

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

50X1-HUM

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794; the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY East Germany REPORT [redacted]

SUBJECT Study Entitled: SSM Units in the GSFG DATE DISTR. 30 APR 1968 NO. PAGES 1 REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. [redacted] a study comprising 16-pages [redacted] Surface-to-surface Missile (SSM) Units in the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). [redacted] 50X1-HUM

2. The study consists of a detailed analysis of a large number of individual pieces of information in an attempt to form an over-all picture of the status of SSM's and SSM units in the GSFG.

3. The study concludes that over the years since 1957, the introduction of operational/tactical missiles of the light, medium and heavy types into the GSFG has increased to a point during 1962 where SSM troop units have become an integral part of the GSFG in the armies and probably also in the divisions. 50X1-HUM

Comment: [redacted]

[redacted] The over-all level of intelligence reflected in this study is not current. The study contains the early Soviet tactical missile organization which was believed to have been in effect during the period of 1958- [redacted] 50X1-HUM

Distribution of Attachments [redacted]

DIA [redacted]

ORR [redacted]

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

STATE	X	ARMY	#X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	DIA	X	AID	X
											ORR	X	JCS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".) 50X1-HUM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM



S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

13 March 1963

SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE UNITS IN THE GSFG

This study concerns itself with the important question of the presence of surface-to-surface missile units in the GSFG.

We emphasize that these observations of missiles do not permit it to be deduced whether they are practice-exercise missiles, or missiles with actual war heads. Our efforts were exclusively directed towards determining that missile units were being assigned within the GSFG.

The study represents an attempt to form an overall picture from the large number of individual pieces of information available. The result is still incomplete and can only be evaluated as an intermediate, and preliminary study.

Organization of the study:

Part I - Surface-to-surface missile units

1. Introduction of surface-to-surface missiles into the GSFG since 1957. (Numbers 1-3)
2. Identification of missiles and their location. (Numbers 4-5)
3. Tactical missile regiments, and heavy missile sections. (Number 6)
4. Number and organization of surface-to-surface missile units. (Numbers 7-9)
5. Evaluation. (Number 10)

Part II - Technical-performance data
(will be given at a later date)

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-2-

SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE UNITS IN THE GSFG

1. The first reports of equipment indicating missiles in the GSFG arrived in 1957. These observations concerned principally the area of the Eighth Guards Army, and to a lesser degree, other areas of the Soviet Zone of Occupation. At that time the equipment could not be clearly identified. It was later indicated however, that (the equipment observed) was probably surface-to-surface missiles, which at that time were introduced into the GSFG, probably to a limited extent.

The descriptions indicated that the first observations were of the various types of the SS-2 (the 101 and 102 KOROLOV; improved and further developed models of the former German A-4), and in the beginning of 1958, the FROG type missile. While the SS-2 was probably available in the USSR long before this time (assumed to be the first fully operational, tactical missile). The FROG 1, was first displayed to the public during the November 1957 Moscow parade. On the basis of reports, it is believed that FROG missiles could have been introduced into GSFG at approximately this time.

We have insufficient information available to indicate the number of S/S missiles available in the GSFG during the general period 1957/58, or the nature of their organization.

2. Reports regarding observations of S/S missiles increased in the years after 1959. In these reports, the chassis described was particularly often the PT-76. This means that the objects observed were probably the S/S missile FROG-2, which was also displayed for the first time at the 1957 Moscow parade, but probably not until later introduced into tactical (operational) units. The effective range of this weapon (approximately 30 Km.) does not speak for the direct subordination (of FROG units) below GSFG (level); however, again in 1959 insufficient information was available to permit an analysis of the organization and subordination of the S/S missiles in the GSFG.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-3-

In 1960, and particularly in 1961, areas, and later garrisons, developed in ever increasing numbers, where S/S missiles could be located. The descriptions indicated, with increasing frequency, that in addition to the FROG 1, the SCUD (was in the GSFG) and particularly the FROG 3/4, which is believed to have become operational in 1960 and therefore possible for it to be brought into the GSFG.

3. In 1961, the frequency of observations regarding S/S missiles appeared to justify the assumption that a large number of S/S missile units were stationed in the zone. It was assumed that the units were subordinated to the GSFG, and the armies respectively, in approximately Regt. strength. Early in 1962, a large number of observations indicated the possibility that S/S missile units were participating in GSFG troop maneuvers. This was particularly true for the maneuvers in March, June, and July of 1962. It could be concluded from this, that the incorporation of S/S missile units was advanced to the point that joint exercise between this weapon and other troop elements was possible and necessary.

Also, during the course of 1962, the renaming of the "Chief of Artillery Troops," in the headquarters of the GSFG, to "Chief of Missile Troops and Artillery" took place. The same development was detected in the USSR military districts, and after a short time, in the armies of the GSFG; however, not in the divisions.

4. All garrisons of the GSFG, where missiles were suspected, were checked on. As far as possible, the number and types of S/S missiles were to be determined, in order that a determination of number and subordination could be made.

For this purpose, not only Kaserne and garrison observations were included, but also transportation reports. The varying evaluations of the reports available occasioned an error factor which, however, was at least partially compensated for by the large number of reports. Reports which by themselves appeared highly improbable were considered in a cautious manner only in association with other information. Our own work was compared with reports from other agencies, whereby further sources of error were eliminated.

It must, however, be emphasized, that up to this time we are aware of many things, which is proof of the well functioning secrecy measures (of GSFG) and the necessity for further efforts to clarify all aspects of this important weapon.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-4-

5. In detail, the investigation revealed:

a. That with great probability, S/S missiles are stationed in more than 30 garrisons of the GSPG. (see inclosure 1)

All of these garrisons are identical with those in which other troop Ems are stationed. This does not exclude the possibility that S/S missile units could not be stationed in other parts of the Soviet Zone.

b. S/S missiles occur in greater numbers in the southern part of Soviet Zone than in the northern part.

c. Particularly from 1962 on, S/S missiles of the type FROG 2-4 were frequently seen together with rocket weapons of the type EM 20 and/or EM 28. A clear identification in these cases was not always successful.

These observations concern not only garrison observations but also convey reports of units moving to and from maneuver activities. In many cases S/S missile units, rocket units, and other troop Ems were stationed in the same garrisons.

d. While the garrison and billet area observations permitted recognition of the various types, with a high probability of accuracy, the same accuracy could not be obtained in the case of rail movements in which missiles were suspected. In most cases, these movements only gave an indication of the possible source and the area into which they were being delivered.

e. In the case of convey observations in which missiles were suspected, identification of the missile was possible only in exceptional cases. Most of the reports were of canvas-covered, projectile-shaped objects, on 1- or 2-axle trailers, pulled by a prime mover or truck, and accompanied by several vehicles. The descriptions indicated, however, the possibility of S/S missiles SS-2 or -3. There were, however, too many reports for these to be missile units, but probably missile transport, or supply vehicles.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-5-

This appeared particularly probable when the transports moved in the direction of a known or assumed ammunition lager (dump-storage area) or in the direction of training areas, which was the case in most of the observations.

f. Garrisons in which SAM positions or units were known or assumed to be, were also determined, in several cases, to be the location of S/S missile units. This fact requires mentioning because transports observed near these stations could be either SAM, or S/S missiles. The greatest probability for the presence of S/S missiles of FROG or SCUD type was indicated by an accurate description of a missile on a tank chassis.

g. It was not possible in many garrisons to accurately differentiate between FROG and SCUD missiles. In these cases S/S missiles of the FROG type were assumed, because it is not probable that such a large number of SCUD are in the Soviet Zone. The presence of SCUD here and there is not to be discounted, however.

6. The results of the investigation, together with the facts listed under number 3, and the evaluation of deserters' reports, as well as other information in 1962, permits the following observations:

a. According to reliable information, the Soviets differentiate between light, medium, and heavy "operational-tactical missiles". It is assumed, that:

FROG 1-4 belongs to the light missile group.

SCUD A & B (SS-1) belong to the medium missiles.

SS-2 to SS-3 belong to the heavy missiles.

b. It is certain that the GSPG has available missile units of the light, medium, and heavy type.

They are organized into Regiments and Sections (Ba).

At least 2 Regiments are subordinated to the GSPG, probably, however, several regiments of various type missiles.

At least one missile Regt. to each army.

The designation "Tactical Missile Regiment" has been proven; however, it is not clear whether all missile regiments carry this designation. The subordination under the Chief of the Missile Troops and Artillery for the GSPG and Army is regarded as probable.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-6-

c. Heavy missile sections are stationed in the division areas. Their incorporation into the division, and subordination to the "Chief of Artillery" appears probable; however, has not been proven. With the designation "heavy missile sections," it is not believed that they mean missiles of the SS-2 type, but more likely a heavy "unit." This probably has its basis in the fact that although a FROG missile is regarded as a "light" missile, for a division it would be a "heavy" unit (when compared to their other fire power).

d. Although at least one garrison in every division area must be assumed to have S/S missile units, and although other information speaks for the fact that these S/S units belong to the division, the possibility cannot be excluded that this is a coincidental or an intentional stationing of elements of the army's missile Regt, which could represent a tactical distribution or the possible future subordination.

e. The fact of many joint observations of missiles of the FROG type and Rocket Launchers of the RM 20/30 type, makes it appear possible that both weapons were placed in a mixed unit in the place of the Rocket Launcher Battalion in each Division present up to now.

This unit would therefore have weapons with a range of between 20 and 65 Kilometers. The Division Commanders then have been given the means with which they can produce area or senal fire and in addition, atomic fire, whose maneuverability is considered very good.

7. The number and organization of the S/S units within armies and divisions are not yet entirely clear. From the aforementioned observations only a presumed organization can be used which later will need to be supplemented or confirmed.

As a basis for this analysis, the S/S missiles observed in garrisons were used according to number and presumable types.

a. The number of FROG reported from individual garrisons was between 2 and 6; however, there was a predominance of statements of between 4 and 6.

Considering the fact that the report picture showed 2 FROG quite often, it is assumed that this dealt with a battery.

A Section could consist of 2 Batteries of 4 x FROG or of 3 Batteries of 6 x FROG.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-7-

If it is considered that the "Heavy Missiles Section" also has Rocket Launchers, then a probable organization of two Batteries of FROG and 1 to 2 Batteries of Rocket Launchers seems more probable when considering the scope of the Section so that 4 x FROG per "Heavy Missiles Section" are accepted.

b. In a few garrisons of the GSFG, observations showed a large number of S/S missiles. The observations fluctuated between 8 and 18; often 10-15 S/S missiles were mentioned. The descriptions indicated S/S missiles of the FROG type; however, in smaller numbers "SCUD" (SS-1) was indicated.

Even though the statements as to number are in variance, it must be assumed that this deals with larger troop units as with a Division, because the number reported was comparatively higher.

It seems plausible that this dealt with Rocket Regiments of the armies, equipped with FROG 3 and 4. A possible organization of these Regiments is: 3 Battalions of 2 Batteries each, each with 2 x S/S missiles, equalling 12 S/S missiles. They could, however, have more S/S missiles at their disposal. As stated, it is not impossible that the missiles observed in these garrisons have a connection with the S/S missiles observed in divisional areas because a differentiation between the types of FROG is not always possible.

c. Observations of S/S missiles of the "SCUD" (SS-1) type have increased. In the majority of cases they came from garrisons, which is shown in paragraph 7 (b). This type of missile has not been accredited to all Army areas. Here, also, the number reported has been at variance, but more often the number 6 is mentioned.

It can be said with certainty that the S/S missile of the "SCUD" type is not a weapon for the Divisions but, in consideration of the range and the presumed logistical support necessary, this weapon must be assigned to an Army. It is therefore assumed that there must be S/S missiles in garrisons, in those where S/S missiles of the "SCUD" type were observed, and that they are subordinate to the Armies and that their size approximates that of a regiment. There is a great possibility that a regiment of this type has 6 x S/S missiles of the "SCUD" type. Also, in agreement with reports from another agency, it is assumed that the Battery is a firing unit of 1 x S/S missile of the "SCUD" type.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-8-

The organization of an exclusively "SCUD" type Regiment could be one of the two following possibilities:

- Regiment of 2 Battalions of 3 Batteries each, each with one (1) S/S missile, equalling 6 x S/S missiles.
- Regiment of 3 Battalions of 2 Batteries each, each with one (1) S/S missile, equalling 6 x S/S missiles.

The second possibility is considered most probable. Therefore, an Army area could possibly have 2 missile troop units, of which one unit is equipped with FROG (type FROG 3 and 4) and one unit equipped with "SCUD."

It has long since been proven that one "Tactical Missile Regiment" was in an Army area whose equipment has not been completely clarified. It could be that both S/S missile types are coupled in this one "Tactical Missile Regiment" and this Regiment then consists of 4 Battalions (2 Battalions each of FROG and SCUD). Because a connection with the S/S missiles of the FROG type observed in Division area cannot be determined, it is therefore accepted that the "Tactical Missile Regiment" is subordinate to the Army and equipped with S/S Missiles of the "SCUD" type.

8. Additional Rocket Troop units are directly subordinate to the GSFG which can be accredited to a few garrisons with great probability. Beyond this especially, is the appearance in the southwestern area of the Soviet Zone of Germany of S/S missiles whose subordination has not yet been clearly defined, which to some extent at least also are subordinate to the GSFG. In at least 3 garrisons there exists the probability of the stationing of heavy S/S missiles. Whether or not this deals with the SS-2 type or SS-3 (SHYSTER) cannot be said with any certainty. Because there has long been no clear indication of the presence of the SHYSTER, it is tentatively accepted that this deals with the SS-2 type.

Several indications show, in connection with the construction of hangars, that of these missiles 6 x S/S missiles are stationed in the garrisons so that a heavy missile regiment of the GSFG could have 6 x S/S missiles of the SS-2 type.

Beyond this no evaluation can be given as to the scope of any additional S/S missile troop units subordinate to the GSFG. In agreement with reports from another agency it is presumed that a few missile regiments equipped with "SCUD" are immediately subordinate to the GSFG with an organization comparable to the Regiments subordinate to the Armies.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-9-

It therefore seems justified to assume that the following as a minimum are subordinate to the OSFG:

- 2 heavy Rocket Regiments, each with 6 x SS-2 type S/S missiles.
- 2 medium Rocket Regiments, each with 6 S/S missiles of the SCUD type (SS-1).

9. An exact computation of the total number of S/S missiles present in the OSFG is not possible because of the aforementioned inconclusive factors.

It is possible to arrive at a number in two different ways:

a. Starting with a minimum of only 30 garrisons in which 4 x S/S missiles could be accepted, this would show an overall total of 120 S/S Missiles.

This statement does not take into consideration the various types and does not include any possible subordination. This method can also be used only as an indicator for the following reasons:

- in garrisons with Missile Regiments, there are with certainty more than 4 x S/S missiles present,
- possibly there are more than the assumed 30 garrisons in which S/S missiles are stationed
- no examination provided the presumption that in a few garrisons possibly more than one Rocket Regiment is stationed.

b. On the assumption that there is one "heavy" Missile Section in each Division and each Army has one "Tactical Missile Regiment," and the OSFG has two additional medium ("tactical?") and two heavy Missile Regiments, the overall total is:

- 20 Divisions each with 1 "Heavy" Rocket Section (minimum) of 4 x FROG, equals 80 x FROG
- 6 Armies each with 1 "Tactical Rocket Regiment" each with 6 x SCUD, equals 36 x SCUD
- OSFG with 2 medium Rocket Regiments (tactical?) each with 6 x SCUD, equals 12 x SCUD and,
- 2 heavy Rocket Regiments each with 6 x SS-2, equals 12 x SS-2.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

-10-

In total, this shows a total of 140 x S/S missiles, of which there are:

80 x FROG

48 x SCUD

12 x SS-2

The possibility of a larger number of FROG is not considered impossible as long as the subordination of the large number of S/S missiles, mentioned in paragraph 7b, of the FROG type, remains unclear.

Both computations show only the possibility of determining the number of S/S missiles present within the GSFG.

After summarizing all knowledge, the number of S/S missiles arrived at in paragraph 9b, of the SS-1 type (SCUD) and SS-2, is presumed to be correct.

The number of FROG type S/S missiles arrived at is accepted with reservation.

Closing Evaluation:

The introduction over the years of operational/tactical missiles of the light, medium and heavy types, into the GSFG reached a positive balance in 1962: it is certain that in the meantime the introduction of these weapons has been so carried out that at least from here on (1962) S/S Troop units, in the Armies and probably also in the Divisions, have become an integral part of the GSFG.

The course of the training year shows that the introduction of these weapons played a part in the planning and conduct of exercise activities.

The reduction of artillery pieces during 1961 and 1962 in the Artillery Brigades and then in the Tank Armies and - presumably since the end of 1962 - in a portion of the Mechanized Armies also, reflects the substantial increase in the nuclear weapons potential.

Precisely the decrease in conventional artillery shows, in connection with the introduction of atomic weapons, that the Soviet ground forces are adapted to the conduct of atomic warfare.

Therefore, the GSFG is in the position to conduct atomic and non-atomic warfare.

However, it shows that on the level of the Army and Group (Front), the possibility of influencing combat with non-atomic fire has become smaller.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 22 Page(s) In Document Denied