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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Poland

REPORT

SUBJECT Police Repression, Regimentation,  
Sabotage and Overt Violence in  
Poland (STRIKES/CORRUPTION/  
CENSORSHIP/RADIO JAMMING)

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SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE

1. report containing information on police repression, promised reforms, forced labor camps, specific and pretable incidents of sabotage, enforced regimentation, radio jamming, press censorship and known incidents of strikes and overt violence in Poland.

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ARMY review completed.

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POLICE REPRESSION, ENFORCED REGIMENTATION, SABOTAGE AND  
OVERT VIOLENCE IN POLANDIntroduction

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The following is a list of locations referred to in this report with coordinates:

BYDGOSZCZ	(N53-09, E18-00)(UTM CD-0190)
DARLOWO	(N54-25, E16-25)(UTM WA-9131)
DEBICA	(N50-03, E21-25)(UTM EA-3044)
GOLDAP	(N54-19, E22-18)(UTM EF-8919)
GOZDNICA	(N51-26, E15-06)(UTM US-1941)
JAWORZNO	(N50-13, E19-17)(UTM CA-7663)
JERZMANICE	3 km southwest of ZLOTORYJA (N51-07, E15-55) (UTM WS-6464)
KOLOBRZEG	(N54-11, E15-35)(UTM WA-3703)
KOWARY	(N50-48, E15-50)(UTM WS-5928)
LODZ	(N51-45, E19-28)(UTM CC-9437)
LUBON	(N52-21, E16-54)(UTM XU-2901)
MIELEC	(N50-17, E21-25)(UTM EA-3070)
MIELECIN	(N53-05, E14-55)(UTM WU-8489)
NOWA HUTA	(N50-05, E20-04)(UTM DA-3448)
PIECHCIN	(N52-50, E18-03)(UTM CD-0157)
POZNAN	(N52-30, E17-00)(UTM XU-3080)
SIERADZ	(N51-36, E18-45)(UTM CC-4319)
SLUPSK	(N54-27, E17-02)(UTM XA-3237)
STRONIE SLASKIE	(N50-18, E16-53)(UTM XR-3373)
STRZEGOM	(N50-58, E16-21)(UTM WS-9546)
STRZELCE OPOLSKIE	(N50-31, E18-18)(UTM CA-0999)
STRZELIN	(N50-47, E17-04)(UTM XS-4628)
USTKA	(N54-35, E16-51)(UTM XA-2050)
WALBRZYCH	(N50-46, E16-17)(UTM WS-9024)
WOJCIESZOW	(N50-55, E15-45)(UTM WS-5239)
WROCLAW	(N51-06, E17-02)(UTM XS-3468)

1. Police Repression

## a. Statistics on Crime

Infractions of the law have been constantly increasing during the post-war years. In 1956, there were 45,000 cases of hooliganism handled by the Police, which constituted a 25-percent increase over 1955. However, there were many cases of hooliganism not reported, which would increase this amount tremendously.

In 1956 there were 18,000 cases of illegal financial speculation and blackmarketeering reportedly handled by the Police; however, it could be justly estimated that as many again were hushed by corrupt police officials.

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Approximately 230,000 cases of armed robbery and 100,000 cases of larceny were reportedly handled by the Police, as well as 1,300 arrests of registered prostitutes. This latter number would be increased by 15-fold if all unregistered prostitutes were picked up for known infractions of the law.

Official police reports regarding criminal arrests for 1956 were 370,000 incidents, or percentage wise 16 incidents for every 10,000 inhabitants in Poland.

#### b. Police Activities

The Police were less evident in the streets as a general rule. In cases of street brawls, the Police were seldom if ever present to arrest the offenders and to reinstate order. No one ever depended on the Police in a case of emergency. In rare cases when a policeman was around when a street brawl started, the civilian population never lifted a finger to aid him if the odds were against him. There were cases in WARSAW, where a person, drunk or ill, lay on the city's sidewalk for hours without the aid or intervention of the Police or the civilian population. No one ever wanted to be a witness for or against the police authorities when incidents were brought into court. Secret arrests and trials were practically non-existent. The Police generally remained at their headquarters where they were constantly busy maintaining and issuing citizen identity cards, registering transients, book-keeping criminal and domestic complaints, and maintaining their method of prosecution control and registration.

After 1956, there was approximately 15 percent more police in evidence than there had been before GOMULKA came into power. On the other hand, the fear of the Police had lessened. In the past the inhabitants did not believe that the Police were their protectors and the enforcers of laws protecting the people, but that they were only used as a means of terror and pressure against the people. After 1956, the inhabitants at least looked on the Police as non-persecutors, who, however, were without too much success in combating criminal offenders. In the past there were many complaints against Police brutality and outright murder. Since GOMULKA'S investiture the Police became less brutal. Laws were established to the effect that unnecessary use of weapons against the people was punishable by suspension, dismissal or imprisonment. These laws put fear into the Police to such a degree that they even refused to use arms against outright criminals and incidents of hooliganism.

A large number of the complaints and processes were shelved and forgotten since there was a lack of qualified personnel to handle the investigation details. The lack of the following factors caused a low level of Police efficiency: communication, personnel, education and training, walking and motorized patrols, and citizen support. Added to the above, there was too much paper work and too many fields to cover for the personnel on hand. The Police were too deeply involved in the crackdown on blackmarketeers and scalpers.

In the latter part of 1956 and early 1957 the Polish Government announced open warfare against hooliganism, however, with no gratifying results. Many cases of outright brutality, such as rape, murder, armed robbery and assault by the hooligan gangs came to light daily. Many were arrested; however, the penalties imposed on these delinquents was not harsh enough and the percentage of those arrested and tried was too small to make any noticeable decrease in their activities. Those who were brought to justice were usually paroled to their parents or guardians after being held a month or two in confinement.

#### c. Promised Reforms

In 1957, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Wladyslaw WICHA, and the Commander of the Polish Citizens Militia (Polska Milicja Obywatelska), DOBIESZAK (fnu), promised that reforms would take place. The following steps were taken:

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(1) The increase in Police pay from 1200 to 2000 zlotys a month was announced. (This was still a meager salary when compared with the cost of living in Poland.)

(2) The allocation of sufficient new and better housing facilities for the Police and their families. (These improvements only scratched the surface of the housing problem.)

(3) Requirements for higher aptitude and scholastic standards were instituted for Police personnel and a two year trial training was established for new recruits.

(4) Ex-military personnel were approached by recruiters for police duty.

(5) New regulations were established and those regarding the use of weapons by the Police were modified, thereby affording the Police more protection against possible prosecution.

(6) The latest known criminal laboratory equipment was purchased for the purpose of combating crime, and more communication and transportation equipment was made available to the Police.

(7) Propaganda popularizing the Police became more evident.

(8) New and stricter laws combating alcoholism and prostitution were brought into effect.

(9) New divisions for combating juvenile delinquency and hooliganism and added administrative sections were formed.

(10) Brutal interrogation methods were abolished and persons could not be held longer than 48 hours without being formally charged with a specific infraction of the laws.

The above-mentioned reforms slightly improved the Police standards, when compared with the conditions of the past. The people were not favorably impressed by these changes, since it was still evident that the Police acted cowardly toward hooligan gangs; that the overall laws were still bad; that the Police still used their weapons unnecessarily; that the ranks of the Police still included uneducated personnel; that brutal methods were still used in obtaining necessary information; that the lack of sufficient patrols was still evident and lastly that Police bribery, "bought" protection, and conceit still existed. These facts left the people with feeling of distrust, disrespect, and scorn for the Police.

#### e. Forced Labor Camps

After GOMULKA came into power, 22 of the then existing camps were liquidated. Approximately 50 percent (40,000) of the political and civil offenders were given amnesties. In July 1957, [redacted] camps existing in Poland. They were located in the following places:

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DEBICA	JAWORZNO	KOWARY
JERZMANICE, approximately 3 km SW of ZLOTORYJA	MIELECIN	
PIECHCIN (two camps)	SLUPSK	STRONIE SLASKIE
STRZEGOM	STRZELCE OPOLSKIE	STRZELIN
WOJCIESZOW	WROCLAW	

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The political and civil offenders were compelled to work in lime, granite, and basalt quarries, coal and ore mines probably including uranium mines, and in an unidentified steel and concrete prefabrication plant in JAWORZNO as well as many other unidentified plants and construction sites throughout Poland.

## 2. Sabotage

### a. Minimizing the Existence of Saboteurs

The authorities labelled all accidents, economic failures and outright mistakes as deliberate acts of sabotage. They could not claim inefficiency and economic blunderings on Communist doctrine. It was for this reason many such incidents were labelled Western-influenced acts of sabotage against the government. However, the Polish people knew, that it was for the most part "fictitious sabotage".

It could not be said that there were no cases of sabotage at plants, construction sites etc, since many cases of deliberate intent to stop production and output had occurred. These acts were committed by persons with grudges against foremen, supervisors and others, as well as outright acts of spiteful hooliganism. [redacted] not know of any organized groups of trained saboteurs existing in Poland or any which were directly or indirectly supported by a western power for the sole purpose of committing acts of sabotage against the Polish Government. Security agencies of the former UB had taken preventive measures against the constant occurrence of these incidents by making periodic security checks at all plants, factories, construction sites and other places of work, and by placing informants and "watch dogs" at these locations for the purpose of spying on people.

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### b. Specific Incidents

In 1947, the Chief of the Quartering-Construction Department (Department Kwaterek-Budowlany) of the Ministry of National Defense, Col BRONSKI, (fnu), was executed by a firing squad for the deliberate mishandling of finances and the acceptance of bribes, while four of his subordinates, two majors and two lieutenants (names unknown) were imprisoned (length of sentence unknown). One of the imprisoned majors was pardoned in 1956, because of ill health, after serving seven years in prison. The owner of the private construction firm, SZTOMPKA, (fnu), who was supposed to have given the bribes, was sentenced to death; however it was later reduced to 15-years imprisonment.

In 1949, during the dedication ceremonies of the newly constructed complex of buildings of the Council of Ministers Offices, located on the former Alleja Stalina 1-3 (presently changed to Alleje Ujazdowskie) in WARSAW, a water heater exploded (apparently due to a faulty thermostat) in the bathroom of Premier BIERUT'S office, destroying the bathroom and partially damaging BIERUT'S office. The director of the construction project, along with three technicians (names unknown), were accused of sabotage, secretly tried and sentenced to 12 years in prison.

In 1949, the Vice Minister of Public Security in charge of Economic Sabotage Incidents, KRATKA, (fnu), accused and arrested one GROSZKOWSKI, (fnu), who was the Director of Mining Enterprises in DARLOWO, USTKA, SLUPSK, and KOLOBRZEG along with a number of his subordinates (names and number unknown), for misappropriating government funds. They were found guilty and sentenced to 12 years in prison. GROSZKOWSKI and several others were released from prison in 1956.

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In 1950, during the construction of the building complex for the State Economic Planning Commission (Panstwowa Komisja Planowania Gospodarczego-PKPG) in WARSAW, some water pipes burst under mysterious circumstances, flooding and thereby ruining the completed construction work of the main floor and basement of the building. Construction experts claimed the accident occurred because of faulty water pipes; however the Ministry of Public Security labelled it as sabotage and conducted a lengthy investigation of the incident which was brought to a close because of insufficient evidence against anyone.

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In 1952, during the construction of an Aeroplane Factory (S-Plant) in MIELEC, an entire assembly hall collapsed. The Ministry of Public Security labelled this incident as sabotage on the part of Construction Engineer BULKOWSKI, (fnu), who was the director of the project, and who was tried and sentenced to four years in prison. He was pardoned in 1954, after serving two years of his sentence. Another similar incident occurred in 1952, at a construction site of a textile mill in SIERADZ, where the roof of a section of the constructed complex caved in injuring several of the construction workers. The director, (nu) of construction was sentenced to seven years in prison.

In 1953, at a coal mine in WALBRZYCH, eight of the mine's directors (names unknown) were accused of economic sabotage and consequently imprisoned. Later when the output of the mine came to practically a standstill Hilary MINC, the Chief of the State Economic Planning Commission, intervened on behalf of the directors and had them released from prison and reassigned to their former positions.

In 1954, at an unidentified Chemical Plant "ERG" located on the outskirts of BYDGOSZCZ, which produced explosives, an explosion occurred causing the death of a number of employees (exact number unknown) and scores of injuries as well as extensive property damage in the BYDGOSZCZ area. The incident was labeled an act of sabotage. The investigations were conducted secretly as were the trials of the accused (names and number of persons unknown). [redacted] the incident had instigated the proceedings for the release and consequently degrading of the then Vice Minister of Chemical Industry, Karol AKERMAN.

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In 1955 an accident in a coal mine in Silesia (exact name and location unknown) which took the lives of approximately 40 miners was labeled as an act of sabotage, planned and financed by western capitalistic powers.

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### 3. Enforced Regimentation

#### a. Civilian Organizations and Societies

Enforced regimentation became practically non-existent after GOMULKA came into power. The following voluntary organizations and societies were [redacted] in existence in Poland [redacted]

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(1). The Polish Soviet Friendship Society (Towarzystwo Przyjazni Polsko-Radzieckiej). In the latter part of 1955 this society had approximately 1,000,000 members who were both Party and non-Party members. This number dropped to 450,000 after GOMULKA came into power. The membership dues were approximately 50 groszy a month. The society held monthly social afternoon teas and discussion sessions pertaining to Soviet culture, traditions and their influence in Poland. The Society also held quarterly Soviet cultural, musical and film festivals. Most of the non-Party members belonged to this society so they would not be harassed by Party activists as being belligerent toward Polish-Soviet friendship ties.

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## (2). Polish Trade Unions (Polskie Związki Zawodowe)

There were approximately 21 trade unions in existence in Poland. The total membership was approximately 7,000,000. The membership dues varied between one-half and one percent of the members monthly gross wages. Members were supposed to attend monthly meetings (50 percent seldom did) and a yearly election and progress review meeting. It was during this yearly election and progress review meeting, that it was often necessary to post guards at all exits of buildings, factories, etc. in order to insure 100 percent attendance.

## (3). League of Soldiers' Friends (Ligja Przyjaciół Żołnierza)

This organization was in reality a paramilitary one, although it was not propagandized as such. Membership was voluntary and monthly dues were small, while the courses it offered were very attractive to the younger generation.

The courses offered were as follows: rifle match competition, glider flying, model building, Morse code and radio transmission, parachute jump training, boating and swimming, and first aid and medical.

The League also organized welcome celebrations for military units returning from maneuvers and sponsored air show spectacles with the cooperation of the Polish Air Force.

Besides the aforementioned organizations and societies, other organizations and societies (to which membership was voluntary rather than compulsory) were the Ladies League (Liga Kobiet) and the Polish Boy Scouts (Polskie Harcerstwo) which came back into existence in 1955.

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## b. Military Training in Higher Schools of Learning (Studium Wojskowy)

There were 76 schools of higher learning in Poland and approximately 140,000 students. There were approximately 100,000 male students who were compelled to take the military training course for a three or four year period (particulars regarding the course were unknown). this training made 25,000 young men available for officer duty yearly in Poland, in the event of an emergency.

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## c. Reserve Military Training

all Polish reservists were compelled to take one day of military training within their military district each year and three months training every three or four years. In the 1956-1957 period there were two major reductions in the Polish Armed Forces which relaxed the stress on general military training throughout Poland.

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## d. Radio Jamming

no existing radio jamming stations or networks in Poland after January 1957. However, it was a well known fact that during the Poznan Riots in 1956 a radio jamming station and tower were completely destroyed by rioters in that city. Practically similar incidents occurred in BYDGOSZCZ in November 1956 and in SZCZECIN in December 1956. After GOMULKA came to power, it was widely propagandized, that all radio jamming stations in Poland would be abolished. Even after this statement became fact, jamming incidents still occurred, particularly around 2300 hours. these jammings were caused by jamming stations located in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. This did not create much of a problem since the same transmissions by BBC, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America could be picked up on other wave lengths and times.

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[redacted] in the past Poland received 50 million zlotys yearly from a Soviet Satellite Bloc Fund for the maintenance of radio jamming stations in Poland. BILLIG further commented that he did not know why the Poles were so happy over the liquidation of these stations, since it cost the Polish Government Treasury 50 million zlotys yearly, which could have been put to good use.

#### e. Press Censorship

Immediately after GOMULKA came into power press censorship was completely relaxed; however, the government heads realized this was a mistake and in June or July of 1957, press censorship and control were again put into effect. The Press, Publications and Pageants Control Administration (Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk) located on Ulica Bracka in WARSAW, under the Directorship of ZAWADKO (fnu) was directly responsible for press censorship in Poland. ZAWADKO and his administration were in turn responsible to Artur STAREWICZ, who was the Chief of the Press Department in the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party (Kierownik Wydziału Prasowego, Komitetu Centralnego, PZPR) in WARSAW.

#### f. Job Changing

[redacted] job changing did not pose a major problem in Poland. All job changes had to be listed in a person's passport. The real problem of job changing, particularly when a person went from one city to another, was housing. Persons desiring to change jobs from one large city to another, such as WARSAW, KRAKOW, POZNAN, or within the areas of the Polish Border Belt, first had to receive a letter of acceptance from the new employer stating that the person would be accepted and would be given adequate living quarters upon making the job change.

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### 4. Strikes and Overt Violence

#### a. Striking Prior to 1956

Prior to 1956, strikes were unheard of in Poland. There were minor protests, peaceful demonstrations and work stoppages at some plants, mines and construction sites. These protests were treated as minor workers' grievances against the directorates of their plants. The grievances were usually settled after some minor official was chosen as the scapegoat. Promises were made for improvements; however, few ever became realities.

These minor protests, peaceful demonstrations and work stoppages were usually instigated at Workers Meetings (Narady Wytworcze). They usually began with sharp criticism of the plant "Bureaucracy", but never the government. Party officials always based their arguments against strikes on claims that the party theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" stated that the proletariat could not strike against the state since he was a worker and everything in a workers' state belonged to the worker. It was further stated that in Capitalism, the owners of private industries never went on strike against themselves.

#### b. Specific Incidents of Protests, Peaceful Demonstrations and Work Stoppage

Such incidents became apparent between 1953 and 1955. They had always been settled after minor concessions and threats of expulsion and possible arrest were made. In LODZ, the women workers of an unidentified textile mill protested that they were underpaid; forced to work under unhealthy conditions; received suspensions for pilfering bits of material and yarn; and had inadequate housing in the mill region. Promises were made to improve general conditions; however, they seldom if ever were carried-out.

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The miners in the Silesian Region protested because they had to work on Sundays; they were forced to work under unsafe and unhealthy conditions; they had to compete with prison labor; and the directors and experts at the mines were not their own people but "foreigners" sent from WARSAW to boss them.

Machine shop workers in Silesia and construction workers at large construction sites throughout Poland protested against the increased demands of production output without increase in pay and the insufficient padding (niedostateczny przyrtek długiego ołowka) of production output by foremen and timekeepers.<sup>2</sup>

The farmers and village folk and the intelligentsia of the cities seldom if ever complained about working conditions or salaries. Their main complaints and protests were against the outrageous acts and wrongful arrests by the Public Security Forces (UB) of Poland.

#### c. The 1956 Strikes

In the early part of 1956, small departmental strikes began to occur in unidentified plants in LODZ and WROCLAW and then finally in July 1956, at the Cegielski Locomotive Plant in POZNAN.

##### (1) The Poznan Strike

This locomotive plant was directly subordinate to the Central Administration of Railroad Equipment (Centralny Zarząd Taboru i Sprzętu Kolejowego-TASKO) of the Ministry of Industrial Machinery. The negotiations lasted for approximately three months. The workers demanded additional pay for overtime, for difficult working conditions, for shutdowns due to lack of materials. They also wanted to be reimbursed for unjustified withholding of wages for such as insurance, vacations and medical care.

The plant's administrative body could not make any conclusive decision in the case and referred the matter over to TASKO, which in turn referred it to the Minister of Industrial Machinery, Roman FIDELSKI, who referred it to Vice Premier Stanislaw LOPAT. LOPAT refused to make any conclusive decision in the matter, for fear of weakening his position in the government. Only after all these indecisive moves did the workers of the Cegielski Plant call out a general strike. They gathered in the plant's yard and several thousand workers walked out into the streets of POZNAN. The interesting fact of the whole matter was that the workers of the Cegielski Plant who walked out, worked under better conditions and were paid better wages than their counterparts at other plants in Poland. One predominant factor for the walk-out was that the plant had many old workers, who compared the working conditions of 1956 to those of the pre-WWII period.

When the workers walked out into the streets, rumors spread through the crowds that the plant's delegates who were sent to WARSAW to negotiate the demands were arrested by the UB. The strikers immediately began to shout anti-regime slogans as well as defamatory remarks against the Ministry of Public Security and its personnel. The strikers were joined by multitudes of POZNAN dwellers, who joined not because of the economic pay reasons the workers first had in mind, but because of the anger created by the mob. The entire mob marched to the building which housed the UB Headquarters. The UB personnel in the building immediately called WARSAW for instructions, which were "do not fire at the workers" and an immediate decision was made to meet the workers demands. However, this decision was made too late to avert a catastrophe. The mob began to throw stones through the windows of the UB Headquarters and used small arms fire from weapons taken away from the Police. The 1st Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR) in POZNAN, STASIAK, (fnu), escaped from the building and went into hiding before the mob entered the building. The 2d

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Party Secretary walked out into the street and tried to talk to the mob, but he was beaten. The Police which were called to the scene were disarmed by the mob and dispersed. One policeman was killed by the mob. Meanwhile the mob in front of the UB Headquarters, set fire to a gasoline station across the street from the headquarters building. After four hours the UB personnel in the building opened fire on the mob in the street. After this the demonstrators turned to rioting. The workers began canvassing all offices and enterprises in POZNAN, instructing all personnel to join the rioters. Other workers, who had a complete list of all UB personnel and their home addresses, entered their homes with the intention of doing them bodily harm. However, no one was found since most of the personnel were either at the UB Headquarters or in hiding.

It was then that the government dispatched Premier CYRANKIEWICZ to POZNAN, and Minister of Defense ROKOSSOWSKI ordered armored units from LODZ and LUBLIN to converge on POZNAN. Simultaneously, he ordered General POLTORZYCKI to POZNAN, to take charge of the armored units which were sent there and he also ordered the stoppage of all traffic out of POZNAN, because he feared that the rioting workers would make an attempt to incite other workers in other cities to a general strike. The following day CYRANKIEWICZ and POPLAWSKI arrived at the airport in POZNAN and there they began to form a plan of operation. The armored units began to arrive at the city's outskirts from the south and the east; however, they were ordered not to open fire on the people. The government officials began parleys with workers, assuring them that the delegates, who were sent to WARSAW, were in good health and that the entire demonstration was in bad taste in the eyes of all foreigners, who were presently in POZNAN participating in the International Sports Meet. The demonstrators destroyed an antenna tower and a radio jamming station which was within seeing distance of the stadium where the meets were being held. The workers denied this act, and said that it was apparently a deliberate act of destruction on the part of some hooligan gang, which took advantage of the demonstration and confusion. CYRANKIEWICZ told the workers that the following concessions would be made,

- (1). Pay demands would be met.
- (2). The personnel of the administration, the ministry, and the Vice Premier, who were responsible for the negligence of negotiating and arriving at a conclusive answer to the problem would be dealt with.
- (3). The 1st Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the PZPR would be replaced.
- (4). The organizers of the strike would not be punished, but the persons who were responsible for the deaths of the policemen and others killed or injured during the riots and those who tried to overthrow the government would have to face a just court where considerations would be given the circumstances surrounding the incident.
- (5). The UB offices would either be abolished or reduced.

CYRANKIEWICZ further stated that the strike may well have been justified, but that open rebellion against the government was uncalled for and this made it necessary for the responsible parties to be punished. (In CYRANKIEWICZ's own words, "the hand raised against the government with malicious intent, would be cut off.") From that day on, CYRANKIEWICZ was referred to by the POZNAN workers as the Premier with the amputated hand (Premier z odcieta reka).

The Polish newspapers carried many stories regarding the Poznan Riots, stating that foreign agents were responsible for the organization of the riots. Two hours after CYRANKIEWICZ spoke to the rioters, order was reestablished with a minimum loss of blood and property damage. A very shaken CYRANKIEWICZ returned to WARSAW, realizing the possible consequences which could have arisen from the Poznan Riots.

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## (2) Aftermath of the Poznan Strike

CYRANKIEWICZ immediately began to work on democratic-type reforms, insisting on more rights for the workers, the curtailment of UB powers and the complete breakaway from the Stalinist methods of operation. The UB in POZNAN was reduced in strength and reprimanded for their past actions. In September 1956, the remnants of UB personnel in POZNAN resigned. Their spokesman said that the government sold them out after 11 years of forcing them to work against the people, causing the wrath of the people of POZNAN to come down on their shoulders, and now after they had outlived their usefulness they were being put out to pasture, just like so many cattle. Soon after this the Polish government officially announced the liquidation of all UB offices throughout Poland.

Meanwhile, in the latter part of September, approximately 200 persons were arrested (workers, students and intelligentsia) in POZNAN. The trials began in October; however, in the end, all were released, with the exception of the few who were found guilty of murder and unnecessary brutality during the riots. The editor of the newspaper "Trybuna Ludu", Jerzy MORAWSKI, wrote an editorial about the Poznan Riots, stating that the riots were justified in many ways. He put a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Party was partially to blame, since many Party members had participated in the riots. The Soviet newspapers carried accounts of the riots, putting the blame for them on western imperialist powers and said that the workers of POZNAN allowed themselves to be used as pawns of these powers. MORAWSKI in turn countered the Soviet newspaper accusations by again stating that the fault of the riot should be laid at the feet of the Party, since it was the Party which did not correct its errors in time to avert the riot. It was for this article in the Trybuna Ludu, that MORAWSKI was released from his position as editor.

The aftermath of the riots also saw the release of Minister FIDELSKI and Vice Premier LOPAT. It was from the delegates who represented the locomotive workers of POZNAN and WARSAW that the idea of Workers Councils had crystallized and these councils began to form spontaneously in many government institutions throughout Poland, after 1956.

After "Poznan" many of the political leaders who had been in office during the crisis were discredited and released. Consequently, a person was sought after who did not have anything to do with the incident, in fact, one who may have suffered some repercussions during the crisis. Such a person was GOMULKA, who came into power in October 1956. It was not until three months after the incident that he came into the limelight of political significance. When he did, the workers thought that now their demands would be realized to the fullest extent. Every factory, plant, construction enterprise and other place of employment began to claim compensations from four to five years back. Workers sent delegates to their individual ministries, who had ultimatums as follows: "If you do not meet our demands we will strike, and furthermore we will not return to work unless positive decisions are made".

From the beginning CYRANKIEWICZ announced in a speech, that all grievances from the past four years would be compensated, and the Polish Parliament (Sejm) passed a Workers Compensation Act. However, after a month when the government figured out the compensations due, it was established that it would be necessary to pay out 40 billion zlotys. (The yearly government income was approximately 250 billion zlotys). The Pay Fund for 7,200,000 employees in Poland came to 116 billion zlotys. The government was shocked at this sum, because, if it were paid, inflation would be inevitable. CYRANKIEWICZ, afraid to back down on this promise, turned the whole matter over to Vice Premier JAROSZEWICZ, who on 1 December 1956, took it upon himself to issue a confidential circular, instructing all Polish Banks not to pay any compensations. In the latter part of

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December 1956, GOMULKA asked the Polish workers to voluntarily give up their due compensations to the government. In February 1957, the newly elected Parliament (Sejm) amended the legislation passed by the former Parliament in November 1956. Nonetheless, between November 1956 and February 1957, the Polish Workers managed to receive approximately eight billion zlotys in extra compensations from the frightened ministers and directors of individual ministries and central administrations, through the constant threat of starting strikes.

During this time many small strikes occurred, which lasted one or two days. However, the threat of larger strikes was always averted when the ministries and directorates agreed to the terms of the workers. Many ministers and directors found themselves caught between the demands of the workers and the scorn and reprimands of Vice Premier JAROSZEWICZ, who was actually the only one looking out for the country's economy. This wrath brought on voluntary resignations of many ministers and directors. Many Workers Councils literally "carried out ministers and directors on slabs" when they refused to concede to the demands of the workers.

#### d. Minor Strikes

The first was at the "Lenin" Steel Combine in NOWA HUTA approximately 20 km east of KRAKOW, in October 1956. A regulation had been in effect giving a 20-percent bonus allowance to all plant employees including common laborers and administrative personnel. The construction workers at the yet uncompleted part of the plant demanded the same type compensation be paid their common laborers and administrative personnel. The workers called a general meeting of all construction personnel and elected delegates to deliver their argument to the proper people. The delegates were sent to the Minister of Construction, Eugeniusz SZYR, who answered that concessions as such would be a breach of regulations. The construction workers went on strike immediately, halting all activity on the project. The first Party Secretary of the Krakow Provincial Committee, seeing all work stopped at the project, immediately went to Minister SZYR and pressured him to meet the demands of the workers so that the construction work would continue on the project. SZYR made the concessions and the strike ended. However, he was called to appear before JAROSZEWICZ, to whom he explained that he had no alternative in the matter, since the Director of the Lenin Steel Combine and the Ministry of Steel Industry had previously set a precedent, and therefore he had no alternative but to agree.

The second took place in LUBON, south of POZNAN, on 12 December 1956, at an old synthetic fibers plant which was being enlarged since 1954, by the Poznan Industrial Construction Association (Poznanskie Zjednoczenie Budownictwa Przemyslowego). The plant workers were receiving a 20 percent additional allowance for unhealthy working conditions due to bad ventilation and the constant presence of sulphur fumes and smoke in and outside of the plant. The construction workers on the project, who worked mostly in the open air complained that they were also subject to the effects of the sulphur fumes and smoke since they first began working on the project years earlier. In October 1956 there were several conferences held in the construction workers' Trade Union regarding these complaints. The Minister of Construction was forwarded a copy of the grievance and he assigned a medical expert to substantiate the complaint. The medical expert was given a month to bear out his findings. In December 1956 the workers refused to wait any longer and demanded immediate action in the matter plus a two year retroactive pay of the 20 percent that was being paid the factory workers. For an unknown reason there was no expert's report, and the construction workers went out on strike. The Poznan Party Provincial Committee immediately notified Vice Premier JAROSZEWICZ, who became uneasy about the situation, since this was also in the Poznan area.

After lengthy discussions, the workers relented in their demands for the two year retroactive pay allowances, and in turn were given the 20-percent additional allowance

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for unhealthy working conditions. [ ] the director of the construction project could have easily settled the whole matter had he not been afraid to make any decisions.

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In September 1956 the doctors and nurses in WROCLAW threatened to walk out on strike if the Ministry of Health would not improve their pay scale and working conditions. Promises were immediately made regarding the pay raises and improvements. However, the concessions never became a reality until the early part of 1957. Before the concessions were made the doctors and nurses in an unidentified hospital in WROCLAW walked out on strike for a twenty-four hour period, leaving behind a skeleton crew of doctors and nurses to handle the patients on hand and to look after any emergencies that might occur.

In October 1956, the dock workers and sailors in the port of GDANSK went out on a general strike, demanding that the Director of the Sea Institute (Dyrektor Instytutu Morskiego), DARSKI, (fnu), be reinstated to his former position as Minister of Navigation, which he held from 1953 to 1955, replacing Minister POPIEL whom they claimed incapable of performing the job. Another demand of the strikers was that all seamen who had in earlier years been banned from sailing on merchant ships on the open seas because they were considered political risks, be again allowed to sign on vessels making foreign voyages, and that the stress on political education of merchant seamen be lessened. The first demand was granted, whereas partial concessions were made regarding the last two demands, and the strike was called off after several days.

In November 1956 the workers at the Locomotive Repair Works in POZNAN went out on strike for one day; however, the Ministry of Railroads met all the demands of the workers and the strike was called off.

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2. [ ] it was common practice in Poland, throughout all employment fields, to pad all output or production data of the workers, thus affording them higher wages. [ ] although this was illegal everyone knew it was going on.

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