to be considerable unhappiness in the officer corps below the general officer rank because of the nepotism, favoritism, and corruption that plays—as it always has—a key role in promotions and assignments and because of a perception of less pay and fewer opportunities for advancement than civilian counterparts receive. This dissatisfaction has not as yet translated into any anti-Shah feeling. Rather, the blame is placed on civilian ministers and old established general officers.

One informed opinion holds that a portion of the officer corps—perhaps 25 percent—does not believe that Crown Prince Reza will have the ability to replace his father. They would weigh their choices carefully. These officers chose the military because of chances for personal advancement and will remain loyal as long as their interests and those of the monarchy coincide.

<sup>22</sup> Some of them, however, were from the previous elite, for example, the Jahanbanis.



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They would probably be most comfortable with the emergence of a strong military figure who could ensure the ascendancy of the military over the civilian sector.

Ground force officers would be the most influential. The Navy and Air Force officers would probably be less important.<sup>23</sup> Those military units in and around Tehran would be the most important because to them will fall the task of providing security during the transition. Some Air Force officers might play a role but probably for their individual qualities rather than for the troops they control.

The Iranian ground forces number about 280,000, most of them enlisted conscriptees. Seventy-five percent of the officers are professionals, the other 25 percent are conscripts serving for two years. Among the noncommissioned officers, 85 percent are professionals. The attitudes of the common soldier will be important only if the Army is called on to control or suppress popular demonstrations. Over the years Iranian officers have occasionally expressed concern that their troops might under some circumstances balk if required to fire on civilians. There is no independent evidence to suggest that this might be the case, and discipline has not been a problem. The rank and file, however, have not been tried in an extreme case and the officers' attitudes may reflect a prudent caution. In case of widespread opposition to a new regime from conservative, religious elements, the reliability of the troops might be even more in question since most of the conscripts come from exactly that milieu. It seems likely, then, that in a showdown a new government would prefer to depend mostly on elite units such as the Imperial Guard, Special Forces, and commandos.

Within the military, only the higher ranking officers exert significant political influence. They are the ones who have had the time and position to gain the experience and to make the

<sup>23</sup> Prince Shafiq, a nephew of the Shah, is a Navy commander and probably a future chief of the Iranian Navy. His influence, if any, would derive from his membership in the Royal Family rather than his post in the Navy.

#### Chiefs of Key Iranian Military Positions

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Supreme Commander's	
Staff .....	General Gholam Reza Azhari
Imperial Guard .....	Lt. General Abad Ali Badreh-Lorestani
Imperial Guard Brigade .....	Major General Ali Neshat
Imperial Guard Division .....	Major General Mohammad Amin Beglari

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contacts—and the enemies—which will affect their conduct toward a new regime.

The chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff (SCS) is a position of potential power, but the actual power depends on the incumbent. This staff assists the Shah—the Supreme Commander—in the overall direction of the armed forces, but the Shah maintains direct personal contact with the commanders of the individual services. The post obviously calls for a man completely loyal to the Shah and therefore, presumably, to the Pahlavi dynasty. It also requires a man with professional ambition but without personal ambition. The two predecessors of the present chief were removed after policy differences with the Shah. The Shah may also have come to distrust one of them, General Feridun Jam, a former brother-in-law of the Shah, because of the general's personal popularity in the armed forces.

The current chief of the SCS is General Gholam Reza Azhari, the fourth to hold this post in 17 years, and has held it longer than any of the others—since 1971.<sup>24</sup>

Azhari's successor, then, will probably be the one to take account of. Three generals are likely candidates for the post:

- Gholam Ali Oveisi—Commander, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF)
- Hushang Hatam—Deputy for Coordination, Supreme Commander's Staff (SCS)
- Abbas Karim Gharabaghi—Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie

All three are well-trained, competent officers. They have had some military training in the

<sup>24</sup> A recent report that Azhari is being replaced by General Gholam Ali Oveisi is at present unconfirmed.

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Figure 7. Gholam Reza Azhari, Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff

**General Gholam Reza Azhari**  
Commander, Supreme Commander's Staff  
Career Highlights

1917	Born in Shiraz
1935	Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant
1958	Commander, 11th Infantry Division
1960	Commander, Military Academy
1964	Commander, First Army
1967	Iranian military representative, CENTO
1969	Acting Commander, Supreme Commander's Staff
1971	Commander, Supreme Commander's Staff and promoted to full General

United States and have good reputations in the military.

Gholam Ali Oveisi has been Commander of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces since 1972, the longest time in office of anyone in this post for 17 years. He is deemed to be completely loyal to the Shah. He was a classmate of the Shah at the military academy graduating in 1938. It is

**General Gholam Ali Oveisi**  
Commander, Ground Forces  
Career Highlights

1918	Born in Qom
1936	Graduated from Military High School
1938	Graduated from Military College
1938-55	Various troop commands
1954	Member of Special Court trying Communist officers
1955	Chief of Staff, Imperial Guard Division
1958	Promoted to Brigadier General and attended Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
1960	Commander, Imperial Guard Division
1965	Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie
1972	Commander, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces



Figure 8. General Gholam Ali Oveisi, Commander, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces

probably more than a coincidence that Oveisi's two sons are named Mohammad Reza and Ali Reza.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Ali Reza was the Shah's only full brother and for many years was the likely successor to the Shah although never officially recognized as such. He was killed in an airplane accident in 1954.

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Oveisi apparently became a protege of General Nematollah Nassiri when the latter was Commander of the Imperial Guard.<sup>26</sup> Oveisi was appointed Chief of Staff of the Imperial Guard Division in 1955 and, when Nassiri was moved to another post in 1960, Oveisi became Commander of the Imperial Guard Division, a post he held until 1965.

Several years later Nassiri and Oveisi were professional rivals, the former as chief of SAVAK, the latter as Commander of the Gendarmerie.<sup>27</sup> There is nothing to indicate that this has led to any long-lasting personal animosity, and for a number of years the two have been in posts that do not put them into competition. By working together rather than in competition Oveisi and Nassiri could help ensure a smooth transition of the monarchy.

Lt. General Hushang Hatam, now 59 years old, appears to be a good candidate. The Shah is

<sup>26</sup> DOD IIR 2846053964, 21 July 1964, C/NFD.



Figure 9. General Hushang Hatam, Deputy for Coordination on Supreme Commander's Staff

#### **Lt. General Hushang Hatam**

Deputy for Coordination, Supreme Commander's Staff

##### **Career Highlights**

1919.....	Born in Rasht
1936.....	Secondary school, Bandar Pahlavi
1939.....	BS from Tehran University
1941.....	Graduated from Military College
1942-57 .....	Various posts at the Military College and training courses in US and Germany
1959.....	Graduated from Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
1964.....	Promoted to Brigadier
1966.....	Commanding General 1st Guards Division, Artillery
1966-69 .....	Commandant Artillery and Rocket Center, Isfahan
1972-74 .....	Commanding General II Corps
1975.....	Deputy for Coordination, Supreme Commander's Staff

said to have been grooming him for a dozen years for eventual appointment to the post of chief, SCS. This is apparently well known to many officers. Whether Hatam's reported distant relationship to the Royal Family has influenced the Shah's plans for Hatam cannot be judged. The Shah certainly knows his officer corps well, but the long-range planning suggested by this story seems unusual.

Hatam is an artillery officer who graduated from the military college in 1941, the same year the Shah ascended the throne. He is unmarried, has little social life, and is not well known outside the military. General Hatam is responsible for monitoring and coordinating several of the key programs which the Shah considers very sensitive, Long Range Resource Management, Civil Defense, and National Command and Control.

General Abbas Karim Qarabaghi, like Oveisi, was a classmate of the Shah at the military college. He has been close to the Shah ever since and, like other Army officers who have risen to high rank, has served in the Imperial Guard. He has a reputation as an officer who likes and knows how to use power. He maintains good relations with both military and civilian officials and was one of the few military men who remained on good terms with Hoveyda when the

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Figure 10. Abbas Karim Qarabaghi, Commander of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie

**General Abbas Karim Qarabaghi**  
Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie  
Career Highlights

1918.....	Born in Rezaiyeh, Azerbaijan
1939.....	Graduated from Military College, Ph.D. in law, Paris; Imperial Guard Division
1965.....	Commanding General 1st Guard Division
1969.....	Chief of Staff, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces
1972.....	Deputy Commanding General, Imperi- al Iranian Ground Forces
1974.....	Commander, Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie

latter was Prime Minister. If this relationship holds up, Qarabaghi, as chief of the SCS and Hoveyda as Minister of Court, with his following, could be a strong force for stability, as well as a power center in a new government.

Little is known of the Imperial Guard commanders. We do not even know their birth dates, although all must be in their 50s. Badreh-Lorestani appears to have spent most of his career in the Imperial Guards, and General Beglari may be related to one or more of the other Beglaris—Army and Navy—who have attained flag rank.<sup>28</sup> The family appears to be originally from Kermanshah. Nothing more can be said about General Neshat.

In view of the paucity of information on these key commanders, it is prudent to anticipate that the military might provide major surprises in the succession process. <sup>25X1C</sup>


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### The Royal Family

Members of the Royal Family have played only a limited political role in Iran since the 1950s. The one exception is the Shah's twin sister, Ashraf, who is a strong personality and has been a rival of each of the Shah's three wives. If the Shah disappears within the next five years, Ashraf would probably make a strong bid for an influential position behind the scenes. She certainly could count on little popular support, but she probably has extensive contacts among politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen. She could probably mobilize these to support whatever faction she favored, but the extent of her current network of supporters is unknown. So little is known of the relationships among the members of the Royal Family that it is impossible to judge if she would have support from any

of the Shah's half-brothers or whether it would make any difference if she did.

The other members of the Royal Family have served the Shah mostly in protocol and ceremonial functions. They have not had, and in the last 25 years have not sought, any political role. Next to nothing is known of their friends or associates, but it is unlikely that any of them have a personal following that could have an impact on the transition. Prince Gholam Reza, who is a half-brother of the Shah, is a general occupying a mostly ceremonial post and is said to have a personal following of sports-minded youth and junior officers who share his interests. This does not seem translatable into any kind of political influence. Prince Abdor Reza, another half-brother, is said to be particularly respected among young Iranians for his high personal ethics and honesty, which is in marked contrast to other members of his family. He is also respected for making a life of his own and insisting on keeping it separate from the intrigues of the royal court.<sup>29</sup> In the 1950s and early 1960s Abdor Reza flirted with the nationalists and was the one member of the Royal Family most acceptable to the National Front. Those nationalists who saw some role for the monarchy on the Iranian scene toyed with the idea of deposing Mohammad Reza and putting Abdor Reza on the throne. Prince Abdor Reza and Princess Ashraf have clashed in the past, and Abdor Reza probably would support Farah within the family not only to frustrate his half-sister but also to try to influence the new government to go in a more liberal direction. His views would probably carry little weight, however, except within the family councils.<sup>30</sup>

The second generation of the Royal Family—the nephews and nieces of the Shah—can be ruled out as significant factors, although one or two might be willing to attempt a spoilers role.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Tehran, A-56, 22 February 1971 (S/NOFORN).

<sup>30</sup> Tehran, A-33, 27 February 1975, The Iranian Imperial Family (C).

<sup>31</sup> Princess Sarvenaz, daughter of Abdor Reza, has expressed intense dislike of the Shah, and Prince Ali Patrick, son of the late Prince Ali Reza and Christine Cholewsky, was at one time involved with a dissident group. The Shah had once considered naming Ali Patrick as Crown Prince.

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The best of the lot seems to be Navy Captain Shahryar Shafiq. He is the son of Princess Ashraf and her former husband, the late Ahmad Shafiq. Captain Shafiq has been described as intelligent, dynamic, confident, and dedicated, with widespread influence in the Navy. He has been considered as a future Chief of Naval Operations. There is no reason to believe that he is interested in any career outside the Navy, but if he is assessed correctly, he could be an influential figure within the family and perhaps in public in any conflict over the succession.

At least two other personalities need to be considered in looking at those who will be actors in a new regime. They are Ardeshir Zahedi, at present Iranian Ambassador in the United States, and Hushang Ansary, director of the National Iranian Oil Company.

Ardeshir Zahedi is the son of the late General Fazlollah Zahedi who, in 1953, led the promonarchist move that ousted Prime Minister Mossadeq. Ardeshir acted as a go-between for his father and the Shah and has been close to the monarch ever since. Even after Fazlollah lost

favor with the Shah and resigned, spending the rest of his life in Europe, Ardeshir remained in the good graces of the throne and only a year after his father's removal became engaged to the Shah's 16-year-old daughter Shahnaz.<sup>32</sup>

In the last two decades Ardeshir has served the Shah in several high-ranking positions. As Ambassador to the United States from 1960 to 1962 he performed in a mediocre manner, and the Shah's expectation that Zahedi would provide a better image for the Shah's regime was not realized. He did not lose favor with the Shah, however, and was appointed Ambassador in London. On returning from London he served as Foreign Minister for five years. The Shah removed him from this job in 1971 after he had clashed with Prime Minister Hoveyda, and, presumably more mature and experienced, he returned to Washington. Since his arrival in the United States in April 1973 he has acquired a reputation as a genial host and party goer, and among his colleagues at the Embassy he is seen as a hard worker and a strict taskmaster.

Zahedi has ambitions, a fact the Shah undoubtedly realizes. Possibly, even, the Shah has decided to keep Zahedi abroad until such a time as he feels he can use him in the perpetual balancing that the Shah must carry on among ambitious underlings. Zahedi has expected on

<sup>32</sup> They were married in 1957 and divorced in 1964.



Figure 13. Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Ambassador to the United States

**Ardeshir Zahedi**  
Ambassador to the United States  
Career Highlights

1927	Born in Tehran
1932-42	Education in Iran
1942-45	Attended American University of Beirut
1950	Graduated from Utah State University
1951-52	Employee of United States Operations Mission (Point IV) in Iran
1953	Participated in overthrow of Mossadeq
1957	Married Princess Shahnaz; divorced in 1964
1960-62	Ambassador to US
1962-66	Ambassador to the UK
1967-72	Minister of Foreign Affairs
1972	Appointed Ambassador to the United States

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several different occasions that he was about to return to Iran as Prime Minister or as Minister of Court. He has said that in 1960 he was offered a choice of the US post or of the Ministry of Court.

Aside from the feud with Hoveyda, which apparently has been patched up in recent months, Zahedi has major competitors in Prime Minister Amuzegar and NIOC Chairman Hushang Ansary. He has also been on the outs with Princess Ashraf, a factor that might complicate Zahedi's attempts to win support of the Royal Family.

Zahedi will probably be returning to Iran within the next year. His next post should give some clue as to his future position and influence. If, as one report says, he becomes Minister of Court and Hoveyda comes to the United States as Ambassador, Zahedi will be in a position to build up a solid body of supporters, something that his long absence from Iran has probably prevented him from doing. He appears to be close to—or trying to get close to—Moinian. If this becomes a close relationship, it might be possible to throw Zahedi into the small group associated with Farah who favors a diminished royal authority.

Hushang Ansary must have been disappointed when his rival in the Rastakhiz Party, Jamshid Amuzegar, became Prime Minister. Ansary had been considered a strong candidate for the post, and when the Shah transferred him from his post as Minister of Economics and Finance to the chairmanship of the National Iranian Oil Company, most observers concluded that he had, at least temporarily, been relegated to the background. Most likely, however, the Shah is keeping him in reserve as a potential prime minister should Amuzegar stumble. Ansary certainly still has the Shah's confidence. The NIOC post is not one that the Shah would give to someone he does not trust, and Ansary continues to participate in the management of the Shah's personal finances and investments. In commenting on his plans for the National Iranian Oil Company, Ansary has pointed out that the Shah wishes him to expand operations into nonoil sectors of the economy.



Figure 14. Hushang Ansary, Director of National Iranian Oil Company

The politically influential position Ansary holds is demonstrated by the reaction of one of the officials in the Prime Minister's office. When told in April 1978 that visiting British opposition leader Margaret Thatcher wanted to meet with Ansary in his capacity as chairman of NIOC, the official initially objected, saying that it would be too much like her calling on the chief of the opposition.

So, four of the potentially most important figures on the Iranian political scene today, Amuzegar, Zahedi, Hoveyda, and Ansary, are all likely to be available to compete or cooperate in any new regime that might emerge in the next five years. None could admit it publicly, but it is likely that at least part of their planning and activities in their present jobs will be devoted to considering their futures when the Shah is no longer around to support their ambitions.

#### Social Class Roles

The great masses of the Iranian people—still primarily rural—will have little voice in any new government. As always, they will have to go along with whatever government results. Most

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**Hushang Ansary**  
 Director, National Iranian Oil Company  
 Career Highlights

1928.....	Born in Iran
1940s.....	Worked for Iranian textile import-export firm in London. Allegedly educated there but his whole educational history is unclear
1950.....	Worked in Tokyo as representative of Iranian textile import-export firm. Widely believed in Iran that irregular handling of firm's funds provided basis for his later wealth and influence
1954.....	Press attache and economic attache in Iranian Embassy, Tokyo
1960-61.....	Returned to Iran and managed textile factory
1962.....	Undersecretary, Ministry of Commerce; resigned to become once more a manager of a textile factory
1963.....	Vice President, Tehran Chamber of Commerce; a founder of Iran Novin Party
1964.....	Appointed roving ambassador to Africa
1965.....	Ambassador to Pakistan
1967-69.....	Ambassador to the United States
1969-74.....	Minister of Economics and Minister of Economics and Finance
1975-78.....	Leader of Constructive Wing of Rastakhiz Party
1978.....	Appointed Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company

popular sentiment will be expressed in the towns and cities, especially Tehran where nearly 15 percent of the population lives.

The reactions of groups of people are difficult to estimate. The urban "crowd" in Iran has historically been easy to inflame and has often played an important role in the political maneuvering of individuals and of special interest groups. In recent years the Shah has used popular demonstrations organized and orchestrated by his Rastakhiz Party to show public support for him and his programs. The party has also sponsored demonstrations against the resurgent National Front and the "Islamic Marxists"—the government's term for the violent opposition of all stripes. If Rastakhiz is still in existence at the time of the Shah's demise, it will probably be the

new government's main tool for marshaling expressions of popular support.<sup>33</sup> The lack of a strong hand, however, could make Rastakhiz as ineffective as Iranian political parties usually are.

The religious leaders and their followers are the group most likely to try to mobilize the masses against the new government. The disappearance of their arch-enemy will encourage them to believe that concessions can be forced from a new government,<sup>34</sup> and they are likely to be more effective in mobilizing popular support than the government. How much religious resentment will be focused against Farah because she is a woman is impossible to judge at this time. None of the attacks by religious leaders so far appears to have been directed against her. If, however, she assumes a key role in the regime, this will change.

No one who is likely to be influential in a new government appears to have any ties to the religious community that would give the religious leaders a voice in government. Should the new government take a more liberal approach to dissent, as seems likely, it will find its major problem in maintaining public order will arise from those groups that are influenced by religious leaders.

The two terrorist groups—the People's Strugglers and the People's Sacrifice Guerrillas—if they are still in existence as separate entities at the Shah's demise, are likely to be important only by infiltrating and inflaming the religious opposition. At present the terrorists seem to have neither the organization nor the following that would give them a significant independent role. If the threat of government reprisal is no longer credible, however, they might become more effective.

"There is no reason to believe that the Rastakhiz will not continue to flourish over the next five years. Should the Shah become displeased with the party for any reason he could, of course, abolish it. He would, however, probably replace it with a new party structure which would serve the same function.

" Clerical power was drastically curbed by Reza Shah. When he abdicated, the clergy had a resurgence of influence as seen, for example, in the reemergence of the head-to-ankle body covering—the chador—whose removal in 1936 had enraged so much of the clergy.

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An important element of the population on which any Iranian government must depend to implement programs and policies is the professional middle class. This class, which has developed relatively recently, is primarily urban. Its members possess a modern higher education and base their power position on acquired skills rather than wealth, family ties, or property. They are engaged in salaried professional, technical, and administrative occupations, a large number of them in government. They generally have little interest in political affairs, partly because they are unwilling or unable to adopt the traditional methods necessary to gain influence.

Most of them would probably hope that a new regime would be less authoritarian than the present one, but they would be cautious about participating in activities designed to put pressure on the new government. The risk of choosing the wrong side and thus ending up in a worse position would be too great. Many of this class choose to leave Iran for Europe or the United States, providing a manpower drain that Iran can ill afford.

A portion of the professional middle class is attaining the status of a political elite. Those in this group hold positions of power and influence within the Shah's governmental structure,<sup>35</sup> and therefore have a high stake in political stability. Many would be ambitious to better themselves under a new monarch. They would have to

<sup>35</sup> A full picture and understanding of this new component of the political elite still needs to be developed. A century and more ago many men of obscure origin attained elite status by acquiring wealth—mostly land—by marrying into the Royal Family of the time, the Qajars, and by being of some service to the dynasty. When the Qajars were ousted in 1925 by Reza Shah, many of the notables retained their elite status by switching to Reza Shah. They were joined by a new elite component, primarily from the family of those military men who supported Reza Shah. The new elite element solidified their position in the usual manner—good marriages, attaining wealth, usually land, but often from trade and commerce, and by loyalty to the dynasty. The elites of the Reza Shah period—both old and new—switched easily to Mohammad Reza, and he depended on them for the first 20 years of his reign. Just as the Qajars needed the landowners with local influence and Reza Shah needed his military men, so Mohammad Reza needs his professional/technical men. Many of these will be absorbed into the political elite in the same time-honored manner, by accepting and practicing the traditional procedures of Iranian political conduct, by good marriages, and by acquiring wealth.

choose sides eventually but, like their less political countrymen, would be cautious about a premature decision. The bulk of the elite, too, would probably find it possible—and expedient—to throw its support to whatever dominant figure might emerge, whether he be shah, general, prime minister, or commissar.

### Domestic Policies

Domestic policies in the long run will undergo considerable change as the result of a new regime. These changes would probably come piecemeal, however, and over a period of time. Most will not occur during the time frame of this paper. Any regime claiming to be the legitimate successor to Mohammad Reza would almost of necessity have to embrace the programs he has advocated. There is little in the Shah's overall reform program that would be objectionable except to the most reactionary and conservative groups.

The criticism centers around the claim that the Shah's programs have been a fraud and were never intended to be successful. In point of fact the reforms have generally been a success because the Shah has had enough authority to push them in the face of the usual bureaucratic inefficiency and lethargy.

The major problem of a new regime, then, would not be to produce a new program but to keep the present ones going. In the face of uncertainty as to the actual authority of the new government (as opposed to the paper authority), we might expect a general slowdown in many projects, especially those requiring large expenditures of money. It has already been suggested that a new government might find it expedient to reduce the rate of military expansion. This would deemphasize the program most likely to meet resistance when Shah Mohammad Reza is no longer around and would release resources for widely supported social programs. Military developments for the next five years have, however, been for the most part determined by the purchases and plans already under way and immediate benefits would be difficult to come by.

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What other changes might be felt necessary to garner public support can hardly be suggested. The particular domestic situation at the time would be a determining factor. A tranquil polity presumably would require less conciliation than a quarrelsome one.

The Shah has hoped to create institutions that will have a life of their own and be able to carry on when he is no longer around to direct his programs personally. It is not clear that he has yet succeeded in doing this, and a new government will have to spend considerable time just to ensure that the various ministries and commissions, Parliament, Cabinet, and other governmental and quasi-governmental institutions remain loyal and not become the means for personal aggrandizement by individual politicians.

#### Foreign Policy

Iran's major foreign policy lines are not likely to change significantly within the time frame of this paper. The major goal of every Iranian regime has been to achieve as much autonomy as possible in its relations with its foreign friends and enemies. Aside from its geographic position, which through the centuries has made it a valuable prize as an ally—or a puppet—Iran's approach to its foreign relations has been strongly conditioned by the character of the Shah as the principal foreign policy official and by internal weakness as a limiting factor on external relations. One writer's analysis of Iranian foreign policy at a considerably earlier period is still relevant:

The monarchy was the most structured unit of foreign policymaking. The nature of the foreign-policy decisions was significantly influenced by the character of individual monarchs. An incompetent ruler would be incapable of maintaining political order and his failure to do so would invite foreign intervention and occupation. A strong ruler, on the other hand, would be able to revive the state after its collapse and reestablish its former political boundaries and independence.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Ruhollah Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941*, Charlottesville, 1966, p. 32.

A key element in this personalism of foreign policy was a lack of realism. Earlier Shahs were irredentist. The glances that Mohammad Reza gives to the past as sources of Iranian pride and inspiration are not uniquely his. Qajar Shahs, too, looked to the past and hoped to revive Iran by recouping territories that the empire had lost over the centuries. In no case, however, did its capabilities match this vision, and the result was a series of defeats by Russians, Turks, British, and even Afghans that leave scars to this day.

But lack of realism was not the product only of the monarchs. In the first quarter of the 20th century, when nationalism superseded irredentism as the perceived path to a restoration of Iranian power, the principal foreign policymakers were the politicians and the Majlis. The nationalists' objectives of "absolute independence" regardless of the chaotic internal situation in the early part of the century resulted in a virtual partition of the country between Russia and Great Britain. And a few years later Iran's declaration of neutrality in the two world wars was not matched by its ability to maintain that neutrality. Again, in the early 1950s, Prime Minister Mossadeq's policy of "negative equilibrium"—that is, balancing the refusal to give the Soviet Union an oil concession by the nationalization of the British-controlled industry—failed because of the nationalists' misconception of Iran's power to make the policy work.

Mohammad Reza, in producing his policy of "positive nationalism" and his later "independent national policy," has revived the early role of the Shah as the principal maker of foreign policy but with a keener sense of Iran's capabilities at any given time.

The main objectives of the Shah's overall strategy have been to establish domestic stability by consolidating control over all aspects of political life and by pushing forward with extensive reforms. With his rear secure, he has been freed to cooperate extensively with the Soviet Union in economic matters; to establish a relationship toward the United States that parallels, but is not dictated by, policies of the United States; and, finally, to project Iran's power throughout the Persian Gulf and into the Indian Ocean.

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This, then, is the substance of the foreign policies that a successor regime will inherit from the present Shah. There is no reason to think that any of those likely to have a policymaking role in a new government will be in a hurry to alter these policies. What is likely to change, however, is the style and some of the content of the larger issues. An initial, and perhaps a long-lasting, result of a change of regime will be confusion as to who speaks authoritatively for the new government in foreign affairs. Certainly, the Regent or new Shah will insist on this role, but the foreign affairs bureaucracy in the person of the foreign minister may try to reclaim the prerogatives it has lost to Mohammad Reza. The Majlis is also likely to try to increase its influence. Some Parliaments in the past have played decisive roles. Even in more recent years when the Parliament has acted primarily as an arm of the political elite, it has played an important role in foreign policymaking. It has delayed action, criticized, modified, and even rejected proposals on which the elite itself did not wish to take a stand, such as the 1954 oil nationalization issue, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the status of forces agreement with the United States. Close advisers to the ruler have also played and will continue to play a role, even though they may have no official place in the policymaking apparatus. The result of trying to accommodate all the claimants to a voice will probably be a slower and less decisive response to problems and initiatives in foreign affairs.

One probable development is a slowdown in the pace of military development and thus a reduction in the US function as an arms supplier. This would not be likely to affect the basis of close US-Iranian relations. A new regime would probably seek expressions of US confidence and support in order to counter the Soviet Union's probing for weaknesses in the new government.

The Soviet Union must always loom large in Iranian calculations, and the relationship that Shah Mohammad Reza has established between the two countries is likely to serve a new government well. Suspicion of Moscow is part of the mental baggage of most Iranians, as is the awareness of the overwhelming power that the USSR could bring to bear. Correct but cautious

official relations and mutually profitable commercial relations can be expected to continue. A new leader may be warier than the present Shah, who over the years has become confident of his ability to handle the USSR. The precise Iranian response to specific Soviet pressures or overtures cannot be gauged until a new government has had an opportunity to demonstrate its perceptions of the world.

Iran's uneasy relations with its other neighbors and its interest in projecting its influence into the Persian Gulf are likely to remain constant. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan all present potential problems for Iran which no government can ignore. Iran's eastern and western borders are long and difficult to police, and illegal movement across the borders by smugglers, migrant labor, and tribal groups has always been an irritant. The extent to which this is permitted to trouble relations between Iran and Iraq, or Iran and Afghanistan, depends on other factors in the relationship. Except for the Kurds—and perhaps the Baluchis—who will always remain a potential source of trouble, none of the border irritations seems important enough to create major crises.

The April 1978 coup in Afghanistan put in power a regime which, from Iran's point of view, could be as threatening to Iran as the 1958 coup in Baghdad. The Shah perceives the Soviet grand design in the Middle East as surrounding Iran with hostile regimes. This view may not be shared by his successors. Nevertheless, nearly every Iranian "knows" that Moscow has always had designs on Iran, and some version of the encirclement theory is likely to be accepted when the Shah's successor looks at Iran's neighbors. Nevertheless, Tehran will continue to try to maintain correct, if not close, relations with all its neighbors.

Unless domestic political or economic problems overwhelm them, the new rulers will probably retain the Shah's present interest in maintaining Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf and pushing a presence of some sort into the Indian Ocean. Should a new regime choose to deemphasize the Iranian military establishment, the Indian Ocean aspect could be sacrificed.

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## EPILOGUE

This review of people, institutions, and forces that will play a role in the succession to the Iranian throne suffers from lack of information at key points. Masses of paper are available, but with few exceptions the kind of detail necessary to suggest how people might act is lacking.

The web of influence possessed by key figures cannot be mapped with any certainty; the debts owed and the favors received are virtually unknown. Some things known to be true a decade ago have not been addressed since then.

If the passing of the Shah is viewed as a significant event for US policies in the region, a firmer grip on less tangible influences seems advisable. To what extent does the traditional loyalty to the concept of a monarchy as distinguished from a particular dynasty still hold true? To what extent do the urban masses in Tehran

provide an exploitable tool to support or oppose a new government? What institutions are so dependent on royal patronage that they would collapse if this patronage were withdrawn? Much charitable activity, for example, is directly connected with the Royal Family. The true opinions of key Iranians toward the monarch is scantily documented. We knew much more about their views 15 or 20 years ago when many of these Iranians discussed with American officials the position of the Shah, his strengths and weaknesses, and even doubts about the viability of the monarchy.

Caution suggests that in future years persons, institutions, and trends be looked at not only for their current significance but also for whatever impact they may have on the succession of Shah Reza Cyrus Pahlavi, third and perhaps last of his dynasty.

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