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SALT TWO-I

US/USSR MINI-PLenary MEETING NO. 2  
Soviet Mission, 1100 Hours, December 12, 1972

Persons Present:

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley	Academician Shchukin
Mr. Nitze	Gen. Trusov
Dr. Brown	Mr. Grinevsky
Gen. Allison	Mr. Chulitsky
Dr. Garthoff	Mr. Beletsky
Dr. Ifft	Mr. Kochetkov
Mr. Arensburger	Mr. Chesnokov

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Discussion:

Minister Semenov declared the meeting open and offered the floor to Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador Smith asked Ambassador Farley to make a presentation.

Ambassador Farley then presented his prepared statement on aggregates and substitution (see Attachment 1).

Minister Semenov said that at today's meeting he wished to call the attention of the U.S. side once again to the array of tasks which must be solved in reaching an understanding on more complete measures regarding strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side attributes importance to the principle of restraint in new major programs for strategic offensive arms. The Interim Agreement provides for obligations regarding two types of strategic offensive arms. Our task is to go further and expand the limitations on strategic offensive arms and in so doing to block all channels for a race in this area.

To exercise restraint in areas not limited--not to adopt major new programs in these areas--would create more favorable conditions for new measures limiting strategic offensive arms. At the same time, obligations to exercise restraint would be an important

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contribution to the goals of these talks and would correspond to the spirit and the letter of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement between the U.S. and the USSR. President Nixon, in a letter to the Chairman /Speaker/ of the House of Representatives on June 13, 1972, pointed out that these agreements are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint between the two principal nuclear powers. The sides should set about solving the limitation of strategic arms in accordance with the "Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA", which was signed in May, 1972, in Moscow. This would no doubt cement the foundation upon which relations between the U.S. and the USSR are based.

The question of restraint acquires special significance in the case of discussions regarding the renunciation of major new programs in strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side wished to emphasize again that throughout these negotiations it has proceeded on the basis of strict adherence to the principle of equal security and no unilateral advantage. Any agreement the sides work out which includes mutually agreed measures will exclude unilateral advantages. Therefore, the measures proposed by the Soviet side on restraint would give no unilateral advantage and would apply to both countries.

Minister Semenov said that, as far as the questions raised by Ambassador Farley today were concerned, he thought that he had already presented relevant clarification of the Soviet position at the previous meeting. A careful examination of Soviet statements would give a sufficiently clear understanding of the Soviet position.

One could have objectives regarding questions which have been settled in the Interim Agreement. It has been said that a future, more complete agreement should provide certain more equitable terms for ICBM's and SLBM's. It is known that "every definition is negation." The Interim Agreement is the product of a protracted negotiation in which certain asymmetries were taken into consideration. The attitude of certain circles toward the Interim Agreement is no secret. Some U.S. politicians have tried to speak against our talks even before the parliamentarians of third countries. Minister Semenov declared that he would not be frank if he did not say that, within the Soviet Delegation, some puzzlement arises when remarks are heard regarding the equity or inequity of solutions already found. Minister Semenov's understanding was that if this was direct or indirect criticism of some authorities, our negotiations were not a proper forum for airing such internal differences.

The Interim Agreement entered into force quite recently--on October 3, 1972. No doubt the contents of a permanent agreement

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will not coincide with those of an Interim Agreement. This is what the Soviet Delegation is referring to when it talks about taking into account all strategic arms and liquidating bases in third countries. The U.S. side is also well acquainted with the proposals of the Soviet side regarding strategic aviation offensive arms. The U.S. side has its own opinions, but the Soviet side is very hopeful that it can persuade the U.S. side that the Soviet position is well grounded. At the same time, voices are heard on the U.S. side calling for revision of agreements in force. Where did this come from? The Soviet side cannot agree with such sentiments. It proceeds from the premise that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which we have concluded are in force and are effective, legally binding international instruments. Therefore, directly or indirectly casting doubt on them does not correspond to the task of our talks.

Ambassador Smith stated that Minister Semenov must be hearing voices not heard by Ambassador Smith. He knew of no American who proposed revision of the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement. Perhaps this idea came from a third country.

General Allison then presented his prepared statement on the Soviet proposals of November 28 and December 5 (see Attachment 2).

General Trusov said that, in connection with the remarks made by General Allison on December 8, he wished to address the Soviet proposal limiting strategic aviation offensive arms. First of all, he did not share the view that strategic bombers are the least destabilizing component of strategic offensive forces, nor did he agree with attempts to divide strategic offensive forces into primary and secondary components. The goal of our negotiations is to limit all types of strategic offensive arms and not simply any parts which look to one of the sides to be primary and the most destabilizing.

The Interim Agreement limits two types of strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side had already underscored the importance of finding solutions for other strategic offensive arms, particularly with respect to strategic aviation, since the absence of limitations on such arms could allow substantial channels for the buildup of other strategic arms.

Attempts to establish a link between limitations on strategic aviation and systems of air defense are totally unconvincing. It is unfounded to draw an analogy between attempts to limit strategic aviation and the limitation of ballistic missiles and the ABM systems defending against them. It is well known that air defense systems do not belong to the category of strategic systems and are not a subject

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of our negotiations. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation is not instructed to consider these systems.

General Trusov said that General Allison's remarks regarding the U.S. belief that it would be impractical at this time to ban nuclear weapons did not cast doubt on the Soviet proposal to ban strategic bombers as nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviet proposal would also limit the number of bombers on each side to agreed levels. Such levels should not be those at the disposal of the sides now, since such an approach would not be consistent with the principle of equal security. On December 8, the Soviet side had already dwelt upon its opposition to the U.S. approach to establishing levels of strategic offensive arms.

Turning to the Soviet proposal banning new types of strategic aircraft, General Trusov said that General Allison had called attention to the understanding that modernization and replacement would be allowed subject to the limitations of the agreements. The Soviet position does not contradict this understanding, because this position precisely concerns the question of the limitations within which modernization and replacement should be considered. If the U.S. side has any proposals on this subject, the Soviet side is ready to consider them.

With regard to what types of air-to-surface missiles would be considered "long range", General Trusov said he believed this question would present no difficulty after agreement in principle was reached to ban the development and deployment of such missiles.

Turning to the question of verification, General Trusov said that the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement stipulated that verification of compliance would be carried out by national technical means. The Soviet proposals concerning an agreement on more complete measures for limiting strategic offensive arms also stipulate that verification should be ensured by national means. He believed that the U.S. Delegation agreed with this position. At first, there may appear to be certain difficulties in this regard, but consideration of the way in which the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement were worked out offered grounds for optimism.

General Trusov concluded his remarks by saying that it would be useful in preparing for the next stage of our negotiations for the Soviet side to know the opinion of the U.S. side concerning the essence of the Soviet proposals on strategic aviation. Referring to the concluding remarks of General Allison in the previous meeting,

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General Trusov said that he would note that the adoption by the U.S. of a record-high postwar defense budget, the acceleration of programs to build up strategic offensive arms, and other facts speak for themselves.

Ambassador Smith then asked Dr. Brown to present some views.

Dr. Brown presented his prepared statement in response to Academician Shchukin's question on MIRV's (see Attachment 3).

Academician Shchukin said that he would like to present several considerations related to the exchange of opinions at the previous meeting. If he understood correctly, Mr. Nitze had stated that the key conditions for strategic stability are survivability and the capability to penetrate the defenses of the other side. Academician Shchukin said that he considered that conditions of this kind could not be accepted without reservations. An increase in arms could be carried out under the pretext of improving survivability and, conversely, measures which appeared superficially to decrease survivability could serve the goals of our negotiations.

It is known that the Soviet Union and the U.S. have concluded an ABM Treaty, and this should be regarded as an important constraint on the arms race. He wished to note that the Soviet proposal to withdraw submarines with ballistic missiles beyond agreed limits would not upset strategic stability and would create no additional threat to, nor decrease the survivability of, such submarines. On the contrary, the withdrawal of SLBM submarines could be an important factor in avoiding an instability in the arms race, which instability he understood to result from a feeling of insufficient security. In the case of SLBM's, there were other ways to increase their efficiency as a deterrent. Academician Shchukin then repeated that Mr. Nitze's first condition for strategic stability could in no way be regarded as true without any conditions.

Academician Shchukin said that according to Mr. Nitze's second condition, any increase in the capability of strategic offensive arms to penetrate opposing defenses would be stabilizing. This gave rise to the question of whether such a condition would not give impetus to a further arms race. Academician Shchukin said that it seemed to him that such a condition could not be accepted as a guiding principle in these negotiations.

The proposal of the Soviet side on strategic aviation would increase strategic stability rather than decrease it, and would impede the development of the arms race. He wished to point out

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the obviously destabilizing effect of long-range ASM's. Such missiles could be launched from over the territory of third countries or over water. In view of the load-carrying capability of modern aircraft, the number of such missiles could be fully commensurate with the number of land-based and sea-based missile forces of the two sides. Under these conditions, would not such ASM's be a factor in the strategic arms race? Therefore, it was obvious that the proposal of the Soviet side not to create, test, or deploy such weapons was precisely directed toward increasing strategic stability and containing the strategic arms race.

Academician Shchukin said that in addition to what General Trusov had said on the subject of verification, he wished to add that there are cases in which the sides have undertaken important obligations not fully verifiable by national means--for example, the obligation not to put nuclear charges in outer space. Such obligations, no doubt, have a positive and stabilizing effect.

Mr. Nitze then presented his statement on throw-weight (see Attachment 4).

Minister Semenov asked whether any Delegates wished to present any further remarks. There being none, he proposed that the next meeting be held on Friday, December 15, at 11:00 a.m. in the U.S. Mission, and suggested that a continuation of the mini-plenary format would be useful.

Ambassador Smith agreed, and Minister Semenov adjourned the meeting.

Drafted by: Edward M. Ifft

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Approved by: *OS per RSG*  
Ambassador Smith

December 12, 1972

STATEMENT ON AGGREGATES AND SUBSTITUTION  
(Ambassador Farley)

During the period in SALT ONE when we were discussing a permanent agreement with respect to strategic offensive arms rather than a temporary freeze, there was general agreement between our two Delegations that our negotiations on strategic offensive arms should establish a limit on the aggregate number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. The U.S. side put forward a specific proposal on this subject on August 4, 1970; however, the two sides did not reach the point of coming to agreement on the level of the aggregate.

The U.S. Delegation believes that the considerations which led our two sides to the concept of limiting the aggregate of central systems remain valid. The U.S. Delegation has consistently held that the level established for an aggregate must be equal for both sides. We reaffirm that our present objective should be to negotiate a permanent agreement, and that that agreement should embody the fundamental principle of overall numerical equality in the central systems; that is, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

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Within the framework of equal aggregates on central systems, the U.S. side also believes that there should be equal ceilings on the number of deployed ICBM launchers and on the overall ICBM throw-weight of each side. We have also expressed our view that the sides should reach agreed ceilings through reductions, rather than through a buildup. What is your view of these concepts?

An important element of a permanent agreement would be certain provisions for substitution of one type of launcher for another among the central systems. This would allow each side flexibility to adjust its force composition to preserve the effectiveness of its deterrent capabilities, and thus could contribute to strategic stability. The degree of freedom-to-mix would depend upon the other limits. The Soviet Delegation advocated such a provision in Helsinki and Vienna. Does the Soviet position on this issue remain the same?

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STATEMENT ON SOVIET PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 28 AND DECEMBER 5  
(General Allison)

The U.S. side has studied the Soviet statement of November 28 on the subject of "assuming obligations to ban deployment of strategic ballistic missiles on airborne or waterborne platforms (except submarines), as well as on any fixed or mobile devices which could be deployed on the seabed or the ocean floor, or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial sea and internal waters." We also have studied the Soviet proposal of December 5 to "ban the development, testing and deployment of intercontinental cruise missiles and sea-based cruise missiles specially designed to strike land targets."

You will recall that on August 4, 1970, the U.S. side proposed comprehensive limitations which included a ban on testing of cruise missiles of intercontinental range, and on deployment of launchers for such missiles. The U.S. side also proposed at that time banning the production, testing, and deployment of ICBM systems utilizing waterborne vehicles on inland waterways. The Soviet views noted above are also compatible with those set forth by the U.S. side on April 8, 1971, in regard to the seabed zone.

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The Soviet side proposed on December 5 a ban on deployment of strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms. As indicated in my remarks on December 8, your proposals on strategic aircraft and armaments raise several issues and questions. Among these are the matters of non-verifiability by national technical means of the complex of constraints you propose on strategic aviation, and the matter of the relationship of air defenses to the constraints you propose. We will pursue this latter point at a later date.

On the proposal to ban testing and deployment of sea-based cruise missiles "specially designed to strike land targets," we would ask two questions: How do you propose to distinguish between cruise missiles which are specially designed to strike land targets and other cruise missiles which are also capable of striking land targets? Does the Soviet side believe that, if a cruise missile has not been specifically designed to strike land targets, its capability to do so is irrelevant?

In conclusion, it appears that there is a convergence of views on some of these points; there is apparent disagreement on others. We believe these matters can be taken up later as a part of our consideration of limitations on strategic offensive forces.

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ATTACHMENT 3

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STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SHCHUKIN QUESTION ON MIRV'S  
(Dr. Brown)

On December 8, Academician Shchukin raised the question of qualitative limitations and referred specifically to multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV's/MIRV's) and maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV's).

It is the view of the U.S. Delegation that the question of qualitative limitations on strategic offensive weapons is open for discussion during the course of our negotiations. The question of qualitative limitations is understood to be covered by the formulations of the draft Program of Work now in preparation.

The U.S. Delegation would be interested in hearing any further views on this subject which the Soviet Delegation wishes to put forward at this time.

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STATEMENT ON THROW-WEIGHT  
(Mr. Nitze)

At the December 8 mini-plenary, Academician Shchukin said that he doubted the urgency of agreeing to an equal ceiling on the throw-weight of ICBM's, arguing that the Interim Agreement contains an answer to the throw-weight problem. We question the validity of these comments.

The Interim Agreement provides a temporary freeze on ICBM forces which is helpful in the short term but is not adequate for the long term. We believe a permanent agreement should provide for equal ceilings on ICBM throw-weight, as well as on numbers of ICBM launchers, to be achieved through a program of reductions.

We believe that it is urgent that we get on with the task to which both sides agreed in Articles VII and VIII of the Interim Agreement. In the context of a permanent agreement, throw-weight should be recognized to be one of the important measures of the potential capability of ICBM's. A ceiling on aggregate ICBM throw-weight would place a limit, relatively insensitive to future developments of technology, on the potential of an ICBM force. Thus agreement on ICBM throw-weight is important to our current negotiations.

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