

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

17

OCR

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT

SUBJECT 1. Report on the Five Soviet Republics of Central Asia
2. Soviet Russian Strategy in South Turkestan

DATE DISTR. 5 September 1961

NO. PAGES 2

50X1-HUM

REFERENCES RD

50X1-HUM

DATE OF INFO.

50X1-HUM

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

50X1-HUM

THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE.

1. [redacted] dated spring 1961, on Russian Turkestan. One report [redacted] two reports is a "Report on the Five Soviet Republics of Turkestan"; the other, report [redacted] (23 pages), [redacted] (24 pages plus a map), is called "Soviet Russian Strategy in South Turkestan."

2. Report [redacted] shows the trend and development of the Soviet economic system and the extent to which the people of Turkestan put up a resistance. Khrushchev, the report says, tries to blame his agricultural and ideological defeats on the local Party officials; therefore, purges are being carried out in Turkestan. In order to consolidate their position, the Russian authorized representatives in Turkestan in January 1961 demanded that more Communists be sent there on the grounds of a labor shortage. Moscow, consequently, is planning to send one million young Communists.

3. [redacted] the irrigation projects in southern Turkestan are of military and political, as well as economic, significance. Although the Soviet Russians insist that all these irrigation plants serve merely agriculture and industry and are built to supply hitherto uncultivated steppes with water, a network of canals and lakes is a hindrance to invading troops, is advantageous to partisan movements, and can be used by the Red Army to convey reinforcements. Besides, says the report, the haste with which all these canals are being built shows that the Soviet Russians are more concerned with fortifying the frontiers than with making new areas arable. Moreover, Khrushchev himself admitted that there are millions of hectares of arable and pasture land which should be fully utilized. This fact makes implausible the argument that new canals are being built to get more irrigated land for cultivation. Of political importance is the intensified settlement of Russians among the untrustworthy Turkestanians (sic), which will be forcibly effected upon completion of the various canals, artificial lakes, dams, and water-power stations.

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

Table with columns for ARMY, NAVY, and other distribution codes, with 'X' marks indicating distribution.

Distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[Redacted]

-2-

50X1-HUM

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Since the Russians regard Turkestan as the shop window for the Orient, political benefit would also come, in Moscow's opinion, from opening up vast regions of southern Turkestan for agriculture and industry.

[Redacted]


50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[Redacted]


50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM



S o v i e t R u s s i a n
S t r a t e g y i n S o u t h
T u r k e s t a n
(With one Map)
=====

50X1-HUM




Canals in Karshi-Chol Amu-Darya - Bukhara Canal

reading: 1st February
1961

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM



- = rivers
- +— = railways
- - - = frontier between the republics
- o = towns
- - - = projected canals
- - - = projected canals
- ◊ = artificial lakes
- o = projected pumping-stations

50X1-HUM

- 1 -



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



50X1-HUM

C o n t e n t s :

50X1-HUM



B. Canals, artificial lakes, dams and
Water power Stations in the southern
region of Turkestan

page 7

=====

1. Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal	page	7
2. Amu Darya - Karakul Canal	page	12
3. New artificial lakes	page	13
a) The artificial lake of Chumkurgan	page	13
b) Kara-Darya reservoir	page	14
4. Kara-Kum Canal	page	15
5. Nurek Water power station	page	15
6. Artificial lake on the Surkhan Darya	page	18
7. Dams, artificial lakes, central water distribution points and canals on the lower course of the Amu Darya	page	19

50X1-HUM



2



50X1-HUM

8. New canals, dams and
artificial lakes in
Mirza Chol

page 23

50X1-HUM

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

50X1-HUM

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

7

50X1-HUM

B. Canals, artificial lakes, dams and
water power stations in the southern region
of Turkestan

=====

1. Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal

At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1961 in Moscow, Khrushchov issued instructions that a widely ramified canal network was to be built in Karshi Chol (= Karshi Steppes). This is a project to divert the waters of the Amu Darya into the area between the towns of Bokhara and Karchi and between Kitab and Amu Darya by means of canals, dams and reservoirs. Of this area, which covers 2 million hectares, 1 to 1.2 million hectares of land are to be irrigated by means of this canal network. In addition, that part of the Kizil-Kum desert which borders on Bokhara is also to be traversed by a canal. An additional 1.7 million tons of cotton and other agricultural products will allegedly be harvested on this newly acquired land.

The purpose of this project, which is known as the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal project, is to intersect the entire southwestern region of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan between the rivers Amu Darya, Kashka Darya and Zarafshan by canals and artificial lakes so that a direct connection is effected between these three rivers. This will guarantee a quick route by waterway between the frontier of Afghanistan and Bokhara and Samarkand. Since that section of the Kara-Kum Canal which begins in the same region on the Amu Darya has already been completed, there is also a direct connection with the frontier region bordering on Iran.

It is an established fact that Karshi Chol was always a fertile district, but the River Kashka Darya loses much of its water

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM



8

50X1-HUM

on its course and the supply is no longer adequate to irrigate the steppes. This region is now therefore to be irrigated by the water of the Amu Darya. Hitherto this was not possible, for the Amu Darya lies 450 to 600 feet lower than Karshi Chol and a water supply could therefore not be conveyed to the higher areas. Practically all the other canals in Turkestan are not dependent on electric power. With the aid of big electric pump stations the water of the Amu Darya is now to be pumped up to the higher Karshi Chol area. By this new method it will be possible to supply the entire region with water.

Since the rivers, towns, railway routes, artificial lakes and the canal network planned are all marked on the appended map, a more detailed description of the localities is not necessary. We should, however, like to point out that the Mattakurgan, Kuymazar and Dengiz-Kul reservoirs, as well as the Eski-Anhor Canal and the Kara-Kum Canal are already in operation.

There are three different projects to intersect the southwest regions of Uzbekistan with an extensive canal network - the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal, but all three projects have the same purpose, namely to irrigate the steppe regions between Karshi and Bokhara with the aid of the Amu Darya. The sole difference in these projects is the question as to where the dams are to be built in the Amu Darya and where the canal network is to branch off from the Amu Darya. The length of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal is 312 miles.

The first project provides for a dam to be constructed at Kelif on the Amu Darya. Kelif is a railway-station on the route Bokhara - Duchambe (= Stalinabad) and is situated on the Afghan frontier. From here the canal is to proceed parallel to the Amu Darya as far as Kurshab reservoir (an artificial lake). (Marked in green - - - - on the appended map.) From the Kurshab reservoir the water is to be distri-

50X1-HUM



9

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

buted by numerous canals in an easterly direction, in the Karshi Chol region, on the one hand, and in a northerly direction, on the other hand, to Bokhara and into the delta of the River Zarafshan. The disadvantage of this Kelif project, however, is that the canal in this case would be much longer than those planned in the other projects and hence would involve more time and money as far as construction is concerned.

For this reason a second project, which has Burdalik as its starting-point, was evolved in 1959. Burdalik is likewise situated on the middle reaches of the Amu Darya, downstream from Kelif. This is the narrowest stretch of the Amu Darya and the distance from Karshi Chol is less. The town of Karshi is about 62 miles away from the Amu Darya. A dam to collect the water of the Amu Darya is to be built in Burdalik according to this project. In addition, pump stations, which would convey the water supply into the canal, situated 600 feet higher, and would have a pumping capacity of 30 cubic metres of water per second, are also to be erected there.

From Burdalik the water supply is to be conveyed in a northerly direction by a 50-mile long canal to Dengiz-Kul (sea-water lake). (Marked in green - - - - on the appended map.) This artificial lake has already been completed. With the help of further pump stations the water of the Amu Darya collected here is to be conveyed to Karshi Chol and to the Zarafshan region. Part of the water supply, according to this project, would be conveyed by means of pump stations and via a widely ramified network of canals to Karshi Chol. Numerous water distribution points and pump stations would provide for an intricate network of canals. Part of the water supply would also be diverted via the Kurshab reservoir in a northerly direction to Bokhara, thus linking up with the Kuymagar reservoir and the delta of the River Zarafshan.

According to this project, some of the water supply from the Amu Darya would also be diverted into the Kizil-Kum desert

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM



(northwest of Bokhara). The Kizil-Kum Canal begins in Lake Dengiz-Kul and can also irrigate the districts round the town of Karakul (on the railway line between Bokhara and Charjui).

The advantage of this project is that the canal would be about 94 miles shorter than the canal from Kelif. In addition, the soil in this region is also more favourable for the construction of a canal since it absorbs less water.

With the aid of pump stations and water distribution points, this canal network would irrigate the regions of Karshi Chol and of the Zarafshan, as well as the regions of Kizil-Kum and Karakul. It is estimated that in the regions of Karahi and Bokhara 700,000 hectares of land could be irrigated, as well as 500,000 hectares in that part of the Kizil-Kum desert located on the right bank of the Amu Darya.

In addition, there is also a third project, which provides for the construction of a dam north of Kizil-Ayat. (Kizil-Ayat is situated slightly south of the town of Kerki on the Amu Darya, and it is here that the Kara-Kum Canal begins.) From here the intended canal network in a northerly direction would irrigate the Karshi region and would link up with the Zarafshan. (This project is not shown on the appended map.) It is also hoped that the above-mentioned dam would divert more water into the Kara-Kum Canal, which would then irrigate several million hectares more of land.

According to this third project the Kizil-Kum desert is also to be irrigated. For this reason it is also planned to build an electric power station, the Eltshik Works, to the north of the town of Charjui (on the Amu Darya). From here a network of canals is to extend into the Kizil-Kum desert and irrigate vast areas of it.

For all three projects various pump stations, which would pump

[REDACTED] 50X1-HUM

11

[REDACTED] 50X1-HUM

the water of the Amu Darya into the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal, as well as numerous pump stations at the water distribution points, which would convey the water supply into the widely ramified canal network, would be needed and they would use up a huge amount of electric power. In addition, once the canal is completed, the region in question will be opened up agriculturally and industrially, and this again needs a lot of electric power. In order to supply this, two big electric power stations are at present being built.

50X1-HUM

Since large quantities of natural gas have been found in the Bokhara area, which are now being used for industrial purposes

[REDACTED], a big power station, which is to be driven by gas from Bokhara, is now being built there. This power station, known as the Navaji station, will be able to supply all the above-mentioned pump stations with electric power.

In addition, a big water power station is being constructed on the River Wachsh, which in Tadzhikistan flows into the Amu Darya not far from Pandsh (on the Afghan frontier). This water power station is close to the village of Nurek and goes by the same name. (We shall discuss the Nurek power station in more detail below.) At Khrushchov's explicit orders, construction on this power station began this year and when completed, it will be the largest water power station in Central Asia. The Nurek power station will be in a position to supply not only all the pump stations of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal with electric power, but also the agricultural and industrial plants in the entire region. By means of overhead conductors, electricity will also be supplied to Karshi Chol.

The power station in Nurek is to provide the pump stations along the Amu Darya with electricity so that these stations will then be able to pump 30 cubic metres of water per second. By comparison, the Parchad electric power station (at the

50X1-HUM

12

50X1-HUM

confluence of the rivers Chirtchik and Syr Darya, south of Tashkent) supplies the pump stations of the Mirza Chol Canal with 3 cubic metres of water per second. The Nurek power station is to be completed in 1962.

The Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal will open up a further region in the southern frontier territory of Turkestan to Soviet economy. This canal is a continuation of the Kara-Kum Canal in an easterly direction. By this means it will be possible to convey transports from the western regions of Turkestan, which border on Iran, by waterway parallel to the Iranian and Afghan frontiers.

This entire network of canals parallel to the frontiers of Iran and Afghanistan is an additional traffic and transport route to the already existing roads and railways, and the canals and artificial lakes are included in the general fortifications belt as hindrances. The extent to which in peace-time additional agricultural products can be obtained from newly irrigated land and industrial enterprises set up there, can only be ascertained when the canal has been completed. But it is already an established fact that a large number of Russians are flocking into the frontier regions of Turkestan and that they must be regarded not merely as workers but, above all, as farmers in a military capacity.

2. Amu Darya - Karakul Canal

On the middle course of the Amu Darya, on a level with the town of Charjui, a canal is being built, which is to extend as far as the rayon of Karakul. The town of Karakul is situated in southwest Uzbekistan and is a railway station on the line from Bokhara to Charjui. The rayon of Karakul borders on Turkmenistan.

The River Zarafshan ends in the rayon of Karakul. The Amu Darya - Karakul Canal will thus link up the rivers Zarafshan and Amu Darya. The artificial lakes of Kattakurgan and Kuymazar, which are fed by the Zarafshan, already supply large areas with water, and hence the preconditions are given for further canals. The Kattakurgan reservoir near Samarkand was already completed in 1948. Thus there is a chain of artificial lakes, dams and canals from Samarkand, via Bokhara, to Charjui.

The Amu Darya - Karakul Canal is 33 miles long, 180 feet wide and 75 feet deep. It is obvious from this width and depth that the canal can be navigated by large freighters without difficulty. The first section, 9 miles in length, has practically been completed. Canal construction experts from Turkmenistan, who have been working on the Kara-Kum Canal project, have already arrived to give their assistance in this case, too.

When the canal is finished 50 cubic metres of water will pass through it per second and will irrigate the steppes of Mahankul, Chigodchi and Kirk-Eshak. It will complete the above-mentioned canal network of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal and will be the shortest route between the Amu Darya and Bokhara, as well as Samarkand.

3. New artificial lakes

In order to complete the chain of artificial lakes and to provide the various canal networks of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal with an adequate water supply, more and more reservoirs are being constructed in the regions of Kashka-Darya and Samarkand.

a) The artificial lake of Chumkurgan

In the rayon of Kamashi (the town of Kamashi lies close to the



14



50X1-HUM

railway line between the towns of Karshi and Kitib) a large artificial lake, Lake Chumkurgan, is being constructed, which is to have a water capacity of over half a milliard cubic metres. Part of this reservoir was completed in Spring 1961 and already contains 170 million cubic metres of water. Construction on the reservoir is to be completed within a year's time and it will then be filled to its full capacity.

The water of the Chumkurgan reservoir has already been diverted into the region of Chambus-Say and several hundred Russian kolkhoz farmers have already been settled there. New villages, Chambay, Tokbay and Madjara, have been built and a kolkhoz, the Lenin kolkhoz, has been founded. Cultivation of cotton has already begun. All these new villages and the kolkhoz are situated in the rayon of Kamashi.

This artificial lake is fed by the River Kashka-Darya. It is hoped that the new canal network under construction will result in an additional 40,000 hectares of land being made available for agriculture. The canals are being constructed in such a way that it will be possible to drain or fill them, as required, at any time.

b) Kara-Darya reservoir

A large dam is at present being built on the River Kara-Darya not far from Samarkand. This will result in the formation of a large artificial lake at this point, Lake Kara-Darya. The dam will be about 225 feet high, and 6 million cubic metres of soil and 1 million cubic metres of stone are needed for its construction. The bottom of this artificial lake is to be concreted.

50X1-HUM

15

4. Kara - Kum Canal


The Kara-Kum Canal in Turkmenistan has already been completed as far as the large artificial lake of Han Havus, which is situated between the towns of Mary (= Merv) and Tedchen. Construction on the next section, between Han Havus and the River Tedchen, commenced on March 2, 1961. 50X1-HUM

It is obvious from the speed at which work on the Kara-Kum Canal is progressing that the Russians regard its completion as extremely vital. According to the latest plans, it is now intended to continue the canal, which was originally only to lead as far as Archman, a small railway station on the Ashkabad line, as far as the Caspian Sea. The Soviet Russians have realized how important a through connection by waterway between the Amu Darya and the Caspian Sea is for them, in this region. In addition, the importance of the Kara-Kum Canal is increased considerably by the above-mentioned projects of the Amu Darya - Bokhara Canal and the Amu Darya - Karakul Canal; for in this way the regions of Samarkand and Bokhara are linked up directly by waterway with the Caspian Sea, and, vice versa, there are good connections from the frontier of Turkmenistan to the central regions of Turkestan.

5. Nurek water power station

The River Wachsh rises in the Pamirs and flows into the Amu Darya near Bandsh in Tadzhikistan. It is fed by the snow which melts in the Pamirs and is a rapid and powerful river,

50X1-HUM



which at some points, however, is so narrow that one can leap from bank to bank. On the other hand, it is very deep.

In order to utilize the enormous water power of the Wachsh, Khrushchov issued orders at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1961, in Moscow, that a large water power station was to be erected close to the village of Nurek. Construction on this project has already begun.

The water power station at Nurek is to be the largest in the Soviet Union and is to have an even larger capacity than the Stalingrad water power station on the Volga, which has a capacity of 2.1 million kilowatts. Nurek would thus be in a position to supply not only the entire industry of Tadzhikistan with electricity, but also to pass on milliards of kilowatts to other republics, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan. The electricity is to be conveyed by means of overhead conductors. The power station at Nurek is to be finished by 1962. It will be in a position to supply electricity very cheaply. 1 kilowatt hour will only cost 1/4 tien (= 1/4 Pfennig).


In order to provide the Nurek station with the necessary power, a large dam is to be built on the River Wachsh. The artificial lake formed in this way will not be very large, but it will be extremely deep. This reservoir, so it is planned, will be able to absorb 70 per cent of the total yearly water of the Wachsh. It is to have a water capacity of over 10 milliard cubic metres.


With the aid of electric pump stations, this artificial lake will supply the surrounding areas with water and the cultivation of cotton is thus to be increased. It is affirmed that these pump stations will irrigate 200,000 hectares of land. In the region of Evan construction has already commenced.



Furthermore, the electric power supply from Nurek is to further the industry of Tadzhikistan. The heavy industry is to be extended and increased and factories for the processing of metal alloys are to be erected. In addition, engineering works and food factories are also to be built.

50X1-HUM





6. Artificial lake on the S u r k h a n D a r y a

An artificial lake, which when finished will have a water capacity of 800 million cubic metres, is to be built on the River Surkhan Darya in Uzbekistan. This river is a right tributary of the Amu Darya and joins the Amu Darya at Termez (in Uzbekistan on the Afghan frontier).

Preparations on this project have already commenced, and labour-camps, roads, communication points and electric lighting are now under construction. The first section of this artificial lake is to be completed by the beginning of 1962, and when the whole project is finished in 1963, 6,000 hectares of land will be irrigated by this lake.

In order to convey a water supply from this lake to the land which is to be irrigated, a main canal, as a branch of the Cherabad Canal, is to be constructed. In the town of Cherabad (northwest of the town of Termez) nearby, a water power

station and a dam have already been completed.

Once the entire project is finished, new industrial plants, kolkhozes and sovchozes are to be set up in this district. It is planned, above all, to cultivate sub-tropical plants such as oranges, lemons, etc., in this area.

This artificial lake on the Surkhan Darya and the connecting canals are of considerable importance since they are in close proximity to the Afghan frontier.

7. Dams, artificial lakes, central water distribution points and canals on the lower course of the A m u D a r y a

The Amu Darya has an enormous supply of water, comparable to that of the Nile. Every year 50 milliard cubic metres of water flows away unused into Lake Aral. For this reason it is now planned to use the water of the Amu Darya from the upper course to the delta for the purposes of Soviet economy. As we have already seen above, the big power station at Nurek and the canal network for Karshi Chol, Bokhara and Karakul are being constructed on the upper course and middle course respectively. At the same time, various projects are planned for the delta of the Amu Darya and some of them are already under construction.

By utilizing the 50 milliard cubic metres of water from the Amu Darya, which so far have been flowing away unused into Lake Aral, 5 million hectares of land could be irrigated, industrial plants could be built and people could be settled in this region. In the regions along the lower course of the Amu Darya alone - in Chorezm, Karakalpakistan and Tashauz, 1.5 million hectares of land could be gained. For this reason projects are now entertained to set up central water distribution points, with the aid of dams, along the lower course of the Amu Darya, in order to supply the

50X1-HUM

20

surrounding districts with water.

The first step in this direction has been to extend and concrete the existing irrigation plants in the delta of the Amu Darya, in order to prevent corrosion and absorption of the water by the desert soil. It is extremely difficult to preserve an adequate canal system on this sandy soil, and for decades the Soviet Russians have suffered one big reverse after another in this connection in this region. They are now hoping to surmount these difficulties with the aid of technical measures. But how far their efforts will be crowned with success, remains to be seen.

The problem of irrigating the regions of Chorezm and Tashauz, as well as the Autonomous Soviet Republic (ASSR) of Karakalpakistan is now to be solved by means of two central water distribution points. These points are to be built in Tujamujin and Takhya-Tash. Tujamujin lies south of Urgench on the railway line Charjui - Kungrad; Takhya-Tash is likewise a railway station on the same line and is close to the town of Nukus.

Large dams are to be erected at both places, and the water collected in the artificial lakes thus formed is to be diverted via these central water distribution points into the surrounding areas. When finished, the dam at Tujamujin is to be 60 feet high, and the reservoir thus formed is to have a water capacity of 5 milliard cubic metres. At the same time, water power stations, which will supply the industry and kolkhozes located along the lower course of the Amu Darya with electric power, are also to be erected at both places. The power station at Tujamujin is to have a capacity of 120,000 kilowatts. In addition, the various electric pump stations along the Amu Darya are also to be supplied with electric power, and in this way it will also be possible to fill the already existing canals, such as the Chorezm Canal and the Pahta-Arna Canal, with water.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

21

As the central water distribution point and the dam at Tujamujin are of considerable political and economic importance, work on this project is to begin without delay, that is in 1961. A cotton and rice cultivation centre is to be set up here. It is planned to cultivate rice in the northern areas of this region which border on Lake Aral, since they are not suitable for the cultivation of cotton. The largest rice-growing centre of the Soviet Union is to be established here. The southern regions of Karakalpakistan, Choresm and Tashauz are to be utilized exclusively for the cultivation of cotton.

The preliminary work involved in connection with setting up kolkhozes and sovchozes and building roads and houses is to be undertaken immediately, without waiting for the completion of the water distribution points. Large pump stations could already provide the water supply needed. The plants in Takhya-Tash are already under construction.

It is planned to make 470,000 hectares of land arable for rice cultivation and 300,000 hectares for cotton cultivation in Karakalpakistan, Choresm and Tashauz (Turkmenistan).

This same project also includes a large circular canal, the so-called "collective" or "friendship canal", which is being constructed in the regions of Tashauz and Choresm south of Lake Aral. This canal commences at Urgench (situated in the region of Choresm) and proceeds in a northwesterly direction into Turkmenistan, via Tashauz, to the low-lying plain of Sari Kamish. In a big loop it then proceeds in a southwesterly direction, via Khiya, as far as Tujamujin and the Amu Darya. The plain of Sari Kamish is an old dried-up lake, which was once the source of the River Ozboy. It lies 600 feet below sea-level.

The first section of this circular canal, 132 miles in length, was finished at the beginning of April 1961. Once the whole project is finished, the marshes and salt-lakes in the regions of Choresm and Tashauz will be drained and the water diverted into the Sari Kamish plain. In this way 200,000

50X1-HUM

22

[redacted]

hectares of land will be drained and 120,000 hectares of arable land will be gained. New industrial plants, settlements and kolkhozes are then to be built here.

This canal has been named the "collective" or "friendship canal" because, in addition to Turkestanians, including Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kazakhs, Russians and other Slavs, too, are employed on this project. This name is meant to emphasize the alleged friendship between the Turkestanians and Russians.

None of these projects on the lower course of the Amu Darya are new. This circular canal is planned for the same region in which the so-called Turkmen Main Canal (linking up the Amu Darya and the Caspian Sea) was to be built and on which construction was begun, but abandoned in 1953. Nor was this an original plan on the part of the Soviets, for the same project was already considered in tsarist times. Similarly, plans were also entertained in those days regarding the construction of a number of canals in the delta of the Amu Darya. This region was greatly favoured by the Russians in the tsarist era, and numerous canals were already constructed in those days. Even in the pre-tsarist era there was already an extensive network of canals in this region. The fact that the Soviet Russians have now taken up all these old plans again and intend to realize them shows how great their interest in this region is. In former times there was frequently a shortage of labour which made it impossible to carry out such big projects, but since the Russians have been able to consolidate their position in the northern regions, they are now advancing further and further south in order to settle here, too. Indeed, they continue to push on further south to the Turkestanian frontier and Iran and Afghanistan.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

It is obvious from the existing plans that the southern region of Turkestan is to become a new food basis for Russia and a new settlement region for the Russians. [redacted]

[redacted] new centres of rice and cotton cultivation and of other agricultural products are to be established here.

The Russians always aim to equip every region in which they settle for the eventuality of war, so that it shall be self-supporting as far as the food situation is concerned, should it be cut off from other regions. Moreover, by means of this extensive network of lakes and canals, Russia intends to secure this region for the settlement of Russians in order to gain a firmer control of South Turkestan.

9. New canals, dams and artificial lakes in Mirza Chol

Just as the water of the Amu Darya is being used to build canals, dams and artificial lakes, the water of the Syr Darya, the second largest river in Turkestan, is also to be used for the same purpose. In this report, however, we only intend to mention the new projects in Mirza Chol (= Mirza steppes). Mirza Chol, which is situated on the middle course of the Syr Darya not far from Tashkent and borders on the Kizil-Kum desert, has an area of 1 million hectares.

The plans to irrigate Mirza Chol are likewise very old. Even prior to conquest by the Russians, canals were already built here, and during the tsarist era the Russians concentrated their attention on this region. In those days the Romanov Canal was built, but it was renamed the Kirov Canal by the Soviet Russians after it had been extended in 1940. The Kirov Canal, which is 300 miles long, irrigates the districts round the town of Chinaz (Chinaz is situated south of Tashkent on the Syr Darya and is a railway station on the line between Tashkent and Samarkand). In May 1948 the South Mirza Chol Canal, which irrigates the rayon of Havas and is known as the Baywud Canal, was opened. (Havas lies south of Chinaz on the same railway route.)

In December 1960 a further canal, 58 miles long, 180 feet wide and 15 feet deep, was opened in the southern part of Mirza Chol. At present a 37-mile long road, which leads from this canal into the desert, is being constructed. A new town,

50X1-HUM

2A


complete with schools, a hospital, dwelling-houses, gas and electricity plants, etc., is to be erected here. The big electric power station at Farchad, with a capacity of 200,000 kilowatts, which was opened on the Syr Darya in 1948, supplies this region with electricity. So far, asphalted and gravelled roads, 375 miles long, have been built in Mirza Chol and they intersect the steppes from one end to the other.

It is planned to gain 350,000 hectares of land in Uzbekistan and 10,000 hectares in Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan, once the various canals in Mirza Chol have been completed. The canal network is to extend as far as Dzisak (a railway station between Tashkent and Samarkand).

The northern regions of Mirza Chol, which are part of Kazakhstan, are also to be linked up by waterways. A dam, 3 miles in length, is to be built on the Syr Darya close to the town of Chardara, which lies west of Tashkent on the Syr Darya, and the water of the Syr Darya collected at this dam is to be diverted into an artificial lake, which will be known as the Chardara reservoir. This artificial lake will be 47 miles long and 22 miles wide. Construction on this project has already begun, and when finished, the Chardara reservoir will have a water capacity of 6 milliard cubic metres. A canal is to be constructed from this lake to the rayon of Chinaz and in this way the canal networks of Mirza Chol, which are being built by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will be linked up with each other.

These canals, dams and artificial lakes in Mirza Chol are of equally great importance for the republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan, for they will thus be provided with additional traffic and transport routes by waterway. In addition, a new food and industrial centre is to be set up here on the periphery of Tashkent. Since the Turkestanian people are not numerous enough to settle these regions, to cultivate the kolkhozes and to supply industry with the necessary labour, countless Russians will as usual swarm into these areas.

50X1-HUM




50X1-HUM

R e p o r t o n t h e
f i v e S o v i e t
R e p u b l i c s o f
T u r k e s t a n
=====

CONFIDENTIAL



50X1-HUM



C o n t e n t s :
=====

50X1-HUM

A. I n t r o d u c t i o n	page 2
B. The Present Situation in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan	page 6
C. S u m m a r y	page 22

CONFIDENTIAL



50X1-HUM



A. Introduction

In the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan relations are at present strained between the Communist Party and the population. The functionaries insist that the peasants and workers must fulfil the quotas of the agricultural and industrial plans for 1961 and they are being censured most severely for not having fulfilled the 1960 plans. Not only the population but also many functionaries of the Communist Party, as for instance secretaries of the districts and rayons, supervisors of the sovchozes and kolkhozes, leading directors of industrial concerns and factories, and even ministers and secretaries of the Communist Party have recently been sabotaging Soviet economy and Soviet planning in Turkestan and have caused huge losses in these sectors.

Internal Party sessions and congresses of the agricultural functionaries and advisory commissions are at present being held in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan. It is obvious from these sessions, which are in part secret and in part public, that for the past three years - as we already mentioned in Report No. 33 on Tadshikistan - catastrophic conditions have prevailed. Various information has leaked out in the course of the secret sessions.

Party secretaries, ministers and Party functionaries of the state, districts and rayons have been dismissed from office and called to account. These secretaries of the district committees, chairmen of the executive committees and other functionaries appointed by the Communist Party, as well as the kolkhoz supervisors and peasants have all been working hand in hand and have sabotaged the economy. In this respect it should be stressed that the functionaries in this case are young persons who have grown up during the Soviet era and



have been trained in the Communist spirit in school, in the the Komsomol and the Communist Party.

For years Moscow has been trying to hush up the true state of affairs in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan, which, incidentally, have been known to us for a long time and which we have stressed again and again, and has only talked about the success and achievements of Communist economy and of Communism and about the loyal devotion of the population. Now, however, since the catastrophic conditions in the economic and agricultural sectors have assumed such proportions, Moscow is forced to discuss the state of affairs which exists, to resort to counter-measures and to find out who is to blame. For, under Khrushchov's Seven-Year Plan, production was to be increased to such an extent that the American standard of living was to be attained or, in fact, even overtaken. But it has now transpired that, as a result of passive resistance and sabotage on the part of the population, agricultural production has not increased, but, on the contrary, has decreased.

At present the kolkhoz farmers in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan are being accused of having deceived the government and the Party in all sectors of agriculture. They have left millions of hectares of irrigated land uncultivated and in some rayons have divided up the land belonging to the kolkhozes amongst themselves for private use. They have for the most part been working for their own private enterprise and their own private interests and have left the agricultural products of the state farms, such as grain and cotton, to rot on the fields. The farmers have stolen the agricultural products of the kolkhozes and have intentionally allowed millions of sheep, calves and cows to starve to death. In 1960 for instance, 15 per cent of the sheep and lambs in Kirgizstan, 4 million sheep in Kazakhstan, and a total number of 10 million sheep in all five Soviet Republics of Turkestan perished.

The farmers show no interest whatever as far as the state farms and state property are concerned and are definitely






4

hostile in their attitude towards the Soviet economy. For this reason they do not look after the cattle properly and do not get in sufficient fodder for the winter months, with the result that the animals die of starvation. In Uzbekistan, for example, the kolkhozes and sovchozes in 1959 needed 4.7 million tons of silo fodder and 4.2 million tons of hay as winter fodder for the amount of live-stock there, but only 2.1 million tons of silo fodder and 2.1 million tons of hay were available. There was likewise a shortage of winter fodder in Tadzhikistan, where the kolkhozes and sovchozes needed 314,000 tons of silo fodder and 260,000 tons of hay. But here, too, the quotas were not fulfilled and many of the animals died of starvation.

In addition, there are not enough stables, and those that are available are so badly in need of repair that the rain and snow leak through and the animals perish from cold. Very often animals are slaughtered on the pretext that they are sick or old, which of course is not the case.

Millions of roubles have been spent in order to renew the live-stock and cattle have been imported into the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan. But instead of using this pedigree stock for breeding more cattle and for increasing dairy production, a large percentage has been slaughtered and the meat handed over to the state in order to fulfil quotas. Similar conditions prevail in poultry breeding. In Kazakhstan, for instance, only 3 million hens out of 28 million chickens were handed over by the farmers, whilst 25 million disappeared and allegedly starved to death within a year.

Conditions are equally bad in grain and cotton cultivation. Irrigated land is not cultivated, acres are overgrown with weeds, the crops are not harvested in time but are left to rot on the fields. Machines and valuable fertilizers are left out in the rain and snow by the farmers and consequently rot. And the so-called trained cadres fail to carry out the tasks entrusted to them.



50X1-HUM



On the other hand, however, the Party functionaries of the rayons and districts and the kolkhoz supervisors arrange all kinds of festivities together with the kolkhoz farmers, at which the "achievements" of the kolkhozes are celebrated. But these functionaries, as we shall see later on, are themselves responsible for the said conditions and cover up the acts of sabotage against the state by forging receipts for meat, fats and grain, etc., that has allegedly been delivered, and thus deceive the state.

The Soviets have now been obliged to admit that a process of deterioration is in progress in every sector of Communist economy in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan and that the Turkestanian farmers are not in the least interested in their work. The Party functionaries have long been aware of this state of affairs but have not taken any steps to alter matters. For this reason political purges are once more being carried out, and Khrushchov recently toured the Soviet Union in order to look into conditions himself. On March 20, 1961, he was in Alma Ata, but he then broke off his tour of inspection on account of the international situation, without visiting the other capitals of the Soviet Republics of Turkestan.




B. The Present Situation in the five Soviet Republics
of Turkestan


=====

In spite of the fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government have for years been trying to conceal the true state of affairs in Tadzhikistan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan was, on February 15, 1961, obliged to admit in a special session as well as in internal conferences that conditions in agriculture have become worse since 1957 and that the population is still putting up a passive resistance against the Sovietization of the country. This fact has, incidentally, been pointed out by us repeatedly. We have been aware of this a long time and during the past few weeks it has now been officially corroborated.

Naturally, the nationalists, the clergy and the "agents of the West", who have allegedly misled the people of Tadzhikistan, are held responsible for conditions there. Actually, not only the farmers, workers and young people, but also the middle and lower classes of the Party functionaries have for years been putting up a secret resistance in the villages, towns, rayons and districts; and the latter have supported the acts of sabotage carried out by the farmers. It has transpired that a large number of the Communist functionaries in the towns and rural areas are nationalists in disguise, who have harmed not only Soviet economy but also the Communist ideology very considerably. The real Communists only constitute a minority.



50X1-HUM

The First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan, Tusunbai Oldchabay(ev), admitted 

 that the economic situation in T50X1-HUM istan had reached a depression and that agriculture and industry had not handed over enough products to the state. In spite of the fact that these circumstances and the "criminal activity" of the functionaries were known to many ministers and responsible persons of the Party, so he added, no steps were taken against the persons concerned, nor were they called to account. The kolkhoz and sovchoz farmers, for instance,




had not delivered sufficient agricultural products to the state, but had been dividing them up amongst themselves, and, so he stressed, had been slaughtering hundreds of thousands of calves, sheep and cows yearly or had allowed them to die. Kolkhoz land had even been partly divided up amongst the farmers in some rayons. 50X1-HUM


 the kolkhozes and sovchozes there in 1960, for example, produced 4,500 tons of meat, 26,500 tons of milk and 680,000 tons of wool, all of which however disappeared. The poultry farms produced 19 million eggs and likewise did not deliver these to the state. On the other hand, the inclination of the kolkhoz farmers to private enterprise has increased.

This state of affairs has been known to the supervisors of the kolkhozes and to the Party secretaries of the districts and rayons for years, but they have concealed it from the government and have made out faked receipts for the kolkhozes stating that the latter had allegedly delivered sufficient agricultural products to the state, when in reality these quantities have not been handed over at all.

The same thing has been happening in Uzbekistan. Here, the kolkhoz supervisors together with the Party functionaries in the rayons of Termez, Charkurgan, Sakat and Cherabad, for instance, have been supporting the acts of sabotage on the part of the kolkhoz farmers by means of faked receipts. In May and June 1960 the Party bureau in Cherabad made out receipts for 316 tons of meat which were never handed over, and receipts were likewise made out for the kolkhozes in the rayons of Churdchi for 485 tons of meat, which were never delivered to the state. The farmers of the kolkhozes Kirov and Norveu in the rayons of Samarkand divided the products of the kolkhozes amongst themselves and cultivated kolkhoz land for their own purpose.

At a congress of active Party members on February 4, 1961, in



Tashkent and at the congress of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan on February 5, 1961, the First Party Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Rashid(ov), and the Prime Minister Alim(ov) gave reports on the conditions which prevail, and with considerable indignation Rashid(ov) referred to the gradual undermining of industry and agriculture which has been going on for years:

"During the past years and also in 1960 Uzbekistan has failed to fulfil the production quotas. For years there has been no increase in production, and the government and the Party are being deceived and swindled not only by the kolkhoz supervisors and farmers but also by numerous Party functionaries of the districts, rayons and towns. These Party secretaries and heads of the executive committees of the Party, as for instance the Party secretary of the district committee of Surhan-Darya, the secretary of the district committee of Samarkand, Sharif, the head of the executive committee of Samarkand, Abdulla, and others, have for years been aware of these conditions, deceptions and thefts of state property and they have even shielded those kolkhoz farmers who have intentionally robbed the state".

Rashid(ov) quoted numerous examples from various districts of Uzbekistan and said in conclusion:

"The Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the government of Uzbekistan bear the responsibility for all these incidents. We must not forget the admonitions of Khrushchov at the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in January 1961. Khrushchov demanded that drastic measures should be taken against functionaries and all public enemies in order to punish them and exclude them from office and from the Party."

The same state of affairs prevails in Turkmenistan, whilst in Kazakhstan the Party leaders talk quite openly about "frauds" and "false reports" which have been practised and passed on by the kolkhoz supervisors. By means of these faked receipts the kolkhoz supervisors and farmers have an alibi, with which the Party functionaries have provided them.

In Kirgizstan Party functionaries - from the lowest to the highest ranks - until a short time ago worked hand in hand

with the population. Since the Kirgiz have suffered terribly under the Soviet regime they have a strong feeling of affinity and unity irrespective of any difference in their political views. Even today the patriarchal system still prevails in Kirgizstan. On February 12, 1961, the Minister of the Interior of the Republic, Isa(jev) and six members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan were dismissed from office and excluded from the Party. This measure was however only carried out at Moscow's orders. X

Razak(ov), the Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan, admitted that the organization of the Party was very poor and that the Party secretaries neglected their duties and together with the population and the kolkhoz farmers were causing considerable harm to the economy. Many of the high-ranking Party leaders, so he added, had not fulfilled the tasks assigned to them but had swindled the government and the Party and endangered the ideology and economy. They had so far secretly supported and strengthened the anti-Communist and anti-Russian feelings of the population. After having been severely censured by Khrushchov in January 1961 in Moscow, Razak(ov) announced that the Communist Party of Kirgizstan would now take drastic steps to deal with the Party functionaries of the country, of the districts and rayons and with the kolkhoz supervisors who had committed "frauds".

The Party functionaries in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan and in particular in Tadzhikistan, instead of taking measures against the kolkhoz farmers, have, jointly with the latter and the kolkhoz supervisors, arranged big festivities, celebrated their "socialist achievements" and held boastful speeches, and in this way intentionally sabotaged work. Restaurants and pavilions for these festivities have been built in the gardens of the kolkhozes; the funds of the kolkhozes have thus been squandered, instead of being used, as prescribed, in order to build schools, irrigation plants, roads and propaganda clubs. The Party functionaries have been furthering their own private

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

10

financial interests and in Uzbekistan, for instance, have been building luxury villas from state funds. Corruption predominates in the Party and government, and state funds are being squandered.

The following examples will serve to illustrate the catastrophic conditions in agriculture in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan.

Cattle-breeding in particular, which has always played an important part in Turkestan, has suffered considerably. It was ascertained in Tadzhikistan that in three years alone hundreds of thousands of sheep perished as a result of lack of fodder and care. In 1960, 10 million sheep died in Turkestan, and of this number 4 million in Kazakhstan alone. The biggest losses, namely almost 2 million, were in the districts of Alma Ata, Dzhambul and Semipalatinsk.

50X1-HUM

In addition, many horned cattle and calves also perished. In the Tashkent district, for example, there were 127,000 calves in 1959, of which only 23,000 were still alive in 1960. The animals died as a result of lack of fodder and proper care and poor stabling.

there is a serious shortage of winter fodder. In Kazakhstan, for instance, the hay is not gathered in in many districts. The entirely inadequate number of stables are in such poor condition that many of the animals die as a result of exposure to rain and snow. Last winter 6 million animals in Kazakhstan had no stables and were thus left out in the open at night. This is one of the reasons for the big loss in young animals.

In Kirgizstan, which has been especially chosen to increase cattle-breeding, 15 per cent of the stock of sheep perished in 1960, and the number of horned cattle and calves has likewise decreased. As Razak(ov), the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan, was himself obliged to admit, the kolkhoz farmers did not give the animals sufficient fodder in winter and they died of hunger in the cold weather. Even the cattle on the state farms were not watered sufficiently. In the winter

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

11

they were driven out onto the pastures in the mountainous districts and a large number perished as they could not find any food because the soil was frozen and covered with snow. This is one of the reasons why Kirgizstan has for years not been delivering sufficient milk, wool, beef, poultry and fats to the state.

On the other hand, however, the Kirgiz have for years been fostering and intensifying private enterprise. They have privately distributed amongst themselves many of the animals which belong to the state. The kolkhoz farmers have been occupying themselves more with the one or two cows and poultry, etc., which they are allowed to own, than with their work on the state farms. And this is not only the case in Kirgizstan, but also everywhere else in the entire Soviet Union. Private enterprise in the Soviet Union has produced 50 per cent of the fats, 50 per cent of the meat and 80 per cent of the eggs and sold them to the state authorities. Officially the kolkhoz farmers are allowed to cultivate up to 1 hectare of land for their own private agricultural and horticultural use. They are also allowed to keep a few animals for their own use, such as cows, sheep and poultry on this land.

At the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in January 1961, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirgizstan, Razak(ov), promised that Kirgizstan would fulfil the quotas of the production plan in 1961. The quotas of the 1960 plan were by no means fulfilled, and at the said session Razak(ov) was severely reprimanded by Khrushchov. After Razak(ov)'s promise for 1961, Khrushchov said: "The gipsies make all sorts of promises, but when the time comes to fulfil them they disappear to another country". To which Razak(ov) replied in true Kirgiz manner: "But we have no other country to which we can go". Whereupon Khrushchov retorted: "That's true, the mountains in Kirgizstan are very high". These remarks characterize the position and the feeling in Kirgizstan.

In Turkmenistan, too, the kolkhoz farmers occupy themselves for the most part with their own cattle and their own horticulture. And here, too, there has been a considerable decrease in the state stock of cattle. For this reason the local Party functionaries were authorized by a decree of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan to collect all "surplus" cattle and give a refund for it according to the set tariff. In this way private property is to be reduced so that the kolkhoz farmers will occupy themselves more with state cattle. An attempt is being made to control the farmers and workers more strictly and if possible to abolish private property.

In order to improve home cattle-breeding and dairy-farming, valuable pedigree stock from abroad was imported into the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan. But instead of improving and increasing the stock of cattle by breeding calves, the kolkhoz farmers slaughtered these valuable pedigree animals and milch cows and delivered the meat to the state authorities in order to fulfil the quotas of the production plan.

During the past five years the Soviets have imported into Uzbekistan 45,000 pedigree calves, to the value of 130 million roubles, for breeding purposes. But in the districts of Andizhan and Fergana, for instance, within the past three years 61,000 dairy cattle, which were to be used to increase breeding and dairy-farming, were slaughtered. The kolkhozes in the Tashkent district have likewise slaughtered 25,000 valuable milch cows, which had been purchased for considerable sums, and as a substitute have bought 19,000 lean cows out of kolkhoz funds. Thus Uzbekistan is greatly in arrears with its meat and milk deliveries, but the Party functionaries have taken no steps to remedy this state of affairs.

The kolkhoz system in Tadzhikistan has likewise been undermined. In the kolkhozes in the district of Leninabad, for example, more than 5,300 pedigree cows, that is one-fourth of the total stock, were slaughtered in 1960 in order to fulfil delivery quotas. On the cattle-farms of the kolkhozes in the rayons of Kolchosabad, Pandch, Moscow and Ferhad valuable

milch cows were also slaughtered. In the kolkhozes of the rayon of Soviet alone, 850 milch cows, that is to say 35 per cent of the total stock, were rigorously slaughtered in 1960 and the meat delivered to the state. The high-ranking functionaries complain that this type of crime has been going on for years, but that nobody ever took any steps to stop it.

Similar conditions prevail in poultry breeding. The poultry farms boosted with so much propaganda in Tadzhikistan, which were set up in the rayons of Kolchosabad and Kannibadam, have deteriorated completely within the past three years. 40,000 poultry perished there either as a result of negligence or lack of food, - this was alleged by the kolkhoz supervisors. 50X1-HUM

[redacted] 40,000 poultry had been privately distributed amongst the kolkhoz farmers. In 1960 there were only 13,000 poultry left on the said poultry farms. But 24 special poultry breeders were permanently engaged to look after this stock and they spent 185,000 roubles a year, i.e. 555,000 roubles in three years. In addition, the director engaged so-called seasonal poultry workers who received 400,000 roubles a year. Thus 1.75 million roubles were squandered in three years, from 1957 onwards.

One poultry farm in the rayon of Kannibadam only delivered 238 cwts of poultry meat from 26,000 poultry. In view of the high costs of the poultry farm, this means that the cost price per kilogram amounts to 17.4 roubles and price per egg to 1.24 roubles (1 rouble = approximately 1 Deutsche Mark).

Here, too, the kolkhoz farmers are mainly occupied with their own poultry and have no interest whatever in the state poultry farms. On the contrary, they sabotage them, hence the huge losses in stock and exorbitant prices of the products.

In 1953 the Russians began forcing the Moslems in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan to engage in pig-breeding, but the Turkestanians refused to comply with these orders. The

50X1-HUM

[REDACTED]

Soviets imported 76,000 pigs into Tadzhikistan, but as a result of the opposition of the population this experiment proved a failure, though this fact was hitherto always hushed up. Up to 1960 the Party secretaries of the districts and rayons and the kolkhoz supervisors always talked about large pig-breeding farms, but in reality the farms in this case only possessed a stock of one to nine pigs. This fact now had to be admitted by the Deputy Prime Minister of Tadzhikistan, Dadabay(ov), when he said that the situation in this branch of cattle-breeding was catastrophic. The kolkhoz farmers have simply neglected the animals and allowed them to die of starvation.

The most important task of agriculture in the Soviet Union is to fulfil the quotas of the production plan, and the kolkhoz supervisors and Party functionaries are forced to fulfil these quotas. But there is a shortage of products in every sector, and consequently the functionaries in charge are constantly threatened with severe punishment. In order to cause chaos and confusion in the Soviet economic system, the kolkhoz supervisors and farmers have for years been resorting to the following method: they have been buying agricultural products such as fats, milk, meat, etc., from the state stores with kolkhoz funds and have then delivered these products to the state as "own production", as if they were the produce of their kolkhozes. For years the local Party functionaries have been covering up this activity, and the heads of the rayons have been making out faked receipts for the quantity of products delivered to the state. In some cases private produce has also been bought from the population and then delivered to the state by the kolkhoz as "fulfilled quotas".

In Tadzhikistan, for instance, the Tomin kolkhoz near the town of Kuljab bought 31,000 tons of milk from the population and 7 tons from the fat works in the town and then delivered this quantity to the state as kolkhoz produce. Incidentally, some of the kolkhozes produced plenty of milk but they sold it privately to the population. The kolkhozes in the TBAO region, for instance, produced 323,000 tons of milk on their

50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL

farms, but only handed over 421 tons to the government. The rest of the milk simply vanished.

The Party Secretary of the district of Tienchan in Kirgizstan, Isa(jev), had hitherto instructed the heads of the kolkhozes, sovchozes and rayons to buy the agricultural products needed to fulfil the quotas from the state stores and then deliver them to the state as "own produce". With the approval of the Party and the government this same Isa(jev) was recently appointed Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Kirgizstan. He has now, however, been removed from office, as was already mentioned above.

In Kazakhstan numerous complaints are being voiced about the poor cultivation of vegetables, for vegetables are one of the staple foods. But supplies to the population are by no means adequate. There is a shortage of machines everywhere and cultivation has so far not been mechanized properly. In the past three years the kolkhozes in Tadzhikistan have only fulfilled 60.5 per cent of the quotas in this sector, and in 1960 there was a decrease of 40 to 50 per cent in the production of vegetables. In 1960 the kolkhozes in Tadzhikistan produced 84,000 cwts of vegetables, but only delivered 26,000 cwts to the state. 50 to 60 per cent of the produce disappeared.

The cultivation of grain, especially in Kazakhstan, is by no means satisfactory. Instead of 794 million puds, only 642 million puds, i.e. 80 per cent of the total amount of grain cultivated, were delivered to the state (1 pud = 16.38 kilograms). The yield per hectare only amounted to 8.4 double cwts, instead of the fixed 10.5 double cwts. By comparison Germany harvests 30 double cwts per hectare. In the grain areas of Kustanai, Akmolinsk and Kokchetau in particular, the harvest was very poor, due to improper cultivation of the soil, fields overgrown with weeds, sowing of poor seed, as well as losses during transportation and inadequate agricultural mechanization. The corn was in many cases mown whilst it was still green and before the grain had formed. In order to

fulfil their quotas, the kolkhoz farmers ploughed the soil so flat that the grain either did not grow properly or else was choked by weeds. The machines could not be used to the full extent, for over half the kolkhozes and sovchozes have no repair-shops; hence the machines could very often not be used for weeks on end. Since the farmers are not in the least interested in state property, the machines and fertilizers are left out in the open and, as a result of exposure to rain and snow, are ruined. Only half the fertilizers needed were supplied. The workers sabotaged transportation of the grain by tying up the sacks so loosely and stacking the sheaves so carelessly that part of the grain was lost en route during transportation. Brigades of agricultural workers then had to be employed to collect the sheaves that had been lost en route. At the delivery centres a large amount of the grain was found to be missing; it had been sold on the black market at exorbitant prices.

There is a shortage of trained personnel everywhere. 80,000 mechanics are now to be trained in special courses, but even this number will not cover the present needs. As a result of sabotage, squandering of funds and unnecessary expenditure, the cost price of a double cwt of grain is far too high. It amounts to 45.83 roubles, whereas according to the agricultural plan it should only be 39.59 roubles.

Although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decreed that in 1960 73,000 hectares of virgin land were to be opened up in the Hunger Steppes, not a single hectare has so far been cultivated.

On account of the unsatisfactory state of affairs, the Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan was dismissed from office in March 1961. But apparently it has meanwhile been realized that the grain harvest in Kazakhstan will not be any better in 1961, for the plan for 1961 only provided for 650 million puds of grain. This is the same amount that was harvested in 1960. But, as we already mentioned above, only 80 per cent of the production plan was fulfilled in 1960.

A similar state of affairs exists in Tadzhikistan. For years the Soviet press has been propagating the idea that the area of grain cultivation has been increased. In reality, however, the opposite is the case. During the past seven years the area of grain cultivation in the kolkhozes in Tadzhikistan has decreased by 106,000 hectares and 45,000 cwts less of grain have been harvested. The area of grain cultivation has thus decreased by one-fourth.

In Turkmenistan, too, the fields have not been cultivated to the full extent and are overgrown with weeds. The kolkhoz workers show no interest whatever and leave the grain to rot on the fields. Indeed, the same holds good for all five Soviet Republics of Turkestan.

Although conditions for the cultivation of cotton in Tadzhikistan are excellent and this Republic is to become the second cotton supply centre of the Soviet Union, next to Uzbekistan, the farmers have failed to fulfil the quotas in this sector. The cotton shrubs have not been watered, the soil has not been cultivated properly and fertilizers have not been used in sufficient quantities. Thus the farmers of Tadzhikistan have intentionally sabotaged the cotton cultivation, a fact which the Secretary of the Communist Party of the district of Leninabad, Ibrahim(ov), was obliged to admit. He accused the Party functionaries of this district of having tolerated this mismanagement. At present a political purge is being carried out all over the country, and agitators have been sent into the rural areas in order to re-train the population and in particular the young people ideologically. Above all, the womenfolk, too, are now to be rounded up for work on the land.

At Moscow's orders an additional 12,000 girls and women were to be mobilized in Kirgizstan in 1960 for work on the state farms. But only 5 to 6000 could be recruited pro forma and they soon quitted their place of work again.

In Turkmenistan the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Ovez(ov), admitted that the production plans for 1960 had not been fulfilled and that 123,000 tons of cotton, i.e. 30 per

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED]

cent, less than the fixed quotas had been delivered. Only 317,000 tons were delivered to the state, although the quota of cotton to be delivered by Turkmenistan was fixed at 440,000 tons. But the workers showed no interest whatever in collective work and devoted themselves to their own private work. The Party functionaries affirm that ideological training is inadequate and that even the trained cadres are not interested. In Turkmenistan most of the cotton crop had to be picked by hand, since the number of harvesting machines available is by no means adequate. Owing to the tedious and lengthy hand-picking, additional high costs were incurred, which had not been provided for.

In Uzbekistan the area for the cultivation of cotton has been increased during the past years, but in many districts this irrigated area has not been planted with cotton, as for instance the districts of Andizhan, Fergana and Bokhara. Many of the kolkhoz farmers have simply neglected the shrubs, have allowed the boils to shrivel up and the plantations to be choked with weeds. The cotton crop on the state farms has in some cases been divided up amongst themselves by the farmers, whilst in some districts land belonging to the kolkhozes was secretly given to the kolkhoz farmers, who then sold the crop to the state as their own produce.

The cotton production quotas in Kazakhstan have likewise not been fulfilled. The quotas were fixed at 205,000 tons, but only 175,000 tons were delivered to the state, that is to say only 85 per cent. This represents a considerable loss to Soviet economy. X

As is obvious from the above, a state of mismanagement prevails in every sector of agriculture in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan. The Party and the government blame negligence in dealing with ideological questions for this state of affairs. They maintain that if the people are loyal Communists and "Soviet beings", their interest in work on the state farms, and hence production, too, increases. But this is precisely the reason why this state of mismanagement prevails everywhere. Whenever they have an opportunity, the people

CONFIDENTIAL

sabotage the Soviet economy. The passive resistance of the people against Soviet leadership and planning is, as we have seen, supported by the middle and lower classes of the Party functionaries in the districts, rayons and towns. For this reason purges are now being carried out everywhere and they have already claimed countless victims.

Local Party functionaries and the central government in Moscow have so far endeavoured to hush up the said conditions, which have prevailed for years, in order to save their prestige. Purges have been carried out again and again, changes in appointments to Party and government posts have been made on numerous occasions, but all these measures have proved futile since the population is opposed to the Sovietization of their country and continues to put up a passive resistance.

At an internal congress of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan on February 8th and 9th, 1961, high-ranking Party functionaries, members of the Central Committee and trustworthy Party functionaries of the districts, rayons and towns, as well as propagandists conferred on the question of adopting the strictest measures possible to deal with the prevailing conditions and to punish those elements that are hostile. But whether these measures will be successful, is another matter.

In the ideological sphere the general attitude is, as ever, one of complete indifference, not only amongst the kolkhoz farmers but also amongst the so-called representatives of culture. For this reason the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Rashid(ov), on February 14, 1961, organized a congress in Tashkent for writers, artists, painters, musicians, actors, journalists, composers, poets, and teachers, etc., from Uzbekistan, in order to stir up their enthusiasm anew for the Communist ideals and Soviet economy. In addition, all the members and candidates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the representatives of the security service were also present on this occasion. Rashid(ov) censured the representatives of culture who had not fulfilled their duty towards the Party most sharply. In the name of the

50X1-HUM

20

Communist Party of Uzbekistan he exhorted all representatives of culture to contribute towards the realization of the decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961 and to propagate the significance of the Seven-Year Plan amongst the population by their works, films, plays, lectures and articles. They are to arouse the enthusiasm of the people for the fulfilment of the quotas. He sharply criticized the attitude of the representatives of culture. The themes of their works, so he stressed, did not deal with the socialist achievements and the heroes of work; they did not, for instance, give an account of the latest irrigation plants or electric power stations, but chose themes for their works, which, in Rashid(ov)'s opinion, glorified the past or dealt with romanticism. He said:

"Recently, it is true, works have been written about the achievements of the workers, but these works are very few in number and they are too superficial. The intellectual elite must choose themes about individual heroes of work, about farmers who fulfil the quotas and even more. This is the task of literature. So far no books or plays have been produced which have as their subject the great Fergana Canal or the Farchad electric power station, etc. Everybody knows that we have declared war on the uncultivated steppes and intend to open up virgin regions, as for instance Mirza Chol. But the writers do not mention this at all and do not choose current topics for their works. The subjects of the painters and the themes of the poets and artists are not dedicated to Soviet achievements, but deal with romantic old traditions.

The representatives of culture must be completely familiar with the doctrine of Marxism and Leninism, with socialist realism, and must stand in the foremost ranks of the fighting front in order to make the people familiar with the propaganda of the Party, with the Party line and the interests of the government".

In the name of their organizations in Uzbekistan and the members of these organizations, the following persons publicly pledged their word at this congress to contribute an active share in influencing the people and, in particular, the young generation in cultural, ideological and economic respect, and to help to realize the decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party:



K. J a s h i n, First Secretary of the Writers' Union
E s h a n t o r a (jev), people's actor
B a b a (jev), chairman of the Composers' Union
I k r a m (ov), chairman of the Society of Fine Arts
A h m e d (ov), chief producer of the Tashkent theatre
M u h a m e d (ov), Minister of Culture of Uzbekistan
A i m i r z a (jev), chairman of the Writers' Union of
Karakalpakistan
A l i c a n (ov), in the name of the kolkhoz farmers
S a l a m o v a, in the name of the industrial workers

50X1-HUM

22

C. Summary
=====

By means of various typical examples, we have, in this report, illustrated the trend of the present situation in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan; but this trend against the Soviet regime is by no means new. (As early as 1937 organized anti-Soviet and anti-Russian movements were discovered in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan; and first Party secretaries, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, ministers, presidents, intellectuals, kolkhoz supervisors, and others were arrested and shot in mock trials.) Indeed, 50X1-HUM Turkestan was bled on a large scale.

Moscow has been endeavouring to increase the production of milk, meat, fats, etc., as well as the stock of cattle; but in 1960 there were still only 5.5 million horned cattle in Kazakhstan, that is to say, the same stock as in 1930. Such is the result after 40 years of Soviet rule in Kazakhstan, and, incidentally, the 40th anniversary of this Soviet Republic is to be celebrated on a large scale in 1961!

50X1-HUM

23

[REDACTED]

This report endeavours to show the trend and development of the Soviet economic system and the extent to which the people put up a resistance. Khrushchov, however, tries to blame his defeat in the agricultural sector and in the ideological field on the local Party functionaries in Turkestan; and for this reason, purges are now being carried out there. In order to consolidate their position, the Russian-authorized representatives in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan in January 1961 demanded that additional young Communists should be sent to Turkestan, on the grounds that there was a shortage of labour there. Moscow is therefore planning to send one million young Communists to Turkestan.

The situation as described in this report shows what the general feeling is in the five Soviet Republics of Turkestan. In spite of passive resistance, the people are, of course, aware that they cannot overthrow the regime by such measures; but they harm the regime whenever they have an opportunity. The Turkestanian population is still a factor of danger which the Kremlin will have to face in the event of a conflict.