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PART I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE USSR AND POLAND UNTIL 1956

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Chapter I.

The Beginnings of Relations Between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Poland

1. ← The development of relations between the leading strata of the Communist Soviet Union and Poland shows several peculiarities. Some of these

peculiarities are based on historical facts. The facts are both new and old and have caused a greater feeling of enmity on the part of the Polish people toward Russia to be much greater than that in many other satellite (for example, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania). These facts have also caused the Polish leaders, appointed by Stalin, to behave much more callously against their own Polish people; the Polish communist leaders were among the most "zealous" until 1956, were diligent in their emulation of the Soviet Communist Party and pushed the "Stalin Cult" to its very peak (much like Rakosi did in Hungary).

2. The following are among the factors of the past which led to the above contentions:

(a) A large part of Poland, including the largest towns of Warsaw, Lodz and Wilno, were under Russian rule for more than one hundred years. The Poles are quite familiar with the Russian character and vice-versa. This knowledge, however, did not result in any rapprochement; on the contrary it resulted in estrangement, in emphasis of the difference between the two nations, and in mutual condemnation.

(b) The Polish Freedom Fighters were the enemies of the Czar, just like the Russian Revolutionaries, although for varying reasons, both groups were united on certain of their goals and many Poles were extremely active and played significant parts in the creation of the revolutionary movement in the USSR.

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(8) Many deported Polish Freedom Fighters and Russian Revolutionaries came together in the penal colonies of Siberia.

(d) ^{between} 1895-1915, the Polish Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania ^{and} was the "most loyal" ^{of all parties} party to the Leninist Bolshevik group and, at the international congresses of the Communist Party, frequently the only party which supported Lenin's program and helped him to success.

(e) The Bolshevik-inspired street battles of 1901, 1905, and 1912 were always accompanied by simultaneous battles in Warsaw and Lodz. Until World War I, Polish and Russian communists worked hand in hand and the personal and organizational relationships between these two parties were closer than those between the CPSU and communist parties of other countries.

(f) After the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1918, Polish Communist leaders were active in the highest places of Bolshevik dictatorship. For example, there was Feliks Dzerzhinski ^{Dzierzynski}, the founder of the Cheka; there were Urycki, Marchlewski, Feliks Kon, and others. Rosa Luxemburg was dispatched to Germany ~~in order~~ to lead the communist party there. Many young Poles entered the services of the Russian Cheka or the Russian military (Bierut, Rokossovski, Malinowski, and others).

(g) Thus, around the period of 1918-1921, the Polish communists wielded an important influence and enjoyed a great deal of ^{Lenin's} confidence, ~~on the part of Lenin~~. At the beginning it appeared as though strong communist influences were at work among the Polish people; however, it soon transpired that the Polish people rejected Communism and, in 1921, the peace treaty between Russia and Poland was signed at Riga finally quashing the Russian Revolutionary hopes for Poland.

(h) In 1926, when Pilsudski was developing a strong anti-Communist and anti-Russian policy in Poland, Stalin criticized the Polish Communist Party for its blindness; since that time, relations between the Bolsheviks

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and the Polish Communist Party began to cool visibly. These relations had been warm and friendly under Lenin; finally, in 1936, the Komintern decided, ^{at} upon Stalin's instigation, to dissolve the Polish Communist Party (under the pretext of accusing it of being permeated with traitors and provocators).

The Polish communist leaders, Warszawski, Warski, Ryng and many others, who had been invited to Moscow, were killed there, ^{probably} ~~The reason~~ ^{because} ~~was probable that~~ they were members of the same group of old-guard communists (to which Rykov, and Bucharin also belonged) ^{and} which was liquidated by Stalin.

Chapter II.

New Leadership for the Polish Communists

3. ~~1~~ Stalin began to prepare a new leadership [for the Poles], ~~consisting of only~~ blindly loyal Polish communists, capable of any deed (even deeds directed against the Polish people). This group included such people as Wanda Wasilewska; Franciszek Mazur, who was the only surviving member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party; Berman; Radkiewicz; and others. In 1939, when Stalin annexed Eastern Poland, all Polish communists were carefully "sifted" and examined and many of them were deported or murdered. Only a small part, ^{of} the Bolshevik followers, ~~the~~ ^{the} people blindly loyal to Stalin, ^{they} were recognized as equals and ~~these~~ ^{they} entitled to stay alive, ~~and~~ were assigned to the Ukrainian Bolshevik Party to be generally used as denunciators and propagandists. These were the people who not only did not raise any objections to the deportation of 1.5 million Poles (their own countrymen), but actually assisted in these moves.

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4. ~~2.~~ In 1941-1942, a change took place. In order to convert the deported Poles into a Polish army under ^{Soviet} Russian leadership, Stalin needed more political agitators of Polish origin. The "Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich" (ZPP -- Association of Polish Patriots), which was created in 1942 in Moscow, consisted of the following:

- (a) The few remaining Polish communists of the Bolshevik group;
- (b) Former Polish communists ^{into} which were "fished out of" the resettlement areas of Kazakhstan, Siberia, etc., and who were now assigned to the First Polish Division in Lenino on the Oka River;
- (c) Russians of Polish origin who still spoke a little Polish and who suddenly appeared in leading positions in the new divisions as "Polish Nationals."

5. ~~3.~~ The change in the relationship between Stalin and the Polish Communists in 1942-1943 thus was based on the fact that he trusted them only a little; he had only some confidence in the newly-created communists, that is to say, these people who were left after the liquidation of the Polish Communist Party and after the 1939-1941 purges.

These people were placed under the leadership of Beria agents such as Bierut; Berman; Mazur; Radkiewicz. From this first division sprang the upper strata of the Polish government and Polish Communist Party in 1944. This strata included such names as Minc, Jedrychowski, Naszkowski, Nowak, Zambrowski, Modzelewski (died in 1950), Jaroszewicz and others. But Stalin continued in his distrust of the Polish people and those Communists who were active in occupied Poland.

4. In 1943 and 1944, as the field of the battle shifted to Poland, the Moscow-trained Polish Communists created partisan groups which, from the very beginning, did not work together with other ~~National~~ Polish underground groups. These emissaries, who had been sluiced into Poland by parachute from Russia, collaborated with the following groups which were then active in Poland:

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AL (Armia Ludowa - people's Army); BCH (Bataliony Chlopskie - Peasant Battalions), and the GL (Gwardia Ludowa - People's Guard), but they worked against the AK (Armia Krajowa - Home Army) and the NSZ (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne - National Armed Forces).

5. The Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Polish National Liberation Committee) which was created in Lublin in 1944, consisted on the one hand, of the emissaries who had returned from Russia, Beria agents, Russian-trained members of Patriotic Association and leaders of the First Division, and on the other hand of the leading communist^s who had not been in Russia but had been active in German-occupied Poland. These latter included such persons as Gomulka, Spychalski, Albrecht, Zawadzki, Mijal, Loga-Sowinski, Dworakowski, etc. or persons who were active in labor camps during their confinement by the Nazis, such as Cyrankiewicz, Izydorczyk, etc. However the difference between the communist leaders, that is to say the difference between those who had come from Russia at the behi^est of Stalin, and the Poles themselves who had been recognized by Bierut and had been utilized for collaboration, remained. Thus, the first group from Russia had Stalin's confidence. On the other hand, group B, although they were indispensable to the government of Poland, were under constant surveillance by Russian NKVD agents working in Poland.

There was a thir^d group, however, This consisted of Polish communists who had once been active in the West, for example in Spain. These included such names of Swierczewski, Walter, Komar, Szyr, Konar; or those who had worked in France and Belgium (Gierek). Even this group of "deserving" Communists did not enjoy Stalin's confidence, although many of these people had been in the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945. The Soviet NKVD experts worked with group A and determined which persons from groups B and C were temporarily indispensable but should, in due time, be purged.

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6. At first, however, group A had more important work to do between 1945 and 1947, namely the combating of the National Partizan groups, the combating of several Home Army groups and the UPA (Ukrainian Anti-Russian) groups. Group A also had to liquidate the coalition parties such as the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Polish People's Party) under Mikolajczyk, the PP (Polish Workers Party) under Popiel, the PPS (Prawica-Rightist Socialist and Center Party) and the socialist parties such as the WRN (Wolnosc, Rownosc, Niepodleglosc -- Freedom Equality and Sovereignty Party) and WIN, (Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc Freedom and Independence Party).

This mission was accomplished by Group A to the greatest satisfaction of Stalin (in Czechoslovakia for example it was necessary to create a coup d'etat, whereas in Poland, Bierut accomplished these missions with much less fuss).

7. Upon completion of this mission the internal purge began. A part of the socialists went over to the communist (with their leaders -- ^C ~~A~~yrankiewicz, Rapacki, Matuszewski). The remainder of the socialist party was purged (Osobka, Morawski, the first Premier, etc.).

A part of Group B and Group C blindly subordinated itself to Group A. These defectors including Albrecht, Zawadzki, Mijal, Dworakowski. Such others as Gomulka, Spychalski, Loga Sowinski, Kliszko, Bienkowski (from Group B), Rola Zymierski etc., were excluded from the party. Some from Group C, such as General Swierczewski, disappeared forever. Komar was arrested later.

In any case, in 1948, Group A held the entire balance of power in its hands and began the execution of the second mission.

8. Uncovering of a Tito Plot and Show Trials

This mission was not accomplished by Bierut quite as rapidly as for example in Hungary (Rajk - trial); in Czechoslovakia (Slansky - trial); in Bulgaria (Koslov - trial); and in Rumania (Anna Pauker - trial).

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For unknown reasons there were no such show trials in Poland, although there were executions and trials of military leaders such as Kirchmayer, Tatar, Rzepecki, Lechowicz, Jarosiewicz, etc., and show trials directed at bishops, accompanied by imprisonment of generals and communists such as Komar, Kuropieski and others.

Some people attributed this fact to the tenacity of Gomulka and Spychalski but this does not appear to be credible. It is more likely that the reason lies in "long-lasting preparations"; preparations were so long that in the meantime Stalin died and the party line changed.

Nevertheless, through these preparatory measures, Bierut presented "proof that the Polish military is unworthy of trust" and Rokossowski took over the military leadership. The prewar officers and the officers of the Home Army were considered unreliable from the very beginning. Now, after the arrests of Spychalski and Rola Zymierski, Bierut and Stalin wanted to prove that the communist generals of the underground movement in Poland between 1939 and 1945 were also not trustworthy.

Thus, according to Bierut, the necessity "arose" of obtaining a supreme commander from the USSR. Rokossowski was given the broadest powers. He became Minister of Defense, Deputy Premier, and Member of the Politbureau, and became the second man following Bierut (some claimed he was number one). In no other satellite (as far as source knows) did an analogous situation exist, namely that a Russian stood at the head of the military forces and of the state. This unusual step had its special reasons. They were:

- a. Distrust of Polish generals. No single general (even a communist) could be found whom Stalin trusted completely.
- b. Distrust of the Polish military and of the Polish people who, in 1939-1945, were constantly active in partizan warfare and in underground movements. The combination of Polish will-to-fight, training in street fighting and anti-Russian feeling was considered by Stalin to be particularly dangerous and required special precautions.

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Simultaneously, the strategic significance of Poland, as a result of war tensions (Berlin and Korea) was rising and Stalin ordered the creation of a war industry in Poland. This gave him more reason to want to maintain strict supervision over everything and so Rokossowski was sent to Poland.

Chapter III.

The Rokossowski Period

9. Under Rokossowski the following developments took place:

The military was Russified; the amount of equipment was increased; assignments for military purposes were increased; the entire economy was militarized; the living standard declined, and the income and standing of the military rose; police power increased.

In the other satellites similar steps were taken but Bierut was particularly zealous. Polish efforts were greater than those of the other satellites.

The Polish communist leadership was particularly obedient and extra zealous; they bent every effort to increase Stalin's confidence in them, to dispel the last shadows of doubt; pro-Russian propaganda in Poland was particularly abundant; the Stalin Cult was being untiringly propagated. In the "family of Stalin students," Bierut and Rakosi were the "Exemplary Pupils." Bierut^{is} propaganda did not shy away from claiming that the Warsaw uprising was an act of treason; that the members of the Home Army were enemies of the people or were misled by the enemies of the people; that the deportation of from one to 2 million Poles ~~to~~^{to} Siberia between 1939 and 1941 was justified; that the annexation of Eastern Poland in 1939 was actually an act of benevolence; or that Lwow, Wilno, and other cities were of long-standing Russian or Ukrainian origin, etc.

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This type of propaganda tended to desecrate everything dear to the Poles, including Polish traditions, Polish pride and willingness to make sacrifices, and Polish heroism during the occupation (unlike propaganda in Czechoslovakia, for example, where the number of Nazi victims and battles with the Nazis was much smaller in comparison to Poland). Bierut sent triumphant reports on the development of the "Society of Polish-Soviet Friendship" (official statistics quoted the society's membership in 1954 at 7,000,000 members); he reported triumphantly on the "love" and "grat~~i~~itude" of the Poles to Russia and to Stalin; he sent glowing reports about the Stachanovite movement in Poland; etc.

Somehow this must have had an influence on Stalin, since he occasionally praised Bierut. Later he donated the Palace of Science and Culture in Warsaw; at this time the Poles played the leading role among the satellites.

Chapter IV.

Relationships Between Government Representatives

At official meetings of ministries the highest degree of friendliness was observed. Polish delegations in Moscow (for example, the delegation on science and technical cooperation) were treated cordially, enjoyed banquets, plenty of drinks, joy-rides and visits to the theater, etc.

One delegation of Polish party officials from the industrial sector of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, who were in the middle rank (not in the highest positions but so-called Central Committee instructors) who visited ~~at~~ the USSR in 1952, were received in luxury and toured the country for a period of 4 weeks. Upon departure, each received a present plus 1,000 rubles for personal purchases. In Poland, the Russians were treated with

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excessive cordiality during official encounters. Russian experts were received by Bierut personally and one word from the Russian expert was sufficient to cause a dismissal of a high ranking Polish official.

During the period from 1945 to March 1956 it was virtually impossible, for example, to oppose the views of a soviet expert during a conference or meeting. The chairman of such a conference was always briefed beforehand on the opinion the expert would express and in his resume at the end of the conference would always confirm the views expressed by the soviet experts, taking the opportunity to express his thanks to them; not only his personal thanks but he would also thank them as representatives of the government of the USSR or the CPSU. In most cases, these experts were members of the CPSU and personally accepted the thanks in the name of the party and government. Source can recall no single case in which a soviet expert was not a party member. Only among the workers who built the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw was a small part (particularly good welders and machinists ect.) not party members or members of the Komsomol.

Every conference or meeting in which Soviet delegates participated was used for propaganda purposes to stress the authority and "unselfishness" of the Soviet Union and to emphasize that the Soviets only had the interests of Poland at heart and that all their services were rendered only in a spirit of friendliness and fraternity.

Any kind of criticism or even differences of opinion were undesirable and not permitted; even the best Polish engineers and the highest ranking department directors who had expressed any kind of criticism were, for the most part, not promoted to higher positions and sometimes demoted to lower positions. In any case, they were

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withdrawn from future collaboration with soviet experts. On the other hand the Soviet delegates had strict orders to exercise the greatest degree of courtesy and their behavior was to be exemplary. The latter was not always the case and there were certain incidents of drunkennessⁿ⁾.

The entire period from 1945 to 1956 was dubbed in Poland as the period ^{of} ~~the~~ the three "P" namely Przyklad - Przyjazn - Pomoc (example - friendship - assistance) of the Soviet Union primarily because this theme was repeated time and time again in every Bierut speech and in every speech by Minc and Jedrychowski, as well as other leading personalities, and in all lead editorials published in the press.

With such attitudes ^{and} ~~the~~ directives it was absolutely impossible, in the course of any negotiations or trade agreements between Poland and the Soviet Union, to make any kind of justified demands, for example in relation to price or transit conditions etc., since both sides constantly emphasized that they were dealing in relations of a new kind in which there was no question of one side having an advantage over the other. After all, the Soviet Union was rendering the Polish people the maximum amount of "fraternal" assistance, without thinking of an advantage for herself. Simultaneously, Polish propaganda concentrated on praising the achievements of the USSR in all fields; this included fields of culture, science, history, technology, industry, military might etc., and everything which originated from the Soviet Union was represented as being exemplary and worthy of emulation, with the political and social achievements naturally standing at the peak.

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Chapter V.

Beginning of Criticism Following Stalin's Death

However, this propaganda was struck a serious blow from the very side from which the Polish party leadership had not expected it, namely from the Soviet Union herself in 1953 and 1954.

In the Soviet Union, the death of Stalin was followed first by a quiet and later by a louder criticism of various economic and cultural phenomena from the period of his reign. After the official announcement of Beria's execution at the end of 1953 there was also partial criticism of the methods used by the secret police. These new stands adopted by the new Soviet leadership were relayed to the Poles by the Soviet experts in Poland with some delay and found expression in the economic resolutions of the Second Polish Communist Party Congress in the spring of 1954. However, no deterioration of relationships between both parties, between both governments, was felt (with a few minor exceptions) and the existing relationship resting in every respect on blind obedience and recognition of Soviet authority in all respects, with demonstrative "gratitude" and "admiration" on the part of the Polish Communist Party and government, remained.

The Stalin line on absolute supremacy of heavy industry was now (1954) replaced by the Malenkow line of the necessity for simultaneous expansion of consumer goods industries.

The Stalin line revolving around gigantic irrigation systems (so-called Stalin's Structures of Communism) was replaced by the Khrushchev line of rendering new land arable. This new line influenced the Poles (where there are no steppes and unoccupied land) to the extent that, in general, the line of "giant Mania" was abandoned.

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In place of the monumental architecture of Stalin, including magnificent skyscrapers, Khrushchev stated the necessity for a simple, frugal building style. This style was adopted in Poland with particular interest because leading Polish architects had always hesitated to acquiesce to the idea of the Bierut show style and tongue-in-cheek had protested against the "Byzantine" foreign element in Polish postwar construction. This criticism of architecture led to the downfall of some "party architects" who were personally favored ^{by} ~~in~~ Bierut in 1955 and 1956 and since Bierut was evincing a strong personal interest in all architectural problems, the defeat of his architects was more or less a partial defeat of the party line. Even the Palace of Culture, which Bierut praised so often as "Stalin's gift and the most visible symbol of Soviet-Polish friendship," became more and more frequently the theme of Polish satire (naturally -- as long as Bierut was alive -- only in hidden form).

A generally sobering influence became apparent throughout the economy. The sensational results of ^{research by} ~~of~~ Professor Lysenko (new plants) and Lepienskaja (who claimed to be able to create artificial living cells) were disproved. However, since these research results had previously been lauded by the propaganda machine as a victory of Marxist science over "capitalist" science their disproof meant a political defeat. This had its ^e ~~an~~ effect on personnel policies. Bierut began to place individual specialists in higher positions; specialists who were not deserving communists and possibly not sons of workers or peasants (which had up to now been the primary prerequisite for occupying a leading position). Actually, three vice-ministries ⁴⁵ were appointed who were not even party members. Propaganda in favor of "the wonder plants of Mitshurin and Lysenko" was replaced by propaganda for Khrushchev's corn cultivation.

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The changes in literature were more significant. Here the period of the so-called "thaw" began. In 1954, and still more so in 1955, Polish literature was filled with critical articles attacking the cultural policy of the party. The significance of this criticism soon burst the bounds of the "cultural framework" and, in 1955-1956, grew to a criticism of the entire propaganda apparatus of the party. In addition, almost all Polish periodicals are not purely literary papers but are cultural-social-political papers, so that the criticism began to encompass the field of internal policy and the economy. The Adolf Berman who was criticized because of his cultural policies was simultaneously (with Bierut, Mazur, Radkiewicz) the person responsible for the secret police; consequently the criticism of these persons took on special significance.

Chapter VI.

Relationships Between Khrushchev and the Polish Communist Party Until the 20th Congress of the CPSU

As long as Bierut was alive, he maintained the relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union on the basis of complete subservience and obedience. Nevertheless, he was forced to permit a certain amount of criticism of Polish conditions since even in the Soviet Union a wave of criticism was permitted and actually encouraged by Khrushchev (within certain limits prescribed by him).

In this period, a certain amount of criticism was fashionable in all Satallites and the actual party line was "criticize the old party line within certain limits"; thus, as an exemplary satellite leader, Bierut also had to fill a certain "quota" of criticism in his country. However, he accomplished this with exceptional care and fear, since

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he sensed the special situation in Poland which was dangerous for him. First, he had lost his benefactor with Stalin's death and Khrushchev treated him without special preference. During the Stalin era, he was praised as the first among the satellites of Europe; at congresses, conferences, etc., he sat in the first row among the invited guests. Second, the downfall of Beria was a personal blow for Bierut, who had served under Beria for years and who understood him very well (on the other hand, he did not, for example, understand Mikojan who was not treated very highly by Stalin). Khrushchev treated Bierut in the same manner as all the other satellite leaders but without any special sympathy, which after all, he could not have for a Beria man.

This status of ~~aff~~airs made itself felt more severely after the "Swiatlo" case. During the Stalin era, this case might have cost Bierut his job, if not more. Stalin would have held him responsible for the whole situation, for the fact that Swiatlo had left Poland at all; Stalin and Beria would have punished Bierut for carelessness and inability to prevent such a "mistake."

For Khrushchev, on the other hand, the involvement of Bierut, and the exposure of the Beria system of Stalin's secret police, did not come as an altogether unwelcome episode; nevertheless, thereafter he treated Bierut in a more detached way and Czechoslovakia began to emerge more and more as the first among the Satellites. Bierut lost prestige in his personal position and was extremely zealous in attempting to win the favor of the new Kremlin leadership once more through obedience and ^esurvivality. Nevertheless, Khrushchev had no reason to depose Bierut, first because he himself was having internal difficulties with the Soviet party leadership and secondly, he could hardly have found more willing tools than Rokossowski and Bierut in attempting to counter any anti-Russian movement in Poland, possibly even with force.

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The unexplained death of Bierut after Khrushchev's ^erevolutions during the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 (Bierut died at the beginning of March 1956 in Moscow) brought a solution to the "Bierut question." Simultaneously, this point of history signifies the beginning of a change in the relationship between the two parties and the two governments.

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Part II. -- RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES FOLLOWING THE 20TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

Chapter VII.

Relationship Between the CPSU and the Natolin Group

Following Bierut's death, Edward Ochab was elected First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party with Khrushchev's approval. Ochab was a Polish communist about whom it was known that he had no dictatorial intentions and that he was less connected with the terror and secret police activities of the past years than the other members of the Politburo. He belonged to the old guard Polish Communists and was not an actual NKVD agent such as Bierut had been. He was affable, had no special enemies, and was relatively popular with party members. He was no "strong man" and was considered obedient and moderate. His election went off without any special difficulties and Khrushchev instructed his ambassador to Poland, Ponomarenko, to look around for a successor to Ochab for a later date. Ponomarenko and Rokossowski did this in a fairly off-handed manner and actually in an overtly conspicuous manner. Ponomarenko invited various Polish communists to visit him at his villa at Natolin near Warsaw and there negotiated with them regarding future power positions, etc.

A rare and particular relationship began to develop between the communist party of Poland and the CPSU. The Natolin group gained in trust and confidence and the center group (as the group with Ochab as its head was known) began to be less important and the relationship toward this group began to cool. This division of groups came to pass because Ponomarenko favored the Natolin group and considered it suitable for future leadership assignments rather than the more conservative center group which, at this point, still was at the helm. This latter group felt itself endangered and began to prepare for a power struggle; during this phase, Cyrankiewicz and Zambrowski were more the actual strategists than Ochab himself.

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Ponomarenko and Rokossowski considered it a certainty that during the next elections of the Politburo the group proposed by the Soviet leadership and the candidates supported by it would be elected, since this had always been the case. When, during the course of the plenary session, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke in behalf of a certain candidate in the name of the presidium of the CPSU, this sufficed to accomplish the election of the candidate. Normally, everything was agreed upon prior to the elections. The Natolin group made no great secrets about the fact that at the next plenary session new Politburo members would have to be elected and that Minc, Berman, Radkiewicz, and Zambrowski were to be removed in favor of Klosiewicz, Witaszewski, Lapot and Dworakowski. On the other hand, it was less well known that the ruling group intended to defend itself. Both groups knew precisely that Minc, Berman and Radkiewicz (following Khrushchev's revelations and discussion of his speech in April by all parties) were bound to be expelled from the Politburo.

Thus the situation was such that the "conspirators" who wanted to usurp power for themselves were acting fairly overtly, whereas the "legal" ruling group kept their defense measures secret.

It was difficult to see in what manner the center group could prevail against the will of the Soviets. After all, it was known that of seven Politburo members, three were out-and-out Natolin group members (Rokossowski, Nowak, and Zawadzki, the latter being scheduled for first secretary in case the Natolin group was victorious) and that 25% of the members of the Central Committee were already actively working for the election of the Natolin group, whereas the remainder were indifferent and most certainly did not intend to oppose the directives from Moscow. As far as party officials throughout the land were concerned, they were predominately in favor of the Natolin group.

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Thus it was clear that the balance of power had shifted against the center (Ochab and Cyrankiewicz) and in favor of the Natolin group, (not even taking into account the fact that military power was in Rokossowski's hands); this balance of power would appear this way as long as the analysis of it was kept within the conventional framework, that is to say as long as "obedience and servility" to the Soviet party was concerned.

However, the situation was different when this framework of blind servility was breached, if the Polish party were to travel an independent road. In order to be able to maintain his leading position, Cyrankiewicz dared to oppose the will of the Soviet party. Cyrankiewicz was possibly known as the most daring "player" at the party head. Even Zambrowski, a very experienced party official who knew that a victory for the Natolin group would spell the end of his career or possibly worse (the Natolin group had marked him as the next guilty one after Berman), dared to take this step and they together convinced Ochab (after some hesitation on Ochab's part) to take up the battle against the Natolin group despite the fact that the Natoliners were supported by the Soviets.

The center party adherents did not at first turn to the public with their proposition; they knew very well that if they were to confront the Polish people with an anti-Russian solution then the resulting anti-Russian wave would also sweep away the communists and Zambrowski and Cyrankiewicz in first place. However, they slacked off on censorship and this was sufficient to permit the development of criticism, not only of the Polish but also of ^{the} Russian party in the press. They sought allies among the 90 or so still uncommitted members of the Central Committee. The justifications they used to convince some of these members who were elected in 1954 vary in nature; sometimes they were even controversial.

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Chapter VIII.

Positions Taken by Various Groups in the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party Toward Khrushchev

1. A part of the membership of the Central Committee was of the opinion that the methods used by Khrushchev (brutal disclosures) had caused irreparable damage to the prestige of world Communism and did not want to support him in this venture. They also criticized him for not having prepared the Communist Party leaders throughout the world for this move in any way so that these leaders were completely taken by surprise. This part of the central committee membership was against Khrushchev, not because they did not believe in Communism or had any doubt in respect to Stalin's atrocities, but because the methods Khrushchev used appeared clumsy and "bear-like" and they believed that in their opinion a man using such unthought-out methods would not prevail for long.

They justified this "unwise" method by claiming that he permitted himself to be carried ^{AWAY} by his hatred for Beria and by long years of fear of Stalin, which had now culminated in sheer hatred and in the throes ^e of which he had gone too far; they felt that this mistake would come home to roost to Khrushchev.

2. Another part of the membership however continued in their conviction of Stalin's "genius" and looked upon Khrushchev's steps not only as "unthought-out" tactics but more as a criminal action; this part of the membership took a stand against people sponsored by Khrushchev.

Thus, both of these groups were opposed to the Natolin group primarily because both were against Khrushchev in varying degrees of severity. They did not oppose the Natolin group because perhaps the Soviet policy of the group did not appeal to them (this group was just as friendly toward the Soviets), but because they did not as yet believe in Khrushchev's complete success.

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3. There was another group, which was not opposed to Khrushchev at all, was actually favorably inclined toward him but was nevertheless definitely oriented against the Natolin group. The Natolin leaders (Nowak, Mijal, Witaszewski, Klosiewicz and others) who were so strongly pushed to the front and supported by Ponomarenko and Rokossowski, had a very bad reputation regarding their capabilities and wisdom. They were considered malicious and inflexible and void of any capability and intelligence required to lead a country. This third group was not so much opposed to the program of the Natolin group as to the persons which headed it.

4. Another faction of the Central Committee felt personally endangered by the Natolin group, since the Natolin people were known to favor a police and dictatorship system (strict leadership, terrorist tactics and secret police); there were even some members of the Central Committee who had already had difficulties with the secret police and feared further retributions. These were primarily the so-called "Dabrowszczaki" who had fought in Spain; Communists who, during the war, had spent time in prisoner-of-war camps in Germany and who were already suspected by the secret police because they had survived imprisonment at all. There were also individual cases in which harassing tactics were employed against persons (for example against Albrecht, whose wife was arrested, etc.).

5. Still another group which felt itself endangered or threatened were the Jewish members of the Central Committee. The Natoliners, as well as Rokossowski and Ponomarenko did not bother to hide their anti-Semitic stand and one of the main planks of the Natolin platform was the purging of Jews from the party apparatus and from higher positions of the administration. One such purge in the military had just been completed by Rokossowski and his deputy Witaszewski after two years of preparatory work. In their platform, the Natolin group was able to refer to various anti-Semitic expressions used by Khrushchev.

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6. There was also a group which at that time was actually opposed to the entire leadership of the CPSU. These old communists recalled that in 1936 not only Stalin but the Komintern dominated by him (Kuusinen, Togliatti and a total of seven party secretaries and Communist leaders in various countries) had dissolved the Polish Communist Party and that Stalin had caused the liquidation and death of Polish party leaders. They said among themselves that they would never permit the development of a situation again in which they would be forced to spy on their own party leadership and their own party. They emphasize that Khrushchev, in reviewing the various atrocities committed by Stalin, never once mentioned the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and the murder of its leaders and that he himself was the most dangerous enemy of the old Polish communists in 1939 and 1941.

These feelings receded after several months but at this time, during the second half of 1956, they were discernible close to the surface in many ^{an} old communist group (although not overtly).

7. Still another group really believed naively that Khrushchev's new policy would mean a greater degree of independence for the Communist Parties in the satellites and that he was sincere with his slogans of "collective leadership" and "An end to the cult of the personality." As an example, they cited his new line toward Yugoslavia and they were of the opinion that he would not mix into personnel problems of the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party too dictatorially but would permit the existence of an elected loyal leadership group in the party. Those members of the Central Committee who were of this opinion were not opposed to him but were for him; nevertheless they did not feel any compelling urge to vote for the unpopular Natolin group -- they were much more in favor of the Ochab-Cyrankiewicz group, being convinced that this leadership would be loyal and could cooperate with the CPSU and with Khrushchev loyally and respectfully and much more effectively than the Natolin group, which was bound to meet with a considerably amount of resistance (even if only passive) among the Polish people.

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This then was the way in which it was possible for the Central Committee, elected under Bierut (in 1954) and completely obedient to the Soviets, to defend a point of view during the Seventh and Eighth Plenum sessions, which was diametrically opposed to the view of the First Secretary of the CPSU; the Polish Central Committee did not bow before Khrushchev's orders or even his threats. This unprecedented procedure in the history of the CPSU can be compared with the various party vacillations and minor or major internal revolts in the history of the CPSU. Previously, such actual or imagined disputes were immediately followed by the "punishment" and complete sublimation; when Tito opposed, a break ensued and he was condemned throughout international Communism; the Hungarian revolt (which took place shortly after the Eighth Plenum session of the Polish Communist Party) was drowned in blood; only here in this case, in Poland, did Khrushchev and the CPSU have to suffer an undeniable defeat without following it with any immediate punishment for the opponents.

This opposition was already evident at the time of the Seventh Plenum session (July 1956) and led to the unprecedented case in which Romana Granas, alternate member of the Central Committee, pointed out to Khrushchev, who was present during a party session, in reply to Khrushchev's personal proposals calling for a renewal of the Polish leadership, that this kind of interference on the part of Khrushchev stood in contradiction of "Leninist principles" and represented an unpermissible restriction of the sovereignty of the Polish Communist Party. Even this move was not followed by any punishment. Although Romana Granas became the object of many subsequent attacks and was dropped from her position as chief of the party school in 1957, she was appointed editor-in-chief of the weekly Polityka which is the economic-political organ of the Communist Party, in 1958.

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Chapter IX.

The Period of Disobedience

All of the above are signs of a temporary change in the mutual relationship between both parties, that is to say between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Poland. The period during which these changes took place extends from March 1956 through October 1956.

The following are some of the indicators of this period:

1. Following the death of Bierut, and in the wake of the revelations made by Khrushchev, which were followed in all countries by the feelable weakening of Communist Party authority, the Polish Communist Party faced great internal difficulties. The party prepared to fight against these difficulties and needed help. However, help from the CPSU ^{was} ~~was~~ a problem, the CPSU had its own difficulties; at that time, it ^{was} ~~was~~ not clear whether Khrushchev ^{was} ~~was~~ willing to help former Stalinists and present-day "moderate" centralist^s. In other countries, the ^m imminent downfall of such Stalinists as Ulbricht, Rakosi and Novotny was being discussed. The Polish leaders did not know at that time that Khrushchev would in fact support such Stalinist^s as Novotny and Ulbricht. They sought assistance from other directions, namely from China and generally, because of the gravity of the situation, decided to pursue their own policy in internal affairs. This policy, however, required at least token restitution of civil liberties, the release of political prisoners, and a minimum of freedom for the press and freedom of speech. Despite efforts on the part of the Communist leadership to suppress them, these small freedoms ^{immediately} brought all of the anti-Russian feelings of the Polish people to light, even though they made themselves known in a partially concealed manner.

The Russians, particularly Ponomarenko and Rokossowski, were taken by surprise. Without much thought, they made the Polish Communist Leadership

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(Secretary Ochab) responsible for the anti-Russian expressions and began to look around for other people. Once again they did not hesitate very long but looked for their people among the highest party functionaries, among those who promised blind obedience and assured the Russians that they would find the means and methods (terrorism, secret police, low standard of living, etc.) by which they would be able to assure this kind of blind obedience throughout the country. These people were (and this is no accident but a logical deduction) the most malicious, inflexible and primitive among the party leaders and sought their own support among party officials throughout the land who were hated by the people but who nevertheless retained the power in the cities and in the villages. Thus, a type of double relationship began between the CPSU and the Polish Communist Party. The former relationships remained in effect, that is to say the demonstrative cordiality, the blind obedience toward the First Secretary of the CPSU, these things remained but only partially within the Polish Communist Party among a group selected by the Russians from among the Natolin followers. There was a definite cooling off and an actual feeling of mistrust toward the legal party leadership of the Polish Communist Party. This was accompanied by a mood of disdain, during which the CPSU frequently voiced the opinion that "these people (Ochab and his Centralists) would not remain at the helm too long anyway."

The relationship between members of the government and members of delegations also underwent a cooling off. By and large, the government and the highest civil servants were considered by the population to be in favor of Ochab-Cyrankiewicz and not in favor of the Natolin group. In addition, Khrushchev's antipathy th ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~against~~ civil servants, managers, etc., even in the Soviet Union, became visible at this time (in 1956). The managerial class were considered followers of Malenkov. Thus the relationships between government delegations etc. became cooler, more official, and without additional courtesy being demonstrated. Also, Polish engineers and managers discarded

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the "Toga of Wonderment" which they had thus far audibly and visibly warn in discussions with Russian experts as a "duty" and began to speak openly -- frequently with unconcealed glee -- of the mistakes of the Soviet Economy; Soviet experts began to feel a little worse. Negotiations on trade agreements were handled by both sides more officially and on a somewhat harder basis.

However, these changes, that is to say the cooling-off of relationships between the representatives of both governments, between the CPSU and the "official" part of the Polish Communist Party, and the strong identification of the USSR with another part of the party, the Natolin group -- these three phenomena became known only by fragments to the Polish people and in the meantime events in Poland took another course than the one visualized by the Centralists, the Russians or even by the Natolin group. The desire for freedom on the part of the Polish people, which came to the fore during the Poznan^N rebellion, showed that all party groups were hated and particularly the following factions:

Rokossowski, who ordered his troops^{to} march into Poznan^N;

Deputy Premier Lapot, who was directly responsible for the state of affairs at the Cegielski factory (Lapot was a leading Natolin group member);

Cyrankiewicz, who came to Poznan^N to suppress the rebellion.

During the attack by the demonstrators on the building of the secret police, it transpired that the secret police chief had waited for hours for directives from Warsaw on how he was to handle the situation. He waited without results. Following the Poznan^N rebellion, the Poznan office of the secret police decided to disband; this was the beginning of the subsequent disbanding of secret police offices over the following months. They were not so much completely disbanded as they were integrated with the people's militia

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and the organs of the Ministry of the Interior. The rebellion also compromised the party in general and documented the hatred of the Polish workers for the various party officials.

Both the Natolin group, as well as the Centralists, learned a common lesson from the uprising, namely that all party leaders are much too hated to permit any kind of old name to be put before the Polish people and both groups cast about ^{for} a Communist who was popular with the people. ~~Both~~ ^{Both} groups found only one name, that of Gomulka, who enjoyed a great deal of sympathy in worker circles, not because of his Communism but because he had spent 7 years as a prisoner of Berias's and Bierut's secret police.

Chapter X.

The Nadir of the Relationship Between the CPSU and the Polish Communist Party

Characteristically, during the Eighth Plenum session of October 1956, ^IGomulka was unanimously elected to the Central Committee, even with the support of the Natolin group. Mijal praised him in a speech (Mijal was a leader of the Natolin group, one of the worst offenders under Bierut who, in 1948, had spoken most vociferously against ^IGomulka).

Both groups were desirous of carrying on their own policies under the name of ^IGomulka. He, on the other hand, had the following choices:

He could follow either the Natolin policy of blind obedience to the CPSU and clear contradiction to the feelings, desires, and expressions of the Polish people; or

He could follow the centralist policy, acquiescing to the will of the Polish people, in effect being in contradiction to the CPSU and to Khrushchev.

Gomulka chose the latter course. The Natolin group was defeated, Rokos-sowski was removed from the Politburo and there was a dramatic conversation

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with Khrushchev in Warsaw. The military power-grab, prepared by Rokossowski, was opposed by the centralists through their preparation of the Corps of Internal Security, commanded by General Komar, and by mobilizing the workers of Warsaw. At that time, Khrushchev shied away from a bloody battle and returned to Moscow with the matter not settled.

However, the affair had not been completely clarified as yet. Many threatening situations hung in the air. Gomulka was not certain of Khrushchev's immediate moves and Rokossowski was still dangerous. In order to strengthen his own position vis-a-vis the USSR, Gomulka had to rely on the Polish people, had to make concessions to the people which at times went "too far" (from the Communist point of view) and whose future negation would certainly prove very difficult; however, he had no other way out, he had to count on the will of the people.

Many promises were made to the people but only some of them were fulfilled. The following is the status of some of the items promised:

1. Dismissal of Russian experts -- only 70% accomplished;
2. Dismissal and punishment of Rokossowski -- only dismissed;
3. Punishment of Berman, Rokossowski and others -- only very inadequate;
4. Payment of various wage claims -- very quickly halted;
5. Disbanding of collectives -- implemented;
6. Religious freedom -- for the most part carried out;
7. Freedom of the press -- only at the onset, later called off;
8. New type of economy -- only very superficially;
9. Development of worker councils -- permitted, but their further development somewhat more hampered than supported;
10. Complete sovereignty -- not implemented;
11. Depriving the party dictatorship of its power -- not implemented, although some of the hated party officials were swept aside in the first weeks. Gomulka continued to support the supremacy of the party;

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12. Removal of secret police -- formally, but actually not completely;

13. Free parliamentary elections -- some degree of freedom attained.

Although this list could be expanded further, this is another topic. In any case the relationship between the CPSU and the Polish Communist Party had reached its lowest point in October 1956 and anti-Russian feelings found many expressions among the population. The period of this overt cleft between ^{the} two parties was only very short. Gomulka did everything within his power to heal the break without provoking the Polish people or disillusioning them completely right at the start. He was aided in this by the Hungarian revolution. First of all, Khrushchev was so absorbed in the Hungarian revolution that he was unable to worsen the relationship between the USSR and Poland at that time. Secondly, he was having internal difficulties with the other leaders of the CPSU, who were attributing the Hungarian revolt to his disclosures. Thirdly, this was a warning for Poland that overt resistance against Russia could only lead to bloodshed and a clear indication that an agreement with the CPSU would have to be accomplished, a factor which was also one of Gomulka's wishes from the very beginning.

The Polish people began to return to the status of maintaining silence in Soviet affairs and started once more to "think^K realistically." Although at first the workers were warning Gomulka not to go to Moscow, they welcomed him enthusiastically upon his return in November 1956; he brought ^{some} ~~some~~ results back with him.

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Chapter XI.

Reconstruction of Relationships By Gomulka

Beginning in November 1956, a new period in the relationships between the two parties and governments ensued and lasted until about October 1957. This period did not include any blind obedience, or blind servility; during this period discussions were apparently conducted on the basis of equality but drawn out by the Russians, nothing was accomplished which could be at all postponed. In relationships between representatives of either government, negotiations were conducted on a very official and formal level, full of distrust and with commercial hardness. The problem of behavior toward Polish delegations was accurately assessed during this period and the instructions read that they were to be treated like delegations from capitalist countries but without attempts to impress them with propaganda, etc. Polish delegations were to be treated coolly and correctly and were not to get much accomplished. Instructions included warnings to stick to the point at hand, not to engage in private conversations, for individuals to be very careful and restrained, to elicit information but to tell nothing and also to stay away from criticism.

In February 1957, during a two week trip to the Soviet Union as a member of the Polish delegation, the source of this report was able to observe the following:

The decorum of the Russians was very official, cool, but courteous. The anticipated celebrations in connection with the Tenth Anniversary of Russian and Polish Scientific-Technical Collaboration were not held. They were not canceled but they were postponed until the summer session. The farewell banquet was shorter than usual. The Russians had been instructed not to drink very much and also not to encourage drinking. The banquet itself was held in a stiff and boring atmosphere with a minimum of toasts, which were very polite but not warm. Private conversations were rare but, as an exception, did take place between people who knew each other from previous occasions.

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[redacted] Anatol Siergiejevic^A Ladynski, director of a section of the Gos-stroj, who had been a construction expert with the Polish government between 1954 and 1956 [redacted] the un- 25X1
rest in higher official circles in connection with Khrushchev's decentrali-
zation reforms. [redacted] it was clear that Khrushchev was
unpopular in Moscow but had numerous supporters in the provinces. Ladyn- 25X1
ski said, among others: "In Poland one may at least be unemployed; here
in Russia, when one loses one's position one is transferred to the distant
provinces within 2 weeks -- this is probably the object of Khrushchev's re-
forms." 25X1

In relation to the changes in Poland, Ladynski felt [redacted]
[redacted]
that the disbanding of the collectives was a mistake which will come home
to roost. On the other hand, he believed that a little "private initiative"
could be ^qquite useful and that the State would be able to retain control so
that no risk would arise from this kind of initiative for the Communist econ-
omy. The partial re-establishment of artisans and the private construction
of one-family houses in Poland was considered by Ladynski as being worthy 25X1
of imitation. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] Rokossowski was a good general
but a hopeless statesman who does not know his way around in Polish psychology
and who has pushed the "wrong people" to the top. On the subject of Poland,
Ladynski felt the Poles were industrious, unpredictable, and difficult to
lead. Subject was convinced that the relationship between both governments
and parties would soon be completely mended, that Polish demands of sover-
eignty would subside and that the Russians would show a greater measure of

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understanding. He was convinced that the Poles would soon return to a period of obedience and servility.

In general the attitude was one of a little bit of recognition, a little bit of envy and much criticism and compassion, particularly for the period of future Polish development.

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Regarding conditions in the Soviet Union, [] much consternation regarding the methods used by Khrushchev; a good deal of personal dissatisfaction but absolute belief in the power of the party which will always be able to overcome its own mistakes and which is considered invincible.

An "improvement" in relations between the Polish Communist Party and CPSU began to show up as early as the summer of 1957. The indicators of this improvement are as follows:

The Polish Communist Party began being more obedient toward the CPSU. Although there was an absence of wonderment and praise, there nevertheless was recognition of CPSU supremacy and power. There was subordination to Khrushchev's policy, with the objective of attaining as much as possible but in the most painless manner. There was also Gomulka's conviction that "one can talk with Khrushchev but it is too dangerous to fight him." Added to this was the conviction of Khrushchev that, ^{FIR} from the time being, a person like Gomulka can be useful, since he nevertheless governs a difficult-to-lead people, leads them in moderate channels and is prepared to come through with wide concessions. By this time, Gomulka fully recognized the supremacy of the USSR in foreign policy, in military problems, in the Hungary question (which was a heavy blow to the Polish public), in the Tito problem, and instituted the throttling of the so-called "revisionist" press; he also accepted Khrushchev's directives in regard to "purging" the Polish Communist Party (he postponed the party congress and halted the development of worker councils). In return for this, he was permitted, for the time being, to carry out his farm policy, his policy toward the Catholic Church and

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his negotiations regarding United States loans. Furthermore, Gomulka has ceased speaking of the "Polish Road to Socialism" completely. This situation satisfied Khrushchev for the time, because he still has some internal matters to deal with.

Subsequently, the purging of the Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich group, as well as the demotion of ^{h/}Zukov, resulted in personal supremacy for Khrushchev.

Chapter XII.

De-Facto Relationships

October 1957 signalled the onset of the next period in the relationship between the CPSU and the Polish Communist Party. The crisis of CPSU prestige was, for the most part, negated following the successful launching of Sputnik I; all Communist parties, with the exception of that of Tito's Yugoslavia, ^{but} including those of Poland and China, again recognized the absolute supremacy of the CPSU. Tito, who did not want to sign the November 1957 Moscow declaration, was promptly punished by being outlawed, just as at the time of Stalin. In the spring of 1958 Khrushchev took over the reigns of government, Bulganin was removed, and Khrushchev actually has the same unlimited power position in his own hand as Stalin did in his time (although he himself at one time spoke so harshly against the concentration of all power in one hand, following Stalin's death.)

Since 1958, the byword in Russian-Polish relations is once more obedience and servility, even within CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance); everything is as it was at the time of Stalin, with the exception that fewer overwhelming acts of praise on the part of Polish propaganda speak of the "infallibility" of the CPSU, since it is felt that it is a little too early to ply the Polish people with such crass propaganda again. On the part of the CPSU and Khrushchev, there is more distrust and much cooler demonstrations of friendship than existed under Stalin. These differences are more overt.

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As to content, relations between the two countries and the two parties follow along the line of "obedience and servility;" however, Gomulka must be prepared for more distrust on the part of Khrushchev than Bierut, in his time, on the part of Stalin. It is also probably^e that Khrushchev has not forgotten his defeat of October 1956 and that he will later take his revenge on Gomulka, although the latter is becoming a more and more willing servant and tool in Khrushchev's hand. In relationships between government representatives, more servility was demanded of the Poles; on the other hand, the Russians are very reserved in reciprocating and frequently abandon the Poles in their economic difficulties. In any case, Khrushchev is very slow in granting long-term credits, etc.

For the immediate future, there are continued indications of more Polish dependency on the USSR in all respects and in all fields and propaganda will slowly but surely revert to a cult of the personality centered around Khrushchev, although it will be more moderate than during the time of Stalin.

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