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SALT TWO-I  
US/USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 1  
U.S. Mission  
1100 Hours, December 8, 1972

Persons Present:

Ambassador Smith  
Ambassador Farley  
Mr. Nitze  
Dr. Brown  
General Allison  
Dr. Garthoff  
Col. C. FitzGerald  
Mr. Krimer (Interpreter)

Minister Semenov  
Academician Shchukin  
General Trusov  
Mr. Grinevsky  
Mr. Chulitsky  
General Beletsky  
Mr. Bratchikov (Interpreter)  
Mr. Sudonkin (Military Interpreter)

Discussion:

Ambassador Smith welcomed the members of the Soviet Delegation to the U.S. Mission for the first Mini-Plenary of SALT TWO and gave the floor to Minister Semenov.

Minister Semenov gave a statement (see Attachment #1).

Ambassador Smith said the U.S. Delegation would study the statement carefully and asked whether the Soviet side had any further considerations it wanted to present at that time.

Minister Semenov said that it was traditional for the sides to have a dialogue. He would be interested in continuing along the same line.

Ambassador Smith said he wanted to make a few preliminary observations on what he had understood to be in Minister Semenov's statement. If he had understood him correctly, Minister Semenov had said that the U.S. side is somehow or other attempting to amend

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

the Interim Agreement which had been concluded in May, 1972, and had also said that the U.S. approach in attempting to replace the Interim Agreement with a permanent agreement was, in some way, wrong. Ambassador Smith wanted to read for the Soviet side paragraph 2, Article VIII, of the Interim Agreement.

"2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible."

Ambassador Smith declared that when that Article says "with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible," he took these words to mean precisely what the U.S. side conceives its responsibility to be -- to conduct active negotiations to conclude such an agreement to replace the Interim Agreement as soon as possible.

Ambassador Smith then gave a statement on the Soviet Add-on Approach (see Attachment #2).

Minister Semenov asked Academician Shchukin to speak.

Academician Shchukin said he intended to address a question which, in a way, is related to the qualitative aspect of strategic offensive weapons. He was speaking about multiple warheads, i. e., what is abbreviated in Russian as "RGCh," and in English as MRV/MIRV.

Academician Shchukin said that the sides had devoted considerable attention to this question during the first Vienna phase of SALT. As is known, the view was repeatedly expressed that MRV/MIRVs are one response to the development and deployment of ABM systems. Now, given the fact that the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement have been concluded, it would be useful to return to the question of multiple warheads.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-3-

Academician Shchukin said that the limitation of ABM systems as it was provided for in the ABM Treaty cannot help but influence one's reasoning on possible measures related to MRV/MIRV, i.e., the question of limiting strategic offensive arms. Naturally, this would be on the basis of the principle of equal security and prevention of unilateral advantages. The U.S. side had expressed the view at the end of the first Vienna phase of SALT that the question of MIRVs was left for consideration at a subsequent stage of the talks. Consequently, it is important to have the opinion of the U.S. side set forth on the question related to MIRVs in the light of the changed situation to which he had referred.

Academician Shchukin said that the question of maneuvering warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs as one type of response to ABM systems is also directly linked to the question of the ABM Treaty. The limitation of ABM systems as provided in the Treaty should evidently exert an appropriate influence on the approach to that question as well.

Academician Shchukin then declared that, during the present phase, the U.S. side has devoted much attention to the throw-weight question as applied to land-based ICBMs. There is every ground to doubt the urgency of raising this question. He wanted to recall that the agreed provisions of the Interim Agreement and related documents essentially contain an answer to this question. At the same time, there is an entire series of topical questions related to limiting strategic offensive arms which the Soviet side referred to at the meeting on November 21 and which the Soviet side has said are important for reaching a mutually-acceptable agreement and for the success of the negotiations.

Ambassador Smith said the U.S. side will study these remarks with great care. He asked General Allison to take the floor.

General Allison gave a statement on the Soviet proposals for constraints on strategic aviation (see Attachment #3).

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-4-

Minister Semenov asked General Trusov to speak.

General Trusov said that, at the last meeting, the USSR Delegation had put forth the Soviet Union's proposal that the sides assume obligations in regard to a ban on developing or testing new types of strategic offensive weapons which would increase the threat of outbreak of nuclear war, and thereby conflict with the goals of these negotiations. Assumption of such obligations, along with the obligations the sides have already undertaken in the Interim Agreement as well as other possible agreements on weapons not covered by the Interim Agreement, would decrease the prerequisites for the strategic arms race, increase the security not only of our two nations but international security as well, and would be fully consistent with the spirit and letter of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the continued viability of which, as Ambassador Smith had said on November 21, both sides are seeking to assure. Naturally, the Soviet side is speaking about obligations for both sides which would observe the principle of equal security and not permit any unilateral advantages.

General Trusov said that both sides have stressed the importance of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, which were concluded in May, as a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms. The U.S. side's statement of November 28 declared that, "These ABM limitations tend to reduce the requirements for strategic offensive force capacity from what they might have been in the absence of the ABM Treaty."

General Trusov continued that, at the same time, measures are being taken in the U.S. to implement new major programs for strategic offensive weapons. For example, there is expansion and acceleration of the program for the submarine nuclear ballistic missile system Trident, and acceleration of the development of the B-1 strategic bomber, as well as programs for air-to-surface missiles, such as SRAM and SCAD, and others, despite the ABM Treaty and its restraining influence on the requirements for the

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-5-

capacity of strategic offensive systems to which the U.S. side had referred. There is also acceleration of Poseidon missiles and Minuteman III with multiple warheads, and at the same time new large funds are authorized for these as well as other programs.

General Trusov said that substantial elements in the USSR had noted that, at virtually the same time as the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement entered into force, the U.S. had approved the largest defense budget in post World War II history, thus playing a part toward accelerating strategic offensive arms efforts. Naturally, the question is asked, why is this being done? What purpose does it serve? How does it correspond to the declared purpose of limiting strategic offensive arms? These actions by the U.S. side can only be regarded as designed to upset the balance in strategic systems and aimed at achieving unilateral advantages and can essentially only lead to a race in strategic arms.

General Trusov said that it is perfectly obvious that the sides cannot ignore such actions together with all their ensuing consequences as regards the development of our negotiations. He wanted to say that the Soviet side has repeatedly stressed during the negotiations that accelerating the strategic arms race not only does not correspond to the purpose of our talks but does not increase the security of the side taking such measures. In light of this, the USSR Delegation has been instructed to direct the U.S. side's attention to the importance of the proposals which have been submitted for exercising restraint and also for the sides to assume obligations not to develop or test new types of strategic offensive weapons which would increase the threat of outbreak of nuclear war.

Ambassador Smith asked Mr. Nitze to make a statement.

Mr. Nitze gave a statement on stability (see Attachment #4).

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-6-

Ambassador Smith asked whether Minister Semenov had any further material to present.

Minister Semenov said not for today.

Ambassador Smith said that, in that case, he would ask General Allison to say a few words.

General Allison said that he had not hitherto thought, and did not now think, it useful for the sides to enter into recriminations regarding the strategic force programs on either side. General Trusov's incorrect assessment, however, required a prompt response. He said that it is well known that it is the Soviet side which has engaged in substantial deployments of new strategic offensive forces and increases in deployed numbers of strategic offensive launchers during the course of these talks.

Ambassador Smith said that left only the task of arranging for the next meeting. He asked what Minister Semenov's preferences were in that regard.

Minister Semenov said that whatever suited Ambassador Smith was suitable to him.

Ambassador Smith proposed that the next meeting be a Mini-Plenary at 11:00 a. m. on December 12 at the Soviet Mission.

Minister Semenov accepted.

Ambassador Smith adjourned the meeting.

Drafted by: Col C. G. FitzGerald

Approved by: Ambassador Smith

SECRET/EXDIS

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ATTACHMENT

SEMENOV MINI-PLenary STATEMENT, December 8, 1972

In the course of the current Geneva phase the USSR Delegation has submitted a number of concrete proposals which provide for further measures to limit strategic offensive arms. We do not preclude that there might also be some other matters to be discussed in connection with working out agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms.

At the same time, we are convinced that implementation of the measures we have proposed would ensure substantial progress in limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis of the principle of equal security for both sides, and would thereby help to reduce the threat of outbreak of nuclear war.

The course of discussions at this phase indicates that the U.S. Delegation so far does not provide any answers to the concrete questions raised by the Soviet side. I would like to note that this gives rise to a feeling of uncertainty on our side with respect to the U.S. side's position. We hope that before the end of this phase we will be able to hear its positive response to the proposals we have submitted.

SECRET - EXDIS

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We have noted that in dealing with the question of the content of a future agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive arms, as for example on November 28, the U. S. side spoke only of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. It was argued that "these systems are central, not only because of their role in deterrence and in the strategic relationship between the two countries, but also because these systems drive the strategic arms competition which we aim to curb." On December 5 the U. S. Delegation once again stated that "it is the three central systems on which we should focus since they play the major role in determining the strategic balance. Forward-based systems are not of the same significance in the nuclear arms competition as the central systems."

The Soviet side considers such an approach to consideration of this important matter as not at all in accord with the principle of equal security, and therefore unacceptable. We would like to draw the attention of the U. S. side to the USSR Delegation's statement of November 28, 1972, which gave a detailed analysis of the importance of solving the problem of withdrawing strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidating corresponding bases in third countries, and contained concrete proposals. I do not think

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it necessary to repeat the arguments we have cited, which completely refute the concept of so-called "central" and non-central systems, as well as the proposition that forward-based nuclear systems and other strategic nuclear systems whose capabilities are substantially expanded by use of bases on foreign territory, supposedly do not have the same significance as so-called "central" systems.

I would like to note that we have discussed this matter in detail at a number of phases of the negotiations in Helsinki and in Vienna, and that careful study of the record of discussions only reaffirms our belief in the correctness of the position advanced by the Soviet side at the beginning of the current Geneva phase.

On the other hand, no one underestimates or can underestimate the systems the U.S. side is discussing here. As you know, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms came about as a result of the May 20, 1971 Understanding between the Governments of the USSR and the U.S. This Understanding made it possible to delimit the sphere of the initial agreement, in view of difficulties encountered at the negotiations, to two types of strategic offensive weapons--ICBMs and SLBMs. It is precisely these that were covered by the Interim Agreement.

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Now there are broader problems before us which need to be resolved. If anyone is of the opinion that our task here consists in somehow amending or replacing the Interim Agreement, which allegedly in some respect or other takes insufficient account of the existing strategic situation, then such an opinion is based on incorrect premises. Within the framework of the systems it covers, the Interim Agreement is based on the whole on a correct account of the objectively existing strategic situation, including the particulars of the geographic situation of the two sides. In this connection, however, I would like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, of the official statement made by the Soviet side in Helsinki on May 26, 1972, to the effect that the solution for modern SLBM submarines which is provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S. Therefore the Soviet side proceeds from the premise-- and this was also stated by us--that at follow-on negotiations a solution to this entire problem would be found, and above all to the problem of liquidating U.S. missile submarine bases beyond the borders of the United States.

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SECRET - EXDIS

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Today I would like to remind you of that statement. I would also like to say that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement were affirmed in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each side, and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The USSR Delegation has not been instructed to engage in negotiations concerning revision of the agreements which have entered into force.

And so, in accordance with the May 20, 1971 Understanding, other types of strategic offensive weapons which were not included in the Interim Agreement were set aside for a period of time. Therefore, having fulfilled the objectives established by the May 20 Understanding, both sides are called upon to take up broader questions of limitations and possible subsequent reductions of strategic offensive arms. It is natural that now, before everything else, those types of strategic offensive arms which were not covered by the Interim Agreement are coming to the fore.

As for strategic offensive air weapons, the concrete proposals of the Soviet side submitted December 1 in our view reflect the importance and necessity of limiting this type of weapon. Undoubtedly we will have to deal with this.

SECRET - EXDIS

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The Soviet side proceeds also from the premise that there are no grounds of any kind for evading at this stage of negotiations consideration of the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries. As we have already stated, in addition to land-based ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers, any other types of missiles with nuclear warheads and any types of nuclear delivery aircraft whose geographic deployment enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side, must also be considered within the composition of strategic offensive arms. All carrier aviation, regardless of the geographic deployment of attack carriers, must also be considered within the composition of strategic offensive arms, since they are mobile systems.

The USSR Delegation proposed withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems together with concurrent liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries. Such a solution of the issue would fully meet the principle of ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral advantages.

In light of what has been said it appears obvious that what the U.S. Delegation for some reason labels "central systems" not only cannot be treated separately from other strategic

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offensive systems, but neither can any kind of levels be considered without taking into account the entire totality of strategic offensive arms.

On November 28, 1972 the U. S. Delegation's statement advanced a consideration on establishing for both sides equal aggregate levels of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

The USSR Delegation has been instructed to state that in establishing levels for limitation of strategic offensive armaments, all types of such armaments must be taken into account, including forward-based nuclear systems as well as SLBM submarines of U. S. NATO allies.

The question of subsequent reduction of strategic offensive arms will undoubtedly also take its due place in the negotiations. The USSR Delegation has already repeatedly drawn attention to this matter, for example in its statements of November 17, 1969, April 20, 1970 and in others. The U. S. side has also given attention to this matter.

In this connection it is natural that the question of reducing strategic offensive arms ought to be treated in the context of limitation of all strategic offensive systems. If our understanding is correct, the sides proceed from the premise that measures to

SECRET - EXDIS

- 8 -

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reduce strategic offensive arms must be based on the principle of equal security for the sides and inadmissibility of unilateral advantages. We are prepared to discuss this matter after working out measures which ensure equal security for both sides.

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SECRET - EXDIS

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SMITH  
(December 8, 1972)

We are charged with working out a permanent agreement on strategic offensive arms to replace the interim measures agreement.

Limitations on strategic missile launchers in a permanent replacement agreement would be different than those in the interim agreement, which were acceptable to both sides for a temporary period only. Were it otherwise, there would have been no need for the interim agreement to be temporary. Rather, we could have concluded a permanent treaty on missile launchers as we did for anti-ballistic-missile systems. Article VII of the Interim Agreement reads:

"The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations."

This article negates the thesis that the provisions of the Interim Agreement were negotiated in the expectation that they were intended to serve in a permanent agreement.

SECRET

-2-

Your side appears to take the position that in the Interim Agreement we have solved the problem of limiting ICBMs and SLBMs and that all we have to do now is to carry over those provisions, work out additional provisions on certain other systems, and thereby convert the Interim Agreement into a permanent agreement.

Our view is quite different. We cannot follow such a restrictive approach if we are to achieve a mutually acceptable stable and secure arrangement for strategic offensive arms which will curb the competition in such arms. The provisions of the Interim Agreement are intended to last for a maximum of five years. Our task here is to work out a permanent treaty to replace the Interim Agreement. Such a treaty must be equitable if it is to last for the long term. It clearly cannot incorporate the ratios in ICBM and SLBM launcher numbers that were frozen as a temporary standstill arrangement.

I wish to emphasize the unacceptability of the approach which seems to have been suggested by the Soviet side. Such an approach cannot form the basis of an equitable and mutually acceptable permanent agreement. To postpone the start of a search by both sides for an equitable and mutually acceptable permanent agreement would reduce prospects for the success of our efforts.

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STATEMENT BY GENERAL ALLISON  
(December 8, 1972)

I.

I want to make some preliminary remarks on the Soviet Statement of December 1, 1972. As our comments on stability indicate your approach raises many questions regarding the nature and concept of the general Soviet approach to our task. I would like to ask certain questions directed at obtaining a clearer understanding of your thinking.

II.

First, your use of the term "strategic bombers" would lead us to believe that the Soviet proposals apply to heavy bombers. However, elsewhere in the proposals reference is made to the term "strategic aircraft." Under the Soviet proposals of December 1, by "strategic bombers" and "strategic aircraft" do you mean "heavy bombers"?

Second, we note the Soviet statement makes reference to constraints on "long-range" air-to-surface missiles, but lacks clarity as to what is meant.

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-2-

III.

In the past, both sides have agreed in principle to limit heavy bombers together with ICBM and SLBM launchers in an aggregate total. The U.S. side has reaffirmed this aspect of its position in recent statements. Do your proposals for limiting strategic bombers call for a separate limit? If separate, do you have in mind the existing levels of heavy bombers for each side?

IV.

During our negotiations in SALT ONE, there was general agreement by both sides that for weapon systems being limited modernization and replacement would be permitted subject to other limitations that might be agreed upon. The U.S. side still maintains this view.

Your proposal would prohibit replacement of strategic bombers with new bombers and would limit modernization to existing systems. Does this reflect a change in the Soviet position on modernization and replacement? Why do you single out strategic bombers for such constraints? Is it your intention that strategic bomber forces wither away?

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

V.

The Soviet side proposes a ban on nuclear payload for strategic bombers, but calls for no similar measures for ICBMs and SLBMs. We believe it to be impracticable at this time to ban nuclear weapons and we do not understand why you single out strategic bombers, the least destabilizing of the three central systems, for this special treatment. The logic of this idea escapes us.

VI.

The introduction of your complex of constraints on strategic aviation raises the question of constraints on counterpart air-defense systems. Discussion of such constraints will require discussion also of air defenses. We will pursue this latter subject at a later date.

VII.

It was decided early in SALT ONE that each side would rely primarily on national technical means to verify any arms limitation agreement. We believe that the complex of constraints you have proposed on bomber armaments could not be verified by national technical means. How would either side be assured of compliance with such constraints on bomber armaments?

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ATTACHMENT 4

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STATEMENT BY MR. NITZE  
(December 8, 1972)

Mr. Minister, at our meeting on December 1, you indicated that your proposals were aimed at maintaining strategic stability, which would reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. The U.S. side believes that agreeing on constraints which will contribute to maintaining strategic stability is a matter of primary importance in our task. As SALT ONE opened in Helsinki, the U.S. noted that a principal objective of our negotiations would be to achieve an agreement that would enhance the security of both sides and would contribute to stability. To that end, the U.S. expressed certain aims regarding strategic stability:

-- We said that we hope to achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship which would minimize the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

-- We stated our belief that agreed limitations on offensive and defensive strategic systems can be reached which contribute to the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship and enhance the security of both countries and of the entire world.

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-2-

I would like to discuss some key conditions bearing on strategic stability as we see it; namely, the evident survivability of retaliatory forces and their evident ability to penetrate defenses. These conditions for enhancing stability are consistent with your statement of December 1 where you pointed to the need to find the most effective solution that would reliably block the channels for strategic arms competition and contribute to enhancing the security of both sides. An agreement which enhances survivability of strategic forces would reduce perceptions by either side of the necessity, other than for modernization and replacement purposes, for undertaking major new arms programs to avoid being placed at a strategic disadvantage and would reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Confidence in the enduring survivability of strategic systems is an essential feature of deterrence, and thus of a stable strategic relationship, and it also contributes to effective arms control.

Another factor affecting stability is the capability of retaliatory forces to penetrate defenses. Stability could be seriously eroded if one side deployed defenses which the other side believed could reduce its retaliatory capability below the level it judged necessary for deterrence. That was the major reason for the ABM Treaty.

-3-

The U.S. and, I assume, the Soviet Union attach importance to not having to rely upon any one system alone for deterrence, since any of them might be degraded in some manner. The importance of this consideration, as far as can now be foreseen, will continue.

If one important part of either side's deterrent were to be seriously degraded by actions of the other side, the resulting situation would not contribute to stability or to the maintenance or improvement of security. Accordingly, one aim of a more complete agreement on strategic arms limitation should be reduction of the possibility that any important deterrent element could become excessively vulnerable or suffer deterioration of its penetration capability. You, Mr. Minister, have on several occasions in this session of SALT referred to the beneficial effects of the ABM Treaty on the strategic relationship between the two sides. The ABM Treaty, however, dealt only with assurances of missile force penetration capability. Since this is but one element among those which affect stability, our task still requires consideration of the survivability of missile launchers and the survivability as well as the penetration capability of heavy bombers.

SECRET

-4-

As is well known, because of time factors and recallability, heavy bombers are the least destabilizing of current strategic offensive systems. We cannot reconcile your proposal to ban the use of heavy bombers for delivery of nuclear weapons--thereby eliminating the least destabilizing of the deterrent forces--with the objective of enhancing the security of both sides.

Preservation of the deterrent capability of heavy bomber forces would require modernization and replacement to maintain the survivability and penetration capability of these forces. Mr. Minister, we are unable to reconcile your proposed ban on development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic aircraft with the goal of strategic stability.

We note your statement that the capabilities of strategic aircraft can be substantially increased; for example, by equipping them with long-range air-to-surface missiles. Air-to-surface missiles improve defense penetration capability, which is necessary for bombers to play a deterrent role. Consequently, if defenses against bomber forces are not correspondingly limited, your proposals to limit bomber armaments could reduce strategic stability. Therefore, it seems strange that you choose this particular element of the deterrent forces for drastic qualitative limitations.

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-5-

SLBM's are in a somewhat different category than are other strategic forces. Their mobility and their capability to operate in the vast ocean areas are major factors in their pre-launch survivability. If the ocean area within which they operate is reduced, the potential survivability of the system is thereby reduced.

Another factor important to long-term stability is the pre-launch survivability of ICBM's. Some protective measures can be accomplished without secondary effects which would be inconsistent with our objectives. For example, hardening of ICBM silos is being done by both sides. The most feasible and meaningful contribution, consistent with limiting rather than increasing strategic arms, is to have in a permanent agreement equality on both sides by providing for equal numbers of ICBM launchers for the two sides and reducing ICBM throw-weight to an equal ceiling. This would constrain the principal threat to ICBM pre-launch survivability.

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-6-

In summary, Mr. Minister, the Soviet approach to enhancement of stability does not appear to us to be consistent or effective.

The U.S. Government has consistently maintained the position that deterrence is fundamental to the prevention of a nuclear war. The view of the Soviet Union, expressed during SALT ONE, that the damage in the event of a nuclear exchange would be unacceptable to both sides no matter who started the war, implies that both sides have weapons which exist primarily to prevent their use. This implicit recognition that deterrence is the foundation of the nuclear strategic relationship between our two sides is derived also from the fact that both sides stress the importance of stability in the strategic balance. If we are to advance toward the objective of our negotiations, it is essential that we seek limitations which will enhance rather than degrade the stability of the strategic relationship between the two sides.

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SEMENOV MINI-PLENARY STATEMENT, December 8, 1972

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At the same time, we are convinced that implementation of the measures we have proposed would ensure substantial progress in limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis of the principle of equal security for both sides, and would thereby help to reduce the threat of outbreak of nuclear war.

The course of discussions at this phase indicates that the U.S. Delegation so far does not provide any answers to the concrete questions raised by the Soviet side. I would like to note that this gives rise to a feeling of uncertainty on our side with respect to the U.S. side's position. We hope that before the end of this phase we will be able to hear its positive response to the proposals we have submitted.

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I would like to note that we have discussed this matter in detail at a number of phases of the negotiations in Helsinki and in Vienna, and that careful study of the record of discussions only reaffirms our belief in the correctness of the position advanced by the Soviet side at the beginning of the current Geneva phase.

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Now there are broader problems before us which need to be resolved. If anyone is of the opinion that our task here consists in somehow amending or replacing the Interim Agreement, which allegedly in some respect or other takes insufficient account of the existing strategic situation, then such an opinion is based on incorrect premises. Within the framework of the systems it covers, the Interim Agreement is based on the whole on a correct account of the objectively existing strategic situation, including the particulars of the geographic situation of the two sides. In this connection, however, I would like to remind you, Mr. Ambassador, of the official statement made by the Soviet side in Helsinki on May 26, 1972, to the effect that the solution for modern SLBM submarines which is provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S. Therefore the Soviet side proceeds from the premise-- and this was also stated by us--that at follow-on negotiations a solution to this entire problem would be found, and above all to the problem of liquidating U.S. missile submarine bases beyond the borders of the United States.

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Today I would like to remind you of that statement. I would also like to say that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement were affirmed in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each side, and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The USSR Delegation has not been instructed to engage in negotiations concerning revision of the agreements which have entered into force.

And so, in accordance with the May 20, 1971 Understanding, other types of strategic offensive weapons which were not included in the Interim Agreement were set aside for a period of time. Therefore, having fulfilled the objectives established by the May 20 Understanding, both sides are called upon to take up broader questions of limitations and possible subsequent reductions of strategic offensive arms. It is natural that now, before everything else, those types of strategic offensive arms which were not covered by the Interim Agreement are coming to the fore.

As for strategic offensive air weapons, the concrete proposals of the Soviet side submitted December 1 in our view reflect the importance and necessity of limiting this type of weapon. Undoubtedly we will have to deal with this.

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The Soviet side proceeds also from the premise that there are no grounds of any kind for evading at this stage of negotiations consideration of the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries. As we have already stated, in addition to land-based ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers, any other types of missiles with nuclear warheads and any types of nuclear delivery aircraft whose geographic deployment enables them to strike targets on the territory of the other side, must also be considered within the composition of strategic offensive arms. All carrier aviation, regardless of the geographic deployment of attack carriers, must also be considered within the composition of strategic offensive arms, since they are mobile systems.

The USSR Delegation proposed withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems together with concurrent liquidation of corresponding bases in third countries. Such a solution of the issue would fully meet the principle of ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral advantages.

In light of what has been said it appears obvious that what the U. S. Delegation for some reason labels "central systems" not only cannot be treated separately from other strategic

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offensive systems, but neither can any kind of levels be considered without taking into account the entire totality of strategic offensive arms.

On November 28, 1972 the U. S. Delegation's statement advanced a consideration on establishing for both sides equal aggregate levels of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers.

The USSR Delegation has been instructed to state that in establishing levels for limitation of strategic offensive armaments, all types of such armaments must be taken into account, including forward-based nuclear systems as well as SLBM submarines of U. S. NATO allies.

The question of subsequent reduction of strategic offensive arms will undoubtedly also take its due place in the negotiations. The USSR Delegation has already repeatedly drawn attention to this matter, for example in its statements of November 17, 1969, April 20, 1970 and in others. The U. S. side has also given attention to this matter.

In this connection it is natural that the question of reducing strategic offensive arms ought to be treated in the context of limitation of all strategic offensive systems. If our understanding is correct, the sides proceed from the premise that measures to

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reduce strategic offensive arms must be based on the principle of equal security for the sides and inadmissibility of unilateral advantages. We are prepared to discuss this matter after working out measures which ensure equal security for both sides.