


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
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**THE MEETING OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, 14-19 NOVEMBER 1957**

**Analysis of the Significance
for
Free World Communist Parties**



December 1957



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BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

1957

-VIII-

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S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	1
The Meetings and their Internal Utility for the CPSU	4
The Meetings	8
Mechanics and Agenda	8
Organizational Integration of the International Communist Movement . . .	13
Organizational Principles and Procedures . . .	15
A Theoretical Journal and Future International and Regional Centers	21
The Tactical Program of the Declaration . . .	23
Outlook	33

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

THE MEETINGS OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS
IN MOSCOW, 14-19 NOVEMBER 1957

Analysis of their Significance for Free World
Communist Parties

1. Introduction. The following observations are based largely on Communist press and radio coverage of the events under discussion. Although reliable information indicates that the Communist leaders had agreed not to publish detailed accounts of the meetings, points of general significance are clearly discernible in the published statements. Further analysis and amendment will, however, be necessary in the future.

The practice of publishing only partial or slanted accounts of international Communist meetings is, of course, standard. For example, statements published after the founding meeting of the Cominform (September 1947) concealed completely the severe criticism to which CP Italy and CP France had been subjected by the Soviet, Yugoslav, and other delegations. They gave figures representing Communist Party strength an upward slant. The general direction prescribed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the International Communist Movement was, however, clear: the Free World Communist parties were to organize maximum pressure and violent assaults on local political structures while, at that period, the Soviets were about to complete the subjugation of Eastern Europe and the Chinese Communists aimed at gaining total power.

2. The Declaration issued after the meeting of twelve Bloc Communist parties * (14-16 November 1957) and the Peace Manifesto issued after the meeting of Communist party representatives

* Those of Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, Vietnam.

S E C R E T

from sixty-five countries (16-19 November 1957) ** reflect the intention of the CPSU and the Bloc Communist parties to efface the after-effects of Khrushchev's secret speech in February 1956, the June and October 1956 events in Poland, the revolt in Hungary, etc., in order more closely to integrate the activities of the entire International Communist Movement in the Free World with Soviet and Bloc policies and interests. This attempt is being made at a time when the Soviet Union and China are ambitiously endeavoring to outstrip the capitalist countries in per capita production "within ten to fifteen years," and by this means as well as through their foreign policy operations, hope to achieve a shift in the balance of power. It is evident in the documents of the November meetings that the general direction prescribed for the International Communist Movement in this period is intended to contribute to and accelerate this shift through a variety of united front tactics adapted to local circumstances: for example, direct action or political maneuver, insurrection or parliamentary methods, united action or popular fronts. In adjustment to a new set of circumstances, this general directive line is aimed militantly at increasing disunity, conflict and polarization within the Free World, the tempo of this increase obviously being contingent upon local factors such as the strength and status of the local Communist party.

3. Reports have been received since mid-1956 indicating that several Communist parties have repeatedly requested the Soviets to improve procedures and techniques for the coordination of the movement. In March 1957 Communist circles rumored consistently that the CPSU would render a decision on international problems. In 1957 there were also evident CPSU attempts to strengthen the Foreign Section of its Central Committee (hereafter CC) and to encourage regional consultations of Communist parties in Europe and Latin America. On 1 July 1957, prior to the announcement of the Malenkov-Molotov -

** The official listing is misleading. The Icelandic CP did not sign the Peace Manifesto, probably because it was represented by a Party functionary who is also a member of the government. Other parties such as those of Iran, Egypt, and the Sudan may have been represented but were omitted from official lists.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Kaganovich purges, various Communist parties abroad were given, through the local Soviet Ambassadors, the CPSU version of the purge. This unusual procedure suggested that the CPSU recognized the need for improved international coordination. It is, however, not unlikely that the Soviets postponed attacking this complex and thorny problem on an international scale until they were in a position to galvanize the international Communist leadership into action with their achievements in rocketry and space travel. The November meetings were apparently staged to deal with the problems of coordination, as well as the confusion and ideological dislocations created by the 20th CPSU Congress and its aftermath, in an atmosphere benefiting from these scientific achievements and from the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Gomulka, on his return from the Moscow meetings, admitted that the "Declaration and Manifesto /issued at the meetings/ contain ideas expressed before" but stressed that "their great importance consists in the fact that the ideas are assuming increasing practical significance." The atmosphere of great optimism flowing from Khrushchev's 6 November speech enhanced the galvanizing effect. The result has been to formalize the basic outlines of global Communist tactics and to create the foundation of a new structure for the International Communist Movement within and outside the Bloc--in brief, to weld together the Communist Movement in the spirit, although not in the form, of the prewar Third Communist International (Comintern). The Soviet press and Soviet functionaries reporting the Moscow meetings described them as "the most representative in Communist history," adding, "There has been no event like it in the Communist movement for more than 20 years." The 7th (the last) World Congress of the Comintern, with which the November 1957 meetings of Communist leaders were obviously being compared, took place in July-August 1935.*

* The 7th World Congress raised the tactics of the united and popular front, with all their revolutionary and insurrectionary aspects in the struggle against Fascism, to the global level. The November 1957 meetings parallel this policy.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Judging from the text of the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto, Gomulka's characterization of these documents appears quite correct. They are restatements of previously published formulas and even cliches. The accent at the November meetings must clearly have been upon action, and the discussion of action problems. In Communist parlance, these documents are meant to exert a "mobilizing and organizing force." Soviet Marshal Chuikov, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on 2 December, emphasized exactly this aspect of the documents.

4. The Meetings and their Internal Utility for the CPSU. Khrushchev's aim has been to replace the one-man dictatorship of Stalin by the dictatorship of the Communist Party which is also the basis of his personal strength. It has been argued by many competent observers that this aim is not necessarily realistic and that Khrushchev and the CPSU may yet have to retreat before the growing pressure of social forces. The propagandistic treatment of the November meetings in the Soviet Union indicates that a strenuous effort is being made to "sell" the CPSU and to strengthen its authority internally on the grounds of the increased international stature and prestige gained at the November meetings. A cardinal point in this effort is the leading role of the CPSU in the International Communist Movement, acknowledged, at least on paper, at the November meetings.

At the meeting of the Moscow Party Aktiv (leading Party functionaries) on 26 November the CPSU Presidium member, Furtseva, stressed this point at least five times. Soviet leadership of the world movement, she reportedly said, "is very important to emphasize because revisionists in certain foreign Communist parties applied much effort to discredit the successes of the Soviet Union, undermine the authority of our party . . . This is why the position put on paper in the Declaration about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the family of Socialist countries, about the need to defend and support the Soviet Union as the first and most powerful Socialist power, is so important for further strengthening of the whole

S E C R E T

Communist movement." /Evening Moscow, 27 November./

Pravda, 28 November, carried an account of a similar meeting of the Leningrad Party Aktiv at which Kozlov called the CPSU the "leading force of the world revolutionary movement."

On November 30 several Soviet papers reported the speech of the Czech CP leader, Hendrych, made in Prague upon return from the Moscow meetings. Hendrych said that it was very important that the Communist Movement have a solid center and that this center be the CP of the Soviet Union.

A Pravda editorial, "Great Unity," broadcast on 6 December, quotes the Chinese Peoples Daily as stressing "the consolidation and strengthening of the camp of Socialism led by the Soviet Union, the consolidation and strengthening of the international Communist movement with the CPSU at its head . . ." /Underlining supplied/

The actual text of the Declaration contains, indeed, the formulation so typical of the Soviets, i.e., "the indivisible camp of Socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union." Although language is no substitute for reality, the CPSU obtained a net gain by inserting the formula into the Twelve-Party Declaration.

Note: From the point of view of historical accuracy it should be noted that there are some indications that Gomulka, who has had an aversion for using the term "the Socialist camp led . . ." or "headed by the Soviet Union," may have objected to the language of the Declaration referring to the leading role of the Soviet Union. The SED Politburo member Friedrich Ebert, in his report on the "twelve-party meeting," related that Mao Tse-tung stated at the meeting that "like any small party group, we too must have a head." Mao said that the Chinese Communist Party was not worthy of this function because China was not yet fully industrialized. The Soviet Union, however, was powerful, could protect the other Communist countries, and had,

S E C R E T

since Stalin's death, improved its working methods. Mao said, reportedly, "From all this results the leading role of the CPSU in the community of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the leading role of the Soviet Union at the head of the states of the Socialist camp." Following this statement, Ebert reported, "Old Ho Chi-minh, Comrades Enver Hoxha, Albania; Hendrych, Czechoslovakia; Zhivkov, Bulgaria; Dashim Damba, Mongolian Peoples Republic; Stoica, Rumania; and Kim Il-sung, Korea; unanimously agreed with Mao Tse-tung that only the CPSU can be at the head of the Socialist camp." /Underlining supplied./

Strangely absent from the list of those who unani-
mously agreed are Gomulka, Poland, and Kadar, Hungary. The significance of these presumable abstentions, however, should not be overrated. Gomulka's possible abstention did not refer to the entire document. Further, his reluctance to employ the term "leading role" does not indicate a reluctance to acknowledge the reality of Soviet leadership. On one previous occasion in Poland, as was reliably reported, he replied to his Stalinist-Natolinist critics that Mao, being a powerful leader, could admit openly that the Soviet Union had a leading role, and at the same time preserve an independent policy and remain free of attacks from internal opposition for subservience to the Soviet Union. Gomulka stated that he would possibly acknowledge the leading role of the Soviet Union, but not until "our party in Poland will be carrying out its leading role," i. e., not until the Soviets would have something to lead. At the same time he said, "We know what is the role and place of the Soviet Union in the Socialist camp. No Socialist nation, not one, would be able to exist if it were not for the Soviet Union since everyone would be too weak to struggle against the threat of external attack even if at times we had at our disposal adequate forces to destroy the internal enemy of Socialism." Kadar's possible abstention remains puzzling. Representing a regime of little power, he may

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

not have attended the Twelve party Meeting. In a broadcast of 22 November recording Kadar's speech on his return there was no reference to his attending the meeting although he described several other gatherings which he attended. Rumors concerning a possible replacement of Kadar have been received since the broadcast.

Additional endorsement of Mao's statement was forthcoming on 20 November from the official organ of the Lao Dong (Communist Party of Vietnam), which added editorially that "being the first socialist country whose experiences constitute valuable lessons for other countries which are building or will build socialism, the Soviet Union is a worthy leader of the socialist camp."

5. The increase in prestige which resulted from the November meetings was publicized by a number of leading Soviet figures. The Soviet writer Korneychuk spoke in this vein at the 2 December plenum of the Central Committee, CP Ukraine. At the same meeting Soviet Marshal Chuikov stressed that "Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals of the Okrug are studying the Declaration and Manifesto with a feeling of great pride in the dear Communist Party. . . ."

The activities conducted during the Afro-Asian Solidarity Week held in December in the USSR fall into the same pattern. So does the highly unusual presence of Khalid Bakdash, Secretary General of the CP Syria and Lebanon, at a recent meeting of the Aktiv of republic and Yerevan city party organizations in the Armenian SSR. This meeting was devoted to a discussion of the two documents issued by the November meetings. A Soviet Armenian regional broadcast to Armenians abroad (3 December) stated, "Those present at the meeting warmly greeted the speech delivered by Bakdash, Chief Secretary of the Central Committee of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties."

S E C R E T

The internationalization of CPSU internal propaganda for the purpose of raising the prestige and authority of the Party is only one aspect of the "leading role" of the Soviet state and the CPSU in international Communist affairs. The other is the commitment inherent in the claim to leadership, i. e., to guide, assist, and strengthen Communist parties abroad. The CPSU is now irrevocably committed to undertake actions which are bound to conflict with the posture of "peaceful coexistence" and non-interference in the internal affairs of the Free World countries.

6. The Meetings. The series of meetings of Communist party leaders which ended in the late afternoon of 19 November in the "festively illuminated George's Hall in the Kremlin" with the singing of the "Internationale" did not, however, solve all problems and disagreements with which the International Communist Movement has had to cope since the 20th CPSU Congress. These meetings were first, although exceedingly important, steps toward achieving real unity and effective international coordination. As Friedrich Ebert put it, "the consultations . . . created the prerequisites for the continuation of the discussion with a view to clarifying all fundamental problems After two decades the first step was made toward a closer and more comprehensive cooperation among the Communist and Workers' Parties." The SED delegation under Walter Ulbricht claims credit for the formula which enabled the representatives to agree upon a common starting program, i. e., to achieve and formulate maximum agreement, get on with the job, and work out remaining disagreements at a later date.*

7. Mechanics and Agenda. Available data on the mechanics and organization of the meetings suggest, first, that the problems

* Walter Ulbricht stressed the need to adopt "a concerted document concerning the principal problems where there may be certain questions on which some representatives of a party still entertain certain doubts. Although opinions vary on many a problem, the future experiences of life and of the struggle will lead to the clarification of these problems."

S E C R E T

of International Communism received a thorough airing, and secondly, that the CPSU had distributed key roles to reliable delegations and leaders in order to keep the meetings on the desired track. The CPSU, it was reliably reported, did not give general advance notice of the agenda of the meetings, probably in order to prevent delegations from preparing their positions.

The preparatory stage took place in Moscow. Prior to the formal sessions a "comprehensive exchange of opinions within and among delegations" was held for about one week. Communist accounts also refer to "commissions established by Communist and Workers' Parties" in connection with the meetings. According to Communist practice these "commissions" may have concerned themselves with the drafting of the documents published. They may also have dealt with more specific problems of doctrine and organization.* In any case this preparatory work appears to have been under the control of the CPSU and the Bloc parties which in this fashion assumed policy-making powers. According to Ebert's account, the "sister parties from the capitalist countries" (i. e. , from the Free World) were only "consulted" in these preliminary discussions. These discussions centered around the drafting of the Twelve-Party Declaration, which contains a general directive for Communist parties in the Free World. There is, however, no indication that the Free World Communist parties had a direct vote in this matter affecting their operations.

8. The meeting of the twelve Communist parties in power was opened by Khrushchev. Mao Tse-tung was the first speaker on the draft of the Declaration, which had been prepared jointly by the CPSU and CP China. Walter Ulbricht closed the debate.

* A "commission" chaired jointly by the CPSU and CP China may have existed. The Twelve-Party Declaration was drafted by the CPSU and the CCP. A meeting attended by all Latin American delegates, as well as by Soviet and Chinese representatives, apparently discussed area problems (e. g. , the strengthening or reorganization of the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL), the Latin American regional organization of the WFTU).

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

The Declaration was adopted unanimously, although Gomulka, and possibly Kadar, as already noted, may have had reservations on language concerning the leading role of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia did not attend this meeting. The twelve-party meeting represented in effect the session of a small but powerful policy-making executive--an international Politburo or Presidium.

9. The meeting of Communist representatives from sixty-five countries was a plenary session on the order of an international Central Committee. It met "a few hours after" the conclusion of the twelve-party meeting, "in the same place." It was again Khrushchev who opened the meeting with a speech which emphasized that "consolidation and preservation of peace (is) a principal task of the present time." Suslov welcomed the meeting briefly. A bulky written report by Suslov had been circulated earlier in order to speed up the discussion and may also have been considered by the twelve-party meeting. Allotments of speaking time were reduced to twenty minutes, but not all the delegates were permitted to speak. The French and Italian delegates (Thorez and Togliatti?) made lengthy speeches. Mao Tse-tung talked for two to three hours, apparently about the internal problems of China. Because of poor health he remained seated while speaking. Representatives from Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, and Guatemala also spoke--the last-named on behalf of Mexico and the Caribbean area.

The meeting centered about the draft of the Peace Manifesto which had been drawn up "upon the initiative of the CPSU and the Polish Workers' Party," as Ebert reported. Gomulka himself, however, claimed exclusive credit for the initiative. In a 28 November speech to the Warsaw Aktiv he claimed, "As far as the Peace Manifesto is concerned, we were its initiator. In common with the CPSU, we submitted a draft of the Manifesto to the general conference of all the parties, which adopted this draft unanimously after it had been supplemented by other parties." The task of preparing the final draft of the Peace Manifesto was handled by a thirty-or-forty-member editorial committee assisted by inter-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

preters. One reliable source reports that at least four rough drafts were in circulation. It was reliably reported that during the process of drafting the Peace Manifesto the World Peace Council was severely criticized for inefficiency.* The Manifesto indicates, indeed, that the Communist parties themselves will take a stronger initiative in the peace campaign, and rely less on the initiative of the World Peace Council.

10. The meeting of representatives of sixty-five countries also discussed the Declaration "decided upon by the representatives of sister parties of the socialist countries." Again, there are no indications that it was brought to a formal vote, and it may be presumed that at least a majority of the Communist parties of the Free World represented there accepted the Declaration.** Some of the issues inherent in the Declaration (i. e., the evaluation of the war threat and the leading role of the Soviet Union) may have aroused debate. Mao Tse-tung, Walter Ulbricht, Duclos and the Czech leader Hendrych appear to have steered the debate into desired channels.

The Suslov report must obviously also have been discussed. Available references suggest that it dealt, among other topics, with an assessment of the strength of the Communist Movement in the Free World. The report appears to have contained some

* The World Federation of Trade Unions, another international Communist front organization, was also criticized. In this context it is noted that the CPSU Central Committee Plenum decision on trade unions (16-17 December) states that "it is the task of the Soviet trade unions to work actively for the consolidation of the World Federation of Trade Unions."

** There are no indications that the Yugoslav delegation defined whatever objections it may have had at this meeting. A reliable source indicated that the Yugoslavs merely stated that they were not yet ready to sign the Declaration.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

frank admissions of damages sustained and existing weaknesses. Although referring to the growth of International Communism since the prewar period, the report pointed out that "at present the existence of 34 of 62 Communist parties is strictly illegal." Judging from Ebert's account, it also admitted "some damages at individual points of the Communist movement" as a result of the Korean War, the events in Egypt, and the Hungarian revolt. This admission points to Europe, since the report stated that "in Asia and Africa, however, and also in some Latin American countries, some of the sister parties have considerably grown."*

11. The difficult situation of non-Bloc Communist parties, which was referred to in the Suslov report, was apparently elaborated upon in speeches made by representatives of those parties. Ebert stated, "their reports on their parties' struggle show the full impact of the difficult stand they have facing the imperialist rulers." The result appears to have been an acknowledgement of the needs of the weak Communist parties of the Free World. Ebert postulated: "It appears to be a matter of greatest urgency to devote more attention to the sister parties which are working under such difficult circumstances and above all to grant them more moral and political help within the framework of the cooperation of the Communist and workers' parties of all the world." The implementation of this policy is bound to increase security problems in many countries in the Free World where Communist parties are outlawed or have lost ground.** Ebert referred to needy Com-

* Max Reimann, the West German Communist leader, warned the meeting of the unfavorable climate existing in Western Germany because of Adenauer's popularity.

** In certain states such as Syria, Iran, the Sudan, and Egypt, it is also likely to involve serious political problems, because such action is difficult to reconcile with the Soviet claim of non-interference in the internal affairs of these countries. In order to conceal this conflict, the Soviets may channel assistance through Bloc Communist parties. Important SED functionaries with extensive conspiratorial background have already been spotted in the area.

S E C R E T

munist parties in Latin America and the Near and Middle East, and the small European Communist parties were also considered by Moscow.

12. Organizational Integration of the International Communism Movement. One of the most important items on the agenda, a subject extensively discussed, was the problem of the organizational integration of the Communist Movement, under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Bloc. The concept had been postulated in the Declaration, which stated:

"At bedrock of the relations between the countries of the world socialist system and all the Communist and workers' parties lie the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the principles of proletarian internationalism which have been tested by life. Truly the vital interests of the working people of all countries call for their support of the Soviet Union and all the Socialist countries, who, pursuing a policy of preserving peace throughout the world, are the mainstay of peace and social progress. The working class, the democratic forces, and the working people everywhere are interested in tirelessly strengthening fraternal contacts for the sake of the common course, in safeguarding from every encroachment the historic political and social gains effected in the Soviet Union, the first and mightiest socialist power--in the Chinese People's Republic, and in all the Socialist countries, in seeing these gains extended and consolidated."* /Underlining supplied./

* This formulation is a modernization of Article #14 of the Conditions of Admission to the Comintern, which stated, "Each Party desirous of affiliating with the Communist International should be obliged to render every possible assistance to the Soviet Republics, in their struggle against counter-revolutionary forces."

S E C R E T

13. The dominant position assumed by the Bloc and the Soviet Union was apparent in a statement in the Declaration revealing-- possibly inadvertently--the policy-making power of this group, i. e., "What is needed here is a united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front." /Underlining supplied./

From Ebert's account it emerges that the subject caused debate. The issue at stake apparently was that "closer co-operation under the leadership of the Soviet Union would impair national interests." Ebert stated "It was established during the discussion that any concern in this respect was completely unjustified." The issue, however, is a real one. Communist party leaders in the Free World (Togliatti, to mention one) are fully aware of the fact that the open identification of the local Communist party with the interests of the Soviet Union hampers their efforts. At the meeting, representatives of CP Great Britain, CP India and some Latin American parties apparently also had some reservations on this point.

However, the forces demanding full and open subordination of the Communist Movement to the CPSU carried the Declaration.* Ulbricht stated flatly, "National interests are not impaired by proletarian internationalism," referred to the war threat to justify organizational unity, and pointed out that "so far nobody has doubted or questioned the independence of the Communist and workers' parties."

The trend toward closer identification of the Communist Movement with Soviet and Bloc interests was also apparent in the Peace Manifesto accepted by the meeting. The Peace Manifesto equates the peace movement with the International Communist Movement. In the past, Communists were careful to conceal their leading role in the peace movement

* Among them, as reliably reported, were the French, Dutch, Czech, and Chinese delegations.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

behind the facade of the World Peace Council and its offshoots: as one example, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The CPSU rationale for this insistence on the identification of the interests of Free World Communism with the Bloc and its head, the Soviet Union, cannot lie in a real need for defense of the Bloc by Communist parties abroad--a majority of which (thirty-four) are illegal and in need of assistance. Rather, it would seem, the CPSU assumes that identification with the Soviet Union would enable Communist parties in the Free World to cash in, in political terms, on the recent scientific successes achieved in the USSR, and to transform themselves into more effective instruments for subversion abroad. Whether this assumption will prove correct remains to be seen.

14. Organizational Principles and Procedures. As previously noted, the November meetings represented only the first stage in the organizational integration of the movement. The Declaration stated tersely, "After exchanging views, the participants in the meeting arrived at the conclusion that in present conditions it is expedient besides bilateral meetings of leading personnel and exchange of information, to hold, as the need arises, more representatives' conferences of Communist and workers' parties to discuss current problems, share experience, study each others' views and attitudes, and concert /i. e., coordinate/ action in the joint struggle for the common goals--peace, democracy and socialism." Gomulka, in his speech of 28 November to the Warsaw Aktiv, added a few more points. Ebert's report to the SED added others. At this time, therefore, only a few tentative conclusions can be reached concerning organizational principles and procedures.

a) Agreement in principle has been reached on the basis that the CPSU, as head of the International Communist Movement, will give due consideration to the views of Communist parties, especially of those in power. Both Mao and Gomulka expressed their satisfaction that the CPSU leadership would behave properly. At the meetings, it was reported, all foreign Party representatives were treated with the same consideration.

- b) For the time being, the CPSU is willing to be correct in its dealings with foreign Communist parties and to foster the impression that "collective leadership" prevails in international affairs. Furtseva, in her report to the Moscow Party Aktiv, emphasized that the documents issued by the meetings had been "collectively worked out." In view of the open credit taken by Ulbricht, Gomulka and the Czech delegation for their contributions to the documents, Furtseva probably was right.
- c) Instead of creating a "central management" (i. e. another Comintern) for the International Communist Movement, a coordination procedure was adopted. The main vehicle for coordination will be "conferences of a large number or even of all Communist and workers' parties." (Gomulka referred to the meetings as "the structure of mutual relations.") According to reliable data these meetings will apparently be of two kinds:

International (or plenary) meetings of all (or a great majority) of Communist parties, on the model of the meeting of Communist party representatives from sixty-five countries, which would be able to pass decisions binding for all. Such meetings are scheduled to be held at least once a year. The CPSU will convoke these meetings.

Regional meetings of Communist parties with common problems. Such meetings would apparently not have policy-making powers and would deal only with "practical problems" on an informal, ad hoc basis. Ulbricht, at the November meetings, emphasized the need for regional consultation and coordination of the anti-NATO campaign within the Bloc. Prior to the November meetings indications pointed to increasing regional consultations on the NATO problem between

CP France and some European Communist parties. Regional consultation meetings between Scandinavian Communist parties were held twice in 1957. In the future such regional meetings should increase on the basis of need. The possibility of Yugoslav participation in such meetings cannot be ruled out. Participation of the ostensibly non-Communist parties and fronts from Bloc countries is certain.

- d) This coordination procedure complements but does not supersede bilateral relations and meetings. The CPSU, therefore, can, as before, coordinate directly with those Communist parties which are more subservient or dependent than others.
- e) Some constitutional and procedural terms apparently agreed upon in connection with the international (plenary) meetings, would be designed to provide guarantees for protecting the authority of Communist parties. The following points emerged from Gomulka's 28 November address:

"As a rule such conferences must be participated in by party leaders."

This would prevent the CPSU from manipulating secondary leaders in order to put pressure on the top.

"The questions which will be discussed at the conference must be known in advance to all its participants."

Such procedure would ensure that national CP leaders would be able to anticipate and reply to criticism and other pressure.

"The problems existing in the internal policy of each party, in accordance with the principle that each party is best able to determine the political line for itself and for its country, cannot be decided by interparty conferences."

This statement, however, was immediately weakened by the following point.

"This does not apply to the internal problems common to all parties if they have --or if they achieve at a conference--the same views on these problems."

These affirmations suggest that Communist parties will accept plenary conference decisions as binding only with their consent. The Declaration itself has already been formally accepted by Central Committees and party Aktivs in the Bloc.* Outside the Bloc the Declaration has been accepted by CP France and CP Italy. The CPUSA, however, was forced to postpone ratification because of internal factional struggles. The significance of these procedural safeguards remains to be tested by practice. It is amusing to note that even the CPSU, which drafted the Declaration, had it formally ratified by its Central Committee.

* The Declaration characterizes "revisionism and dogmatism" as "international phenomena," indicating a binding resolve of and for the Movement.

- f) According to reliable information, the question was raised at the meeting, as a procedural problem, whether or not the international body would or should have a right to subject member parties to criticism, and whether or not such criticism should be made public. Some delegates apparently maintained that timely criticism of CP Hungary would have prevented the revolt in 1956.

No evidence is available to show that agreement has been reached on the question. Some representatives appear to have been reluctant to endorse the publication of criticism because open criticism would immediately expose the mechanics of Moscow's leadership.

- g) According to some indications, the problem of speeding up communications was also discussed. The problem was expressed in terms of the need of non-Bloc Communist parties to stay ahead of the West in reporting about the Socialist countries, and to impress the workers in the Free World with the alleged high living standard in the Bloc. One delegate -- apparently seriously -- proposed that East Germany and Czechoslovakia should be made into showplaces. Meetings between CP's in Western Europe and the fraternal parties in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland would be arranged in order to speed up the dissemination of favorable propaganda about the Bloc to the West.
- h) The language of Bloc propaganda to the West also came in for some criticism. One unidentified Yugoslav delegate apparently pointed out that in order to be more effective the language of such propaganda should be made more intelligible to U.S. and Western audiences, which are different from East European ones. In drafting the documents issued by the meetings, however, the "Socialist countries" did not take the Yugoslav point into consideration.

S E C R E T

- i) The principle of subordinating the interests of Communist parties in capitalist countries to the anti-colonial struggle also was discussed. The French representative, Duclos, defended, with little success, the PCF position that Algeria should remain with France. Ali Jata, Secretary General of the Moroccan CP, speaking in behalf of all Arab CP's, opposed the French stand. A Syrian delegate and some European delegates also opposed the French. The Syrian delegate appears to have strongly recommended that the interests of the Communist parties in imperialist home countries and in France be strictly subordinated to the interests of the struggle against colonialism. This position was supported by the Dutch delegation.

15. Organizational procedures of Free World Communist parties were discussed. Fragmentary information available indicates that there were views in favor of a general reinstatement of "illegal" or "parallel" apparats to prepare for the revolutionary overthrow of a government. This is plausible in the light of the Declaration which emphasizes the need for "non-peaceful" transition to Socialism in case of resistance to Communist parliamentary advances. The November meetings did not result in a firm agreement or policy on this point. It is nevertheless probable that this question will be pressed again by the CPSU in bilateral conversations or at conferences. One significant Communist party in South Asia reportedly objected to organizing an illegal apparat on the grounds that the effort would pull away valuable functionaries from important overt political work. This party, however, promised to increase its penetration of the local armed forces.

S E C R E T

16. A Theoretical Journal and Future International and Regional Centers. Thus far only the issuance of a "theoretical journal" for the Communist and Workers' parties has been announced as agreed upon.* Contributions to the journal will be submitted on a voluntary basis. As a preliminary step to issuing the journal a press agency may be set up, probably in Prague.

An international conference of Institutes of Marxism-Leninism and Party History, held in Prague from 19-23 November, may have concerned itself with the question of issuing the journal. The conference allegedly was organized by the Institute of History of the Czech Communist Party, and attended by delegates from Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR.

Whether there will be a permanent international headquarters organization is not clearly discernible at this moment. A more permanent organization is bound to emerge from the pattern of plenary and regional meetings, if for no other reason than to conduct business between sessions. The CC/CPSU has in its Foreign Section and the latter's subsidiaries (CPSU fractions in the headquarters of the international fronts) the nucleus of an international apparatus through which it may be able to exert its leadership role more efficiently than at open meetings. Other Communist parties may, in the future, renew a clamor for an international organization on the Comintern model.

The emergence of future regional coordination centers can be anticipated, although evidence is not yet firm. It stands to reason that certain Communist parties will assume a more formal and dominant position in regional affairs because of their strength and experience and, in certain areas, because of their legal status. (A

* One report claims that CP France was made responsible for this publication. Another source claims that M. Suslov will be responsible for the journal.

S E C R E T

legal CP could better control communications than could an illegal CP).

In the Bloc, CP China, CP Czechoslovakia and the SED have already emerged as playing an increasing role. CP China consulted with leaders of CP Australia and possibly also CP New Zealand in September; two leading functionaries of CP Japan returned to their country from China in December 1956, after a stay of five and three years respectively; and in November 1957, a training school for foreign Communists was reported to have been formed in Peking.

The SED met with representatives of the Algerian CP on 31 October 1957; representatives of the CP Denmark arrived in East Berlin on 16 December 1957.

Outside the Bloc, CP France in 1957 made efforts to coordinate anti-NATO propaganda with the CP's in Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. CP Finland reportedly attempted to assert a leading position among the Scandinavian Communist parties. In accordance with previous practice, CP Mexico was used by the local Soviet Embassy in 1957 as a communication channel to other Communist parties in Central America. According to some reports, CP Indonesia had been instructed by the CPSU to coordinate the work of Communist parties in Southeast Asia.

The emergence of more formal regional centers should facilitate indirect CPSU control of the Communist parties coordinated by these centers. The most important trend, however, in the regional pattern will be the further development of contacts between Communist parties in "capitalist" and "colonial and semi-dependent" countries.

17. The data published in the Communist press on the organizational aspects of the meetings make it obvious that the major part of the proceedings is being concealed. None of the actual speeches of the representatives have been published in full; the findings of the Commissions created by the meetings have not been published; the

S E C R E T

Suslov report (allegedly several hundred pages long) has been publicized only in a few excerpts. It is also not unlikely that specific organizational proposals were made at the meetings which went beyond the publicly-adopted positions on periodic conferences and on the issuance of a theoretical journal. Some of the documents issued at the meetings are reliably reported to be of such a sensitive nature that they cannot be revealed fully even within a national Communist party. After the conclusion of the meetings at least one Communist party outside the Bloc is reliably reported to have received a document through the local Soviet Embassy with the advice to take action upon it.

While some of the secrecy can be attributed to a desire to conceal the extent of disagreements and weaknesses--which are apparent even in the published data--it would be safe to assume that specific operational reasons are also involved. The November meetings succeeded in establishing a preliminary program and a procedure for the tactical integration of the Communist Movement. It may be expected that both will be refined and improved, upon the initiative of the CPSU. The programmatic statement issued in the Declaration shows that the CPSU considers that opportunities for increasingly aggressive action have improved since last year, and that, given increased discipline and unity, these opportunities can be exploited. In short, the program aims at a restoration of the "revolutionary content" and the "revolutionary spirit" of the Communist action plan. It is perhaps for this reason that a Communist leader thought his party would be outlawed if the full contents of the November meetings were made public. They would be certain to reveal that International Communism in concert with the Bloc has been called upon to mount a political offensive.

18. The Tactical Program of the Declaration. In line with previous estimates by the Soviets, opportunities exist particularly in "colonial and dependent" (i. e., underdeveloped) countries, whereas "relatively good economic activity" in a "number of capitalist countries" (i. e., industrialized areas) reduces the effectiveness of Communist leverage there for the time being.

S E C R E T

In order to increase the opportunities the Declaration puts in the center of Communist tactics the exploitation of a threat which, it alleges, derives from "the presence of military danger created by imperialism, and primarily by the imperialism of the United States of America, which has now become the center of international reaction."* By fanning war hysteria and anti-Americanism the Communist Movement will seek to mount increasing political and other pressures on the local governments and political structures. The exploitation of this issue could, in the Communist estimate, effect a change in the balance of power in the country in which the party is operating, and therefore, internationally.** The operational method selected for this purpose is the promotion of the United Front on the broadest possible basis. "The Peace Manifesto clearly defines the position of Communist and workers' parties, which consists of offering support to every step taken by a state, a party, an organization, a movement, or an individual for the preservation of peace and against war, for peaceful coexistence, for the establishment of collective security in Europe and Asia, for reduction of armaments, and for banning the use of atomic weapons and the carrying out of atomic tests."*** (Underlining

* Quoted from Suslov's account of the Moscow meetings to the Rostov Oblast party organization, 2 December.

** In this regard it is interesting to note recent reporting concerning Syria, which indicates that the Communist Party has been consciously exploiting the artificially sustained threat of external aggression to persuade its opponents both in and outside the Party to forego disputes, electoral contests, and other actions which threaten to weaken the Party's position in relation to the national front government.

*** From a Tbilisi (Tiflis) 1 December broadcast, report on a Georgian party organization Aktiv meeting.

S E C R E T

supplied.) This position permits and demands manipulation not only of "left" political groups but also, and in some areas preponderantly, of "right" and nationalist forces.

19. This tactic of building up pressure in the Free World is, of course, not a new one. In the postwar period such attempts were intensified, particularly in periods when the Soviet expansion drive was frustrated. The Cominform-endorsed tactic of direct assault was adopted following the loss of goodwill which the Soviet Union and Communist parties had accumulated during World War II in many countries. When the aggression in Korea was halted, the Cominform tactic of direct assault was transformed into the tactic of the United National Front which closely corresponded to the current line, inasmuch as it was also based on marshalling all anti-American forces on a minimum platform. The current action line stems mainly from the frustrations suffered by the Bloc as a result of internal pressures developing after the 20th Congress and in the wake of the Hungarian revolt.

The fact that this action line is being re-emphasized indicates that internal pressures are still operating in the Bloc. In this context it is not coincidental that Walter Ulbricht, as reported by Ebert, "emphasized the statement included in the draft declaration that by the reestablishment of German militarism a focus of serious danger of war has been established in Europe." Ulbricht was seconded by "the representatives of the Czechoslovak and French sister parties," and by Mao Tse-tung.* Ulbricht also stressed

* The question of "German militarism today" had been previously discussed at a joint conference of the editorial boards of the Soviet publication International Affairs and parallel publications of Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia (Prague, 17-18 July 1957.)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

that there was not the "slightest difference" between SED, CPSU and CP China in the appraisal of the international situation. In sum, the "threat of war" issue corresponds most to the interests of the Bloc as an excuse for halting revisionism and evolution. It can make a significant contribution to the fortunes of parties in critical underdeveloped areas, such as the Middle and Near East, but in Western countries it makes demands upon rather than contributes to the forces of the International Communist Movement. It is an artifice and therefore is in need of artificial stimulation. It is probable that the Communist leaders assembled for the November meetings were cleverly propagandized in this respect. A clue is contained in a Rostov broadcast report of 31 December on Suslov's account of the November meetings which, presumably, followed the pattern of his report at the Moscow meetings. According to the Rostov broadcast

"a considerable place in the (Suslov's) report was devoted to showing how imperialist reaction is striving to undermine the position of the countries of socialism and to restore in them the dominance of the capitalists and landowners. The ruling circles of the imperialist powers are using any means of political, economic and ideological advance from outside the socialist countries with the simultaneous activation of internal counter-revolution in these countries."

Ulbricht, at the meetings in Moscow, referred to "NATO documents which show that in the future methods of violence are to play a greater role in organizing counter-revolutionary putsches in Europe, in order to pave the way for military interventions," thus adding to the abundance of "plots" and "documents" used by Khrushchev and Communist media throughout the world to keep the issue of the war threat alive.*

* During the Stalinist precedent of the current tactic, the trials of Bloc leaders were used to dramatize the external threat. Rajk, Slansky, Merker were the symbols then.

S E C R E T

Although the artifice of the "war threat" is a paradox in a period when the "world system of socialism" proclaims superiority, it is advantageous to the Soviet Union not only for internal reasons. It also permits the Bloc to provoke the U.S. and its allies into positions which can then be "exposed" as proof of the thesis. It permits the Bloc to blame the West for failure to negotiate on Soviet terms, and to maintain a climate of political pressure on Free World nations, especially underdeveloped countries, to alienate them further from the West. It permits even the use of the paradox itself by alternately emphasizing the war threat and the peaceful posture of the Soviet Union and the Bloc.

The threat of war is also an essential element of the Soviet appeal to Yugoslavia. A 12 December Moscow broadcast in Serbo-Croatian stated, "The great historic mission of the Socialist countries, of all Communist parties and of peace-loving forces is to prevent imperialism" from plunging "mankind into the flames of nuclear war." The broadcast added that "not only one state but thirteen Socialist states... are now fighting to prevent a third world war. They will prevent it if they act monolithically in defense of the cause of peace." The figure thirteen obviously includes Yugoslavia.*

20. As an operative directive, the war threat as the central issue for the United Front tactic is a signal for intensified disruptive action in the Free World. This signal appeared previously in the August 1957 (#12) issue of Kommunist in an article by Ponomarev,

* The cited broadcast is noteworthy because it omits one of the nine laws which were codified by the Declaration as the most important tenets of Marxism-Leninism to be applicable to all Communist-led countries. The law omitted reaffirmed Communist orthodoxy.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

and was apparent in the "Theses" issued in September by the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution. The resolutions passed by the 4th World Trade Union (WFTU) Congress, 8 October 1957, did not use precisely the same terminology as these documents, in view of the mixed attendance, but some delegates, i. e., Pena from Cuba, and Chu Hsu-fan of the All-Chinese Federation of Trade Unions, pointed to the need to establish an anti-imperialist (national) front.

For "colonial and dependent" countries the Declaration prescribes a united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front exploiting peasant unrest and the grievances of the middle class, as well as aspirations of "patriotic democratic forces." That the Declaration calls for increasing pressure emerges from its position on neutralist governments of underdeveloped countries --- the "zone of peace." This accent on pressure becomes recognizable in comparing Khrushchev's statement at the 20th CPSU Congress with the Declaration. In February 1956 Khrushchev defined the "vast peace zone" (of neutralist governments) as a "group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs a principle of their foreign policy." This "peace zone" was presented as augmenting "the Communist forces of peace." The Declaration, on the other hand, defined as "the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa" those "taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming together with the Socialist countries, a broad peace-zone." In this definition there is no longer any reference to "peace-loving European states." More important, the "anti-imperialist stand" is emphasized as the chief criterion. "Non-participation in blocs" is no longer mentioned as a chief characteristic of a neutralist country. This language suggests that the Soviet Union now requires a closer alignment on the part of neutralist governments prior to considering them as

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

useful adjuncts to its foreign policy aims.* Local Communist parties may therefore exert greater pressure on their governments to force their alignment, or to bring them down.

21. Pressure on capitalist countries can also be expected to mount. This is indicated in the Declaration by the call for attacks on the "big monopoly" groups--the traditional signal for intensification of infiltration and unrest in labor and other fields.

For those capitalist countries which are closely allied with the U.S., the Declaration also prescribes the foundation of a broad united front, based on unity of the working class (i.e., united action with Socialists) in order eventually to "overthrow the rule of the monopolies who betray national interests." The Democratic Socialists remain a key target for the united front attack. Ponomarev, in the August issue of Kommunist, indicated

* A Soviet Foreign Office official recently urged in conversation with Egyptian officials that Egypt abandon its "positive neutrality" formula.

One source has also reported that pressure had been applied by a key figure within the Syrian government to make the national front "truly representative" by reshuffling the cabinet and including Khalid Bakdash, Secretary General of the Communist Party, in it. D.N. Aidit, Secretary General of the Indonesian Communist Party, in a key speech delivered in Djokjakarta on 20 October 1957, addressed both Communists and nationalists on this point in the following terms: "The question of cooperation between the Communists and nationalists is not a question of wanting to or not, but a question of historical necessity."

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

clearly that some of the Asian Socialists were closer to the Communist position than the European Socialists. The 40th Anniversary Theses flatly declared that without a Communist-Socialist united front "the working class cannot win power." The Declaration is not so strongly worded and emphasizes the incompatibility of (Democratic) Socialist and Communist doctrine. It is entirely possible that Khrushchev and the CPSU considered that opportunities exist for a "united front from above," i. e., agreement with Socialist leadership,* whereas leaders of Communist parties abroad, especially those from Europe, pointed to the practical difficulties involved. The Declaration suggests that the tactic of the "united front from below" (i. e., infiltration and splitting of the rank and file from the Socialist leaders) has been agreed upon as the most practical one, especially in Western Europe.

Accordingly, the 5 December resolution of the Central Committee of CP France speaks of efforts necessary "to win Socialist workers (not leaders) to the united front." Leadership agreements will probably be sought by the CPSU and the Soviet government with Democratic Socialist parties in power.

22. The Declaration also makes perfectly clear---clearer, perhaps, than the 20th CPSU Congress---that the purpose of the united front tactic is the gaining of state power. Reviving Dimitrov's formulae of the 7th (Comintern) World Congress, it permits a variety of "transitional forms" to this end, i. e., a "popular front" based on "a united working class" (unity with the Socialists), or "other workable forms of agreement and political cooperation between the different parties and public organizations." The latter formula obviously pertains to situations such as in Egypt,

* Khrushchev's October letter to European Socialist parties appears to have been based on this assumption. At the 20th CPSU Congress, Khrushchev also appeared to have in mind a united front from above.

S E C R E T

Syria, Indonesia or any other country where political fermentation is spearheaded by nationalist (anti-imperialist) forces.

The Declaration restricts the "parliamentary road to Socialism" to "a number of capitalist countries," and postulates that a Communist majority in a parliament must be employed so as to "smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the Socialist revolution." In case of resistance to this scheme, the Declaration warns, "the possibility of non-peaceful transition to Socialism should be borne in mind." The intensification of the united front pressures in the Free World will, of course, vary from country to country.

The recent (5 December) Central Committee resolution of CP France illustrates how the line set forth by the Declaration is being implemented in one country. The resolution emphasized the exploitation of the recent strike waves in protest against the high cost of living; development of the opposition to the war in Algeria, particularly as a means of achieving agreement with the Left; development of increased violent opposition to the U.S. and NATO policies through protest campaigns and the peace movement, coupled with a dramatization of the war threat. This tactic is clearly designed to increase direct pressure on the local political structure and government.

CP Brazil furnishes another example. In August 1957, Party leader Luis Carlos Prestes in issue #11 of Kommunist published an article which was consistent with the fundamental position of the 1954 Program of CP Brazil, calling for the union of all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces: the proletariat, peasants, petit and national bourgeoisie, all under the guidance of the working class and its Communist party. In the article, Prestes still called for the overthrow of the Kubitschek regime and stated also that "we must concentrate all our fire on the North American imperialists and their agents in Brazil" in order to mobilize the widest possible forces and to exploit all possible divisions among the bourgeoisie. In October CP Brazil started its drive for "legalization"; it surfaced

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

some of its leaders and took steps to bring about the change of laws governing its status. A Soviet Bloc drive for increased trade and cultural relations started about that time also. Prestes adjusted the tactics of the CP Brazil on 9 November in an article in which he stated that the party had been in error in advocating the immediate overthrow of the Brazilian government, and that CP Brazil would fight henceforth with constitutional means for a "national democratic coalition government" which would, in time, lead to "Socialism." The apparent "softening" of the line vis-a-vis the Brazilian government--motivated by a variety of practical considerations--still permits CP Brazil to intensify its united front tactic by an increased exploitation of the anti-imperialist issue, i. e., anti-Americanism.

In Japan, HAKAMADA Satomi, JCP Central Committee member, who returned to Tokyo in the summer of 1957 after five years in Moscow, immediately began a denunciation of the inflexibility of the incumbent Party leadership. He utilized as a factional nucleus elements of local Party organizations which had independently initiated a criticism of the Party leadership on the same grounds. An early convert to HAKAMADA's opinions (which have been assumed throughout the Party to represent those of the CPSU) was Communist Diet member SHIGA Yoshio who later was appointed chief of the three-man JCP delegation attending the 40th Anniversary Celebrations and subsequent conferences.

23. Given an intensified united front tactic with all its varieties as the international tactic of the World Communist Movement, the Declaration was forced to place not only "revisionism" but also "dogmatism" out of bounds. Although the document states that "revisionism is the main danger," it raises the fight against dogmatism to a higher priority. "Dogmatism" means tactical inflexibility and the inability to make and manipulate concessions to the non-Communist partners of the united front or united action.

In conformity with this precept, Thorez and the CP France devoted more attention to the dangers of dogmatism in their 5 December

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Central Committee meeting than previously. Thorez reportedly declared that "dogmatism (and sectarianism) impedes the application of Marxist-Leninist theory in concrete and changing conditions. It prevents seeing modifications which are operating. It ties those who are its victims to outmoded formulae and hinders them in accomplishment of necessary efforts to win Socialist workers to the united front." (Underlining supplied).

Thus, it would seem, the line against "revisionism" has been blurred somewhat, at least outside the Bloc,* by the need to permit the International Communist Movement the necessary tactical flexibility in its united front maneuvers. In any case the position should facilitate purges of deviators and anti-party groups of any persuasion. Such a purge was carried out, apparently with success, by CP Syria as early as October of this year.

24. Outlook. The November meetings of Communist leaders in Moscow perpetuated and generalized the hardened and bolder line of the CPSU and Soviet foreign policy which has been characteristic of the period following Khrushchev's victory in the June CC Plenum. They resulted in a first step toward increased organizational unity within the International Communist Movement. The Economic Conference of the Eastern European satellites, convened as of December 1957, is an indication of the determination with which the CPSU pursues its objective of increasing cohesion in the Bloc.

* Within the Bloc, the line retains its potency. Suslov stated, "In the countries of socialism, revisionism today is taking the form of ignoring the teaching of the unavailability of a serious class struggle during the period of transition." While this formula is not as forceful as Stalin's on the sharpening of class struggle in the period of transition, it would seem to recognize China's problem in particular.

S E C R E T

25. Whether the current tactical line of the World Communist Movement will be maintained depends, of course, on its success, particularly on the ability of the Soviet Party/government to play with fire. For the moment the official Soviet prognosis is extremely optimistic. The Soviet writer and Khrushchev protege, Korneychuk, stated at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on 2 December:

"Having frequently had the chance to travel abroad, I have seen what prestige is enjoyed by our great fatherland, the mighty Soviet Union, which leads the struggle for peace in the whole world. That prestige has greatly increased since our country launched the artificial earth satellites, which are the glory and pride of our creativeness, our science, and our whole socialist system. Next year, the World Congress of Peace Partisans will be held. Many will be invited who have not yet joined that movement. The Congress will be devoted to the problem of disarmament. We are happy that the main theses of the Declaration and the Peace Manifesto will help us to organize new hundreds of millions of people around the invincible banner of peace."*

* A new peace campaign has already begun in the Bloc and outside. In Rumania, "spontaneous" mass meetings in factories, institutes, clubs, etc. were organized to attack the U.S. for a refusal to ban tests. Noteworthy was the attendance of the Catholic clergy. CP Italy issued a statement following a joint session of its CC and Control Commission on 11 December, which said that the Peace Manifesto will constitute the beginning of wide agitation and political action by the central Party. The concrete forms are to be determined shortly by the PCI directorate.

S E C R E T

While this extravagant claim does not specify whether these "hundreds of millions" will be organized within or outside the Bloc, it clearly indicates an expectation that the Communist Movement can ride on the coat-tails of increasing Soviet prestige. Khrushchev, in confidential discussions with foreign CP leaders in Moscow, also appears to have imbued them with a fighting optimism.

26. Mao's long speech at the plenary session followed the same line. He must have deeply impressed the delegates, because some had great praise for Mao's statesmanship and his modesty in renouncing a role of world leadership in favor of the Soviet Union. The war threat and the superiority of the Bloc formed an integral part of his speech.

Mao stated that the imperialist powers were moving toward atomic war. At the time of the Suez crisis, the Politburo of CP China estimated that, in case of general atomic war, 600 million people would be killed and 300 million would be totally disabled. In view of this high cost, Mao stated that "we do not desire to start a war."* He reportedly stated, however, that if there were no other alternatives "we will do it" and in that case, another and an accelerated victory for socialism would ensue.

Mao stressed that vigilance was necessary lest "we be drawn into such an impasse." He reportedly also warned that certain "elements among the imperialists" will take risks and will try to "draw us out of our tents." Apparently in order to dramatize the strength of the Bloc and the weakness of the imperialist "paper tigers," Mao cited a series of instances where the imperialists had suffered defeat, e. g., in Korea, Vietnam, Suez. He bragged

* In his use of the word "we," it is not known whether Mao was speaking for the entire Communist side.

S E C R E T

that the Soviet Union solved the Suez crisis by sending a telegraphic warning to England and that in the Syrian crisis "not even the cost of a telegram was required." Khrushchev merely published an article in his own newspaper.

The sputnik, according to Mao, signified the turning point. From now on the imperialists would get blow upon blow although they still could launch small offensives which could cause great harm to the Communists. Mao called the Communist delegates to do their utmost to deny the enemy even this capability.

Whether or not Khrushchev and Mao divulged their true estimates of the strength of the Bloc to the international Communist leadership cannot be ascertained. In any case their talks were clearly meant to strengthen Communist morale and to inspire action designed to create serious trouble in the Free World.

27. It may be assumed that the 1958 World Congress of Peace Partisans (mid-1958?) will provide the CPSU with an opportunity for a review of its tactics. The next international meeting of Communist leaders may well coincide, or be held in conjunction with, the next World Peace Congress, and thus facilitate a general review.

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