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REVIEWS
COMPLETED.

SCC
Session III
A-259

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, June 18-19, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Lt. Col. DeSimone (part-time)	Capt. Kuznetsov (part-time)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter) (part-time)	Capt. Korobchenko (part-time)
	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)

At 2230 hours on June 18, 1974, Mr. Graybeal received a telephone call from Mr. Karpov, who stated that the Soviet Component had just received word from Moscow and would like to meet with Mr. Graybeal at his convenience. Mr. Graybeal proposed that the meeting be held at the Soviet Mission at 2300 hours on June 18.

Meeting, June 18, 1974
(2300 to 2345 hours)

Present at the meeting on the US side were: Mr. Graybeal, Brig. Gen. Georgi, and Col. FitzGerald. The Soviet Component was represented by Brig. Gen. Ustinov, Mr. Karpov, Mr. Yereskovsky, and Mr. Marchuk.

Commissioner Ustinov welcomed Graybeal to the Soviet Mission and said that he had just received information from Moscow concerning Paragraph III.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, which paragraph he and Graybeal had previously discussed and which Graybeal had touched upon on June 17.

Ustinov said that he was instructed by Moscow to inform Graybeal of the Soviet Government's proposed formulation for Paragraph III.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.

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He then read and handed to Mr. Graybeal a Working Document of the Soviet Component containing that formulation (Attachment No. 1).

Commissioner Graybeal said that in principle the Soviet-proposed wording was acceptable to the US Component. He proposed that the phrase "or destruction" be inserted between the words "dismantling" and "of replaced submarines" in the first sentence. He also clarified that the word "plants", which had appeared in the context of SCC-III negotiations for the first time, was synonymous with the US-proposed wording--"major shipyards."

General Ustinov agreed that it would be possible to insert the phrase "or destruction" in the document on which the Commissioners were working. He also agreed that the Soviet words for "plants" and "shipyards" were synonymous with each other and equivalent to the US phrase "major shipyards."

Mr. Graybeal then stated that he could agree to the wording proposed by the Soviet side as amended by him.

General Ustinov said that inasmuch as the US side had agreed to the above wording for Paragraph III.2, he had instructions to inform Graybeal of a second matter. Ustinov had been instructed by the Soviet Government to initial, here in Geneva, the Protocols and Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their Components, so that these documents could be signed in Moscow during the forthcoming Summit Meeting.

Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov and confirmed his agreement to Paragraph III.2 with the minor modifications which Graybeal had proposed. He added that this agreement to Paragraph III.2 was reached with the understanding for the record that the Atlantic Coast area of the United States included the Gulf Coast area, and that this is understood by both the Commissioners. He concluded that he was prepared to initial the four documents as soon as the typing was completed of the as yet non-conformed portion of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures.

General Ustinov proposed that the sides complete the necessary typing at their respective Missions and that the US Component return to the Soviet Mission at 0130 hours on June 19 to initial the four documents.

Mr. Graybeal agreed.

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Mr. Karpov stated that, in looking at the sample final pages for the Protocols which the US Component had furnished to Mr. Yereskovsky on June 17, he had noticed that the US-proposed format did not contain a signature block for the respective Commissioners. He asked whether the US Component had received instructions from Washington to delete these signature blocks.

Mr. Graybeal answered in the negative. He said that the US side had followed the procedure set by Ambassador Smith and Minister Semenov when they initialed the text of the "Measures Agreement" in Helsinki in 1971.

Mr. Karpov stated that, since neither Component apparently had received instructions from its Government to delete the signature blocks on the two Protocols, the Soviet Component wanted to propose that the signature blocks be shown on the texts which were to be initialed.

Mr. Graybeal agreed, but emphasized that in so doing the Commissioners would not be prejudging who would actually sign the documents in Moscow.

General Ustinov agreed, and adjourned the meeting.

Meeting, June 19, 1974
(0145 to 0315 hours)

At 0145 hours, FitzGerald, accompanied by DeSimone and Arensburger, met at the Soviet Mission with Yereskovsky, Kuznetsov, Marchuk, and Korobchenko. They conformed the English and Russian language versions of the new page 4 of the Protocols, as well as Paragraphs III.2, 3, 4, and 5 and Section IV of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms. At 0215 hours they were joined by the other US and Soviet participants for the final meeting of the SCC.

Commissioner Ustinov declared the final meeting of SCC-III open, commenting that it was taking place at a most unusual time. He suggested that he and Graybeal, according to the agreement between them, proceed with initialing the documents which had been prepared.

Commissioner Graybeal said he agreed completely with Ustinov's suggestion.

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Graybeal and Ustinov then initialed the Protocols and Procedures for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their components, and exchanged the appropriate original copies in English and Russian (Attachments Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5).

Mr. Graybeal then made a prepared statement (Attachment No. 6).

General Ustinov then delivered his prepared statement (Attachment No. 7).

Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov, and said he shared the views Ustinov had expressed concerning the work accomplished by the Deputy Commissioners, Executive Secretaries, interpreters, and all the members of both Components of the SCC. He added that it was interesting to note that the success of our work was so similarly reflected in the statements he and Ustinov had made, and said he thought this reflected, in turn, the degree of success we had achieved through direct and frank exchanges at all levels with an understanding of the views of the other side, an attribute which he thought would serve us well in future SCC sessions.

With respect to press releases, he said that he had a copy of the press release the US side intended to make tomorrow, which had already been discussed between our Executive Secretaries and Deputy Commissioners (Attachment No. 8). It contained no mention of the Procedures or of our work at SCC-III, but simply noted the closing of this SCC session along with the comment we normally included concerning the scope and purpose of the SCC. Graybeal concluded by noting that we intended to tell our press representative, and he thought the Soviet side would agree, that we had had a one-hour meeting on June 18 and a two-hour meeting on June 19, without any reference to the time of day that these had taken place. In this way we intended to avoid any speculation concerning the nature of these meetings based on the unusual hours at which they had taken place.

General Ustinov said that the Soviet side's press release would conform with the description Graybeal had just provided of the press release the US side intended to make, and also contain a comment concerning our agreement on the opening date of the next SCC session.

Mr. Graybeal said he agreed.

General Ustinov asked whether the US side had anything to add at this closing meeting.

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Mr. Graybeal said he thought not, but he did want to express his great appreciation to the Soviet side for the timely calling of our meetings tonight.

General Ustinov said that in that case he personally, along with Mr. Karpov and all the members of the Soviet Component, wanted to wish Graybeal bon voyage and a happy landing in Washington. He then said that with Graybeal's consent, he would like to declare this final meeting of SCC-III closed, and invite the US Component to mark the occasion with a glass of champagne.

Attachments:

1. Soviet Working Document on Para. III.2, Offensive Procedures
2. Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, US Version, English Text
3. Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, US Version, Russian Text
4. Procedures for ABM Systems, US Version, English Text
5. Procedures for ABM Systems, US Version, Russian Text
6. Graybeal Statement
7. Ustinov Statement
8. Press Release of US Component of the SCC for June 19, 1974

Drafted by: FPDeSimone:bd

Approved by: SNGraybeal

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Attachment No. 1

Official Translation

Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
June 18, 1974

Dismantling of replaced submarines shall be accomplished only at plants (shipyards) which carry out construction and repair of submarines, and which are situated on the Northern and Pacific coasts of the USSR and on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continental part of the USA.

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Attachment No. 2

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Interim Agreement;
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

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4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of launchers used for replacement; and

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8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Moscow on 1974, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

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Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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Geneva

June 19, 1974

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for each Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964, launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of type.

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3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

4. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of a ballistic-missile submarine or SLBM launcher.

5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, being replaced, shall be given by the Parties

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twice annually at the beginning of regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of that session of the Commission and covering the period since the last report in the Commission. The notification shall contain:

(a) the number and type of ICBM launchers (soft or silo ICBM launcher), deployed prior to 1964, and the number of launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process;

(b) the number of launchers for ballistic missiles on replacement submarines which have begun sea trials; and

(c) the number of ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, out of the number dismantled or destroyed, which have been replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

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II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

(a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment; and

(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, associated with the launcher and located at the launch site, and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;

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(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site; and

(c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads and of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and the fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site; and

(b) after the actions provided for in subparagraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silos shall remain open for a period of six months, after which they may be filled with earth.

4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not be

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used for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers

1. The following procedures, to be performed in the open, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:

(a) scrapping the submarine and its launchers. Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;

(b) removing the submarine's missile section;

(c) dismantling of ballistic-missile launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines on which the upper parts of missile launch tubes protrude into

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the fairwater may also be accomplished by removing the missile launch tubes together with the fairwater and those parts of the outer hull and pressure hull above the missile section which contain all of the penetrations for the missile launch tubes.

The pressure hull and outer hull may be restored by welding into place new sections without missile launch tube penetrations or missile hatches. The sail and deck may be modified in such a way that the submarine remains seaworthy.

2. Dismantling or destruction of replaced submarines shall be accomplished only at plants (shipyards) which carry out construction and repairs of submarines, and which are situated on the Northern and Pacific coasts of the USSR and on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continental part of the USA.

3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.

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4. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed no later than six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance with the following:

(a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission;

(b) the number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the total number of launchers to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto; and

(c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these Procedures.

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Attachment No. 3

Procedures for
Strategic Offensive Arms
Initialed Text
June 19, 1974

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ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОТОКОЛ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ
ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

В соответствии с положениями и в осуществление Временного соглашения между Соединенными Штатами Америки и Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений от 26 мая 1972 года, Протокола к нему, а также Согласованных заявлений в связи с этим Соглашением участвующие в них Стороны, в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии, согласились о процедурах, регулирующих замену, демонтаж или уничтожение и уведомление о них, для стратегических наступательных вооружений, ограниченных этим Временным соглашением, как они сформулированы в Приложении к настоящему Протоколу, которое является неотъемлемой частью этого Протокола.

Стороны согласились также о следующих общих руководящих положениях:

1. Прилагаемые Процедуры применяются только в отношении средств, заменяемых и демонтируемых или уничтожаемых в соответствии с положениями Временного соглашения;

2. Любая замена пусковых установок межконтинентальных баллистических ракет (МБР) или подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок (БРПЛ) осуществляется на основании Статей III и IV Временного соглашения, Протокола к нему, а также соответствующих Согласованных заявлений;

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3. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения пусковых установок МБР и относящихся к ним сооружений, а также подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ обеспечивают приведение их в состояние, исключающее возможность использования их для пусков соответственно МБР или БРПЛ; обеспечивают возможность обнаружения повторного развертывания демонтированных или уничтоженных единиц национальными техническими средствами; являются такими, что время, необходимое для повторного развертывания этих единиц, не было бы значительно меньше, чем время, необходимое для нового строительства; а также исключают неоправданные задержки в демонтаже или уничтожении;

4. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения формулируются отдельно для незащищенных и для шахтных пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования, а также для подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ;

5. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения обеспечивают возможность соответствующего контроля национальными техническими средствами в соответствии со Статьей У Временного соглашения;

6. После демонтажа или уничтожения, проведенного в соответствии с прилагаемыми Процедурами, сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях МБР наземного базирования, а также подводные лодки могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Временного соглашения и Протокола к нему;

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе пусковых установок, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления, а также о количестве пусковых установок, использованных для замены; и

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8. Количество подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами, одновременно находящихся в постройке и предназначенных в качестве замены, не будет превышать количества, совместимого с нормальным графиком строительства. Под нормальным графиком строительства понимается график, совместимый с прошлой или нынешней практикой строительства у каждой из Сторон.

Настоящий Протокол и прилагаемые Процедуры вступают в силу с момента подписания данного Протокола и остаются в силе на период действия Временного соглашения, и Постоянная консультативная комиссия может по своему усмотрению вносить в них поправки.

Совершено 1974 года в городе Москве в двух экземплярах, каждый на английском и русском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

Представитель
Соединенных Штатов
Америки

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Представитель
Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик

J.Y.

Женева

19 июня 1974 года

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ
ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

I. Общие

1. Для замены на пусковые установки баллистических ракет современных атомных подводных лодок, в пределах уровней, установленных для каждой из Сторон, могут использоваться пусковые установки межконтинентальных баллистических ракет (МБР) наземного базирования старых типов, развернутых до 1964 года, пусковые установки баллистических ракет любых атомных подводных лодок, а также пусковые установки современных баллистических ракет дизельных подводных лодок.

2. Современными баллистическими ракетами подводных лодок считаются: для Соединенных Штатов - ракеты, установленные на всех атомных подводных лодках; для Советского Союза - ракеты того типа, которые установлены на атомных подводных лодках, введенных в боевой состав после 1965 года; а также для обеих Сторон - баллистические ракеты подводных лодок, впервые прошедшие летные испытания после 1965 года и установленные на любой подводной лодке независимо от ее типа.

3. Пусковые установки старых баллистических ракет на дизельных подводных лодках не могут использоваться для целей замены, предусмотренных Протоколом к Временному соглашению о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений.

4. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых пусковых установок начинается не позднее даты начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены. Началом демонтажа или

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уничтожения пусковой установки МБР является начало выполнения любого из мероприятий, указанных ниже в Разделе II. Началом демонтажа или уничтожения подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами либо пусковой установки БРПЛ является начало выполнения любого из мероприятий, указанных ниже в Разделе III.

5. Началом мореходных испытаний подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, предназначенной в качестве замены, является дата, когда такая подводная лодка впервые совершает плавание своим ходом вне гавани или порта, где производились постройка или оснащение подводной лодки.

6. Уведомление о демонтажа или уничтожении заменяемых пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок производится Сторонами два раза в год в начале регулярных сессий Постоянной консультативной комиссии по фактическому состоянию на начало данной сессии Комиссии за период со времени последнего уведомления, представленного в Комиссии. В уведомлении указываются:

а) количество и тип пусковых установок МБР (незащищенная или шахтная пусковая установка МБР), развернутых до 1964 года, и количество пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления;

б) количество пусковых установок баллистических ракет на подводных лодках, которые начали мореходные испытания и предназначены в качестве замены; и

с) количество пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок из числа демонтированных или уничтоженных, которые были использованы для замены на пусковые установки баллистических ракет современных атомных подводных лодок.

7. Каждая Сторона может на добровольной основе дополнять уведомления другими сведениями, если она сочтет, что они необходимы для обеспечения уверенности в выполнении принятых по Временному соглашению обязательств.

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П. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования, заменяемых пусковыми установками БР III

1. Во всех случаях при проведении демонтажа или уничтожения выполняются следующие мероприятия:

а) удаление со стартовой позиции запаса ракет и их компонентов, головных частей и подвижного оборудования; и

б) демонтаж стационарного пускового оборудования, подъемно-транспортного оборудования и заправочного оборудования, связанного с пусковой установкой и находящегося на стартовой позиции, а также удаление всего демонтированного оборудования со стартовой позиции. Под пусковым оборудованием понимаются системы, компоненты и приборы, необходимые для проведения пуска ракеты.

2. В отношении незащищенных стартовых позиций в дополнение к мероприятиям, перечисленным в пункте 1, осуществляются следующие мероприятия:

а) участки стартовых площадок диаметром по меньшей мере в 20 метров с центром, находящимся на стартовом столе, и пункты (бункеры) управления пуском ракет приводятся в непригодное для использования состояние путем демонтажа или разрушения;

б) емкости для хранения топлива демонтируются и удаляются со стартовой позиции; и

в) обломки разрушенных участков стартовых площадок и пунктов (бункеров) управления пуском ракет, а также фундаменты емкостей для хранения топлива могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев места, где они находились, могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. В отношении шахтных стартовых позиций, в дополнение к мероприятиям, перечисленным в пункте 1, осуществляются следующие мероприятия:

а) защитные крыши шахт, рельсы защитных крыш, газоотводные каналы, шахтные стаканы и оголовки шахт демонтируются или уничтожаются, а демонтированные компоненты удаляются со стартовой позиции; и

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В) после проведения мероприятий, предусмотренных выше в подпункте "а", шахты оставляются открытыми в течение шести месяцев, после чего могут быть засыпаны землей.

4. После осуществления демонтажа или уничтожения в соответствии с вышеуказанными процедурами сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях МБР, не используются для хранения, обслуживания или пуска МБР, но могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Временного соглашения и Протокола к нему.

5. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых пусковых установок МБР завершается не позже, чем через четыре месяца после начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены.

III. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ, заменяемых новыми подводными лодками с баллистическими ракетами и пусковыми установками БР ПЛ

I. Для демонтажа или уничтожения подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ приемлемыми являются следующие процедуры, осуществляемые под открытым небом, из которых каждая из Сторон может делать выбор:

а) превращение в металлолом подводной лодки и ее пусковых установок. Превращение в металлолом предусматривает капитальную разборку;

б) удаление ракетного отсека подводной лодки;

в) демонтаж пусковых установок баллистических ракет старых атомных подводных лодок, у которых верхние части ракетных пусковых шахт выходят в ограждение шахт, может осуществляться также путем снятия ракетных пусковых шахт вместе с ограждением шахт и теми частями легкого и прочного корпусов над ракетным отсеком, в которых находятся все выходы ракетных пусковых шахт.

Прочный корпус и легкий корпус могут быть восстановлены путем вваривания новых секций, не имеющих выходов ракетных пусковых шахт и ракетных люков. Ограждение рубки и палуба могут быть модифицированы таким образом, чтобы сохранялись мореходные качества подводной лодки.

5.

2. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых подводных лодок производится только на заводах (верфях), осуществляющих строительство и ремонт подводных лодок и расположенных на Северном и Тихоокеанском побережьях СССР и Атлантическом и Тихоокеанском побережьях континентальной части США.

3. При любом из вариантов демонтажа люки пусковых шахт остаются открытыми в течение всего периода демонтажа, а ракеты и оборудование для пуска ракет удаляются.

4. Любое из указанных выше мероприятий завершается не позже, чем через шесть месяцев после начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены.

IV. Процедуры замены подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, погибшей в море или получившей повреждение, исключающее ремонт

В том случае, если подводная лодка с баллистическими ракетами гибнет в море или получает повреждение, исключающее ремонт, то такая подводная лодка может быть заменена другой подводной лодкой с баллистическими ракетами в соответствии с нижеследующим:

а) другая Сторона уведомляется в Постоянной консультативной комиссии о гибели или повреждении;

б) количество пусковых установок на подводной лодке с баллистическими ракетами, предназначенной в качестве замены, не приводит к превышению общего количества пусковых установок, разрешенного Временным соглашением и Протоколом к нему; и

в) поврежденная подводная лодка с баллистическими ракетами демонтируется или уничтожается в соответствии с Разделом III настоящих Процедур.

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Attachment No. 4

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty;

2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

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4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.

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
This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Moscow on 1974, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America



Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics



Geneva

June 19, 1974

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth.

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and headworks, and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth.

3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three months after their initiation.

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4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and applicable Agreed Statements.

5. Notification of the completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session of the Commission.

II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be cut off.

2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state for six months, after which they may be covered with earth.

3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.

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4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials removed.

5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement on these Procedures.

6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission.

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Procedures for
ABM Systems
Initialed Text
June 19, 1974

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ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОТОКОЛ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

В соответствии с положениями и в осуществление Договора между Соединенными Штатами Америки и Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны от 26 мая 1972 года и Согласованных заявлений в связи с этим Договором участвующие в нем Стороны, в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии, согласились о процедурах, регулирующих замену, демонтаж или уничтожение и уведомление о них, для систем ПРО и их компонентов, ограниченных этим Договором, как они сформулированы в Приложении к настоящему Протоколу, которое является неотъемлемой частью этого Протокола.

Стороны согласились также о следующих общих руководящих положениях:

1. Прилагаемые Процедуры применяются только в отношении систем или их компонентов, заменяемых и демонтируемых или уничтожаемых в соответствии с положениями Договора;
2. Любая замена систем ПРО или их компонентов осуществляется на основании Статьи УП Договора, а также соответствующих Согласованных заявлений; демонтаж или уничтожение систем ПРО или их компонентов сверх количеств или вне районов, определенных Договором, осуществляется на основании Статьи УШ Договора и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений;
3. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения систем ПРО или их компонентов, связанные с осуществлением положений Статьи УП в отношении замены этих систем или их компонентов и Статьи УШ

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Договора, обеспечивают приведение этих систем или их компонентов, а также относящихся к этим компонентам сооружений, за исключением сооружений на испытательных полигонах, в состояние, исключающее возможность использования их в целях ПРО; обеспечивают возможность обнаружения национальными техническими средствами повторного развертывания демонтированных или уничтоженных единиц; являются такими, что время, необходимое для повторного развертывания этих единиц, не было бы значительно меньше, чем время, необходимое для нового строительства; а также исключают неоправданные задержки в демонтаже или уничтожении;

4. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения формулируются отдельно для наземных и шахтных пусковых установок противоракет и для радиолокационных станций ПРО;

5. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения обеспечивают возможность соответствующего контроля национальными техническими средствами в соответствии со Статьей XII Договора;

6. После демонтажа или уничтожения, проведенного в соответствии с прилагаемыми Процедурами, сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях ПРО или на позициях радиолокационных станций ПРО, могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Договора и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений; и

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе (наземная или шахтная) пусковых установок противоракет и о количестве радиолокационных станций ПРО, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления, а также о количестве пусковых установок противоракет и радиолокационных станций ПРО, использованных для замены.

Настоящий Протокол и прилагаемые Процедуры вступают в силу с момента подписания данного Протокола и остаются в силе

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на период действия Договора, и Постоянная консультативная комиссия может по своему усмотрению вносить в них поправки.

Совершено 1974 года в городе Москве в двух экземплярах, каждый на английском и русском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

Представитель
Соединенных Штатов
Америки

гнч

Представитель
Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик

ТМ

Женева

19 июня 1974 года

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ И
УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

1. Пусковые установки противоракет на испытатель-
ных полигонах сверх установленных количеств

1. Наземные пусковые установки и относящиеся к ним оборудование удаляются со стартовых позиций, а вся часть стартовой площадки, занимаемая стойкой пусковой установки и арматурой, демонтируется или разрушается. Обломки стартовой площадки могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев это место может быть засыпано землей.

2. Шахтные пусковые установки приводятся в непригодное для использования состояние путем демонтажа или уничтожения их надземных конструкций и оголовков, а также путем удаления направляющих. Обломки шахтных пусковых установок могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев шахты могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. Указанные в пунктах 1 и 2 мероприятия по демонтажу или уничтожению завершаются не позже, чем через три месяца с момента их начала.

4. Сооружения, относящиеся к демонтированным или уничтоженным пусковым установкам противоракет на испытательных полигонах, могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Договора об ограничении систем ПРО и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений.

5. Уведомление о завершении мероприятий, предусмотренных в пунктах 1 и 2, производится в Постоянной консультативной комиссии два раза в год по фактическому состоянию на начало регулярной сессии Комиссии.

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П. Сооружения ПРО на базе Мальмстром

1. Металлические стержни арматуры зданий РЛС срезаются.

2. Здания РЛС, для которых было уже начато возведение стен, оставляются неприкрытыми в их незавершенном состоянии в течение шести месяцев, после чего они могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. Сооружения для пусковых установок, а также зданий РЛС, для которых были завершены строительством лишь фундаменты, засыпаются землей.

4. Осуществляется разравнивание почвы на всем участке, а строительные материалы удаляются.

5. Работы по демонтажу или уничтожению начинаются не позже, чем через шесть месяцев после согласования настоящих Процедур.

6. Уведомление о завершении вышеуказанных мероприятий производится в Постоянной консультативной комиссии.

Э.М.

Т.У.

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Attachment No. 6

STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL

June 19, 1974

I

1. Mr. Commissioner, at this final meeting of the Third Session of the SCC, it is a pleasure to take stock of where we stand in our assigned responsibilities. With the initialing of the mutually agreed Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their Components, we have authenticated two important completed documents to be signed and enter into force at the forthcoming Moscow Summit meeting. These documents represent a noteworthy step in promoting the objectives and implementing the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

2. Working out these mutually agreed procedures was not an easy task. The issues were complex and the solutions often difficult to find. However, by perseverance on both sides and, more importantly, facilitated by direct and frank exchanges at all levels, we have succeeded in

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formulating the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its Protocol. Working out mutually agreed procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers posed one of our more difficult problems. However, with the recent resolution of paragraph III.2 dealing with the locations where such dismantling or destruction shall be accomplished, that problem was also successfully resolved. In connection with the language of paragraph III.2, it is understood that the Atlantic area of the United States includes the Gulf Coast area.

3. Mr. Commissioner and all members of the Soviet and U.S. SCC Components, I believe that we, both those here present and all those who have participated in the preparation of these Procedures over the past three SCC Sessions, can justifiably take pride in our accomplished work.

II

4. As important as these procedures are, they represent only one factor in the success of the Standing Consultative Commission. The SCC is a unique organization; it is the first of its kind. We have thus been "plowing new ground" and effectively "learning as we go." In my

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opinion we have come a long way. We have proven the ability of the SCC to solve complex technical problems to the mutual interest of both sides. We have developed a direct and frank exchange of views, including an understanding of the concerns of the other side, which can be of utmost importance as the SCC may be called upon to implement the full scope of its responsibilities as set forth in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty and Article VI of the Interim Agreement.

III

5. Mr. Commissioner, we have agreed that the fourth session of the SCC will convene in Geneva on September 24, 1974 to discuss the general framework for detailed procedures for replacement of ABM Systems and Their Components as called for in Article VII of the ABM Treaty. The experience we have gained in working out the procedures we have initialed tonight will be invaluable in meeting this task. It is recognized that either side may convene the SCC at an earlier date should it desire to raise any other matters within the scope of our assigned responsibilities.

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IV

6. Mr. Commissioner, in summary, the U.S. Component of the SCC would like to express its appreciation to all members of the Soviet Component of the SCC for the direct, frank and businesslike manner in which they have approached the problems we have faced. The manner in which both sides have conducted these negotiations is conducive to the further success of the SCC. We have achieved mutually agreed procedures which both sides can be proud of, not only for their content but for the precedent they set in establishing the capabilities and utility of the SCC. In my opinion, the SCC has contributed, and will continue to contribute, to reducing possible misunderstandings and uncertainties that could arise in connection with existing agreements, and will continue to contribute to continued overall improved relations between our two great countries.

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Attachment No. 7

COMMISSIONER USTINOV'S STATEMENT

June 19, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

Today we have initialed the Protocols and attached Procedures, Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction and Notification Thereof for Strategic Offensive Arms and ABM Systems, limited by the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty respectively, with the expectation that the signing of the initialed documents will take place in Moscow in the course of the forthcoming Summit Meeting. This successfully completes a specific phase in the activity of the SCC, established by the Governments of the U.S. and the USSR to promote the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and Interim Agreement, concluded between our countries.

Today it gives me great pleasure to congratulate you, our Deputies and all members of the U.S. and Soviet Components of the SCC on the completion of the responsible task assigned to us by the Governments of the USSR and U.S.

The work carried out in the course of three sessions has convincingly demonstrated that, given mutual understanding and good will, both sides, within the framework of the SCC, can

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successfully carry out tasks related to implementation of the provisions of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. We have no doubts that the SCC, through its activity, makes a useful contribution to the cause of general improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Particular note should be made of the businesslike atmosphere, and the constructiveness and frankness which marked the just-concluded SCC session and which is becoming traditional for the SCC. We believe that this has to no small degree contributed to our success, in spite of the existence of a number of complex issues, solution of which, as you know, required considerable effort on both sides.

Extensive and useful work in reaching agreement on mutually acceptable formulations with respect to questions of dismantling or destruction and notification thereof has been carried out by the working groups, headed by General Georgi and V. P. Karpov. It is precisely due to their constructive and businesslike cooperation that we were able to reach agreement on procedures for dismantling replaced submarines and on notification questions.

A special role in our work was played by the Executive Secretaries and interpreters to whom fell the difficult task

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of editing, translating and preparing a large number of texts containing proposals of the sides as well as the resulting documents. I would like to express my gratitude to all members of the SCC for their fruitful activity at this session.

The results of our joint work seem to us to be quite substantial; they lay down a good foundation for further cooperation of the sides within the framework of SCC.

Both Components of the Commission apparently agree that the Protocols and Procedures worked out in the SCC will, by their scope and nature, facilitate strict and precise implementation by the sides of the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, using national technical means for their verification.

In this connection the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that in actual implementation of the provisions of the Protocols and Procedures, governing replacement, dismantling or destruction for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems, initialed by us today, both sides will be guided by precisely those procedures which are set down in the texts of these documents. The Soviet side also believes that after being signed, the Protocols and Procedures must retain their confidential nature and must not be subject to publication.

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With respect to the time for holding the fourth session of the SCC, we agree to convene it September 24, 1974. We believe that there is also no disagreement between us with respect to the agenda for that session -- to discuss the question of approach to procedures governing the replacement of ABM systems and their components which is permitted under Article VII of the ABM Treaty.

In conclusion, Mr. Commissioner, allow me to express once again my gratitude to you personally, to General Georgi, V. P. Karpov, and all members of the U.S. and Soviet Components of the SCC, for the work carried out at the third session.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 8

June 19, 1974

P R E S S R E L E A S E

The US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission met for one hour on June 18, and held another meeting for two hours on June 19 to complete its third session in Geneva. The session began on April 2, 1974. US Commissioner, Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal and USSR Commissioner, Mr. G. I. Ustinov agreed to convene the next session of the SCC in Geneva later this year on a date to be mutually agreed between them.

The Standing Consultative Commission was established by the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the US and USSR Governments on December 21, 1972, for the purpose of promoting the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972.

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SCC
Session III
A- 257

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, June 17, 1974
US Mission, Geneva

Persons Present

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Arensburger	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
(Interpreter)	

Commissioner Graybeal opened the meeting by thanking General Ustinov for coming to the US Mission at such short notice. He said that since he had called the meeting he would propose that the normal procedure of asking General Ustinov to speak first be changed and said that he would take the floor.

Commissioner Ustinov agreed and suggested that Commissioner Graybeal proceed.

Commissioner Graybeal then gave a prepared statement on the United States Government desire that the procedures be signed in Moscow instead of Geneva (see attachment.)

Commissioner Ustinov then thanked Graybeal for sharing with him the instructions he had received from Washington. He said that he would report those instructions to Moscow immediately. Ustinov said that, as Graybeal knew, he was at the present time expecting, literally from "hour to hour", instructions from Moscow with regard to our future work, with respect to Paragraph III.2, and also with respect to signing the documents the Commissioners are working out. He said that as soon as he received such instructions, he would immediately call Graybeal so that they could resolve the issue which is still unresolved. He concluded that, as Graybeal would understand, he could, unfortunately, say no more in regard to the questions which Graybeal had raised today.

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Commissioner Graybeal thanked Ustinov and proposed that the meeting be adjourned at this point and that the Commissioners agree that the next meeting should be held on call of either Commissioner.

Commissioner Ustinov agreed, commenting that, as he understood it, important meetings of the SCC were now being held on the shores of Lake Geneva.

Commissioner Graybeal agreed and declared the meeting adjourned.

Attachment: As Stated

SCC:CGFitzGerald:mtf:6/17/74

Approved by: SNGraybeal

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STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL

June 17, 1974

1. Mr. Commissioner, I am under instructions to inform you that the U.S. Government desires that the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and Their Components be initialed by Commissioners here in Geneva, and signed at the forthcoming Moscow Summit.

2. At this time, I have no guidance concerning the U.S. Government's preference regarding who would sign these procedures in Moscow. I am instructed to initial the completed procedures no later than Tuesday, June 18th, if possible, and to return to Washington Wednesday, June 19, 1974.

3. As you know the Washington review of the JD Ts, preliminarily agreed by Commissioners, June 5, 1974, has been completed. There are no major problems.

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I am prepared to proceed with our work, and to resolve Para. III.2 of the procedures for strategic offensive arms along the lines we have been discussing. With resolution of this paragraph, we could initial the documents here in Geneva; this would certify that the texts are authentic and prepared for final signature at the forthcoming Moscow Summit.

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SCC
Session III
A-251

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, June 5, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Cdr. Atkinson	Col. Belyanin
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Mr. Marchuk
Mr. Burrell	(Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Ustinov opened the meeting at 12:30 p.m. and gave the floor to Mr. Graybeal.

Commissioner Graybeal said that before turning to substantive business he would like to introduce Mr. Lawrence Burrell, whom the Soviet side had kindly agreed to invite to today's meeting as well as to the luncheon which was to follow. As the members of the Soviet Component no doubt knew, Mr. Burrell has worked very closely with Mr. Krimer and Mr. Arensburger on both SALT and SCC business for several years, and appreciated the opportunity to attend a meeting.

Graybeal then said that once again, in exchanging two documents today, we were taking a very important step in connection with working out the procedures called for by the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty. The first document was the Joint Draft Text, preliminarily agreed by Commissioners as of June 5, 1974, of Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms. Graybeal stated that he had been informed that the language of this document had been conformed, and represented agreement between Commissioners on the complete document with the exception of the wording for Para. III.2 which still needed to be worked out. The second document, he said, was the Joint Draft Text,

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preliminarily agreed by Commissioners as of June 5, 1974, of Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and their Components. This document had also been conformed in its Russian and English versions, and was a complete document.

Graybeal said that at this time he would like to present to Ustinov the English language texts of the two documents he had just described (Attachment No. 1 and No. 2).

Commissioner Ustinov, reading from a prepared text, said that our Executive Secretaries, Col. FitzGerald and Mr. Yereskovsky, had done a lot of work in a short time by preparing the preliminarily agreed texts of the Protocol and Procedures for both strategic offensive arms and ABM systems. He wanted to express his great satisfaction with the work that they had done and with the results achieved. He hoped that within the next few days the last question which remained unagreed between Commissioners would be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. Ustinov concluded by stating that he agreed that these Joint Draft Texts should be considered preliminarily agreed by Commissioners as of June 5, 1974, and added that they would be sent to Moscow for review today. He then passed to Graybeal a copy of the Russian language text of each of the two documents (Attachment No. 3 and No. 4).

Mr. Graybeal said he fully endorsed Ustinov's comments with respect to the work done by our Executive Secretaries. He stated that he, likewise, would be transmitting the texts to Washington today for final review prior to signature.

General Ustinov said that since we had planned lunch together following this meeting, he thought we could probably adjourn the meeting, which had been very successful and productive, and turn to the real substantive business of lunch.

Mr. Graybeal agreed.

General Ustinov declared the meeting adjourned at 12:45 p.m.

Attachments:

1. English, JDT of Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, June 5, 1974
2. English, JDT of Procedures for ABM Systems, June 5, 1974
3. Russian, JDT of Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, June 5, 1974
4. Russian, JDT of Procedures for ABM Systems, June 5, 1974

Drafted by FPDeSimone:bd

Approved by: SNGraybeal

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Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
June 5, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Interim Agreement;
2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

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4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of launchers used for replacement; and

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8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for each Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964, launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of type.

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3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

4. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of a ballistic-missile submarine or SLBM launcher.

5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, being replaced, shall be given by the Parties twice annually at the beginning of regular sessions of

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the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of that session of the Commission and covering the period since the last report in the Commission. The notification shall contain:

(a) the number and type of ICBM launchers (soft or silo ICBM launcher), deployed prior to 1964, and the number of launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process;

(b) the number of launchers for ballistic missiles on replacement submarines which have begun sea trials; and

(c) the number of ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, out of the number dismantled or destroyed, which have been replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

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II. Procedures For Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

(a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment; and

(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, associated with the launcher and located at the launch site, and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;

(b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site; and

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(c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads and of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and the fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site; and

(b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silos shall remain open for a period of six months, after which they may be filled with earth.

4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

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5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers

1. The following procedures, to be performed in the open, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:

(a) scrapping the submarine and its launchers.

Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;

(b) removing the submarine's missile section;

(c) dismantling of ballistic-missile launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines on which the upper parts of missile launch tubes protrude into the fairwater may also be accomplished by removing the missile launch tubes together with the fairwater and those parts of the outer hull and pressure hull above the missile section which contain all of the penetrations for the missile launch tubes.

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The pressure hull and outer hull may be restored by welding into place new sections without missile launch tube penetrations or missile hatches. The sail and deck may be modified in such a way that the submarine remains seaworthy.

2. Ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling shall be accomplished at major shipyards, located in designated areas, where ship construction, fitting out, or major overhaul is carried out.¹

2. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ballistic-missile submarines, carried out in accordance with the specified procedures, shall be accomplished in designated areas.²

3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.

4. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed no later than six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

¹ Proposed by U.S. side.

² Proposed by Soviet side.

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IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile
Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance with the following:

(a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission;

(b) the number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the total number of launchers to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto; and

(c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these Procedures.

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Attachment No. 2

Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2

Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
June 5, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

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Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2

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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty;

2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

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4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.

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This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF,
FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth.

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and headworks, and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth.

3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three months after their initiation.

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4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and applicable Agreed Statements.

5. Notification of the completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session of the Commission.

II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be cut off.

2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state for six months, after which they may be covered with earth.

3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.

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4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials removed.

5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement on these Procedures.

6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission.

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Strategic Offensive
Arms)Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
June 5, 1974Текст совместного проекта,
предварительно согласованный
представителями
5 июня 1974 годаПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯПРОТОКОМПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ
ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

В соответствии с положениями и в осуществление Временного соглашения между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений от 26 мая 1972 года, Протокола к нему, а также Согласованных заявлений в связи с этим Соглашением участвующие в них Стороны, в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии, согласились о процедурах, регулирующих замену, демонтаж или уничтожение и уведомление о них, для стратегических наступательных вооружений, ограниченных этим Временным соглашением, как они сформулированы в Приложении к настоящему Протоколу, которое является неотъемлемой частью этого Протокола.

Стороны согласились также о следующих общих руководящих положениях:

1. Прилагаемые Процедуры применяются только в отношении средств, заменяемых и демонтируемых или уничтожаемых в соответствии с положениями Временного соглашения;

2. Любая замена пусковых установок межконтинентальных баллистических ракет (МБР) или подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных

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лодок (БР ПЛ) осуществляется на основании Статей III и IV Временного соглашения, Протокола к нему, а также соответствующих Согласованных заявлений;

3. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения пусковых установок МБР и относящихся к ним сооружений, а также подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ обеспечивают приведение их в состояние, исключающее возможность использования их для пусков соответственно МБР или БР ПЛ; обеспечивают возможность обнаружения повторного развертывания демонтированных или уничтоженных единиц национальными техническими средствами; являются такими, что время, необходимое для повторного развертывания этих единиц, не было бы значительно меньше, чем время, необходимое для нового строительства; а также исключают неоправданные задержки в демонтаже или уничтожении;

4. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения формулируются отдельно для незащищенных и для шахтных пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования, а также для подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ;

5. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения обеспечивают возможность соответствующего контроля национальными техническими средствами в соответствии со Статьей У Временного соглашения;

6. После демонтажа или уничтожения, проведенного в соответствии с прилагаемыми Процедурами, сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях МБР наземного базирования, а также подводные лодки могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Временного соглашения и Протокола к нему;

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе пусковых установок, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления, а также о количестве пусковых установок, использованных для замены; и

8. Количество подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами, одновременно находящихся в постройке и предназначенных в качестве замены, не будет превышать количества, совместимого с нормальным графиком строительства. Под нормальным графиком строительства

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понимается график, совместимый с прошлой или нынешней практикой строительства у каждой из Сторон.

Настоящий Протокол и прилагаемые Процедуры вступают в силу с момента подписания данного Протокола и остаются в силе на период действия Временного соглашения, и Постоянная консультативная комиссия может по своему усмотрению вносить в них поправки.

Совершено _____ года в городе Женеве в двух экземплярах, каждый на русском и английском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

Представитель
Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик

Представитель
Соединенных Штатов
Америки

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ
ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

I. Общие

1. Для замены на пусковые установки баллистических ракет современных атомных подводных лодок, в пределах уровней, установленных для каждой из Сторон, могут использоваться пусковые установки межконтинентальных баллистических ракет (МБР) наземного базирования старых типов, развернутых до 1964 года, пусковые установки баллистических ракет любых атомных подводных лодок, а также пусковые установки современных баллистических ракет дизельных подводных лодок.

2. Современными баллистическими ракетами подводных лодок считаются: для Соединенных Штатов - ракеты, установленные на всех атомных подводных лодках; для Советского Союза - ракеты того типа, которые установлены на атомных подводных лодках, введенных в боевой состав после 1965 года; а также для обеих Сторон - баллистические ракеты подводных лодок, впервые прошедшие летные испытания после 1965 года и установленные на любой подводной лодке независимо от ее типа.

3. Пусковые установки старых баллистических ракет на дизельных подводных лодках не могут использоваться для целей замены, предусмотренных Протоколом к Временному соглашению о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений.

4. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых пусковых установок начинается не позднее даты начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены. Началом демонтажа или уничтожения пусковой установки МБР является начало выполнения

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любого из мероприятий, указанных ниже в Разделе П. Началом демонтажа или уничтожения подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами либо пусковой установки БР ПЛ является начало выполнения любого из мероприятий, указанных ниже в Разделе Ш.

5. Началом мореходных испытаний подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, предназначенной в качестве замены, является дата, когда такая подводная лодка впервые совершает плавание своим ходом вне гавани или порта, где производились постройка или оснащение подводной лодки.

6. Уведомление о демонтаже или уничтожении заменяемых пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок производится Сторонами два раза в год в начале регулярных сессий Постоянной консультативной комиссии по фактическому состоянию на начало данной сессии Комиссии за период со времени последнего уведомления, представленного в Комиссии. В уведомлении указываются:

а) количество и тип пусковых установок МБР (незащищенная или шахтная пусковая установка МБР), развернутых до 1964 года, и количество пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления;

б) количество пусковых установок баллистических ракет на подводных лодках, которые начали мореходные испытания и предназначены в качестве замены; и

с) количество пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок из числа демонтированных или уничтоженных, которые были использованы для замены на пусковые установки баллистических ракет современных атомных подводных лодок.

7. Каждая Сторона может на добровольной основе дополнять уведомления другими сведениями, если она сочтет, что они необходимы для обеспечения уверенности в выполнении принятых по Временному соглашению обязательств.

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II. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования, заменяемых пусковыми установками БР ПМ

I. Во всех случаях при проведении демонтажа или уничтожения выполняются следующие мероприятия:

а) удаление со стартовой позиции запаса ракет и их компонентов, головных частей и подвижного оборудования; и

б) демонтаж стационарного пускового оборудования, подъемно-транспортного оборудования и заправочного оборудования, связанного с пусковой установкой и находящегося на стартовой позиции, а также удаление всего демонтированного оборудования со стартовой позиции. Под пусковым оборудованием понимаются системы, компоненты и приборы, необходимые для проведения пуска ракеты.

2. В отношении незащищенных стартовых позиций в дополнение к мероприятиям, перечисленным в пункте I, осуществляются следующие мероприятия:

а) участки стартовых площадок диаметром по меньшей мере в 20 метров с центром, находящимся на стартовом столе, и пункты (бункеры) управления пуском ракет приводятся в непригодное для использования состояние путем демонтажа или разрушения;

б) емкости для хранения топлива демонтируются и удаляются со стартовой позиции; и

в) обломки разрушенных участков стартовых площадок и пунктов (бункеров) управления пуском ракет, а также фундаменты емкостей для хранения топлива могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев места, где они находились, могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. В отношении шахтных стартовых позиций, в дополнение к мероприятиям, перечисленным в пункте I, осуществляются следующие мероприятия:

а) защитные крыши шахт, рельсы защитных крыш, газоотводные каналы, шахтные стаканы и оголовки шахт демонтируются или уничтожаются, а демонтированные компоненты удаляются со стартовой позиции; и

б) после проведения мероприятий, предусмотренных выше в подпункте "а", шахты оставляются открытыми в течение шести месяцев, после чего могут быть засыпаны землей.

4. После осуществления демонтажа или уничтожения в соответствии с вышеуказанными процедурами сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях МБР, не используются для хранения, обслуживания или пуска МБР, но могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Временного соглашения и Протокола к нему.

5. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых пусковых установок МБР завершается не позже, чем через четыре месяца после начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены.

III. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ, заменяемых новыми подводными лодками с баллистическими ракетами и пусковыми установками БР ПЛ

I. Для демонтажа или уничтожения подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ приемлемыми являются следующие процедуры, осуществляемые под открытым небом, из которых каждая из Сторон может делать выбор:

а) превращение в металлолом подводной лодки и ее пусковых установок. Превращение в металлолом предусматривает капитальную разборку;

б) удаление ракетного отсека подводной лодки;

с) демонтаж пусковых установок баллистических ракет старых атомных подводных лодок, у которых верхние части ракетных пусковых шахт выходят в ограждение шахт, может осуществляться также путем снятия ракетных пусковых шахт вместе с ограждением шахт и теми частями легкого и прочного корпусов над ракетным отсеком, в которых находятся все выходы ракетных пусковых шахт.

Прочный корпус и легкий корпус могут быть восстановлены путем вваривания новых секций, не имеющих выходов ракетных пусковых шахт и ракетных люков. Ограждение рубки и палуба могут быть модифицированы таким образом, чтобы сохранялись мореходные качества подводной лодки.

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2. Демонтаж подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ производится на находящихся в указанных районах крупных верфях, на которых осуществляется строительство, оснащение или капитальный ремонт судов.¹

2. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами, осуществляемые в соответствии с перечисленными процедурами, производятся в указанных районах.²

3. При любом из вариантов демонтажа люки пусковых шахт остаются открытыми в течение всего периода демонтажа, а ракеты и оборудование для пуска ракет удаляются.

4. Любое из указанных выше мероприятий завершается не позже, чем через шесть месяцев после начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены.

IV. Процедуры замены подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, погибшей в море или получившей повреждение, исключающее ремонт

В том случае, если подводная лодка с баллистическими ракетами гибнет в море или получает повреждение, исключающее ремонт, то такая подводная лодка может быть заменена другой подводной лодкой с баллистическими ракетами в соответствии с нижеследующим:

а) другая Сторона уведомляется в Постоянной консультативной комиссии о гибели или повреждении;

б) количество пусковых установок на подводной лодке с баллистическими ракетами, предназначенной в качестве замены, не приводит к превышению общего количества пусковых установок, разрешенного Временным соглашением и Протоколом к нему; и

в) поврежденная подводная лодка с баллистическими ракетами демонтируется или уничтожается в соответствии с Разделом III настоящих Процедур.

¹Предложение американской стороны.

²Предложение советской стороны.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 4

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(Procedures for
ABM Systems)

Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
June 5, 1974

Текст совместного проекта,
предварительно согласован-
ный представителями
5 июня 1974 года

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОТОКОЛ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

В соответствии с положениями и в осуществление Договора между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны от 26 мая 1972 года и Согласованных заявлений в связи с этим Договором участвующие в нем Стороны, в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии, согласились о процедурах, регулирующих замену, демонтаж или уничтожение и уведомление о них, для систем ПРО и их компонентов, ограниченных этим Договором, как они сформулированы в Приложении к настоящему Протоколу, которое является неотъемлемой частью этого Протокола.

Стороны согласились также о следующих общих руководящих положениях:

1. Прилагаемые Процедуры применяются только в отношении систем или их компонентов, заменяемых и демонтируемых или уничтожаемых в соответствии с положениями Договора;
2. Любая замена систем ПРО или их компонентов осуществляется на основании Статьи УП Договора, а также соответствующих Согласованных заявлений; демонтаж или уничтожение систем ПРО или их компонентов сверх количеств или вне районов, определенных Договором, осуществляется на основании Статьи УШ Договора и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений;

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3. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения систем ПРО или их компонентов, связанные с осуществлением положений Статьи УП в отношении замены этих систем или их компонентов и Статьи УШ Договора, обеспечивают приведение этих систем или их компонентов, а также относящихся к этим компонентам сооружений, за исключением сооружений на испытательных полигонах, в состояние, исключающее возможность использования их в целях ПРО; обеспечивают возможность обнаружения национальными техническими средствами повторного развертывания демонтированных или уничтоженных единиц; являются такими, что время, необходимое для повторного развертывания этих единиц, не было бы значительно меньше, чем время, необходимое для нового строительства; а также исключают неоправданные задержки в демонтаже или уничтожении;

4. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения формулируются отдельно для наземных и шахтных пусковых установок противоракет и для радиолокационных станций ПРО;

5. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения обеспечивают возможность соответствующего контроля национальными техническими средствами в соответствии со Статьей XII Договора;

6. После демонтажа или уничтожения, проведенного в соответствии с прилагаемыми Процедурами, сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях ПРО или на позициях радиолокационных станций ПРО, могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Договора и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений; и

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе (наземная или шахтная) пусковых установок противоракет и о количестве радиолокационных станций ПРО, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления, а также о количестве пусковых установок противоракет и радиолокационных станций ПРО, использованных для замены.

Настоящий Протокол и прилагаемые Процедуры вступают в силу с момента подписания данного Протокола и остаются в силе на период действия Договора, и Постоянная консультативная комиссия может по своему усмотрению вносить в них поправки.

Совершено _____ года в городе Женеве в двух экземплярах, каждый на русском и английском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

Представитель
Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик

Представитель
Соединенных Штатов
Америки

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ И
УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

I. Пусковые установки противоракет на испытательных полигонах сверх установленных количеств

1. Наземные пусковые установки и относящиеся к ним оборудование удаляются со стартовых позиций, а вся часть стартовой площадки, занимаемая стойкой пусковой установки и арматурой, демонтируется или разрушается. Обломки стартовой площадки могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев это место может быть засыпано землей.

2. Шахтные пусковые установки приводятся в непригодное для использования состояние путем демонтажа или уничтожения их надземных конструкций и оголовков, а также путем удаления направляющих. Обломки шахтных пусковых установок могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев шахты могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. Указанные в пунктах 1 и 2 мероприятия по демонтажу или уничтожению завершаются не позже, чем через три месяца с момента их начала.

4. Сооружения, относящиеся к демонтированным или уничтоженным пусковым установкам противоракет на испытательных полигонах, могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Договора об ограничении систем ПРО и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений.

5. Уведомление о завершении мероприятий, предусмотренных в пунктах 1 и 2, производится в Постоянной консультативной комиссии два раза в год по фактическому состоянию на начало регулярной сессии Комиссии.

Секретно

II. Сооружения ЦРУ на базе Мадьярстром

1. Металлические стержни арматуры зданий РЛС срезаются.
2. Здания РЛС, для которых было уже начато возведение стен, оставляются неприкрытыми в их незавершенном состоянии в течение шести месяцев, после чего они могут быть засыпаны землей.
3. Сооружения для пусковых установок, а также здания РЛС, для которых были завершены строительством лишь фундаменты, засыпаются землей.
4. Осуществляется разравнивание почвы на всем участке, а строительные материалы удаляются.
5. Работы по демонтажу или уничтожению начинаются не позже, чем через шесть месяцев после согласования настоящих Процедур.
6. Уведомление о завершении вышеуказанных мероприятий производится в Постоянной консультативной комиссии.

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SCC
Session III
A-249

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, June 4, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Belyanin
Cdr. Atkinson	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Arensburger	(Military Interpreter)
(Interpreter)	

Commissioner Ustinov opened the meeting by welcoming the U.S. Component, and gave the floor to Mr. Graybeal.

Commissioner Graybeal said that the Working Group on Notification, under the able leadership of Deputy Commissioners Karpov and Georgi, had again demonstrated our ability to resolve very complex issues. He said it was his understanding that agreement had been reached in the Working Group on wording for the various sections in the two Protocols and Procedures dealing with notification. The text of those paragraphs had been conformed by our Executive Secretaries, and he believed they could be considered "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners." Graybeal then provided Ustinov with a copy of the English-language text of those paragraphs (Attachment No. 1).

General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and, reading from a prepared text, said that the Working Group under Deputy Commissioners Georgi and Karpov had completed its assigned task of working out mutually agreed formulations with respect to notification yesterday, June 3, and noted the appropriate four paragraph numbers. He said that we should express our gratitude to the Working Group for the successful completion of its work on the complex subject of notification, which had appeared to be one of our most difficult problems. He stated that like Graybeal, he believed that the formulations presented today could be considered preliminarily agreed by Commissioners, with the usual

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understanding that either side could introduce changes or amendments if it were considered necessary. With that, he handed over to Graybeal a copy of the Russian-language text (Attachment No. 2).

Mr. Graybeal said that he thought this was a significant milestone on the road toward working out the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its Protocol. Through the efforts of the Working Group, he said, we have achieved solutions in the net interest of both our countries.

He concluded by stating that the U.S. side had no further comments or statements to make this morning.

General Ustinov said he fully shared Graybeal's opinion that the work done in the Working Group was a considerable success in our mutual work; it facilitated to a significant degree successful completion of the procedures for dismantling or destruction with respect to both strategic offensive arms and ABM systems and other components.

He said the Soviet side had nothing additional for this morning's meeting either, and suggested that it be adjourned and that the Commissioners and their deputies continue their work in the informal post-meeting atmosphere.

Mr. Graybeal accepted Ustinov's suggestion.

General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 11:25 a.m.

Attachments:

1. English-language text of notification paragraphs, June 4, 1974
2. Russian-language text of notification paragraphs, June 4, 1974

Drafted by: FPDeSimone:bd

Approved by: SNG *SNG* Graybeal

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Joint Draft Text

Preliminarily Agreed by Commissioners

June 4, 1974

NOTIFICATION

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Protocol, Paragraph 7

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of launchers used for replacement; and

Procedures, Paragraph 1.6

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, being replaced, shall be given by the Parties twice annually at the beginning of regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of that session of the Commission and covering the period since the last report in the Commission. The notification shall contain:

(a) the number and type of ICBM launchers (soft or silo ICBM launcher), deployed prior to 1964, and the number of launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process;

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(b) the number of launchers for ballistic missiles on replacement submarines which have begun sea trials;

(c) the number of EOBM launchers and launchers for ballistic missiles on submarines, out of the number dismantled or destroyed, which have been replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

Protocol, Paragraph 7

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.

Procedures, Paragraph I.5

5. Notification of the completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session of the Commission.

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(Notification Paragraphs)

Текст совместного проекта,
предварительно согласован-
ный Представителями
4 июня 1974 года

УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ
ПРОЦЕДУРЫ ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

Протокол, пункт 7

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе пусковых установок, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления, а также о количестве пусковых установок, использованных для замены; и

Процедуры, Раздел I, пункт 6

6. Уведомление о демонтаже или уничтожении заменяемых пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок производится Сторонами два раза в год в начале регулярных сессий Постоянной консультативной комиссии по фактическому состоянию на начало данной сессии Комиссии за период со времени последнего уведомления, представленного в Комиссии. В уведомлении указываются:

а) количество и тип пусковых установок МБР (незащищенная или шахтная пусковая установка МБР), развернутых до 1964 года, и количество пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления;

б) количество пусковых установок баллистических ракет на подводных лодках, развернутых на начало очередных испытаний и пред-
назначены в качестве замены;

с) количество пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок из числа демонтированных или уничтоженных, которые были использованы для замены на пусковые установки баллистических ракет современных атомных подводных лодок.

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

Протокол, пункт 7

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе (наземная или шахтная) пусковых установок противоракет и о количестве радиолокационных станций ПРО, на которых демонтаж или уничтожение завершены и находятся в стадии осуществления, а также о количестве пусковых установок противоракет и радиолокационных станций ПРО, использованных для замены.

Процедуры, Раздел I, пункт 5

5. Уведомление о завершении мероприятий, предусмотренных в пунктах I и 2, производится в Постоянной консультативной комиссии два раза в год по фактическому состоянию на начало регулярной сессии Комиссии.

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SCC
Session III
A-240

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, May 28, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col (Ret.) FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Belyanin
Cdr. Atkinson	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Mr. Smith	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	(Military Interpreter)

Commissioner Ustinov welcomed the US Component and opened the meeting. He then stated that the Working Group which had been established to consider "naval matters" had completed its work with respect to reaching agreement on an Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms Pertaining to the Dismantling of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers. He said this work had been done in accordance with the provisions of Para. 7 of the SCC Regulations, with the goal of ensuring uniform understanding by both sides of those terms. The Soviet Component proceeds from the premise that the document which has been worked out and agreed upon is an internal SCC document which must be entered into the record of today's meeting. Ustinov concluded by proposing that he and Graybeal initial the document, which had been done in two copies each in the English and Russian languages, both copies being equally authentic.

Commissioner Graybeal said that he was in complete agreement with Ustinov's statement. He believed that the work of the Working Group on the "Agreed Interpretations of Some Terms" had been a useful exercise, and that in accord with Para. 7 of the Regulations, it should be entered into the record of SCC proceedings. He said he was prepared to initial the document.

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The SCC Commissioners initialed the documents and exchanged them in accord with normal procedures (Attachment No. 1).

Mr. Graybeal, having been given the floor by Ustinov, delivered his prepared comments on Para. 1, Section III of the offensive Procedures (Attachment No. 2).

General Ustinov said that he fully agreed with the comment Graybeal had paid to the Chairmen and the members of the Working Group, and with his evaluation of the work which had been done, specifically with respect to the agreement achieved on Para. III.1 of the offensive Procedures. He stated that he also agreed with Graybeal's remark that we appeared to be nearing completion of the work required to accomplish our task in connection with the "naval issues."

On the question of Para. III.4, he said, we had two formulations on the table--the Soviet proposal of May 10 and the US proposal of May 17. He hoped that the Soviet side would soon be able to comment on that US proposal, which was currently being given most careful consideration.

However, he concluded, in addition to the problem remaining in Section III, we had a no less important problem, and in the Soviet view a more complex one, before us. He said he was referring to the notification issue, which was reflected in Para. 7 of both Protocols and in Para. I.6 and Para. I.5 of the offensive Procedures and ABM Procedures respectively. He said the Soviet side, on May 14, had proposed a formulation for Para. 6 of the offensive Procedures, and he hoped the US side would soon be able to comment on this Soviet proposal so that our work could move forward.

Mr. Graybeal said that he did, indeed, have some comments to make on that Soviet proposal concerning notification procedures, and delivered his prepared comments (Attachment No. 3). He also tabled the US Working Document containing proposed language for the paragraphs on notification in both sets of Procedures (Attachment No. 4).

General Ustinov said that the Soviet side had listened with most careful attention to Graybeal's statement and proposal with respect to notification, and that they would be studied most carefully. He said he would like to propose, to accelerate work on this problem, that we utilize the good experience we had had in the Working Group on SLBM submarine and launcher dismantling or destruction, and establish a working group to

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study notification questions and find mutually acceptable solutions. By doing so, we could gain time, he said, and he thought that General Georgi and Mr. Karpov would not decline to head up such a working group.

Mr. Graybeal stated that he would give careful study to the proposal to establish a working group, and respond at an early time. He said that though we certainly recognized the capabilities of our Deputy Commissioners, it was his belief that there was still some unfinished work with respect to Section III. He was not certain that we would want to burden Karpov and Georgi with an additional task; as an alternative, perhaps he, Graybeal, and Ustinov could sit down and work the notification problem. In any case, he said, we would be in touch through our Executive Secretaries concerning Ustinov's proposal.

General Ustinov agreed with that approach, said that the Soviet side had no additional matters to bring up, and asked whether the US side had any other business.

Mr. Graybeal said that he had nothing further for this morning's meeting.

General Ustinov said he thought that the next meeting of the SCC could be scheduled after the US side had decided upon its response to his proposal for establishing a working group. However, should we decide that the next meeting would be an SCC meeting, that would take place on Friday, May 31.

Mr. Graybeal agreed.

General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 11:50 a.m.

Attachments:

1. Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms Pertaining to the Dismantling of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers, Agreed by Commissioners, May 28, 1974, Geneva
2. Commissioner Graybeal's Comments on Section III, Para. 1 of Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms
3. Commissioner Graybeal's Comments on Notification
4. US Working Document on Notification Procedures

Drafted by:FPDeSimone:bd
A

Approved by:SNGraybeal ^{SNX}

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Attachment No. 2

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - SECTION III,
PARA. 1 OF PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

May 28, 1974

1. Mr. Commissioner, on May 3, 1974, we established a Working Group to work out procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers and to clarify terminology associated with these procedures. Today, we have completed agreement on the terminology and exchanged documents thereon for the record. I am advised that the Working Group has made significant progress on resolving the "naval issues" in Section III.

2. It is my understanding that the Working Group has effectively reached agreement on Section III, Para. 1. In this connection, it is recognized that final agreement on Section III, Para. 1 is contingent upon resolving Section III, Para. 4 along the lines proposed by the U.S. side on May 17, 1974.

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3. Mr. Commissioner, Section III, paragraph 1 provides for three alternative procedures from which each Party may choose for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers. Should either side choose to implement the procedure in Para. 1(b) calling for the removal of the submarine's missile section, it is understood that if the missile section is to be replaced, it will not be replaced by a new section of similar dimensions; any replacement section must be significantly shorter in overall length than the missile section it replaces. Similarly, in implementing the procedures in Para. 1(c) it is understood that the dimensions and profile of any modified sail will be distinguishably different from those of the fairwater which was removed.

4. Mr. Commissioner, with the positive results being achieved in the Working Group, we appear to be nearing agreement on all the "naval issues" reflected in Section III. When we have reached agreement on Section III we will also have agreement on Section I, Para. 2, and thus on all aspects of the procedures for strategic offensive

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arms and for ABM systems and their components "Preliminarily Agreed by Commissioners," except for those aspects dealing with notification. I want to compliment the Chairmen and the Soviet and U.S. members of the Working Group on both the constructive manner in which they approached the problem and the results achieved to date.

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Attachment No. 3

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - NOTIFICATION

May 28, 1974

I

1. Mr. Commissioner, as a result of a great amount of work done by both Components of the SCC involving direct, frank and businesslike discussions at all levels, we appear to be nearing successful resolution of our assigned task of working out the mutually agreed procedures called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and its Protocol with the exception of one major area -- namely, notification.

2. Timely notification is recognized by both sides as a required part of the procedures for replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their components. This is reflected in Agreed Statement "K" to the Interim Agreement.

II

3. Mr. Commissioner, I must again make absolutely clear that the United States considers that certain prior notification measures would promote the implementation of

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the provisions and objectives of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement by reducing potential misunderstandings and uncertainties, would enhance the viability of these and future arms limitation agreements, and thereby contribute to continued improved relations between our two countries. The U.S. side believes that prior notification would result in significant benefits at little or no cost or effort, and at no risk to the security interests of either side.

4. The Soviet side has not addressed the substance of the various U.S. proposals; rather, it has continually stated that any form of prior notification is unacceptable as a matter of principle. In my view, this has resulted in disappointing exchanges on the subject of notification, particularly when compared with the in-depth, direct and frank exchanges we have had on other subjects. The Soviet side has not engaged in direct and frank exchanges on the essence or substance of the various U.S. proposals on notification.

III

5. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side has carefully reviewed Soviet statements and proposals involving notification, including the Soviet proposal of May 14

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for Para. I.6 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms. In the interest of finding a mutually acceptable solution to this one remaining issue, today I am tabling a Working Document of the U.S. SCC Component which fully takes into account the views and proposals of both sides, and provides a satisfactory solution to the overall notification problem.

(Read and pass to Commissioner Ustinov Working Document.)

6. Mr. Commissioner, you will note that the new language for Para. I.6 incorporates proposals and formulations previously suggested by each side. Specifically, the U.S. side has made a major move toward a solution to the notification issue by dropping the requirement for reporting on the number of replacement SLBM launchers on submarines which have been launched but have not yet begun sea trials. The U.S. side is willing to make this major change in Para. I.6(b) provided the Soviet side accepts in principle the U.S. approach and proposed language for Para. I.6(a) and for Para. 7 of the Protocol.

7. You will also note that we have incorporated the Soviet proposal for Para. I.6(c), although we consider such reporting unnecessary and somewhat overlapping with that reporting called for in other portions of Para. I.6.

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8. You will also note that we have accepted Soviet-proposed language for Para. I.5 of the Procedures for ABM Systems and Their Components.

9. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side has made a significant move today; one which takes full account of Soviet views and proposals, and which is designed to provide a mutually acceptable solution to the one remaining issue.

IV

10. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side has now removed from its proposed notification procedures all requirements for notification that could possibly be construed to be "prior notification." This U.S. proposal provides for a mutually acceptable solution to the notification issue in the Procedures we are currently charged with working out.

11. Mr. Commissioner, I fail to understand the reluctance of the Soviet side to provide in these Procedures for an exchange of information that would help meet the objectives of the SCC by reducing misunderstandings and uncertainties. Although the U.S. side has made this move to facilitate agreement on the procedures we are charged with working out,

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the United States remains firmly convinced that prior notification measures are valuable in reducing potential misunderstandings and uncertainties and in enhancing the viability of existing and future arms limitation agreements.

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Working Document of
U.S. SCC Component
May 28, 1974

NOTIFICATION

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Protocol, Paragraph 7.

"7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers on which dismantling or destruction is in process and the number of replacement launchers; and"

Procedures, Paragraph I.6.

"6. Notification of replacement and dismantling or destruction activities shall be given at the beginning of each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission, reflecting their status as of the beginning of that session and covering the period since the last report in the Commission. The notification shall contain:

- (a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for ballistic-missile launchers on older submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher)

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on which dismantling or destruction is in process and the number and type on which dismantling or destruction action has been completed since the last report in the Commission.

- (b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the number on submarines which have begun sea trials since the last report in the Commission.
- (c) The number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, out of the number on which dismantling or destruction has been completed, which have been replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines since the last report in the Commission."

PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

Protocol, Paragraph 7

"7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of ABM launchers and the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction is in process, and the number of replacement ABM launchers and ABM radars."

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Procedures, Paragraph I.5

"5. Notification of the completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission."

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Attachment No. 1

Geneva

Agreed by Commissioners
May 28, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

AGREED INTERPRETATION OF SOME TERMS PERTAINING TO THE
DISMANTLING OF BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES AND SLBM LAUNCHERS

To ensure uniform understanding of some terms pertaining to the dismantling of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers, the Commissioners have agreed that, for the purposes of the provisions of Section III of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, the terms below shall mean:

1. SAIL - the structure above the outer hull which encloses the bridge, conning tower, and retractable devices (antennas, periscopes, etc.).

2. FAIRWATER - on submarines on which the upper parts of the missile launch tubes protrude into the enclosure which is adjacent to and an extension of the sail, the fairwater is the structure above the outer hull which immediately encloses the missile launch tubes.

3. SUPERSTRUCTURE - on submarines on which the upper parts of the missile launch tubes do not protrude into the fairwater, the superstructure is the structure above the outer hull which encloses the missile launch tubes protruding out of the pressure hull.

4. LAUNCH TUBE - the cylindrical structure which is welded to the pressure hull and encloses the missile, including the complete missile launcher.

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Секретно

г. ЖеневаСогласовано Представителями
28 мая 1974 годаПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯСОГЛАСОВАННОЕ ТОЛКОВАНИЕ НЕКОТОРЫХ ТЕРМИНОВ, ОТНОСЯЩИХСЯ
К ДЕМОНТАЖУ ПОДВОДНЫХ ЛОДОК С БАЛЛИСТИЧЕСКИМИ РАКЕТАМИ
И ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК БР ПЛ

В целях обеспечения единообразного понимания некоторых терминов, относящихся к демонтажу подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БР ПЛ, Представители согласились, что применительно к положениям Раздела III Процедур по стратегическим наступательным вооружениям нижеследующие термины означают:

1. ОГРАЖДЕНИЕ РУБКИ - сооружение над легким корпусом, которое ограждает мостик, боевую рубку и выдвижные устройства (антенны, перископы и т.п.).

2. ОГРАЖДЕНИЕ ШАХТ - на подводных лодках, на которых верхние части ракетных пусковых шахт выходят в ограждение, прилегающее к ограждению рубки и являющееся продолжением ограждения рубки, ограждением шахт считается сооружение над легким корпусом, непосредственно ограждающее ракетные пусковые шахты.

3. НАДСТРОЙКА - на подводных лодках, на которых верхние части ракетных пусковых шахт не выходят в ограждение шахт, надстройкой считается сооружение над легким корпусом, ограждающее ракетные пусковые шахты, выходящие из прочного корпуса.

4. ПУСКОВАЯ ШАХТА - конструкция цилиндрической формы, которая вваривается в прочный корпус и ограждает ракету, включая всю ракетную пусковую установку.

Секретно

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: May 21, 1974

TIME: 1100 - 1240

PLACE: US Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting, May 21, 1974

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. R. A. Anderson
Cdr. G. Atkinson
Lt. Col. F. P. DeSimone
Lt. Cdr. R. K. Martin
Mr. P. Afanasenko
(Interpreter)

Mr. V. P. Karpov
Mr. A. S. Yereskovsky
Capt. V. P. Kuznetsov
Capt. Ye. G. Korobchenko
(Military Interpreter)
Mr. B. Yu. Marchuk
(Interpreter)

FitzGerald opened the meeting stating that in the continued absence of General Georgi he was pleased to welcome Karpov and his colleagues of the Soviet Component of the Working Group to the premises of the US Mission. FitzGerald turned the floor over to Karpov.

Karpov stated he would like to make a few comments regarding Para. III.1(e) submitted by the US side at the previous meeting of the Working Group. He then gave a prepared statement (Attachment No. 1).

FitzGerald stated the US side would take into account the remarks made by the Soviet side this morning and pay appropriate attention to them. He added that on the part of the US side, he also had some comments to make. FitzGerald then read his prepared statement (Attachment No. 2).

Karpov stated that he understood FitzGerald's statement to be a concise and accurate historical review of the events which had taken place over the last two weeks. He asked "But what does it mean in terms of our effort to reach mutually agreed procedures?"

FitzGerald stated that there was an old Latin saying which would be appropriate and for which there was a precise counterpart in Russian--"Repetition is the mother of learning."

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FitzGerald stated that he thought the purpose of this so-called "historical review" was to indicate that, while both sides had made some contributions, the US Component feels its contributions have been more positive and more recent than those of the Soviet Component as regards reaching a solution for Section III.

Karpov responded that his understanding was that the US side wanted to say that it had set forth everything and it is up to the Soviets to decide now. He stated he did not think the situation is like this. Karpov pointed out that both sides had tried to introduce changes in its initial drafts and that it seemed to him we had not exhausted the possibilities for further negotiation. He stated that he thought the solution of questions to Section III, particularly Para. 1, should be considered in the light of both sides searching for mutually acceptable solutions. It was not only up to the Soviet side to make further decisions; it was also up to the US side. Karpov then gave a prepared statement (Attachment No. 3) and submitted a new Soviet proposal to replace the US-proposed subparagraph (e) (Attachment No. 4).

FitzGerald stated that his preliminary reaction to the Soviet proposal is that it was a step in the right direction. Karpov interjected that the Soviet side was moving to meet the US side "half-way." FitzGerald commented that any time either side shows willingness to meet the other half-way, it is a step in the right direction. He would study the proposal more closely and discuss it with the US advisors during a break and Karpov and he might decide how they would proceed thereafter.

Following a 40-minute break, FitzGerald commented he believed that the advisors had had time for useful discussion and that the remaining order of business was to set a time and place for the next meeting. FitzGerald proposed the next meeting be held at the Soviet Mission at 1100 hours on Friday, 24 May 1974 and that it would be a Working Group meeting. Karpov agreed. FitzGerald commented that the agenda would be as agreed in his private conversation with Karpov. (Comment: FitzGerald and Karpov had privately agreed that Friday's meeting would be devoted to discussion of an agreed formulation for the "H-Class only" paragraph which will, in the future, be called Para. III.1(c). It was also agreed that the Soviet side might also, but not necessarily, table a counter-proposal for Para. III.4).

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Meeting adjourned at 1240.

Attachments:

1. Karpov Statement, May 21, 1974
2. Col. FitzGerald's Comments: Section III of Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms
3. Karpov's Second Statement, May 21, 1974
4. Working Document of the Soviet SCC Component, Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, Section III, paragraph 1

DRAFTED BY:
RKMartin:bd

Approved by:
C.G. FitzGerald

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Attachment No. 1

KARPOV STATEMENT, May 21, 1974

The Soviet SCC Component has carefully studied the proposal for paragraph III.1(e) (old designation) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, tabled by the U.S. side at the May 17 Working Group meeting.

Unfortunately, those changes which were introduced into the text of the May 10, 1974 U.S. proposal on this very question, do not alter the essence of the U.S. side's position on the question under discussion. Therefore, the new wording of the U.S. proposal, just as the previous wording, cannot be accepted by the Soviet side.

We have already spoken on this subject and would like to emphasize once again: like the U.S. side, the Soviet Component of the SCC, in its consideration of questions pertaining to the scope of dismantling of submarines being replaced, fully takes into account the provisions of paragraph 3 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol, agreed by both sides, and is invariably guided by them.

The Soviet SCC Component is convinced that the proposals it tabled for paragraph III.1(d) (old designation) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures are fully consistent with the criteria set forth in paragraph 3 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol.

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I must say frankly that we have not heard any convincing arguments from the U.S. side that could change our point of view on this question.

At the same time, speaking of the scope of dismantling activities and the possibilities of using replaced submarines for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement, the U.S. approach to this appears to us to be academic and divorced from reality, and is thus inapplicable for solving those specific tasks which ensue from the provisions of the Interim Agreement with respect to the replacement of ballistic-missile submarines of older types by new submarines.

First, the U.S. proposal is overloaded with provisions which in essence are unrelated to accomplishing the task of putting SLBM launchers on replaced submarines into a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching SLBMs, formulated in paragraph 3 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol. This applies, above all, to the provisions concerning hull liners and frame segments.

I would think that the discussion of these questions at the previous meeting of the Working Group speaks for itself.

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Second, both sides proceed from the premise that after dismantling activities are carried out in accordance with the agreed procedures, replaced submarines may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto. But for one side or the other to have such an opportunity, the replaced submarine must not simply have its capability of being used for launching SLBMs removed, but must remain seaworthy. In this respect the U.S. proposals are unsatisfactory since in fact they ignore the necessity to realistically take into account the particular nature of the subject referred to in these specific procedures.

And although the new wording of item 4 in subparagraph (e) does contain some positive movement in the U.S. side's position, on the whole it is not satisfactory from the point of view of what was said above.

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Attachment No. 2

COL. FITZGERALD'S COMMENTS: SECTION III OF PROCEDURES
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Working Group Meeting
May 21, 1974

I

1. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, we agreed at the May 17 Working Group meeting to continue our exchange of views on the alternative proposals for ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling. The U.S. side believes such exchanges are useful.

2. At the SCC meetings on April 30 and May 7, Commissioner Graybeal set forth the U.S. views regarding the procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers replaced by new ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers. General Georgi and I, at Working Group meetings on May 10 and May 17, respectively, elaborated on the details of the U.S. proposals, and made some preliminary observations regarding the Soviet proposal of May 10.

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II

3. The U.S. side continues to believe that the U.S. proposals in the Strategic Offensive Arms Joint Draft Text of April 19, 1974, as revised by the U.S. side on April 30 and May 7 and in the Working Group, provide a firm basis for agreement on Section III. We are agreed that the task before us is to work out mutually agreed procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction and notification thereof for strategic offensive arms called for by the Interim Agreement and its Protocol. There is also complete agreement between us on the fundamental point that the procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers must satisfy the agreed criteria contained in Para. 3 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol.

4. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, in SCC discussions on Section III of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, the U.S. side initially proposed three alternative procedures which we believe fully satisfy these agreed criteria. The Soviet side initially made one proposal which, in the U.S. view, did not adequately meet those criteria. The U.S. side studied the Soviet proposal as

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it was explained during SCC II, and, in an effort to move negotiations forward, added a fourth proposal which would apply to one type of nuclear ballistic-missile submarine. The U.S. side believes this proposal meets the criteria the sides have agreed upon, when applied to this one type of nuclear ballistic-missile submarine.

5. The U.S. side has made continued efforts during our discussions of Section III to move the negotiations forward toward the goal of achieving mutually agreed procedures. As a result of our discussions at SCC II and this session, the U.S. side has proposed revised wording for the U.S. proposal in Para. III.1(e) on April 30, May 10 and May 17. On May 7, the U.S. side stated it was prepared to drop the requirements for "predesignated shipyards" and "agreed shipyards" in Paras. III.1(b), (c) and (e), if we could reach agreement based on a new approach for solving this question. After the Soviet side explained its views and tabled its proposal in response to this new U.S. initiative, the U.S. side proposed an alternative Para. III.4 on May 17 which takes into account the considerations set forth by the Soviet side. In addition, the

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U.S. side withdrew Para. III.1(a)--the sinking option. Each of these actions has represented positive and significant movement by the U.S. side toward finding a solution to the complex problem in Section III.

6. On April 30 the Soviet side tabled a revised proposal for ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling. The U.S. side considered this revision a step forward in our efforts to reach mutually agreed procedures for Section III. However, as Commissioner Graybeal remarked in his statement on May 7, the U.S. side did not find this proposal acceptable as replacement for Para. III.1(e) of the April 19, 1974 Joint Draft Text.

III

7. Mr. Deputy Commissioner, at the May 10 Working Group meeting, General Georgi stated that the U.S. side would carefully study any Soviet-proposed formulations to resolve issues remaining in Section III. If the Soviet side has additional clarifications or modifications to its May 10 proposal, the U.S. side will give them the same careful consideration that is being given to that proposal.

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Attachment No. 3

KARPOV'S SECOND STATEMENT

May 21, 1974

At the last Working Group meeting the U.S. side expressed a view according to which the main objection to the Soviet proposal for paragraph III.1(d) is that it is intended for not one but for various types of submarines. We also understood the remarks of the U.S. side to mean that on condition that the Soviet proposal be applied to only one certain type of submarine, the U.S. side would be prepared to regard the Soviet proposal for subparagraph (d) more favorably.

We remain convinced that the May 10, 1974 proposal of the Soviet SCC Component for subparagraph (d) is fully consistent with the criteria agreed by us, as well as with the tasks before us in the matter of working out adequate procedures.

At the same time, desiring to facilitate achievement of a mutually acceptable understanding on questions of the dismantling of submarines being replaced, the Soviet side is in principle prepared to consider the possibility of applying the procedures it proposed on May 10, 1974 (subparagraph (d)) to only one type of submarine, namely, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines of older types.

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We are prepared to consider such a solution on condition that the U.S. side agree in principle to the substance of the Soviet proposal regarding the scope of dismantling of submarines being replaced, and to provisions designed to ensure the possibility of using replaced submarines for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement.

In the event the sides agree in principle to such a solution, specific formulations could be discussed further in order to work them out in detail on a mutually acceptable basis.

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Attachment No. 4

Official translation

Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component

May 21, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Section III, paragraph 1

(d) Dismantling of ballistic missile launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines may also be accomplished by removing, in the open, the missile launch tubes together with the fairwater and those sections of the outer hull and pressure hull above the missile compartment which contain all of the penetrations for the missile launch tubes.

The pressure hull and outer hull may be restored by welding into place new sections without missile launch tube penetrations or missile hatches. The sail and the deck may be put in a condition ensuring that the submarine remains seaworthy when used for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: May 17, 1974

TIME: 1100-1325 Hours

PLACE: Soviet Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting, May 17, 1974

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald
Mr. R. A. Anderson
Cmdr. G. Atkinson
Lt. Col. F. P. DeSimone
Lt. Cmdr. R. K. Martin
Mr. P. Afanasenko
(Interpreter)

Mr. V. P. Karpov
Mr. A. S. Yereskovsky
Capt. V. P. Kuznetsov
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
(Interpreter)

Karpov opened the meeting of the Working Group and turned the floor over to FitzGerald.

FitzGerald thanked Karpov. He began by recalling that, at the last meeting of the working group on 10 May headed by Georgi and Karpov, Karpov had made a suggestion that the time for long speeches and repetition of old arguments as such is over. FitzGerald stated he intended to proceed directly to the task at hand. He said he would like to submit for the consideration of the Soviet side two working documents of the US SCC Component which have to do with two paragraphs of Section III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.

FitzGerald handed over the first U.S. document--a revised proposal for paragraph III.1(e) (Attachment No. 1). He stated that in looking over the document the Soviet side would see the U.S. Component had made two changes to our earlier proposal for that paragraph and without reading the entire document he wanted to call Karpov's attention to the changes which had been made. First of all he stated that, inasmuch as we have not had a response (FitzGerald commented that this was not a criticism of the Soviet side as it had not yet had a chance to respond) to Graybeal's proposal of May 14 to delete paragraph III.1(a) the U.S. side has kept the same paragraph number--i.e., (e). FitzGerald stated this was also a practical matter--changing the paragraph letters would confuse people in both Washington and Moscow.

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FitzGerald continued, that as for the changes which we have introduced to our earlier document there are two. First, the term "hull liner" is added within the parenthesis in sub-paragraph (2). This is done on the basis of discussion within the FitzGerald/Yereskovsky working group and since we appear to have a common understanding on these terms, the U.S. side thought it appropriate to add the term "hull liner" to our proposal. Second, FitzGerald called the attention of the Soviet Component of the working group to sub-paragraph (4). FitzGerald stated that, having in mind certain comments and questions raised by Karpov at the last meeting (May 10) of the working group, the U.S. side has made a change which we believe goes a considerable distance to answer the questions asked of General Georgi.

FitzGerald stated he believed that our naval experts, Kuznetsov, Atkinson, and Martin, could agree the new wording in paragraph (4) does much to restore the seaworthiness of the submarine which has been dismantled.

FitzGerald asked Karpov if he had any comments or questions on the revised U.S. proposal for paragraph III.1(e). Karpov stated that he did have some questions.

Karpov stated that, first, as far as he understands, the U.S. side continues to insist that this procedure should be applicable only to submarines constructed prior to 1965. FitzGerald responded that fundamentally that is true, adding that, as General Georgi had pointed out, the procedure set forth in (e) applies only to one class--for submarines whose missile launch tubes protrude into the fairwater. FitzGerald stated Georgi had also indicated that, as far as the specific date is concerned, it would appear to the U.S. side that, if there could be a meeting of the minds regarding types of submarines, it would be a relatively easy problem to reach an agreement regarding dates.

Karpov stated that in this connection he wanted to invite attention to the Soviet proposal set forth on May 10. He stated that in the Soviet proposed procedures for paragraph III.1(d) the provisions are equally applicable to all types of submarines. He stated that the point in this respect is that in Section III the procedures should be alternative procedures applicable to all types of submarines covered by the Interim Agreement and Protocol. Karpov pointed out that at the last formal meeting Graybeal had mentioned that the U.S. proposed procedures were

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alternatives and, at the same time, Graybeal indicated a procedure could be formulated for one separate class. Karpov stated that he didn't quite see the logic of the U.S. proposals. He said "if we do agree there should be alternative procedures, then we should also agree that procedures should be applicable to all types of submarines covered under the Interim Agreement and Protocol." He added that two of the U.S. proposals are alternatives; the other is not an alternative but a procedure for only one type of submarine.

Karpov stated the Soviet side bases its view on the need to work out procedures for Section III. He said the Soviet proposal dated May 10 is formulated to cover submarines whose missile tubes protrude into fairwater and submarines whose missile tubes protrude into the superstructure. Karpov pointed out this could be seen in the very first phrase of the Soviet proposal for paragraph III.1(d).

Karpov stated he wanted to pose a direct question. He asked "What does the U.S. find unacceptable in this proposal?" Atkinson stated the answer to that was the same today as the answer General Georgi gave at the last meeting of the working group. Karpov responded that he didn't pose that question to Georgi, so the answer couldn't be the same.

FitzGerald stated he believed the sides are agreed that two criteria must be met in any dismantling or destruction procedure. These two criteria are well known; they are that the procedures must be verifiable and that the procedure should preclude a rapid reactivation time. FitzGerald said the U.S. side has proposed from the beginning of our discussions three alternative procedures which we believe fully meet both criteria. He stated that the Soviet side initially made a proposal which the U.S. side did not consider adequately met either criteria. However, in an effort to move negotiations forward, the U.S. side had made a close study of the Soviet proposal, as explained during SCC-II, and had added a fourth proposal which the U.S. says can apply to one class of submarines but to no other. The U.S. side believes this proposal meets the verification and reactivation time criteria which the sides have agreed upon.

Karpov stated that he was in full agreement with the U.S. side that we do have agreed criteria and that agreed criteria must be the foundation of the specific procedures. Karpov said, however, he did not understand why the U.S. proposals met the

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criteria but that the Soviet proposal does not. He asked what might be the problem with the Soviet proposal--is the problem that the Soviet proposal would apply both to submarines whose missile tubes protrude into the fairwater and to those whose missile tubes do not.

Martin referred to the revised U.S. proposal for paragraph III.1(e) as tabled today and stated that if the Soviet side restored the submarine under this proposal it would be equally clear to both sides that the submarine could no longer be capable of carrying ballistic-missile launchers. This is so because there is a clearly visible area aft of the sail, which we have been calling fairwater, which is no longer there. Martin stated that there was not the same assurance with restoration of a submarine whose "outer hull" would be restored above the area where ballistic-missile launchers had protruded into the pressure hull. Once this was done there could not be the same assurance, as with the other class, that the submarine would not be capable of carrying ballistic-missile launchers.

Karpov stated he did not quite see how it affects the problem of verification and asked what is the difference between the types?

Martin pointed out, for example, that if the Soviet procedure were followed just the simple matter of counting submarines which carry ballistic missiles and those which do not would be difficult.

Karpov stated that, if he understood it, on submarines where missiles do not protrude into the fairwater, the "sail" has nothing to do with missile launch tubes. What counts, he stated, is the superstructure and the outline of the superstructure. He stated it is not clear, when the missile launch tubes, outer hull and pressure hull have been removed and the submarine is restored by placing sections without penetrations for missile launch tubes and decking, why the difference is not detectable by national technical means. He stated that although he was not a naval expert, it was his understanding of the problem that he really could not see any real convincing arguments against the Soviet proposal which applies to both types of submarines, either from the standpoint of verification or reactivation time.

Karpov invited the U.S. side's attention again to the proposal of the Soviet side, tabled May 10. He stated the Soviet side continues to believe this proposal meets to a full degree the agreed criteria as well as the purposes and goals for Section III of the Procedures. He added that, of course, the Soviet side would yet another time give careful attention

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to the U.S. proposal. Talking frankly, however, he stated he saw no difference in the proposal tabled today from what was already tabled before.

Karpov stated he had some questions regarding the revised U.S. proposal for Para. III.1(e). He stated he did not quite fully understand FitzGerald's early reference to discussion with Yereskovsky as a reason for including in sub-paragraph (2) of the proposal the term "hull liner." Karpov asked what is the connection between this and the discussion with Yereskovsky.

FitzGerald stated he would attempt to answer Karpov's question. First, he did not mean to imply that there had been any agreement between him and Yereskovsky to change wording in the proposals. He stated the U.S. side felt that given the substance of the conversations between our naval experts, if a dismantling or destruction procedure were to be adequate, it would have to include the term "hull liner." Again, he repeated he did not intend to imply agreement by Yereskovsky.

To change formulations, Karpov stated that in this respect he had a question for the American naval experts that is: How can one remove from a submarine the launch tube and the hull crown plating without removing the hull liner? Atkinson responded that all three would come out and, as such, there should be no problem with including the additional term "hull liner." Karpov said that he was still not getting an answer to his question and asked again "Is it possible to remove hull crown plating and launch tubes without removing the hull liner?" FitzGerald stated, "No, to give you a short direct answer." Karpov responded that, if that was the case, he did not see the reason for making up things like this--the main point is that hull liners are removed. Atkinson repeated that, if that is the case, then there should be no problem in including the term "hull liner" in the list of things which are removed.

Karpov stated that the reason we should not include the term "hull liner" is simple--if we include this then we must include other things like "port side tube" and "starboard side tube," etc. Karpov commented that everything can be reduced to an absurdity.

FitzGerald stated that in his view it was time to go on to other things which may help to clarify this item. FitzGerald stated that again he finds himself working backwards, which is a common feeling with him when dealing with Karpov; he also stated

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that he had the same problem with substance as Karpov as he too was approaching this as a layman. FitzGerald suggested that, perhaps when the sides begin discussing ABM radars, he may be able to participate as a specialist. FitzGerald stated that for the time being, in all these questions concerning the proposals of the two sides, he also must rely on advisors. As regards which proposal was better, clearly Karpov and he were getting difference advice from their naval experts. Karpov stated the Soviet side finds their information better.

FitzGerald stated he wanted to return to Karpov's original question: that is, what portion of the Soviet proposal is of concern to the U.S. side--e.g., is it procedures which apply to all classes? FitzGerald stated that that was the fundamental issue between us--the Soviet proposal would apply to all classes; the U.S. side feels that our proposal, part of which the Soviet side has incorporated in its proposal, could apply only to classes with ballistic-missile launchers which protrude into the fairwater. FitzGerald also commented that there is also the usual difference in approach--the U.S. side likes details (Karpov commented, "academics."). FitzGerald suggested that, if we could resolve the fundamental issue, we could probably resolve the other issues more readily. He commented that these are technical details and technicians have a way of reaching agreement as we have already seen in our discussions of terminology. FitzGerald stated to Karpov that he hoped this answered his question.

Karpov stated that, in any case, he regarded it as a statement of the U.S. position. In this connection he wanted to ask a question regarding sub-paragraph (4) of the U.S. proposal for Para. III.1(e). Karpov read sub-paragraph (4).

Karpov stated that any submarine is designed to have a certain outline or profile and that in order to change it additional engineering work must be done and this will require additional expense--expense possibly beyond that required for dismantling. He asked "how acute is the need for this procedure in order to make the submarine unable to carry ballistic missiles?" He added that, as far as he understood submarine design on this type of submarine, besides the launch tubes, there might be other items aft of them that need to be enclosed during restoration--these items might have nothing to do with launch tubes. He also asked that, if both sides agree missile launch tubes are removed and new sections of pressure hull without launch tube penetrations are welded back in, then it would seem we would have agreement.

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However, there would have to be an additional enclosure to cover the area aft of the tubes--otherwise the submarine would look something like a two-humped dromedary.

FitzGerald asked Karpov to clarify that this equipment aft of the missile tubes on this type submarine was not related to launching missiles. Karpov stated that the equipment aft of the missile launch tubes in the fairwater was not connected with missile launch tubes.

FitzGerald stated that the U.S.-proposed Para. III.1(e)(4) is an effort to meet valid considerations which the Soviet side set forth to General Georgi on May 10. As Georgi had indicated and as our naval experts have discussed, the question of restoration of the sail to make the submarine seaworthy is an engineering question--nevertheless, resolution of the question must be accomplished within the agreed criteria. Karpov responded that that was primarily the reason behind his question. FitzGerald responded that Para. III.1(e) was an acceptable procedure in our point of view--if Soviet engineers decided it would not be possible to make the submarine seaworthy without extending the sail completely over the area where the missile tubes had protruded, then the sides would indeed have a problem resolving this issue. FitzGerald commented that it was his view that both Soviet and U.S. naval engineers have vast expertise, knowledge and resourcefulness and that they should be able to solve the problem in a way that could meet the agreed criteria.

Karpov suggested the Working Group take a break for refreshments. FitzGerald agreed.

Following the break, FitzGerald began by stating that he would like to return to the second working document which the U.S. Component of the SCC wanted to submit to the Soviet side for its consideration today. The proposal, he stated, was a new formulation for Para. III.4 for the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms. Karpov stated that he hoped the U.S. side had accepted the Soviet formulation. FitzGerald stated that the U.S. side did not quite accept it, but that we think we have met Soviet considerations by combining our earlier proposal with the proposal of the Soviets. He stated we believed we had reached a formulation close to what the two sides could agree on. FitzGerald handed over the document to Karpov (Attachment No. 2) and read the new wording. FitzGerald commented that he would like

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to add that the "designated areas" which the U.S. side has in mind in the new proposal are those Ustinov had indicated in his statement of last week. FitzGerald added that, in his view, the new formulation speaks for itself quite well.

Karpov responded that he was not so sure the specifics speak for themselves--he had some questions. First, what does the term "designated areas" signify--does it apply to areas already known by the sides or is there a requirement to supply additional "areas" for dismantling or destruction? FitzGerald responded that each side knew the areas referred to at the present time and at some time before the Procedures and Protocol are signed by Commissioners, it would be necessary to reaffirm the areas mentioned by Ustinov last week. He added that in the future, if either side or both were to decide dismantling was to be accomplished in areas other than those designated, there would be an obligation on the side making the choice to notify the other side. The side making the decision to accomplish dismantling in another area would not require the approval of the second side to do so, nor could the other side place any restrictions on the first side.

Karpov stated he had a second question--what does the term "major shipyards" mean? FitzGerald responded that the term means, in essence, a shipyard which is of such a size as to be capable of handling, docking and overhauling the type of submarine being dismantled or destroyed. Karpov stated that, if the Soviets have shipyards where dismantling can be performed and shipyards where dismantling cannot be performed, then we should not be talking about shipyards where dismantling cannot be performed. FitzGerald commented that we could attempt to adjust the wording to meet the desires of the Soviet side; we welcomed new suggestions the Soviet side might make. Karpov responded that he was still at the stage of asking questions to get the clear essence--the Soviet proposal was clear to the Soviet side and does not correspond to the U.S. proposal.

FitzGerald commented that there was a basic difference between the two sides--the Soviet side had proposed there be a choice between shipyards and areas for dismantling. He pointed out that it was not clear to the U.S. side whether "areas" involved shipyards as well. Karpov stated he would not attempt to answer such a question--if there are no shipyards in an area then dismantling can't be done there. Karpov stated that the Soviet proposal really speaks for itself--the proposal is that dismantling be performed at existing shipyards known to both sides or in designated areas. The U.S. proposal just seemed to confuse the issue.

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FitzGerald stated he would repeat his earlier statement--that is the Soviet proposal involved a choice whereby dismantling could be accomplished in existing shipyards or in designated areas (Karpov interjected "If we go beyond those areas"). FitzGerald commented the U.S. side had not understood that and that our wording makes it clear that other areas are shipyards. DeSimone commented that there could be confusion between the terms "shipyards" and "designated areas" in the Soviet-proposed language. He pointed out it was logical to assume that the other designated areas are also places where shipyards exist, and therefore the U.S.-proposed wording provided for the same possibilities as did the Soviet proposal, but stated things much more precisely. There could be no question that dismantling would take place in shipyards known to both sides.

Karpov stated he had a third question. He asked "What do you mean by the term 'ship construction?'"

FitzGerald said that, if there were doubts as to the meaning of this expression, the U.S. side would be happy to add such a definition to the list of terms he and Yereskevsky were compiling. He then gave the floor to Atkinson.

Atkinson answered that if the Soviet side had allowed Capt. Mazerkin and himself to continue discussions on ship construction we would now know. Karpov stated he didn't recognize that there was much disagreement because the subject of ship construction wasn't discussed. Martin pointed out that in SALT VII in Helsinki, the term "under construction," as it applied to submarines had been discussed by Capt. McLean and Admiral Sinetsky. He pointed out to Karpov that, if there were Soviet concern regarding definitions in the new U.S. proposed Para. III.4, he would be glad to sit down at any time with Kuznetsov and work out coming to an agreement on what is meant by the terms.

FitzGerald stated that he believed Atkinson could clarify the term "shipyard." Atkinson stated that a "shipyard" was any place that has enough depth of water which would handle the tonnage of an SSBN or larger. Atkinson commented that the wording in the new U.S. proposal tabled today was an attempt on our part to broaden the definition as the Soviets had apparently objected to the term "where ballistic-missile submarines are constructed" in our earlier formulation. FitzGerald pointed out that the U.S. side could, of course, go back to the term "ballistic-missile submarines" vice "ships"--we had felt this was one of the areas where the Soviet side had problems and that our new wording here could solve the problem.

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Karpov stated that his questions were for clarification and added that now we have more or less an understanding of the U.S. side's position. He stated he had no other comments on the U.S. proposals; he wanted to do his homework and refrain from further comments. He added that, if we do agree to have another Working Group meeting, the Soviet side may discuss these new proposals then. Karpov then asked FitzGerald if he had any thoughts regarding another meeting of the Working Group. FitzGerald stated he did not--he felt the U.S. side had made two worthwhile contributions. Karpov asked if FitzGerald believed we did not need to discuss Section III any further. FitzGerald stated that the U.S. side had in mind that, when the Working Group had been established, Ustinov had said one or two meetings of the Working Group would be sufficient to make recommendations to Commissioners. He added, however, that Karpov had mentioned the Soviet side had homework to do and suggested that maybe we do need one more meeting.

Karpov stated that it would be agreeable to him to meet on Tuesday, May 21, to discuss all of these questions. Karpov stated that before this meeting ended he had two more items to address--not in relation to the discussion today but on related subjects. First, regarding Para. III.1(a) he had been instructed by Ustinov to accept the U.S. proposal to drop this paragraph. The second, regarding further discussion of submarine dismantling procedures, he wanted to come to an agreement on how to proceed with this question. He stated that, in fact, what we have are two sets of proposals--those proposed by the U.S. and those proposed by the Soviet Union. He stated that up to now, for some reason, our discussions have been limited primarily to the proposals of the U.S. side. His suggestion was that, at our next meeting, we should exchange views not only on the U.S. proposal but also on the Soviet proposal tabled May 10. Karpov urged that the U.S. side give thought to the Soviet May 10 proposal and added that the fact the Soviet side has no idea as to what the U.S. objections to the Soviet proposal are is a major stumbling block. He concluded stating we can now adjourn the meeting; his understanding being that we will meet again on Tuesday, the 21st at 11:00 o'clock.

FitzGerald stated that, having in mind a Karpov-FitzGerald meeting in SCC-II, he trusted this would not be the second longest adjournment of a meeting; however, he would like to address Karpov's last statements in reverse order. First, FitzGerald thought the U.S. side had made clear its considerations on the Soviet proposal for Para. III.1(d). He commented that at the moment he could not think of anything more he could say on the subject, but that

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he would ask Cdrs. Atkinson and Martin to relook at the problem. He could, however, not promise that our views would be new ones. Second, FitzGerald also wanted to state he was pleased that Karpov on instructions from Ustinov had accepted the U.S. proposal to delete Para. III.1(a).

FitzGerald commented with regard to the meeting of the Working Group on Tuesday that he would be happy to agree, with one qualification. That is, the U.S. side is not yet certain whether Georgi will have returned, and asked if Karpov would not object to FitzGerald chairing the meeting. Karpov commented he had "absolutely no objection."

The meeting adjourned at 1325.

Attachments

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Attachment No. 1

Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 17, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 1(e)

III.1(e) for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines originally constructed prior to 1965 whose ballistic missile launch tubes protrude into the fairwater, removing the missile launch tubes in the open as set forth below.

- (1) That entire part of the fairwater and outer hull above the missile compartment of the submarine shall be removed.
- (2) That section of the missile compartment pressure hull (hull crown plating, hull liners and frame segments) which contains all of the hull penetrations for the missile launch tubes, shall be removed.
- (3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then be restored only by welding into place new sections without launch tube penetrations.

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- (4) No fairwater shall be replaced. The sail may be restored, but shall not extend beyond the former location of the forward edge of the forward missile launch tube.

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Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 17, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES
SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 4

III.4. Ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling shall be accomplished at major shipyards, located in designated areas, where ship construction, fitting out or major overhaul is carried out.

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of Cdr. Atkinson and Cdr. Martin in compiling the definitions presented to the Soviet side under the guidance of Col. FitzGerald. The Soviet view, however, is that we are not working out a dictionary of naval terms and that, if the US side would look at the three terms in the Soviet document, the Soviet side had kept much of the wording used by the US side in working out their definitions for the terms "sail," "fairwater" and "superstructure." Yereskovsky concluded that it was the Soviet view that the Soviet document should be acceptable to the American side as it has all of the terminology required for agreement to Section III of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures. If there are any questions from the US side, Yereskovsky stated Capt. Kuznetsov would be prepared to answer them.

FitzGerald thanked Yereskovsky for the new document. He stated that in taking a quick look at the document which the Soviet Component today had submitted that he could see there are a few more switches in method and that there has been movement toward solving the tasks which the Commissioners assigned us. As a general observation, FitzGerald noted with satisfaction that the US and Soviet Components of the SCC seem to have arrived at a satisfactory "upper right hand corner wording" for SCC Working Documents. FitzGerald stated he remembered that at the early meetings of this SCC session the Soviet Component was tabling documents with the words "Working Document of the Soviet SCC Component" in the upper right hand corner; the US was tabling documents with the words "US Working Document" in the upper right hand corner. Then the US moved to using the Soviet wording; Soviet side moved to using the US wording. FitzGerald commented it seems at last we have made some progress in that we have agreed as to what should appear in the upper right hand corner of our documents.

Yereskovsky commented that there is one more question we need to address regarding what might appear in the upper right hand corner of the document--we need a date and a place of signature, e.g. Geneva. FitzGerald agreed.

FitzGerald, moving to the substance of the document, stated that the US side is pleased to notice that the document will be for internal use in the SCC--this is reflected by the heading which the Soviet side had used. Also FitzGerald added that he was happy the Soviet side agreed with us that instead of using the term "sides" we would use the term "Commissioners" as it is the Commissioners who would be initialing this document for internal use. FitzGerald concluded that while we haven't

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carefully had a chance to compare the terminology used, he noted that Yereskovsky had said that it was approximately the same as the language used in the US document. Yereskovsky stated, "That is correct. You will find it almost the same." FitzGerald responded that he would have to rely on other experts--Martin, Atkinson and Anderson--for a closer look.

FitzGerald stated that he had noticed that the Soviet side had adjusted their previous wording in the preamble and asked Yereskovsky the reasoning behind this as the US side had found their previous wording to be acceptable.

Yereskovsky stated that the Soviet thought was that perhaps in the final document we don't need to say "as a result of discussions held in the Working Group." He stated that the new preamble states the purpose of the document--the remainder is unchanged. FitzGerald stated he did not see any difficulty. Yereskovsky asked if the US side would like to revert to the original wording the Soviet side had used in the preamble, adding that the Soviet side considers the new wording a step forward as it better meets the purpose. FitzGerald stated that it is correct that we have had more discussions than those on May 7 and to include that one date really doesn't make sense. He stated that the US side would review the new wording but didn't see any major problem. FitzGerald suggested the US side might be inclined to delete the lead-in to the preamble and suggested it might start with other words like "the Commissioners have agreed" Yereskovsky said the Soviet side welcomed all suggestions the US side might have.

FitzGerald stated that the remarks he had made were the initial remarks on the US side on the document--in summary, he would say the Soviet Working Document tabled today was a step forward and a clear attempt to bring the needs of the two sides together. FitzGerald stated he would like to turn the floor over to Cdr. Atkinson who would make a few remarks on the purpose of the document as it would serve as a foundation for future work on the SCC.

Cdr. Atkinson stated that in looking over the document the US side tabled at the last meeting of the Working Group we find that of those terms which appear, of which there are nine, five of these terms appear both in the Soviet proposed procedures in paragraph III.1(d) and in the US proposal for paragraph III.1(e); three appear in the US proposal for paragraph III.1(e); one of the terms appears solely in the Soviet proposal for paragraph III.1(d).

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Specifically, he stated the term "sail" appears only in the Soviet proposed procedures; the terms "outer hull," "pressure hull," "fairwater," "superstructure" and "launch tube" appear in both proposed procedures; the terms "hull crown plating" and "framing" appear in the US tabled procedure. Atkinson stated that the US Component believed that these agreed interpretations should provide a foundation for the procedures in Section III and should therefore include the complete range of technical terminology which is used in that section. The reason that the US side believes this necessary is that the foundation must be strong enough for the rest of the structure to stand. Not only we in the SCC need to understand the meaning of the terms, but people in the US and Soviet governments also need a clear understanding of the terms in order to make judgments on the procedures proposed. Atkinson concluded, stating that these judgments can only be made after there is complete understanding of the complete scope of the detailed procedures tabled by both sides.

Yereskovsky stated that he had one small comment to make in reply to Cdr. Atkinson; perhaps Capt. Kuznetsov might have more to add. Yereskovsky stated that we are dealing in Section III with procedures for ballistic missile submarine and SLBM launchers dismantling. He stated the Soviet side believes that for the purpose of arriving at these dismantling procedures it is not necessary to include a complete dictionary of naval terminology beginning with the term "submarines," and including terms such as "submarine-launched ballistic missile," "missile compartment," "shipyard," etc. The Soviet side saw no need whatsoever to do this. In those places where there was some uncertainty, he stated, we think we have found a common interpretation; we don't need other definitions for the purpose of agreeing to dismantling procedures if they are clearly understood--it is simply not dictated by necessity.

Kuznetsov stated that the Soviet side had set forth during the last meeting of the Working Group the points which support the Soviet view that nine separate terms do not need to be defined in the document--the only items needed are terms on which there was confusion. Kuznetsov stated that he believed the foundation of the document will be strong, not by having a large number of terms included, but by including only those terms which really need clarification for paragraph one of Section III. He stated nine items will not help to do this--the three items defined in the Soviet working document today are all that are needed to address the essence of the problem.

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Yereskovsky stated that with regard to one term--"outer hull"--there has been no misunderstanding. He also stated there was no misunderstanding regarding the word "framing." Everyone understood these terms, he thought.

FitzGerald asked Cdr. Martin whether he had any comments. Martin began by stating that, as a result of his discussions with Capt. Kuznetsov over the previous weeks, it was clear to him that there was no question now within the SCC as to the meaning of the terms we are using. He stated that clearly the three terms which the Soviet side has included in the working document tabled today are the terms which have caused us the most trouble. Martin pointed out, however, that others we had come to agreement on had not always been clearly understood. He stated that in SCC II Capt. Mazerkin and Cdr. Owens had long and detailed discussions on the subject of submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling but there had been no clear agreement between them on such terms as "sail," "superstructure" and "fairwater." Martin referred to the example FitzGerald had pointed out at the last Working Group meeting whereby there had been much confusion in previous SCC sessions regarding the term "launch tube" and "launch mount tube." He also pointed out that there had been confusion regarding the term "outer hull"--for a long time the US side had not recognized that the "outer hull" is considered by the Soviets to be "superstructure." He added that our proposal for paragraph III.1(e) had intended that that type submarine, when dismantled, could be restored--the wording of our proposal however prohibited the Soviet side from replacing the outer hull.

Martin commented that he agreed with Yereskovsky that the SCC is not the place to come to grips with the whole range of terminology required to discuss limitations on submarines, suggesting that perhaps the SALT Delegations are better prepared to come to grips with defining terms such as "shipyard" and "submarine-launched ballistic missile." He pointed out that in SALT ONE the process of agreeing on definitions had been quite a lengthy process. He recalled his participation in Helsinki during SALT VII in work on defining the term "ICBM" and also referred to the working group in SALT ONE which worked on definitions on Article II of the ABM Treaty. Martin restated his view that there is no misunderstanding or disagreement regarding the substance of the terms which the US side had included in our Working Document. He stated that "nine" is not a magic number--more terms could be included; some could be dropped, or combined into other definitions. The important point is that the document should be a complete document; not just one that is half finished. He concluded by stating that he did not understand why, if there is no disagreement in substance, the Soviet Component could not agree to include all the terms used in the procedures in Section III in a document of definitions.

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Yereskovsky had no additional comments to make. Atkinson asked if he might make some additional remarks. FitzGerald agreed.

Atkinson stated he would like to address one of the comments made by Yereskovsky, and to address some additional subject matter. He began stating it is true that none of the definitions would be required if two of the US-proposed procedures were followed--"scrapping the submarine" and "removal of the missile section." It was however in the context of the US desire to accommodate initial Soviet proposals for submarine and SLBM dismantling and destruction that the US side proposed paragraph III.1(e)--it was then that these technical terms became important. He stated in paragraph III.1(e) the terms "hull crown plating," "framing" and "hull liner" are important to the US side and it must be established if they are to be used along with other elements of that paragraph. He concluded that as procedures get more complex, more technical terms appear. In order to have confidence in the procedures it is important that all terms be defined and included in a common understanding.

FitzGerald stated he had now had time to look at the Soviet working document and consult with experts on the US side--he commented that it looked as if the Soviet proposals for the terms "sail," "fairwater" and "superstructure" were an improvement on the words used in the US proposal of May 13.

Yereskovsky commented that maybe if the US side looks harder at the Soviet working document we might consider it even better.

FitzGerald stated that in that regard the US Component has a working document to present to the Soviet side today which may help to resolve the differences that exist. FitzGerald handed Yereskovsky the document (Attachment No. 2). FitzGerald pointed out after a comment by Yereskovsky regarding the number of terms in the document that the US side believes we are able to say that both sides had moved a lot closer together on the meaning of this document. Regarding the title, FitzGerald stated that the US side had seen the "crystal clear logic" of the Soviet argument that we are not coming up with definitions but rather we are developing interpretations. The US side believes the new wording is not in fact definitive; rather it is an attempt to make clear that when the Soviet side says one thing in its proposal it corresponds to the US side's understanding in its proposal. FitzGerald commented, with regard to the three definitions "sail," "fairwater" and "superstructure," that the wording of the terms and definitions in both US and Soviet documents are nearly the same and that he saw no problem in accepting Soviet definitions for them.

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Regarding the fourth term in US Working Document--"part of the pressure hull"--FitzGerald stated the US side had taken that term to correspond with US terms based on Kuznetsov/Martin discussions. He stated we had made no attempt to define "hull crown plating," "frame" and "hull liners" in our new proposal--we are merely attempting to equate Soviet and US terminology so we know this is indeed corresponding terminology. FitzGerald stated it is to some extent true that Yereskovsky and he could do the same thing while conforming language of the JDT but that this would not be beneficial to the people in the US and Moscow.

FitzGerald stated that after listening to Yereskovsky's statement at the last working group meeting, we also had concluded there was no confusion in the terms "hull crown plating," "framework" and "hull liners." We agreed we did not have to define them. FitzGerald stated the US side feels that when we use different technical language which equates to the same thing, the documents should, however, reflect that the different terms are in agreement.

In concluding FitzGerald stated the US side regards the new US Working Document as an attempt to meet Soviet considerations expressed in regard to the document which the Commissioners have assigned us the task of working out.

Yereskovsky thanked FitzGerald for the working document. He stated the Soviet side would certainly study it, and asked FitzGerald if he had any further comments for today's meeting. FitzGerald responded that he would be glad to answer any questions the Soviet side had.

Yereskovsky suggested that the formal meeting adjourn--he would have some questions to ask in private discussion. FitzGerald agreed.

The meeting was adjourned at 1610.

Attachments:

1. Working Document of the Soviet SCC Component, May 15, 1974, Agreed Interpretations of Some Terms Used in Section III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.
2. Working Document of US SCC Component, May 15, 1974, Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms Used in Section III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms

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Attachment No. 1

Official translation

Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component

May 15, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

AGREED INTERPRETATIONS OF SOME TERMS
USED IN SECTION III OF THE PROCEDURES
FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

To ensure uniform understanding of some terms used in submarine dismantling procedures, the Commissioners have agreed that for the purposes of the provisions of Section III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms the terms below shall mean:

1. SAIL - the structure above the outer hull which encloses the bridge, conning tower and retractable devices (antennas, periscopes, etc.).

2. FAIRWATER - on submarines on which the upper parts of missile launch tubes protrude into the enclosure which is adjacent to and is an extension of the sail, the fairwater is the structure above the outer hull which immediately encloses the missile launch tubes.

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3. SUPERSTRUCTURE - on submarines on which the upper parts of missile launch tubes do not protrude into the fairwater, the superstructure is the structure above the outer hull which encloses the missile launch tubes protruding through the pressure hull.

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Attachment No. 2

Working Document of

US SCC Component

May 15, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Agreed Interpretation of Some Terms
Used in Section III of the Procedures
for Strategic Offensive Arms

As a result of discussions held in the SCC working group on May 7, 1974, the Commissioners have agreed that, for purposes of the provisions of Section III of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures, the terms below shall mean:

SAIL

That structure above the outer hull which encloses the bridge, conning tower, antennas, periscope, etc. but does not enclose the ballistic-missile launch tubes.

FAIRWATER

On submarines whose ballistic-missile section is enclosed by structure adjacent and integral to the sail, the FAIRWATER is that structure above the outer hull which encloses the missile launch tubes.

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SUPERSTRUCTURE

On submarines whose missile launch tubes do not protrude into the fairwater, SUPERSTRUCTURE is the structure which extends upward from the outer hull above the water line and houses the portion of the missile launch tube which extends above the pressure hull.

PART OF THE
PRESSURE HULL

Hull crown plating of the pressure hull of a ballistic missile submarine together with all frame segments and hull liners.

LAUNCH TUBE

The cylindrical structure which is an integral part of the pressure hull and which immediately encloses the missile, to include the complete missile launcher, wiring, piping, and missile launch tube foundations.

OUTER HULL

The external hull of double-hulled submarines

PRESSURE HULL

The inner hull of double-hulled submarines;
the external hull of single-hulled submarines.

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SCC
Session-III
A- 219

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, May 14, 1974
US Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald	Mr. Karpov
Mr. Anderson	Mr. Yereskovsky
Cdr. Atkinson	Col. Belyanin
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Long	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Mr. Smith	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Afanassenko (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Graybeal welcomed Commissioner Ustinov and the members of the Soviet SCC Component, and opened the meeting. He explained that, as Ustinov already knew, General Georgi had been called to Washington on business not connected with the SCC, and said that we hoped he would rejoin us by the end of this week. He then gave the floor to Ustinov.

Commissioner Ustinov delivered a prepared statement on Para. I.6 of the offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 1), and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing proposed language for Para. I.6 of those Procedures (Attachment No. 2).

Mr. Graybeal said the new Soviet proposal and Ustinov's statement would be given careful study in the context of seeking satisfactory solutions to notification issues. Noting that he would restrict himself to two observations by way of preliminary response, he said he agreed with Ustinov that the problem of limiting accumulation of replacement submarines had been satisfactorily resolved with the language we had

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worked out for Para. 8 of the offensive Protocol. However, this was not related to the notification issue now being discussed; we are dealing with an entirely different problem, that of formulating adequate notification provisions to reduce any possibilities for misunderstanding or uncertainty regarding activities taking place on either side. The language proposed by the U.S. side on May 10 for the second half of Para 6(b) provides for reporting on the number of launchers on replacement submarines which had begun sea trials since the last report in the SCC. Together with the first part of that proposed Para. 6(b), we consider this to be the minimum required notification to keep an account of the status of replacement launchers and the dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers. A preliminary reading of today's Soviet proposal reveals that it seems to accept the second half of the U.S. May 10 proposal, but eliminates the first half of our May 10 proposal, which is also important and focused on a matter different from the accumulation of SLBM submarines and launchers.

Secondly, Graybeal continued, as he had indicated in his May 10 discussion with Ustinov, the notification proposed in our Para. 6(b) would merely require reporting on two events after they had already taken place. This, in the view of the U.S. side, would make an important contribution to reducing any misunderstanding or uncertainty regarding SLBM submarines specifically with regard to whether such submarines were new or replacement submarines.

These were his preliminary reactions and comments, which he hoped would be useful in working out mutually acceptable procedures. Graybeal concluded by noting again that he would forego further comment until such time as the U.S. side had more carefully studied today's Soviet proposal.

General Ustinov said that the Soviet side had tabled a new proposal today which, to a significant degree, took account of both the U.S. May 10 proposal and the views expressed by the U.S. side on this subject.

Ustinov continued by noting that Graybeal had said the U.S. May 10 language concerning notification on launched submarines dealt with a different problem from the one concerning accumulation. The problems were perhaps different, but the essence of the question is one and the same. Therefore, he would request that Graybeal give careful attention to Ustinov's own statement this morning, that the Soviet side cannot take the view that the problems are different.

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If the matter is going to be put in the way the U.S. side proposes, information could be requested concerning stages in SLBM submarine construction such as the beginning of construction, the completion of construction, launch of the submarine, etc. In the Soviet view this is not required by the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol. Both sides have agreed that the starting time for dismantling activities would be the time of the beginning of replacement submarine sea trials. That point in time was chosen because the beginning of sea trials is verifiable by national technical means. Therefore, the Soviet view is that no information is required concerning replacement submarines which have begun sea trials, but in spite of that the Soviet side has found it possible to accept the second half of the U.S.-proposed Para. 6(b). Therefore, the Soviet side could expect, he thought, this constructive step to provide the point of departure which would help us solve the whole problem of notification. Ustinov concluded by again expressing the hope that the U.S. side would give most careful attention to the new Soviet proposal tabled today.

Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov for his additional remarks, and said that as he had already indicated, the Soviet proposal would be given careful study. He felt that additional direct exchanges such as this always helped to provide clarification on the positions of the two sides.

He then asked Ustinov if there were anything else he would like to bring up this morning.

General Ustinov said the Soviet side had nothing further to discuss at this plenary meeting.

Mr. Graybeal said considerable progress had been made in some important areas during this SCC session, but two unresolved issues--notification and questions having to do with ballistic-missile submarine dismantling or destruction--were still before us. It was his understanding that the Working Group we had established to consider "naval issues" was clarifying terminology and conducting a useful exchange of information. He thought it desirable for that Working Group to have at least one more meeting to wind up its activity and enable it to make its report to Commissioners. He said he would not like to draw any conclusions concerning Section III of the Procedures until the Working Group had had at least one more meeting, which could be held on May 15 or 16.

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He said he would like to make a proposal this morning designed to facilitate the work of the Working Group and, he hoped, contribute to a satisfactory solution of all the issues in Section III. Taking account of past exchanges concerning the U.S.-proposed procedure in Section III.1(a), concerning sinking of replaced SLBM submarines, and considering related factors outside the scope of the SCC, such as the International Convention on Marine Pollution, the U.S. side proposes dropping the aforementioned alternative procedure for SLBM submarine dismantling or destruction. Thus, from the standpoint of the U.S. three alternative procedures now remain in Section III - scrapping, removing the submarine's missile section and not replacing it except with a significantly shorter section, and the proposal which is now in Para. III.1(e).

General Ustinov said he completely agreed with Graybeal's assessment of the activity of the Working Group, which was now basically concentrating on working out agreed terminology in connection with Section III of the Procedures. He also considered that work quite useful and thought it could facilitate mutual understanding. However, the Working Group has other questions remaining before it, for instance the new proposals submitted by the Soviet side on May 10 for Paras. 1(d) and 4 of Section III. Of course, Ustinov said, he hoped the U.S. side would express its views on these Soviet proposals.

Ustinov agreed that Graybeal's withdrawal of the U.S. "sinking" alternative left four alternative dismantling or destruction procedures as proposals in Section III -- the three to which Graybeal had referred and the Soviet proposal which was identified as Para. III.1(d). Naturally, since these are all valid alternatives one could say that they are all applicable to any type of submarine. Therefore, Ustinov said he would like the Working Group, in addition to working on terminology, to work on the formulations of these proposals. For its part, the Soviet side was ready to do this work as soon as the U.S. side is prepared, whether before or after the return of General Georgi.

Mr. Graybeal said he understood, and agreed except for one point -- that concerning the applicability of all the proposed alternative procedures to all classes of submarines.

Graybeal said that as he had indicated, Georgi would probably not rejoin us before May 17, but the U.S. side is prepared to proceed in the Working Group with FitzGerald substituting for Georgi if there were no objection on the part

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of the head of the Soviet side of the Working Group, Mr. Karpov. He would leave the questions of time, place, and composition of the Working Group to FitzGerald and Karpov.

Graybeal concluded that if Ustinov had nothing further, we should adjourn this meeting, and schedule the next meeting through our Executive Secretaries after we had had a chance to see where things stood in the next couple of days.

General Ustinov suggested that perhaps the Working Group could work on terminology at its next meeting on May 15 or 16, and then, at the following meeting, work on Section III issues under the leadership of Karpov and FitzGerald if Georgi had not yet returned.

Mr. Graybeal said that sounded like an agreeable plan.


General Ustinov agreed, and noted that of course the Commissioners could meet as well, at any time Graybeal desired.

Mr. Graybeal said, to sum up, that the Working Group would meet on May 15 or 16, and again on May 17, and that he and Ustinov could meet at any time in accord with the wishes of either Commissioner. He then adjourned the meeting.

Attachments:

1. Ustinov Statement on Para. I.6, offensive arms Procedures
2. Soviet Working Document

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Approved by:  S. N. Graybeal

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USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH I.6 OF STRATEGIC

OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

May 14, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

Taking into account past discussions, today I want to address the question of notification, specifically, to consider paragraph I.6 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms in connection with those proposals for subparagraph (b) which you officially tabled during our informal discussion of May 10.

The position of the Soviet side and specific proposals for modified wording of this paragraph were set forth in our statement of May 7, 1974.

In studying the new formulation of subparagraph (b), proposed by the U.S. side, we note that to a certain degree it takes into account the point of view of the Soviet side on the question of prior notification. Specifically, deletion of the provision for notification on the number of ballistic missile launchers on submarines, that will begin sea trials during the next six-month period, is a step in the right direction.

However, in place of the deleted provision, the U.S. side included in this subparagraph a provision for

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notification on the number of launchers on submarines "which have been launched but not yet begun sea trials."

I must say candidly that the U.S. side's tabling of a proposal on inclusion in the notification information on submarines "which have been launched but not yet begun sea trials" only puzzles the Soviet SCC Component.

Doesn't it seem to you, Mr. Commissioner, that by doing so the U.S. Component of the SCC thereby again, and seemingly anew, is opening a discussion of problems which have already been the subject of thorough consideration and solved on a mutually acceptable basis? Therefore I will not repeat those arguments which the Soviet side presented at the last session of the SCC in connection with consideration of the U.S. proposal for limiting to a specific number submarines that have been launched but have not yet begun sea trials.

I merely want to say that the sides found a solution at that time. They agreed that the number of replacement ballistic missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. The concept of a normal construction schedule was formulated in paragraph 8 of

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the Protocol for strategic offensive arms. Thus the U.S side's proposal for limiting to four the number of ballistic missile submarines concurrently in a launched status was withdrawn. It would seem that the issue had been resolved. Now, you are again raising the same question in essence though in a different context--the context of notification. Clearly such a proposal cannot be acceptable to the Soviet side.

The Soviet side also believes it necessary to draw the attention of the U.S. Component of the SCC to the fact that with respect to replacement procedures for ICBMs and ballistic-missile submarines the sides have agreed to a kind of time criterion, which establishes that dismantling of replaced ICBM and SLBM launchers must begin not later than the time of the beginning of sea trials of the replacement submarine.

Therefore, information concerning earlier stages of construction or fitting out of a replacement submarine is not required; there is no need whatsoever for it from the point of view of implementing the replacement provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

Mr. Commissioner, at the same time, desiring to promote progress toward achieving mutually acceptable

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solutions in the area of notification, the Soviet side accepts your proposal for specifying the number of ballistic missile launchers on replacement submarines which have begun sea trials during the period since the last notification.

In this connection the proposals for wording of paragraph I.6 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, tabled by us on May 7, could read as follows.

(Paragraph I.6 is read)

Mr. Commissioner, I hope that this new proposal of the Soviet side will move us significantly forward in the matter of resolving the whole notification issue and will contribute to overall success in our work.

Thank you for your attention.

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Official translation

Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component

May 14, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Section I, paragraph 6

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission and covering the period since the last report in the SCC:

- (a) on the number of ICBM launchers, deployed prior to 1964, and SLBM launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been completed;
- (b) on the number of ballistic-missile launchers on replacement submarines which have begun sea trials;
- (c) on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, out of the number dismantled or destroyed, which have been replaced by ballistic-missile launchers on modern submarines since the last report.

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SCC
Session-III
A-207

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, May 7, 1974
U.S. Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Yereskovsky
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald	Col. Belyanin
Mr. Anderson	Capt. Kuznetsov
Cdr. Atkinson	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Mr. Long	Capt. Korobchenko
Lt. Cdr. Martin	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Smith	
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	
Mr. Afanasenko (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Graybeal welcomed the Soviet Component of the SCC, and declared the meeting open. He said that the U.S. Component was sorry to hear that Mr. Karpov was ill, and wished him a rapid recovery and a speedy return to work. He also introduced Cdr. Atkinson, who was with us for the first time today and would be working with us for the remainder of this SCC Session.

Commissioner Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and said that he shared those thoughts expressed in Graybeal's opening remarks, and that the Soviet Component was happy to welcome Cdr. Atkinson.

Mr. Graybeal said that in accord with the understanding discussed by our Executive Secretaries, he would speak first. He said he had a statement with respect to Section III of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, delivered his prepared comments, and handed over a Working Document containing the language being proposed as paragraph III.4 (Attachment No. 1).

General Ustinov said that Graybeal's statement would be carefully studied by the Soviet side. By way of preliminary reaction, he wanted to say that the Soviet Component considered the proposal it tabled on April 30, on the scope of dismantling for SLBM submarines, to be quite constructive; it was a significant

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move in the direction of the U.S. side's position. He said he was sorry that the U.S. Component had not yet found a way to bring its position closer to that set forth by the Soviet side on April 30.

He then delivered a prepared statement on shipyards for SLBM submarine destruction or dismantling (Attachment No. 2), and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing proposed new wording for paragraph III.1 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 3).

Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov, and said that both the statement and the proposal would be given careful consideration. He said he had noted that the Soviet proposal was for paragraph III.1(e), and asked whether he had properly understood. Was this proposal being suggested as a subparagraph of paragraph 1, or as a new added paragraph for Section III? That is, did the Soviet side intend that it apply to all the alternative dismantling procedures, or only to one of them?

General Ustinov said that Graybeal had correctly understood the way the proposal was numbered, but that it could be included as a new paragraph 4, or as a new paragraph anywhere in Section III, in the same way that Graybeal had proposed his own new paragraph for Section III this morning.

Mr. Graybeal said he understood. He then stated that as he understood the scenario that had been worked out for this morning's meeting, General Ustinov had another statement he wished to make at this point.

General Ustinov laughed and said that he thought he would be out of turn, but quickly added that he was nevertheless prepared. He delivered a statement on notification (Attachment No. 4), and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing proposed language for paragraph I.6 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 5).

Mr. Graybeal said that the new Soviet proposal and the statement Ustinov had made in connection with it would both be very carefully studied. He would postpone any comment on the specifics of that proposal until he had had a chance to carefully study the newly proposed language for paragraph 6, and would restrict his comments this morning to some general observations.

The U.S. side, Graybeal said, had addressed the question of notification on numerous occasions, specifically, during this session, on April 19, April 23, and May 3. As Ustinov had noted in his statement, there is agreement between us that notification

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is not required for adequate verification of compliance by national technical means. However, Graybeal continued, as he had indicated on April 19 and May 3, the utility of notification is much broader than that, and should be considered on its own merits. The U.S. side has set forth its views on this subject, and hopes that they will be taken into account, just as the Soviet views presented this morning would be taken into account. He would encourage the Soviet side to carefully study the U.S. proposal presented today regarding modifications to Section III of the offensive Procedures. This proposal would not require any prior notification, predesignation, or designation of the shipyards to be used for dismantling or destruction unless yards other than those used for construction of ballistic missile submarines were used. He wanted to note, in this connection, that when we referred to shipyards used for construction, we included fitting out of submarines.

Graybeal said that we have made progress in this SCC Session, but still have some very difficult and complex issues before us. He would agree with Ustinov's comment that further progress toward the mutually agreed procedures we are trying to work out requires taking into account the views and considerations of both sides. He assured Ustinov again that Soviet views would be studied by the U.S. side, just as we would ask the Soviet side to study our views, and we would be returning to the subject of Section III, as well as to the subject of notification, at subsequent meetings.

Mr. Graybeal said that the U.S. side agrees with the proposal Ustinov made at the May 3 meeting, concerning establishment of a working group to take account of the views of both sides on Section III, to clarify the terminology used by both sides in addressing that complex subject so as to be sure that we understood one another, and to make, if possible, recommendations on Section III to the SCC Commissioners.

Before adjourning this meeting so that the working group could begin its own work, Graybeal said, he wanted to note that the Executive Secretaries had today conformed the Russian and English texts of Section II of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, as well as paragraph I.2 of the ABM Procedures, and that we could exchange those texts this morning. He added that this summary of his understanding of where we stand in terms of the working group schedule and the exchange of texts was not intended to preclude Ustinov's making further comments on the substantive issues being discussed.

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General Ustinov noted that the Soviet side carefully studies all statements made by the U.S. side at SCC meetings, as well as those made during informal conversations between Commissioners after those meetings. He believed that there were two basic questions remaining to which we must give primary attention at this point in time; these were the questions of naval matters and notification. With mutual and careful attention to those matters, we can make progress, just as we have made progress and achieved solutions to other questions which were no less complex or important.

Ustinov, reading from a prepared note, said that the Executive Secretary of the Soviet SCC Component, Mr. Yereskovsky, had reported that he and Col. FitzGerald had completed conforming the texts of Section II of the offensive arms Procedures, and paragraph I.2 of the ABM Procedures. These could be considered Joint Texts as of May 7, with the understanding that they are subject to consideration by Governments and that either side could propose amendments or changes if they were deemed necessary. He handed Graybeal the Russian language texts of the referenced portions of the Joint Draft Texts.

Mr. Graybeal said he agreed with Ustinov's statement concerning the status of those portions of the documents we are working on, and said he would like to pass to Ustinov the English language texts which were to be considered preliminarily agreed by Commissioners (Attachment No. 6).

He then asked if Ustinov had any further matters to bring up today.

General Ustinov said he had nothing more for this morning.

Mr. Graybeal suggested that in that case, the next meeting of the SCC be scheduled based on progress in the working group. We could keep in touch while monitoring the activity of the working group, and thus determine an appropriate time for the next SCC meeting.

General Ustinov agreed, and noted with satisfaction Graybeal's acceptance of the proposal to establish a working group which would be headed by Yereskovsky and FitzGerald today. As he saw it, the task for today's working group meeting would be to go over the terminology used by both sides in Section III of the strategic offensive arms Procedures. He said he did not know whether or not Graybeal agreed, but he thought that in the future, for example on May 10, the working group could continue its work under the chairmanship of Mr. Karpov and General Georgi,

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and attempt to find solutions on Section III which were satisfactory for both sides. Later, taking account of progress made in the working group, we could set a date for the next SCC meeting. If the working group was successful in its work, we could further apply the same approach with respect to the questions of notification which had been referred to at today's meeting.

He closed by reminding the U.S. side of its invitation to lunch at the Soviet Mission tomorrow, May 8, at 1:00 p.m.

Mr. Graybeal agreed that the working group, headed by FitzGerald and Yereskovsky and with the participation of advisors directly concerned with naval matters, should go to work today. He saw no reason why we could not agree to continue that work on Friday, May 10, under the chairmanship of General Georgi and Mr. Karpov, and decide on the date of the next SCC meeting after that. He did not want, however, to comment on, or prejudge, the desirability of establishing a working group on notification.

He said the U.S. Component was pleased, as always, to accept an invitation to lunch from the Soviet Component. He thought that such occasions were extremely enjoyable and that the exchanges which took place at them were very useful, but he was not certain that our waistlines could always tolerate them.

General Ustinov nodded in assent to Graybeal's remarks.

Graybeal declared the meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

Attachments:

1. Graybeal Comments and U.S. Working Document on Section III of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures
2. Ustinov Statement on Shipyards for SLBM Submarine Destruction or Dismantling
3. Soviet Working Document on para III.1 of Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures
4. Ustinov Statement on Notification
5. Soviet Working Document on para I.6 of Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures
6. Joint Draft Texts, Section II of Offensive Procedures, and paragraph I.2, ABM Procedures .

Drafted by FPDeSimone:sbs

Approved by: SNG^{SNH}Graybeal

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Attachment No. 1

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - SECTION III OF
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

May 7, 1974

I.

1. Mr. Commissioner, at our meeting on April 30, I set forth U.S. views regarding the procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers replaced by new ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers. As I stated then, we believe the U.S. proposals in the JDT's of April 19, 1974, as revised by the U.S. side on April 30, provide a firm basis for agreement.

2. I have reviewed the Soviet statements regarding procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers and am convinced that the alternative procedures proposed by the U.S. side should be acceptable to both sides. In my opinion, the Soviet proposal for Section III, Para.1(d) of April 30, 1974 does not adequately meet the criteria set forth in Para. 3 of the Protocol. Therefore, it is not an acceptable substitute for Para. (e).

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II.

3. I believe there is complete agreement between us on the fundamental point that the procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers must satisfy the agreed criteria contained in Para. 3 of the Strategic Offensive Arms Protocol. The four alternative procedures proposed by the U.S. side clearly do meet these criteria. Further, the U.S. side firmly believes that the U.S.-proposed procedures provide adequate and effective alternatives for all presently known classes of submarines. The procedures we have proposed are verifiable by national technical means, and they are such that reactivation time of replaced submarines and launchers would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction. It is my view that the alternative procedures proposed by the U.S. side provide for reasonable economy of effort and funds, and permit the possibility of using the submarines, after dismantling, for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

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III.

4. Mr. Commissioner, we are agreed that the task before us is to work out mutually agreed procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms called for by the Interim Agreement. Today, in an effort to move our negotiations forward toward this goal, the U.S. side is proposing a significant modification to Section III of the Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures concerning ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling. Specifically, we propose to add a fourth paragraph to Section III as follows:

(Read and hand over text)

4. "Ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling shall be carried out at those shipyards where ballistic-missile submarine construction is accomplished, or at additionally agreed (or designated) shipyards."

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5. The U.S. side proposes that this sentence become new Para. 4 in Section III. With the addition of this paragraph, the U.S. side is prepared to drop the present requirement for "predesignated shipyards" and "agreed shipyards" in Paras. III.1(b) (c) and (e).

6. This new U.S. approach has a precedent in the SALT negotiations--it parallels Article IV of the ABM Treaty dealing with ABM test ranges wherein the U.S. and Soviet Union have agreed on "currently or additionally agreed test ranges."

IV.

7. Mr. Commissioner, I emphasize again the firm conviction of the U.S. side that the ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling or destruction procedures proposed by the U.S. side provide a sound basis for agreement on Section III.

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Working Document of
US SCC Component
May 7, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 4

III.4. "Ballistic-missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling shall be carried out at those shipyards where ballistic-missile submarine construction is accomplished, or at additionally agreed (or designated) shipyards."

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Attachment No. 2

USTINOV STATEMENT ON SHIPYARDS FOR SLBM SUBMARINE

DISMANTLING

May 7, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

At today's meeting I would also like to address again the question of shipyards at which submarine dismantling or destruction will be accomplished.

I have already set forth the position of the Soviet side on this question and it remains valid. I repeat again, briefly, its basic elements.

In our view, prior notification on the location of submarine dismantling or destruction is inadvisable for the following reasons:

first, in our view, designation of shipyards supplants the functions of national technical means which are charged with verifying compliance with the Interim Agreement and the Procedures we are working out;

second, dismantling or destruction of submarines takes a long time, during which national technical means of verification are capable, with a high degree of reliability, of carrying out verification of the progress of this work. The duration of the process of dismantling in conjunction with its accomplishment in the open, on which both sides agree, permits each side to follow the

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progress of the dismantling work with adequate confidence, wherever it is carried out. This being so, it is our deep conviction that no additional information on this question is required. At the same time, taking into account the position of the U.S. side on this question and desiring to assure achievement of a mutually acceptable solution, the Soviet side considers it possible to propose the following wording for Section III of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms. (The wording is read). In order to clarify the meaning of "dismantling area," I can say that for the United States-- this can be, for example, the Atlantic and Pacific areas, and for the Soviet Union--the Northern and Pacific areas.

Mr. Commissioner, we hope that the U.S. Component of the SCC will carefully study the new, constructive Soviet proposal aimed at successful accomplishment of the tasks before us.

This proposal will contribute to purposeful verification of the dismantling of ballistic-missile submarines being replaced, insisted upon by the U.S. side, and at the same time will make it possible to avoid agreeing on specific locations of this work, to which the Soviet side objects as a matter of principle.

Thank you for your attention.

Official translation

Soviet Working Document

May 7, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

paragraph III.1

(e) Dismantling or destruction of replaced ballistic-missile submarines, carried out in accordance with the specified procedures, shall be accomplished in designated areas.

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Attachment No. 4

USTINOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION

May 7, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

At today's meeting I will once again address the notification questions to which a mutually acceptable solution has not yet been found at the current session, due to differences between us.

We have repeatedly set forth in detail the position of the Soviet side on these questions; therefore, there is no need to address it fully. I merely want to direct your attention once again to its main provisions of principle.

The Soviet side is against prior notifications because, just as the U.S. side, it believes that with national technical means of verification at the disposal of both sides, such notifications are not necessary for verification purposes. In as much as they are not required for verification, there is no need to include them in the Procedures.

We believe that for these same reasons, advance designation of shipyards where dismantling of SLBM launchers is carried out, should also not be included

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in the Procedures. In its place we have proposed today the designation of areas for submarine dismantling. This is a constructive proposal of the Soviet side. It is aimed at achieving agreement on this question with account for the proposals of the U.S. side.

Taking into account that in their statements at the first, second, and current sessions both sides have emphasized the reliability of national technical means with respect to questions of verifying compliance with obligations assumed by the sides, we also believe that it is superfluous to specify in the notifications the number of launchers by type, since national technical means can determine with full reliability what types of launchers are undergoing dismantling.

With regard to the proposals of the U.S. side concerning notification on the number of launchers, dismantling of which is in process, we believe that such notification will add nothing to the Procedures but complications in accounting, and therefore, consider it inadvisable.

In view of the reasons given by me, the Soviet Component of the Commission remains convinced that notification must be made at the beginning of each regular session of the SCC on the number of dismantled

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or destroyed ICBM, SLBM, and ABM launchers and radars, as well as on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers which have been replaced since the last report.

Such a proposal of the Soviet side should be regarded as a part of the mutually agreed procedures being worked out by us. Obviously, in order to make progress on this question, it is necessary to take into account the points of view and positions of both sides.

Desiring to promote progress in our negotiations, today we are proposing for consideration a refined formulation of paragraph I.6 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms.

(Wording of paragraph I.6 is read)

Careful study of the text of this formulation will show you that in subparagraph (a) we have used the word "actual," and ^{that} the provision contained in subparagraph (b) is formulated somewhat differently from the way it was in the previous Soviet proposal.

Mr. Commissioner, this was done with account for those discussions in the course of which opinions were expressed about the possibility of situations when, for

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various reasons, the number of replacement launchers could exceed the number dismantled.

That wording of paragraph 6, which we are now proposing, makes it more clear that we are speaking of the actual status with respect to dismantling and replacement as of the beginning of a regular session of the SCC. It shows that the number of launchers replaced can be equal to or less than, but certainly not greater than, the number of launchers dismantled or destroyed. We have also taken into account the common point of view of both sides that the number of dismantled launchers and the number of replaced launchers constitute two different categories and therefore are subject to separate accounting.

Mr. Commissioner, we believe that the new Soviet wording of paragraph I.6 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms represents a step forward toward resolving the question of notification procedures. We hope that the U.S. Component of the Commission will carefully study this proposal.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 5

Official translation

Soviet Working Document

May 7, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

paragraph I.6

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission and covering the period since the last report in the SCC:

(a) on the number of ICBM launchers, deployed prior to 1964, and SLBM launchers on which dismantling or destruction has been completed;

(b) on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers, out of the number dismantled or destroyed, which have been replaced by ballistic-missile launchers on modern submarines since the last report.

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Attachment No. 6

Joint Draft Text
Section II of Procedures for
Strategic Offensive Arms
Preliminarily Agreed by Commissioners
May 7, 1974

II. Procedures For Dismantling or Destruction of
Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

- (a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment; and
- (b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, associated with the launcher and located at the launch site, and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

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- (a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;
- (b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site; and
- (c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads and of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and the fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site; and

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(b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silo shall remain open for a period of six months, after which it may be filled with earth.

4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

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Joint Draft Text
Paragraph 1.2 of Procedures
for ABM Systems
Preliminarily Agreed by Commissioners
May 7, 1974

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and headworks, and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth.

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SCC
Session-III
A-203

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, May 3, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Belyanin
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Capt. Kuznetsov
Mr. Long	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Mr. Smith	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Afanassenko (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Ustinov declared the meeting open and gave the floor to Graybeal.

Commissioner Graybeal gave his prepared comments on paragraph I.2 of the ABM Procedures (Attachment No. 1).

General Ustinov delivered a brief prepared statement on the same subject, and tabled a Soviet Working Document containing the formulation for paragraph I.2 of the ABM Procedures which, in the view of the Soviet SCC Component, should become "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners" (Attachment No. 2).

Mr. Graybeal said that a quick review of the Soviet Working Document just handed to him, along with Ustinov's remarks, indicated that the two sides have preliminary agreement concerning that paragraph dealing with dismantling or destruction of silo ABM launchers.

He said he had noted that the Soviet side, apparently based on the precedent in the draft offensive arms Procedures, had used the formulation "may" rather than "shall" (be filled with earth) with respect to the action to be taken six months after the dismantling or destruction of the launchers. His preliminary reaction was that the language of the paragraph as it appeared in the Soviet Working Document could be considered "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners," including that use of the word "may."

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He added that we should probably task our Executive Secretaries to conform the English and Russian texts of the language for paragraph I.2; though he saw no major problems, it could be checked now. He commented that he was happy to see that we had solved this "and/or" problem much more easily than similar problems in the early phases of SALT, which Mr. Karpov, in particular, would appreciate.

Graybeal said he would like to return to a subject which still remains one of the unresolved issues before us in our efforts to work out mutually agreed procedures, and present some considerations on notification. He then delivered his prepared comments on that subject (Attachment No. 3), and inserted the comment that he would not repeat all of the arguments and rationale previously presented by the U.S. side for its proposals.

General Ustinov said that Graybeal's statement would be studied, and immediately launched into his statement on paragraph I.2 of the offensive arms Procedures, concerning the definition of a "modern SLBM" (Attachment No. 4). In connection with that, he tabled a Soviet Working Document consisting of proposed language for that paragraph (Attachment No. 5).

Mr. Graybeal said the U.S. side had carefully listened to Ustinov's remarks, and added that both the statement and the proposal would be carefully studied.

He had one question, however; to clarify Ustinov's proposal concerning establishment of a working group, he wanted to know whether that working group, in Ustinov's view, would discuss both the proposed language for paragraph I.2 and the remaining issues in Section III of the offensive arms Procedures. He had understood Ustinov's statement in that way, and had further understood Ustinov to say that he considered it possible to discuss the possibility of agreeing on the language proposed today for paragraph I.2 provided mutually acceptable solutions are found for Section III.

General Ustinov said that when he proposed establishing a working group, he had in mind that the respective positions of the sides on naval matters would be clarified in more detail. This included Section III and paragraph I.2; what he also had in mind was a detailed study of the proposals of both sides on the questions in those parts of the Joint Draft Text, with a view to trying to arrive at a common view on them. The Soviet side felt that General Georgi and Mr. Karpov should be assisted in their work by the appropriate experts from both Components of the SCC. He said he further felt that in order to clarify the matters in question, the working group would probably need only a meeting or two, after which work on these subjects could continue in the forum of the entire SCC.

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Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov for the additional clarification of his proposal, and said that he understood it. He stated that he would like a little time to think about it and discuss it with the other members of the U.S. Component, and that he would respond to the proposal as soon as possible. He indicated that General Ustinov again had the floor.

General Ustinov said he had no further matters to bring up today.

Mr. Graybeal said that he, also, had nothing further.

General Ustinov stated that, in that case, we could probably agree that the next meeting would take place on Tuesday, May 7, at 11:00 a.m. The decision as to whether it would be a plenary session of the SCC or a meeting of the working group could be made after Graybeal had decided whether or not to accept the proposal to establish a working group.

Mr. Graybeal remarked that the two sides might even decide to have both kinds of meetings on May 7, and schedule a working group meeting to follow an SCC meeting on that date.

General Ustinov said that was also possible, and adjourned the meeting at 11:35 a.m., commenting as he did so that he would await Graybeal's response concerning the establishment of a working group.

Attachments:

1. Graybeal Comments on para I.2 of ABM Procedures
2. Ustinov Statement on para I.2 of ABM Procedures, and Soviet Working Document
3. Graybeal Comments on Notification
4. Ustinov Statement on para I.2 of Offensive Arms Procedures
5. Soviet Working Document on para I.2 of Offensive Arms Procedures

Drafted by: FPDeSimone:sbs

Approved by: SNGraybeal

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COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - PARAGRAPH I.2. OF
PROCEDURES FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

May 3, 1974

1. Mr. Commissioner, the only bracketed portions of the Joint Draft Texts for the Protocol and Procedures for ABM Systems and Their Components, other than those related to notification, are the two words "and" versus "or" in paragraph I.2 of the Procedures. The issue, simply stated, is whether dismantling or destruction of the headworks (if present) should be mandatory or optional.

2. The U.S. side continues to believe that, where headworks are present, their dismantling or destruction should be mandatory. Without such a provision the agreed reactivation time criterion contained in paragraph 3 of the Protocol would not be met.

3. We are aware of no reason why a procedure similar to that preliminarily agreed to for silo ICBM launchers should not also be applied to those silo ABM launchers which have headworks.

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4. Mr. Commissioner, the procedures we are discussing this morning apply to "Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges." It is understood that these procedures shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the procedures to be worked out for dismantling or destruction and replacement of ABM systems and their components at operational ABM deployment areas as provided for in the ABM Treaty.

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USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH I.2 OF ABM PROCEDURES

May 3, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

Today we would like to express our views concerning the Procedures governing dismantling or destruction of ABM systems and their components, specifically, that part of Section I of this document which concerns the scope of dismantling or destruction of excess ABM launchers at test ranges.

We have again carefully studied the proposal tabled by the U.S. side at SCC-II on paragraph I.2 of the ABM Procedures, concerning the scope of measures necessary for putting silo launchers in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ABMs.

We, also, believe that the dismantling of ABM silo launchers at test ranges can be carried out applying that scope preliminarily agreed by us on April 30, 1974 for land-based silo ICBM launchers. Therefore, the Soviet side proposes the following wording for paragraph I.2 of the ABM Procedures:

"2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures

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and headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth."

Thank you for your attention.

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Official translation

Soviet Working Document

May 3, 1974

ABM PROCEDURES

Section I, paragraph 2

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth.

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COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - NOTIFICATION

May 3, 1974

1. Mr. Commissioner, we have carefully studied the statements you made and we note that you are still studying the clarifications we provided to your questions on notification. But, the two sides still appear to be far apart on the overall issue of notification in spite of the efforts made by the U.S. side to facilitate progress in this area.

2. It remains the U.S. position that certain notification provisions would promote the objectives of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement by reducing the possibilities for uncertainties and misunderstandings and thereby enhance the viability of these agreements and contribute to continued improved relations between our two countries. The U.S. side believes that significant benefits could be achieved at little or no cost or effort, and at no risk to the security interests of either side.

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3. Mr. Commissioner, I would like to reemphasize the importance the U.S. side attaches to including adequate notification provisions in the mutually agreed procedures we are charged with working out in the SCC. Consequently, I repeat that the U.S. proposals regarding notification should be considered on their own merit as an integral part of the mutually agreed procedures we are developing. Progress requires taking into account the views and concerns of both sides.

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USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH I.2 OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

May 3, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

At today's meeting I would like to return again to paragraph I.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms.

The Soviet side has already expressed its point of view on this question on April 19, 1974. Briefly stated, we believe the addition proposed by the U.S. side to be superfluous, since the definition of a modern SLBM, as it applies to the tasks of the procedures which we are working out, is expressed with adequate completeness in the agreed portion of the formulation for paragraph 2.

On April 19, 1974 the U.S. side submitted for the Commission's consideration two modified alternative versions of wording, supplementing its bracketed proposal of November 16, 1973, and stated that it considers these to be preferable.

The Soviet Component of the Commission has carefully studied these drafts and remains convinced that introduction of the proposed addition to paragraph 2 will not add anything new of substance in terms of accomplishing the tasks stemming from the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

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Mr. Commissioner, there is a large group of questions concerning ballistic-missile submarines under consideration by the Commission. It is apparent from past discussions that achievement of mutually acceptable solutions to these questions is meeting with rather considerable difficulties.

It would appear useful to approach solution of these questions taking into account all aspects of this matter, especially the fact that both the definition of a modern SLBM, and resolution of the questions contained in Section III of the Procedures, ought to be considered in the context of the provisions of the Interim Agreement concerning the replacement of weapons, covered by that agreement, by new ballistic-missile submarines.

Therefore, desiring to facilitate finding mutually acceptable solutions, and taking into account the importance which the U.S. side attaches to the addition to paragraph I.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, the Soviet Component of the SCC is prepared, in principle, to discuss the question of the possibility of considering the U.S. addition to paragraph I.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, provided mutually acceptable solutions for Section III of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms are found.

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In that case, the following wording of the addition to paragraph I.2 of the Procedures, defining a modern SLBM, could be taken as a basis for discussion.

(The wording of paragraph I.2 is read)

It seems to me that we could establish a working group, headed by Mr. Georgi and Mr. Karpov, for the purpose of a more detailed discussion of these questions.

Thank you for your attention.

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Official translation

Soviet Working Document

May 3, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Section I, paragraph 2

2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine regardless of type.

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SCC
Session III
A- 200

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, April 30, 1974
US Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) FitzGerald	Col. Belyanin
Mr. Anderson	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. Bartos	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Mr. Long	Capt. Korobchenko
Lt. Cdr. Martin	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Smith	
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Graybeal declared the meeting open and delivered a brief prepared statement noting that there appeared to be preliminary agreement by Commissioners on Section II of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, and provided the Soviet side with English and Russian texts of the language for that section which the US side believes is now preliminarily agreed by Commissioners (Attachment No. 1).

Commissioner Ustinov said the Soviet Component of the Commission is pleased that we have been able to reach agreement in principle on one of the most important sections of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, Section II, which governs the scope of dismantling on land-based ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964. He added that such agreement had become possible thanks to a constructive approach by both sides towards solving problems in a spirit of mutual understanding. Ustinov said he thought the two Executive Secretaries could be charged with presenting to the Commissioners, sometime next week, the Joint Draft of the Text of Section II "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners". It went without saying that this language was subject to consideration and approval by Governments, and that either side could propose changes or amendments if they were

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considered necessary. He concluded by expressing the hope that other remaining unagreed issues would be dealt with just as quickly and successfully as had been Section II.

Mr. Graybeal agreed that the English and Russian texts of the language for Section II should be conformed under the supervision of the Executive Secretaries. He also noted his agreement with Ustinov's remarks that, obviously, we could return to this subject if either Government deemed it necessary, and that "nothing is agreed until all is agreed."

Graybeal said that he had wanted to lead off at this morning's meeting because he had thought it useful to respond to the proposals made by the Soviet side, and the progress made at the last meeting and during the subsequent conversation between Commissioners, by tabling the language the US side considered to be preliminarily agreed at this point.

He concluded by commenting that important work on the resolution of other issues still remained, and with that returned the floor to Ustinov.

General Ustinov delivered a prepared statement on Para. III.1 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 2) containing a Soviet proposal on submarine dismantling, and tabled that proposal in the form of a Working Document (Attachment No. 3).

Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov's statement and the proposal he had tabled would be given the most careful study by the US side. Without commenting further at this time on the new Soviet proposal, Graybeal said, he would like to set forth US views regarding Section III of the offensive arms Procedures. He then delivered his prepared comments on ballistic missile submarine and SLBM launcher dismantling or destruction (Attachment No. 4).

In presenting his comments, Graybeal noted Ustinov's mention in his own statement of the need to satisfy the agreed criteria included in Para. 3 of the offensive arms Protocol.

He tabled a Working Document of the US SCC Component containing new language for subparagraph III.1(e) of the offensive arms Procedures, noting that it incorporated those changes in the language of that subparagraph to which he had referred in his comments (Attachment No. 5).

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Graybeal said that he had no further considerations to present at this morning's meeting.

General Ustinov said that Graybeal's statement, as well as the revised US proposal, would be studied by the Soviet side. Both sides had tabled proposals for Section III, and we would have the opportunity to exchange points of view on this subject in the future. However, he said, he would like to draw attention again to the proposal the Soviet side had tabled for consideration today. In his view, it was quite constructive, and acceptable to both sides. He simply wanted to suggest careful study of that proposal.

Ustinov said he would like to continue with some considerations concerning several issues which had been addressed at previous meetings, if Graybeal had no objection.

Mr. Graybeal said it was his pleasure to listen to considerations of the Soviet side on any issue which needed further discussion, in the spirit of direct and frank consideration of all issues between the two sides. He noted that the US side always listened very carefully to any remarks made by Ustinov.

General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and delivered a prepared statement on notification (Attachment No. 6).

Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov's statement would be carefully studied, and that he would restrict his preliminary reaction to three points:

First, there is agreement between the sides that prior notification, or any notification, for that matter, is not required for verification of compliance with the Interim Agreement and its Protocol or with the Procedures we are working out. There was one important exception, as had been previously mentioned by the US side. If either side chooses to implement the Procedure calling for sinking of a submarine, that would require some notification to insure adequate verification.

Second, mutual trust and the viability of existing agreements is based on a number of factors, among which one of the most important is compliance with those agreements by both sides. Insuring confidence in compliance, by national technical means, is also an important item.

Third, Graybeal said, in his opinion, one of the important tasks of the SCC is to promote the implementation of both the

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provisions and the objectives of the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and its Protocol, and applicable Agreed Statements. Any action we can take in the SCC, whether in formulating mutually agreed procedures or in raising other questions arising on either side, the clarification of which would be useful in reducing misunderstandings or uncertainties, would contribute not only to the viability of those existing agreements, but also to improving relations between our countries, and improving the climate for possible future agreements. Therefore, adequate notification procedures, which can be implemented at no expense to the security interests of either side while contributing to reducing the possibilities for misunderstanding and uncertainty, remained, in his opinion, an important element of the task before the SCC.

Graybeal said that he would conclude from Ustinov's statement this morning that some major work still remains to be done by the SCC.

General Ustinov said that in his statement on notification this morning, he had addressed the subject of notification as a whole, proceeding from the position taken by the Soviet side on that issue as a whole. The problem, however, consists of a number of particulars, one of which Graybeal had addressed during the April 19 meeting as well as in his remarks in response to Ustinov's own statement this morning. The specific particular he had in mind dealt with prior notification of the time and location of the sinking of a replaced submarine. However, Ustinov continued, Graybeal had said nothing regarding those elements of prior notification which were still part of the US proposals as reflected in the Joint Draft Texts of November 16, 1973 and April 19, 1974. He had in mind notification concerning shipyards to be used for submarine dismantling, advance notification concerning submarines which would begin sea trials during the next six months, and other matters.

Inasmuch as this issue was being dealt with at this morning's meeting, he would like to continue his comments by addressing the two particulars he had just mentioned.

He then read prepared statements on predesignation of shipyards and on prior notification of the commencement of submarine sea trials (Attachments No. 7 and No. 8).

Following his prepared comments, Ustinov said he had addressed those two questions in detail in connection with Graybeal's comments regarding the Soviet position on notification, so that the US side would better understand that Soviet

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position. He would like to ask, he said, that the US side carefully study his considerations, so that we might achieve progress and success in our work.

Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov for the additional clarification concerning notification, and said that we would, obviously, be returning to this important subject, on which we remained far from agreement. He said that having listened carefully to Ustinov's statement, he could only reinforce his own comment that the SCC still has a great deal of work to do.

General Ustinov interjected that he agreed.

Mr. Graybeal said that the US side would carefully study all the points Ustinov had made, and subsequently return to them. He asked whether Ustinov had any other matters to raise today.

General Ustinov said he thought it was already time to wind up this meeting.

Mr. Graybeal said he had only a pair of minor items he would like to mention. He noted the imminent departure of Lt. Col. Bartos, who would be replaced on the US side by a Navy man whom some on the Soviet side already knew, Cdr. Atkinson. He also noted that tomorrow was an important Soviet holiday and, on behalf of all of the US Component, he wished all of the Soviet Component a happy May Day.

Graybeal then suggested that the next meeting be scheduled for 11 a.m. on Friday, May 3, at the Soviet mission, if that were agreeable.

General Ustinov thanked Graybeal for the holiday greeting, said that on his own behalf, and on behalf of all the members of the Soviet Component, he would like to wish Lt. Col Bartos bon voyage and a pleasant trip to the United States, and added that the Soviet side would be happy to welcome Cdr. Atkinson and work with him in the SCC. He concluded by noting his agreement to the proposed schedule for the next meeting.

Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 12:20 p.m.


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
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Attachments:

1. Graybeal's Statement on Section II, Offensive Arms Procedures and Working Document, US SCC Component on Section II, Offensive Arms Procedures
2. Ustinov's Statement on Para. III.1, Offensive Arms Procedures
3. Soviet Working Document on Para. III.1(d), Offensive Arms Procedures
4. Graybeal's Comments on Section III of Offensive Arms Procedures
5. Working Document of US SCC Component on Para. III.1(e), Offensive Arms Procedures
6. Ustinov's Statement on Notification
7. Ustinov's Statement on Predesignated Shipyards
8. Ustinov's Statement on Prior Notification of Commencement of Sea Trials

Drafted by:  F. P. DeSimone:bd

Approved by: S. N.  Graybeal

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Attachment No. 1

SCC-III

STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL

April 30, 1974

Mr. Commissioner, on April 26 we had a useful exchange of views which appears to provide a solution to our differences in regard to the Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers. We are in agreement that the procedures of Section II of the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms are interrelated and that each part should be considered in the light of this relationship. Therefore, after careful study of the language proposed by the Soviet side at the meeting of April 26, 1974 and modified during our private discussion following that meeting, we appear to have preliminary agreement by Commissioners on all of Section II as follows:

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Working Document of
US SCC Component
April 30, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES

II. Procedures For Dismantling or Destruction of
Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced By SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

- (a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment; and
- (b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, associated with the launcher and located at the launch site, and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 20 meters in diameter and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;

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- (b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site; and
- (c) debris of destroyed areas of launch pads and of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and the fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes, and silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed, and dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site; and
- (b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silo shall remain open for a period of six months, after which it may be filled with earth.

4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support

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or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

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USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH III.1

April 30, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

As we agreed, I want to set forth at this meeting the point of view of the Soviet side on paragraph 1 of Section III, Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers, on which we have not yet reached agreement.

In my statement I will specifically address in greater detail the scope of dismantling, since we have already spoken on the overall issue of notification. We have carefully studied the U.S. proposals on this question, submitted at SCC-II.

In setting forth the position of the Soviet side on questions of dismantling or destruction of SLBM launchers and ballistic missile submarines, it is my aim to resolve the differences between us through a frank exchange of views. This would permit us to successfully resolve the problem of working out wording which is acceptable to both sides.

First of all, we believe that dismantling or destruction procedures must be acceptable for any

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ballistic missile submarine covered by the Interim Agreement. Also, as we have already said, the procedures being worked out must not provide for prior notifications, and verification of compliance with these procedures must be provided by national technical means.

Agreed paragraph 4 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol specifies that dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for ICBM launchers, as well as SLBM launchers and ballistic missile submarines. In our opinion, however, such a formulation in no way means that procedures must be worked out for some kinds of separate classes of submarines.

In matters of submarine dismantling, it is of paramount importance that SLBM launcher dismantling procedures be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction. The U.S. side, too, has emphasized this on more than one occasion. In this connection, in establishing the scope of dismantling, one should take into account the necessity for reasonable economy of effort and funds, as well as the possibility of using the submarines, after dismantling

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of launchers, for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the strategic offensive arms Protocol.

Thus, the Soviet side believes that procedures for dismantling and replacement of ballistic missile submarines must be applicable to any ballistic missile submarine covered by the Interim Agreement, and that it is not advisable, in this connection, to single out any sorts of individual classes of submarines.

Taking the above into account, the Soviet side does not see the necessity of wording subparagraph (e) in the form in which it was proposed by the U.S. side at SCC-II, and in place of that subparagraph, proposes a new formulation for subparagraph (d).

"(d) removing, in the open, the missile launch tubes together with the part of the superstructure or fairwater and the section of the outer hull and pressure hull above the missile compartment, with subsequent welding of new sections without launch-tube penetrations or missile hatches into the outer hull and pressure hull. The superstructure and fairwater may be replaced over the section of the hull of the submarine from which the launch tubes have been removed."

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Mr. Commissioner, as you can see for yourself, in this subparagraph, we provide for carrying out such dismantling measures as would fully preclude the possibility of using submarines, which are being replaced, for launching ballistic missiles as well as the possibility of their rapidly being put into a condition in which they are usable for launching such missiles. At the same time, in spite of the fact that the formulation proposed by the Soviet side is shorter, it covers the whole set of items which were proposed by the U.S. side in subparagraph (e). It can be applied to any ballistic missile submarine covered by the Interim Agreement.

Also, the measures specified in this formulation ensure the possibility of using a dismantled submarine for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement.

Mr. Commissioner, we hope that the U.S. side will carefully study our proposal. With a positive approach to it on your part, we could reach agreement on this yet unresolved issue.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 3

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Official translation

Soviet Working Document

April 30, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Section III, paragraph 1

(d) removing, in the open, the missile launch tubes together with the part of the superstructure or fairwater and the section of the outer hull and pressure hull above the missile compartment, with subsequent welding of new sections without launch-tube penetrations or missile hatches into the outer hull and pressure hull. The superstructure and fairwater may be replaced over the section of the hull of the submarine from which the launch tubes have been removed.

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Attachment No. 4

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS - SECTION III OF
PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

April 30, 1974

1. Mr. Commissioner, today I will set forth U.S. views regarding the procedures for dismantling or destruction of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers replaced by new ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers--Section III of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.

2. During the period between SCC sessions, the U.S. side carefully analyzed the five procedures set forth in the Joint Draft Text of November 16, 1973 and studied the exchanges which had taken place on this subject during the first two SCC sessions. We continue to believe that the alternative procedures proposed by the U.S. for dismantling or destruction of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers, which are now in Section III of the Joint Draft Text of Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures of April 19, 1974, should be acceptable to both sides.

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3. The U.S. proposed sinking of the submarine with its launchers in international waters at least 2000 meters in depth. When this procedure for ballistic-missile submarine destruction is chosen, notification of the time and location of the planned destruction shall be given to the other side at least one month prior to the planned destruction.

4. The U.S. proposed scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the open in predesignated shipyards.

5. The U.S. proposed removing the submarine's missile section in the open in predesignated shipyards. In implementing the procedure for "removing the submarine's missile section in the open," it is the U.S. view that if this submarine is to be used for other purposes then the missile section must not be replaced by a new section of similar dimensions. Any replacement hull section must be significantly shorter in overall length than the missile section it replaces.

6. During SCC II, after carefully analyzing the Soviet proposals for procedures for ballistic missile submarine and SLBM launcher destruction or dismantling, the United States set forth another alternative procedure (Para. III.1(e)

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of JDT dated November 16, 1973). This proposal was made in an effort to bring the views of the two sides closer together. After further study since our last session, the U.S. side developed new language which we believe should make this alternative acceptable to the Soviet side. Our revised proposal would apply to nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines originally constructed prior to 1965 whose ballistic missile launch tubes protrude into the sail.

7. The U.S. approach to procedures for the dismantling or destruction of ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers is predicated upon the view that they must be consistent with the agreed criteria contained in Para. 3 of the Protocol. I believe there is complete agreement between us on this fundamental point.

8. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side remains convinced that the four U.S.-proposed procedures provide adequate and effective alternatives for all presently known classes of submarines. We believe the U.S. proposals in the JDT of April 19, 1974, as revised by us today, provide a firm basis for agreement.

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Attachment No. 5

Working Document of
US SCC Component
April 30, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 1(e)

III.1(e) for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines originally constructed prior to 1965 whose ballistic missile launch tubes protrude into the sail, removing the missile launch tubes in the open in predesignated shipyards as set forth below. The shipyards to be used for ballistic-missile submarine dismantling shall be agreed between the Parties.

- (1) That entire part of the superstructure (including the fairwater) and outer hull above the missile compartment of the submarine shall be removed.
- (2) That section of the missile compartment pressure hull (hull crown plating and frame segments) which contains all of the hull penetrations for the missile launch tubes,

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as well as the missile launch tubes,
shall be removed.

- (3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then be restored only by welding into place new sections without launch tube penetrations.
- (4) No superstructure or fairwater shall be replaced over the section of the submarine from which the missile launch tubes have been removed.

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USTINOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION

April 30, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

Since the April 19, 1974 meeting, the Soviet SCC Component has devoted much attention to study of the position of the U.S. side on notification issues which was set forth by you on that date, and those clarifications which you provided on April 23 in connection with the questions raised by the Soviet side on this matter.

We agree with you, Mr. Commissioner, that notification is one of the principal unresolved issues. I can also affirm with satisfaction the agreement of both sides that prior notification is not necessary for verifying, by national technical means, compliance with existing agreements or with the Procedures we are working out. This spares me the need of again repeating the basic premise of both sides concerning the reliability and effectiveness of national technical means of verification.

At the same time I cannot comprehend the persistence with which the U.S. side is nonetheless pressing for the inclusion of elements of prior notification in the Procedures. You say that this would enhance the

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viability of already concluded agreements and would contribute to the development of mutual trust between our countries.

But it is not notification, whether prior or not, on which viability of Soviet-American agreements and mutual trust are based. They are based on strict compliance by the sides with the provisions of these documents, and the capabilities of the sides to carry out reliable verification, using their national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of these agreements, as well as with the Procedures we are working out.

The main purpose of notification procedures is that each side inform the other side through the Standing Consultative Commission, for the period between sessions, on the completion of dismantling or destruction of numbers of ICBM launchers, submarines, and SLBM launchers, as well as ABM launchers and radars; and for that same period, on the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers used by each side for replacement.

Such a reciprocal exchange of information by the sides through the SCC would be documentary confirmation of completion of actions in this area for their official recording in the SCC.

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Precisely this would promote enhancement of the viability of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and would contribute to the strengthening of mutual trust between our countries.

Therefore, on the strength of the considerations set forth by us, the Soviet side does not see a necessity to replace the functions of national technical means of verification with any sort of additional functions of the Commission with respect to prior notification. Such a solution of the question is unacceptable to us as a matter of principle.

Mr. Commissioner, with respect to your clarifications of April 23 on questions of notification, we are still studying them thoroughly. Today, in a preliminary manner, it can be said that the notification procedures proposed by you on launcher dismantling which is in progress are in our opinion not dictated by necessity, and only complicate what is already a complicated task for the SCC.

The Soviet side proposes a solution to the question of notification, which is simpler and which fully meets the tasks before us--that notification be made on that number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, ABM launchers, and radars, the dismantling of which has been completed

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by the beginning of a regular session, as well as on the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers used during that same period for replacement. We are convinced that such a solution more precisely reflects the substance of this matter.

Thank you for attention.

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SECRETAttachment No. 7

USTINOV STATEMENT ON PREDESIGNATION OF SHIPYARDS

April 30, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

1. Prior notification of the location of dismantling or destruction of submarines is inadvisable and unnecessary for the following reasons.

First, predesignation of shipyards where submarine dismantling is carried out, in our opinion, replaces the functions of national technical means of verification.

Second, paragraph III.2 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, agreed by us at SCC-II, sets the period of time for submarine dismantling or destruction. This period covers an extensive increment of time during which national technical means are capable of verifying progress in this work with a high degree of confidence. The lengthy dismantling process and its implementation in the open permit each side to follow, with adequate certainty, the course of dismantling work. Therefore, no additional information or data is required on such work and the shipyards in which this work is carried out. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account that we do not designate the shipyards where ballistic missile submarines are built; why, then, designate where we will dismantle them. Incidentally,

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at SCC-II the U.S. side displayed reasonable flexibility when it withdrew its proposal on specifying coordinates for ICRM and SLBM launchers being dismantled. Why then did shipyards remain; after all, these are coordinates too? In our opinion this question is so clear that it needs no additional explanation.

In light of the considerations set forth by me, we believe that the proposal of the U.S. side for prior designation of shipyards is not advisable and therefore cannot be accepted.

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Attachment No. 8

USTINOV STATEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF
COMMENCEMENT OF SEA TRIALS

April 30, 1974

2. In subparagraph I.6(b) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures, the U.S. side proposes that with respect to SLBM replacement launchers, notification contain "the number of ballistic missiles which are on submarines that will begin sea trials during the next six-month period."

Such a formulation cannot be acceptable to the Soviet side because it plainly contains the principle of prior notification which we have always opposed. We believe that such prior notification is not required.

Both sides have agreed that the beginning of sea trials of a ballistic missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting-out of the submarine was performed. The time of the beginning of sea trials, which is the basis for timing initiation and completion of dismantling or destruction of launchers being replaced, can be determined by national technical means of verification. This is the substance of the question with which, it seems to us, both sides were

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in agreement. In such a case we cannot understand why the U.S. side again advances a requirement for prior notification. We cannot agree to this.

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SCC
Session-III
A-190

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, April 26, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Belyanin
Lt. Col. Bartos	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Long	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Smith	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Ustinov declared the meeting open and said that in accord with his prior understanding with Mr. Graybeal he would take the floor first. He then gave a prepared statement on paragraph II.4 of the strategic offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 1).

Ustinov continued by following up with statements on paragraphs II.2 and II.3(a) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures (Attachments No. 2 and No. 3), and tabling two Soviet Working Documents containing proposed language for those two paragraphs (Attachment No. 4).

Ustinov concluded by thanking Graybeal for his patience in hearing out a rather long statement. He said it seemed to him that the proposals he had made today should constitute mutually acceptable solutions to all the remaining questions in Section II of the Procedures, along the lines spoken of at the last meeting, and that should permit us to remove all of the brackets from Section II of the Procedures.

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Commissioner Graybeal said that General Ustinov's statements and the specific proposals of the Soviet side would, needless to say, be given very careful consideration and study. His preliminary reaction, he continued, now that both sides had set forth their views on Section II, was that we seem to be moving toward solution of the issues in that section of the offensive Procedures.

Graybeal said he thought Ustinov would understand that in view of the statement he had made and the new Soviet proposals he had tabled, he, Graybeal, would refrain from any prepared statement or further comment on Section II. Rather, he would carefully study them, as he had already said, and we would return to the subject very soon. However, for the purpose of improving our mutual understanding of the Soviet proposals, he would like to make several preliminary observations.

The U.S. side, he stated, continued to consider cost and expense a secondary factor. Though we recognize it as a factor, it is not nearly as important as working out mutually agreed procedures which meet the criteria set forth in the offensive arms Protocol.

Second, as he understood Ustinov's initial statement and summary remarks, the Soviet side sees a relationship between paragraph II.4 and the remainder of the questions in Section II as set forth previously by the U.S. side.

Third, it would appear that there is agreement in principle concerning the issues in Section II, with the exception of the size of the area of the launch pad to be dismantled or destroyed in the case of soft ICBM sites, and whether or not, in the case of silo launch sites, launch control bunkers are subject to dismantling or destruction.

Finally, Graybeal said he believed that our exchange on paragraph II.4 had been a constructive one, and he shared the view that we should be able to reach mutually acceptable solutions concerning the two remaining issues he had noted.

He concluded by repeating that he would like to reserve further comment until the statement and proposals of the Soviet side this morning had been studied.

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General Ustinov thanked Graybeal for his comments, and said he would like to emphasize that in studying the new Soviet proposals the U.S. side should give attention to that aspect of the overall issue Ustinov had emphasized again in his statement today. Specifically, he was referring to the view that these procedures we are working out should be considered in the light of a dual requirement -- to put the launchers in a condition precluding the possibility of their use for launching missiles while simultaneously realizing maximum economy of expense and effort. This view of the Soviet side is one of principle. Ustinov said he thought the U.S. side understood that this is a reciprocal proposition which was important for the U.S. side also, and that all proposals on procedures must be considered in the context of these requirements.

Ustinov concluded by noting that he thought we could rather quickly remove all of the brackets from Section II of the offensive arms Procedures on the basis of the new specific proposals he had tabled this morning.

Mr. Graybeal said that he understood Ustinov's comments and that they would be taken into account, and repeated his comment with respect to refraining from any further statements today.

General Ustinov said he understood Graybeal's remark to mean the U.S. side had no further matters to raise today, and that, in that case, we could close this morning's meeting, which had been very productive. He proposed that if there were no objections from the U.S. side, the next meeting be held at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, April 30, at the U.S. Mission.

Mr. Graybeal agreed to the proposed schedule.

General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 11:45 a.m.

Attachments:

1. Ustinov Statement, strategic offensive arms Procedures, Paragraph II.4
2. Ustinov Statement, strategic offensive arms Procedures, Paragraph II.2
3. Ustinov Statement, strategic offensive arms Procedures, paragraph II.3(a)
4. Soviet Working Documents, on para II.2 and II.3(a)

Drafted by FPDeSimone:sbs

Approved by: SNG Graybeal

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Attachment No. 1

USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH II.4 OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

April 26, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

In my statement today, I would like to address paragraph II.4 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, with respect to which the U.S. side tabled its new proposal at the last meeting.

I believe that there is no disagreement between us that the procedures we are working out must, of course, be in full accord with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto, as well as related Agreed Statements of the sides.

As you know, these documents, as well as paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft Protocol for strategic offensive arms and Section I of the draft Procedures for strategic offensive arms, strictly establish the possible framework of dismantling and replacement.

Paragraph 1 of the Protocol for strategic offensive arms, for example, specifies that the attached procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Interim Agreement.

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Paragraph I.1 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms specifically states that within the limits of the levels established for each side, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964, may be replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

It is quite clear that since the subject is replacement of launchers of one type by launchers of another type, within the limits of established levels, it is understood that the ICBM launchers of older types being replaced cannot be reactivated. One of the purposes of the procedures being worked out by us is to insure that the ICBM launchers being replaced be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs, and make impossible their reactivation within a period of time substantially less than the time required for new construction. Both Components of the SCC agree that provisions of this nature must be included in the Procedures, although their wording has not yet been completely agreed upon.

At the same time, the Soviet side has repeatedly called attention to the fact that putting launchers

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which are being replaced in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs must be combined with reasonable considerations of economy of effort and cost. And in any case, we must not unnecessarily carry the scope of dismantling activities to such proportions, that such dismantling activity would require greater expenditures and effort than the construction of the launchers being dismantled.

At the last meeting, the U.S. Component of the SCC stressed the importance which it attaches to the wording which it tabled for paragraph II.4 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, including its importance with respect to the scope of dismantling activities for ICBM launchers being replaced.

We understood the remarks of the U.S. side on this question to mean that on condition that paragraph II.4, as proposed by the U.S. side on April 23, is in the Procedures, a reduction is possible in requirements presented until now on the scope of dismantling activities for ICBM launchers being replaced, both soft and silo.

Taking into account the above considerations, the Soviet Component of the SCC continues to see no need

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for including in the Procedures paragraph II.4, even in its new, refined formulation.

However, desiring to facilitate finding mutually acceptable solutions, and taking into account the importance which the U.S. side attaches to the inclusion of paragraph II.4 in the Procedures, the Soviet Component of the SCC is in principle prepared to consider the question of its possible inclusion in the Procedures, if mutually acceptable solutions are found on the other issues in Section II of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms.

As you know, other unagreed provisions remain in this section besides paragraph 4, in subparagraph 2(a) and subparagraph 3(a).

On condition that mutually acceptable wording is found on these issues, we would be prepared to agree to the U.S. proposal on paragraph 4, as formulated by the U.S. Component of the SCC at the April 23, 1974 meeting.

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Attachment No. 2

USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH II.2 OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

April 26, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

Continuing our discussion of the Procedures for dismantling or destruction of land-based inter-continental ballistic missile launchers, being replaced by SLBM launchers, I intend to address those additional dismantling measures with respect to soft launch sites, which, as you know, are covered in paragraph II.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms.

In my statement, I would like to set forth the position of the Soviet side on the substance of the questions contained in this paragraph, and if possible attempt to remove the brackets which still remain therein.

As a result of careful study of the Soviet and U.S. drafts of the text of paragraph 2, contained in the November 16, 1973 document, we came to the conclusion that the points of view of the two sides on possible ways for resolving the question of degree of dismantling soft launch sites are rather close. This gives rise to hope for a rapid resolution of existing differences.

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Specifically, Mr. Commissioner, we decided to propose for your consideration new wording for subparagraph (a) which consists of the following: "areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and 10 meters in diameter, and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction."

Thus, we are in agreement, as is proposed by the U.S. side, that the Procedures indicate the specific size of the area of the launch pad, which must be dismantled or destroyed.

In our opinion, the size of the area of the launch pad which must be dismantled or destroyed could be limited to an area 10 meters in diameter. This would fully ensure that the intercontinental ballistic missile launcher would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of its use for launching missiles and make impossible its reactivation in substantially less time than the time necessary for new construction. At the same time such a size for the area of the launch pad being dismantled or destroyed would reduce by nine times the amount of dismantling work as compared to the size of the area to be destroyed you proposed, 30 meters in diameter, and, consequently,

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would considerably reduce the expenditure of funds and effort; we have drawn your attention to this repeatedly.

The Soviet side believes that the new wording proposed today for subparagraph (a) can provide a solution acceptable to both sides, and hopes that the U.S. Component of the SCC will favorably consider this constructive Soviet proposal.

Thank you for your attention.

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USTINOV STATEMENT ON SUBPARAGRAPH II.3(a) OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROCEDURES

April 26, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

In my next statement I would like to address the wording of subparagraph II.3(a) of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms, which governs the additional dismantling measures for intercontinental ballistic missile silo launchers.

We believe that on this matter, too, a mutually acceptable solution can be found which satisfies the basic principles of the dismantling or destruction Procedures, adopted by us, set forth in paragraph 3 of the Protocol for strategic offensive arms. At the same time, the Soviet side's proposal on the necessity for maximum possible reduction of expenditures for dismantling work would also be satisfied.

I want to propose for your consideration new Soviet wording for subparagraph 3(a).

(Text of subparagraph II.3(a) of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms is read and handed over).

If you, Mr. Commissioner, carefully examine this wording, you will undoubtedly note that it is almost

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fully identical with the U.S. proposal of November 16, 1973. The only thing missing in the Soviet draft, is the mention of dismantling or destruction of launch control posts (bunkers).

In our opinion, and I think the U.S. side will agree with this, putting the silo launcher itself into an unusable condition is governing and most important in carrying out dismantling or destruction of facilities at silo launch sites.

The Soviet side believes that the scope of dismantling work on a silo launcher, carried out in accordance with the aforementioned subparagraph (a), makes it completely unusable for launching missiles and leaves the sides no possibility whatever to reactivate it in a period of time, less than that required for new construction. Under these conditions, launch control posts (bunkers) completely cease to serve their purpose, especially since the launch equipment in them must be completely dismantled and removed from the launch site in accordance with paragraph 1 of the same Section of the Procedures.

Also, such a resolution of the question of dismantling or destruction of silo launchers would

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permit a considerable reduction in expenditures for dismantling work.

Mr. Commissioner, I hope that the U.S. side will carefully study the new Soviet proposal tabled today, which is aimed at reaching mutually acceptable solutions on matters of dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and being replaced by SLBM launchers.

I would also like to remind you that we look upon our proposals for subparagraphs II.2(a) and II.3(a) of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms in the context of the statement I made earlier concerning the U.S. proposals on paragraph 4 of the same section.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 4

Official translation
Soviet Working Document
April 26, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Paragraph II.2

(a) areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and 10 meters in diameter, and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;

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Official translation
Soviet Working Document
April 26, 1974

PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Paragraph II.3

(a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes and silo headworks shall be dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site;

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SECRET/EXDISSCC
Session-III
A- 181

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, April 23, 1974
U.S. Mission, GenevaPersons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Belyanin
Lt. Col. Bartos	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Long	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Smith	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Graybeal welcomed General Ustinov and the members of the Soviet Component of the SCC, declared the meeting open, and gave the floor to General Ustinov.

Commissioner Ustinov delivered a prepared statement on paragraph II.1(b) of the strategic offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 1).

Mr. Graybeal gave the first part of his prepared comments on land-based ICBM launcher dismantling or destruction (Sections I, II, and III of Attachment No. 2), and passed to the Soviet side a U.S. Working Document containing proposed revised language for paragraph II.4 of the offensive arms Procedures (Attachment No. 3).

General Ustinov said he had listened very carefully to Graybeal's statement, and wanted to express his satisfaction that the sides had found a common formulation for paragraph II.1(b); it seemed that both sides were able to find a common point of view. As for paragraph II.4, it seemed to him that before he could speak to that subject the Soviet side would have to study the new draft which had been presented this morning. He said the U.S. proposal would be carefully studied, and a response would be forthcoming at a future meeting.

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General Ustinov continued by saying that keeping our previous meeting in mind, he would like to try to clarify several questions in connection with the U.S.-proposed alternative formulations for the definition of a "modern SLBM," which had been tabled at that meeting.

He then read a prepared text containing two questions on the "modern SLBM" definition (Attachment No. 4).

Mr. Graybeal said he would like to give a preliminary response, which could be amplified at a subsequent meeting, to assist the Soviet side in understanding the U.S. position. He said that both alternatives suggested by the U.S. side at the April 19 meeting used the phrase "first flight-tested" in place of the "first tested" which was part of the bracketed language of the offensive JDT, in paragraph I.2 of the Procedures. This change had been made as a result of certain questions raised by the Soviet side -- informally, he thought, although he would have to check the record of our meetings at the second session of the SCC to be certain. Since "test" is very broad in its connotations, and many kinds of tests such as laboratory tests, drawing board tests and others exist, and since we are dealing here with procedures which are to be verified by national technical means, we changed the formulation so as to clearly distinguish flight testing from other kinds of testing.

As for the change in the date from 1964 to 1965, Ustinov would note that the alternative proposed phrases which the U.S. side had tabled on April 19 were written so as to become part of paragraph I.2. With the addition of either one of those phrases, the paragraph would deal with the definition of "modern SLBMs" in three parts -- the first part of the paragraph describes a modern SLBM for the U.S.; the second part, for the Soviet Union; and the third part, for both sides. For consistency, since the cutoff date used in the second part was 1965, we had changed the date in our proposed additional phrase correspondingly. It is obvious that we are speaking of new missiles here, and it would seem appropriate to use such a cutoff date in order to distinguish the new from the old; this is a well-established precedent in previous SALT and SCC documents and discussions.

Graybeal said he hoped this preliminary response would be helpful. He also added that he thought it became clear from Ustinov's questions and his own answers that the alternative proposed additions to paragraph I.2 which had been tabled on April 19 were both preferable, in terms of

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their clarity and the consistency of the date, to the third alternative, that is, the bracketed sentence in the November 16, 1973 and April 19, 1974 JDTs.

General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and said his question had been intended to get at the essence of the new U.S. proposals. He noted that from Graybeal's explanation he understood "first flight-tested" to mean the end of flight testing.

Mr. Graybeal said he believed the language we had used had properly expressed our intent; it said "first flight-tested since 1965." The meaning here is parallel to the meaning of "made operational since 1965," which was in the unbracketed part of the paragraph. That is, the missiles spoken of here would have begun their flight testing sometime after 1965. Presumably, if such a missile ever became operational, then its flight testing would have been completed by that time. The important point is that flight testing would have begun after 1965, and this formulation would provide for completing the definition to include "modern SLBMs" on diesel submarines.

General Ustinov expressed his great appreciation for the explanation. He said that it would be carefully studied, just as the Soviet side had been studying the new U.S. proposals, and that we would be able to return to this question at a future meeting.

Ustinov said the newly-proposed formulation for paragraph II.4 of the offensive arms Procedures would be just as carefully studied. He added that he wanted to very frankly say he had intended to present the Soviet viewpoint on that paragraph today, but since the U.S. side had tabled a new proposal, he thought it would not be well to speak on the previous formulation. Therefore, the Soviet side would study the new proposal and address the subject later.

Mr. Graybeal said that in keeping with the understanding he and Ustinov had reached on today's agenda, and in the light of the earlier exchange at this meeting, he would like to continue with comments and presentation of the U.S. side's views concerning the subject of ICBMs; specifically, he wanted to address paragraphs II.2 and II.3 of the offensive arms Procedures. He emphasized that these comments were in the context of the interrelationship he had previously mentioned between paragraph II.4 and the other paragraphs of Section II. These comments should be understood in the context of the importance of that concept in paragraph II.4 and its relationship to the degree of dismantling and destruction at both soft and silo ICBM sites.

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Graybeal then gave the remainder of his comments on procedures for dismantling or destruction of land-based ICBM launchers (see Attachment No. 2).

General Ustinov said he had listened very carefully to the U.S. proposals on the various paragraphs of Section II of the offensive arms Procedures. He wanted to repeat that everything Graybeal had said today would be carefully studied by the Soviet side. Several points of contact had become evident, which could be used to try to find solutions to all the issues in Section II. Since there were new proposals from the U.S. side, he would not critique the U.S.-proposed formulations in the JDT at this time, but would study instead the new proposals, which pertain to questions of interest to the Soviet side.

Mr. Graybeal said the U.S. side would like to provide answers to the questions concerning notification which had been asked by the Soviet side at the April 19 meeting, and gave his prepared response to those questions (Attachment No. 5).

He then said that completed the material he had for this morning, and asked whether the Soviet side had any further considerations.

General Ustinov thanked Graybeal for the clarification on the notification questions, and said it would be carefully studied and analyzed by the Soviet side.

As to further comments, he said he would like to repeat that he would abstain in view of the new proposals presented today.

Mr. Graybeal said the only question remaining, in that case, was to schedule the next meeting, and proposed that it take place on Friday, April 26, at 11:00 a.m. He noted that it would be at the Soviet Mission, if that were agreeable, and that he believed we had also already agreed to an informal meeting in the form of a luncheon at 1:00 p.m. tomorrow, April 24.

General Ustinov said the schedule for Friday was agreeable, and that the Soviet side also found tomorrow's schedule very agreeable.

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Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

Attachments:

1. Ustinov Statement on Offensive Procedures Para II.1(b)
2. Graybeal Comments on Dismantling or Destruction Procedures for Land-Based ICBM Launchers
3. U.S. Working Document: Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures, Para II.4
4. Ustinov Questions on "Modern SLBM" Definition
5. Graybeal response to Soviet Questions on Notification

Drafted by: FPDeSimone:sbs

Approved by: SNG ^{SNH} Graybeal

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Attachment No. 1

USTINOV STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPH II.1(b) OF
PROCEDURES FOR OFFENSIVE ARMS

April 23, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

As you and I agreed, today I will present comments of the Soviet side regarding the wording of some of the unagreed paragraphs of Section II of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms; specifically, I have in mind, first of all, paragraph II.1(b) of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms.

As you know, this paragraph specifies those measures which shall be carried out in all cases of dismantling or destruction of land-based ICBM launchers being replaced by SLBM launchers.

The difference between the formulations of this paragraph is that the U.S. wording, as set forth in the November 16, 1973 draft, speaks of the dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, located at the launch site or associated with it (i.e. with the launch site), whereas the Soviet draft speaks of the dismantling of this very same equipment, associated with the launcher and located at the launch site.

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In view of the vagueness of the U.S. proposal regarding the aforementioned equipment, it would be possible, if one so desired, to include any systems and components, even if located at a considerable distance from the launcher, or from the launch site of an ICBM launcher, of an older type and unrelated to the launching of ICBMs deployed prior to 1964. In this connection, it would be impossible to establish territorial bounds within which the equipment dismantling provision will apply, which could lead to misunderstandings in verification. It seems to us that this is not in the interests of both sides.

In our view, the Soviet draft of this portion of paragraph 1(b) provides full clarity on this question. To begin with, it presupposes the dismantling of equipment associated with the launcher, i.e. that equipment which is directly involved in preparing and carrying out the launch of a missile from this launcher. The dismantling of precisely this equipment is necessary for putting this launcher in a condition that precludes the possibility of its use for launching an ICBM.

Moreover, the Soviet draft precisely defines the territorial bounds within which the dismantling provision applies, by indicating the equipment located at the launch site. This facilitates

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verification of dismantling, by national technical means, since its territorial confines are strictly delineated by the launch site.

Thus, the Soviet draft provides for the dismantling of all the equipment related to carrying out the launch of ICBMs, deployed prior to 1964, at a given launch site.

Therefore, the Soviet draft of subparagraph (b), as it applies to ICBM launcher equipment, is fully in accord with paragraph 3 of the Protocol for strategic offensive arms, agreed by us, which specifies that the procedures for dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers and associated facilities shall insure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs, shall insure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means and shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction.

Taking into account all that I have said above, we believe that the Soviet version of the formulation for subparagraph (b) of November 16, 1973, fully meets the objectives of the Procedures we are working out.

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Mr. Commissioner, I hope that the U.S. side will regard our considerations with full attention. I think that achievement of mutual understanding on this question would be in the interests of both sides.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 2

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS -- PROCEDURES FOR
DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS

April 23, 1974

I.

1. Mr. Commissioner, today we are exchanging views on dismantling or destruction procedures for both soft and silo ICBM launchers.

2. Para. II.4 sets forth a concept which the U.S. side continues to believe important. We have carefully reviewed prior exchanges on this concept, and are prepared to make some changes in Para. II.4 which take into account certain considerations expressed by the Soviet side.

(Read revised Para. II.4 and pass copy to Soviet side)

3. Mr. Commissioner, you will note from this revision of Para. II.4 that we have deleted the phrase "or for storage or support of ICBM - capable launchers." There can be no question that this paragraph now deals clearly, directly, and only with ICBMs -- a subject clearly within our assigned responsibilities. If the USSR does not intend to use replaced ICBM launch sites for storage, support or launch of ICBMs, then there should be no reason why agreement cannot be reached.

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4. Mr. Commissioner, on November 5, 1973 I reiterated the view of the U.S. side that there is a direct link between the solution we reach on this concept and the scope and extent of dismantling or destruction procedures for land-based ICBM launch sites which would be acceptable to the U.S. side. This remains the U.S. view.

II.

5. Mr. Commissioner, keeping in mind my previous statement regarding the inter-relationship between the concept in our revised Para. II.4 and the remaining issues involving procedures for dismantling or destruction of land-based ICBMs, I would like to make the following additional comments.

III.

6. As you correctly noted in your opening statement, the present bracketed language in Para. II.1(b) indicates a difference in the scope of dismantling activities at land-based ICBM launch sites. The U.S. proposal would include fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant handling equipment located at the site or associated with it, whether or not

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specifically located within the site per se. The Soviet language would deal with the same items but only those associated with the launcher and located at the launch site.

7. The U.S. side does not see why certain items directly associated with the specific launch site, even though not located within the launch site, should not be dismantled or destroyed. However, Mr. Commissioner, taking into account Soviet considerations, including those presented this morning, the U.S. side is prepared to accept the Soviet language which reads "associated with the launcher and located at the launch site."

IV.

8. The difference between the U.S. and Soviet approach to dismantling or destruction of soft ICBM launch sites, as reflected in Para. II.2(a), involves the extent to which the launch pads are to be dismantled or destroyed. We are agreed that dismantling and removal of the launch device alone are not adequate. In our view an area of the launch pad centered on the launch stand must be made unusable by dismantling or destruction. This area must be of sufficient size to meet the reactivation time criterion. The U.S. side believes that dismantling or destruction of an area of the launch pad 30 meters in diameter would meet this criterion.

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9. From my review of past exchanges on this subject, it is my understanding that the Soviet-proposed language also includes dismantling or destruction of the locations where the launch device was emplaced. The Soviet proposal, however, does not specify the area of the launch pad to be dismantled or destroyed.

10. I do not believe there is a major difference in the approaches of the two sides, and thus it should be possible to find compromise language which meets the reactivation time criterion as well as the objective of the procedures of the two sides.

V.

11. The present bracketed language in Para. II.3 indicates a significant difference in the scope of dismantling activities at silo launch sites. The U.S. proposal includes certain actions which the Soviet proposed language does not require: the dismantling or destruction of silo headworks and launch control bunkers and filling the silo with earth.

12. The reactivation time agreed to in Para. 3 of the Protocol also applies to silo launch sites. The U.S. side continues to believe that silo headworks and launch control

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bunkers should be dismantled or destroyed in order to meet the reactivation time criterion. The Soviet proposal as currently worded does not meet this criterion.

13. The present U.S. proposed language^{in Para. II.3(b)} requires that after a period of six months the silo be filled with earth. The U.S. side is prepared to accept the Soviet language reading as follows: "After the actions provided in subparagraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silo shall remain open for a period of six months, after which it may be filled with earth."

VI.

14. Mr. Commissioner, today the U.S. side has proposed a comprehensive solution for the four bracketed paragraphs of the Procedures for dismantling or destruction of land-based ICBM sites. This movement on our part provides for a compromise solution which takes into account previously expressed considerations of the Soviet side, and is designed to contribute to working out the mutually agreed procedures we are charged with in the SCC.

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Attachment No. 3

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U.S. Working Document
April 23, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES
PARAGRAPH II.4

"4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites shall not be used for storage, support or launch of ICBMs but may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto."

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Attachment No. 4

USTINOV QUESTIONS ON "MODERN SLBM" DEFINITION

April 23, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

At the last meeting, the U.S. side set forth two alternative formulations regarding the concept of a modern SLBM, for an addition to the agreed portion of paragraph I.2 of the Procedures for strategic offensive arms.

The position of the Soviet SCC Component on this question has already been presented at the last meeting and remains valid. At the same time, in our study of these additional formulations, questions arose which we would ask the U.S. Component of the Commission to answer if possible.

First of all, what is the difference between the wording of November 16--"first tested," and the wording used in your new proposals--"first flight-tested." What is the essence of the difference and what specifically does the U.S. side mean by these expressions?

Secondly, why is 1964 spoken of in one case, and 1965 in the second case?

I would be grateful to you, Mr. Commissioner, if the U.S. Component of the Commission would clarify these matters for us.

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Attachment No. 5

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S RESPONSE - QUESTIONS ON NOTIFICATION

April 23, 1974

1. Mr. Commissioner, at the SCC meeting of April 19, 1974, you raised certain questions regarding the manner in which notification of certain dismantling or destruction activities would be handled under U.S. proposed procedures for reporting such activities which are in process and those which have been completed. You cited specific examples where with varying intervals between SCC sessions and different times for completing dismantling or destruction activities, some dismantling or destruction actions could be started and completed between successive SCC sessions, others could continue in process over the period of two SCC sessions, and still others could start during one interval between SCC sessions and be completed in the next. Today I would like to respond to the questions you have raised.

2. The situations you have described could exist; however, they would be handled easily and simply in the proposed notification procedures.

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3. Looking at both the U.S. and the Soviet version of Paragraph I.6 of the procedures for strategic offensive arms, it will be noted that there is agreement that notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement activities "shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session." The beginning of a SCC session is a fixed point in time. Likewise, each launcher subject to the notification is in a precise status at that time, with dismantling or destruction either in process or completed. No launcher could be in both categories at the same time.

4. Turning now to your questions:

- (a) A launcher on which dismantling or destruction action was started and completed between successive SCC sessions would be included only in the number completed since the last report in the SCC.
- (b) Where a launcher is in process of dismantling or destruction over two SCC sessions, it would be included at both sessions in the total number in process.

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- (c) If a launcher is in process of being dismantled or destroyed at the beginning of one session and completed prior to the beginning of the next session, in the first report it would be included with the number in process and in the second report with the number completed.

In all cases, the notification would reflect the status of the launchers as of the beginning of each regular SCC session when the notification is made.

5. Mr. Commissioner, each notification at the beginning of a SCC session would include the number of launchers on which dismantling or destruction was in process at that point in time and the number of launchers on which dismantling or destruction had been completed since the last report in the SCC. We believe that this notification procedure provides a simple and unambiguous method for providing a twice annual accounting of the total number of launchers on each side on which dismantling or destruction has been completed or is in process. Of course, the cumulative number of launchers on

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which dismantling or destruction has been completed plus the number in process of dismantling or destruction must not be less than the number of replacement SLBM launchers at any time. I hope this explanation satisfactorily answers the questions raised by the Soviet side.

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SCC
Session-III
A- 177

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, April 19, 1974
Soviet Mission, Geneva

Persons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Belyanin
Lt. Col. Bartos	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Long	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Smith	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Afanasenko (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Ustinov opened the meeting and said that before giving the floor to Graybeal he would like to say a few words. He delivered a brief prepared statement on the exchange of the JDTs (Attachment No. 1), and passed the Russian texts to Graybeal (Attachments No. 2 and No. 3).

Commissioner Graybeal said that he was in full agreement with Ustinov's comments, particularly concerning the usefulness of the work which had been done under the supervision of our Executive Secretaries and Deputy Commissioners, and with respect to the status of the JDTs. The texts which our Executive Secretaries had finished conforming yesterday, he agreed, are to be considered Joint Draft Texts "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners" as of April 19, 1974, with the same understanding Ustinov had noted; that is, there may be further requirements for clarification and editorial work, and also "nothing is agreed until all is agreed." He then passed to Ustinov copies of the English language versions of the two Joint Draft Texts (Attachments No. 4 and No. 5).

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General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and proceeded to deliver a brief prepared statement concerning the task of the SCC at this session (Attachment No. 6).

Mr. Graybeal said that the U.S. Component agreed with Ustinov's remarks, and also considers that completion, to the extent possible, of work on the substantive issues in the JDTs to be the principal task at this session of the SCC.

Graybeal continued by noting that he would like to turn to one of the areas in the JDTs containing bracketed language, and present some considerations on the subject of notification. He read his prepared comments on that subject (Attachment No. 7).

General Ustinov thanked Graybeal, and said that the statement of the U.S. Component, to which he had listened very carefully, would also be very carefully studied. He continued by delivering his own prepared statement on the subject of notification (Attachment No. 8), inserting the following comment between the 6th and 7th paragraphs: "By way of comment on certain remarks in your statement, we are speaking here not only of notification concerning the sinking of submarines, but also of such U.S. proposals during SCC-II as notification concerning sea trials which will begin during the next six months, and the predesignation of shipyards to be used for dismantling activities."

Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov's comments would be carefully studied, of course, but that he would like to make a preliminary remark with respect to their substance. A careful study, he said, of U.S. and Soviet statements on this subject indicates that there is agreement that prior notification is not required for adequate verification of compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement or with the procedures now being worked out in the SCC. He wanted to suggest again that the notification problem and the procedures proposed by the U.S. side be considered on their own merit, and that both sides carefully review the considerations presented on the subject today with a view to returning to it at an early date.

General Ustinov said he had no objection to such a careful study and return to this subject, as the Soviet side believes it to be one of the most important questions on which the sides have differing points of view. Noting

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that he would like to continue discussion of this subject today in order to clarify several points, he turned to a prepared statement on notification concerning dismantling and destruction activities in progress (Attachment No. 9).

Following the penultimate paragraph of his statement, he noted that the additional examples he was referring to included about ten which Capt. Kuznetsov had worked up "in his spare time over the past few days."

Mr. Graybeal said that Ustinov had raised several interesting questions, and would probably fully understand if Graybeal did not attempt to answer them here and now. He said they would be studied and answered at a subsequent meeting.

General Ustinov said he had not expected answers today, and agreed that we should return to this subject at a future meeting.

Mr. Graybeal said he would like to address another point which is the subject of differing views, and read his prepared comments on "modern" SLBMs (Attachment No. 10), passing to the Soviet side the two additions proposed by the U.S. side as alternative additions to take the place of the bracketed language in paragraph I.2 of the Offensive Arms Procedures (Attachment No. 11).

In presenting the two proposed variants for addition to paragraph I.2, Graybeal said both of them were consistent with the Interim Agreement and its Protocol, and that either of them would complete the definition of a "modern SLBM," making that definition independent of the type of submarine on which SLBMs were installed. He concluded by stating that if the Soviet side felt either or both of the proposed alternatives to be inadequate or incorrect, he would strongly urge that the Soviet side provide its own variant for consideration; the objective here was to find some way to make the definition complete and correct.

General Ustinov said he understood that Graybeal's statement today meant the U.S. side had now proposed three alternatives for inclusion in paragraph I.2; the one which was bracketed in the Joint Draft Texts and the two which had been presented today. Graybeal confirmed that to be the case.

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Ustinov continued by saying that he would also like to address the subject of this definition in paragraph I.2, and read a prepared statement (Attachment No. 12).

He closed by saying that he had listened attentively to Graybeal's remarks and the new U.S. proposals, which would be carefully studied. He requested that the U.S. side take his own statement of today into consideration in its work on this subject, and that we return to some detailed work on the matter at a future meeting.

Mr. Graybeal said the U.S. side would certainly study Ustinov's considerations very carefully, but that he had to differ on one point. Ustinov had said that paragraph I.3 "answered the U.S. question." That paragraph deals with "older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines." The point under discussion here is the definition of a "modern SLBM," and paragraph 2 deals with missiles installed not on diesel submarines but on nuclear-powered submarines. Therefore, in Graybeal's opinion, paragraph 3 is not an adequate substitute for the U.S.-proposed addition to paragraph 2. He would have to carefully review Ustinov's remarks, since possibly he had not understood them in the proper context. He agreed that we would return to this subject at a future meeting.

General Ustinov asked if the U.S. side had any further matters to raise this morning.

Mr. Graybeal replied that it did not.

General Ustinov said that this morning's meeting, which had put some questions before us which we must work on, had been productive and useful. He proposed that the next meeting be set for Tuesday, April 23, at 11:00 a.m. at the U.S. Mission.

Mr. Graybeal accepted that proposal.

General Ustinov adjourned the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

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Attachments:

1. Ustinov Statement on Exchange of JDTs
2. Russian Text, April 19, 1974 JDT (Offensive)
3. Russian Text, April 19, 1974 JDT (ABM)
4. English Text, April 19, 1974 JDT (Offensive)
5. English Text, April 19, 1974 JDT (ABM)
6. Ustinov Statement on Task of SCC-III
7. Graybeal Comments on Notification
8. Ustinov Statement on Notification
9. Ustinov Statement on Notification of Dismantling in Process
10. Graybeal Comments on "Modern SLBMs"
11. U.S. Working Document -- Offensive Procedures Paragraph I.2
12. Ustinov Statement on Definition of "Modern SLBMs"

Drafted by:  FPDeSimone:bjg

Approved by:  SNGraybeal

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Attachment No. 1

USTINOV STATEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF JOINT DRAFT TEXTS

April 19, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

As reported to me by our Executive Secretary, Mr. Yereskovsky, he and Col. FitzGerald yesterday concluded the work of conforming the Russian and English texts of the Protocols and Procedures, governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems, preliminarily agreed, reflecting their state as of April 19, 1974.

We note with pleasure the fruitful activity in this regard by the Joint Working Group, headed by the Executive Secretaries. In our opinion the work which was carried out is beneficial in all respects. In this connection, we proceed from the premise that the texts which were prepared are working texts. They may be refined by us in the course of completing the full texts of the Protocols and Procedures and are subject to review and approval by the Governments.

Allow me to hand to you the Russian Joint Draft Texts of the Protocols and Procedures. As I understand ^{can} it, we/consider them preliminarily agreed by Commissioners, reflecting their state as of April 19, 1974.

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С е к р е т н о

Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
April 19, 1974

Текст совместного проекта,
предварительно согласован-
ный представителями
19 апреля 1974 года

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯПРОТОКОЛ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ
ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

В соответствии с положениями и в осуществление Временного соглашения между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений от 26 мая 1972 года, Протокола к нему, а также Согласованных заявлений в связи с этим Соглашением участвующие в них Стороны, в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии, согласились о процедурах, регулирующих замену, демонтаж или уничтожение и уведомление о них, для стратегических наступательных вооружений, ограниченных этим Временным соглашением, как они сформулированы в Приложении к настоящему Протоколу, которое является неотъемлемой частью этого Протокола.

Стороны согласились также о следующих общих руководящих положениях:

1. Прилагаемые Процедуры применяются только в отношении средств, заменяемых и демонтируемых или уничтожаемых в соответствии с положениями вышеупомянутого Временного соглашения;

2. Любая замена пусковых установок межконтинентальных баллистических ракет (МБР) или подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок баллистических ракет подводных лодок (БРПЛ) осуществляется на основании Статей III и IV Временного соглашения, Протокола к нему, а также соответствующих Согласованных заявлений;

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3. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения пусковых установок МБР и относящихся к ним сооружений, а также подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ обеспечивают приведение их в состояние, исключающее возможность использования их для пусков соответственно МБР или БРПЛ; обеспечивают возможность обнаружения повторного развертывания демонтированных или уничтоженных единиц национальными техническими средствами; являются такими, что время, необходимое для повторного развертывания этих единиц, не было бы значительно меньше, чем время, необходимое для нового строительства; а также исключают неоправданные задержки в демонтаже или уничтожении;

4. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения формулируются отдельно для незащищенных и для шахтных пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования, а также для подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ;

5. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения обеспечивают возможность соответствующего контроля национальными техническими средствами в соответствии со Статьей У Временного соглашения;

6. После демонтажа или уничтожения, проведенного в соответствии с прилагаемыми Процедурами, сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях МБР наземного базирования, а также подводные лодки могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Временного соглашения и Протокола к нему;

7. Посредством соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве демонтированных или уничтоженных пусковых установок, а также о количестве таких пусковых установок, использованных для замены; и 7²

7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе демонтируемых или уничтожаемых пусковых установок, а также о количестве пусковых установок, предназначенных в качестве замены; и 7^I

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8. Количество подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами, одновременно находящихся в постройке и предназначенных в качестве замены, не будет превышать количества, совместимого с нормальным графиком строительства. Под нормальным графиком строительства понимается график, совместимый с прошлой или нынешней практикой строительства у каждой из Сторон.

Настоящий Протокол и прилагаемые Процедуры вступают в силу с момента подписания данного Протокола и остаются в силе на период действия вышеупомянутого Временного соглашения, и Постоянная консультативная комиссия может по своему усмотрению вносить в них поправки.

Совершено _____ года в городе Женеве в двух экземплярах, каждый на русском и английском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

Представитель
Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик

Представитель
Соединенных Штатов
Америки

-
- 1 Предложение американской стороны.
2 Предложение советской стороны.

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ
УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ
НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНЫХ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

I. Общие

1. Для замены на пусковые установки баллистических ракет современных атомных подводных лодок, в пределах уровней, установленных для каждой из Сторон, могут использоваться пусковые установки межконтинентальных баллистических ракет (МБР) наземного базирования старых типов, развернутых до 1964 года, пусковые установки баллистических ракет любых атомных подводных лодок, а также пусковые установки современных баллистических ракет дизельных подводных лодок.

2. Современными баллистическими ракетами подводных лодок считаются: для Соединенных Штатов - ракеты, установленные на всех атомных подводных лодках, а для Советского Союза - ракеты того типа, которые установлены на атомных подводных лодках, введенных в боевой состав после 1965 года. В дополнение к этому современными баллистическими ракетами подводных лодок считаются все баллистические ракеты подводных лодок, впервые испытанные после 1964 года. 7¹

3. Пусковые установки старых баллистических ракет на дизельных подводных лодках не могут использоваться для целей замены, предусмотренных Протоколом к Временному соглашению о некоторых мерах в области ограничения стратегических наступательных вооружений.

4. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых пусковых установок начинается не позднее даты начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены. Началом демонтажа или уничтожения пусковой установки МБР является начало выполнения

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любого из мероприятий, указанных ниже в разделе II. Началом демонтажа или уничтожения подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами либо пусковой установки БРПЛ является начало выполнения любого из мероприятий, указанных ниже в разделе III.

5. Началом мореходных испытаний подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, предназначенной в качестве замены, является дата, когда такая подводная лодка впервые совершает плавание своим ходом вне гавани или порта, где производились постройка или оснащение подводной лодки.

6. Уведомление о произведенном демонтаже пусковых установок МБР и пусковых установок баллистических ракет заменяемых подводных лодок производится через Постоянную консультативную комиссию два раза в год по состоянию на начало очередной регулярной сессии Комиссии. Уведомление должно содержать сведения за истекшее полугодие о количестве демонтированных пусковых установок МБР и баллистических ракет заменяемых подводных лодок и количестве таких пусковых установок, использованных за этот период для замены на пусковые установки современных подводных лодок.⁷²

6. Уведомление о мероприятиях по демонтажу или уничтожению и замене производится через ПКК два раза в год по состоянию на начало очередной регулярной сессии. В уведомлении указываются:

а) В отношении пусковых установок МБР, развернутых до 1964 года, и пусковых установок баллистических ракет старых подводных лодок - количество и тип пусковых установок (шахтная пусковая установка МБР, незащищенная пусковая установка МБР или пусковая установка БРПЛ), на которых демонтаж или уничтожение находятся в стадии осуществления, а также количество и тип пусковых установок, на которых со времени последнего уведомления, представленного в ПКК, мероприятия по демонтажу или уничтожению были завершены.

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Б) В отношении пусковых установок БР ПЛ, предназначенных в качестве замены, — их количество на подводных лодках, которые начнут мореходные испытания в течение следующего шестимесячного периода, а также их количество на подводных лодках, начавших мореходные испытания со времени последнего уведомления, представленного в ПКК. 7¹

7. Каждая Сторона может на добровольной основе дополнять уведомления другими сведениями, если она сочтет, что они необходимы для обеспечения уверенности в выполнении принятых по Временному соглашению обязательств.

П. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения пусковых установок МБР наземного базирования, заменяемых пусковыми установками БР ПЛ

1. Во всех случаях при проведении демонтажа или уничтожения выполняются следующие мероприятия:

а) удаление со стартовой позиции запаса ракет и их компонентов, головных частей и подвижного оборудования;

б) демонтаж стационарного пускового оборудования, всего подъемно-транспортного оборудования и заправочного оборудования, \sphericalangle находящегося на стартовой позиции либо связанного с ней 7¹ \sphericalangle связанного с пусковой установкой и находящегося на стартовой позиции 7², а также удаление всего демонтированного оборудования со стартовой позиции. Под пусковым оборудованием понимаются системы, компоненты и приборы, необходимые для проведения пуска ракеты.

2. В отношении незащищенных стартовых позиций в дополнение к мероприятиям, перечисленным в пункте 1, осуществляются следующие мероприятия:

а) \sphericalangle места установки пускового устройства или стартовые площадки 7², \sphericalangle участки стартовых площадок диаметром по меньшей мере в 30 метров с центром, находящимся на стартовом столе 7¹ и пункты (бункеры) управления пуском ракет приводятся в непригодное для использования состояние путем демонтажа или разрушения;

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Б) емкости для хранения топлива демонтируются и удаляются со стартовой позиции;

с) обломки мест установки пусковых устройств или стартовых площадок, пунктов (бункеров) управления пуском ракет и фундаменты емкостей для хранения топлива могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев места, где они находились, могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. В отношении шахтных стартовых позиций, в дополнение к мероприятиям, перечисленным в пункте 1, осуществляются следующие мероприятия:

а) защитные крыши шахт, рельсы защитных крыш, газоотводные каналы и шахтные стаканы \angle оголовки шахт, а также бункеры управления пуском \angle^I демонтируются или уничтожаются. Демонтированные компоненты удаляются со стартовой позиции;

Б) после проведения мероприятий, предусмотренных выше в подпункте "а", шахта оставляется открытой в течение шести месяцев, после чего \angle может быть засыпана \angle^2 \angle засыпается \angle^I землей.

\angle^4 . После осуществления демонтажа или уничтожения в соответствии с вышеуказанными процедурами сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях МБР, не могут использоваться как для хранения, обслуживания или пуска МБР, так и для хранения или обслуживания пусковых установок, которые могут быть использованы для пуска МБР, но могут по усмотрению сторон использоваться для других целей, не противоречащих положениям Временного соглашения и Протокола к нему. \angle^I

5. Демонтаж или уничтожение заменяемых пусковых установок МБР завершается не позже, чем через четыре месяца после начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены.

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III. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ, заменяемых новыми подводными лодками с баллистическими ракетами и пусковыми установками БРПЛ

I. Для демонтажа или уничтожения подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами и пусковых установок БРПЛ приемлемыми являются следующие процедуры, из которых каждая из Сторон может делать выбор:

а) затопление подводной лодки вместе с ее пусковыми установками в международных водах глубиной не менее 2000 метров;

Г- Когда избирается эта процедура уничтожения подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, другая сторона уведомляется о времени и месте запланированного уничтожения, по меньшей мере за один месяц до запланированного уничтожения; 7^I

б) превращение в металлолом под открытым небом подводной лодки и ее пусковых установок Г на заранее указанных верфях 7^I. Превращение в металлолом предусматривает капитальную разборку;

с) удаление под открытым небом ракетного отсека подводной лодки Г на заранее указанных верфях 7^I ;

Г- д) снятие пусковых шахт или срезка верхней части шахт вместе с надстройкой над ними; 7²

Г- е) для подводных лодок "класса -Н" будут применяться следующие процедуры: снятие пусковых шахт под открытым небом на заранее указанных верфях. Стороны согласовывают, какие верфи используются для демонтажа подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами.

1) Будет снята вся часть надстройки (включая ограждение рубки) и легкого корпуса над ракетным отсеком подводной лодки.

2) Будет снята та часть прочного корпуса ракетного отсека (верхняя обшивка корпуса и сегменты шангоута), в которой находятся все выходы ракетных пусковых шахт, а также будут сняты ракетные пусковые шахты.

3) Прочный корпус и легкий корпус затем могут быть восстановлены лишь путем вваривания новых секций, не имеющих выходов пусковых шахт.

4) Ни надстройка, ни ограждение рубки не будут восстановлены над той частью подводной лодки, с которой были сняты пусковые шахты. 7^I

2. Любое из указанных выше мероприятий завершается не позже, чем через шесть месяцев после начала мореходных испытаний подводной лодки, предназначенной в качестве замены.

3. При любом из вариантов демонтажа люки пусковых шахт остаются открытыми в течение всего периода демонтажа, а ракеты и оборудование для пуска ракет удаляются.

IV. Процедуры замены подводной лодки с баллистическими ракетами, погибшей в море или получившей повреждение, исключающее ремонт

В том случае, если подводная лодка с баллистическими ракетами гибнет в море или получает повреждение, исключающее ремонт, то такая подводная лодка может быть заменена другой подводной лодкой с баллистическими ракетами в соответствии с нижеследующим:

а) другая Сторона уведомляется через Постоянную консультативную комиссию о гибели или повреждении;

б) количество пусковых установок на подводной лодке с баллистическими ракетами, предназначенной в качестве замены, не приводит к превышению общего количества пусковых установок, разрешенного Временным соглашением и Протоколом к нему; и

в) поврежденная подводная лодка с баллистическими ракетами демонтируется или уничтожается в соответствии с разделом III настоящих Процедур.

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Attachment No. 3

Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
April 19, 1974

Текст совместного проекта,
предварительно согласован-
ный Представителями
19 апреля 1974 года

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ

ПРОТОКОЛ

ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ЗАМЕНУ, ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ
И УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

В соответствии с положениями и в осуществление Договора между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны от 26 мая 1972 года и Согласованных заявлений в связи с этим Договором участвующие в нем Стороны, в рамках Постоянной консультативной комиссии, согласились о процедурах, регулирующих замену, демонтаж или уничтожение и уведомление о них, для систем ПРО и их компонентов, ограниченных этим Договором, как они сформулированы в Приложении к настоящему Протоколу, которое является неотъемлемой частью этого Протокола.

Стороны согласились также о следующих общих руководящих положениях:

1. Прилагаемые Процедуры применяются только в отношении систем или их компонентов, заменяемых и демонтируемых или уничтожаемых в соответствии с положениями вышеупомянутого Договора;

2. Любая замена систем ПРО или их компонентов осуществляется на основании Статьи VII вышеупомянутого Договора, а также соответствующих Согласованных заявлений; демонтаж или уничтожение систем ПРО или их компонентов сверх количеств или вне районов, определенных Договором, осуществляется на основании Статьи VIII вышеупомянутого Договора и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений;

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3. Процедуры демонтажа или уничтожения систем ПРО или их компонентов, связанные с осуществлением положений Статьи УП в отношении замены этих систем или их компонентов и Статьи УШ вышеупомянутого Договора, обеспечивают приведение этих систем или их компонентов, а также относящихся к этим компонентам сооружений, за исключением сооружений на испытательных полигонах, в состояние, исключающее возможность использования их в целях ПРО; обеспечивают возможность обнаружения национальными техническими средствами повторного развертывания демонтированных или уничтоженных единиц; являются такими, что время, необходимое для повторного развертывания этих единиц, не было бы значительно меньше, чем время, необходимое для нового строительства; а также исключают неоправданные задержки в демонтаже или уничтожении;

4. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения формулируются отдельно для наземных и шахтных пусковых установок противоракет и для радиолокационных станций ПРО;

5. Процедуры замены и демонтажа или уничтожения обеспечивают возможность соответствующего контроля национальными техническими средствами в соответствии со Статьей XII вышеупомянутого Договора;

6. После демонтажа или уничтожения, проведенного в соответствии с прилагаемыми Процедурами, сооружения, остающиеся на стартовых позициях ПРО или на позициях радиолокационных станций ПРО, могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям вышеупомянутого Договора и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений; и

7. Посредством соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве демонтированных или уничтоженных пусковых установок противоракет и радиолокационных станций ПРО, а также о количестве пусковых установок противоракет и радиолокационных станций ПРО, использованных для замены. 7²

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7. Посредством своевременных и соответствующих процедур Стороны уведомляют друг друга о количестве и типе (наземная или шахтная) демонтируемых или уничтожаемых пусковых установок противоракет и о количестве демонтируемых или уничтожаемых радиолокационных станций ПРО, а также о количестве пусковых установок противоракет и радиолокационных станций ПРО, предназначенных в качестве замены.¹

Настоящий Протокол и прилагаемые Процедуры вступают в силу с момента подписания данного Протокола и остаются в силе на период действия вышеупомянутого Договора, и Постоянная консультативная комиссия может по своему усмотрению вносить в них поправки.

Совершено _____ года в городе Женеве в двух экземплярах, каждый на русском и английском языках, причем оба текста имеют одинаковую силу.

Представитель
Союза Советских Социалистических
Республик

Представитель
Соединенных Штатов
Америки

¹ Предложение американской стороны.

² Предложение советской стороны.

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ

ПОСТОЯННАЯ КОНСУЛЬТАТИВНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
ПРОЦЕДУРЫ, РЕГУЛИРУЮЩИЕ ДЕМОНТАЖ ИЛИ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЕ И
УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ О НИХ, ДЛЯ СИСТЕМ ПРО И ИХ КОМПОНЕНТОВ

I. Пусковые установки противоракет на испытательных полигонах сверх установленных количеств

1. Наземные пусковые установки и относящиеся к ним оборудование удаляются со стартовых позиций, а вся часть стартовой площадки, занимаемая стойкой пусковой установки и арматурой, демонтируется или разрушается. Обломки стартовой площадки могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев это место может быть засыпано землей.

2. Шахтные пусковые установки приводятся в непригодное для использования состояние путем демонтажа или уничтожения их надземных конструкций $\left[\text{или} \right]^2 \left[\text{и} \right]^1$ оголовков, а также путем удаления направляющих. Обломки шахтных пусковых установок могут быть удалены, а по истечении шести месяцев шахты засыпаются землей.

3. Указанные в пунктах 1 и 2 мероприятия по демонтажу или уничтожению завершаются не позже, чем через три месяца с момента их начала.

4. Сооружения, относящиеся к демонтированным или уничтоженным пусковым установкам противоракет на испытательных полигонах, могут по усмотрению Сторон использоваться для целей, не противоречащих положениям Договора об ограничении систем ПРО и соответствующих Согласованных заявлений.

5. Уведомление о $\left[\right]$ завершении мероприятий, предусмотренных в пунктах 1 и $2 \left[\right]^2 \left[\right]$ предусмотренных в пунктах 1 и 2 мероприятиях как находящихся в стадии осуществления, так и завершенных $\left[\right]^1$ производится через постоянную консультативную комиссию два раза в год по состоянию на начало очередной регулярной сессии Комиссии.

II. Сооружения ПРО на базе Мальмстром

I. Металлические стержни арматуры зданий РЛС срезаются.

2. Здания РЛС, для которых было уже начато возведение стен, оставляются неприкрытыми в их незавершенном состоянии в течение шести месяцев, после чего они могут быть засыпаны землей.

3. Сооружения для пусковых установок, а также здания РЛС, для которых были завершены строительством лишь фундаменты, засыпаются землей.

4. Осуществляется разравнивание почвы на всем участке, а строительные материалы удаляются.

5. Работы по демонтажу или уничтожению начинаются не позже, чем через шесть месяцев после согласования настоящих Процедур.

6. Уведомление о завершении указанных мероприятий производится через Постоянную консультативную комиссию.

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Attachment No. 4

Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
April 19, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

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1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Interim Agreement;

2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers;

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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers being dismantled or destroyed and the number of replacement launchers; and¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed launchers and the number of such launchers used for replacement; and²

¹ Proposed by U.S. side.

² Proposed by Soviet side.

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8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the aforementioned Interim Agreement, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for each Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964, launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965. [In addition, all submarine-launched ballistic missiles first tested after 1964 are modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles.]¹

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3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

4. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of a ballistic-missile submarine or SLBM launcher.

5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement activities shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session. The notification shall contain:

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- (a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for ballistic-missile launchers on older submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher) on which dismantling or destruction is in process and the number and type on which dismantling or destruction action has been completed since the last report in the SCC.
- (b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the number which are on submarines that will begin sea trials during the next six-month period, and the number which are on submarines that have begun sea trials since the last report in the SCC.^{7¹}

6. Notification of completed dismantling of ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission. The notification shall contain information for the past six months on the number of dismantled ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines, as well as on the number of such launchers replaced by launchers on modern submarines during that period.^{7²}

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7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

- (a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment;
- (b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, located at the launch site or associated with it¹ associated with the launcher and located at the launch site² and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

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2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) Areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 30 meters in diameter¹
Locations of launch device emplacement, or launch pads² and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;
- (b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site;
- (c) debris of locations of launch devices or launch pads, of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and of fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

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- (a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes silos headworks, and launch control bunkers⁷¹ shall be dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site;
- (b) after the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silo shall remain open for a period of six months, after which it shall⁷¹ may⁷² be filled with earth.

4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites may not be used either for storage, support or launch of ICBMs, or for storage or support of ICBM-capable launchers, but may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.⁷¹

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

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III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers

1. The following procedures, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:

- (a) sinking of the submarine with its launchers in international waters of at least 2000 meters depth. When this procedure for ballistic-missile submarine destruction is chosen, notification of the time and location of the planned destruction shall be given to the other side at least one month prior to the planned destruction⁷¹;
- (b) scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the open in predesignated shipyards⁷¹. Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;
- (c) removing the submarine's missile section in the open in predesignated shipyards⁷¹;

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∠(d) removal of the launch tubes or cutting off the upper part of the tubes together with the superstructure above them;⁷²

∠(e) for "H-Class" submarines the following procedures will apply: removal of launch tubes in the open in predesignated shipyards. The shipyards to be used for ballistic-missile submarine dismantling shall be agreed between the Parties.

(1) That entire part of the superstructure (including the fairwater) and outer hull above the missile compartment of the submarine will be removed.

(2) That section of the missile compartment pressure hull (hull crown plating and frame segments) which contains all of the hull penetrations for the missile launch tubes, as well as the missile launch tubes will be removed.

(3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then be restored only by welding into place new sections without launch tube penetrations.

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(4) No superstructure or fairwater will be replaced over the section of the submarine from which the launch tubes have been removed.⁷¹

2. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed no later than six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.

IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance with the following:

(a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other Party through the Standing Consultative Commission;

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- (b) the number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the total number of launchers to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto; and
- (c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these Procedures.

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Attachment No. 5

Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
April 19, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Treaty;

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2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the aforementioned Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars;

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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the aforementioned Treaty;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the aforementioned Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and the number of ABM radars being dismantled or destroyed, and the number of replacement ABM launchers and ABM radars.¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers and ABM radars, and the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.²

¹ Proposed by U.S. side.

² Proposed by Soviet side.

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This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the aforementioned Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth.

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and¹ or² headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos shall be filled with earth.

3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three months after their initiation.

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4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and applicable Agreed Statements.

5. Notification of the ∧activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 that are in process and that have been completed 7¹ ∧completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2² shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission.

II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be cut off.

2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state for six months after which they may be covered with earth.

3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.

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4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials removed.

5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement on these Procedures.

6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission.

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Attachment No. 6

USTINOV STATEMENT ON TASK OF SCC-III

April 19, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

It should be noted that until now there still remain a number of provisions of the Protocols and Procedures for which the Commission has not yet found mutually acceptable solutions. In our opinion the next stage of the third session of the SCC must be the conduct of this most complex and labor-consuming work. As I understand it, the U.S. Component of the Commission is also in agreement with this.

I can confirm once again that the Soviet side is ready to proceed to consideration of those paragraphs which have not been agreed by us, and to preparation of complete draft texts of the Protocols and Procedures, governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems, insofar as the U.S. side is ready for this. In this connection, we proceed from the premise that completion of this work, if possible, is the main task of the current session.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 7

COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS -- NOTIFICATION

April 19, 1974

1. The U.S. side considers notification to be one of the major unresolved issues. The differences between the approach of the Soviet side and that of the U.S. side are reflected by bracketed language in several places in the JDTs. Although it first appears in para. 7 of the Protocols, the more specific provisions at issue are in the detailed procedures.

2. The subject of notification has been addressed extensively during previous SCC sessions. The U.S. side has carefully reviewed these exchanges, and has the following comments.

3. The Soviet side has maintained that national technical means of verification are capable of verifying with complete confidence and reliability compliance by the sides with the obligations assumed in accordance with the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement; and that therefore, there is no need whatsoever to introduce into the verification process any sort of additional measures,

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including prior notification. Mr. Commissioner, I must once again reemphasize that the U.S. position on notification is that it is not required for adequate verification by national technical means of compliance with the existing agreements or with the Procedures we work out, except in the case of destruction of submarines by sinking.

4. It has been and remains the U.S. position that certain prior notification provisions would promote the objectives of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement in accordance with Articles XIII and VI, respectively, of these agreements. Specifically, such provisions would:

- a. Enhance the viability of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement by reducing possibilities for uncertainties and misunderstandings.
- b. Help develop mutual trust and contribute to continued improved relations between our two countries, thereby creating a better climate for future agreements.

5. The U.S. side considers these to be significant benefits which could be achieved at little cost or effort and at no risk. They would not impinge on the security

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interests of either side. Neither would these provisions cause a loss of flexibility in programming replacement, destruction or dismantling activities; information given at one SCC meeting could be amended as necessary at the next. It is our view that certain prior notification provisions would prevent rather than cause misunderstandings. In my opinion one of the important purposes of objectives of the SCC is to prevent misunderstandings wherever possible.

6. In prior sessions the Soviet side has suggested that para. I.7 of the strategic offensive arms procedures dealing with voluntary information provides an adequate opportunity for one side to provide the other side with advance information if it considers such information necessary to assure compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement. Para. I.7 is an unbracketed paragraph and thus "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners." The U.S. side continues to agree with the desirability of this paragraph, but does not agree that this paragraph is a substitute for certain prior notification provisions. In fact para. 7 deals with "compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement" and applies to more than just the mutually agreed procedures we are working on.

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7. Mr. Commissioner, it is our view that the U.S. proposals for prior notification should be considered on their own merit as an integral part of our mutually agreed procedures. They would thus contribute to promoting the objectives of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. Prior notification is not precluded by the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and its Protocol, or Agreed Statements.

8. The language proposed by the U.S. side in para. 7 of the two Protocols is consistent with the U.S. view on the desirability of including certain prior notification provisions in these mutually agreed procedures. The specific language merely requires the Parties to notify each other of the number and types of launchers being dismantled or destroyed and the number of replacement launchers. The first substantive point regarding prior notification is contained in para. I.6 of the procedures for strategic offensive arms. Notification of the type contained in the U.S. proposed para. I.6 reflects the type of notification which would meet the U.S. objectives I set forth earlier.

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Attachment No. 8

USTINOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION

April 19, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

We have attentively listened to the statement of the U.S. SCC Component. We will study it carefully. For my part I would like to direct your attention to those considerations which govern the approach of the Soviet Component of the Commission to notification procedures. As you know, these procedures were not agreed at the second session.

On questions of notification the Soviet side proceeds from the fundamental joint Soviet-American documents, which first and foremost are the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Article XII of the aforementioned Treaty and Article V of the Interim Agreement specify that for the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of these documents each side shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. In this connection the sides undertook not to interfere with

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the national technical means of verification of the other side which are carrying out their functions, including not using deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and Interim Agreement.

Thus, Mr. Commissioner, both sides have directly and officially recognized the effectiveness and reliability of national technical means in carrying out verification. Moreover, we can say with good reason that the very conclusion in May 1972 of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the U.S., to a significant degree became possible because both sides agreed that national technical means are capable of reliably verifying compliance of the sides with the terms and provisions of these Soviet-American documents.

The U.S. Component of the Commission has also repeatedly emphasized, at the second and at the current session of the SCC, the effectiveness and reliability of national technical means of verification.

In connection with the above considerations, the Soviet side does not see the necessity of substituting any sort of further additional functions of the

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Commission, for example those having the nature of prior notification, for the functions of national technical means of verification.

We believe that with respect to the dismantling or destruction and replacement procedures for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems being worked out by us, national technical means of verification are capable of reliably verifying dismantling activities at appropriate ICBM launch sites, shipyards and ABM test ranges, as well as those arms replacement activities which may be carried out by the sides in implementation of the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.

The Soviet side sees the basic function of notification through the SCC to be that the sides inform each other, for the period between sessions, concerning an accomplished fact--the completion of dismantling or destruction of numbers of ICBM launchers, submarines and SLBM launchers, as well as ABM launchers and radars; and the number of launchers used by each side for replacement purposes during the same period. Such reciprocal providing of information by the sides through the SCC would be documentary confirmation of completed activity for official recording by the other

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side; that will promote the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

In this connection we do not exclude that each side may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications, if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed.

Such are the basic positions of principle on notification issues to which the Soviet side adheres in working out the Protocols and Procedures. These tenets have been reflected in those specific formulations for the corresponding paragraphs of the joint documents, which were proposed by us during the first and second sessions and which are bracketed as the proposals of the Soviet side.

Mr. Commissioner, we hope that the U.S. SCC Component will once again carefully study our point of view on notification procedures. It seems to us that achievement of mutual agreement on this issue would be in the interests of the entire Commission.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 9

USTINOV STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF DISMANTLING
IN PROCESS

April 19, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

The proposals of the U.S. side on notification issues, tabled during the second session of the SCC, speak of notification regarding ICBM, SLBM and ABM launchers, the dismantling of which is in process.

Study by the Soviet side during the recess of such a notification procedure prompted a number of questions on our part. For example, it is not clear to us what one side or another would have to do at the next session about notification of dismantling of launchers or radars if dismantling thereof, already begun before the previous session, is not completed by the beginning of the next session. Will this require repeated notification or will it not be necessary to do so?

Based on those time periods which are provided for the completion of dismantling, such instances are evidently quite possible. For example, according to the procedures, dismantling of replaced ICBM

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launchers must be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials, dismantling of SLBM launchers--within six months, and dismantling actions on ABM launchers at test ranges--no later than three months after their initiation.

At the same time, the experience of the second and third sessions of the SCC shows that the period between sessions lasted from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ months. Thus, the duration of dismantling may sometimes overlap the duration of the period between sessions. Another variant: dismantling begun before the previous session, is completed during the period between sessions. How would one in this instance relate these launchers to those launchers, dismantling of which was both begun and completed during the period between sessions? It would be possible to cite a number of other variants.

We would be thankful to you, Mr. Commissioner, if you would clarify for us how the U.S. side envisages practical implementation of such a notification procedure.

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COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL'S COMMENTS--MODERN SLBM'S

April 19, 1974

1. The Protocol to the Interim Agreement states:
"The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." Paragraph I.2 is included in the procedures for the purpose of defining a modern SLBM. Without the inclusion of an added sentence, of the type proposed by the U.S. side, the paragraph deals only with modern SLBMs on nuclear-powered submarines and does not deal with modern SLBMs "on any submarine, regardless of type" -- for example, diesel-powered submarines. Thus in the U.S. view there is a requirement for an additional sentence to complete the definition of a modern SLBM.

2. From a review of previous exchanges on this subject, I do not detect a substantive difference between the two sides. If I understand the Soviet position correctly it is basically that it is not necessary to introduce this additional language. It is the U.S. view that an additional sentence is necessary to complete the purpose of this paragraph. By such an addition the modern SLBM

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definition would be complete and any possible misunderstanding on this point would be eliminated. It would be clear in the procedures that the term "modern submarine-launched ballistic missile" applies to newer missiles regardless of the type of submarine on which they are deployed.

3. In light of the foregoing and after careful review of the previous exchanges on this subject, the U.S. side proposes the following alternative language for the U.S. proposed additional sentence (read alternatives and pass copies to Soviet side).

4. The U.S. proposed additional sentence in either form would apply equally to both sides, is consistent with Interim Agreement and its the Protocol, and, in the U.S. view, is necessary to complete the definition of a "modern SLBM."

5. Mr. Commissioner, the U.S. side continues to believe that an additional sentence is necessary for completeness in the definition of "modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles." Taking into account Soviet concerns regarding the U.S. proposed sentence, we have provided you today with alternative language, intended to clarify the sentence, which in our opinion would adequately complete the definition of modern SLBMs.

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Attachment No. 11

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U.S. Working Document
April 19, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES
PARAGRAPH I.2

2. "Modern ... 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine regardless of type."

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U.S. Working Document
April 19, 1974

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS: PROCEDURES
PARAGRAPH I.2

2. "Modern ... 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in diesel submarines."

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Attachment No. 1?

USTINOV STATEMENT ON DEFINITION OF MODERN SLBM

April 19, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

In my second statement today I would like to address the question of the definition of modern SLBMs contained in paragraph I.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms.

In paragraph I.2 there are brackets containing a proposal of the U.S. side consisting of an addition to the definition of modern SLBMs. During the recess the Soviet side carefully studied this wording of paragraph 2, taking your proposal into account, and believes that the initial wording, without the U.S. addition, sufficiently completely defines the concept of modern SLBMs, applicable to the objectives of the procedures we are working out.

Furthermore, in accordance with paragraph I.3 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, agreed by the sides at the second session of the SCC, use of launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines for replacement purposes is precluded. In order to avoid the possibility of circumvention of the agreement through accumulation of modern SLBMs on diesel submarines, the sides have also provided

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that these missiles will count in the total level of SLBM launchers established by the Interim Agreement.

Thus, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms, taking into account the provisions of other earlier agreed interpretive statements which are presently in force, define with adequate precision the concept of modern SLBMs for both sides, and it is not necessary to introduce any sort of addition into paragraph 2. The Soviet side proposes to leave the wording of paragraph I.2 of the Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms as follows: "Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965."

Thank you for your attention.

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Session-III
A-170

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, April 16, 1974
US Mission, GenevaPersons Present:

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. (Ret.) C. G. FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col Belyanin
Lt. Col. Bartos	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Long	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Capt. Korobchenko
Mr. Smith	(Military Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	

Commissioner Graybeal opened the meeting at 11:00 a.m., and said that before giving the floor to General Ustinov he would like to introduce Mr. Robert Smith, now working on the US Component of the SCC in place of Lt. Col. Pettyjohn, who had been present at our first meeting of this session.

Commissioner Ustinov acknowledged the introduction, and delivered a prepared statement (Attachment).

Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov and said that the US Component of the SCC also believed that the work of the Editorial Working Group, on the nonsubstantive changes designed to make the JDTs clearer, had been useful and productive and that the JDTs had been improved. Also he believed doing that work now would save time as we neared the completion of our assigned task of preparing mutually acceptable procedures for replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their components.

He continued by stating that the US SCC Component also agrees that the texts of the JDTs, which were now in the process of being conformed, would have the same status as the November 16, 1973 texts; that is, "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners", with

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the appropriate date noted. This set of revised texts would provide the basis for negotiating the much more important issues and differences between the sides, now identified by bracketed language. Graybeal said that he understood Ustinov's statement concerning the status of these JDTs meant that "nothing is agreed until all is agreed." As Ustinov had so aptly put it, our respective Governments would, of course, also review the documents prior to their signature and entry into force. It also went without saying that either side had the option to raise any question concerning either bracketed or unbracketed language if it were considered necessary. He hoped, however, that the currently unbracketed language would have "clear sailing" henceforth, and that we could focus our attention on the substantive matters in the bracketed portions of the JDTs.

Graybeal concluded by noting that the nonsubstantive changes proposed by each side and accepted by the other had been incorporated into the texts which were being conformed by our Executive Secretaries today. With the assistance of our interpreters and those others involved, this conforming of the texts could be completed, we could agree that they were "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners" as of the date that work was done, and the Russian and English-language versions could be exchanged.

General Ustinov said he would like to restate his belief that positive and useful work had been done by the Editorial Working Group and our Deputy Commissioners; it would help to provide a basis for working out the final agreed texts of the Protocols and Procedures. He said he agreed that our Executive Secretaries should complete the work of conforming the texts, preparing them for agreement by Commissioners at the level noted by Graybeal and for exchange of Russian and English versions.

Mr. Graybeal said he thought this exchange of texts could be part of our next SCC meeting.

General Ustinov agreed.

Mr. Graybeal asked if the Soviet Component had any other matters to take up today.

General Ustinov said the Soviet side had many issues it would like to raise at future meetings, but not this morning.

Mr. Graybeal said that in that case, since he also had nothing further to bring up this morning, he would like to propose that

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our next meeting take place at 11:00 a.m. on April 19, at the Soviet Mission, for the purpose of initiating substantive discussion of bracketed language in the JDTs.

General Ustinov stated that as he had said at our first meeting and repeated again today, the Soviet side is ready to go on with that work. He agreed to the time and place proposed by Graybeal for the next meeting.

Mr. Graybeal said he did have one more item of business which concerned pleasure. The US Component would like to invite the Soviet Component to lunch in this room on Wednesday, April 24, at 1:00 p.m.

General Ustinov accepted with gratitude on behalf of the Soviet Component, and remarked that he had no objection in principle to lunching at the same table at which we were now working.

Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 11:35 a.m.

Attachment:
Ustinov Statement

Drafted by: F. P. DeSimone:bd

Approved by: S. N. Graybeal ^{SNS}

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USTINOV STATEMENT, April 16, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

As agreed, today we are holding the second plenary meeting of the Commission.

The Soviet Component of the Commission has carefully studied the editorial changes, proposed by the U.S. side, to the previously agreed provisions of the Joint Draft Texts of the Protocols and Procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems, of November 16, 1973.

We believe that the two meetings of the Working Group headed by the Executive Secretaries and the meeting of Deputy Commissioner V. P. Karpov and General Georgi were useful for both sides and were productive.

We have no objections to the changes introduced by the U.S. side which are of a purely grammatical or stylistic nature and which do not change provisions of principle, flowing from the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty; we agree also to the refinements of a legal nature to the texts of the Protocols and Procedures which do not change the sense of already agreed basic premises on the structure and format of the documents.

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In that light we agree to introduce such corrections into the documents, and specifically:

(a) to indicate more clearly that the procedures for dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their components are being adopted pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty which is in force;

(b) to show more clearly that the procedures for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their components are an integral part of the respective Protocols;

(c) to establish the time of entry into force of the strategic offensive arms and ABM Protocols and Procedures, which are to be considered in force upon signature by us of the respective Protocols.

As for some other proposals and formulations of the U.S. side, we do not see the need to introduce them into the texts already worked out. As I understand it, the U.S. Component of the Commission has also agreed with this.

The specific proposals of the Soviet side are contained in our working document, which we have given to you, and work on which is being finished up today by our Executive Secretaries.

The Soviet side agrees to the changes and additions introduced, and proposes to consider the corrected texts of the Protocols and Procedures to be joint drafts. In this connection it is our understanding that our agreement to these texts is preliminary until final completion of the full texts of the Protocols and Procedures and their approval by Governments.

Mr. Commissioner, the Soviet side is prepared to turn to consideration of other paragraphs of the Protocols and Procedures, which still remain unagreed.

Thank you for your attention.

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3. The Soviet side does not object to changes for stylistic and grammatical purposes which do not affect the Russian language texts; these can be made in the JDTs and confirmed under the supervision of our Executive Secretaries.

4. In principle, the Soviet side also does not oppose "polishing" the texts from a legal point of view, keeping in mind that there should be no changes to the agreed structure and format of the documents. For example, it would appear useful to clearly state in the preambular language that the procedures we are working out are implementation of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, and to clearly set down that each set of Procedures and its respective Protocol comprise an integral document, and also to clearly state when these agreed Procedures enter into force.

5. In other cases, the suggestions and proposals of the US side raise some doubt, and the Soviet side has formulated alternative changes. If these are not acceptable, the Soviet side would prefer to stay with the formulations in the November 16, 1973 JDTs. This approach, retaining November 16 JDT language, also applies in some cases where the Soviet side does not consider the US-proposed changes to be useful, and has made no alternative proposal.

Karpov then handed over the Soviet working documents (Attachments No. 1 and No. 2) and proceeded to review all the proposed editorial changes. Those which were not simply accepted as they were proposed in the US Working Document of April 5, 1974 are reviewed below, with comments and discussion. For ease of reference, see Attachment No. 2 to MemCon, SCC Session III, A-160.

Strategic Offensive Arms, JDT, Protocol

Preambular Language

1. "And in implementation of" -- accepted, but Soviet-suggested language requires minor change in wording which actually better articulates the intent of the US-proposed change.

2. Karpov said that ". . . regarding that Agreement . . ." is better than ". . . related Agreed Statements . . ." because it more closely corresponds to the title agreed upon for those agreed statements initialed by Ambassador Smith and Minister Semenov on May 26, 1972. This approach, Karpov said, applies to all cases where the language of previously agreed documents is used in formulations for the documents now being worked out. In the Soviet view, this approach is extremely desirable, and should be used consistently.

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3. ". . . hereinafter referred to as the Interim Agreement . . ." -- The Soviet view is that it is not useful or necessary to arrive at a contrived way of lumping together the pertinent documents and referring to them in combination as "the Interim Agreement," especially when one of them is already "the Interim Agreement." Listing by their proper names, as previously agreed, the several documents of various categories to which we are referring in this Preamble is more direct and accurate.

4. The Soviet side, based on the need here and the precedent pointed out by the US side at the April 5, 1974 meeting, proposes to explicitly state that the Procedures are spelled out in an Attachment which forms an integral part of the Protocol. This is in accord with the express desire of the US side that ambiguity on that score be removed. The suggested change and addition to the last sentence of the preambular paragraph accomplishes that purpose, in the Soviet view. Georgi agreed that it appeared to do so, though we would have to review it once again to be certain. At the same time, he agreed that if the ". . . hereinafter referred to . . ." phrase was not adopted, it would be necessary to stay with ". . . that Interim Agreement . . ." at the end of the preambular paragraph.

Protocol, Numbered Paragraphs

1. Assuming agreement on the principle and implementation of point 4 above, the "Procedures" would generally be written with a capital letter, contrary to the US suggestion. The US participants indicated that was probably acceptable, since the doubt created by capitalizing "Procedures" should now be completely removed by the explicit statement of the status of the "attached procedures" -- that is, Protocol and Procedures constitute one integral document. Karpov agreed.

2. Reference paragraph 6. Soviet rejection of the proposed deletion of ". . . provisions of the . . ." was not discussed as Karpov reviewed the changes. Later in the meeting, however, the subject was raised by Georgi with a question concerning the reasons for not accepting that "fix" in the several places for which it was suggested, including the ABM Protocol. Karpov said that the working out of these procedures was a precisely defined task -- the SCC was to do so in order to implement specific provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. FitzGerald pointed out that Article XIII of the ABM Treaty charged the SCC with promoting the implementation of objectives and provisions,

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and reminded Karpov of our previous explanation that simply referring to "the Interim Agreement" or "the ABM Treaty" in para. 6 of each Protocol, for example, covered both those charges. If we included "provisions" in that formulation, perhaps inclusion of "objectives" as well would be better.

Karpov disagreed, saying that certainly implementing the objectives of those agreements already in force was an SCC function, but the task at hand was specifically tied to certain of their specific provisions. The SCC can be, and indeed already is, empowered to deal with adding to those agreements based on changes in the strategic situation and so forth, but for the time being we still have SALT to do that job. The SCC, within the broad task of promoting objectives, is now working out procedures for implementing certain provisions of those agreements, as directed by our governments when they signed the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement.

When FitzGerald asked whether or not we were also promoting their objectives, Karpov replied that of course we were. FitzGerald then noted that in that case specifically mentioning "provisions" could be misleading or incomplete. Karpov replied that on the contrary, it is necessary to keep it clear in these documents that the SCC is acting in accord with provisions of agreements in force and not "inventing anything new."

FitzGerald said that it would appear the Soviet side agrees that everything the SCC does is "promoting the objectives" of agreements in force. Karpov said that was true, but added that he saw no need to continually underscore that fact.

3. The wording of the penultimate paragraph to include the "entry into force" phrase follows the US-proposed format and retains November 16 JDT language for ". . . attached Procedures . . ." based on the fix in the preambular language (see point 4 under "Preambular Language" above).

Strategic Offensive Arms JDT, Procedures

1. The US proposal to combine paras. I.1 and I.2, Karpov said, was not a good one. Since "modern SLBM" is not defined elsewhere, we should follow "trails already blazed" in formulating this definition and maintaining paras. 1, 2, and 3 in their present format. He went through a rather lengthy discussion indicating that the Soviet side considers this language to be in the category mentioned above in point 2 under "Preambular Language." The "trail already blazed" in this case is the

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July 24, 1972 agreed clarification concerning SLBMs, which Karpov referred to as "that well-known document", and the Soviet position is that we should avoid reformulating such an agreed definition.

2. For the same reason as above, Karpov said we should stick with ". . . installed . . ." rather than use ". . . deployed . . ." in para. 2. Georgi said that seemed reasonable. (Note: Contrary to the impression gained on April 9 and noted in A-162 Karpov said during this discussion that he did not have, nor had he seen, the English-language text of the referenced "agreed clarification".)

3. Karpov said, with reference to para. I.3, that it did not appear particularly useful to shorthand the title of the Interim Agreement. This applied also to the other places where such shortened reference had been proposed, based primarily on the US-proposed change to the preambular language of the Protocol.

4. See title of Section III. It was agreed to correct the order of "ballistic missile submarines and SLBM launchers", to correspond to the formulation of this title, throughout the document (specifically in paras. 2, 3, and 4 of the Protocol and para. I.4 of the Procedures).

5. Rather than the change proposed by the US side for para. III.2, Karpov proposed "any of the foregoing . . ." to accomplish the same purpose.

6. In para. IV(a), Karpov proposed that since the SCC is mentioned so few times in these documents, it should be given due respect by having its name spelled out rather than abbreviated. Georgi agreed.

7. In para. IV(b), ". . . the Protocol thereto . . ." should stay in, based on the discussion and the conclusion concerning not referring to all the pertinent documents together as "the Interim Agreement" (see point 3 above under "Preambular Language").

ABM Procedures, Protocol

1. For all US-proposed changes not accepted or revised, see corresponding discussion above, under Strategic Offensive Arms, Protocol.

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2. Dropping the word "aforementioned" from paras. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, as well as the unnumbered penultimate paragraph was not accepted based on standard practice and on the failure to adopt the ". . . hereinafter referred to as the ABM Treaty . . ." in the preambular language.

3. Reference para. 3, Karpov said that although he understood the US attempt to improve the language in the second line without affecting the substance, this formulation had been the subject of such detailed scrutiny and negotiation perhaps it was better left alone unless there were some important reason to change it. Since the US side had clearly said no substance was involved in any of its proposed changes, it would appear that no such reason existed. (Note: Karpov quite clearly indicated that it would be difficult to change this language at this point since, as a Soviet proposal (SCC-II), it had been subject to close review and approval in Moscow.) Georgi and FitzGerald agreed that since the suggested change had been purely editorial, it was probably all right to leave the sentence as it was.

4. Reference para. 6. See above discussion of ". . . not inconsistent with the provisions . . ." under "Strategic Offensive Arms JDT, Protocol", point 2 under "Protocol, Numbered Paragraphs".

5. Reference penultimate paragraph. Corresponding discussion under Strategic Offensive Arms JDT, Protocol applies.

ABM JDT, Procedures

1. Paragraph I.4 -- see point 4 in immediately preceding section above on ". . . not inconsistent with the provisions . . .".

2. Reference para. II.2, Karpov asked what point in time "present" indicated, noting that this procedure affected the US side only and that he was prepared to leave the formulation as it was in the November 16, 1973 JDT and his question was motivated by curiosity only. He said perhaps it would be just as well to drop the word "present", and avoid raising a question. Georgi replied that seemed like a useful suggestion, and accepted it.

3. Reference para. II.4, Karpov said he was similarly curious about the meaning of "the entire area". DeSimone explained that it had been intended to mean all of the area in which work had been in progress on the future ABM site, affecting the natural contours of the terrain, and asked whether the Soviet side wished to propose

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an editorial change to clarify the text. Karpov said that he appreciated the explanation and that having heard it he thought no change was required.

4. Reference para. II.5, Karpov suggested that ". . . by the SCC . . ." was unnecessary, since it was clear from the entire document how the Procedures were being agreed. Georgi said he thought striking those words a useful fix which the US side could accept.

5. Reference para. II.6, spell out Standing Consultative Commission; see above, point 6 under "Strategic Offensive Arms JDT, Procedures".

Attachments:

1. Soviet SCC Component Working Document, Strategic Offensive Arms Procedures.
2. Soviet SCC Component Working Document, ABM Procedures

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Attachment No. 1

Official translation

Working Document of the
Soviet SCC Component
April 11, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING
OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Agreement, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by that Interim Agreement, as they are formulated in the Attachment which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed

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pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned Interim Agreement;

2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic-missile (ICBM) launchers or ballistic-missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers shall ensure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of these units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM launchers as well as for ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers;

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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers being dismantled or destroyed and the number of replacement launchers; and¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed launchers and the number of such launchers used for replacement; and²

8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

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This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

-
1. Proposed by U.S. side.
 2. Proposed by Soviet side.

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR
DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for each Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964, launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines.

2. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are; for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965. In addition, all submarine-launched ballistic missiles first tested after 1964 are modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles.⁷¹

3. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement

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purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

4. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ^aballistic-missile submarine or SLBM launcher.

5. The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

6. Notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement activities shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session. The notification shall contain:

- (a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for ballistic-missile launchers on

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older submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher) on which dismantling or destruction is in process and the number and type on which dismantling or destruction action has been completed since the last report in the SCC.

- (b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the number which are on submarines that will begin sea trials during the next six-month period, and the number which are on submarines that have begun sea trials since the last report in the SCC.⁷¹

6. Notification of completed dismantling of ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission. The notification shall contain information for the past six months on the number of dismantled ICBM launchers and ballistic-missile launchers on replaced submarines, as well as on the number of such launchers replaced by launchers on modern submarines during that period.⁷²

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7. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

(a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment;

(b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, located at the launch site or associated with it¹ associated with the launcher and located at the launch site² and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

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- (a) Areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 30 meters in diameter⁷¹ Locations of launch device emplacement, or launch pads⁷² and missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction;
- (b) fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site;
- (c) debris of locations of launch devices or launch pads, of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and of fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes silo headworks, and launch control bunkers⁷¹ shall be dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site;
- (b) after the actions provided for in subparagraph (a) above have been accomplished,

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the silo shall remain open for a period of six months, after which it shall¹ may² be filled with earth;

4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites may not be used either for storage, support or launch of ICBMs, or for storage or support of ICBM-capable launchers, but may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.¹

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers

1. The following procedures, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:

- (a) sinking of the submarine with its launchers in international waters of at least 2000 meters depth. When this procedure for ballistic-missile submarine destruction

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- is chosen, notification of the time and location of the planned destruction shall be given to the other side at least one month prior to the planned destruction⁷₁;
- (b) scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the open in predesignated shipyards⁷₁. Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;
- (c) removing the submarine's missile section in the open in predesignated shipyards⁷₁;
- (d) removal of the launch tubes or cutting off the upper part of the tubes together with the superstructure above them;⁷₂
- (e) for "H-Class" submarines the following procedures will apply: removal of launch tubes in the open in predesignated shipyards. The shipyards to be used for ballistic-missile submarine dismantling shall be agreed between the Parties.
- (1) That entire part of the superstructure (including the fairwater) and outer hull above the missile compartment of the submarine will be removed.

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- (2) That section of the missile compartment pressure hull (hull crown plating and frame segments) which contains all of the hull penetrations for the missile launch tubes, as well as the missile launch tubes will be removed.
- (3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then be restored only by welding into place new sections without launch tube penetrations.
- (4) No superstructure or fairwater will be replaced over the section of the submarine from which the launch tubes have been removed.⁷¹

2. Any of the foregoing actions shall be completed no later than six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.

IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a

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submarine may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance with the following:

- (a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other Party through the Standing Consultative Commission;
- (b) the number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the total number of launchers to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto;
- (c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these Procedures.

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Russian language text might be required. He wanted to make it clear again that there was no intention on the US side to change the substantive meaning of any of the language which had already been preliminarily agreed by Commissioners on November 16, 1973. He also noted that, although we were not yet addressing any bracketed paragraphs, we had included in the working document prepared for today's meeting paragraphs which had brackets within them, in cases where the agreed portions of those paragraphs, in our view, needed some nonsubstantive revision. He emphasized to the Soviet participants that any problem whatsoever they had with our approach on the specific changes we were suggesting should be fully and frankly discussed. The purpose of this work was to make the JDTs better; we wanted to do this in a spirit of mutual cooperation and not create any new problems.

Yereskovsky indicated that the Soviet side understood all that FitzGerald had said and that the approach being taken presented no particular problems.

FitzGerald then provided the Soviet participants with copies of both the Offensive Arms and ABM JDTs which reflected all of the US-suggested changes, as well as an unofficial translation into Russian of both documents (see Attachment No. 1 for the English language texts, and Attachment No. 2 for copies of the November 16, 1973 JDTs with the suggested changes marked in).

The US participants then proceeded to go through the documents, identifying the proposed changes and explaining the reasons for them as necessary. Due to the slow nature of this process, it was decided to work only on the Protocols today, leaving the Procedures for a follow-on meeting. In general, the Soviet participants appeared to be intent on simply listening; discussion across the table was limited to questions and answers for clarification, and some limited discussion of the effect of certain changes on the text. Korobchenko initiated a good bit of internal discussion on the Soviet side; Yereskovsky made a point of not allowing this to become joint discussion, across the table, of reactions to the US suggestions.

There was, however, some preliminary reaction discernible on certain points. Specifically, the change in the 5th line of the preambular language in the Offensive Arms Protocol appeared to give the Soviets some trouble, apparently based on both a possible Russian language problem and a possible ambiguity concerning what would be meant when the phrase "the Interim Agreement" was used throughout the document. The US participants made it clear that the suggested change was designed to improve

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clarity, not reduce it, and that we would be responsive to the reactions of the Soviet side, including possible alternative "fixes."

The Soviet participants appeared to have no trouble with the proposed change in the 7th line of the preambular language and seemed unopposed to it and other changes which were intended to make it clear that Protocol and Procedures were a single document. Nevertheless, the suggested fix to the penultimate paragraph of the Protocol--concerning amendments--seemed to be a problem, primarily due to the rendering into Russian, which might appear to separate the Protocols and Procedures rather than draw them more closely together into a single document. The possibilities of alternative fixes were discussed, including that of explicitly stating that the Protocol and "attached procedures" form a single, integral document. The September 30, 1971 Agreement on Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link was cited as containing a precedent for such a solution.

Other suggested changes, not noted above, were discussed and tied to the applicable legal and editorial reasons. Yereskovsky took copious notes in order to be able to properly consider them and provide some reaction from the Soviet side as soon as possible.

The next meeting was scheduled for April 9, 1974, at which time the suggested changes to the Offensive Arms and ABM Procedures could be discussed.

Attachments:

1. US Working Document
2. JDTs, November 16, 1973

SCC:FPDeSimone:bd

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Attachment No. 1

U.S. Working Document
April 5, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to, and in implementation of, the provisions of the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto, and the related Agreed Statements, hereinafter referred to as the Interim Agreement, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed on the attached procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by the Interim Agreement.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

1. The attached procedures shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the Interim Agreement;

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2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and ballistic-missile submarines shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for SLBM launchers and ballistic-missile submarines shall ensure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of these units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM launchers as well as for SLBM launchers and ballistic-missile submarines;

5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

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6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached procedures, facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and submarines, may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement;

7. (Paragraph 7 is not yet agreed)

8. The number of replacement ballistic-missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

This Protocol, including its Attachment, shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as it deems appropriate.

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Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for each Party, launchers for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of older types, deployed prior to 1964, launchers for ballistic missiles on any nuclear-powered submarines, and launchers for modern ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may be replaced by launchers for ballistic missiles on modern nuclear-powered submarines. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type which are deployed on nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965. In addition, all submarine-launched ballistic missiles first tested after 1964 are modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles.^{1/}

2. Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement.

3. Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning

1/ Proposed by the U.S. side.

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of sea trials of a replacement submarine. Initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. Initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of an SLBM launcher or ballistic-missile submarine.

4. The date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

5. (Paragraph 5 is not yet agreed)

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6. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be accomplished in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

- (a) removal from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment;
- (b) dismantling of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, 1/ located at the launch site or associated with it 1/ 2/ associated with the launcher and located at the launch site 2/ and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

(Paragraphs 2-4 are not yet agreed)

2/ Proposed by the Soviet side.

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5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers

1. The following procedures, from which each Party may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic-missile submarines and SLBM launchers:

(Sub-paragraphs (a) - (e) are not yet agreed)

2. Dismantling or destruction actions shall be completed no later than six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.

IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile Submarine Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine

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may be replaced by another ballistic-missile submarine in accordance with the following:

- (a) notification of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other Party through the SCC;
- (b) the number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the total number of launchers to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement; and
- (c) the disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these Procedures.

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Attachment No. 1

U.S. Working Document
April 5, 1974

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR
COMPONENTS

Pursuant to, and in implementation of, the provisions of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the related Agreed Statements, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed on the attached procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines:

1. The attached procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the Treaty;

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3.

~~[4.]~~ Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. ~~[The initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall~~ ~~be considered to be the]~~ ^{constitute} initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. ~~[The initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall~~ ~~be considered to~~ ^{constitute} ~~be the]~~ initiation of dismantling or destruction of an SLBM launcher ~~or ballistic-missile submarine.~~

4. ~~[5.]~~ ^{date of the} The beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine ^{shall} ~~[is considered to]~~ be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

~~[6.]~~ 5.

Notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement activities shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session. The notification shall contain:

- (a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for ballistic missile launchers on older submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher) on which dismantling or destruction is in process and the number and type on which dismantling or destruction action has been

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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; and

(Paragraph 7 is not yet agreed)

This Protocol, including its Attachment, shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth.

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and¹ or² headworks and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos shall be filled with earth.

3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three months after their initiation.

4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty.

(Paragraph 5 is not yet agreed)

Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80T00435A000400010001-2

¹ Proposed by the U.S. side.

² Proposed by the Soviet side.

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II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be cut off.

2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their present uncompleted state for six months after which they may be covered with earth.

3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.

4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials removed.

5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement by the SCC on these procedures.

6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given through the SCC.

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Attachment No. 2

U.S. Working Document
April 5, 1974

~~Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
November 16, 1973~~

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
, and in implementation of,
Pursuant to [^]the provisions of the Interim Agreement between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, the Protocol thereto,
related and the [^]Agreed Statements ~~regarding that Agreement~~ *hereinafter referred to as the Interim Agreement,*
thereto have [^]within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission ^{on the} agreed ~~upon, in the form~~ attached [^] procedures
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and
notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited by
^{the} ~~that~~ Interim Agreement.

^{on}
The Parties have also agreed ~~to be guided by~~ the following
general guidelines:

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1. The attached ~~Procedures~~ shall apply only to systems to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed ^{pursuant to the} [under the provisions of the aforementioned] Interim Agreement;

2. Any replacement of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and ballistic-missile submarines shall be on the basis of Articles III and IV of the Interim Agreement, the Protocol thereto, and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ICBM launchers and associated facilities and for SLBM launchers and ballistic-missile submarines shall ensure that they would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of these units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; [;] and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Dismantling or destruction procedures shall be ^{formulated} [considered] separately for soft and for silo land-based ICBM launchers as well as for SLBM launchers and ballistic-missile submarines;

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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article V of the Interim Agreement;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached X Procedures, ~~[the]~~ facilities remaining at land-based ICBM launch sites, and ~~[the]~~ submarines, may, at the discretion of the Parties ~~[sides]~~, be used for ~~[other]~~ purposes not inconsistent with the ~~[provisions of the]~~ Interim Agreement ~~[and the Protocol thereto]~~;

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type of launchers being dismantled or destroyed and the number of replacement launchers; and 7¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed launchers and the number of such launchers used for replacement; and 7²

¹ Proposed by U.S. side.

² Proposed by Soviet side.

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8. The number of replacement ballistic missile submarines which are under construction simultaneously shall not exceed a number consistent with a normal construction schedule. A normal construction schedule is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices ^{of each Party} ~~[on each side]~~.

^{, including its Attachment,} This Protocol ~~[and the attached Procedures]~~ ^{enter into force upon signature and} shall remain in force for the duration of the Interim Agreement and may be ^(JCC) amended by the Standing Consultative Commission [^] as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I. General

1. Within the limits of the levels established for ~~each Party~~ ^{each Party} ~~[both sides]~~, ^{missiles (ICBMs)} ~~launchers for~~ ^{launchers for} land-based intercontinental ballistic ~~[missile (ICBM) launchers]~~ ^{launchers for} of older types, deployed prior to 1964, ^{launchers for} ballistic missile ~~[launchers]~~ ^S on any nuclear-powered submarines, and modern ballistic missiles ^{launchers for} ~~[launchers]~~ on diesel submarines may be replaced by ^{launchers for} ballistic missiles ~~[launchers]~~ on modern nuclear-powered submarines. →

~~[2.]~~ Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are ~~[understood to be]~~ ^{which are deployed on} for the United States, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; and for the Soviet Union, missiles of the type ~~[installed in]~~ ^{made} nuclear-powered submarines ~~[which have become]~~ operational since 1965. ¹ In addition, all submarine-launched ballistic missiles first tested after 1964 are modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles. ¹

2. ~~[3.]~~ Launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel submarines may not be used for the replacement purposes provided for in the Protocol to the Interim Agreement ~~[on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms]~~.

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3.

~~4.~~ Dismantling or destruction of replaced launchers shall be initiated no later than the date of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine. ~~The~~ ^{= constitute} initiation of any of the actions in Section II below shall ~~be considered to be the~~ initiation of dismantling or destruction of an ICBM launcher. ~~The~~ ^{= constitute} initiation of any of the actions in Section III below shall ~~be considered to be the~~ initiation of dismantling or destruction of an SLBM launcher ~~or ballistic-missile submarine.~~

4. ~~5.~~ ^{date of the} The ^{shall} beginning of sea trials of a replacement ballistic-missile submarine ~~is considered to~~ be the date on which such a submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the construction or fitting out of the submarine was performed.

~~5.~~ 5.

Notification of dismantling or destruction and replacement activities shall be given through the SCC twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session. The notification shall contain:

- (a) For ICBM launchers deployed prior to 1964 and for ballistic missile launchers on older submarines, the number and type (silo ICBM launcher, soft ICBM launcher, or SLBM launcher) on which dismantling or destruction is in process and the number and type on which dismantling or destruction action has been

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(b) For replacement SLBM launchers, the number which are on submarines that will begin sea trials during the next six-month period, and the number which are on submarines that have begun sea trials since the last report in the SCC.^{7¹}

~~5.~~ ^{5.} Notification of completed dismantling of ICBM launchers and ballistic missile launchers on replaced submarines shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually, reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission. The notification shall contain information for the past six months on the number of dismantled ICBM launchers and ballistic missile launchers on replaced submarines, as well as on the number of such launchers replaced by launchers on modern submarines during that period.^{7²}

6. Party
~~7.~~ Each ~~side~~ may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Interim Agreement.

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II. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Land-Based ICBM Launchers Replaced by SLBM Launchers

1. In all cases the following actions shall be ^{accomplished} ~~performed~~ in carrying out dismantling or destruction:

- (a) ~~Removal~~ from the launch site of the supply of missiles and their components, warheads, and mobile equipment;
- (b) ~~Dismantling~~ of fixed launch equipment, all erecting and handling equipment, and propellant-handling equipment, located at the launch site or associated with it¹ associated with the launcher and located at the launch site² and removal of all dismantled equipment from the launch site. Launch equipment is understood to be systems, components, and instruments required to launch a missile.

2. In the case of soft launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) Areas of the launch pads centered on the launch stand and at least 30 meters in diameter¹ Locations of launch device emplacement, or launch pads² and

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missile launch control posts (bunkers) shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction:

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- (b) Fuel storage tanks shall be dismantled and removed from the launch site;
- (c) Debris of locations of launch devices or launch pads, of missile launch control posts (bunkers), and of fuel storage tank foundations may be removed, and, after six months, the places where they were located may be covered with earth.

3. In the case of silo launch sites, in addition to the actions specified in paragraph 1, the following actions shall be performed:

- (a) Silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, launch tubes silos headworks, and launch control bunkers¹ shall be dismantled or destroyed. Dismantled components shall be removed from the launch site.
- (b) After the actions provided for in sub-paragraph (a) above have been accomplished, the silo shall remain open for a period of six months, after which it shall¹ may² be filled with earth.

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4. After dismantling or destruction has been accomplished in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites may not be used either for storage, support or launch of ICBMs, or for storage or support of ICBM-capable launchers, but may, at the discretion of the sides, be used for other purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto.¹

5. Dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers shall be completed no later than four months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

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III. Procedures for Dismantling or Destruction of Ballistic -
Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers Replaced by New
Ballistic-Missile Submarines and SLBM Launchers

1. The following procedures, from which each ^{Party} ~~side~~ may choose, are acceptable for dismantling or destruction of ballistic ~~missile~~ submarines and SLBM launchers:

(a) Sinking of the submarine with its launchers in international waters of at least 2000 meters depth. When this procedure for ballistic missile submarine destruction is chosen, notification of the time and location of the planned destruction shall be given to the other side at least one month prior to the planned destruction¹;

(b) Scrapping the submarine and its launchers in the open in predesignated shipyards¹. Scrapping shall involve extensive disassembly;

(c) Removing the submarine's missile section in the open in predesignated shipyards¹;

(d) Removal of the launch tubes or cutting off the upper part of the tubes together with the superstructure above them⁻²;

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(c) For "H-Class" submarines the following procedures will apply: removal of launch tubes in the open in predesignated shipyards. The shipyards to be used for ballistic missile submarine dismantling shall be agreed between the Parties.

- (1) That entire part of the superstructure (including the fairwater) and outer hull above the missile compartment of the submarine will be removed.
- (2) That section of the missile compartment pressure hull (hull crown plating and frame segments) which contains all of the hull penetrations for the missile launch tubes, as well as the missile launch tubes will be removed.
- (3) The pressure hull and outer hull may then be restored only by welding into place new sections without launch tube penetrations.
- (4) No superstructure or fairwater will be replaced over the section of the submarine from which the launch tubes have been removed.¹

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Dismantling or destruction

2. ~~Each of the foregoing~~ actions shall be ~~accomplished~~ ^{completed} no later than six months after the replacement submarine begins sea trials.

3. Under any dismantling option, launch-tube hatches shall be left open throughout the entire period of dismantling, and missiles and missile-launching equipment shall be removed.

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IV. Procedures for Replacement of a Ballistic-Missile Submarine
Lost at Sea or Disabled Beyond Repair

In the event that a ballistic-missile submarine is ~~accidentally~~ lost at sea or disabled beyond repair, such a submarine may be replaced by another ^{ballistic-missile} submarine in accordance with the following:

- (a) ~~Notification~~ of the loss or disablement shall be made to the other ~~side,~~ ^{Party through the SCC;}
- (b) ~~The~~ number of launchers on the replacement ballistic-missile submarine shall not cause the total ^{number of launchers} to exceed that authorized in the Interim Agreement; and ~~the~~ ^{Protocol thereto;}
- (c) ~~The~~ ^{at the} disabled ballistic-missile submarine shall be dismantled or destroyed in accordance with Section III of these Procedures.

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Attachment No. 2

U.S. Working Document
April 5, 1974

~~Joint Draft Text
Preliminarily Agreed
by Commissioners
November 16, 1973~~

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND
NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

, and in implementation of,

Pursuant to [^]the provisions of the Treaty between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,
related and the [^]Agreed Statements *hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,*
~~[regarding that Treaty]~~, the Parties
thereto have ~~[]~~ within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission ^{on the} ~~[]~~ agreed ~~[upon, in the form]~~ ~~[]~~ attached ~~[]~~ procedures
governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and
notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components
limited by ^{the} ~~[that]~~ Treaty.

^{on}
The Parties have also agreed ~~[to be guided by]~~ the following
general guidelines:

1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or
their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed ^{pursuant}
~~[under~~ *to the*
~~the provisions of the aforementioned]~~ Treaty;

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2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the ~~[aforementioned]~~ Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the ~~[aforementioned]~~ Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;

3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components ~~[related to implementation of the provisions of]~~ ^{implemented pursuant to} Article VII regarding replacement of these systems or their components and Article VIII of the ~~[aforementioned]~~ Treaty ~~]~~ shall ensure that these systems or their components and facilities associated with those components (except for facilities at test ranges) would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of these units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction ~~]~~ and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction;

4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be ^{formulated} ~~[considered]~~ separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars;

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5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the ~~[aforementioned]~~ Treaty;

6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached procedures, ~~[the]~~ facilities remaining at ABM launch ~~[and]~~^{or} ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for ~~[other]~~ purposes not inconsistent with the ~~[provisions of the~~
~~aforementioned]~~ Treaty ~~[and applicable Agreed Statements]~~; and

7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and the number of ABM radars being dismantled or destroyed, and the number of replacement ABM launchers and ABM radars.7¹

7. Through appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number of dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers and ABM radars, and the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement.7²

¹ Proposed by U.S. side.

² Proposed by Soviet side.

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, including its Attachment, shall enter into force upon signature

This Protocol [^] and ~~the attached Procedures shall~~ remain in force for the duration of the ~~forementioned~~ Treaty and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission ^(SCC) [^] as it deems appropriate.

Done at Geneva on _____, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Commissioner,
United States of
America

Commissioner,
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

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ATTACHMENT

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION,
AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS

I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges

1. Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth.

2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures ~~[and]~~¹ ~~[or]~~² head-works and removal of launcher rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos ~~[will]~~^{shall} be filled with earth.

3. The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be ~~[accomplished]~~^{completed} no later than three months after their initiation.

4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the ~~[side]~~^{Parties}, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the ~~[provisions of the]~~ Treaty ~~[on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and applicable Agreed Statements]~~.

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5. Notification of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 that are in process and that have been completed¹ completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2² shall be given through the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the status as of the beginning of each regular session of the Commission.

II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom

1. Metal reinforcing rods on ~~the~~ radar buildings shall be cut off.
2. ~~Those~~ radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their present uncompleted state for six months after which they may be covered with earth.
3. Launcher facilities and ~~those~~ radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth.
4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials ~~shall be~~ removed.
or destruction
5. Dismantling_A activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement by the ^{SCC} ~~Standing Consultative Commission~~ on ^{these} ~~the relevant~~ procedures.
6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given through the ^{SCC} ~~Standing Consultative Commission~~.

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SCC
Session III
A-157

US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Meeting, April 2, 1974
US Mission, Geneva

Persons Present

Mr. Graybeal	Brig. Gen. Ustinov
Brig. Gen. Georgi	Mr. Karpov
Col. C. G. FitzGerald	Mr. Yereskovsky
Mr. Anderson	Col. Starodubov
Lt. Col. Bartos	Capt. Mazerkin
Lt. Col. DeSimone	Col. Belyanin
Mr. Long	Capt. Kuznetsov
Lt. Cdr. Martin	Mr. Sazonov
Lt. Col. Pettyjohn	Mr. Kochetkov (Interpreter)
Mr. Afanasenko (Interpreter)	Mr. Marchuk (Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	Capt. Korobchenko (Military Interpreter)

Commissioner Graybeal declared the third session of the SCC open at 11:00 a.m., welcoming General Ustinov and the members of the Soviet Component of the SCC to our new facilities. He explained that the new building we were in would be the working location of the US Component of the SCC as well as the US SALT Delegation, and that the conference room would be used by both delegations. He said it was his pleasure to open the first official meeting for which this beautiful new conference room had been used. Graybeal then introduced all of those present on the US side, and gave the floor to Ustinov.

General Ustinov delivered a prepared statement expressing his pleasure at being back at work with the SCC in Geneva, introducing the members of the Soviet SCC Component, and briefly summarizing the basic positions of the Soviet side (Attachment No. 1).

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Mr. Graybeal thanked Ustinov and said that his statement would be given careful study. He then delivered his own prepared statement (Attachment No. 2). In response to several points in Ustinov's statement, Graybeal inserted the following points as noted:

At the end of Section II, he added: "In this connection, noting the remarks you made in your statement, I would like to re-emphasize that the US side considers cost to be a secondary consideration in connection with the procedures we are working out, compared to the objective of achieving mutually agreed procedures which meet the security interests of both sides as well as the various agreed criteria we have set forth."

At the end of Section III, he said: "I would also note that you referred in your statement to the connection between verification by national technical means and the lack of any need to include prior notification measures in the agreed procedures. I believe there is mutual agreement, as noted in my November 16, 1973 statement, that prior notification is not, I repeat not, required for adequate verification. I believe there is agreement on this point, and I would note that this does not address the essence of the US proposals on prior notification."

As an introduction to the final sentence of his statement he said, "I also share the belief you expressed that we have established a tradition of proceeding in a direct, frank, and businesslike manner, and I believe that this has contributed significantly to the success we have achieved to date. I also believe that ..."

Mr. Graybeal said that concluded his remarks at this opening meeting of the third SCC session, and asked whether the Soviet side had any further considerations to present.

General Ustinov replied that the Soviet side had nothing more to add today.

Mr. Graybeal adjourned the meeting at 11:40 a.m.

Attachments:

1. Ustinov Statement
2. Graybeal Statement

Drafted by: FPDeSimone:bd

Approved by: SN Graybeal

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Attachment No. 1

USTINOV STATEMENT, April 2, 1974

Mr. Commissioner,

It is with pleasure that the Soviet Component of the SCC approaches the work of this regular session. On my own behalf, on behalf of Deputy Commissioner V. P. Karpov and on behalf of all the staff of the Soviet Component of the Standing Consultative Commission, I have the honor of greeting you and General Georgi and all the members of the U.S. Component of the SCC.

I would like to introduce the members of the Soviet Component of the Commission, the composition of which has undergone some changes. [Ustinov introduced the members of the Soviet Component of the SCC.] In addition, as necessary, we may, as before, call upon some members of the Soviet SALT Delegation to work with the SCC. [Ustinov introduced Capt. Mazerkin and Col. Starodubov, saying that they were in this category.]

I hope that at the third session of the SCC there will exist between the two Components of the Commission that same atmosphere of businesslike cooperation, frankness and desire to find mutually acceptable solutions, which marked our activity at the first and second sessions and is becoming traditional for the SCC.

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Mr. Commissioner, the Soviet Component is ready to continue our joint work on the preparation of the draft Protocols and Procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms and ABM systems. In this we proceed from the premise that completion, if possible, of this work is the main task of the current session. In this work the Soviet side will be guided by the letter and the spirit of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We are prepared to conduct this work constructively in a spirit of seeking mutually acceptable solutions which would fully correspond to the tasks flowing from the provisions of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty.

During the recess we carefully studied the documents submitted at the Second Session and consider basically acceptable those formulations in the draft Protocols and corresponding Procedures with respect to which we have achieved agreement. In our view, these formulations and agreed provisions constitute a good basis for further progress.

At the same time, Mr. Commissioner, we understand the complexity of the task of working out the Protocols

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and Procedures and take into account those difficulties and differences which still exist in the matter of achieving mutually acceptable formulations for unagreed paragraphs. The existence of these difficulties demands that we apply maximum efforts toward finding ways of overcoming them.

In this connection I would like once again to draw the attention of the U.S. Component of the SCC to those tenets of principle from which the Soviet Component of the Commission proceeds in carrying out this work.

First, we proceed from the premise that the Procedures being worked out must ensure that the replaced launchers and associated ICBM launch site facilities, as well as replaced submarines be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for launching the corresponding missiles. We approach in a similar manner the Procedures for dismantling ABM systems.

Second, the Soviet side attaches great importance to the matter of carrying out dismantling with minimal expenditure of effort and funds, as well as to the possibility of using facilities remaining at ICBM launch sites and ABM ranges for purposes not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty.

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Third, we remain convinced that national technical means of verification are capable of verifying with complete confidence and reliability compliance by the sides with the obligations assumed in accordance with the Treaty and the Interim Agreement, as well as in accordance with the Procedures being worked out. Therefore, there is no need whatsoever to introduce into the verification process any sort of additional measures not provided for by the Treaty or the Interim Agreement, including prior notification as well.

And finally, fourth, the Soviet side believes that only those arms which are covered by the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty can be considered in the dismantling and replacement Procedures, and the SCC cannot prejudice the nature and content of possible future agreements between the USSR and the U.S.

Regarding the methods of our work, the Soviet side is prepared to discuss the draft documents article by article or in any other manner which will most successfully move us toward completion of the work.

Mr. Commissioner, it seems to me that successfully completing the working out of the Protocols and Procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic

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offensive arms and ABM systems would be a useful contribution to the implementation of the provisions and tasks of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty.

In concluding my statement I would like to wish the whole Commission success in carrying out at the third session the tasks placed before it.

Thank you for your attention.

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Attachment No. 2

SCC-III

STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER GRAYBEAL
April 2, 1974

I

Mr. Commissioner, with this first meeting of the third session of the Standing Consultative Commission, we resume our efforts to achieve the mutually agreed procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof for strategic offensive arms and for ABM systems and their components as called for by the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty. Substantial progress was made during the first and second sessions of SCC, and a number of important issues have been resolved. However, at the conclusion of SCC-II, several important issues were still unresolved. Our assigned work is not yet completed.

The Joint Draft Texts, of November 16, 1973, reflect the areas in our discussions in which we have achieved preliminary agreement and, equally as important, the areas enclosed by brackets indicate the major substantive

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issues still to be resolved. During the recess, the US Government has engaged in a thorough examination of the areas where disagreement still exists. We have carefully reviewed our positions and have also analyzed the proposals and rationale which have been presented by the Soviet side. The US Component proposes that the SCC continue working out the details of agreed procedures as called for by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. I consider this task to be the primary purpose of this SCC session. It is understood, of course, that either side may, as it deems appropriate, raise any issues which fall within the scope of SCC responsibilities.

II

The bracketed portions of the Joint Draft Texts indicate the issues raised during the first two SCC sessions on which we were unable to reach agreement. Among those unresolved issues are: the degree to which ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and ballistic missile submarines, and ABM launchers are to be dismantled or destroyed; the definition of "modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles;" and the use of facilities remaining at deactivated ICBM sites.

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In this regard, I should like to re-emphasize that in our view dismantling or destruction procedures must be in consonance with agreed guidelines. Two of these important criteria are: first, the procedures must ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means; and second, the extent of dismantling or destruction must be such that reactivation time of units dismantled or destroyed is not substantially less than the time required for new construction. The US side cannot agree to procedures that do not meet these mutually agreed criteria.

III

A large portion of the bracketed language in the Joint Draft Texts concerns the issue of notification. In our SCC negotiations, the US side has made extensive efforts to bring the views of the two sides together on the issue of notification. In our view there has been no comparable effort by the Soviet side thus far to help resolve this issue. I would hope that the Soviet side, based on its re-examination of this issue during the recess, is now prepared to move from the rigid position it has thus far maintained.

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IV

Mr. Commissioner, in summary, I would like to repeat that the US side proposes to continue our efforts to reach agreement on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms and for ABM Systems and their Components. Our point of departure should be the JDTs of November 16, 1973, which were "preliminarily agreed by Commissioners" with the understanding that we are working ad referendum to Governments and that nothing is agreed until all is agreed. By proceeding on the basis of frank discussion of the issues and taking into account the views and interests of both sides, we can expect success in that endeavor.

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