

Page Denied

USAF
review
completed.

SECRET




2

32

25X1


**HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION OF THE 66TH HUNGARIAN FIGHTER AIR DIVISION AT
KECSKEMET AIRFIELD (4655N/1945E), HUNGARY.**




25X1

IV. DIVISION HISTORY:

A. The Birth and Establishment of the 66th Fighter Air Division.

Although the Hungarian Air Force already had a mixed regiment at SZENTKIRALYSZABADJA airfield (4730N/1758E) and the 25th Fighter Air Division already existed, the establishment of the 66th FAD in 1951 meant the birth of the first actual combat unit of the Hungarian Air Force. The mixed regiment at SZENTKIRALYSZABADJA could only be considered as the place of origin for the first commanders and pilots of the various Hungarian Air Force (HAF) units. Actually, this regiment had been an initial training unit where all WW II aircraft which were still useable were flown to their death. These aircraft were "small" and "large" ARADO's, BUEKKER's, ZRIN-385's, YAK-9's, and the like. Flying training 

25X1

 was accomplished here and this was also the location where the old technical personnel (cadre-mechanics, etc.) trained the new aircraft

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

3

32

[redacted]

technicians.

25X1

[redacted]

The 25th PAD existed mainly only on paper at that time.

The 66th PAD was established in 1951 at KUNMADARAS airfield (4724N/2047E). This airfield was the first to have a more or less complete and useable concrete runway. According to the original plans it was to be a bomber airfield with two (2) concrete runways, one for take-off, and the other for landing. In 1951 one of the runways was completed, along with only those taxi X strips which were absolutely necessary for airfield operations. Runway dimensions were 2,600 by 80 meters and the runway's direction (in Azimuth) was from 55 degrees toward 235 degrees. This direction was well chosen, for it was that of the prevailing winds in this area for 350 days out of the year. The old runway, which had been built by the Germans, was still there, about forty (40) meters north of the new one; the two runways paralleled each other. In 1951 the necessary buildings and facilities were also completed to such an extent that the 66th Division could now be activated. Establishment of the division was considered such an important step that KUNMADARAS airfield was visited on more than one occasion by General FARKAS, MIHALY, the XX Minister of Military affairs, and by the former Prime Minister of Hungary, RAKOSI, MATYAS. Establishment of the division was completed ahead of schedule. Prime motivation for this was the report that the MIG-15's intended for the equipping of this division were to be delivered within a short period. At this time the degree of personnel training was of secondary importance. The main thing was that the personnel should be assembled into a division for the receipt of the MIG-15's from the USSR. Organization and establishment of a division staff was the initial concern; therefore, this was accomplished early in 1951. Officers, NCO's, and enlisted men were billeted in half-finished quarters and barracks even before the official acceptance of the installation. Plumbing in wash rooms and latrines was

SECRET

SECRET

4

32

25X1

not yet connected; the only available drinking water available on the installation was in the mess hall, plus that which personnel could obtain from other sources and which they had to boil. Personnel coming from more cultured environments than this were extremely dissatisfied with the primitive living conditions. The remoteness of the nearest town, N KARCAG (4719N/2055E), which was about sixteen (16) kilometers away, coupled with the lack of transportation to the town, only added to this discontent. Inhabitants of the nearby village of KUNYADARAS showed a pronounced hostility toward the soldiers for two (2) reasons:

1. The labor battalions who built the airfield proved to be a nuisance.
2. The AVH (internal security police) had moved several of the villagers out of their homes and had sent them to concentration camps under the ruse of "poor reliability". The reasons for these arrests were to obtain more housing for the military and to keep the "politically unreliable" distant from the new MIG-15's.

The airfield was finally completed and accepted in the first quarter of the calendar year 1954.

B. Cross Training into the MIG-15's.

The cross training began in May 1951 and constituted the initial working phase of the division. In the first group of trainees were those persons ~~III~~ selected for division command positions. The training itself was divided into two (2) categories:

1. Theoretical Training, which began about May 1951 and lasted about three (3) months. It was conducted by Soviet advisors with the aid of interpreters and through the use of Soviet regulations, directives, and wall charts. Upon completion of the theoretical phase an examination had to be passed by the students. The results of the examinations were evaluated by a board headed by Brigadier General HAZI, SANDOR, at that time Commander of the Hungarian Air Force. Other board m

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

5

32

members were: the staff of HAF Headquarters, several Soviet advisors, and some of the Soviet instructors. Upon completion of the exam a log was prepared on the results achieved by the student in each subject. Based on these logs, an HAF order was issued which authorized by name those students allowed to participate in the actual cross training on the MIG-15. Pilots who did not obtain a passing score in any one or more of the subjects were re-assigned to auxiliary courses and re-examined upon completion of such course(s). The commander of the first training course was Lieutenant Colonel MEZOPI, ISTVAN, who also was 66th division commander at that time. Members of the training staff were: Major EORI, ELEK; Captain IVAN, DEZSO; Captain HAGYASI, JENO; Lieutenant PAAR, FERENCZ; M/Sgt SIRAK, GEZA; M/Sgt BENKE, SANDOR; Senior Lieutenant KOPLANYI, ISTVAN; Lieutenant TURKSANYI; M/Sgt GROSS, JOZSEF, and others. Biographical data on the above-mentioned persons can be found either in IR-1201-57 or later in this report under paragraphs IV C, and VII, below.

2. Actual Flight Training (MIG-15), which began in July 1951 in accordance with a Headquarters HAF order. The training ^{was} accomplished in three (3) phases:

a. Ground Preparation. This phase consisted of a set of questions which a pilot had to answer concerning a previously worked-out simulated flight. The pilot had to obtain a grade of at least "good", equivalent to our "C" school grades. Then the simulated flight was "played" on the ground, outside on the airfield. Next, the pilot, while blindfolded, had to pass a cockpit check, i.e., point to all instruments, controls, and levers. Finally he had to preflight the aircraft from the cockpit while blindfolded.

b. Phase two (2) consisted of flying in a UTI MIG-15 dual-control jet trainer.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

6

32

c. The third phase of the training was solo flight. The division commander, Lt Col MEZOPI, ISTVAN, a member of the first training group, was the first Hungarian to solo in a jet aircraft. This happened near the later part of July or in early August 1951. The event was considered of great importance in high Hungarian military and government circles. Training progress was carefully watched by General PARKAS, MIHALY, Minister of Military Affairs at that time, and by other high officials who were under personal supervision of Prime Minister RAKOSI; RAKOSI himself requested weekly training progress reports. When the first group completed theoretical training and started flight training, the second group arrived at KUNMADARAS airfield for training. This then became the first group of HAF officers to graduate from an officer pilot training school equivalent to two (2) years of college. SOURCE was the commander of this second group, and he graduated from the school with the rank of Senior Lieutenant. Besides SOURCE, the officers who still remained alive in the HAF in November 1956 were: SZINYEI, LAJOS; CSERNAK, JANCOS; VASAS, KENNE JANOS; JOGOVICS, JANCOS; FRENCZ, ISTVAN; SZOCSEI, MIKLOS and FODAR, ZOLTAN

25X1

The flight training was started with three (3) or four (4) UTI MIG-15's (a/c # 320 and 343 were among these). Initially, there were twenty (20) to thirty (30) single seat MIG-15's. The second delivery of MIG-15's was received

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

7 32

[redacted]

late in the fall of 1951 and consisted of another thirty (30) aircraft. The period of cross training was spent by the pilots under an almost inhuman work load. Since training still continued in the other, older, types of aircraft mentioned above, there were [redacted] training missions in five (5) different types of aircraft in the same day. The year 1952 was especially difficult because the Pilot Officer Training School graduated more students to the division. After that, the students' further training became the responsibility of the squadron commanders. During several months of that year instructor pilots got only about twenty (20) to twenty-two (22) hours of rest per week.

25X1

C. Activation of the Division's Regiments.

As in the establishment of the division, the initial task was to form the command staff of the regiment. This was accomplished simultaneously with the cross training into MIG-15's. The first regiment of the division was the 62nd Fighter Air Regiment (FAR) [redacted] Its commander was Captain HAGYASI, JENO. ~~XXXX~~ Prior to activation of the regiment, the 42nd OREMUZ (an abbreviation for ORKALO REPOLU MUSZAKI ZASZLOALY, meaning "Independent Flight Technical Battalion") was assigned to and located at KUNMADARAS airfield, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] This base support battalion supported the 62nd FAR. As the division and regiment were located at the same airfield, the division did not have a separate OREMUZ for its support but rather, was supported by the same battalion which served the regiment. The 62nd FAR remained the most advanced unit of the division in training and combat readiness. The second regiment of the 66th FAD to be established was the 31st FAR. The command and political staff of this regiment was also selected and appointed from the first training group (MIG-15) of the division. This occurred during July 1951. M/Sgt BENKE, SANDOR became regimental commander. The division commander had him promoted

XX

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

8

32

[REDACTED]

to Senior Lieutenant by taking a few "short cuts". Another OREMUZ (support battalion) was activated simultaneously with the regiment. Thus, by fall of 1951, there were a division Headquarters, two (2) regiments, and two (2) support battalions located at KUNMADARAS airfield. Each of the regiments consisted of only two (2) squadrons at that time. Both regiments were brought up to strength in 1952 and this was the first time that both units reached those minimum requirements by which they could be considered complete regiments. The division's third regiment was formed in 1953. Under command of Captain SZOCSEI, MIKLOS, this, the 47th FAR, was located at KISKUNLACHAZA airfield (4711N/1900E). Up to the fall of 1955 it was considered as the "training regiment" of the division. Then more experienced personnel were assigned to strengthen the unit. From the division aircraft pool the 47th FAR received the most extensively used MIG-15's.

D. Cross Training to the MIG-15BIS.

From time to time aircraft were delivered to the HAF from the USSR ~~XXXX~~ to replenish the aircraft pool of the divisions. By agreement between Hungary and the Soviet Union, the HAF fighter divisions were to be equipped with MIG-15BIS type aircraft as soon as possible. Although the shipment of these aircraft did not arrive until the first quarter of 1953, cross training into this type was accomplished in the summer of 1952. The difference between the MIG-15 and the MIG-15BIS was that the former was driven by the RD-45-F power plant while the latter was powered by the improved VK-1 engine.

Initial training into the MIG-15BIS was only for the commanders, i.e., the commanders down to "Flight" level. In order to accomplish the training before the Hungarian divisions were re-equipped with the new type MIG, a flight of MIG-15BIS¹ with all necessary flight and technical ground personnel arrived at KUNMADARAS airfield from PAPA (4720N/1728E) airfield, home base of the Hungarian-
 III

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

9

32

[redacted]

based Soviet Fighter Air Division. They supervised all phases of the cross training. The theoretical phase consisted only of emphasis on the differences²¹ between the old MIG-15 and the new type. ~~KEM~~ Flight-preparation training on the ground followed, and the training was accomplished in accordance with the L.V.H.K.T. (LEGHAJTASOS VADASZ HAJOZO KEKEPZESI TERV - JET FIGHTER PILOT TRAINING PLAN), i.e., L.V.H.K.T. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] After the training was completed, Soviet personnel and their aircraft left KUNMADARAS airfield. The MIG-15BIS shipment for the HAF arrived early in the first quarter of the calendar year 1953.

E. Pilot Classification and O.S.Z.P. Training.

O.S.Z.P. was [redacted] an abbreviation adopted from the Russian O.S.P. (OBLACHNAYA SISTEMA POLYETA - OVERCAST FLIGHT SYSTEM). This system, operating by radio, provided radio beams which guided aircraft to their field of destination. From there, the system, through the use of a long-range and short-range direction finder station located in line with the main runway, provided for a let-down of an aircraft after ~~KEM~~ it had described a prescribed pattern. However, the let-down phase of the system had its minimum limitations. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] OSZP training was initiated in the HAF in the summer of 1953.

All flying personnel who were chosen by Headquarters HAF to undergo OSZP training were trained at the 66th Air Division at KECSKEMET airfield. Interceptor pilots received their pilot classification according to their flying qualifications. A Third Class Pilot was one who could fly an intercept mission only under good weather conditions during daylight hours. A Second Class Pilot could fly and

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

10

32

[REDACTED]

interception during good or bad weather conditions in daytime and under clear weather conditions at night. A First Class Pilot could fly an intercept mission in obscure or clear weather, both day and night.

F. Relocation of the 25th and 66th Fighter Air Divisions.

In the fall of 1952, the 25th FAD moved from KECSKEMET airfield to the newly completed TASZAR (4622N/1754E) airfield, while the 66th FAD was moved from KUNMADARAS airfield to KECSKEMET airfield. This enabled Headquarters HAF to implement the full plan of Hungarian air defense with divided areas of responsibility [REDACTED]

25X1

G. Cross Training to MIG-17's.

Each of the two (2) Hungarian Fighter Air Divisions (the 25th and the 66th) received six (6) MIG-17FF's (FF - radar-afterburner) in 1955. Cross training into this type aircraft was not begun until delivery of the aircraft to Hungarian units. After some time each division received ~~EEEE~~ eight (8) more MIG-17's, but these were equipped only with afterburner, not with radar, so their designation was not MIG-17FF as the first shipment of MIG-17's, but merely MIG-17F. Pilots received lectures on the difference between flying the MIG-15's and the MIG-17's and on the use of the radar on intercept missions. After that the pilots were simply instructed to take the MIG-17's up on familiarisation flights. [REDACTED] in 1956, the 66th division had ^a approximately eighteen (18) to twenty (20) pilots qualified in MIG-17's, while the Hungarian Air Force as a whole had about forty (40) to forty-five (45) such pilots.

25X1

H. National Air Defense Combat Readiness.

In 1952, while pilot training for MIG-15's was still in full operation, GCI and combat readiness alert was initiated. Initially, this worked considerable

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

11

32

hardships on pilots since there were only a few who could render scramble-alert duty, and they themselves were actually still in training. The situation was corrected in time when a sufficient number of pilots were fully trained and alert requirements were eased.

I. Schooling of Personnel in the USSR.

In 1955 and 1956 an extensive movement toward sending personnel to the USSR for various schools was initiated. Approximately eight (8) to ten (10) percent of the 66th FAD officer staff were in some school or attending some course in the USSR at that time. Generally, military academies and schools in the USSR were five (5) to seven (7) years long, with special courses lasting about six (6) months.

J. Soviet Advisors and Training Instructors.

From the time of the establishment of the 66th FAD in 1951 till 1955 Soviet Lieutenant Colonel KONCZDA^LYOR was assigned to the division as an advisor to the division commander. He was a 1st or 2nd Class MIG-15 pilot. During WW II he had been a regimental commander. [REDACTED]

25X1

When the MIG-15's arrived at KUNMADARAS airfield, the Soviets assigned an entire team of technical instructors and flying instructors to the division. With the aid of interpreters, training charts, and other visual training aids they trained the first Hungarian crews and pilots. Subsequent training programs were all based on these methods, as well as many later changes that originated in MOSKVA (5545N/3735E). In effect, ninety percent (90%) of all the equipment as well as the procedures, doctrines, regulations, tables of organization, and manning authorizations were of Soviet origin.

V. MISSION OF THE DIVISION:

The mission of the 66th Hungarian Fighter Air Division was the air defense of

SECRET

SECRET

12

32

[redacted]

the air sector

[redacted]

VI. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION:

For Headquarters organization of this division refer to Incl 1, this report,
 [redacted] sketch of the 66th FAD organizational chart. [redacted]

25X1

Pt 1 - Headquarters, HUNGARIAN AIR FORCE (OLP).

Pt 2 @ DIVISION COMMANDER.

a. Function: Carried overall responsibility of division command.

Responsible to the Commander, Hungarian Air Force. Was advised in decisions by an assigned Soviet advisor who was consulted at all times in order to assure adherence to Soviet policies. The Soviet advisor made a monthly report to the chief Soviet advisor at OLP in BUDAPEST (4730N/1905E) on the activities of the division. Operational control of divisional combat forces was the division Commander's main responsibility. For instance, if one third or more of his forces were airborne the division Commander was required to lead the formation. A division Commander, although perhaps holding the rank of only a Lieutenant Colonel, was considered to be a general officer and received all the prestige and benefits of that position. The division Commander was the final authority on promotion and demotion recommendations of all enlisted men and NCO's in the division.

Recommendations pertaining to officers were forwarded to OLP for final perusal; in most cases, however, the division Commander's recommendations were followed.

b. Personal Data: Name: EORI, ELEK; rank: Lieutenant Colonel; First Class MIG-17PF pilot. In 1951 he was the Assistant Commander of the 66th FAD, later he became the Fighter Observer at Headquarters, HAF. In October 1956

SECRET

SECRET

13

32

25X1

[REDACTED]

HORI was in the USSR attending a special school of unknown nature. In his absence the division Executive Officer assumed his position and responsibilities.

e. Aides: Besides his regular staff, he had three (3) persons directly assigned to him: an interpreter for liaison between him and the division Soviet advisor, a chauffeur, and an aide.

Pt 3 - COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BEŁUGY MINISZTERIUM). This section was responsible only to the Ministry of Interior. The chief of this section ~~HE~~ had the option of submitting his reports directly to the Ministry of Interior with information copies to the counter-intelligence section of Headquarters, HAF and the division commander, or through the C-I section of Headquarters, HAF to the Ministry of Interior. The C-I section of Headquarters, HAF had a seniority over the division C-I section only by virtue of its being at a higher echelon. On the other hand, the C-I section at Headquarters, HAF served as a distributing agent for most of the general instructions emanating from the Ministry of Interior. Outwardly, the division section maintained the appearance of subordination to the division commander. The section's overt mission was to maintain internal security chiefly against penetration, sabotage, and espionage. This overt status and mission served as a cover for its additional covert function of collecting compromising information on division personnel. Methods employed in gaining this type of information ranged from trying to win the confidence of an individual by taking his side against a superior or subordinate to the use of female "plants". Physically, the C-I section was located either in a separate building or in the wing of a building which was ^usec~~u~~red by barred windows and a constant armed guard. During off-duty hours, there was always a duty officer present. Organizationally, twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) individuals were assigned to this section. They included the section chief, three (3) to four (4)

E

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

14

32

officers, one (1) typist who wore civilian clothes, ten (10) to twelve (12) counter-intelligence enlisted men (sub-machine gunners), one (1) to three (3) staff car drivers and one (1) or two (2) trucks. ^{-drivers} Even the drivers were hand-picked personnel who were specially trained (e.g., to shoot at targets while driving). Assigned drivers were all military personnel, although some wore civilian attire only. Even the office cleaning-women were specially screened.

Pt 3a - Ministry of the Interior.

Pt 4 - DIVISION (POLITICAL) ASSISTANT COMMANDER: One (1) officer assisted by one (1) NCO. Aided the division Commander in political matters. Was in charge of the political department and the officer's club. Until 1953, the Political Assistant Commander was on an equal level with the division Commander; the latter could not release an order without the signature of the former. Because this hindered the division Commander too much, the Political Assistant Commander was subordinated directly to the division Commander after that time. The Political Assistant Commander was sort of a "political chaplain" who listened to personal problems of division personnel, as he was responsible for personnel morale as well as political education. He arranged political lectures, morality lectures, etc., in accordance with the Communist doctrine.

Pt 4a - POLITICAL DEPARTMENT: Made arrangements for and conducted political training sessions, gave political examinations, distributed pamphlets and other forms of propaganda and took care of Communist Party matters within the division. Eight (8) officers, one (1) NCO, one (1) enlisted man, and one (1) civilian assigned.

Pt 4b - DIVISION STAFF COMMUNIST PARTY SECRETARY: Consisted of one (1) officer. Supervised Communist Party meetings. Represented the interests of the Party in the division. Had to be a member of the CP.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

15

32

Pt 4c - PARTY RECORDER: Maintained CP membership records and books. Kept files on present and proposed members. One (1) NCO, a CP member.

Pt 4d - PARTY SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE: Acted on recommendations for CP membership or expulsion. Was presiding body at political trials for infractions by division members (the Commander and his immediate staff excepted) of CP doctrine and procedures. This committee established political guilt or innocence and determined the type and degree of punishment of those convicted. Committee members were elected from military personnel (party members) throughout division Headquarters. Being a committee member was a secondary duty. Number of committee members unknown; one (1) officer, however, was constantly assigned.

Pt 4e - OFFICERS' CLUB: Two (2) officers, one (1) NCO, and eighteen (18) civilian employees.

Pt 5 - DIVISION ASSISTANT COMMANDER: One (1) officer assisted by one (1) enlisted man. Was representative of the Commander in ^aaviation and operational matters. His rank was Major, and he was a First Class MIG-17PF pilot. He had one (1) staff car driver assigned.

Pt 6 - EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Responsible for overall supervision of division administrative matters. Supervised the work of the Combat Operations Department. Conducted monthly staff inspections. Was representative of the Commander in disciplinary matters. Except during important instances, he represented the Commander at daily staff meetings. He had one (1) driver assigned.

Pt 7 - DIVISION COMBAT TRAINING DEPARTMENT: One (1) officer in charge. This was the largest staff section in the division. Responsible to the division Commander through

- a. The Assistant Commander (Pt 5) for operational matters.
- b. The Political Assistant Commander (Pt 4) for political matters.

SECRET

SECRET

16

32

25X1

c. The Executive Officer (Pt 6) for matters pertaining to administration. This department coordinated and supervised the functions of its sub-sections in pilot training matters, both theoretical and practical. It maintained the prescribed records, logs, training graphs and charts, and prepared the quarterly and long-range training plans. The department chief was a pilot.

Pt 7a - DIVISION OBSERVER: One (1) officer, a pilot. Responsible for instrument and navigation training of pilots. The section maintained records of pilots' progress in this type of training. Responsible for keeping the division supplied with the latest, most accurate navigational aids, i.e., maps, charts, etc. One (1) NCO, an expert on maps, was assigned here. The officer in charge of this section had to be able to fly any type of aircraft assigned to the division, and he had to be able to fly any given training problem required of division pilots.

Pt 7b - DIVISION AVIATION-TECHNIQUE OBSERVER: One (1) officer, a pilot. Same functions as Pt 7a, above, except that his responsibilities included everything concerning flight techniques except navigation. Specifically, this meant formations, maneuvers, tactics, and flying proficiency training.

Pt 7c - AERIAL GUNNERY LEADER: One (1) officer, a pilot. While the officer at Pt 7b, above, was responsible for teaching pilots how to execute certain maneuvers, this officer was responsible for teaching them when to apply these tactics in combat. He was also responsible for aerial gunnery training and evaluation. He also maintained adequate training aids for aerial gunnery, i.e., tow targets, ground targets, etc.

Pt 7d - DIVISION COURIER PILOT: Was assigned a YAK-12 or "PIESELER STORCH" for courier flying purposes.

Pt 7e - PLANNING AND RECORDING OFFICER: Responsible for the accomplishment of

END**SECRET**

SECRET



17

32

25X1

administrative work connected with the entire combat training department.

Pt 7f - DIVISION PARACHUTE SERVICE CHIEF: One (1) officer. Responsible for parachute training of division flying personnel. This included supervision of theoretical training in parachuting as well as supervision of the two (2) training jumps required of all pilots annually. Responsible for maintenance of parachute training records.

Pt 7g - PARACHUTE XMB DEPOT: Since the division was physically located on the same airfield as one of its regiments, it did not maintain its own parachute depot. Division parachutes were therefore stored, maintained, and repacked at the regimental parachute depot. Personnel ^{w/0} which normally would staff this division depot were assigned to the regimental depot as additional help.

Pt 7h - DIVISION ATHLETIC OFFICER: Responsible for physical^{a/} training, both formal and informal, of division personnel. Supervised major sport events, maintained athletic equipment.

Pt 7i - BASE GYM: Subordinate to Pt 7h, above.

Pt 7j - CIVILIAN TYPIST: Did all unclassified typing for the combat training department.

Pt 7k - DEPARTMENT DRAFTSMAN: An enlisted man. Prepared training aids, graphs, and charts.

Pt 7l - MAP AND CHART NCO: Subordinate to the Division Observer, Pt 7a, above.

Pt 8 - COMBAT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT: (Training and Plans). Title of this department was misleading as to its actual functions, which were the planning and supervision of base defense procedures and all ground training activities connected thereto, i.e., security, small arms proficiency, chemical defense, etc. One (1) officer.

Pt 8a - ASSISTANT TO THE ^{CHIEF} COMBAT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT NEWS, Pt 8, above.

SECRET

SECRET



18

32

25X1

Pt 8b - SECOND ASSISTANT.

Pt 8c - RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER: Received through dissemination from higher echelons up-to-date intelligence on "enemy" capabilities. He applied this information to the training and planning policies of the division. In addition, he cooperated with the Division Observer on the planning of reconnaissance problems and on the evaluation of the results of reconnaissance missions flown by the division. He kept division pilots up to date on recognition and performance data of "enemy" aircraft. Sources of intelligence material were unknown



25X1

Pt 8d - CHEMICAL DEFENSE OFFICER: Conducted training of division personnel in chemical, nuclear, and bacteriological defense. During practice attacks he commanded defense and decontamination teams. He was also responsible for obtaining and storing special clothing, equipment, and decontamination agents.

Pt 8e - DRAFTSMAN: An enlisted man. Prepared drawings, graphics, and charts for the department.

Pt 8f - FIRING RANGE SQUAD: One (1) officer, eight (8) enlisted men. Maintained small arms range, aerial gunnery range, and gun calibration pits.

Pt 8g - POSSIBLE HEADQUARTERS GROUND DEFENSE PLATOON: SOURCE was not sure whether or not this force actually existed at this division. If so, they consisted of one (1) officer and about thirty (30) enlisted men whose mission was to protect division Headquarters in the event of enemy ground attack. This force was armed with sub-machine guns.

Pt 9 - AIRCRAFT DISPATCH SERVICE: As the division was located physically adjacent to an operational regiment, this section, within division structure, existed only on paper. The regimental dispatch service (control tower) actually took care of this section's function on this airfield.



25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

19

32

The division assigned nine (9) enlisted men of this section to the equivalent regimental section to help out.

Pt 10 - CLASSIFIED CONTROL AND PREPARATION: Took care of typing, dispatching, receiving, recording, and storing of all classified documents of the division. One (1) officer, two (2) NCO's.

Pt 10a - CODING OFFICER: Although his office was located physically adjacent to the classified control office, his section was an independent entity. He encrypted and decyphered classified transmissions with the help of tables. There was no mechanical or electrical cyphering or decyphering equipment.

Pt 10b - CLASSIFIED MATERIALS TYPING SECTION: Three (3) civilians employed.

Pt 11 - COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT: One (1) overall officer in charge assisted by one (1) enlisted man. Operationally, this department was subordinate to the directives of Headquarters, HAF, Communications Department. It was the responsibility of each Headquarters communications section to establish and maintain a communications system only with its subordinate units (e.g., Headquarters, HAF Communications Department had to build and maintain a system connecting it with its divisions, while division Communications Departments built and maintained systems connecting them with their subordinate regiments.) The department was responsible for all ground point-to-point and ground-to-air communications including radio, telephone, and teletype facilities. These responsibilities also included radio equipment and telephones for the division direction center and fighter control center. Administratively, the department was subordinate to the division Executive Officer.

Pt 11a - Communications Company (SZAZAD). Three (3) officers, eighty-seven (87) enlisted men, three (3) NCO's. Might also have been only a platoon, twenty-seven (27) to thirty (30) men. These communications men operated and maintained
 XX

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

20

32

division communications equipment and were assigned either to ^{Pts} 11b, 11c, 11d, or 11e.

Pt 11b - WIRE CHIEF: Officer in charge of all wire communications services.

Pt 11c - RADIO OFFICER: In charge of all ground radio and teletype facilities.

Pt 11d - RADAR OFFICER: Responsible for operation and maintenance of the GCI unit located on this base. Was also called upon to give lectures on radar theory to division pilots.

Pt 11e - PELLENGATOR (D.F.) OFFICER: It is possible that in the case of this division no such officer was assigned, although it was normal practice. If not, then it would have been the radar officer's responsibility to operate and maintain the pellenator, as it was called in HAF. This D.F. was used to give pilots the reverse ^z azimuth reading from the D.F. station upon request.

Pt 11f - GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER: He was familiar with all phases of the division communications system and assisted the division Communications Chief. He accomplished for the Communications Chief, all of the administrative work of the Communications Department, including the handling of such documents as authentication tables, frequency authorizations, call sign lists, SCP's, etc.

Pt 12 - ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT: One (1) officer, sixteen (16) civilian employees. Prepared and stored all of the unclassified documents, directives, and orders. They also handled all of the administrative work pertaining to enlisted personnel, i.e., clothing issue, duty rosters, food service administration, disciplinary action, etc. Also issued hand-weapons to enlisted men. Issued meal and trip tickets to traveling personnel. This department also had a civilian employment office for the hiring of cleaning women, secretaries, etc. They also inspected enlisted quarters and mess halls. In addition, they assigned motor vehicles at the instruction of the Executive Officer.

SECRET

SECRET

21

32

25X1

Pt 12a: GUARD PLATOON. Twenty (20) enlisted men. These men supervised various manual details that had to be accomplished on base. In the event of ground attack, they supplemented the force at Pt 8g, above. They were armed with sub-machine guns.

Pt 12b: RECORDING NCO. Accomplished the recording and dissemination of incoming and outgoing unclassified administrative correspondence as well as official and personal mail.

Pt 12c: CIVILIAN TYPIST.

Pt 12d: ADMINISTRATIVE LIBRARY. One (1) NCO. For official use only, this library contained files of HAF regulations, base regulations, division regulations and orders, etc.

Pt 13: PERSONNEL SUB-DEPARTMENT. Officer personnel administration, files, etc. One (1) officer in charge.

Pt 13a: ASS'T OIC, OFFICER PERSONNEL SECTION.

Pt 13b: TYPIST. Civilian employee. Officer records were considered classified and all personnel working on them, including this typist, had to be specially cleared.

Pt 14: DIVISION COMMAND POST: This was the fighter control ~~EXERCISE~~ center for all ^{aircraft} acft of all three (3) regiments in the 66th FAD. From here, all fighters were scrambled either by instructions from ^{the} OLP command post or, in some emergency instances, by the division commander directly. In the event OLP's command post was not functioning, this division command post was normally designated and used as the alternate Command Post for the entire HAF. Although the 66th FAD Command Post had the capability of directing all fighters of all its regiments, it actually only coordinated the fighter direction of its regimental command posts ^{and} directly controlled fighters of only the 62nd Fighter Air Regiment, as that regiment's

SECRET

SECRET

22

32

25X1

[redacted] command post, located on the same airfield with the division, was maintained as a backup direction center with a skeleton crew only. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Following personnel were assigned to ^{the} division command post: Twenty-two (22) officers, six (6) NCO's, six (6)

25X1

enlisted men. They were broken down as follows:

- a. Three (3) duty commanders (one for each shift)
- b. One (1) administrative commander
- c. Three (3) observers
- d. Three (3) P-20 (GCI) observers who directed only radar-equipped

MIG-17's.

- e. Three (3) fighter directors
- f. Six (6) liaison officers who maintained communications liaison with regimental command posts of any cooperating satellite or Soviet tenant forces.

- g. Three (3) interpreters who assisted the liaison officers.

- h. Six (6) plotters

- i. Six (6) tellers who called plots from radar sites to the plotters and other command post personnel.

Pts 14a & 14b: AUXILIARY COMMAND POSTS. Physically discontinued in 1956, they still existed on paper. Formerly, each auxiliary command post was occupied by three (3) officer controllers and three (3) ~~en~~ enlisted men. Their job had been to take over the control of aircraft which the division command post could not handle due to loss of ^f control over certain aircraft at certain times. These auxiliary command posts had been physically located at KUNMADARAS and SZEGED (4615N/2009E).

Pt 15: MOTOR VEHICLE FLIGHT. Responsible for minor maintenance, and dispatch of motor vehicles and drivers for members of the division staff.

SECRET

SECRET

23

32

25X1

Pt 15a: MOTOR VEHICLE GARAGE. Repaired all vehicles for the division, base support battalion, and 62nd fighter Air Regiment.

Pt 15b: MOTOR VEHICLE FUEL DEPOT. Had underground tanks.

Pt 16: MEDICAL SERVICE. Since the division was ~~physically~~ located physically adjacent to a regiment, both pooled their medical facilities and personnel. Normally, four (4) doctors constituted the division medical service. The division furnished some personnel for the following dispensary sections:

Pt 16a: AMBULANCE SECTION. Two (2) enlisted men, two (2) vehicles.

Pt 16b: MEDICAL DUTY SECTION. Three (3) NCO's and three (3) enlisted men who were assigned to the base dispensary from the division to serve in shifts so that someone was always on duty at the out-patient section of the dispensary.

Pt 16c: TWO(2) NURSES, who were also furnished by division.

Pt 16d: OUTPATIENT RECEPTIONIST.

Pt 16e: X-RAY LAB

Pt 16f: DENTAL WARD. Manned by regimental personnel only.

Pt 16g: ISOLATION WARD.

Pt 16h: HOSPITAL BATH HOUSE. One (1) civilian employee.

Pt 17: DIVISION ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT. One (1) officer, one (1) enlisted man, other personnel strengths unknown. Responsible for procurement and distribution of all ^{aircraft} ~~air~~ and ^{aircraft} ~~air~~ components of the division. Also responsible for inspection of regimental engineers to see that all of their procedures regarding ^{aircraft} ~~air~~ maintenance conformed to HAF policies. Also responsible for distribution of tech orders, modification orders, maintenance manuals and directives for all division ^{aircraft} ~~air~~, their components, and their airborne equipment. The department's inspection jurisdiction also extended over the major ^{aircraft} ~~air~~ repair unit described under Pt 18, below.

SECRET

SECRET

24

32

25X1

Pt 17a: RADIO ENGINEER. One (1) officer with a required degree in electrical engineering. The division engineer was directly superior to him, both operationally and administratively. The radio engineer's responsibility was strictly confined to airborne radio equipment. He saw to airborne radio maintenance, overhaul, and requisitions of equipment and parts. These requisitions were submitted to the Division Engineer (Pt 17, above). The radio engineer maintained working records on every airborne radio in every ^{aircraft} ~~soft~~ of the division; dates of repair, overhaul, replacement, person accomplishing the work, etc. Records on file covered these details over a period of the last five (5) years.

Pt 17b: RADIO LAB. Workshop of the radio engineer. Contained his calibration equipment, test instruments, tools, work benches, and parts storage.

Pt 17c: SPECIAL ENGINEER. One (1) officer. His job requirements coincided with those of the radio engineer (Pt 17a, above), except that they applied strictly to ^{aircraft} ~~soft~~ instruments.

Pt 17d: INSTRUMENT WORK SHOP.

Pt 17e: WEAPONS ENGINEER. Same as Point 17a with regard to aerial weapons, ejection seats, and gun cameras.

Pt 17f: POWER PLANT ENGINEER. His existence within the division organizational structure was questionable. If he existed, his responsibilities were the same as Pt 17a, above, but pertaining to ^{aircraft} ~~soft~~ engines.

Pt 17g: AIRFRAME ENGINEER. Same as Pt 17f, above, with regard to airframes. Existence in division also questionable.

Pt 17h: ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT RECORDING OFFICER. Maintained necessary maintenance and requisition files for the entire ^e engineering department. Was assigned one (1) NCO and (1) one enlisted man for assistance.

Pt 17i: BATTERY SHOP. SOURCE was not sure if this section ^{fitted} ~~fit~~ into division

SECRET

SECRET

26

32

25X1

on-the-spot repairs. This situation existed until 1954 when the large part of the repair jobs from this and other "TARMS" was given to the PESTVIDAKI GEPGYAR on CSEPEL ISLAND in BUDAPEST. TARM & thereafter only took care of repairs which were not major in nature, but which squadron maintenance crews could not handle. However, TARM's still maintained their ~~expertise~~ capability for major overhauls and, in emergencies non-scheduled or non-anticipated overhauls were still accomplished by them. TARM & occupied one (1) hangar on KECSKEMET airfield. It had one (1) administrative commander: the engineer mentioned under Pt 18, above, an assistant commander (administrative), and one (1) records NCO. TARM & was divided functionally into the following sections.

Pt 19a: RADIO SHOP. Airborne radio repairs. Manned by one (1) officer and one (1) NCO.

Pt 19b: RADIO LAB. Airborne radio inspections and calibrations. Manned by the one (1) officer and one (1) NCO cited in Pt 19a above.

Pt 19c: INSTRUMENT SHOP. Repair functions. Manned by one (1) officer and one (1) NCO.

Pt 19d: INSTRUMENTS LAB. Inspection and calibration functions. Manned by the one (1) officer and one (1) NCO cited in Pt 19^c above.

Pt 19e: WEAPONS SHOP. One (1) officer, one (1) NCO, two (2) enlisted men, Accomplished weapons repair.

Pt 19f: POWER PLANT SHOP. Repair of aircraft jet powerplant plants by one (1) officer, one (1) NCO, three (3) or four (4) enlisted men.

Pt 19g: AIRFRAME SHOP. Repair of airframe, landing gears, hydraulics, fuel systems, and control surfaces. One (1) officer, two (2) to three (3) NCO's, five (5) or six (6) enlisted men.

Pt 19h: MACHINE SHOP. Machine tools shop that could be used by anyone of

SECRET

SECRET



27

32

25X1

the TARM sections. X One (1) NCO, three (3) to four (4) enlisted men.

Pt 19i: PAINT SHOP. Two (2) or three (3) enlisted men.

Pt 19j: TARM & PARTS & EQUIPMENT DEPOT. One N (1) NCO.

This gave the 66th Division Headquarters, including TARM 4, an approximate total of ninety-nine (99) officers, forty-seven (47) NCO's, and two hundred (200) enlisted men as well as thirty-eight (38) civilian employees. These figures do not include the following organizations:

Pt 20: HEADQUARTERS, HAF CENTRAL SUPPLY DEPOT.

Pt 21: 62nd FIGHTER AIR REGIMENT. Refer to IR-1207-57.

Pt 21a: 42 OREMUZ. Refer to paragraph IV., 3., above and to IR-1209-57.


Pt 22: 31st FIGHTER AIR REGIMENT.

Pt 22a: OREMUZ (Support battalion of the 31st Regiment)

Pt 23: OREMUZ of the 47th FAR

Pt 23a: 47th FAR

Pt 23b: Unknown.



25X1


SECRET

25X1

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET



SKETCH OF
66TH FIGHTER AIR DIV.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
DIV. AT KECSKEMET AIRFIELD
(46SSN/194SE), HUNGARY

SECRET