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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 3
USSR Mission
1100 Hours, November 28, 1972

Persons Present

Ambassador Farley	Minister Semenov
Mr. Nitze	General Trusov
General Allison	Mr. Shchukin
Dr. Garthoff	Mr. Pleshakov
Mr. Graybeal	Mr. Grinevsky
Mr. Shaw	Mr. Chulitsky
Mr. Earle	General Beletsky
Dr. Weiler	Col Budantsev
Mr. Jones	Capt Mazerkin
Lt Col Youngflesh	Mr. Skoptsov
Mr. Stivers	Mr. Smolin
Dr. Zemach	Col Starodubov
Dr. Timbie	Mr. Shelepin
Mr. Krimer (Interpreter)	Mr. Klyukin (Interpreter)
Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter)	Mr. Sudonkin (Interpreter)
	Lt Col Chesnokov (Interpreter)

Minister Semenov opened the third meeting of SALT Two by welcoming the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Mission. He then gave the floor to Ambassador Farley.

Ambassador Farley conveyed the regrets of Ambassador Smith that he was unable to attend this Plenary. Ambassador Farley stated he hoped Ambassador Smith's indisposition would be only a temporary one. Ambassador Farley then delivered the U.S. prepared statement.

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Minister Semenov acknowledged the U.S. statement and then delivered his own prepared statement.

Ambassador Farley stated that the U.S. Delegation would study the Soviet statement with care. He indicated that he had no other statement to make.

Minister Semenov replied that in that case he could solve the problem of the next meeting. He proposed the next Plenary be held at 1100 hours on Friday, December 1, 1972 at the U.S. Mission.

Ambassador Farley agreed with this proposal and the meeting was adjourned by Minister Semenov.

Drafted by: R.D. Youngflesh *RDY*
Approved by: John P. Shaw *APS*
R. L. Garthoff *RLG*

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FARLEY

November 28

Mr. Minister:

I

In their initial statements made on November 21, both sides set forth views regarding the task before us in developing a mutually acceptable permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. We are carefully studying the statement of the Soviet Delegation.

II

Today I wish to set forth additional considerations regarding the US position. Before doing so, however, I will address an element in the Soviet Delegation's opening statement which appears to introduce a consideration which would constrain our search for a mutually acceptable permanent agreement. I refer to the statement by the Soviet Delegation on November 21 that, in addition to providing limitations on those types of strategic offensive arms not covered by the Interim Agreement, the permanent agreement

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"must include the provisions of the Interim Agreement in the form in which they have already been agreed by the sides."

We cannot agree with this proposition. As Amb. Smith stated on November 21, "what is acceptable for an interim standstill arrangement is not the same as what would be equitable under a treaty."

Our task here is to develop a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms which will replace the interim agreement. The very title of the interim agreement makes clear that it is a temporary arrangement, one which is to remain in force for a period of five years "unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms."

The interim agreement makes a valuable contribution by putting a freeze for the interim on certain elements in an otherwise escalating situation. We have agreed that the terms of the interim agreement do not constrain the provisions of a permanent agreement; Article VII specifies that "the obligations provided for in this interim agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations."

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We are all more familiar with the factors involved in our negotiations than we were at the outset of these talks in 1969, and our discussions over the past three years will be of assistance, but we must now approach anew the task of reaching a permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

III

With this goal in mind, I shall now set forth some of our views on appropriate permanent limitations on strategic offensive arms and the relation of those limitations to the principle of no unilateral advantage to either side.

An objective of SALT is to limit strategic arms in a manner which will increase the security of both sides by enhancing the stability of the strategic relationship between us in accordance with the principle of no unilateral advantage to either side. The Soviet objective, as we understand it, is essentially consistent with this position.

During the first three phases of SALT One, the two Delegations devoted many hours to an examination of the question of the mode of limiting strategic offensive weapons. This

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lengthy examination made it clear that both sides agree that our negotiations should among other things establish an aggregate limit on ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. They are central, not only because of their roles in deterrence and in the strategic relationship between the two countries, but because these systems drive the strategic arms competition which we aim to curb. Our position on non-central systems is well known to you, Mr. Minister, and it has not changed.

Together with the primary task of reaching overall limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers, we will want to negotiate appropriate provisions for substitution of units of one kind for units of another kind.

As we begin our work in SALT TWO where our task is to reach a permanent agreement on offensive arms, we should once again recognize that an agreement of indefinite duration must provide for lasting equality.

The strategic balance between the two sides is substantially affected by the balance between the capacities of the ICBM forces

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of the sides. Both sides have the means to increase the throw weight and thus add to the ultimate capacity of ICBM forces that could be deployed within a given numerical launcher limit. While there are other differences in design approach and in technology, such differences could change or cease to exist over time. Under these circumstances, the throw weight of ICBM forces is an important aspect to be limited as a further means of achieving the objectives of a lasting agreement.

Throughout SALT ONE the US Delegation pointed out the potentially destabilizing effect of large ballistic missiles. We already have recognized that a ban on the conversion of light missile launchers into heavy missile launchers even during the interim period limits the throw weight of each side's ICBM forces. In our present task, achievement of a permanent agreement, it is necessary that there be an equal ceiling on the overall ICBM throw weight permitted to each side as well as on launchers.

We believe the best way to attain equality of an overall aggregate, equality of ICBM launchers, and equality of ICBM force throw weight for the two sides is by a program of reductions. The task of SALT TWO should be viewed in the context of the pre-existing Treaty which limits to low levels ABM defenses of the two sides. These ABM limitations

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tend to reduce the requirements for strategic offensive force capacity from what they might have been in the absence of the ABM Treaty. The concept of reductions is compatible with the need for security of both sides. We will at a later time discuss further our views on this matter of reductions.

IV

In conclusion, Mr. Minister, we envisage that in a permanent agreement for limitation of strategic offensive forces we should (a) establish an equal aggregate limit on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers for each side, (b) establish an equal subceiling on the number of ICBM launchers, and an equal ceiling on the aggregate throw weight of ICBM forces for each side, and (c) establish a program for arriving at such limits and ceilings through reductions.

Thank you.

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SEMENOV STATEMENT, November 28, 1972

At previous meetings the USSR Delegation presented general considerations regarding the newly begun stage of the strategic offensive arms limitation negotiations. We have also had an opportunity to learn the U.S. Delegation's views on certain questions, partially amplified in today's statement.

Today we would like to address one of the main questions which must be solved in working out an agreement on more comprehensive measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

As you know, the Interim Agreement provides for limitations on land-based ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines. By mutual agreement the discussion of other questions of limiting strategic offensive arms was postponed to the subsequent stage of the negotiations.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly presented arguments in favor of its position regarding the composition of the strategic offensive armaments of the sides, which are subject to limitation in the context of the ongoing negotiations. In addition to

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land-based ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers, any other types of missiles with nuclear warheads and any types of nuclear delivery aircraft, whose geographic deployment enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side, must also be considered within the composition of strategic offensive arms. All carrier aircraft, irrespective of the geographic deployment of attack aircraft carriers, should also be regarded as strategic offensive weapons, since they are mobile strategic systems. Such an approach will in practice ensure that the fundamental principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages will be embodied in the agreement we are now negotiating.

Of course, if strategic offensive arms were located only within the national territories of the sides, then the problem of limiting them could be substantially simplified. This is not the case, however, and any attempt not to take into account the real situation as it exists cannot be understood.

It is quite evident that any nuclear systems of one of the sides (let us call it A), deployed on corresponding bases on the territory of third countries and capable of striking targets on the territory of the other side (side B), have a direct

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influence on the overall strategic situation. I have here in mind strategic offensive weapons which belong to side A and pose a threat of nuclear attack on targets on the national territory of side B. The situation does not change in the least because these nuclear systems are located on bases on the territory of third countries in accordance with some military-political agreement or other.

Of course, we are talking about the influence of this factor on the overall strategic situation in principle, regardless of the side on which such a factor is present. In this connection I have in mind not only forward-based nuclear systems, but also other strategic offensive weapons whose capabilities would be substantially expanded by the use of bases on foreign territory.

Take for instance the question of forward submarine bases on the territories of third countries. Let us assume that side A has at its disposal forward submarine bases which enable it to reduce significantly the time required for operational deployment of SLBM submarines and eliminate the need for these submarines to return to rear bases located on their own national territory. In the final analysis such a situation

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would enable that side to maintain almost all its combat-ready SLBM submarines in areas of close proximity to the territory of side B; in a strategic respect this is equivalent to increasing the overall number of SLBM submarines for side A. In this I am not even mentioning the peculiarities of the geographic situation of the sides, which must also be taken into account in conformity with the principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages; we have made statements concerning this, as you well recall, at the end of the last Helsinki phase, and the situation with respect to this question has not changed.

This is why, proceeding from the principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages, as well as on the basis of what we believe is the common desire of both sides to take mutual actions to reduce the danger of outbreak of nuclear war between them, the Soviet side proposes agreeing on the withdrawal of submarines with ballistic missiles beyond agreed limits, placing these missiles out of range of the territory of the other side, and simultaneous liquidation of submarine bases on the territories of third countries.

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Strategic offensive systems having a substantial influence on the overall strategic situation also include nuclear delivery aircraft based on attack aircraft carriers. Attack aircraft carriers, being floating airfields for aircraft, enable them to carry out nuclear strikes on the territory of the other side within range of the aircraft. Deployment of attack aircraft carriers of side A, for example, near the territory of side B gives the former the capability of maintaining a threat of nuclear attack on targets on the territory of the other side. Withdrawal of aircraft carriers beyond aircraft range of the other side's territory would make it significantly more difficult for carrier aircraft to strike the territory of the other side; this would facilitate achievement of the goals of our negotiations.

Desiring to achieve as quickly as possible an agreement on more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms, we are authorized to submit a proposal for the withdrawal of attack aircraft carriers beyond agreed limits, which would place aircraft based thereon out of range of the territory of the other side.

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In connection with negotiation of a broader agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms it is necessary to consider one further group of nuclear systems whose geographic deployment enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side.

Can there be any doubt that movement forward by one of the sides of its nuclear systems toward the borders of the other side expands the array of weapons which are capable of carrying out strategic missions? From the point of view of a state's security it makes no substantial difference which specific nuclear attack systems can strike targets on its territory. Therefore the question of forward-based nuclear systems is organically linked to solution of the whole problem of limiting strategic offensive arms.

In the interests of achieving such an agreement the Soviet side proposes withdrawal to their national territories of all nuclear delivery aircraft and any missiles with nuclear warheads whose geographic deployment enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side, and to liquidate their corresponding bases in third countries.

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In submitting these proposals the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that resolving the question of withdrawing strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidating their corresponding bases in third countries, as set forth above, would fully correspond to the principle of ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral advantages. This would eliminate one of the factors which substantially influences the overall strategic situation. Solution of the problem of reaching agreement on more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms would also be made considerably easier.

Mr. Ambassador, at one time the U. S. Delegation addressed the question of not deploying strategic ballistic missiles on airborne or waterborne platforms, or on fixed or mobile devices on the seabed or the ocean floor. This question was carefully considered. I would like to say that the USSR Delegation would be prepared to discuss the question of the sides assuming obligations to ban deployment of strategic ballistic missiles on airborne or waterborne platforms (except submarines), as well as on any fixed or mobile devices which could be deployed on the seabed or the ocean floor, or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial sea and internal waters.

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Discussion and positive solution, on the basis of reciprocity and the principle of equal security, of the questions we have set forth is an urgent task of our negotiations, and therefore we expect that the U. S. side will give them careful attention.

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