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# SOVIET BORDER TROOPS OPERATIONS AND SECURITY DEVICES IN THE TURKMEN BORDER DISTRICT (C)

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SOVIET BORDER TROOP OPERATIONS AND SECURITY DEVICES IN THE TURKMEN PORDER DISTRICT (C)	
Introduction	50X1-HU
A. SOVIET BORDER ZONES AND PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES  1. Forbidden Border Zone (Zapretnaya Pogranichnaya Zona—ZPZ)  the ZPZ as border terrain over which the Border detachments exercised operational control (pogranichnyy rezhim). At the crossing points into the ZPZ there was a border control, consisting of por four troops from the detachment headquarters, who checked the document individuals entering and leaving the zone. The physical facilities existed of a road barrier, a control booth, and a warning sign which in that it was a document checkpoint. There were no barriers and no border controls between the checkpoints, but the population commonly respected in the consequences for crossing at any uncent point without specific permission.  The limits of the ZPZ usually coincided with those of the local	the three th
administrative authority in which the Border Troop detachment operated example, the headquarters of the 67th Detachment (Otryad) of the Turkm Border District was situated in KIZYL ATREK, which was the capital of therefore, the entire rayon was within the ZPZ. If the detachment head quarters were in a capital city of an oblast, the entire oblast was within ZPZ, under the laws of the operational control.	. For en the rayon; d- thin
the word "rezhim" as meaning regulations and or controlling the rights of the inhabitants to reside and to move within PZ. the regulations, in the regulations, in the regulations of the inhabitants (prescribed that all persons desiring to live in the receive permission to do so from their district office of the Ministry internal Affairs (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh DelMVD). The inhabitants	the a most ZPZ must 50X1-HU

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Particular emphasis was placed on were always suspected of unauthori	checking the docume	ents of transien	ts, who	
2. Forbidden Border Strip (Za	pretnaya Pogranich	naya PalosaZPP	)	
Within the ZPZ, along the land called the ZPP, which was com and control. There were no marker depending on the terrain, the sens the land to the local economy. In areas, the ZPP could be as little Troops considered inadequate for p and depending on the visibility an 800 m to 3 km in width. In rugged where the maintenance of an outpos the ZPP was 25 km to 30 km wide. special permission of the local ou herders were allowed, for a limite meadow to harvest the hay or graze were not classed or named. From twider the ZPP was, the better it w devices and outpost operations (pothe ZPP.	repletely under the less indicating its less indicating its less indicating its less indicating its less industrial, mining as 30 m wide, the moreover security. In a nature of the term mountain terrain as at close to the bord. The ZPP was an evacutpost commander, less to the indication of the variable point of view of as for security. set	Border Troops' actimits. The width der, and the important and including the less important train, the ZPP was and uninhabited of the was not practicularly granticularly g	dministration varied, ortance of cultural ne Border areas, as from deserts, tical, by sheep assy ne ZPP ops the unity	on
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3. Physical Security Devices	in the Border Strip			
The Border Troops installed detect and deter any border violate chief of the 3d Section, determined on the basis of terrain study and sector. In general, the obstacles wire; the Klen M fence; the S-100 fobservation towers. Those devices varying distances from the border, terrain.	ors. The detachmen d the number and na the frequency of bo included the barbe fence; the S-2 devi were used singly o	t commander, thr ture of the obst rder/violations d-wire fence; en ce; plowed strip r in combination	ough his cacles, in the tanglement and	50X1-
a. Barbed-Wire Fence (Tuls	skiy Zabor)			
The barbed-wire fence we wooden posts with two arms at the teither singly or in parallel pairs, protected by rolls of concertina with for the obstacl	top, forming a lette and the approacher ire, or by entangler	er Y. Fences we	ere built	50X1-
b. Entanglement Wire (Malo	-Zametnoye Pripyata	stviyeMZP)		
was a very thin steel wire net, mad	e of a series of a	this device	weighed about	50X1-

The Klen M was considered obsolete and was not being replaced.  $^2$  The vibration on the Klen M, which signaled the disturbance of the fence,

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was so sensitive that it signaled gusts of wind, contact with a tumble weed, a bird, or a meandering porcupine, which kept the outpost on constant alert. An improved and cheaper substitute for the Klen M was the signaling fence S-100	o.				
d. S-100 Signaling Fence	FOVA LILIM				
See Annexes C, C-1, and C-2 for the S-100 fence	50X1-HUM				
e. S-2 Detection Device <sup>2</sup>					
B. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING					
1. Criteria for Assignment to Border Troop Duty					
The Soviet Border Troop enlisted personnel came from the normal conscription channels.					
by the military commissariats (voyenkomaty), qualify, a conscript had to have only a clean record from his school, the police and the Komsomol (if applicable) for the previous 5 years. Even though some conscripts assigned to border guard duty were not members of the Komsomol, they joined the organization within the first year of service, so that every unit had 100 percent participation. Education did not appear to be a factor in the assignment, but political reliability was.	50X1-HUM				
youths, because of their exposure to Western influences through Western music, dances, films and dress, were considered less politically reliable than country elements.  soldiers referred with contempt to the cynical city youths, and called them "stilyagi." It was rumored that, because of their political unreliability, conscripts from metropolitan areas	50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM				
Upon his arrival at the detachment headquarters, an attempt was made to impress each trooper through slogans and training that his duties on the borders of the USSR were as important as those of the Minister of Defense. In fact, the trooper on his post had the authority and duty to challenge any Soviet official, and stop him from entering the "sacred USSR border," unless permitted to enter by the local Border Troop commander. The slogan that the frontier of the USSR was sacred and untouchable, and that it was secured by "lock and key," was taken literally and seriously by the new conscripts; their first and most burning desire was to see the "border gate and the lock" which they were to guard with their lives. Within a year, however, they became more or less cynical about it. There was a story that a soldier wrote home asking for 50 rubles to pay for the key to the border lock, which he had lost through no neglect on his part.  The enterprising soldier received the money from his parents by return mail!	50X1-HUM				
The scheduling of training and activities of the outpost was made by the unit commander. It was a rather complex problem, since the border was guarded by a combination of several patrols, posted on a staggered schedule for varying lengths of time. Hours of darkness were considered the critical hours, and consequently, the operations of the unit were most intense during that time. In preparing the training schedule, the unit commander was guided by the border situation and a directive which prescribed that each trooper received 8 hours of sleep daily, 6 to 8 hours of border duty (travel time to and from post not counted); 2 to 3 hours of training; 3 hours for meals and preparation for duty; 1 hour of political training; and 2 to 3 hours of free time. The schedule prescribed each EM's activities by the hour for the day.					

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Usually, mandatory training was scheduled from 1500 hours to 1800 hour when most of the personnel were available. It was conducted by the outpost officers and NCOs and consisted of the following subjects: political training weapons drill and, twice a year, weapons qualification firing; anti-chemical training; field sanitation training; tactical (basic infantry) training; physical training; wire communications, engineer training; and border guard training.	•
The main stress in training was placed on border guard subjects, theory and practice, but especially on the detection of tracks (sledopytstvo) on the plowed strip (kontrolna sledovaya polosa—KSP). The men were taught how to inspect minutely every inch of the strip and many ways of detecting and interpreting tracks on it, such as backward tracks to mislead as to direction of crossing; stilt tracks; imitation animals tracks; pickaback crossing, indicating the crossing of two individuals; two or more persons stepping into the same tracksping on bundles of grass then retrieving the bundles; walking on boards, leaving imprints similar to the plowed strip; and pole-vaulting tracks. There was no reliable, undetectable method of crossing a plowed strip. The only successful method of crossing it without arousing the guard's suspicion was at an authorized crossing point, where the guard, who was supposed to obliterate his own tracks after crossing and mark the place with a code sign (e.g., imprinting the letter T inclosed in a triangle, from the butt of his weapon), would not be critical of a random obliteration of crossing tracks as long as the code sign appeared with it.  Technical training in engineering and communications was limited to	9r- no
the most elementary principles in each subject, consistent with the average mentality of the conscripts. For example, troops did not get any instruction on operation of field radios, field telephones and switchboards, because they were considered too ignorant. Specialists such as radio operators, wiremen, drivers and signaling-fence console operators were trained in the 67th Detachment's specialist school, in a 6-month course.	5074 111 114
3. <u>Duty</u>	50X1-HUM
a. Types of Border Patrols (Naryady)	
The duty of guarding the border was always assigned to a team of not less than two sentries, called a patrol (naryad). There were several types of patrols, each assigned a specific duty. every border guard was required to know thoroughly the duties of the following patrols:	50X1-HUM
(1) Border Sentinel (Chasovoy GranitsyChG) (See Annexes D and E)	
The patrol consisted of two or more walking guards, designated to guard a well-defined sector of the border, about 3 to 4 km long. The patrol minutely inspected the plowed strip, the signaling fences and the telephone wires. Their equipment consisted of a flashlight, flare pistol and flares (three green, three red, and three white), handcuffs, first-aid packet, and a plug-in telephone handset. Each sentry was armed with AK SMG and 50 rounds of ammunition carried in two magazines. Walkie-talkie radios were not used in routine border duty. The equipment was considered standard for most types of patrol.	
(2) Roving Patrol (DozorD)(See Annexes D and E)	

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The patrol consisted of two or more armed border guards, horse-mounted, motorized, or on foot, designated to inspect one of the flanks or the entire sector of the outpost. The sector was always divided into two flanks (razryv), the left and right.

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usually made up of two guards, a senior and a junior; the senior was mounted, the junior was on foot. The duties of the patrol encompassed inspection of the plowed strip, the communication wires, and the border markers. The main and intermediate border markers (see Annex F) were minutely inspected for marks of damage, for possible messages left by foreign agents, and for cleanliness. The D patrol was also sent into the forbidden zone, roamed the country and at random checked documents of the inhabitants, and checked new, man-made terrain features. They carried the same equipment as the ChG patrol.

(3) Secret Patrol (Sekret--S)(See Annexes D and E)

The patrol consisted of two unmounted stationary guards designated to guard natural approaches to the border. It occupied, in secret, a concealed position and maintained absolute silence. The patrol was equipped with S-2 signaling devices, in addition to the standard equipment described for the ChG patrol. A watchdog always accompanied the S patrol. The tour of duty was limited to about 4 hours, which was the maximum endurance for the dog.

(4) Observation Post (Post Nabludeniya--PN) (See Annexes D and E)

The patrol consisted of two unmounted border guards, designated to observe the terrain within sight from an observation tower (see Annex G). Every outpost had three observation towers, one in each of the two flanking sectors, and one in the vicinity of the outpost's installation. The flanking towers were manned only during daylight hours; the installation tower was manned 24 hours. Besides the standard equipment, each member of the PN patrol carried field glasses. All routine observations were entered in a logbook, maintained on the tower, but any unusual observations, such as flare signals or a movement across the border or in the vicinity of the tower, were immediately telephoned to the outpost headquarters, then logged.

(5) Concealed Observation Post (Skrytyy Post Nabludeniya-SPN)

The composition and duties of the SPN patrol were the same as those of the PN patrol, except that it was concealed right on the border, and its field of observation was primarily the area directly across the border. The post was occupied from daybreak to after dusk.

(6) Ambush Patrol (Zasada--Z)

It consisted of five or more armed border guards on foot, designated to apprehend border violators, acting on a previously received warning, which gave the place and time of possible border violation. In addition to the standard equipment, the members of the Z patrol carried knives. The Z patrol was composed of an officer or an experienced NCO and a dog-handler with a dog, who formed the nucleus (yadro), and three or more guards, who formed the apprehending force (gruppa zakhvata--GZ).

In setting up the ambush, the GZ was deployed and concealed along the expected route of approach of the viclator, and the nucleus concealed itself about 30 m behind the GZ. The GZ maintained communications with the nucleus by visual means in daytime, and by pull-signals on a rope at night. While the GZ made the apprehension as quietly as possible, the nucleus was on the alert for possible accomplices of the violator, and was in position to give assistance to the GZ if needed. The ambush was organized as much as possible within the forbidden border strip in order to obtain full proof of intention of the violator to defect.

(7) Screening Patrol (Zaslon-ZL)

It consisted of eight or more armed guards, designated to seal off penetrated areas within the forbidden border zone and strip.

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The ZL was always commanded by a Border Troop officer. Its strength could vary from several to several hundred men, and it could be reinforced by regular military units, temporarily attached to Border Troop operations. In such a case, the military troops were under the command of the senior Border Troop officer. The ZL used its own personnel to organize the various patrols (D, PG, S, ChO) necessary to accomplish the mission. The operation was coordinated by means of R-105 radios and signal flares.

(8) Search Party (Poiskovaya Gruppa--PG)

This patrol consisted of three or more guards, designated to search within the forbidden border zone and strip for a border violator. It was mounted or on foot, or both, depending on the terrain, and consisted of a dog-handler with a dog (instruktor rozisknoy sobaki--IRS), who was the point; and two or more guards deployed parallel to the left and right flanks of the IRS.

(9) Special Guard (Chasovoy u osobogo obyekta-Ch0)

This was a single sentry posted to guard a special object. For example, if a border violator discarded a parcel or any other article during his escape, the patrol commander posted a ChO to safeguard the object until an officer arrived and removed it.

(10) Sentinel (Chasovoy-Ch)

This was a single, armed guard posted to routine sentinel duty, such as guarding a bridge or a Klem M fence crossing point.

(11) Barrier Sentinel (Chasovoy Shlagbauma-ChSh)

This was a single, armed guard, designated to control traffic into the border strip. He had to be well versed in recognition of documents and the technique of searching cars, trucks and cargo which entered or departed the forbidden zone.

(12) Outpost Sentinel (Chasovoy Zastavy--ChZ)

The ChZ was a single, armed guard designated to guard the outpost. In daylight hours he was posted on the outpost tower and performed the duties described for the PN patrol. At night he walked his post on the ground near the tower, keeping alert and giving telephone reports of flare signals, approaching vehicles and personnel, including departing and arriving border patrols.

(13) Border Convoy (Pogranichnyy Konvoy-PK)

The patrol consisted of two or more armed guards (the number always exceeded by one the number of escorted persons), designated to escort apprehended violators to the Komendatura or detachment headquarters. The senior guard was responsible for the apprehended person or persons and for all the belongings found on him, as listed on a jointly prepared inventory. All apprehended persons were handcuffed before being removed from the zone.

(14) Border Post Office (Pogranichnaya Pochta--PP)

The patrol consisted of two or more armed EM, designated to pick up and deliver regular mail and official (including classified) communications. The guards were instructed to destroy the contents of the pouch at all costs, rather than to allow them to fall into unauthorized hands as a result of attack or emergency.

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b. Charge of Quarters (Dezhurnyy po Zastave--DZh)

The duties of the DZh were considered the most important in the outpost. Only the best sergeants and the best-qualified third-year men were assigned to it. The duty was for 12 hours; however, the DZh was required to be thoroughly familiar with all the operational, training and administrative functions of the outpost for a 24-hour period, starting with his first hour of duty. His duties included: to wake up each member of a patrol 30 minutes before duty time; to issue each EM the equipment, ammunition and supplies necessary for performing the specific patrol duty; to bring the patrols to the duty officer for orders and to be present at the time orders were given; to dispatch the patrols and to admit them into the outpost upon completion of their tour of duty; to know the number, type, location and personnel of patrols on duty and those to be posted, including their mission, length of duty and march routes; to know at all times the number of reserve horses and dogs off duty; to make a physical inventory of all operational equipment; to follow the training schedule diligently and get the proper personnel to the proper place at the proper time; to know the whereabouts of all the officers and personnel off duty; to make a telephone report every 4 hours to the DZh at higher headquarters

to receive all messages, 50X1-HUM log them, and bring them to the attention of the duty officer; to receive from border guards reports on the sighting of any aircraft in the vicinity of the border, and to telephone the information to the radar section (lokatornyy post), to receive from all border patrols periodic (about every hour) telephone reports; to furnish, on request, operational information and instructions to border patrols.

c. Duty Instrument Operator (dezhurnyy u apparata--DA)

A school-trained signalman was designated to operate the console of the Klen M or S-100 signaling fence (see Annexes B-2 and C-2). He maintained a journal in which he registered all alarms signaled by the fence; reported the incidents to the DZh; and entered in a logbook explanations of the alarm, as reported by the patrol designated to check the disturbance. He was on duty 6 hours, rested 6 hours, was on duty again for 6 hours, then rested 24 hours.

- 4. Commanders' Decisions and Orders
  - a. Detachment Commander

All operational activities of a Border Troop unit were initiated by the commander's order. The commander of the detachment, being familiar with the requirements from the district (Okrug) headquarters and knowing the overall picture of the sector of his responsibility, determined the necessary security measures to be employed by each of his subordinate units. His decision was expressed to the subordinate commanders through one of his staff officers, who personally visited the subordinate headquarters and wrote the commander's orders into the unit's Border Troop Service Book (kniga pogranichnoy sluzhby), classified secret. The border situation was reviewed by the detachment commander every 15 days, at which time new orders were issued.

A typical detachment commander's order read as follows:

"The borders of the USSR will be guarded in a <u>normal</u> manner. The greatest number of patrols will be posted during hours of darkness between 2300 hours and 0400 hours. The most likely area of the border violation is the Ilidzha and the Kizyl Kaya Valley, and the Idralum Ford, which will be covered with S-2 devices and dogs. The KSP will be inspected no less than twice during a 24-hour period, once before the hours of darkness and once at daybreak." The detachment commander could specify in the first paragraph of his order that the border would be guarded <u>stringently</u> (usilno). Such an order was issued in emergencies, when it was known from intelligence information

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that, for example, son factory, prisoners had agent would attempt a	newhere in the USSR a wo i broken out of confinen crossing.	orker had disappeared : ment, or a suspected f	from a secret oreign	
during the season of of from 5 to 9 November. the intensified travel	routine, the border was official Soviet holidays It was believed that, of the population, and the during holidays, the	s, from 28 April to 6 l because of the holida l a natural tendency of	May, and y celebrations, f the guards	
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guarding for a maximum	commander, on his own of 5 days; the Komenda 24 hours. The border	ture commander for 3	dayes and the	 HUI
b. Outpost Co		,		
border situation every	ng his own orders, the er as minimum guidance. 24 hours, and wrote hi utpost commander was as	He made an evaluations order daily by 1800	on of the	
"I decided	to guard the border of	the USSR in a normal	manner:	
l. T most likely border vio	o employ the maximum nu lation, which I conside	mber of patrols on the r to be from Border Ma	sector of arker	
to grid square on to 0500 hours.	he left, during the hou	rs of darkness from 23	300 hours 50X1-H	HUN
2. To patrols at night and w	o guard the above-menti	oned critical terrain ime.	with eight	
3. To night and two patrols	o guard the remainder of in daytime.	f the sector with four	patrols at	
4. To inspect the KSP once at	o inspect the KSP by use t daybreak and once befo	e of ChG and D, each pore hours of darkness.	atrol to	
5. In cover each of the two m service dogs.	n daytime to guard the host likely routes of ap	porder with PN and SPN pproach with one S-2 d	, and to evice and	
6. To	employ the civilian ir	formore in	e at 50X1-l	
their place of duty.	ompley the civilian in	normers in grid squar	eat 50X1-F	HUN

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8. To use one truck and all available horses for posting the patrols.

9. To keep one vehicle as standby."

After the outpost commander made the decision on how to guard the border and wrote it in the unit's Border Troop Service Book, he prepared a detailed plan of action and entered it in the operations logbook (chernovik). In the plan, he designated the types of patrols and equipment to be employed and the exact time and sector to be patrolled, and assigned personnel by name to each duty. In selecting the men for a specific duty, he kept in mind their reliability, efficiency and experience. As a rule the reliable 2d- and 3d-year men were assigned as the patrol commanders, while the unseasoned lst-year men and unreliable 2d- and 3d-year men were assigned as basics. Also, by regulation, a man could not be assigned twice in a row to the same type of patrol, to the same area, for the same hours of duty and with the same partner. Even though, for garrison duty and telephone purposes each member of the outpost had a code number assigned according to rank (the commanding officer was assigned the numberal 1), in operational orders and border duty only the full name of the man was used.

#### c. Duty Officer

All the patrols were dispatched by order of the duty officer, who personally inspected each man going on duty and asked him whether he was able to perform his duty. Following the inspection, the duty officer repeated to the patrol the outpost commander's over-all plan (decision) to guard the border, then issued a direct order to the patrol similar to the following:

"I order you to perform your duty to guard the border of the USSR, as D patrol on the left sector of the outpost. Your mission on the way to your post, as well as at your post, will be to prevent unauthorized disturbance of the state's border, either from the side of the neighboring country or from our rear. Your route march: from the outpost, horse-mounted, move directly toward the KSP and start inspecting it for tracks from the sector division-point (razryv) to the junction with the adjacent outpost. In the event of uncovering tracks on the KSP immediately notify the outpost, by two means and study the clearly-made imprints to determine the course of the violator. If the tracks indicate that the violator is headed toward the border, pursue him up to the border line. If the tracks indicate penetration into the rear, pursue him until apprehended or destroyed. If the violator disregards your orders, use your weapons in accordance with the 195th article of the Service Regulations for a Border Patrol (Instruktsiya Sluzhby Pogranichnogo Naryada-ISPN). Establish contact and cooperate with ChG patrol (names given), and the S patrol (names given). Contact the outpost by telephone and by flare signals. The password for the day is "Mushka" "Murmansk." When challenged, your identification sign will be your weapon raised vertically at your right hand. You challenge by raising your left hand horizontally, holding your weapon in a horizontal position. Your identification mark for crossing the KSP will be a letter T made of three imprints of your weapon's butt, enclosed in a square-Do you have any questions?" If there were no questions, the duty officer required the patrol commander to repeat the commanding officer's decision and the direct order, then he released the patrol with the mandatory words, 'Carry out the orders.'"

### d. Patrol Commander

The patrol commander was fully responsible for the fulfillment of the patrol's mission. He was also responsible for the functioning of all equipment, weapons and ammunition; and for the health and performance of men, horses and dogs in his charge.

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As soon as the patrol commander received his orders, he assigned his subordinates their duties. The briefing covered the march route to take, the distance to be kept between them, the speed of movement, visual signals to be used in emergencies, where and what to observe (divided fields of observation), actions to take in case of discovery of a border violation, and actions to take on apprehension of the violator. Upon completion of the tour of duty, the patrol commander made an oral report to the duty officer.
5. Password and Signs
The challenge (propusk) and the reply (otzyv) of the password for the day was fixed by the detachment commander. The challenge was always a component part of a weapon; the reply was, as a rule, the name of a city or, rarely, the name of a river which started with the same letter as the challenge word. The procedure for challenging and replying was as follows:
Challenger: "Propusk!"
Challenged: "Boyek (striker), otzyv?"
Challenger: "Biysk"
Other means of mutual identification were recognition signs, such as those described in the duty officer's orders; and, in the darkness, a pattern of taps on the stock of a weapon (e.g., two taps for challenge; three taps for reply).
6. Signal Communications
A telephone communications line, suspended from telephone poles which ran parallel to and in the proximity of KSP, was the primary means of communication between the patrol and the outpost headquarters. Every 300 or 400 m a telephone pole had a telephone receptacle, which received a male plug attached to a telephone handset and made connection with the switchboard at the outpost headquarters. (For
The secondary means of communication was the pistol flare. The standard flare signals were as follows:
a. One green: violation in the direction of the border
b. One red and one green: violation in the direction of the rear
c. Two green: send out the reserves
d. One red: help (sickness or accident)
e. One red, one green and one white: cease all activities and return to base

- f. One green, one white, and one green: send officer to the border
- g. One white and one green: Plug into the telephone net
- h. One white: illumination only (used as a matter of routine)

### 7. Dogs

There were four dogs One of them 50X1-HUM was a trailing dog; the remainder were duty dogs. Each had his own instructor,

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and all were trained as teams at a 9-month course in a dog-handling school in STALINABAD. All dogs were trained not to bark at all and to attack a man from behind, knocking him to the ground. Four times a week they were taken out for training, during which a soldier was designated to traverse a 10-km course, making turns and leaps in an attempt to confuse the dog. The soldier wore protective clothing, and at the end of the exercise allowed himself to be attacked and captured by the dog.

#### 8. Alerts

a. Border Violation Alert

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of normal duty, there were many false alerts activated by jumpy guards on the border The most frequent causes for the false alerts were meandering animals which walked into the Klen M signaling fence, or which in the dark were mistaken for a violator.

When an alert was received, the DZh sounded the alarm, "to arms" (v ruzhe), and, on that command, everybody available at the outpost hastily dressed in the usual duty uniform; was issued arms, 50 rounds of ammunition, a flare pistol and flares, a flashlight, first-aid packet, and a telephone handset; and then fell into a formation. The cavalry soldiers saddled up and formed cavalry squads. The duty officer then organized the patrols and assigned each a specific mission. The "v ruzhe" alerts were of short duration and were called off as soon as the disturbance was explained, usually before the unit had a chance to deploy.

### b. Alert for Enemy Attack

"To battle" (k boyu) was the command given in the event of an enemy attack across the border. Immediately on that command, every soldier, regardless of his state of dress, seized his weapon, 50 rounds of ammunition, a gas mask, and an entrenching tool, and ran to his predesignated battle station on the defensive perimeter of the outpost. The alert was practiced rarely, but one paragraph in the orders for the day, posted on the bulletin board, contained the assignment of personnel to battle stations. The assignments were permanent.

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#### c. Unidentified Aircraft Alert

"Air attack" (vozdukh) was the command given in the event of the presence of an unidentified aircraft in the area. The alert was executed exactly as the "k boyu," except that everybody donned masks. The alert was seldom called.

### d. Fire Alarms

The fire alarm (pozhar) was usually called by a visiting staff officer from the detachment headquarters, who wanted to test the unit's alertness. On command, the troops, as they were, occupied predesignated fire stations, where they picked up the fire-fighting equipment, consisting of water buckets, shovels and axes.

#### 9. Border Violations

#### a. Apprehension Procedures

When a patrol saw a border violator, the observation was first signaled by a flare, then reported by telephone to the outpost headquarters.

15

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If the patrol was in a position to intercept the violator, the junior guard intercepted, while the senior guard covered the operation with his weapon, keeping on the alert for possible accomplices of the violator. Upon being captured, the violator was required to hold his hands up while the guard searched him for weapons. Next, he was handcuffed and required to lie face down. While the prisoner was watched by the junior guard, the senior guard searched the immediate area for accomplices or discarded documents and other items. The prisoner was kept at the place of capture until the outpost reserve party, consisting of an officer, a dog-handler with a dog, and three or more men arrived. After a detailed search of the vicinity of capture, the reserve party escorted the prisoner to the outpost headquarters, where he was kept in the dog kennel under armed guard, until a representative from the detachment headquarters arrived to take him away. As a rule the violator was first interrogated at the detachment headquarters.

The members of the patrol capturing the border violator were rewarded with a 10-day home leave plus travel time, or were given an achievement button (otlichnyy pogranichnik).

	b. Examples of a Border Search	
		50X1-HUM
	shortly after midnight, the Klen M fence signaled a disturbance. Since a similar disturbance.	nce,
an hour	earlier in the opposite sector flank, had proved to have been caused	hv

the Klen M fence signaled a disturbance. Since a similar disturbance an hour earlier in the opposite sector flank, had proved to have been caused by a porcupine, the young and inexperienced duty officer did not react with the required urgency. He liesurely dispatched a PG patrol to investigate. In the meantime, the ChG patrol discovered the violator's trail on the plowed strip; fired one green star, which the PN patrol mistock for the illuminating star and did not telephone the PZh; and, in the excitement, failed to notify the outpost by telephone, which delayed considerably the sounding of the alarm, "To arms."

The ChG patrol traced the violator to a hay shed, where they lost his tracks. They assumed he was hiding in the hay and started a systematic combing of the shed. After searching the shed twice without result, they were still wondering about the disappearance of the violator, when the PG patrol arrived. The dog, although confused for awhile by all the tracks made by the guards, finally found the trail and indicated that the violator was not in the hay shed. It was at this point that the outpost was telephoned, and the general alarm was sounded throughout the detachment.

At the point of penetration, the border strip was about 15 km wide. Since the terrain was mountainous and rugged, the detachment commander assumed that the violator could not reach the border by daylight and, therefore, ordered maximum screening patrols (ZL) to be deployed on the border. With daylight, helicopters and light aircraft joined the search without results. By afternoon the detachment was informed by Moscow Border Troop headquarters that a military unit from the Ashkhabad garrison (element of an unidentified infantry division) was attached to the detachment to support the operation. The joint effort directed by the detachment commander lasted 6 days and produced no results. On the sixth day, the operation was called off by the Border Troop headquarters in MOSCOW. The military unit, allegedly 2000 men strong, returned to the garrison. The Border Troops, however, on orders from the

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detachment commander, remained in the field enother day and captured exhausted and seriously injured violator in the mountains at about 06 hours The prisoner was evacuated helicopter to the Ashkhabad Military Hospital.	00	50X1-HUN
The prisoner was reportedly a 21-year-old White Russian, an unidentified nationalistic White Russian underground center (podpotsentr, or anti-Sovetskiy tsentr), who was allegedly dispatched with intelligence information Allegedly, a list of Soviet air bincluding the number of aircraft and personnel, was recovered, plus a and a map of the border where the crossing was attempted.	lnyy military ases,	<b>f</b> 50X1-HUN
Other Dender Wester		50X1-HUM
c. Other Border Violations		
There were only four other incidents of border violations took place in the sector of the 8th Outpost, 18th Detachment, between 1959. Allegedly, two of the violations were into the USSR, unknown, and were never solved. In 1957, two Russian criminal prison attempted to cross on the right flank of the outpost's sector	1945 and year ers	50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM
both were apprehended shortly after crossing the plowed strip.	•	
the Border Troops were alerted to the	subversive	50X1-HUM
activities of the local population. resistance centers	for	50X1-HUM
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belorussian SSR. In southwestern Sib Furkmenia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and the Caucasus, the local tribe formed resistance centers, and the members, called by the Soviets "the Mussavotisti," were dedicated to anti-Soviet and anti-Communist movem. The political officers insisted that the centers could not possibly exithout outside, foreign help. Therefore, they had to be considered and andled as enemies of the USSR.	s also e ents. xist	
C. OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF OUTPOSTS	5	0X1-HUM
1. Operational Deployment of the 8th Outpost, 18th Detachment (Secondary the organization of the security measures in	ee Annex D	
a. General Information		
The 8th Outpost occupied a very important location, in the serrain in its sector was mountainous and rugged and formed many natural exercises of approach, and the nearness of ASHKHABAD, a non-restricted of exchiming gorod), served the border crossers in both directions as a content of departure. The outpost straddled a major land-croute the Gaudanskoye Shosse, and had at its termination at corder-traffic checkpoint (KPP), operated by the personnel of the 18th lent headquarters.	ral city (ne- convenient cossing	50X1-HUM
The outpost headquarters was in the center of its sector and audanskoye Shosse, almost adjacent to the S-100 and Klen M signaling the passage over the Gaudanskoye Shosse was barred, first by a road be controlled by a barrier sentinel (ChSh), and then by three consecutive controlled gates, one at each of the two signaling fences and one at the state of th	fences. errier	
The outpost installation did not have its customary observe ower because of its proximity to the security fences and because of the elatively short length of the sector. The sector was 7.2 km long and ivided into two flanks: the left, 3.8 km long, and the right, 3.4 km ach flank was equipped with a wooden observation tower. The dividing	he l was	

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(razryv) was at a deep ravine, called "Boba 30," with rocky, vertical walls about 150 m high. As one approached the border from the USSR side, an S-100 signaling fence constituted the first security measure. About 20 m beyond and parallel to it was the Klen M signaling fence. Beyond the Klen M, and at irregular distances from it, was the plowed strip, which covered about 3 km of the critical center sector with double, plowed strips, and the remainder of the sector with a single plowed strip. Between the far limits of the plowed strip and the border there was about 15 km of very rugged mountainous terrain, which was occasionally patrolled, but otherwise was not secured. The main effort of the outpost was directed toward securing its sector in the vicinity of the signaling fences and the plowed strip.

b. Typical Employment and Scheduling of the Border Patrols (See Annex D for graphic illustration)

#### (1) Left Flank

It started in the center of the outpost's sector, where there was a physical break in the security devices, and ran to the limits of the adjacent outpost.

- (a) One D Patrol, with duty from dusk to dawn, patrolled the entire left flank on the far side of the plowed strip.
- (b) Two PN Patrols, with duty from dawn to dusk, occupied the left tower. The period of duty was divided equally between the two patrols, and only one was required during the winter months when the hours of daylight were short.
- (c) Two ChG Patrols patrolled one-half of the left flank between the plowed strip and Klen M signaling fence; one had duty from 2000 hours to 0300 hours; the other from 0100 hours to 0700 hours.
- (d) Two ChG Patrols for the other half of the left flank between the plowed strip and Klen M Signaling fence; one had duty from 2100 hours to 0400 hours; the other from 0200 hours to 0800 hours.

#### (2) Right Flank

It started at the break and ran to the limits of the adjacent outpost.

- (a) One D Patrol, with duty from dusk to dawn, patrolled the entire right flank, on the far side of the plowed strip.
- (b) Two PN Patrols, with duty from dawn to dask divided equally between them, occupied the right tower. During winter months, when daylight was short, only one patrol was required.
- (c) Two ChG Patrols for one-half of the flank, between the plowed strip and Klen M; one had duty from 2000 hours to 0300 hours; the other from 0100 hours to 0700 hours.
- (d) Two ChG Patrols for the other half of the flank, between the plowed strip and Klen M; one had duty from 2100 hours to 0400 hours; the other from 0200 hours to 0800 hours.

### (3) In Front of the Outpost

(a) One D Patrol: duty from 0800 hours to 1600 hours, to patrol the Boba 30 ravine to a designated point.

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50X1-HUM

- (b) One S Patrol with S-2 device, to patrol the Boba 30 ravine in a designated area. The hours of duty were 2200 to 0400 hours.
- (c) One D Patrol, consisting of 10 EM, was assigned for 10 days' duty to patrol the border line itself in daylight hours only and to act as ZL in emergencies. The patrol stayed in a digcut built at the point where the Bobs 30 ravine approached the border line.
  - (4) In the Rear of the Outpost

 $\,$  There was one D Patrol, with duty from 1400 hours to 1900 hours, to patrol the ZPZ.

2. Operational Deployment of the 17th Outpost, 67th Detachment (See Annex E for the organization of security measures in the sector) 50X1-HUM

#### a. General Information

The outpost occupied uninhabited desert terrain, far away from populated areas, where the nomadic Turkmen shepherds (chabany) only occasionally grazed their sheep and donkeys. There were no roads there 50X1-HUM were no legal border-crossing points and no known incidents of border violation. The outpost's sector was 21 km ong and had no security fences or physical obstacles in its entire length. The plowed strip was the only violation-detection device employed. The border in the sector was marked from right to left (west to east) by border marker 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM between each two main border markers there were three intermediate markers,

The outpost headquarters was in open terrain, about 4 km south of a dirt road running from KARA-KALA to KIZYL ATREK. At an arbitrary point in the KSP, the sector was divided by a break (razryv) into a 12-km-long right flank, and a 9-km-long left flank.

b. Typical Employment and Scheduling of the Border Patrols (See Annex E for graphic illustration)

#### (1) Left Flank

- (a) Two D (cavalry) patrols were assigned the left flank of the border line and the entire left flank on the south side of the plowed strip: One had duty from 1600 hours to 2400 nours; the other from 0300 hours to 1000 hours.
- (b) One ChG Patrol, with duty from 2100 hours to 0400 hours, patrolled one-half of the flank on the north side of the plowed strip.
- (c) One ChG Patrol, with duty from 2230 hours to 0530 hours, patrolled the other half of the flank on the north side of the plowed strip. This sector, being the more distant, was posted by a track.
- (d) One S Patrol with S-2 device, on duty from 2100 hours to 0400 hours, patrolled the Ilidzha Valley.
- (e) Two PN Patrols occupied the left tower; one had duty from 0500 hours to 1300 hours; the other from 1300 hours to 1900 hours. They were posted by vehicle.
- (f) One S Patrol with only a watchdog patrolled the wooden bridge over the Sumbar River, situated to the left rear. He was on duty from 2330 hours to 0430 hours.

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(2) Right Flank	
(a) Two D (cavalry) patrols were assigned to the r of the border line and the entire right flank on the south side of t strip. One had duty from 1600 hours to 2400 hours, the other from 0 to 1000 hours.	he plowed
(b) One ChG Patrol, with duty from 2100 hours to 0 patrolled one-half of the flank on the north side of the plowed stri	400 hours,
(c) One ChG Patrol, with duty from 2200 hours to O hours, patroled the other half of the flank on the north side of the strip. They were posted by truck.	500 plowed
(d) One S Patrol with an S-2 device, on duty from hours to 0500 hours, patrolled the Kizyl Kaya Valley.	2200
(e) Two PN Patrols occupied the right tower; one h. from 0530 hours to 1300 hours, the other from 1300 hours to 2000 hours.	rs.
(f) One SPN Patrol. with duty from dawn to dusk, we by truck to a point within 4 border, from where they infiltrated the secret positions on foot.	as posted km.of the
(3) In Front of the Outpost	
The observation tower in front of the outpost was made 24 hours by four PN patrols which rotated every 6 hours, starting at hours. During the hours of darkness, the patrol walked the post on in the vicinity of the tower and the outpost installations.	2200
(4) In the Rear of the Outpost	
One D Patrol, with duty from 1500 hours to 1900 hour the rear (ZPZ).	
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
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Annex A		

THE TULSKIY ZABOR BARBED-WIRE FENCE, USED
BY SOVIET BORDER TROOPS ON THE USSR BORDER (Not Drawn to Scale)

50X1-HUM



### Legend:

- 1. Wooden posts with Y extensions on top
- 2. Ordinary barbed wire
- 3. Concertina barbed wire entanglement net


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Annex B

50X1-HUM

THE KLEN M SIGNALING FENCE OBSTACLE USED BY THE 8TH OUTPOST, 18TH DETACHMENT, YABLONDOVSKIY, TURKMEN, USSR (Not Drawn to Scale)



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23

50X1-HUM

Legend to Annex B

#### Figure 1

- 1. Vertical wooden posts about 10 cm in diameter and 2 m high
- 2. Barbed-wire guy lines used on the outside to support vertical posts
- 3. Diagonal posts, 10 cm in diameter, which were driven into the ground on one end and fastened to the vertical posts at the other end. They were only used at the end of each section (about 400 m to a section). Each of the intermediate vertical posts was supported by a strand of barbed wire (guy line, Item 4), which was fastened to short stakes driven into the ground (Item 5).
- 4. Guy lines (inside) used to keep the vertical posts straight
- 5. Anchor stakes
- 6. Horizontal strands of barbed wire which were fastened to the diagonal posts at the end of the sections (Item 3) and supported by the inside guy wires (Item 4). There were 11 of the barbed wires and they were spaced at about 15 cm intervals. Woven strands of barbed wire (Item 7) were under and over horizontal strands making a wire mesh. The woven strands of barbed wire formed squares about 15 cm on a side.
- 7. Woven strands of barbed wire
- 8. Electric wire, about 3 mm in diameter. Each side of the Klen M fence had one such wire, which conducted a low electric current. Attached to the wires were vibrators (Item 9) and producers (Item 10).
- 9. Electric vibrator (For detailed description see Item 5, Annex B-1.)
- 10. Producer. it signaled the control board (see Annex B-2) in case of break in the wire (Item 8).

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
11. Barbed wire fastened to the vertical posts to prevent animals from disturbing the barbed-wire mesh fastened to the diagonal posts, which activated the vibrator. There were 10 strands, 15 cm between strands, of barbed wire on the vertical posts on each side of the Klen M.

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Annex Bl

THE ELECTRIC DEVICE CALLED
THE VIERATOR USED ON KLEN M SIGNALING FENCE BY
THE 8TH OUTPOST, 18TH DETACHMENT, YABLONOVSKIY,
TURKMEN SSR (Not Drawn to Scale)

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Legend to Annex B-1


- Steel rod connected with one of the strands of barbed wire and holding the vibrator in position
- 2. Electric control wire to which the vibrator was attached
- 3. Plastic cover
- 4. Contacts
- 5. Liquid mercury. When the barbed wire (Item 7) was disturbed, it disturbed the attached vibrator (if one barbed wire was disturbed, the whole wire system vibrated with it because the wires were interwoven into a net), the liquid mercury moved up the channel (Item 6), touched both contacts (Item 4), and closed the circuit in the apparatus. This activated the battery-powered control board in the operations room at the outpost, to indicate the area of disturbance.
- 6. Channel for liquid mercury
- 7. Barbed wire

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Annex B-2	

THE KLEN M SIGNALING FENCE CONTROL BOARD

USED BY THE 8TH OUTPOST, 18TH DETACHMENT, YABLONOVSKIY,

TURKMEN SSR (Not Drawn to Scale)



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Legend to Annex B-2

- Small green light. It worked in conjunction with the electric apparatus called the producer. If the electric wire on either flank was cut or broken, the light lighted up.
- 3. Voltmeter showing the strength of the battery in the control board
- 4. Meter showing the 10 sections (about 400 m in a section) on both the right and left flank, designated by LF and PF. It worked in conjunction with the electric apparatus called the vibrator (see Annex B-1).
- 5. Push buttons (recall, otboy). The buttons were used to cancel the actions on the right or left side of the control board. Once the lights came on indicating a border violation, they would not go off until the button for the appropriate flank was pushed.

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Annex C

THE S-100 SIGNALING FENCE USED ALONG
THE SOVIET-IRANIAN BORDER BY THE STH OUTFOST, 18TH DETACHMENT
AT YABLONOVSKIY, TURKMEN SSR (Not Drawn to Scale)

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Legend to Annex C

- 1. Posts, 10 cm in diameter, spaced 3 m apart
- 2. A total of 24 strands of barbed wire, spaced at 10 cm apart, of which three strands were underground
- Extension arm (see insert). This portion of the fence would break off under a weight of 45 kg or more and cut wire Nr 21.
- 4. Block (see Annex C-1). Within a section of an outpost was a total of 20 blocks, spaced 300 to 400 m from each other, depending on the length of the secured sector: ten secured the left flank and were numbered "left" 1 through 10; ten secured the right flank, and were numbered "right" 1 through 10. Each block was connected by wire with the 1st, 4th, 7th, 14th, 17th and 21st wires of the S-100 fence. The block was designated to register any change in current resistance in the numbered wires mentioned above, caused by grounding contact, by contact between them and the uncharged wires (Nrs 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 22d, 23d, and 24th); and by cutting the 21st wire by sheering action of the broken extension arm of the fence.

Each block was wired into a cable running parallel to the fence, which was connected in the center with the control board in the outpost head-quarters. Each block had a corresponding light signal on the control board (see Annex C-2).

50X1-HUM SECRET 50X1-HUM THE APPARATUS CALLED THE BLOCK, USED 50X1-HUM IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE S-100 BARBED-WIRE OBSTACLE, BY THE 8TH OUTPOST, 18TH DETACHMENT, YABLONOVSKIY, TURKMEN, SSR (Not Drawn to Scale)

#### Legend:

#### Figure 1

1. Button. Once the block was installed and the cover (Figure 2, Item 1) screwed into it, the block could not be tampered with: If an attempt was made to unscrew the cover, the button (held down by the cover) sprang and signaled the control board. The control board also indicated when any of the wires attached to the block was cut.

BASE

- 2. Mass of wires (unknown use)
- Base of block

### Figure 2

- 1. Cover of block
- Base of block
- 3. Ground

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM


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Annex C-2

50X1-HUM

THE CONTROL BOARD WHICH WORKED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE S-100 SIGNALING FENCE, USED BY THE 9TH OUTPOST, 18TH DETACHMENT, AT YABLONOVSKIY, TURKMEN, SSR (Not Drawn to Scale)



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
Legend to Annex C-2

- Control lamp. The light flashed on and off when the control board was operating properly.
- 2. Two ampmeters, one for the right flank and one for the left flank of the sector
- 3. Signal lights for the left flank (lyevyy flang--IF) and for the right flank (pravyy flang--PF). When one of the lights signaled it, it meant that there was a fence disturbance on the indicated flank.
- 4. Scale. Each number ocrresponded to a block section of the signaling fence; 10 numbers on the left for the left flank, and 10 on the right for the right flank. Whenever there was a disturbance within a block sector, a correspondingly numbered light indicated the block's section and flank.
- 5. Signal light, which indicated that the 1st, 4th, 7th, 11th, 14th, 17th or 21st wire had been cut. At the same time a light under an appropriate number on the scale (Item 4) lighted up, pinpointing the section and the flank in which the wire had been cut.
- Counter. It registered each disturbance consecutively by number. The duty NCO had to enter the number in his log, giving a full explanation of the disturbance and what actions were taken by the outpost.
- 7. Switch. There was a switch for each flank, which was used to neutralize the alarm. If, for example, there was a violation on the left flank, the lights on the left of the board remained lit until the switch on that side of the board (Item 7) was pushed. Then the board returned to normal.

50X1-HUM


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### Legend to Annex D (page 34)

1.	Gaudanskoye shosse from ASHKHABAD bituminous wearing course, about 6 m wide, and had 2 m shoulders without drainage ditches. There were many sharp curves and steep grades, but the highway was passable to truck traffic. The surface course appeared to be in good condition.	50X1-HUM
2.	8th Outpost Headquarters	
3.	S-100 signaling fence (see Annex C ran along the entire length of the outpost's sector and extended into the adjacent outposts' sectors.	50X1-HUM
4.	Klen M signaling fence (see Annex B . It ran along the entire length of the outpost's sector and extended into the adjacent outposts' sectors.	50X1-HUM
<ol> <li>6.</li> </ol>	Telephone lines. The telephone lines were installed on wooden poles about 15 cm in diameter, about 6 m high, and spaced about 60 m apart. Source could not describe the telephone wire. The entire telephone net was divided into sections and numbered. A section of the net was about 400 m long and had one telephone pole wired with a telephone receptacle. A border guard on duty carried a headset which, when plugged into the receptacle, enabled him to converse with the outpost headquarters or if necessary, by having the call switched, to the komendatura and detachment headquarters. The telephone lines ran along the entire length of the outpost's sector between the plowed strip and Klen M fence. The net connected the outpost headquarters with the road barrier; with the left and right flank observation towers; with the D patrol dugout  Plowed strip (KSP). A strip of land, about 12 m wide, was plowed by horses after each rainfall or at least once a week. The strip followed as much as possible open and flat country along the entire length of the	<sup>а</sup> 50Х1-НИМ
	The center of the section, containing a road junction and critical natural avenues of approach, was screened by a double strip. The authorized crossing points were over the roads (guarded by a Ch). The plowed strip extended in both directions into the section of the adjacent outposts, and was marked at both limits by a concertina wire entanglement laid across it.	
7.	Dirt road about 3 m wide leading from the outpost headquarters through the Boba 30 ravine	50X1-HUM
8.	200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200	JOX 1-HOIVI
	Usual location of the S Patrol using S-2 device	JOX 1-HOW
9.		30X1-110W
9. 10.	Usual location of the S Patrol using S-2 device	50X1-HUM
	Usual location of the S Patrol using S-2 device Location of the dugout housing a 10-man detail	



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35
Legend to Annex E (page 36)

- 1. A net of dirt roads and trails, passable to vehicular traffic
- 2. Old shepherds' camp
- 3. Single-span, timber trestle flat deck bridge across the Sumbar River
- 4. Fords
- 5. Wooden observation tower on the left flank
- 6. Plowed strip (KSP). The strip averaged 12 m in width, but in rocky terrain it narrowed in places to about 8 m.
- 7. Telephone line. The telephone communication net ran parallel to the plowed strip along its entire length, then branched off to the two flanking observation towers and to the secret observation post on the border. The headquarters had wire communications with the two komendatury and with the 67th Detachment headquarters.
- 8. Location of the SPN, a camouflaged dugout for two men
- 9. USSR border markers 50X1-HUM
- 10. The Ilidzha Valley. A dirt road about 6 m wide ran through the valley

  The road was rarely used by the shepherds
  who, by special permission issued by the outpost commander, on occasion
  grazed their sheep in the valley.


50X1-HUM

11. Cave. It served regularly as a rendezvous area

The S patrol operating in the valley was not posted on days when the meetings took place.


12. Authorized plowed strip crossing point

- 13. Dividing point of the sector (razryv). The post (Ch) was manned 24 hours.
- 14. Location of the searchlight. The searchlight was operated by signalmen from the 67th Detachment headquarters. It swept the rolling terrain of the Kizyl Kaya valley, a natural route of approach.
- 15. Kizyl Kaya Valley
- 16. 17th Outpost Headquarters




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
50X1-HUM



#### Main Border Marker



#### Intermediate Border Marker



#### Legend:

#### Main Border Marker

- 1. Wire point to keep birds off the post.
- 2. USSR national emblem and number of the post, e.g., 179
- 3. Red stripe alternating
- 4. Green stripe alternating

The post was concrete, about 20 x 20 cm and 180 cm high. The posts were spaced at 7.5 km apart.

#### Intermediate Border Marker

There were three intermediate border markers for each main marker. The markers were about 20 x 20 cm and 30 cm high. They were painted white and carried the numeral of the main border marker over the consecutive intermediate numbers from 1 through 3, e.g  $\frac{179}{1}$ ,  $\frac{179}{2}$  and  $\frac{179}{3}$ .



50X1-HUM

SECRET

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Annex G

A GUARD TOWER USED ALONG THE

SOVIET-AFGHANISTAN BORDER (Not Drawn to Scale)

### Legend:

- 1. A frame observation booth with observation windows on four sides
- 2. A wooden platform about 5 x 5 m
- 3. Wooden or wood and metal observation tower

The height varied depending on terrain and desired field of observation.

4. Wooden ladder

50X1-HUM

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50X1-HUM

SECRET 39

50X1-HUM

Annex H

THE TELEPHONE HANDSET USED BY THE SOVIET BORDER TROOPS (Not Drawn to Scale)


50X1-HUM

PRESS to TALK
BUTTON

JACK

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM SECRET 50X1-HUM 40 Annex H-1 THE P-192 SWITCHBOARD USED AT THE 50X1-HUM SHARLOUK POST, USSR (Not Drawn to Scale)



### Legend:

- 1. Operation jack
- 2. Ten jacks
- 3. Ten receptacles
  4. Drops (10 places)


5. Ledge. on the P-192 switchboard 50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

THE TS B-4 x 2 SWITCHBOARD USED 50X1-HUM

IN BORDER GUARD DUTY BY THE 17TH OUTPOST, 67TH DETACHMENT LOCATED AT KIZYL ATREK, TURKMEN. SSR (Not Drawn to Scale)



50X1-HUM

SECRET

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Annex H-2

- 1. Green lights above toggle switches. When one of the lights lit up, it meant a call was coming in. The operator pushed down the toggle-switch below the indicated green light and answered the call, using the switchboard handset (see number 8). Switch number 1 was for the telephone line along the right flank; switch number 2, for the left flank; switch number 3 was for the telephone line to the guard tower nearest to the outpost; and switch number 4 was for the line to the outpost commander's quarters.
- Buzzer. When this button was pushed down, a buzzing noise was made in the handset on the other end of the line, connected with the toggle-switches numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4.
- 3. Switch used to check for short circuits and a weak battery. If there was a short circuit when the switch was pushed down, the needle on the volt meter (number 4) dropped down to the left; otherwise, it registered the force of the current. To check the strength of the battery, the switch was pushed up. If the needle on the voltmeter fell below a heavy green line, the battery needed replacing.
- 4. Voltmeter
- 5. Switch to a separate line. It connected the border telephone line with a land line laid to higher headquarters, permitting a direct telephone conversation between any point on the border and detachment headquarters. The line to the detachment went through another switchboard P-192 (Annex H-1) at the Sharlouk Post, which was operated by detachment signalmen.
- 6. TAI-43 telephone attached to the switchboard
- 7. Carrying handles
- 8. Handset to TSB-4 x 2 switchboard. the nomenclature mean central battery telephone (Ts B). Number 4 designated the number of drops and number 2 designated number of land lines.