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SALT TWO-I
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 5
USSR Mission
1100 Hours, December 5, 1972

Persons Present

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|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Ambassador Smith | Minister Semenov |
| Ambassador Farley | General Trusev |
| Mr. Nitze | Mr. Shchukin |
| General Allison | Mr. Grinevsky |
| Dr. Garthoff | Mr. Chulitsky |
| Dr. Weiler | General Beletsky |
| Col FitzGerald | Colonel Budantsev |
| Dr. Zemach | Colonel Starodubov |
| Captain Matthes | Mr. Skoptsov |
| Mr. McCrory | Mr. Turalin |
| Mr. Shearer | Mr. Obukhov |
| Dr. Ifft | Mr. Shelepin |
| LCdr Martin | Mr. Klyukin (Interpreter) |
| Mr. Mendelsohn | Mr. Sudonkin (Interpreter) |
| Mr. Krimer (Interpreter) | LtCol Chesnokov (Interpreter) |

Minister Semenov opened the fifth meeting of SALT Two by welcoming the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Mission. He then gave the floor to Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador Smith then delivered the U.S. prepared statement.

Minister Semenov acknowledged the U.S. statement, stating that the Soviet side would return to the matter presented by Ambassador Smith in the early part of his statement. He then delivered his own prepared statement.

Minister Semenov asked Ambassador Smith if the U.S. side wished to make any comments on the Soviet statement.

Ambassador Smith stated he had no comments to make at this time.

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Minister Semenov replied that in that case he proposed the next meeting be a mini-plenary meeting to be held at 1100 hours on Friday, December 8, 1972 at the U.S. Mission.

Ambassador Smith agreed with this proposal and the meeting was adjourned by Minister Semenov.

Drafted by: LCdr R.K. Martin *TK*
Approved by: Col C.G. FitzGerald *CGF*
R.L. Garthoff *RLG*

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SEMENOV STATEMENT, December 5, 1972

With reference to the remarks at the beginning of your statement, we will undoubtedly still have to return to discussion of the questions addressed. Now I would like to continue setting forth the considerations of the Soviet side.

Conclusion of the agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments during the summit talks in Moscow in May of this year and their entry into force have created a situation whose characteristic feature is the fact that certain most important channels of the race in strategic defensive and offensive armaments have been blocked, as a result of which it became possible to limit the build-up of strategic weapons arsenals in a significant degree.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, appraising the significance of the documents signed in Moscow in May of this year, among them the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement, said on June 5, 1972: "All these are very important and concrete steps toward a more lasting peace which is in the interests of all peoples."

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Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

A. N. Kosygin, on May 26 of this year, at a dinner given in Moscow by the President of the U. S. in connection with conclusion of the Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments, said: "Agreement on these questions, we hope, will go down in history as a major achievement on the road towards curbing the arms race. It has become possible only on the basis of strict observance of the principle of equal security of the sides and the inadmissibility of any unilateral advantages. This is a great victory for the Soviet and American peoples in the matter of easing international tension, this is a victory for all peace-loving peoples, because security and peace is their common goal."

During consideration of ratification of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of ABM Systems Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N. V. Podgorny emphasized at a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: "Briefly defining the substance of the Treaty and the Interim Agreement, it can be said that they establish quantitative limitations on the most destructive types of nuclear weapons of the two largest powers in the

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world while observing the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages."

It is of substantial importance that very similar assessments were expressed on the part of the United States. U.S. President R. Nixon wrote in June of this year in the U.S. News and World Report: "The Treaty limiting each nation to two ABM sites and the Interim Agreement freezing certain categories of offensive missiles for five years marked the beginning of the end of the unchecked nuclear weapons spiral that began in 1945. They enhance the security of both parties, at the same time that they substantially lessen the danger of global war."

It was also noted that the documents which had entered into force are a first and most significant step toward a more comprehensive solution to the problem of limiting strategic armaments.

In this connection I would like to note President R. Nixon's statement: "The more intense the competition, the greater the uncertainty about the other side's intentions" (Report to Congress dated February 18, 1970), and also his statement: "The United States and the Soviet Union have now reached a point where small numerical advantages in strategic forces

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have little military relevance. The attempt to obtain large advantages would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless" (Report dated February 25, 1971).

We have also taken note of the U. S. Delegation's statement at the current phase on November 21, 1972 that "the judgement that history will make of progress toward a lasting peace will depend a great deal on what our two nations accomplish in the continuation of our negotiations on strategic arms limitations."

At present our Delegations face the responsible task of searching for ways of possible conversion of the Interim Agreement into a permanent understanding, with the two sides assuming appropriate obligations with respect to new, still not covered types of strategic offensive weapons, and also for ways of possible subsequent reduction of strategic offensive arms.

Speaking of the obligations recorded in the texts of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, it is obvious that the Standing Consultative Commission is called upon effectively to facilitate compliance. It appears that the working group we set up to develop proposals for establishment of this Commission is doing useful and productive work.

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We need to look ahead from the angle of the voluminous and extensive tasks that were mentioned in the statements of the leaders of our countries. It is obvious that for truly productive progress of the negotiations on further measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive armaments a general atmosphere of balance and stability is required, free of elements of instability which could be produced by new flare-ups of the arms race in certain fields.

In his Report to Congress dated February 25, 1971, President R. Nixon, calling attention to "the relationship between the process of negotiations--which may be protracted and involve several stages--and actions taken during the talks and even after an initial agreement," drew the following conclusion: "It is clear that restraint is essential."

In the course of the negotiations both Delegations have repeatedly emphasized that an unchecked build-up in strategic armaments by one side does not at all lead to enhancing its security, but on the contrary, creates new threats and new problems.

The statement of the USSR Delegation at the meeting of November 18, 1969 in Helsinki pointed out: "At the present stage, when the world is being saturated by more and more weapons, the arms race in general, and particularly the

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strategic arms race can only contribute to a general increase of the threat of war ... The situation now is such that mountains of weapons are growing, yet security is not improving but diminishing thereby, since the threat of outbreak of thermonuclear war is increasing." At the same meeting the Soviet side stressed that curbing, limiting and completely halting the arms race "would contribute to the strengthening of mutual security and to an increase in the well-being of the peoples."

At the meeting of November 6, 1970 in Helsinki it was also emphasized that "the strategic arms race does not at all mean an increase in the security of the state engaged in such a race, but rather the contrary."

Interpreting the discussions held since then and above all the results of the summit meeting in Moscow in May of this year, and the principal document of that meeting, entitled Basic Principles of Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and signed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President R. Nixon, we see that the efforts applied along this path of strategic arms limitation were replete with real meaning, that the path entered

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upon by both states was widely recognized and ardently supported by the peoples of not only our countries, but also by the peace-loving peoples of the whole world. It is important not to deviate from this path, to protect the sprouts of mutual understanding and trust which have appeared. This is not propaganda for our discussions, since this is partly the result of our efforts, too, nor is it Utopia, since both states have solemnly declared in international law form that they are conscious of the need "to make every effort to remove the threat of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation."

We proceed from the premise that there is hardly any need now to prove here the erroneousness of assumptions to the effect that an accelerated build-up of one type of strategic offensive weapon or another could impel our follow-on negotiations toward positive results. If one of the sides were to engage in intensive construction in fields not regulated by the agreement concluded, taking advantage of the fact that the Interim Agreement covers a part of the types of strategic offensive arms to be limited, this would, of course, be a destabilizing factor. Such actions, even though formally

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they are not in conflict with the letter of the understanding which has entered into force, would objectively work against it, since they would undermine the goal of our negotiations which is known to be above all to curb the race in strategic offensive armaments and to limit them. In practice this would result in lessening the productiveness of the understanding already existing between us.

On the other hand, one must not fail to recognize also that attempts to obtain advantages by means of an accelerated build-up of armaments not limited by the Interim Agreement would objectively also be aimed at undermining the principle of equal security for the sides and inadmissibility of unilateral advantages, on which our negotiations are based, at upsetting the atmosphere of constructiveness and the search for mutually acceptable solutions, which is the result of the great amount of work done.

For the purpose of precluding the possibility that such a situation could arise, the Soviet side advances a proposal not to develop or test new types of strategic offensive weapons which would increase the threat of outbreak of nuclear war and thereby be in conflict with the goals of these negotiations.

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The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that assumption by both sides of appropriate obligations in this matter would be an important measure contributing to further curbing the strategic arms race and an important guarantee for maintenance of an atmosphere favoring achievement of a permanent understanding on the limitation of strategic offensive arms as a result of the new round of negotiations.

Mr. Ambassador, on the basis of a desire to facilitate negotiation of more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms, the Soviet side also submits a proposal to ban the development, testing and deployment of intercontinental cruise missiles and sea-based cruise missiles specially designed to strike land targets.

We hope that the proposals of the USSR Delegation advanced at today's meeting will be considered by the U.S. side with full attention.

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