



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SOVIET POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY

**(CIA Contribution to Senate Subcommittee on
National Policy Machinery)**



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SOVIET POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY

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SECRET**I. INTRODUCTION**

In this study CIA has attempted, at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, to reconstruct from a mass of fragmentary evidence the machinery for national policy-making in the USSR.

The reader will quickly find that all Soviet policy of any importance is determined by the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and that the execution of policy is supervised by the Presidium in considerable detail. Thus this study, while it deals with many different aspects of the Soviet regime, is focused ultimately on the Presidium. The centralization of power in this small group of men--and ultimately in one man--is the distinguishing mark of the Soviet system. The Presidium deals with questions of national security as an integral part of its consideration of the entire range of national activity. Furthermore, its members are responsible as individuals for the execution of policy in every field, and for this purpose they have a control over national life limited only by their resources of manpower and materials and by certain deep-seated national prejudices. In their response to an international challenge, the members of the Presidium can bring the full weight of Soviet power to bear without consideration of past precedents or future elections. They do not have to balance the conflicting interests of forces they do not control, except perhaps in their relations with one another.

These are strong men--men who fought their way up through the ranks of the Communist Party at a time when this was indeed a risky business. As a corporate body they present a solid front to the outside; within, as with any body of strong men, there are inevitably strains and disagreements. However, for a number of reasons not directly related to the organization and functioning of Soviet policy machinery, such strains normally do not greatly affect its operation. Each Presidium member, in his course to the top, has become an able administrator in several fields and widely knowledgeable over the whole range of national policy--he has lived national policy for many years. (Mikoyan, for instance, has been involved in policy formulation since the 1920s).

Furthermore, the Soviet leaders are all Communists. From their lifelong membership in an elite corps, from their single-minded submergence of self in what they regard as a crusade, they draw a strength and unity of purpose which overrides many of the usual problems of committee decision. A common ideology provides the Soviet leaders with a uniform set of basic objectives; there is no need to argue these out before turning to the methods to be used in attaining these goals; Presidium members all start from the same basic assumptions. They are all trained in dialectic materialism; both literally and figuratively they speak the

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same language. Finally, they and all the officials beneath them are accustomed to the discipline of democratic centralism: open discussion until a decision is made, then absolute obedience. These principles govern their relations not only with one another, but also with Khrushchev who--as the final arbiter--gives to Soviet policy the flavor of his own personality.

It should be pointed out, however, that the same kinds of men--and in many cases the same men--staffed the upper levels of the Soviet regime in Stalin's last years, when the USSR's policy was as rigid as it today is pragmatic. Furthermore, the formal organization of Khrushchev's central apparatus differs very little from that of Stalin's. The manner in which Khrushchev uses the men and administrative machinery available to him is thus the central problem of this study.

This consideration has led us to show the Soviet apparatus in both a static and a dynamic sense; we have attempted to interweave what it is with how it works. Section II deals with the central organs of party and state--the structure immediately surrounding Khrushchev and the Presidium. Sections III-VI then take up the advisory and executive organs in the fields of foreign, economic, scientific, and military policy respectively. They deal not only with the structure, but also with the functioning and, when feasible, with the participation of the Presidium in each of these fields.

There are also six sections which we have included as annexes. Annex A is an account of the apparatus used by the Presidium to mobilize public opinion in support of its policies. Annexes B and C are "case studies" of the coordinated use of several arms of government in pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives. Annex D analyzes the machinery used in the development of weapons systems. Annex E describes the methods by which the will of the Presidium is brought to bear at the production level. Finally, Annex F deals with the Soviet intelligence services; this subject is handled separately because its content is TOP SECRET.

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SECRET**II. POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY****Chapter 1. THE SOVIET STATE SYSTEM**

In theory, the USSR is a federally organized constitutional democracy. In actuality, however, there exists no concept of the constitution as a supreme law limiting the powers and operations of government. Despite its democratic trappings, the Soviet Constitution is merely a formal description of the socialist state-organization, and thus it chronicles rather than determines the development of the state.

The Soviet system is a dictatorship in which ultimate power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist Party. While the government apparatus is patterned after that of a Western political democracy, there is no system of checks and balances, and any concept of the separation of powers is definitively rejected. The functions of the government are dictated by the party, whose hegemony is explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution. The prerogative of the party to make state policy and supervise its implementation without direct popular controls or checks is unquestioned, and party influence and power pervade all phases of life from the lowliest private dwelling to the highest councils of state.

This authority derives from the superior understanding of "the science" of Marxism-Leninism allegedly enjoyed by Communists. The party's collective understanding of these "scientific" laws makes it the only body capable of translating Marxist dogma into action. For this reason no other political parties are considered necessary, and none are allowed. Nonetheless, democracy is theoretically safeguarded because the will of the party is supposed to be identical with the will of the people, and because power is exercised through the process of "democratic centralism."

In its structure, the Soviet Government is like a pyramid rising from a broad base of primary organs to the single directing body at the top. This applies equally to the party hierarchy and to the various mass organizations such as trade unions, producers and consumers cooperatives, writers unions, etc. According to democratic centralism, each higher body, in whatever field, is elected by and is directly responsible for its actions to the body immediately beneath it, with final authority resting at the base of the pyramid, the people. In reality, however, the exact opposite is true. Soviet life is ruled from the apex of the pyramid, the leadership of the party, and the membership of each lower body in whatever field is approved by and directly responsible to its immediate superior.

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SECRET**Territorial-Administrative Structure**

The Soviet Union is a federation of 15 theoretically independent republics. The largest and most important of these is Russia proper, which is organized into the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and occupies a land area almost twice the size of the continental United States (excluding Alaska). The other 14 republics are formed primarily on the basis of nationality and in essence form a ring of satellites around the RSFSR.

In keeping with the federal principle, each republic has its own constitution, government, and party hierarchy, and is empowered to run its affairs as it sees fit so long as it does not assume any of the prerogatives of the national apparatus in Moscow. In practice, little is left to the discretion of the republics, and in most respects they are nothing more than pale reflections of the central authority.


From the standpoint of territorial organization, the USSR is comparable to the United States on a magnified scale. Republics are similar to American states, although they are generally larger in size. The eight largest republics are divided into 116 oblasts, or regions, which for practical purposes equate to the US county. There is a great disparity in geographical area between the largest and smallest, but the average oblast is approximately the size of the state of Tennessee. The major city in the region is usually the oblast center, or county seat.

Oblasts are subdivided into rayons, or districts, and these in turn are subdivided into the smallest territorial-administrative unit--the rural soviet. Large cities are also divided into rayons, which are roughly the equivalent of a precinct or ward.

Oblasts do not exist in the seven smaller Soviet republics; the chain of administrative--territorial command goes directly from republic to the rayons. In the RSFSR there are six territorial units called krays. The distinction between a kray and an oblast is not clearly defined; for practical purposes they seem to be the same, although five of the krays contain subordinate autonomous oblasts. Autonomous oblasts, autonomous republics, and national okrugs (areas) are administrative units formed as concessions to various small but homogenous nationality groupings, and they are completely subordinate to the republic or kray of which they form a part. They are the exception rather than the rule, however, and in general terms the line of subordination runs from republic to oblast to rayon to rural soviet throughout the country. (See Chart A).

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SECRETThe Government Hierarchy

The executive branch of the Soviet Government is the USSR Council of Ministers. It is organized and, with the exception of its subordination to the Communist Party, functions in much the same manner as the government of a Western democracy. Each of the Soviet republics has its own Council of Ministers, which is in most respects a carbon copy of the central organization in Moscow. Republic governments do, however, enjoy a certain amount of autonomy in administering those purely local affairs which are not sufficiently important to warrant administration from Moscow. Governments of oblasts and smaller units are called Executive Committees, and these enjoy the same powers and functions in their bailiwicks as a republic government.

These executive organs are constitutionally subordinate only to the legislative branch, but in reality, legislative bodies have little actual power and function as rubber stamps which grant "approval" to laws and appointments already decided on by the party. Known as the Supreme Soviet at USSR and republic level and as Soviets of Working People's Deputies at the oblast and below, these "legislatures" consist of deputies "elected" by direct, universal, secret suffrage. However, candidates are actually chosen in advance by the party, and only one name appears on a ballot in each constituency, thus making any truly democratic choice of representatives an impossibility.

The Soviet judiciary, organized in somewhat the same manner as the government, proceeds downward from the USSR Supreme Court to republic Supreme Courts and oblast and lower courts. The USSR Supreme Court "issues guidance on questions of judicial practice," but it does not rule on questions of constitutionality and has no function of judicial review. Other higher courts are simply the courts of appellate jurisdiction.

The Party Hierarchy

The membership of the Soviet Communist Party (8,239, - 131) is slightly less than 4 percent of the total population of the country. This highly disciplined elite exercises firm control and direction of Soviet life through a rigidly hierarchical professional party machine responsive only to the center in Moscow which controls the strategic assignment of Communists to key positions in all institutions and enterprises.

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The apex of party power is the Presidium, the Secretariat, the Central Committee, and the various staff departments of the central apparatus in Moscow. This organizational scheme is duplicated in all territorial subdivisions of the USSR, and lower organizations differ from higher only in size and over-all responsibility. At the republic and lower levels, the body corresponding to the Presidium is called the Bureau, and from oblasts down the counterpart of the Central Committee is known as the Party Committee. The territorial party organizations are run by full-time party employees--secretaries of the local organizations and members of the staff departments.

In addition to its territorial units, the party has an organization in every institution of Soviet society. These exist in all ministries of the government, in mass organizations in the armed forces, in factories, shops, department-stores, universities, and even on the collective farms. These so-called "primary" party organizations, ranging in size from 3 persons to 3,000, are charged with supervising the activities of the management of the enterprises in which they exist. Membership in the party is expected of all managerial personnel and is a requisite for appointment to more important positions. The most important figures in the territorial governments are also members of the ruling party body; the premier of a republic is a member of the Bureau (Presidium) of the republic party, and his chief governmental deputies are members of the republic's Party Central Committee. The pattern is repeated in the oblasts and rayons.

Party control effectively prevents any genuine exercise of autonomy by governmental bodies. The party does not function on a federal basis but is a completely unified monolith in which the line of command runs directly from the center. It is organized on an administrative-territorial basis in order to facilitate complete party control of the government, mass organizations, and all phases of life. Under this structure the impossibility of any independence for the republics was clearly understood as early as 1923, when a leading Communist from the Republic of Georgia told the 12th All-Union Party Congress:

There has been talk here of independent and self-dependent republics. On this point it is necessary to exert the greatest caution so as to avoid any kind of exaggeration whatsoever. It is clear to all of us what sort of self-dependence, what sort of independence this is. We have, after all, a single party, a single central organ, which in the final resort determines absolutely everything for all the republics, even for the tiny republics, including general directives right up to the appointment of responsible leaders in this or that republic--all this derives from the one organ so that to speak under these conditions of self-dependence, of independence, reflects to the highest degree an intrinsically incomprehensible position.

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The party thus enjoys a pre-eminent place among the instruments of authority available to the regime. Khrushchev's methods of gaining, holding, and wielding power have reinforced this pre-eminence; he has based his administration squarely on the party apparatus. This means, in practical political terms, that the lieutenants he has chosen to implement his policies, the men on whose loyalty he must rely, have been drawn primarily from the professional party machine. At the summit of Soviet power, this method of administration is reflected in the two-to-one majority of party secretaries over representatives of other organs in the composition of the ruling party Presidium.

The Interlocking Directorate


At the top of the Soviet administrative structure distinctions of background and function fade. Supreme authority in both party and government is vested in one man--Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the government's Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Party. Immediately below him stands a close-knit group of top assistants who draw into their hands the main lines of command of both party and government. The frequent practice of announcing national policy in joint decrees of the party and government--a practice which, incidentally, has no explicit constitutional sanction--illustrates this integration of the lines of command.

This merging of authority at the top demonstrates the interlocking nature of the Soviet administrative directorate, with the parallel lines of party and government organizations extending down through the whole Soviet system. (See Chart B). The Soviet Union is a one-party state, ruled by a group of men who exercise effective authority by virtue of their control of the Communist Party. (See Chart C).

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
CHART B

PARALLEL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (REPRESENTATIVE)



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CHART C
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE-USSR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
 1 OCTOBER 1959
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Full Member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party.
 Candidate Members, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party.

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SECRET**Chapter 2. PARTY CONGRESS AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE**Congress

According to the statutes of the Communist Party, the national party congress is the "highest body" of party authority. Made up of delegates ostensibly elected in a democratic manner by lower party bodies, the congress is supposed to embody the wisdom and will of the whole party. The specific duties of the congress laid down in the party rules are: to hear and approve reports of the party Central Committee and other central organizations; to review and amend the program and statutes of the party; to determine the tactical line of the party on fundamental questions of current policy; and to elect the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission of the Communist Party.

However, the party congress has not exercised these "prerogatives," in anything more than a formal sense, for almost 30 years. During the early years of the Communist regime the congress did participate actively in current policy determination; it acted as a consultative and ratifying body and supreme arbiter of disagreements on policy. Then, under Stalin, who convened only four congresses after 1927, it degenerated into one of the regime's policy-propagating organs, automatically granting unanimous approval to the basic principles and current policies of the self-perpetuating party leadership but giving them a facade of democratic legitimacy. Though convened more often in the post-Stalin period (the statutory requirement of once in four years has been met), the role and operations of the congress have not perceptibly changed.

The declining influence of the congress was accompanied by an extremely large increase in membership. In 1918, shortly after the party came to power, the congress consisted of 104 delegates. The number of delegates has now stabilized at around 1400.

Delegates are formally "elected" at oblast party conferences in the RSFSR, Belorussia, and the Ukraine, at the republic party congresses in the other republics, and at party conferences in military units abroad. The norm for the 19th Congress (October 1952) and the 20th Congress (February 1956) was one voting delegate for each 5,000 members and one nonvoting delegate for each 5,000 candidate members of the party. With the increase in party membership (about one million in the next three years,) the norm was changed for the 21st Congress (January 1959) to one per 6,000. Though theoretically elected, each slate of delegates is carefully prepared in advance by the respective top regional and republic party officials with the advice and consent of the central leadership in Moscow, thus assuring a body amenable to the regime's control.

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CHART D

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DATA ON RECENT PARTY CONGRESSES

19th Congress. 5-14 October 1952 (10 days)
1,192 voting delegates 167 non-voting delegates

- Agenda:
- 1) Report of the Central Committee *
 - 2) Report of the Central Auditing Commission**
 - 3) Directives of the 19th Party Congress on the 5th Five-Year Plan for developing the USSR from 1951 to 1955
 - 4) Changes in the Party statutes
 - 5) Election of central party organs

20th Congress 14-25 February 1956 (11 days)
1,349 voting delegates 81 non-voting delegates

- Agenda:
- 1) Report of the Central Committee *
 - 2) Report of the Auditing Commission**
 - 3) Directives of the 20th Party Congress on the 6th Five-Year Plan for developing the USSR national economy from 1956-1960
 - 4) Election of central party organs.

In addition, at a closed session, heard Khrushchev's speech "On the cult of the Individual and its Consequences"

21st Congress (special) 27 January - 5 February 1959 (9 days)
1,269 voting delegates 106 non-voting delegates

- Agenda: 1) Control Figures for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR from 1959-1965

* The Central Committee report, usually divided into three parts--the external situation of the USSR, its internal position and the condition of the party-- reviews the main developments since the last congress and sketches the course for the future.

** The auditing commission report is a rather perfunctory statement on party finances.

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In addition to clothing the acts of the regime with the aura of legitimacy, the congress is also an international forum for propagandizing achievements, summing up and disseminating the experience gained in the preceding period, and outlining basic paths of development and the main task for the future. Its function is the periodic propagation of the broad lines of national policy, rather than the exposition of tactical plans. (See Chart D).

Central Committee

Even if the party congress did fulfill its theoretical role of supreme decision-maker on the most important questions of policy, tactics, and organization, the infrequency of its meetings would necessitate a body empowered to act for it in the interim. In the make-believe system of Soviet party democracy this role is played by the Central Committee.

A Central Committee is "elected" at each regular congress* to serve until the next regular congress is convened and is supposed to meet at least once every six months. The Central Committee elected in February 1956 at the 20th Party Congress consisted of 133 full (voting) members and 122 candidate members. Although the Central Committee is empowered to fill vacancies arising in the list of full members from among the candidates, this apparently has not been done. The Central Committee now consists of 123 full members and 113 candidate members.

As in the selection of delegates to the party congress, "election" to the Central Committee simply means formal approval of a slate already prepared by the top party leaders. This slate consists of the most influential officials in the Soviet Union--leading provincial party secretaries, military leaders, and government executives, as well as the central party leaders.**

*A 'Central Auditing Commission' is also 'elected' to 'inspect' the speed and correctness of actions of central party bodies and the condition of the treasury. It is politically inferior to the Central Committee, and its functions are largely pro forma.

**There is also a meager sprinkling of bench workers and farm and plant managers to propagandize the worker foundations and orientation of the party.

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Thus the Central Committee is potentially powerful, but although its individual members are important and relatively influential, the committee as a body has on only a few occasions had an effective voice in policy decisions in recent years. During the struggle for power in the immediate post-Stalin period, the Central Committee once or twice was apparently called upon to arbitrate disagreements which the Presidium members were unable to resolve among themselves. Since Khrushchev's victory over his principal opponents in June 1957 and his emergence as unchallenged boss, the Central Committee has not exercised decision-making powers.

If the stenographic records* of the two most recent plenary meetings of the Central Committee are any guide, the Central Committee has become just another public forum for the transmission of Khrushchev's ideas. The proceedings seem completely stereotyped with carefully prepared speeches grinding through to preordained, unanimous decisions, which differ only slightly--for the sake of appearances--from the regime's original proposals.

But if the Central Committee as a body has no effective role as a decision-maker, it does provide the regime with an important and authoritative forum for expounding and explaining some of its major policies. Participants in the recent plenums of the Central Committee, in addition to the full and candidate members of the Committee, have included the members of the Central Auditing Commission and a number of lower echelon officials, some even who are not party members. They hear the regime's major policies elaborated and the necessities for courses of action expounded, and receive a certain psychological "recharging of batteries" for the tasks and responsibilities laid down. They in turn transmit that information to officials and fellow-workers in their respective offices and bailiwicks and impart some of the enthusiasm for the aims and policies of the top leaders which was engendered at the plenum. The Central Committee is therefore a useful tool for disseminating and implementing policy and, through the selection of topics, for highlighting especially important areas of current concern. (See Chart E)

The practice begun late in 1958 of announcing dates and agenda of Central Committee plenary sessions in advance has further highlighted the subordinate status of that body in the chain of command. In addition, this advance scheduling has almost certainly had a disciplinary effect on the Central Committee members, forcing them to place their respective houses in order in anticipation of a collective airing of problems.

*Until December 1958 the proceedings of plenums were kept secret. Full or reasonably full accounts have been published for only the December 1958 and June 1959 plenums.

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CHART E

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DATA ON RECENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUMS

27 February 1956	Elections of leading Party organs following 20th Party Congress	(1 day)
20-24 December 1956	Modification of the 6th Five-Year-Plan and Improvement of the Administration of the Economy	(5 days)
13-14 February 1957	Reorganization of Industrial Management Organizational Matters: Shepilov — appointed to Secretariat Kozlov — appointed Presidium candidate	(2 days)
22-29 June 1957	Organizational Matters: (Anti-Party Group) Malenkov } expelled from full member, Presidium, and from the Party Molotov } Central Committee Kaganovich } Shepilov — expelled from candidate member, Presidium, and from the Party CC Pervukhin — demoted to Presidium candidate Saburov — expelled from the Presidium Ignatov } appointed full members, Presidium Kuusinen } Aristov } Belyayev } Kozlov } promoted to full members, Presidium Shvernik } Brezhnev } Furtseva } Zhukov } Pospelov } appointed Presidium candidates Kalnberzin } Kirilenko } Mazurov } Mzhavanadze } Kosygin } Korotchenko }	(8 days)
28-31 October 1957	On Party-Political work in the Soviet Army and Navy Organizational Matters: Zhukov — expelled from full member, Presidium, and from the Party CC	(4 days)
16-17 December 1957	"On the Work of the Trade Unions of the USSR" "On the Results of the Conferences of Representatives of Communist & Workers Parties" Organizational Matters: Furtseva — assigned full time secretariat duties Kirichenko } appointed to the CC Secretariat Ignatov } Mukhitdinov } Mukhitdinov — promoted to full member, Presidium	(2 days)
25 - 26 February 1958	MTS reorganization	(2 days)
6 - 7 May 1958	Chemical Industry Decree	(2 days)
17 - 18 June 1958	Agriculture Procurement reform Organizational Matters Podgorny — appointed Presidium candidates Polyansky	(2 days)
5 September 1958	Called 21st Congress and set its agenda Organizational Matters Bulganin — expelled from the Presidium	(1 day)
12 November 1958	Approval of Seven-Year-Plan Directives Education Reform Decree	(1 day)
15 - 19 December 1958	Development of Agriculture in past five years and Tasks for Further Increase of Agricultural Products	(5 days)
24 - 29 June 1959	Implementation of 21st CPSU Congress decisions on mechanization and automation Report on Implementation of 7 May 1958 Plenum on development of chemical industry	(5 days)

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SECRET**Chapter 3. PRESIDIUUM****Organization**

The Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee, charged by party statutes with directing "the work of the Central Committee" when that body is not in session, is the supreme policy-making body in the USSR, responsible for all spheres of national life-- foreign policy, economic policy, military policy, etc. This self-perpetuating body consists of individuals who, although nominally "elected" by the Central Committee, occupy their positions by virtue of their administrative ability, political prowess, and loyalty to Khrushchev. (See Chart F)


At present the Presidium is composed of 14 full (voting) members who exercise the prerogatives and responsibilities of national policy-makers, and 10 candidate-members, who participate in varying degrees in the policy-making process. The extent to which various members participate in Presidium deliberation is governed, apart from the political weight which they carry, by their collateral duties. And by virtue of the locale of these collateral duties some are even precluded from regular attendance. Belyayev, as the Kazakh party secretary, is not usually in Moscow and most of the candidate members, since they are, in the main, regional party administrators, are also often absent. Of the candidates, only three--party secretary Pospelov, planning chief Kosygin, and RSFSR premier Polyansky--are normally situated in Moscow, where they would be regularly available for Presidium meetings. The nature of their collateral duties also makes it likely that these three would take a more active part in Presidium deliberations than their colleagues of equivalent rank.

The composition of the present Presidium bears the heavy imprint of Khrushchev's power and influence. With the ouster of the "antiparty" group in 1957 and the influx of new, younger elements, the Presidium now has an average age of 57 and has lost its Stalin-appointed flavor. In contrast with earlier practice, under which the ruling group normally included a large number of governmental administrators, it is now largely composed of individuals whose professional experience was primarily acquired in Khrushchev's party machine. Twelve of the present full Presidium members, for example, have had or now have party responsibilities almost exclusively. This preponderance of party administrators in the top policy-making body reflects Khrushchev's efforts to reassert the primacy of the party in all aspects of Soviet life.

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CHART F

TOP ECHELONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION



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An important effect of this policy is the new relationship it has produced between the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. According to the party by-laws, the Secretariat is the executive agency of the party, charged with "supervising current work" and verifying the fulfillment of party decisions." The Secretariat is now represented on the Presidium by 8 full members and one candidate member.* This, in effect, transforms the party secretaries into formulators as well as executors of party policy. More important, it gives the professional party viewpoint a greater weight in the formulation of national policy than that of any other professional group in the Soviet Union. (See Chart G)

From his vantage point at the head of the party and government hierarchies, Khrushchev is clearly the dominant figure in the Soviet ruling group and is in a strong position to insist on his point of view in the councils of state. However, it is characteristic of Khrushchev's personality--by nature he is gregarious, extroverted, and garrulous--and his style of leadership, that he does not rule in the high-handed fashion of Stalin. Khrushchev appears to delegate far greater responsibilities to his subordinates, to place more confidence in them, and to take far greater account of their opinions. Thus, while he possesses supreme power, his lieutenants play an important role in the formulation of Soviet policy and the general administration of the Soviet state. They appear to have fairly broad responsibilities for selected areas of national life and show considerable versatility in their duties.

The influence exerted by individual Presidium members varies with their training, experience, and current administrative duties and also appears to depend heavily upon their relationships with Khrushchev. Included among Khrushchev's principal confidants are First Deputy Premiers Mikoyan and Kozlov and Party Secretaries Kirichenko and Aristov, all of whom enjoy close personal relations with the party chief. These men, along with Party Secretary Suslov, whom Khrushchev appears to regard more as a valuable political and professional asset than as an intimate friend, form the inner circle of top policy-makers immediately below Khrushchev in power and influence. Together they exercise broad responsibility for major areas of domestic and foreign affairs, corresponding roughly with their respective official assignments in the party and government.

*It is doubtful that Presidium member Nikolay Ignatov, though still formally a secretary, is serving in that capacity. In April 1959 he was elected Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (Russian Republic President), a full-time post which is probably incompatible with party secretarial duties.

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CHART 0

UNCLASSIFIED USSR: EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY PRESIDUM 1952-59						
OCTOBER 1952	MARCH 1953	FEBRUARY 1955	FEBRUARY 1956	JUNE 1957	SEPTEMBER 1959	
Stalin Arlatov Khrushchev Malenkov Mikhalov Ponomarenko Suslov Brezhnev Ignatov Pegov Shkiryatov Andrianov Melnikov Patolichov Puzanov	Khrushchev Ignatov Pospelov Shatalin Suslov Melnikov Bagirov	Khrushchev Suslov Pospelov Ponomarenko	Khrushchev Suslov Brezhnev Puztseva Shepilov Belyayev Arlatov Pospelov Shvernik Kirichenko Mukhlidov	Khrushchev Suslov Belyayev Arlatov Brezhnev Puztseva Kuusinen Pospelov Shvernik Ignatov Kirichenko Kozlov Kalibrzin Kirilenko Makarov Mukhlidov Mshvanadze	Khrushchev Kirichenko Suslov Arlatov Brezhnev Puztseva Kuusinen Mukhlidov Ignatov Pospelov Shvernik Belyayev Kalibrzin Kirilenko Makarov Mshvanadze Podgorny	SECRETARIAT PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION PROVINCIAL PARTY SECRETARIES
Stalin Shvernik Beriya Bulganin Ignatyev Kaganovich Malenkov Malyshev Mikoyan Molotov Pervukhin Saburov Voroshilov Ponomarenko Saburov Voroshilov Kabanov Kozgyn Tevotyan Vyshinsky Zverev Korotchenko Kuusinen Chesnokov Kuznetsov Mikhalov Yudin	Beriya Bulganin Kaganovich Malenkov Mikoyan Molotov Pervukhin Saburov Voroshilov Ponomarenko Shvernik	Bulganin Kaganovich Malenkov Mikoyan Molotov Pervukhin Saburov Voroshilov Shvernik	Bulganin Voroshilov Kaganovich Mikoyan Molotov Pervukhin Saburov Malenkov Zhukov	Bulganin Voroshilov Mikoyan Zhukov Kozgyn Pervukhin Korotchenko	Khrushchev Kozlov Mikoyan Voroshilov Kozgyn Pervukhin Ignatov Polyansky Korotchenko	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MISCELLANEOUS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MISCELLANEOUS
<p style="text-align: center;">UNCLASSIFIED</p>						

Full Member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party.

Candidate member, Presidium, Soviet Communist Party.

☐ Full-time Party Functionaries.

☐ Full-time Government Functionaries.

*Probably not functioning as a secretary since election as Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, 16 April 1959.

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Mikoyan, who seems to have achieved the status of an elder statesman, is Khrushchev's closest adviser in foreign affairs, and he probably also has exerted considerable influence in domestic economic questions, a field in which he has had long experience. Kozlov ranks high in Khrushchev's favor--he reportedly is selected as the latter's successor--and appears to be responsible for domestic governmental operations, particularly in the industrial field. Khrushchev's protégé from the Ukraine, Kirichenko, acts as the party chief's alter ego on the Secretariat, exercising general supervision over the professional party machine. Aristov, Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the RSFSR, is Khrushchev's watchdog over all matters of party concern in the all-important Russian Republic. Khrushchev is Chairman of the Bureau but has little time for the actual day-to-day supervision and direction of its work. The fifth member of the inner cabinet, Suslov, has had responsibilities in the foreign policy, ideological, and cultural fields, but he now appears to devote himself primarily to foreign Communist parties.

The Functioning of the Presidium

The absence of strong constitutional traditions and deeply imbedded governmental institutions in the Soviet Union tends to force decision-making functions to the highest levels. Those who enjoy power in the Soviet Union are forced to wield it, to plunge into the day-to-day supervision of the machine they operate, to prevent subordinate bodies from installing themselves along the lines of authority, and to keep open the channels of information and initiative from below. Presidium members apparently involve themselves in great detail in the whole range of activities connected with the initiation, planning, coordination, formulation, and execution of national policy. Published Central Committee decrees, which express Presidium decisions, show that top leadership responsibilities extend from the most weighty of state issues to such relatively trivial questions as the wages of minor functionaries or the ideological qualities of a small literary piece.

These facts concerning the nature of the Soviet political system provide a necessary preface to any discussion of the machinery of Presidium operations. The Soviet Union is a government of men, not of laws. The over-riding aim and the universal rationale is to get the job done, and if machinery or legal red-tape stands in the way, it is cut through, over-ridden, or abolished. However clearly it may be drawn, the operating procedure of the Presidium is at best merely a scheme which conceals as much as it reveals the leadership which drives it.

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Apart from the identity of its membership, which has remained fairly stable during the past two years, and the products of its deliberations, which appear from time to time in the form of published decrees of the Central Committee, less is known about the formal organization and working practices of the Presidium than about any comparable group of men in history. Most of the available information on working procedures at the top level of the Soviet leadership relates to Stalin's Politburo.* However, some of the procedures and habits of leadership established there undoubtedly carry over to the present day.

Under Stalin the Politburo was organized around a system of committees, each headed by a Politburo member and charged with special responsibilities in different fields.**

In practice, the system of committees served as a cloak for Stalin's dictatorial rule. The compartmentalization of duties within the Politburo and the irregularity of its plenary sessions meant that important policy questions came increasingly to be decided by Stalin personally rather than by the Politburo as a whole.

*Renamed the Presidium in 1952.

**Much of the political work of the Politburo was accomplished through a Political Commission which before the war consisted of Molotov, Beria, and Zhdanov. (Malenkov presumably replaced Zhdanov following the latter's death in 1948.) Under the Political Commission were a number of committees, each headed by a Politburo member. Among these committees were the Foreign Affairs Committee headed by Molotov, the Security Committee headed by Beria, and the Military Committee headed by Voroshilov.

Policy on all matters handled by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was determined by the Politburo. When a question of policy arose, Litvinov and his experts from the Commissariat would be called before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Litvinov would make an exposé of the situation and present his recommendations. Discussion might ensue and questions be propounded by members of the Committee. Litvinov and his associates would then be dismissed and the Committee would discuss the question further and formulate its recommendations. These recommendations in turn would be passed to the Political Commission, which normally would make the decision on the action to be taken. If the question were a vital one, however, or if there were disagreement in the Political Commission, the matter would be referred to a plenum of the Politburo for consideration and final decision.

Once a decision had been reached, either at the level of the Politburo or of the Political Commission, it was transmitted to the Foreign Affairs Commissariat in the form of a directive. Such directives had the force of law and were expected to be carried out explicitly without question on the part of the Commissariat.

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Since Stalin's death, the working practices of the Soviet leadership have undergone changes. Khrushchev's disparaging remarks at the 20th Party Congress about the old Politburo committee system under Stalin suggests that a more informal division of responsibilities exists in the Presidium and that the top leaders function more closely as a group. In an interview with a Western journalist in May 1957, Khrushchev stated that the Presidium "meets regularly, not less than once a week." Khrushchev added that at these meetings the Presidium members thrash out various problems and generally arrive at a common viewpoint. In the event of disagreement, he stated, issues are decided by a simple majority vote. Thus the evidence suggests that the evolution of the working practices of the Presidium since Stalin's death has produced a more business-like, regularized pattern of top-level decision-making. However, Presidium members are in close enough daily contact that lateral coordination on many problems can be effected without the necessity of formal Presidium meetings.

While the Presidium, like the party as a whole, has regained more than a shadow of its earlier status and functions, Khrushchev has secured firm hold on the substance of power. There is every evidence that as First Secretary he controls the secretaries who form the core of the Presidium and, on this basis alone, could dominate the proceedings of that body. Even apart from this fact of personal power, it is likely that Khrushchev could, by virtue of his personality, turn the deliberations of the Presidium in any direction he should choose. Essentially, therefore, the Presidium is Khrushchev's cabinet, and its prerogatives are exercised largely at his discretion.

Information on which the action of the Presidium is based reaches the leaders through a variety of official channels.* Regular reports on broad topics of general interest such as the economy, party affairs, scientific and military developments, and foreign policy are disseminated by the responsible party and government agencies on a regular basis. It has been reported that a publication called "Red Tass," a secret, uncensored, and unslanted coverage of the foreign press is prepared by the Central Committee staff and submitted directly to the top leaders. This flow of information has undoubtedly contributed to the keen awareness of contemporary foreign affairs revealed in Khrushchev's many speeches and interviews. Periodic reports on topics of more specialized interest, such as routine military matters, cultural affairs, foreign Communist parties, etc., are also disseminated on the Presidium level. The insights into the working habits of the Presidium members--insights afforded by foreign observers and by the occasional remarks of the leaders themselves--suggest that



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an enormous amount of current informational traffic flows over their desks. Khrushchev in a recent speech complained of the "many tomes" of official documents which he had to read.

This direct contact with a mass of data coming from independent, sometimes competing agencies, as well as the experience gained through the direct participation of each Presidium member in the administration of party and government organs, provides the leadership with a basis for independent judgment in assessing and disposing of proposals and recommendations coming from below. It also puts them in a position to initiate or amend policy on their own. For example, Khrushchev's initiatives in Soviet agricultural policy are well known: sponsorship of the cultivation of "new lands" in Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia; advocacy of corn cultivation; and, on at least one occasion, the upward revision of certain planned goals against the advice of his experts. At the same time, he exercises a dominant role in foreign policy. He is reported to have initiated the move within the Presidium for the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty, and to have dictated important pronouncements on foreign policy ostensibly authored by other men.

Questions for Presidium deliberation normally originate in a subordinate party or government body. Access to the Presidium is probably negotiated in various ways. One avenue would be through the personal secretariats of the individual Presidium members. The executive staff of the party Secretariat also has direct access to the Presidium (since the secretaries are Presidium members) and is presumably the intermediary agency most frequently used to get questions before the top policy body. Some agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report directly to the Presidium on a regular basis, so that questions in this area would appear on the agenda as a matter of routine.

Normally, questions which are brought before the Presidium for deliberation have passed through several stages of coordination before reaching the Presidium table. The first stage occurs when the originating body seeks to elicit the support or satisfy the possible objections of other interested agencies on a lateral basis before moving its proposals forward for higher consideration. This initial stage of coordination is probably governed less by formal procedural protocol than by the natural bureaucratic abhorrence of an open fight with the risk of possible later embarrassment. The brake on precipitate or ill-considered initiative which this provides, however, is counterbalanced by the fierce competitive atmosphere of the Soviet bureaucracy which might occasionally lead an agency to dispense with this lateral coordination in the hope of scoring an advantage over a rival.

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A second stage of coordination, probably indispensable for the great majority of questions which reach the Presidium, takes place in the Central Committee Secretariat. Almost any question for Presidium consideration would fall within the area of responsibility of one or more of the departments of the executive staff of the Secretariat, and it is quite possible that Secretariat recommendations are required as a matter of course, on all questions placed before the Presidium.

An actual case illustrating the stages through which a question passes before reaching the Presidium was revealed in an account recently published in Rome of talks held between a high-ranking Italian Communist Party delegation and Soviet Central Committee officials. The case in question involved the reprimand and restaffing of the editorial board of the journal Questions of History, which had committed a series of ideological errors in 1956.

It depends on the importance of the matter. Information can be given orally to one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. On the other hand, information can be given at the appropriate meetings of the Secretariat or Presidium at which representatives of writers and artists sometimes participate.

Our department is not limited simply to keeping the Central Committee informed on developments in the cultural debate but also takes part in working out the projects and decisions of the Secretariat and the Central Committee. For example, the decision about Questions of History was taken after long discussion inside the Secretariat of the Central Committee which was based on a project drawn up by the department. To draw up the project, we invited at the start the comrades from the editorial board of the review to the department. Next, in January, we held a bigger meeting, convened by our department and the propaganda department at which (there) participated not only the editorial board of the review, but also the president and vice president of the Academy of Sciences and representatives from the Academy of Social Sciences. For two days we had eight- to nine-hour discussions. At the next meeting of the Secretariat, the editors of the review, the comrades of the propaganda department and our department, and finally Comrades Pospelov and Suslov all spoke. After this debate, the decision to change the editorial board of the review was approved....

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Whether this question actually reached the Presidium agenda is not known, but the fact that the decision referred to above was formally published in a Central Committee decree suggests that it was, since the Presidium is charged by the party by-laws to act for the Central Committee when that body is not in session. It seems probable that the item was placed on the agenda for notation, that Suslov or Pospelov may have been called on to report briefly on the matter, and that a draft decree prepared by the Culture Department was approved, probably without formal vote.

The important point to note in this procedure is that the issue was resolved at the top leadership level, with the participation of Presidium members, but before reaching the Presidium table. In this case, Suslov, acting within the framework of basic policy, rendered the effective top-level decision, not as a Presidium member, but in his capacity as a member of the Secretariat. Much of the current business of Presidium-level importance is probably handled in this way. Similarly, Presidium members in a less formal way, may act to screen out nonessential business from the Presidium agenda and act as a court of next-to-last resort.

Major foreign policy questions apparently are handled somewhat differently from ordinary Presidium business. Available evidence suggests that Khrushchev and other members of the Presidium play a greater day-to-day role in formulating basic foreign policy than any other field of national policy. The Presidium, or Khrushchev together with several of the top leaders acting for the Presidium, probably constitutes a policy-planning board on all major foreign policy issues. Foreign Minister Gromyko, who is not a member of the Presidium, sometimes attends Presidium meetings to make suggestions and supply technical advice. In addition, Presidium members--Khrushchev in particular--participate personally in the implementation of the policy decided upon.

Conclusions as to the effectiveness of policy-formulation machinery in the Soviet Union must be tentative and cautious. The scope of responsibility exercised by the leaders of the Soviet Union is in itself an indication of the effectiveness of the machinery on which they depend. It appears to provide well-defined and clearly structured processes for getting policy questions before the Presidium in digested and manageable form, and to combine with this a degree of flexibility which prevents these processes from becoming a limitation on the Presidium's own initiative. The success of the system appears to depend less on its machinery, however, than on the capacity and energy of the men who run it. By placing a premium on political survival in conditions of fierce competition, the Soviet system has ensured the advancement of men with such capacity and energy to the top policy-making positions.

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SECRET**Chapter 4. SECRETARIAT****Organization**

The Central Committee Secretariat is the second most important decision-making body in the Soviet system, ranking next to the Presidium in this regard, and it is probably the most important body for the preparation of plans and proposing new policy. Soviet officials insist that all questions discussed or decided whether by the government or the quasi-independent "mass" organizations be first examined or approved by the organizations of the party, and the most important of these are certain to funnel through the secretariat at one point or another. Unlike the party Presidium, which has no administrative responsibilities, the Secretariat is the administrative head of the party in much the same sense as the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (cabinet) is the administrative head of the government.

The secretaries are formally "elected" by the Central Committee in plenary session, but in practice the Central Committee merely rubber-stamps approval of a slate already drawn up by the top party leaders. In the post-Stalin period the number of secretaries has varied from a low of three (February to July 1955) to a high of ten (December 1957 to April 1959). As noted above, there are now only nine secretaries actually functioning as such. The number probably was increased in part to relieve Khrushchev of some of the burdens of party administration, to enable him to devote more time to political leadership and critical policy problems, in part, to cope with the expanding activities of the party machine in formulating and implementing state policy, and in part to divide responsibility within the Secretariat so that greater attention could be given to daily problems.

The administrative duties of the Secretariat are divided among its members, each of whom has a specific set of responsibilities. In the information available there are hints of division along both functional and geographic lines. Khrushchev, as First Secretary, is of course head of the Secretariat. Aleksey Kirichenko acts as his second-in-command, with general supervision over the Secretariat and its central staff. The other duties are parceled out among the remaining secretaries. (see Chart H).

The variation in the number of secretaries and some apparent shifting of responsibilities over the past several years suggest that the organization of work within the Secretariat is fairly flexible. In addition to their administrative duties, all the secretaries participate in protocol activities at diplomatic and state functions and at one time or another have represented the regime in visits to foreign countries.

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CHART H

PARTY SECRETARIAT

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DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

<u>Secretary</u>	<u>Probable Fields (obviously incomplete)</u>
Khrushchev	- 1st Secretary; head of the Secretariat
Kirichenko	- 2nd-in-command; general supervision of the Secretariat and its central staff
Suslov	- CPSU relations with foreign Communist parties; coordination of world Communist movement
Aristov	- Party organizational and personnel matters; Russian republic party affairs
Brezhnev	- Industry and transport matters; political work in military and paramilitary organizations
Furtseva	- Culture; education, propaganda and agitation matters; youth and women's affairs
Kuusinen	- Assists in the field of party relations with foreign Communist parties
Mukhitdinov	- Central Asian and Moslem Affairs
Pospelov	- Ideology, Propaganda and Agitation, Culture, education, party schools and academies for political and ideological research and training

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As noted earlier the secretaries are all members of the party Presidium. The numerical weight in the Presidium thus lies with the party secretaries, whose judgments and viewpoints will be conditioned by their common day-to-day work with the professional party functionaries. Through this interlocking relationship the Secretariat can and presumably does exercise a very great influence on policy.

The executive staff of the central party organization performs work for the secretariat and is directly subordinate to it. This staff is more than just a support body for the Secretariat, however; it is the nerve center for the entire party machine (see Chart I) and as such plays a key role in both policy formulation and policy execution. Key appointments in the executive staff are made by the Secretariat, presumably with Presidium approval.

The staff is organized by departments (otdel) which fall into three general groups: those concerned with the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and administratively subordinate to the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, those concerned with functions in relation to the other 14 republics that make up the USSR, and those with union-wide functions. A typical department of the staff will have somewhere between 100 and 150 people organized into subdepartments (podotdel) and sectors (sektor). (see Chart J).

During the Stalin period all departments had responsibilities embracing the entire USSR. Experimentation in 1954 and 1955 with a division of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Party Organs along territorial lines led in February 1956 to the formation of a "Bureau for the RSFSR" in the Central Committee, organized, according to Khrushchev, to "provide more concrete and effective leadership" for this largest and most important of all the republics. The Bureau corresponds somewhat to the party bureaus already existing in the other 14 republics but differs in the method of its selection, i.e., it is picked by the all-Union Central Committee instead of by its republic counterpart.* The RSFSR Bureau apparently acts as a junior presidium and secretariat, making republic-level policy decisions, and has thus helped lighten the load of the party Presidium and Secretariat. Previously they had the task of dealing directly with each of the RSFSR's 76 principal administrative subdivisions as well as with the other 14 republics.

The exact relationship between the Secretariat and the Bureau for the RSFSR is not completely clear. There

*Unlike the other republics, the RSFSR does not have its own Central Committee but is administered directly by the central party organization.


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CHART I

THE CENTRAL PARTY MACHINE


1 OCTOBER 1959

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
APPARATUS

DEPARTMENTS FOR THE UNION REPUBLICS



FULL MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
 CANDIDATE MEMBER, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU
 MEMBER, CENTRAL AUDITING COMMISSION, CPSU

BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR



DEPARTMENTS OF GENERAL CONCERN






CHART J
UNCLASSIFIED
PROBABLE ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE,
SCHOOLS AND CULTURE FOR THE RSFSR

Head
N. D. Kazmin

Deputy Head
V. N. Derbinov

Deputy Head
Z. P. Tumanova

SUB DEPARTMENTS



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is no mention of the Bureau for the RSFSR in the party rules, even though amendments were made to the rules at the time the Bureau was created. Therefore it does not have statutory status equal to the Presidium, Secretariat, or Party Control Committee. The fact that First Secretary Khrushchev is chairman, and that the deputy chairman and one of the nine members of the RSFSR Bureau are also members of the Secretariat, is, however, adequate insurance against uncoordinated activities. The Bureau should, perhaps, be viewed as a subcommittee of the Secretariat for dealing with RSFSR problems. A close working relation apparently is maintained between an RSFSR department and its union-republic counterpart.

The fields of responsibility of most of the departments in the party executive staff are generally reflected in their names. The "party organs" departments, however, also have responsibility for the trade unions and the Komsomol (youth organization); "administrative organs" cover a potpourri--the courts, public prosecutor's office, organs of state control, the police and security forces, and health, social welfare, and physical culture organs; and "propaganda and agitation" covers the whole field of mass communications. The publishing houses Pravda and Kommunist function as separate departments, but they maintain close collaboration with the "propaganda and agitation" departments.

The chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is in fact a department of the central party staff and is responsible for political training and loyalty of the armed forces. There is probably also a military commission for considering and approving officer assignments in the armed forces.

Responsibility for relations with foreign Communist parties is divided between two departments, one dealing with Bloc and the other with non-Bloc parties. These are the principal working-level channels for Soviet support, direction, and control of the world-wide Communist movement. Recent activities of personnel associated with these two departments suggest that their responsibility may include foreign affairs generally. The possibility that there is a separate "foreign policy" department, however, cannot be excluded. A special "Commission for Travel Abroad" rules on the political reliability and suitability of individuals proposed by any Soviet agency for a foreign assignment.

The "Administration of Affairs" performs general housekeeping functions for the Secretariat and executive staff and a "General" department handles sensitive material and secret communications; it may, in fact, be the party's internal intelligence unit.

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SECRET**The Functioning of the Secretariat**

Collectively and through the individual activities of its members, the Secretariat provides day-to-day direction and leadership for the rest of the professional party machine (full-time paid officials) which in addition to the Secretariat and its executive staff includes a highly disciplined hierarchy of subordinate secretariats and staffs corresponding to the republics, oblasts, and lesser administrative divisions of the country. (see Chart B).

In general terms, the professional party machine performs the following functions:

- 1) Disseminates, explains, and interprets party and state policy decisions.*
- 2) Implements party policy.
- 3) Checks on and ensures the implementation of state policy by governmental and other organs.
- 4) Mobilizes economic and social pressures for the implementation of party and state policy.
- 5) Allocates manpower and resources of the party.
- 6) Collects and filters information and prepares reports, memos, and staff studies for the Secretariat and Presidium.
- 7) Calls attention of the Secretariat and Presidium to problems and prepares, suggests, and recommends plans for their solution.

The actual operations of the Secretariat are largely unknown. Although most of the secretaries oversee one or more of the departments in the executive staff, in only a very limited sense are they agents of the particular points of view of their respective groups of departments. Each secretary is a relatively free agent expressing his own individual opinion as one of the "elected" leaders of the party. His point of view on policy issues, however, is almost certain to be colored somewhat by the range of his experience in handling day-to-day administrative chores and in overseeing the execution of policy in particular fields, and he will presumably gain an expertise in his fields of responsibility which may tend toward parochialism.

*The apparatus used in this process is described in Annex A.

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The Secretariat undoubtedly prepares reports and papers for the Presidium and may even determine the agenda for its meetings. As a matter of routine, policy papers prepared by the Council of Ministers or any of the quasi-independent organizations, such as the Academy of Sciences, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, or the Central Union of Consumers Cooperatives, may be reviewed by the Secretariat before presentation to the party Presidium, but it is doubtful that the Secretariat could prevent Presidium consideration if any of its members were determined otherwise. Certainly Mikoyan and Kozlov have enough personal power and prestige to ensure such consideration unless it is adamantly opposed by Khrushchev.

The full extent to which the Secretariat prepares plans for approval or rejection by the Presidium is not clear. Fragmentary evidence suggests that the secretariat does a good deal of the actual shaping of plans. So far as is known, there is no planning body as such attached to it. The departments of the executive staff combine the functions of planning with those of policy execution, and then only in their assigned fields. The elaboration of plans cutting across those narrowly defined fields apparently is done in the Secretariat itself, either by the whole body of secretaries or possibly by ad hoc subcommittees of three or more secretaries. The Secretariat is, of course, no more capable of producing finished, coherent, well-meshed plans than the Presidium. It may be assumed that much of the planning consists simply of dovetailing material derived from policy papers and information reports prepared by the departments of the executive staff or other agencies, with liberal interjection of the ideas and points of view of the individual secretaries.

Under the supervisory direction of one of the secretaries, each department of the executive staff, in its assigned field, gathers and processes information, highlights problem areas, prepares reports and staff studies, and recommends courses of action. Information and policy recommendations flow from the departments as the result of direct requests from the Secretariat or an individual secretary, or as a by-product of the department's function of checking on policy execution and the operations of agencies in the department's field of responsibility.

The departments maintain constant contact with the lower echelons of the party. The bulk of communications is probably handled by post, telephone, and radio, but personal contact also plays an important role. Responsible representatives of a department are sent into the field and may spend as much as three fourths of their time visiting agencies, organizations, and operations. They check on conditions, resolve many local problems on the spot, and report the results of their investigations

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to their department in Moscow. Also, the regional party and government officials, despite the long distances they often must travel, spend a remarkable amount of time in Moscow conferring with officials in the executive staff, explaining their local problems and seeking solutions. Frequently, departments organize conferences on topics of general concern, and these conferences are participated in by appropriate officials from all over the country.

In these various ways emerging problems are identified and ideas generated for their solution, but though this process may result in the fragments and pieces of a national strategic plan, because it is carried out on a largely departmental basis, it seldom produces a complete plan. The fashioning of such an over-all plan is performed by the top party leaders in the Secretariat and the Presidium.

As noted earlier, formulations of state policy emanating from the Presidium are sometimes vague and often incomplete. Much of whatever unity and coherency Soviet national policy possesses arises out of the process of explaining, interpreting, translating into concrete tasks, and resolving conflicts as they arise in the course of trying to implement the Presidium decisions. The Secretariat, through the departments of its executive staff, probably does as much as or more than any other agency in the Soviet Union in performing this function.

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SECRET**Chapter 5. SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**

Although the Soviet system of government is in theory a constitutional democracy, the all-pervading influence of the Communist Party has prevented the formal governmental system from achieving any independent life of its own. The government is a major administrator of the policy decisions emanating from the party Presidium, implementing them as quickly and efficiently as it can, but influencing them only with the indulgence of the top party leaders. This influence, however, is easily felt through the presence of several Presidium members at the directing helm of the governmental machinery.

The governmental structure, to an even greater extent than the party structure, is designed to create and maintain the fiction that it is based on popular support and that the will of the mass of people finds accurate expression in its activities. The stellar role in the facade of democratic processes is played by the Supreme Soviet, which according to the Soviet Constitution, is "the highest organ of state power in the USSR." Ostensibly composed of popularly elected deputies and performing the usual functions of a Western legislature, the Supreme Soviet is neither popularly elected nor entrusted with any real role in the decision-making process.

The Supreme Soviet (see chart K) is formally a bicameral legislature with coequal houses, the deputies of one house--the Soviet of the Union--elected on the basis of population, and the deputies of the other--the Soviet of Nationalities--elected on a territorial basis by nationality unit.

"Elections" of deputies are held every four years and are the occasion of a major propaganda effort to popularize the regime and emphasize the "popular" base of the Soviet system. In actual practice, however, only one deputy--selected by or with the consent of the party--is allowed to run from any constituency. Being selected as a nominee by the appropriate party body is tantamount to election. Thus the electorate has no effective choice on election day and traditionally votes over 99 percent for the single candidate in each electoral district. Although the party represents less than 7 percent of the adult population, 76 percent of the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet at the last election (March 1958) were party members. The others were members of the so-called "nonparty bloc," i.e., not party members but considered by the party to be reliable adherents of its program. While most of the deputies are important party or government officials, nearly a third are workers at the bench and the plow, which helps to give the Supreme Soviet the appearance of a truly representative assembly.

Although the Constitution specifies that it convene twice a year, the Supreme Soviet has not usually been called into session that often (See chart L).


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CHART K

POSITION OF USSR SUPREME SOVIET

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**PARTY PRESIDUM,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
SECRETARIAT, AND APPARATUS**



— Actual control - - - - - Formal constitutional control

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CHART L

SUPREME SOVIET SESSIONS

1st Convocation (elected 12 December 1937)
8 years - 12 sessions

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2nd Convocation (elected 10 February 1946)
4 years - 5 sessions

3rd Convocation (elected 12 March 1950)

- 1st session 12-19 June 1950 (7 days)
- 2nd session 6-12 March 1951 (6 days)
- 3rd session 5-8 March 1952 (4 days)
- 4th session 15 March 1953 (1 day)
- 5th session 5-8 August 1953 (4 days)

4th Convocation (elected 14 March 1954)

- 1st session 20-26 April 1954 (6 days)
- 2nd session 3-9 February 1955 (6 days)
- 3rd session 4-5 August 1955 (2 days)
- 4th session 26-29 December 1955 (4 days)
- 5th session 11-16 July 1956 (5 days)
- 6th session 5-12 February 1957 (7 days)
- 7th session 7-10 May 1957 (4 days)
- Jubilee session 6 November 1957 (ceremonial session, no work)

5th Convocation (elected 16 March 1958)

- 1st session 27-31 March 1958 (4 days)
- 2nd session 22-25 December 1958 (4 days)

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The infrequency of its meetings and the restricted length of its sessions is clear indication of its limited role. Membership in the Supreme Soviet, however, does confer prestige on the deputy and, through the periodic trips to Moscow and shoulder-rubbing with the important leaders of the state, expands the number of persons feeling a close identification with the regime. The Supreme Soviet is also a useful forum for explaining and promulgating some of the more formal legalistic decisions of the regime and generating enthusiasm for their implementation.

Patterned on the Western system of legislative committees, each house of the Supreme Soviet has permanent commissions for preliminary preparation of legislation (see chart K). Until 1957 these commissions rarely met. Since then, however, their meetings have been more frequent and of longer duration, and there is some evidence that they may now be playing the useful though limited role of searching out and resolving conflicts between proposed and existing legislation and putting the proposals into legal form. It has increasingly become the practice to draw more of the Soviet citizenry into the legislative process by publishing draft legislation and calling for "nationwide" discussion.* The standing commissions of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet, according to one Soviet law professor, "make a thorough study" of the critical remarks and suggestions made in the course of the public discussion and tailor the legislation accordingly. This is about the closest Soviet public opinion comes to influencing legislation, and the changes that result in the proposed laws are invariably so minor as to rule out any real public opinion influence.

Since important decisions on foreign policy are not channeled through the Supreme Soviet, the Foreign Affairs Commissions play an even more perfunctory role than do the other standing commissions.**

Between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, formal legislative power is vested in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a 33-man body elected by the two houses in joint session to serve as collegial president. This body officially represents the Soviet State and is granted broad powers by the Constitution, including declaring war, mobilization, and martial law, naming and relieving ministers and military commanders, and concluding international agreements. The Supreme Soviet Presidium, however,

* This is never done, however, with matters of direct strategic importance or of foreign policy.

** The commissions probably average about two weeks a year in session. The longest any commission has been reported in session during any one year was eight weeks, and it may be presumed that only a portion of the commission was functioning for the full period.

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is little more than a formal instrument for promulgating some of the decisions of the top party leaders--decisions which in most states are made by organs of government.

The official acts of the Supreme Soviet Presidium are known as Ukases. The great majority of published Ukases involve state awards to outstanding workers, peasants, and officials, or to mothers with many children. Others announce changes in the heads of ministries or ambassadors to foreign countries. Ukases other than awards are confirmed as a matter of course at the next session of the Supreme Soviet. The bulk of what in Western democracies is generally considered the business of legislation, however, is promulgated in the Soviet Union with the full force of law by the executive rather than legislative organ.

The Supreme Soviet in theory "elects" the executive organ of the state--the Council of Ministers--as well as the judicial organs--the Supreme Court and the Procurator General (public prosecutor). In practice, however, the Supreme Soviet without discussion gives automatic, unanimous approval to a list decided on by the top party leaders and presented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The judicial organs play no discernible role in the decision-making process. The concept of precedent as a source of law is expressly rejected, as is the idea of the superiority of constitutional provisions over ordinary legislation. Moreover, the all-pervasive influence of the monolithic party precludes any "independent" court interpretations.


The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, is the most important agency in the governmental structure for highlighting problems and planning policy, and it is the body primarily responsible for the implementation of the law. According to the Constitution, the Council of Ministers directs the work of ministries and other governmental bodies, executes the national economic plan and the State budget, strengthens the monetary system, conducts foreign affairs, and supervises the general structure of the armed forces.

The Council is composed of a Chairman (Premier), First Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen, heads of various ministries, state committees and other agencies, and certain other individuals included on the Council because of either their position or their responsibilities. As of 1 October 1959 there were 65 members of the Council (See chart M). According to one Soviet author, "all important problems within the competence of the Council of Ministers are discussed and resolved at regularly held sessions by a simple majority vote." The extreme bulk of the full Council makes it seem more likely, however, that the actual decisions are made by the much smaller Presidium of the Council of Ministers, with the full Council, if it does meet, giving pro forma approval.

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CHART M
USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
 1 OCTOBER 1959

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■ Full Member, Central Committee, CPSU
 ■ Candidate Member, Central Committee, CPSU
 ■ Member, Central Auditing Commission, CPSU

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SECRET**Chapter 6. PRESIDIUUM OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers consists of the Premier, First Deputy Premiers, and Deputy Premiers, and "individuals personally designated by the Council of Ministers." As of mid-1958 the Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevich, and the Minister of Finance, A. G. Zverev, were the additional members of the Council of Ministers Presidium. (See Chart M).

The Presidium is the administrative head of the Council of Ministers and, in theory, exists to take care of current operational problems so the full council can concentrate on the "big questions." In practice, however, as noted above, the Presidium probably makes the important policy decisions as well. Its position and role in the government structure are thus somewhat akin to that of the party Secretariat in the party hierarchy.

The government Presidium is hierarchically organized with Khrushchev at its head. The two First Deputies, Mikoyan and Kozlov, divide the major responsibilities between them and substitute for Khrushchev when he is absent. Mikoyan concentrates on foreign affairs--including foreign economic relations--while Kozlov is primarily concerned with domestic matters. The Deputy Premiers are assigned special responsibility for certain key fields (Kosygin--economic planning, Ustinov--defense production, and Zasyadko--basic raw materials and fuel). The two added members, Matskevich and Zverev, are responsible for the fields represented by their respective ministries, agriculture and finance.

As a body the government Presidium does not carry political weight equal to that of the party Secretariat. Only the Premier, Khrushchev, and his two First Deputies, Mikoyan and Kozlov, are full members of the party Presidium and one Deputy, Kosygin, is a candidate member. Moreover, Khrushchev, who is above all Party First Secretary, is probably too busy with other matters to participate regularly in the work of the Council of Ministers Presidium. He has been somewhat distrustful of the economic managerial group and impatient with the narrow bureaucratic interests they tend to develop. He has based his regime primarily on the professional party machine and is probably strongly influenced by suggestions and advice emanating from that source. Mikoyan and Kozlov, however, have considerable personal influence with Khrushchev, probably sufficient to ensure that any point of view developed in the government Presidium on major policy issues is given a respectable hearing in the party Presidium. Their influence is probably also strong enough to protect against the encroachment of professional party officials in the managerial functions of the government.

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The Presidium of the Council of Ministers oversees the preparation of plans and information reports by the ministries, state committees, and other agencies of the government; it reviews them, and, where necessary, it merges partial plans into a coordinated whole. It may generate ideas and probably develops guidelines for more detailed planning by subordinate units. It is doubtful, however, that the government Presidium performs the functions of a general policy-planning board, preparing government-party coordinated plans on broad strategic issues for party Presidium consideration. More likely, its responsibility is to see that the policy papers and information reports it forwards to the party Presidium are adequately prepared and fully coordinated within the government. When sharp differences of view develop among ministries and state committees in regard to particular issues, however, alternate proposals are probably forwarded for the party Presidium's consideration.

This view of the government Presidium's functions in policy planning and processing of information does not rule out the existence of considerable informal consultation and coordination with the party Secretariat and officials in its staff, although most such consultation probably takes place at working levels. Any differences of view which remain unresolved after these consultations will go before the party Presidium for decision.

The main work of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers as a body and of its members individually is the supervision of policy execution by the government. Within the framework of policies established by the party Presidium, decisions governing the operations of government agencies are worked out, state policy is interpreted, tasks for its implementation are assigned, and conflicts arising in the course of implementation are resolved. Most of this current operational work probably is performed by the deputy premiers acting individually, with the full Presidium of the Council of Ministers called to discuss and decide only the knottier problems.

Problems arising in operations of the governmental machinery that require high-level decision--whether they involve interpretation of laws or other state policy decisions, jurisdictional disputes or decisions on specific questions not adequately covered in existing laws and regulations--are usually referred to the Deputy Premier or First Deputy Premier who has responsibility for the general field wherein the problem lies. Occasionally other deputy premiers are called in to help with the solution. If the problem is general in nature or cuts across the fields of jurisdiction of several deputy premiers, it is referred to the Commission for Current Affairs, a subcommittee of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers charged with examining and deciding all current problems other than those within the competence of a First Deputy Premier or a single Deputy Premier.

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Decisions on basic problems of governmental activity are issued as decrees (postanovleniya) of the Council of Ministers and are signed by the chairman, or First Deputy acting in his stead, and the Administrator of Affairs, who combines the functions of chief clerk with the responsibility of managing other housekeeping chores for the Council of Ministers. Decisions on questions of current operational administration are issued as orders (rasporyazheniya) of the Council of Ministers and signed by the person who issues them--the chairman of the Council of Ministers or one of his deputies. Decrees and regulations of the Council of Ministers have the full force of law throughout the Soviet Union. Although the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has the constitutional power to annul decrees and regulations which do not accord to the existing law, the practice has been to change the law instead.

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SECRET**Chapter 7. MINISTRIES, STATE COMMITTEES, AND OTHER AGENCIES
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS**

The functional units of the Council of Ministers are the 16 ministries, 13 state committees, five other agencies whose heads are members of the Council, and several specialized agencies of lesser importance.

Ministries administer specific sectors of the nation's economic or cultural life such as agriculture, health, or railways. State committees differ from ministries in that they are not primarily administrative bodies. They supervise and coordinate activities of ministries and other administrative agencies of the government which relate to the committee's field of competence. For example, the State Committee for Automation and Machine Building coordinates the effort to increase automation in all spheres of the national economy. The five special agencies do not fall into either category, but they are regarded as having sufficient importance to be included in the Soviet cabinet because of the national character of their work.

There are also various other councils, chief directorates, directorates, and committees. These administer specialized projects of short duration, important longer term activities over which the government wishes to maintain supervision and control, or certain activities outside the sphere of established ministries but too limited to justify the formation of a new organ of ministerial rank. Among the more important of these special bodies are the chief directorates of civil air fleet, highway construction, peaceful use of atomic energy, and the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). Other committees and councils administer such activities as stockpiling useful minerals, cultural relations with foreign countries, and radio and television broadcasting. The heads of these agencies are appointed by the Council of Ministers but are not themselves members of the Council.

Ministries

There are two types of ministries, "all-union" and "union-republic." (See chart M). The former directly administer enterprises and activities in their fields of responsibility, regardless of their physical location within the country. The "union-republic" ministries administer a few activities directly, but they operate primarily through counterpart ministries in each republic. For example, the USSR Ministry of Health does not maintain field representatives of its own, but transmits its orders to the health ministry in each republic. Such ministries are subordinate both to the republic Council of Ministers and to the parent ministry in Moscow. As previously noted

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republic governments also include ministerial portfolios which are purely local in nature. Called "republic ministries," they direct activities which are peculiar to the republic in which they exist and which are not sufficiently widespread or important to warrant the formation of a ministry in the national government.

The names of the ministries indicate their fields of responsibility, except that Medium Machine Building is a cover name for the atomic energy ministry (development and military uses). The organizational structure of a ministry is very similar to that of the Council of Ministers on a miniature scale; like all other institutions in Soviet society, it is analogous to a pyramid. At the apex stands the minister. He is assisted by a first deputy, who is second-in-command for general administration, and by several deputy ministers, each having jurisdiction over a specific area of the ministry's work. Together with a few other responsible officials, these men form the "collegium" (presidium) of the ministry. Below the collegium are the chief directorates, directorates, and departments, each charged with general supervision of a geographical or functional area of work (or sometimes a combination of both). Often, but not always, deputy ministers are also heads of important chief directorates or other units; in most cases, the heads of the more important directorates who are not deputy ministers are members of the collegium.

Branching out from central headquarters, ministries maintain field representatives in oblasts and lower administrative-territorial units, with the chain of command thence extending downward into individual factories, shops, combines, and other enterprises.

Ministries are executive organs; their work is performed in strict accordance with tasks assigned by the government and is guided by established party and government policy. Any action taken outside their specific fields of competence must have the explicit approval of the Council of Ministers.

Within this framework, ministries are empowered to decide all basic questions affecting the activities and enterprises under their jurisdiction. They function on the principle of "one-man leadership" (yedinonachaliye), in which the minister ultimately and personally bears responsibility for whatever takes place in his agency. He enjoys fairly broad discretionary powers in assigning and promoting personnel, allocating and re-allocating basic means of production (both fiscal and material), and assigning production tasks in order to fulfill the demands levied on the ministry. However, he is always under the watchful eye of professional party officials

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ever ready to call him to account for deviations from party policy or failure to fulfill his assigned tasks.

The collegium, of which the minister is chairman, functions as a collective coordinating body for the entire ministry. It meets regularly to consider reports from lower bodies on the progress of work, to resolve problems which have cropped up, to formulate reports to be sent up to the Council of Ministers, and to draft directives and orders to the subordinate echelons. These reports are signed by the minister, not by the collegium, and despite the facade of collective leadership, his voice is final. In cases of disagreement between him and other members of the collegium, the minister's decision is put into effect with the understanding that members of the collegium have the right of direct appeal to the Council of Ministers.

The chief directorates and the directorates supervise specific sectors of the ministry's work. Also functioning on the basis of one-man leadership, but having no collegia, they maintain a semblance of collectivity through frequent "production conferences" of individual sub-units, or groups of subordinate entities. The chief directorates translate their general assignments into specific tasks and issue the requisite orders to the lower echelons. It is unlikely that the latter have very much leeway in interpreting orders received from above, and independent initiatives probably must be cleared with the collegium. Since the governmental reorganization of 1957, however, there has been an increased tendency on the part of lower echelon officials to assert themselves, and they are not nearly so hesitant to make suggestions and requests to the center as in previous years.

In addition to recommendations and requests, the directorates also regularly prepare work and progress reports for the collegium. These papers are coordinated laterally with other interested directorates and departments before submission; this does not imply, however, that papers reaching the collegium have the general agreement of all concerned. Differences in point of view between lower units are resolved by the collegium, and this body frequently calls up representatives from lower echelons to reinforce their standpoints by oral testimony. The collegium of a ministry of the "union-republic" has the authority to request reports from the corresponding ministries in the republics. A report requested by a republic ministry probably is not coordinated laterally before submission to Moscow. Lateral coordination of important reports prepared by central ministries for the USSR Council of Ministers can be presumed, however; such coordination probably takes place at the collegium level in the ministries concerned.

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SECRETState Committees

State committees are structurally similar to all-union ministries; they operate through a system of field representatives and, with the exception of the State Planning Committee and certain of the specialized agencies, do not have counterparts in the republics. Their organization at the center is also analogous to that of a ministry, being composed of the chairman, his deputy chairmen, and functional subdivisions.

As stated above, state committees are coordinating bodies for those activities of other government agencies centering around a common problem. They make preliminary examinations of the decisions of these agencies and present to the Council of Ministers their conclusions and suggestions on such matters as projected plans, technical-economic indices of work of individual branches and norms for the utilization of the mechanical means of production, and measures for improving the work of ministries and departments.

Within the limits of their competence, the state committees are also charged with supervision over certain activities of government departments. In the specific field with which they are concerned, they oversee the rational use of resources, introduction of new techniques, and attempts to improve the quality of work, and they see to it that the various agencies put resources into the state reserves.

Like the ministries, the state committees also have certain planning functions. Whereas the planning departments of the ministries draw up economic plans for the ministry as a whole, the corresponding departments in state committees have more clearly delineated responsibilities. They pull together information from the rest of the government and prepare for the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee their recommendations on distribution and transportation of the resources with which they are concerned, introduction of new techniques, scientific-technical propaganda, and measures for improving systems of labor and wages.

Thus the state committees assemble from all over the government a variety of reports bearing on a common problem (such as automation) and integrate them into general reports for submission to the State Planning Committee and the Council of Ministers. They receive from these bodies general instructions which in turn are formulated as specific requirements to be put into effect in all government agencies concerned.

The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) deserves special mention because of its unique niche in the Soviet decision-making process. As the central authority supervising the USSR's planned economy, it formulates the specific

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plans for implementing the broad economic objectives laid down by the party Presidium. Its importance is evidenced by the fact that Gosplan Chairman Aleksey Kosygin is a deputy premier and a candidate member of the party Presidium, and several deputy chairmen and department heads carry the rank of minister.

Gosplan is organizationally similar to a union-republic type of ministry, and each republic has a State Planning Committee which in theory is subordinate both to the republic Council of Ministers and to USSR Gosplan. In practice the line of command runs almost exclusively to the center, and Gosplan has direct operational control not only over its counterparts in the republics, but also over the planning departments in individual ministries and state committees.*

Specialized Agencies

None of the five specialized agencies which are a part of the Council of Ministers plays a critical role in decision-making, although they contribute to the process through their special fields of work. The Soviet Control Commission is primarily concerned with checking on fulfillment of State directives, particularly in the implementation of economic plans. The commission has counterparts at the republic level, with representatives stationed throughout the country. The State Bank (Gosbank) is the principal credit institution of the USSR. It is the bank of issue and virtually the sole fiscal agent for all levels of government; it has branches throughout the nation.

The Committee of State Security (KGB) is the organization of the secret police; its functions are similar to those of the FBI, CIA, and the law-enforcement arms of the Treasury Department combined.** The KGB has republic counterparts, but these are completely subordinate to the center rather than to the republic governments. The State Scientific-Economic Council is primarily responsible for coordinating research on technical-economic questions, particularly in the improving of planning techniques.

The Central Statistical Administration is the repository for facts and figures on all phases of Soviet life. It publishes economic and production reports and limited population studies; it supervised the taking of the Soviet census last fall.

*For further discussion of its operations see Chapter IV

**For a discussion of intelligence organizations, see Annex F.

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SECRET**III. FOREIGN POLICY****Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION**

As noted above, major foreign policy questions apparently are handled somewhat differently from ordinary Presidium business. Khrushchev has quite obviously been impatient with the mechanisms of normal diplomacy and patently distrustful of the ability of professional diplomats to handle critical foreign policy situations. The Presidium--or Khrushchev together with several of the top leaders acting for the Presidium--probably constitutes a policy-planning board on all major foreign policy issues. Moreover, Presidium members, Khrushchev in particular, participate personally in the implementation of the policy decided upon. Foreign Minister Gromyko, who is not a member of the Presidium, sometimes attends the meetings to make suggestions and supply technical advice. Khrushchev, however, has gone out of his way in public and private comments to underline the limitations on Gromyko's authority and, in the process, to emphasize the degree of his own personal domination of foreign policy.

Khrushchev's confidence in speaking for the majority of the Presidium has been reflected time after time in his off-the-cuff remarks on international problems, as he has proclaimed in public the aims and tactics of Soviet foreign policy which he determines in private. This is particularly evident on the few occasions he has used the first-personal singular in speaking of the definition or redirection of Soviet policy. Increasingly, as Khrushchev has dominated policy, Soviet conduct of foreign affairs has come to reflect not only one-man domination of the Soviet scene, but also some of Khrushchev's personal characteristics.

In line with his openly expressed dislike for bureaucratic red tape and diplomatic usage, Khrushchev has experimented with a number of devices to bring to bear a personal touch in state-to-state relations: marathon interviews with free-world visitors in order to nail down the Soviet position on world problems, exchanges of visits with foreign heads of government and of state, and continued emphasis on the need for summit conferences to solve outstanding issues. The new Soviet tactics demonstrate Khrushchev's shrewdness, nerve, and unscrupulousness and reflect his efforts fully to exploit Soviet technological, military, and scientific progress to extend Communist influence at the expense of the West. This personal factor is also evident in Moscow's occasional willingness to press provocative policies when seemingly to Soviet advantage, and then dramatically--as in the Syrian crisis of 1957--shift course when the policy has failed.

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The form in which foreign policy plans are worked up is not known, but the high degree of consistency and coordination which Soviet foreign policy manifests in action suggests that they are detailed and comprehensive. They might include over-all strategic plans, setting the basic objectives of Communist policy in various areas of the world for stated periods of time; and operational (or country) plans, spelling out in greater detail the specific tasks of the various aims of Soviet policy abroad in achieving these strategic goals. All such plans are subject to continuous review by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by departments in the staff of the party secretariat, and by the Presidium, particularly when the international situation is changing rapidly.

Policy decisions made by the Presidium are executed by the Foreign Ministry, assisted at the top by party officials and abroad by career diplomatic party-state functionaries.* In the formidable diplomatic missions the USSR maintains abroad there are, in addition to regular Foreign Ministry personnel, assigned representatives of other Soviet agencies who, though nominally subordinate to the Soviet ambassador, maintain direct contact with their home organizations. Increasingly numerous abroad are officials of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which is responsible for administering the USSR's economic cooperation and military assistance programs. The Ministry of Foreign Trade also maintains both permanent and temporary commercial and trade representatives abroad. In those countries where several bloc members are involved in economic assistance programs, an embassy economic official may be charged with reporting on these activities directly to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance--the organ for coordinating Soviet bloc economic activity. At all Soviet embassies abroad, military intelligence and KGB officers are stationed, although in some cases their affiliation is unknown to the Foreign Ministry personnel. These special staffs receive their instructions from their home organizations in Moscow, and their various programs are coordinated by Central Committee organs in Moscow rather than in the field.

The activities of the official Soviet missions in pushing the USSR's foreign policy lines are supplemented locally by Communist parties, taking guidance if not

*For descriptions of the use made by the Presidium of its instruments of foreign policy in two types of overseas operations, see Annexes B and C.

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always direction from Moscow, and by a network of Communist-controlled or Communist-supported front groups which act as a bridge between Communists and actual or potential sympathizers.

All of these organizations are described in the sections following.

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Chapter 2. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The USSR Foreign Ministry is charged solely with responsibility for Soviet foreign relations. Its functions include negotiation with foreign representatives in the USSR, establishment and maintenance of diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and supervision of representatives of other Soviet agencies.

Organization

The headquarters staff of the Foreign Ministry consists of 14 geographic divisions or desks with responsibility for specific groups of countries or international organizations; several functional divisions dealing with such matters as protocol, legal questions, and press relations; a secretariat; and the collegium, or directing staff of the ministry. (See Chart N).


The collegium, chaired by the minister, includes all deputy ministers and a few of the more important division chiefs. Over-all supervisory chores are divided among the deputy ministers, with the first deputy acting in a general capacity as the minister's right-hand man. The collegium advises the minister and, at the same time, serves as a coordinating board for the activities of the various components of the ministry. It helps translate policy directives into specific assignments, oversees their implementation, and assesses the results.

The geographic desks supervise the operations of Soviet missions in the countries of their responsibility, solve minor problems on their own, and seek solution to major ones from the appropriate deputy minister or the collegium of the ministry. The geographic desks also perform the first stage in filtering, consolidating, and synthesizing reports from field missions.

Foreign Missions

Soviet foreign missions have administrative and general supervisory responsibilities regarding most Soviet citizens in the country where the mission is accredited. During the past six years the Soviet Union has added 14 countries to those with which it exchanges diplomatic representation; it now maintains 53 embassies, four legations, and a permanent representation to the United Nations. Most of the recent expansion has been among the newly independent countries of Africa--Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Guinea, and Ghana--and in Southeast Asia--Indonesia, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal, and Ceylon. Very little progress has been made in Latin America, where relations are maintained with only three countries: Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.

CHART N
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 1 OCTOBER 1959 UNCLASSIFIED



FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS

Protocol F. F. Molochkov
Treaty & Legal G. I. Tunkin
Press M. A. Kharlamov
Consular A. P. Vlasov
Economic ?
Administrative ?
Personnel F. I. Baranenkov?

GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS

International Organizations S. K. Tsarapkin	International Economic Organizations P. M. Chernyshev
American Countries A. A. Soldatov	African Countries A. A. Shvedov
1st European S. T. Bazarov	2nd European N. D. Belokhvostikov
3rd European I. I. Uichev	4th European A. I. Gorchakov
5th European P. S. Dedushkin	Scandinavian Countries K. K. Rodionov
Near East Countries ?	Middle East Countries A. P. Pavlov
South East Asia V. I. Likhachev	Far Eastern M. V. Zimyanin

FOREIGN MISSIONS

United Nations A. A. Sobolev
53 Embassies 18 Ambassadors 19 Ambassadors
4 Legations (1 post vacant)

- Top level Ministry personnel at time of Stalin's death
- Brought into Ministry since Stalin's death
- Presumed to exist

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The most important single document which each Soviet Embassy prepares on a routine basis is the Annual Country Report. This report is a comprehensive description of events during the calendar year in all phases of the country's political, economic, and cultural life. Where appropriate, an analysis of a given situation is included, together with conclusions and policy recommendations. When the annual review of an embassy's operations is under way in the ministry--and occasionally at other times as well--the Ambassador may be called to Moscow to explain situations which are difficult to render in report form and to participate in policy discussions.

Personnel

The intense personal interest of all members of the top party leadership in foreign relations has served to keep the ministry under close scrutiny and helped to isolate its operating personnel from factional pressures. Apparently few, if any, of the ministry's personnel, for example, became embroiled in the political intrigues of former Foreign Ministers Molotov and Shepilov.

The average Soviet career diplomat not only has steered clear of top party politics, he has also been generally successful in adapting to the demands of the regime. Most of the important career diplomats displaced in the post-Stalin shake-up have been appointed subsequently to other posts within the ministry without apparent loss of status. Career development, routine reassignment, and the shifting locus of problems requiring depth of diplomatic experience appear to be among the most important reasons for these transfers of career personnel.

On the other hand, an influx of outsiders into high-level positions in the ministry accompanied, and in some cases may have precipitated, the transfer of career diplomats. During the past six years former high party officials and government administrators have been assigned to top diplomatic posts over the heads of career workers in the ministry, and they now constitute a sizable bloc of the ministry's top personnel.

The regime appears to have re-evaluated its bloc diplomatic requirements and instituted a policy of assigning to bloc countries men with party or government administrative experience, rather than men trained in the diplomatic service. In a number of cases the necessity to exile some party or government figure from the arena of power struggle and policy controversy coincided with a need within the ministry for someone with party or government experience. Most of the "outsiders" were assigned to bloc countries or the headquarters staff of the ministry. A few, however, have

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been assigned to nonbloc countries--notably Menshikov to India, and then the United States; Pegov to Iran; and Ryzhov to Turkey.

Revitalization of the ministry since Stalin's death has been accompanied by an enhancement in the prestige of diplomatic service. To a certain extent this was a by-product of the assignment of high-level party officials to the ministry, but it has also been fostered as deliberate policy by the regime. In Stalin's time comparatively few Soviet diplomats were members of top party bodies. At the time of his death only eight were so honored, and of these only Vyshinsky was a full member of the Central Committee. Six were named full members at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, and today 19 enjoy the prestige of high party rank--nine of them as full members of the Central Committee.

Major personnel assignments within the ministry are the prerogative, not of the ministry itself, but of the party, and are exercised by the foreign departments in the staff of the Central Committee Secretariat. The most important assignments undoubtedly receive the direct attention of Khrushchev and the party presidium. The usual procedure is for the ministry to propose a candidate to the Secretariat for consideration. If the candidate is unacceptable to the party department concerned, Gromyko can appeal the decision to the party presidium. Ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, since they are legal representatives of the Soviet state, are formally appointed by decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Decrees on other top assignments in the ministry are issued by the Council of Ministers.

The Soviet diplomatic service has apparently been divided into two parts--bloc and nonbloc. Personnel rotate within each service but seldom go from one to the other. All top positions in the bloc service are staffed by former party and government officials, and all but three of these--Molotov, ambassador to Mongolia; Terenty Shtykov, ambassador to Hungary; and Yury Prikhodov, ambassador to Bulgaria--entered the Foreign Ministry after Stalin's death.

Desk chiefs and in some cases deputy desk chiefs have the same rank as foreign mission chiefs, and it appears to be a matter of policy to rotate top personnel from one position to the other. Soviet career diplomats are generally trained as area specialists, but an effort is made to broaden their experience. During the course of their careers they may expect assignments in several different parts of the world, interspersed with varied headquarters responsibilities.

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Soviet diplomats carry their ranks with them and collectively form a pool of talent available for specific assignments as the need arises. Quite often a high-ranking diplomat will be reassigned to Moscow and not be identified for many months or even several years, only to reappear subsequently in a new post with no apparent diminution in status. It may be assumed that his services have been utilized on special commissions, ad hoc committees, or in other ways which are not normally reported.

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SECRET**Chapter 3. STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations has ministerial rank and operates under the aegis of the USSR Council of Ministers. It was created for the establishment and development of economic contacts with all foreign countries, as well as for the supervision of technical and economic assistance and cooperation, scientific collaboration, aid in the construction of enterprises abroad, training and provision of specialists, and grants of credit.

Organization

The committee is organized both geographically and functionally. Certain divisions have been identified, and it is possible that there are others still unidentified. Those identified are: Administration for Construction of Enterprises Abroad, containing both functional and geographic sections; Main Engineering Administration; and Administration for Matters of Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the latter being composed of country commissions for Bloc countries as well as for Yugoslavia and Finland. The provision of technical military assistance and production facilities is assumed to be the responsibility of the Main Engineering Administration.

The committee oversees the operations of its four all-union associations--which are responsible for the construction of installations abroad. These four associations, whose operations are to a certain extent similar to the associations under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (see below), in that they export and import, also perform additional functions including the furnishing of Soviet experts and the training of native personnel for work in the enterprises built under Soviet supervision. Three of the associations construct specific types of installation and confine their activities to Bloc countries. The fourth-- "Tekhnoeksport;"--however, functions in countries outside the Bloc for all types of installation.

Functioning

Although the committee ranks administratively with the Ministry of Foreign Trade, its function of establishing and expanding economic contacts with foreign countries appears to place it in a higher capacity than the latter, which is concerned more with the implementation of foreign trade operations. Thus, a policy decision to

*Literally "Technically Export;" full title unknown.

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establish or expand economic relations with any given country is translated into action by the committee. When a trade agreement has been concluded, the Ministry of Foreign Trade comes into the picture. The committee has a continuing function, of course, if an agreement for economic or technical assistance is involved.

The nature of the committee's connection with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) is not entirely clear. It is, however, the appropriate Soviet organ to deal with CEMA, and in fact some committee officials have been identified as being Soviet representatives in CEMA. (See below).

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SECRET**Chapter 4. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE****Organization**

The Moscow headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, composed of geographic, functional, commodity, and service divisions (called administrations), supervises the activities of 1) its domestic representatives --representatives at ports, border areas, large industrial centers, councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics, and councils of national economy-- to expedite and control foreign trade operations, foreign trade inspectors of exported and imported commodities, and customs representatives; and 2) its overseas representatives--officials of all-union export-import associations, permanent and temporary trade delegations, agencies and missions, and commercial counselors and attachés.

There are four geographic divisions responsible for planning and supervising trade with countries under their respective jurisdictions. There are also four commodity divisions which directly supervise the import and export of specifically allocated groups of commodities and consolidate the commodity export and import plan. Functional and service divisions include the Foreign Exchange and Finance Administrations which are responsible for preparing the consolidated foreign exchange and financial plan. Other functional and service divisions include those for transport, customs, and trade agreements.

Actual day-to-day foreign trade operations are conducted by the export and import associations (of which there are more than twenty), with representatives both at home and abroad. These associations are legal monopolies; each usually has exclusive trading responsibility for specific commodities, although certain associations have responsibilities for all commodities for trade in specified areas. All associations are legally independent economic organizations, liable for their own actions. As a result, the government of the USSR cannot be held responsible for debts and acts of the associations either at home or abroad, nor can the associations be held liable for actions of the Soviet Government. This is an essential difference between a foreign trade association and a trade delegation, which concludes transactions in the name of the USSR. Both organs nevertheless are responsible for their actions to the Ministry, and their freedom of operation is severely restricted.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade carries out its planning, regulation, and control functions in foreign countries by means of its trade delegations abroad, the chief officials of which have diplomatic status. A trade delegation regulates and conducts Soviet foreign trade in the country concerned. It represents the export

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and import associations, acts as their agent, makes market surveys, and negotiates contracts with buyers and sellers for commodities offered or required by export and import associations. Where a trade delegation does not exist, such duties are handled by trade missions, agencies, commercial counselors, or attachés.

Functioning

Soviet foreign trade is primarily designed and executed to serve the needs of the Soviet economy as determined by the Soviet planners.* Its objectives are determined by the national economic plan, rather than by market conditions as in most Western countries.

In order to ensure that Soviet foreign trade serves the needs of the domestic economy, trade is conducted almost exclusively by state organs.** Aside from ensuring that the export-import plan (see below) is coordinated with the national economic plan, direct control over foreign trade is intended to insulate the Soviet economy from foreign influence and to give maximum protection to domestic industry. Direct control also makes possible a flexible trade policy. The Soviet Government can quickly change the direction and composition of its trade simply by dispatching orders to its export and import associations, and thereby it can take advantage of changes in economic and political conditions abroad. (The above)

The bulk of Soviet foreign trade is conducted on the basis of bilateral commodity and payments agreements, by means of which the USSR attempts to balance its imports from any given country with exports. Such agreements provide for reciprocal deliveries of goods to be carried out in accordance with commodity lists specifying the quota of goods to be delivered. These lists are agreed on between the parties for definite periods of time and are defined in special annual protocols.

The rationale behind specifying what is to be exported and imported in trade with a country lies in the very nature of the Soviet economy. In this way the Soviet Union knows in advance what its exports and imports will be and can more easily integrate them into the

*For economic policy formulation, see Chapter IV.

**The exception is Tsentrosoyuz, the Union of Consumers Cooperatives, which conducts a limited volume of foreign trade in consumer goods.

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national economic plan. The USSR has been turning more to the use of long-term agreements, which have been a regular feature of Soviet trade with the Bloc countries for a number of years. In the last two years long-term trade agreements have been concluded with almost all major Western countries (usually for 2-3 year periods).

Soviet foreign trade with the Bloc countries is conducted more or less on the basis of world market prices; that is, the prices charged other Bloc countries for Soviet exports or prices paid by the USSR for goods from other Bloc countries are determined in trade agreements for the coming year on the basis of prices prevailing in Free World markets in the current year. World market prices are employed because Soviet foreign trade prices and internal prices are unrelated. (Most Soviet domestic prices are set arbitrarily by the planners to absorb excess market demand and to encourage the use of some commodities while discouraging the use of others.) This gap is in fact deliberate, since the Soviet foreign trade mechanism is intended to isolate the planned internal economy from foreign influence.

In conducting foreign trade operations for the state, the Ministry of Foreign Trade deals with a number of Soviet organizations. Because the export-import plan must be integrated with the national economic plan, it is drawn up with approval of Gosplan and receives final approval by the Council of Ministers. Foreign trade questions are also resolved with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state organs. Financial questions dealing with foreign trade are decided with the participation of the Ministry of Finance, and foreign exchange questions in participation with the State Bank. All financial transactions with foreign countries go through Gosbank and its subsidiary, the Bank for Foreign Trade, which handles certain noncommercial accounts.

In planning and engaging in foreign trade activities, the Ministry of Foreign Trade deals with the Sovnarkhozes and the various republics. Within the context of the over-all export-import plan, export and import quotas are assigned to various Sovnarkhozes and supply organizations in the republics by the Ministry. Actual day-to-day transactions are conducted between the Sovnarkhozes and their industrial organizations on the one hand and the export-import associations on the other.

The Foreign Trade Plan

Foreign trade planning is an integral part of Soviet national economic planning. The purpose of the foreign trade plan is to determine what is to be imported

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during the coming year in accordance with the requirements of the national economy and what goods will be set aside for exports in order to provide the foreign currencies needed for the payment of imports. The USSR seeks to export only as much as it needs to pay for imports. A major component of the foreign trade plan is the foreign exchange plan, which envisages the receipts and payments of the USSR in foreign currency for the year ahead. The foreign trade plan is drawn up annually and is corrected semiannually and quarterly.

The chief consideration in planning exports and imports is normally availability (for export) and domestic need (for import) in physical terms. Secondary consideration is given to other factors: e.g., long-term market prospects for a given commodity, amount and type of currency to be earned or expended, etc. Such considerations are, of course, necessary in working out the foreign exchange plan. Therefore, when it has been determined what goods are to be imported and what goods can be spared for export, the USSR will sell in the most expensive market and buy in the cheapest market with the aim of maximizing export earnings and minimizing cost to the domestic economy.

The principle is often modified, however, by political considerations. The centralized control of trade which makes it possible for the USSR to switch its markets rapidly for economic reasons also enables it to use its trade in support of political objectives.* Thus in 1955, when the Burmese Government appeared to be taking a neutralist course, the USSR and other bloc countries concluded agreements to purchase annually 750,000 tons of Burmese rice--a commodity then surplus in Burma, but never imported in large quantities by the bloc prior to this time. By 1958, with a pro-Western government in Burma, the bloc had reduced its purchases to only 100,000 tons.

To establish Soviet influence in Ghana following its achievement of independence in early 1957, the USSR increased its imports in that year of Ghana's chief export--cocoa--400 percent above normal purchases. As it became apparent that Ghana did not intend substantially to reduce its ties with the West, in 1958 the USSR withdrew almost completely from Ghana's cocoa market. Its purchases have since remained well below those made prior to Ghana's independence.

*See Annex B.

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SECRET**Chapter 5. COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE**

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) is the consultative organ coordinating the domestic and foreign economic policies of the USSR and the European Satellite countries. Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia are not members of CEMA, but they are represented at important meetings as observers. Formally, the participating countries in CEMA enjoy equal rights, and the decisions of the Council require unanimous approval of the countries affected. Actually, however, the relative power position of member countries within the Bloc largely determines their respective roles in CEMA affairs, and the undisputed leadership of the USSR ensures conformity with over-all Soviet policy objectives.

Organization

The organizational structure of CEMA comprises the Plenum, the Conference of CEMA Deputies, the Secretariat, and the Permanent Committees for Economic and Scientific-Technical cooperation in all important sectors of the economy.

The Plenum provides policy guidance and direction for CEMA. Composed of the chairman of the State Planning Commissions of the participating countries (high party officials who usually also hold the office of Deputy Premier), the Plenum meets once or twice a year in the capitals of the participating countries to review the activities of the Permanent Committees and recommend, in broad outline form, the course of their subsequent operations.

The Conference of CEMA Deputies--the permanent country delegates resident in Moscow--meeting regularly on a weekly basis, is responsible for supervising and coordinating the day-to-day activities of the Permanent Committees to ensure their compliance with plenary directives.

The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary of the Council, usually a Soviet representative, has both administrative and executive functions. It prepares the agenda for plenary sessions as well as a series of economic and statistical reports. In addition, it directs some activities of the Permanent Committees and organizes ad hoc meetings on problems outside of the jurisdiction of these committees.

The Permanent Committees for Economic Scientific-Technical Cooperation are the most important working bodies of CEMA. They have the responsibility of working out the details of the Plenum's recommendations and of

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providing the machinery for carrying them out. Country representatives on the Permanent Committees are usually the Ministers, State Secretaries, or Chiefs of the Directorates responsible for the economic sector concerned. As a result, these Permanent Committees constitute the direct link between the pertinent ministries in the participating countries and CEMA. The Permanent Committees meet periodically throughout the year; their work is supplemented by bilateral consultations between the participating countries.

Functioning

CEMA activities are usually initiated through proposals submitted to the Secretariat for transmittal to the Conference of Deputies. Unanimous agreement by the Deputies is then required to place the proposal on the agenda for a session of the Plenum, where unanimous agreement is required to formalize the proposal as a recommendation to the Permanent Committees of the Council and to the State Planning Commissions of the participating countries. These recommendations have no legal force; they depend for their execution on enabling acts bilaterally agreed to between the countries affected. This has been one of the great weaknesses of CEMA operations, for nationalist attitudes have frequently prevented the signing of the necessary bilateral agreements. To eliminate this weak link, the USSR has recently pressed for unanimous agreement to incorporate CEMA recommendations into the national economic plans of the participating countries and thereby give them the force of law. No final action has been taken on this proposal as yet.

Soviet Control Over CEMA

As stated earlier, the participating countries in CEMA are formally equal, although Soviet direction and guidance is tacitly accepted. Soviet control is exerted directly through CEMA channels and indirectly through the Communist Party apparatus. The Soviet delegates to CEMA are usually also members of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. (See above) In this dual capacity, therefore, the Soviet delegates are in a position to guide CEMA activities in conformity with Soviet policy objectives. Within the limitations of these objectives, CEMA countries are permitted some latitude concerning details of implementation, and the USSR does not insist on minute compliance with its proposals. On major issues, however, the USSR has not hesitated to use the full weight of its political, ideological, and economic leadership to enforce compliance.

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SECRET**Chapter 6 FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES**

Soviet control and coordination of foreign Communist parties is achieved through a complex--partly overt, partly covert--system of communication and manipulation, rather than through an organizational push-button system. In the absence of any single organizational center comparable in size and bureaucratism to the prewar Comintern, Soviet direction of foreign Communist parties is exercised through a multiplicity of formal and informal control mechanisms, ranging from institutional channels inside and outside the Soviet Communist Party to direct personal contacts between Communist leaders. Soviet objectives have also been facilitated by the existence of such intangible factors as the adherence of Communists to a common ideology--Marxism-Leninism--and the world-wide impact of Soviet national power and achievement.

Direct Contact

Khrushchev has shown great personal interest and leadership in the problem of control and coordination. He has generated and promulgated the basic ideas and concepts of current international Communist strategy and tactics. He generally meets personally with various Bloc Communist Party leaders several times a year, and he has traveled extensively in the Bloc area. Khrushchev has not participated as frequently in bilateral talks with Free World Communists, but there have been more conferences between Free World Communists and Soviet Communist Party officials since he came to power.

In recent years many Soviet leaders and their aides have traveled abroad--sometimes with delegations to local Communist party congresses and conferences, sometimes on special missions--for review, orientation, and on-the-spot coordination.

For the purpose of discussing and coordinating Communist plans and activities on a world-wide scale, Free World and Bloc Communist leaders gather periodically in Moscow under the cover of Soviet Party congresses or other official occasions. The Soviet leaders have also initiated a series of smaller functional meetings of less important Free World Communist leaders for the purpose of stimulating discussions of ideological and theoretical problems of international significance.

Bloc Parties

For Bloc Communist Parties, coordination and control is effected chiefly through frequent and close contacts between Bloc and Soviet leaders. In addition to

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these general and high-level contacts and exchanges, there are numerous functional contacts involving party specialists, trade union officials, organizational experts, etc. The Soviet party keeps a close watch on developments in the Bloc parties and sends in its own experts when weaknesses become apparent.

For the Bloc, governmental coordination is a part of party coordination. Thus, the Warsaw Treaty (military), CEMA (economic), and numerous treaties involving scientific, cultural, and other types of affiliation and exchange buttress the inherent interdependency of the Bloc parties and enhance the position of the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet diplomatic establishments in Bloc countries provide for immediate, on-the-spot consultation either on the party or government level.

Central Soviet Organs

The principal working-level agencies handling Soviet relations with foreign Communist parties are the two departments of the Soviet party Secretariat dealing with Bloc and non-Bloc parties respectively. Divided into geographic subsections and staffed by area specialists, these departments are a direct channel between the foreign Communist parties and Moscow. They provide advice and guidance to other Communist parties and are responsible for all correspondence and exchanges with them. These departments also administer the program whereby foreign Communists are trained in Soviet party schools.

In their contacts with foreign Communists, the departments seek implementation of policy decisions made by the party Presidium. The extent and nature of the advice and guidance given vary. Some powerful Communist parties, headed by veteran Communists of international reputation, would not be amenable to direct advice and instructions from department representatives, but in the case of smaller, less sophisticated parties--particularly those which have been outside the mainstream of the Communist movement--advice and guidance from any level are welcomed.

Training and Guidance

Under Khrushchev's aegis, the USSR has greatly increased its training program for Free-World and Bloc Communists. The leadership training program of the Soviet Communist Party serves as a mechanism for indoctrinating foreign Communists and strengthening their allegiance to the USSR. Since 1956, for example, about 1,000 trainees from over 25 Communist parties in the Free World have been trained in the USSR at the Higher Party School under the Central Committee.

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The Soviet-controlled monthly Problems of Peace and Socialism, published in Prague in 19 languages, serves as a channel for exchanging information--theoretical and operational--between foreign Communist parties. The headquarters staff of the publication is headed by a leading Soviet party official who has several Soviet specialists working with him, and there are representatives from all Bloc parties and from an estimated 20 Communist parties from the Free World. Transmissions of the Soviet wire service, TASS, to foreign countries often contain guidance for foreign Communist parties and front organizations in the guise of "news" items, and the Soviet party newspaper Pravda and journal Kommunist also are used to inform foreign Communists of changes in Soviet policy and to provide guidance for their activities.

Diplomatic Channels

Soviet diplomatic installations in the Free World frequently serve as a cover for specific technical coordination activities. The extent to which Soviet "diplomats" take the risk of exposing themselves to accusations of "interference" depends largely on the political and security climate of a given country. In several cases, Soviet ambassadors have secretly dealt directly with the Secretary General of a given Free World Communist Party when the need for specific briefings has arisen. Secret subsidies for the local Communist Party are often channeled through the Soviet embassies or other diplomatic installations abroad, to be recovered by the local Communist Party through clandestine methods. Soviet embassies are known to have arranged for the travel and training of Free World Communists in the Bloc and to have investigated security and other problems in the local Communist Party, presumably for the benefit of Moscow. Representatives of the Soviet intelligence services under diplomatic cover are known to have contacted local Communist Party representatives for the coordination of espionage activities. In areas where Soviet establishments are few, several Communist parties may utilize one establishment for contact.

Front Organizations

The USSR also has machinery to make international front organizations responsive to its requirements and control. Out of a total of 13 such organizations, six have their headquarters behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet officials, frequently from obscure positions, covertly control the activities of these organizations. The staffs of international front organizations are supplemented by Bloc and Free World Communists and are of sufficient size to coordinate and support the vast networks of affiliated Communist fronts throughout the world.

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The international front organizations coordinate their programs through various means--international and regional meetings, field travel of headquarters personnel, regional relay points, special training facilities, and material and motivational support provided by the USSR.

Soviet bloc subsidies to foreign Communist parties and international front organizations are regularly employed as a covert means of ensuring Soviet control. These subsidies cover a wide range of activities, including travel to and from Bloc Countries, election campaigns in the Free World, and support for front organizations. Annual Soviet subsidies to the French and Italian Communist parties, for example, are reliably estimated at about \$8,000,000 each. The greater part of the budgets of international front organizations is known to stem from Bloc sources.

Effectiveness

The main Soviet technique for coordinating the international Communist movement consists in ever-increasing direct personal contacts, obviating the need for frequent written directives. Since Khrushchev's advent to power, every Communist party--even such an insignificant one as the Communist Party of Panama--has had repeated direct contact with the Soviet center and its auxiliaries. Given the output of the overt Soviet press and radio, which is accessible to Free World Communist Parties, the international Communist movement in the Free World is much more intensively briefed than during the last period of Stalin's life.

This does not mean that Free World Communist Parties are always told of Soviet plans and intentions. At the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 1956, for example, the foreign delegates did not know of Khrushchev's secret de-Stalinization speech in advance. At the November 1957 meetings in Moscow, the Soviet leaders did not inform the foreign Communists of the agenda in advance. On the other hand, several days prior to the Malenkov-Molotov purge in June 1957, a number of Free-World Communist Parties were informed of the situation. Also, some advance information on subjects to be discussed at meetings of Bloc and Free World Communist leaders during the Soviet 21st Party Congress in January 1959 was communicated to a few Free World Communist parties. Nevertheless, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulates most of the policy for the international Communist movement on the basis of national requirements of the USSR and without intensive prior consultation.

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SECRET**IV. ECONOMIC POLICY****Introduction**

In the USSR, there are four unusual and important characteristics in the method of formulating national economic policy and in the functioning of the machinery formally charged with this task.

First, economic policy-making carries the full weight and authority of law. In the Soviet "command" economy, policies are imperatives, to be ignored only under penalty of law.

Second, policy-making for the economy is truly a massive enterprise. The state decides what is to be produced, in what quantities, by what combinations of labor, capital, and other inputs, and to what ends, whether investment, consumption, or defense. With few exceptions the state makes these decisions not only for the national domain as a whole, but also for its subdivisions down to and including the individual plant or farm.

Third, policy-making for the economy is highly regularized. The process characteristically takes the form of periodic programming. At various intervals of a year or several years, detailed economic plans are formulated and carried out in accordance with predetermined schedules.

Fourth, policy-making for the economy is closely coordinated with policy-making with the other realms of state activity. Economic planning is closely associated with planning of foreign and domestic political affairs.

Beside the supreme organs themselves (the State's Council of Ministers, the party's Central Committee, and their respective Presidia), the principal Soviet organs involved in these operations are: at the center or national level, Gosplan and certain specialized State Committees; at the republic level, the Republic Councils of Ministers and Gosplans; and at the lower levels, the sovnarkhozes of the economic administrative regions and the executive committees of oblast and rayon.

Central Organs

The All-Union Gosplan, or State Planning Committee, is the economic general staff of the Council of Ministers. It is the instrument for translating broad policy decisions affecting the economy into concrete programs and for monitoring fulfillment thereof. Its importance is reflected by the fact that whereas all other major organs

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of the Council of Ministers are represented in it by their chiefs only, the Chief of Gosplan and no less than ten of his deputies are members of the council.

Gosplan numbers about 2,500 persons in Moscow alone. These are organized into sections for aggregate planning (labor and wages, capital investment, etc.); sector planning (agriculture, defense, industry, etc.); supply or interrepublic deliveries (coal, metal products, etc.); area planning (planning for Union-Republic development), and coordination and staff support (personnel etc.). Its planning function, broad as the economy itself, embraces the formulation and adjustment of both the short-range (annual) and longer range (five- or seven-year) program through which the state seeks to direct the development of the economy. Its monitoring function includes most notably the exercise of close control over the supply of key materials. Through institutes attached to it, it also plays a leading role in theoretical economic research.

As a check on Gosplan there are various economic departments in the Central Committee Secretariat, which serve both as watchdogs and as a means of keeping Gosplan continually abreast of thinking at the higher party levels.

At the all-union level the specialized state committees concerned with the execution of economic policy fall into two groups: those whose missions are defined in terms of some facet of the economic process, and those whose missions are defined in terms of some industrial sector. Among the first group are the State Committee on Questions of Labor and Wages, the State Scientific-Technical Committee, and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.* (See Chart M) Among the second group, the most notable are the State Committees on Aviation Technology, Defense Technology, Radioelectronics, Shipbuilding, Chemistry, Construction Affairs, and Automation and Machine Building.

The specialized committees of the first group may be described as offspring of Gosplan with the function of pushing development in areas that at the moment are considered so vital as to require attention above what they would receive if entrusted to mere sections of the parent planning agency. The Committee on Questions of Labor and Wages, broken off from Gosplan in 1955, was set up to tackle wage reorganization--that is to spearhead the effort to eliminate major inconsistencies which had crept into the wage system and to enhance the contribution of that system to labor productivity. The Scientific-Technical Committee, a reconstituted form of an

*For discussion of this organization and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, see Chapter III.

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organization originally broken off from Gosplan in 1948, has as its principal function the searching out and dissemination of new techniques. Research and planning are the phases of control to which these agencies make their primary contribution, but they do have a hand in policy execution. The Committee on Questions of Labor and Wages, for instance, monitors the introduction of uniform wage scales in the various industries.

The specialized committees of the second group are, in most cases, rumps of corresponding ministries abolished in the general reorganization of 1957 and its aftermath. They are charged mainly with research and development of new technology in their respective fields. But though primarily active in this phase of control, they too play an executive role. For instance, decisions by the Committee on Chemistry concerning the introduction of new processes in plants of the industry, although technically "suggestions," are almost invariably accepted as directives. Moreover, these committees control pilot-plant production.

Other central agencies of note concerned with the execution of economic policy are the Central Statistical Administration, the State Bank, and the ten remaining economic ministries. Chiefs of these units are members of the Council of Ministers.

The Central Statistical Administration is the head of a hierarchy of information-gathering and reporting organizations, the tentacles of which reach down in the economy to the level of the individual production plant. It is charged with providing the government with a constant flow of accurate, up-to-date information on all facets of economic activity. To secure the integrity of this contribution to intelligent policy-making and policy-execution and to avoid such attempts as individual producers may make to misrepresent the performance of their units, each reporter is made responsible to the echelon next above the one on which he reports. This provision is believed to constitute a fairly effective guarantee against misrepresentations and distortion.

The ten economic ministries at the union level comprise six of the union type and four of the union-republic type. These surviving members of the 60 or so of 1957, while primarily line units concerned with administration of the plans for their respective fields, also share in the formulation role. They draft proposals for programs of activity within their respective fields which Gosplan takes into account in drawing up the master plan.

The State Bank, as the depository of funds for industrial and other enterprises, exerts an important check

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on plan fulfillment, as it has the power to refuse to honor drafts not in accordance with plan.

Republic and Lower Level

The machinery for executing economic policy at the republic level is so nearly like a smaller replica of the machinery at the all-union level that it hardly needs separate description. The supreme executive organ is the Republic Council of Ministers. Beneath it, as above, are to be found another (though smaller) set of specialized committees including, usually, a Scientific-Technical Committee; a Republic statistical organ; and a somewhat different set of ministries. Save for the fact that they receive and defer to orders from their superiors at the level next above, these units do on the smaller stage about what their all-union counterparts do on the larger.

The principal organs concerned with the execution of economic policy below the republic are the sovnarkhozes, which preside over the economic administrative regions established during the 1957 reorganization of industry and construction, and to a lesser extent, the oblast and rayon executive committees. The latter, while primarily administrative, also share in the planning operation. (See Chart B)

The Planning Operation

The planning operation in the Soviet Union may be described as a cycle embracing three-phases--design, counterdesign, and reconciliation. They are carried out respectively by the central government (notably Gosplan), by the lower echelons of government and basic production units, and again by the central government (Gosplan).

The design phase starts with Gosplan's transformation of presidium objectives into the numerical targets for the more important economic aggregates and individual products: so many thousands of workers for the economy in the year in question, so many billion rubles of investment, so many tons of steel and grain, etc. These "control figures" are based on the economy's achievement in the preceding time period and on estimates of future manpower and progress in technology and labor productivity. This phase ends with the passing down of the "control figures" from Gosplan to the All-Union Ministries and the Council of Ministers and Planning Committees of the Republics, and from these to the Republican Ministries, the sovnarkhozes, the oblast executive committees and planning organs, and ultimately individual factories and farms.

The counterdesign and more concrete phase of the cycle involves movement in the opposite direction. It

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starts with the formulation of plans by factories and farms. These plans cover all phases of their operations in great detail: what they are to make, in what quantities, and by what combination of labor and capital; what construction they are to undertake; what new processes they are to introduce--all of this in both physical and monetary terms. It ends with coordination, amendment, and aggregation of these programs by successive higher echelons, first at the sovnarkhoz or oblast level, then at the Republic, and finally at the center.

The reconciliation phase starts with Gosplan's adjustment of presidium objectives from above with the aggregation of concrete programs from below, continues with accommodation to government fiscal, foreign trade, and defense programs, and ends with the approval of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee. Finally, the tasks for each level are passed down the pyramid in the form of firm assignments backed with the full sanction of law.*

Periodic Plans

Generally speaking, the more distant the goals the less regularized is the procedure, the less important the planning operation, and the more important the roles of the Presidium or of individual leaders.**

In setting economic policy for the middle range of five to ten years, the periodic drafting of comprehensive plans comes into its own. The establishment of perspective Five- and Seven-Year Plans follows closely the cycle of design, counterdesign, and reconciliation. The Seven-Year Plan, for instance, evolved on roughly this schedule: In September 1957 the Sixth Five-Year Plan was abandoned. Gosplan then presumably received its broad directives from the Presidium. At the end of 1957, Gosplan sent its tentative guidelines downward in the hierarchy, and by the middle of 1958, it received the counterproposals from below. By August, 1958, Gosplan's draft, after being

*The detail involved is suggested by the fact that the Seven-Year plan (1959-65) takes up nearly 30 volumes of 500 to 1000 pages each.

**Little is known of the precise character of the operations leading to such decisions as Stalin's to industrialize at maximum speed, and to give priority to heavy industry and collective agriculture, or of such decisions as Khrushchev's to reduce some income differentials and attempt to overtake the United States by 1970. It seems reasonably clear, however, that when decisions on this scale are made, little systematic correlation of goals and paths thereto takes place beforehand. Rather, it is left to the professional planners to pick up the pieces.

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returned for revision several times by Khrushchev, was accepted by the Presidium. This draft was published in November 1958 under the names of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee, and in February 1959 it was approved by the 21st Party Congress.

The initial formulation of objectives is a very important part of policy-making at this range. Before Gosplan receives its task of elaborating particulars and subjecting them to technical checks, the Presidium has engaged in extensive discussion not only of such key points as tempo of growth, proportions (e.g., relative growth of heavy and light industry), and investment level, but also of the major strategic posture to be sought and its military and scientific requirements.*

In the adjustment of plans to the peculiarly pressing or the unforeseen, action takes place largely within the Presidium and Gosplan. The new course of increased deference to the consumer (1953-54), the program for overcoming agricultural stagnation (1953-54), the program for correcting imbalances arising from construction shortfalls (1956-57), and the industrial reorganization of 1957 were hammered out in the party Presidium and at plenums of the Central Committee. Gosplan's role was that of elaborator and transmitter of the reallocations of resources required.

Short-range economic policy-making is highly regularized, consisting largely of the annual formulation of the State Plan. The directives which set the framework for the annual planning operation are derivatives of the longer range plan. The cycle of design, counterdesign, and reconciliation takes place on a schedule closely tied to the calendar: for instance, sovnarkhozes are to send their supply and output plans up to the Republic Gosplans between 5 and 10 July, and the latter must send theirs to USSR Gosplan by 1 September. In fact, the operation at this range is of so highly technical a nature and so highly programmed, that it may more legitimately be viewed as a technique for carrying out policy than one of policy-making itself. In this process the role of Gosplan is critical, and the top organs confine themselves largely to review and ratification.

Effectiveness

The formulation of economic policy in the Soviet Union must be considered generally effective, since the USSR has successfully expanded its economy over the 40

*See Annex D.

*See Annex D.

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years of its existence and has realized its goal of gaining world power status.

One of the main strengths of the system is its ability to identify weaknesses. The regularity of the planning process, the extensiveness of the reporting operation, and the doubling of policymaker as executive, all combine to aid early identification of soft spots.

Regularity means periodic review. Each year, when plans for the succeeding year are being set, major courses for that year and for the balance of the current middle-range planning period are re-examined.

The reports constantly fed to the top by the reporting organs, notably the Central Statistical Administration, enable the leaders to keep up with the economy. Such reports alert them to trouble before it becomes acute. Construction shortfalls in 1956 and their adverse impact on production, for instance, could be followed, even by the public at large, in the published (abridged) versions of Plan Fulfillment Reports for the years immediately preceding 1956 and for the first half of that year.*

Finally, Soviet policymakers divide the entire economy into spheres of influence in which they are severally expected to be, and generally are, expert.** Mikoyan's expertness in matters of trade, for example, made him quickly aware of the inflation that developed in late 1953 and 1954, when price and loan reduction produced an expansion of purchasing power greater than the increase in consumer goods production. Khrushchev's awareness of the problems of a manager led him to adopt measures designed to head off autarchical tendencies among the sovnarkhozes established under the industrial reorganization of 1957.

Proposals for treating weaknesses originate in a number of places. The first is Gosplan, but other groups share in this role. The advice of the Academy of Sciences and research institutes was used, for instance, in the drawing up of the Seven-Year Plan. The State Committees and Ministries form another such group. Finally, proposals originate with the leaders themselves. Khrushchev, when production in the Donbas coal mines lagged in

*Treatment of this problem was not timely enough, but failure was ascribable to political factors rather than to lack of data.

**For a discussion of the apparatus which links the leaders to the day-to-day operations of production, see Annex E.

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mid-1956, made a tour of the area, as a result of which he instituted a number of ameliorative measures, including decrees to shorten hours and reorganize pay scales.

Policy proposals undergo much testing in the interplay between proposal and counterproposal and between successive echelons. The assessments by the higher Soviet authorities of the tasks to be performed by their subordinates commonly disagree with the subordinate counter-assessments. The former characteristically expect higher efficiency in operation, higher output for given inputs. The latter characteristically overstate input requirements and understate potential output. A classical example of this give-and-take can be found in the proceedings at the 20th Party Congress. Here the appraisal of the top planners (represented by Saburov and Pervukhin) directly contradicted that of the now defunct industrial operating ministries, represented by the Ministers of Ferrous Metallurgy and the Coal Industry. The planners accused the ministries of loading their claims to investment allocations, and claiming that ministerial estimates for 1956-60 would have required expenditures 250 billion rubles higher than finally settled on (that is, than were necessary in the planners' view). The Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy and the Minister of the Coal Industry alleged in rebuttal that they had asked the minimum necessary to meet their output targets, which, with the allotments finally decided on, would be out of reach.

The history of the sovnarkhozes, which replaced the industrial ministries, furnishes other examples. The 1958 increment for output of Sverdlovsk enterprises, which was placed by the enterprises themselves at 3 percent over 1957, was successively raised to 4.4 percent by the sector administrations of the sovnarkhoz, to 5 percent by the sovnarkhoz itself, and to 5.5 percent by the Republic Gosplan, at which level it was finally confirmed. The center retains the final word in setting targets, but it must at least consider counterrepresentations from below, and its final plan benefits from this conflicting view.

Comprehensive plans also receive a test in the form of a check for internal consistency: e.g., to see that plans for the steel inputs of steel consumers agree in total with output planned for the steel industry. The technique for making this check is known as the "material balance."

In these procedures, the making of economic policy is generally but not always effective. The failures may be exemplified by the responses to the problems raised in 1956 by the conjunction of satellite disturbances (which the leadership had failed totally to anticipate) with the construction shortfalls in the basic materials industry.

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The decisions taken at the Plenum in December of that year were equivocal. On economic organization, they appeared to be calling both for greater centralization of detailed decision-making in Moscow and for more delegation to the republic and local organs. On the question of the status of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, they appeared to be calling at one time for repair and adjustment, at another for replacement. A few weeks later, 1957 production targets were set at relatively low levels, and Khrushchev called for replacement of the industrial ministries with territorially based units. Some confusion and ambiguity in both policy and detail seemed to remain until the planning apparatus was able to rework the whole complex planning cycle and set at least the outline of the Seven-Year Plan.

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SECRET**V. SCIENTIFIC POLICY****Chapter 1. SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS**

Apart from major policies and certain high-priority projects, decisions on scientific research and development are made by administrative agencies of the government to which Soviet scientific institutions are subordinate.

The Academy of Sciences, USSR, which is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers, is the most important scientific body in the USSR.* The Academy's membership, comprised of 167 academicians and 361 corresponding members, includes the Soviet Union's most eminent scientists. In addition to academicians, it employs roughly 10 percent of all scientific workers in the USSR. The Academy of Sciences controls about 195 scientific institutions and coordinates the activities of 13 affiliated union-republic academies of sciences. Theoretical research is emphasized in academy institutions, and its scientists conduct more than half of all the USSR's fundamental research.

The Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education controls research done by higher educational institutions. Nearly half of all Soviet scientists are employed in institutions of higher education, where they are primarily concerned with teaching, but also perform both basic and applied research.

The State Planning Committee (Gosplan), USSR, controls a number of central scientific research institutes and design bureaus in certain basic industrial fields such as steel. These institutes coordinate research and design activities in their respective fields throughout the country.

The Ministries of Defense, Medium Machine Building (responsible for nuclear weapons), Communications, Health, and Agriculture control institutions which conduct research related to their respective fields.

* Regardless of its actual powers, it formally occupies a special status as a quasi-independent, ostensibly self-perpetuating body; thus its Chairman is not a member of the Council of Ministers.

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The State Committees of Defense Technology, Aviation Technology, Radio-Electronics, Shipbuilding, Chemistry, and Automation and Machine Building control research institutions which are either directly related to the USSR's defense effort or to high-priority nondefense fields.

The Councils of National Economy (Sovnarkhozes) control all research institutions not subordinate to the five types of agencies listed above. These are specialized in industrial fields and are concerned primarily with applied research.

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Chapter 2. FORMULATION OF POLICY

Bits of organizational information on the party and government and policy directives on science and technology provide the basis for deducing the probable mechanism for policy decision-making on scientific and technological matters.

Role of the Party Presidium

Decisions by the party Presidium on science and technology seem to be limited primarily to general organizational problems and to the establishment of economic priorities which determine priorities in scientific research. After broad policy directives on science and technology are approved, decisions by the party Presidium on scientific and technical matters appear to be limited to the following situations:

(a) A specific scientific or technical problem involving the initiation of a research and development program which requires considerable investment of money, manpower, and facilities; e.g., the space rocket program.*

(b) An ideological or political issue of major importance in the scientific community; e.g., the dismissal of the editorial board of the Botanical Journal in connection with the genetics controversy.

(c) A major deviation from or change in previous party policy.

Policy decisions by the party Presidium on scientific and technical matters can come about in several ways: the Presidium of the Council of Ministers may assume the initiative in referring problems to the party Presidium; the Secretariat of the Central Committee, on the basis of staff work done by its various departments, may bring an important scientific and technical matter to the Presidium's attention; the party Presidium members themselves may propose that certain scientific and technical matters be studied by the party apparatus.

Functioning of the Mechanism

The Presidium, with the assistance of the Secretariat, schedules meetings specifically for the consideration of scientific and technical policy. In support of the Presidium, the apparatus of the Central Committee through its departments maintains constant vigilance over its fields of responsibility and gathers information with the aid of regional and primary party organs. For example, notes published from the Central Committee Plenum of July 1955 called for an increase in the role of the lower organs in convening scientific-technical conferences--meetings of

*For a discussion of this procedure in the weapons systems field, see Annex D.

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scientists, inventors, and rationalizers. During 1956-58, such meetings were held in all oblast centers of the USSR and in various cities. The practical aim of the Central Committee in having these meetings is to get information and ideas and, on the basis of these, to take organizational and administrative measures to improve the work of scientific organizations.

Scientists and technical experts are probably called to advise the Presidium further on the problems under consideration. The Presidium then formulates broad policy proposals on science and technology which are to be given emphasis in the preparation of directives for the development of the national economic plan or for the establishment of a policy on a specific scientific and technical matter.

Once decrees on scientific and technical matters are issued, they have the force of law. For example, a directive of the June 1959 Central Committee Plenum required certain agencies to furnish recommendations on specified subjects to the Council of Ministers, USSR:

The USSR Gosplan, the Councils of Ministers state committees for different branches of industry and construction, ministries, and departments are to be asked to prepare by 1 January 1960 and to submit to the USSR Council of Ministers proposals relating to the establishment of research institutes directly at major enterprises, to the amalgamation of certain research institutes with higher educational establishments, and to the amalgamation of scientific establishments working in the same field.

Role of the Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is responsible for the implementation of party policy on science and technology through the elaborate network of state organs subordinate to it. Therefore it must make decisions on scientific research and development problems within the broad policy framework of party directives.

Within the Council of Ministers, policy decisions on scientific research and development matters are probably handled by a network of committees. These committees possess considerable policy-making authority and probably refer only the most important scientific and technical matters of long-term and of far-reaching impact on the national economy to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. For example, a committee on scientific and technical matters relating to defense would be headed by Deputy Premier Ustinov, who is generally responsible for defense production, and be composed of the Chairman of the State Committees for Defense Technology, Aviation

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Technology, Shipbuilding, and Radio-Electronics, and the Ministers of Medium Machine Building and of Defense. Such a committee would have a staff to study scientific and technical problems related to defense research and development. It could initiate projects for consideration of the appropriate scientific and technical organizations, call in specialists for advice, and maintain a general check on progress of various areas of research and development.

The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, which is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers, may also constitute a special committee of an advisory nature to report directly to the party Presidium on particular problems in fundamental scientific fields assigned to it; e.g., on the 1957 decision to establish "scientific cities" in Siberia.

In connection with the initiation of the new Seven-Year Plan, approved by the 21st Party Congress in February 1959, several supervisory agencies jointly produced a paper called the "Main Directions for Scientific Research." The supervisory agencies involved were the USSR Academy of Sciences, the republic academies, the State Scientific-Technical Committee, and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. This paper listed about 150 tasks in basic and applied research fields which were to serve as a guide for research planning under the Seven-Year Plan. It appeared to be the most detailed policy guide yet produced for science planners.

Soviet leaders, pleased with this first "major directions" paper, have decided to make this type of policy planning a permanent feature of their scientific organization. They have accordingly charged groups of existing supervisory agencies with the task of working out future "major directions." Representatives of these agencies are apparently organized into five interagency advisory committees responsible for determining the "major directions of research" within the framework of the party directives. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers may call on these committees for advice or recommendations on major problems referred to it for decision. The interagency committees represent the following agencies:

(a) For the natural and social sciences: the Academy of Sciences, USSR; the academies of sciences of the union republics; and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, USSR.

(b) For technical sciences and new technology: the State Scientific-Technical Committee of the Council of Ministers, USSR; the Academy of Sciences, USSR; the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, USSR; and the Committees of the Council of Ministries, USSR, in the appropriate field of technology.

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(c) For the agricultural sciences: the Ministry of Agriculture, with its All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences; and the Department of Biological Sciences of the Academy of Sciences.

(d) For the medical sciences: the Ministry of Public Health, USSR, with its Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR; and the Department of Biological Sciences of the Academy of Sciences, USSR.

(e) For architecture and construction: the Committee for Construction Affairs of the Council of Ministers, USSR; and the Academy of Construction and Architecture.

To improve the coordination and fulfillment of plans at the institute level, the concepts of "head" institutes and joint scientific councils have been introduced. Presumably, those institutes which have demonstrated themselves to be the most competent and the best equipped scientific institutions in a given discipline have been designated "head" institutes and are to provide leadership to other institutions in the same or related disciplines. "Head" institutes apparently serve as staffs to the joint scientific councils, which are associations of institutions in given fields of science or of institutions brought together for the purpose of solving a particular problem. These councils may include representatives of related production enterprises and other agencies. Their purpose is to review draft plans of member institutions to see that duplication is avoided, that tasks are divided properly among the institutions most qualified to do them, and that planning policies have been taken into account. The councils may also make recommendations concerning the determination of "main directions" to the supervisory groups listed in the paragraph above. The USSR has been experimenting with these new forms of planning and coordination since 1957; the final organizational form has not yet been decided.

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VI. MILITARY POLICY

Introduction

Soviet military thinking has for some years reflected the belief that victory in a future war could only be effected by the coordinated and unified efforts of all services. The subordination of the armed forces at the national level to the centralized Ministry of Defense is unquestionably a reflection of this belief. It is worth noting, however, that the armed forces have not always been unified under a single ministry; they were combined from 1946 to 1950, separate from 1950 until the death of Stalin in 1953, and combined again since then. The air forces have never had their own ministry.

Organization


Within the military, all forces and commands report to the Minister of Defense. (Chart O) The present Minister is Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, who succeeded Marshal Zhukov on the occasion of the latter's fall from grace in October 1957. Assisting the minister are ten First Deputy and Deputy Ministers, the most important and influential officers in the armed forces; eight are from the ground forces and one each from the navy and the air force. For example, the Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces and the Chief of the General Staff are both First Deputy Ministers. The Soviet General Staff of the Army and the Navy combines the functions of the US Joint Staff and the staffs of the individual US services. An important section of this staff is the Chief Intelligence Directorate. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

At the same level as the General Staff is the Chief Political Directorate, the main instrument for party control of the armed forces; it is in fact a department in the Party Secretariat. Accordingly, its chief reports both to the Minister of Defense and to the Party Secretariat. He has his own command channels to the political officers who are to be found at every level down to battalion, and they in turn send up periodic reports and in general act as representatives of the party. The role of the political officers has somewhat declined in importance since the death of Stalin--the post of political officer at the company level was abolished in 1955--but this organizational aspect is still the key to party control of the armed forces. The gravest charge made against Zhukov was that he had sought to eliminate party control. At present the Chief Political Directorate is headed by a widely respected regular officer, Colonel General Golikov, who was appointed shortly after Zhukov's demotion.

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Responsible under the General Staff for the preparation of tactical doctrine and the development of weapons* are the four Chief Directorates of force components: Ground Forces, Air Forces, Antiair Defense Forces, and Naval Forces. These directorates are on a staff level and do not have command functions.

The last echelon to be considered is that of the operational commands, the actual fighting elements. These report to the Minister of Defense and include the Groups of Forces in Germany, Poland, and Hungary, the Military Districts, the Naval Fleets, the Long Range Air Armies, and the Air Defense Districts in the USSR. The Warsaw Pact command is almost certainly treated as an operational command, despite its supposed international character.

Interservice Problems

The high degree of centralization under the Minister of Defense and the General Staff facilitates a quick resolution of the apparently few interservice disputes which arise. A good example is the dismissal in 1955 of Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov from his post of Commander in Chief of Naval Forces. Apparently Kuznetsov favored an enlargement of the surface fleet, but was opposed by Zhukov and Khrushchev. Since that time the navy has continued to improve its large submarine fleet but has not given comparable emphasis to its relatively small surface and naval air forces.

There is no known instance of a dispute between the army and the air forces, possibly for the reason that within the high command the air forces occupy a subordinate position. However, this does not appear to have affected Soviet decisions on force requirements. Although the maintenance of powerful ground forces has always been fundamental, Soviet aviation, tactical or strategic, aircraft or missile, has not been starved.

Relations With the Party

In the upper levels of the party the military carries relatively little weight, so that while powerful in his own military domain, Malinovsky's influence outside his own ministry is severely limited.** With the exception of Zhukov, no professional military man has ever been a full

* For an account of the participation of the Ministry of Defense in the development of weapons systems, see Annex D.

** Note also that the party has always been careful to keep the military well penetrated at all levels. At the 19th Party Congress in 1952, Marshal Vasilyevsky claimed that 86.4 percent of all officers were members of either the party or the Komsomol.

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or candidate member of the Party Presidium. Voroshilov's rank of Marshal was political, a reward for his service in the party and his friendship with Stalin rather than for his military service. Of the 123 full members of the Central Committee, only five are military men, and the figures for candidate members are 12 out of 115. In the last two decades military representation has been cut back considerably.

MILITARY MEMBERSHIP IN THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

	Full Members	Candidates
1939	15.5%	14.7%
1941	12.7%	22.0%
1952	5.6%	20.0%
1956	4.1%	10.4%

Following World War II, Stalin purposely reduced the stature of the victorious marshals. However, during the three or four years of inner party political struggles between Stalin's death and the ascendancy of Khrushchev, elements of the military became politically involved. As the struggle sharpened, military influence became stronger. Perhaps Zhukov's career best illustrates this phenomenon. In 1955 he was appointed Minister of Defense; in 1956 he was made a candidate member of the Presidium;* in mid-1957 a full member. Then with the Presidium once again unified, he was ousted in October 1957.

Influence on Policy

Since the ouster of Zhukov, the degree of direct military influence on national security decisions is not as apparent. With the military no longer represented in the Party Presidium, its opinion on top policy matters is only heard when the party leadership specifically asks for it. Furthermore, Khrushchev has his own strong ideas in the military field. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet military leadership today provides anything more than purely military advice to the political leadership; the issue of war or peace does not lie in its competence. This is not to deny that the military retain a great, if indirect, influence on matters pertaining to the military and strategic strength of the USSR. Should the regime wish to reduce the armaments load, however, the military could hardly obstruct the decision. In any case, it is doubtful that with the present system of party controls the military could ever become an organized element in opposition.

On the other hand, during the past few years the question of military doctrine--how a war will be fought--has

* Even in this period his influence on major policy decisions was far from decisive. He is known to have favored military action against the Gomulka regime in Poland during the "events" of October 1956.

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largely reverted to the military professionals. This change since the death of Stalin in 1953 is striking. While the old dictator was being canonized as the only great genius, military science was stagnating. Although the USSR developed nuclear weapons, organized and equipped a long-range air force, and made a concentrated start on a missile program, little was done to adjust military doctrine--far less political objectives--to the implications of these new weapons. Judging by the military journals of the day, no one but Stalin had much to say.

Stalin's death opened the way for a spate of provocative articles and speeches, including reprints of the views of US military leaders. Basic principles were examined, including the value of surprise, whether or not the next war will be a long one, etc. Soviet military science now appears to be reasonably pragmatic.

Execution of Policy

Whatever weight the Presidium gives to military views, it seems determined to maintain forces sufficient to keep the USSR generally secure from Western attack and constitute a constant threat to the Free World. Short of major hostilities, however, the Presidium apparently views its armed forces as one of a number of instruments available for the achievement of political objectives. Military gestures are combined with diplomatic to build pressure on hostile or neutralist governments.* Finally, within the bloc, the Soviet armed forces remain the ultimate guarantee that the will of Moscow must prevail, as in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956.

In the Hungarian operation military moves were closely geared to political events. The shortness of reaction time between appearance of a political crisis and the orders to the troops to move suggests almost direct Presidium control. After the Hungarian Government under the leadership of Gero requested the USSR for help on 24 October 1956, the two Soviet divisions in Hungary moved promptly and another crossed the border from Rumania on the same day. (During the next three days another division moved in from the USSR.) However, the actual engagement with the rebels in the streets of Budapest was not going well, the Soviet units present had their hands full, and the Presidium, undecided on how far to go, decided on 29 October to disengage.

Following a visit by Mikoyan and Suslov to Budapest, the decision was made on 31 October to crush the revolt. Immediately three more divisions moved in from the USSR and the final assault, coordinated with certain political moves, took place on 4 November.

* See Annex C.

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Perhaps the last word on the position of the military in the USSR was spoken by Khrushchev in 1956. In a discussion of disarmament problems, he remarked that if the USSR's generals did not accept a political decision they would be replaced.

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SECRET**ANNEX A: ORGANS AND MEDIA FOR DISSEMINATING
POLICY DECISIONS**

The Soviet regime places great stress on wide dissemination of its decisions and policies aimed at engendering maximum public support. The monopoly which the regime has over all media of mass communication gives it unique opportunity and virtually unlimited resources in this field. It can direct and control the flow of information and at any given moment virtually saturate all public media with whatever subject is considered of greatest importance.

Party Control and Guidance

The party maintains direct or indirect control over all public information and permits no independent commentary or analysis of its decisions and policies. The key agencies in the party's control are the Departments of Propaganda and Agitation in the executive staff of the party Secretariat. These departments are charged with general responsibility for molding and mobilizing public opinion. They unify and give central direction to the vast and multifiform activities carried on by party, government, and other agencies for informing and influencing Soviet citizens.

Within the framework of the policy decisions adopted by the Presidium, these departments determine both the general line and the specific courses of action for bringing the decisions of the party and government to the public, explaining them, winning popular support for them, and mobilizing the people in order to secure their fulfillment. Not only are these departments the chief channel of communications for the party to the people, they are also the chief instrument through which mass attitudes are conveyed to the leaders.

Despite the range of their responsibilities, however, the departments are not primarily operational agencies; they do no major publishing, nor do they operate the Soviet radio or newspaper networks. They function, instead, as planner, director, and watchdog of these media. At every level of party administration there are propaganda and agitation departments with their own personnel in key positions in all local communications media as well as in important factories and other enterprises. Directives and instructions are sent out from the central department to the local offices and, in return, reports on their fulfillment are funneled back to the center.

SECRETMedia of Mass Communication

The press and radio are the principal media by which decisions of the party and government are publicized throughout the country. Texts of high-level decisions generally appear first on the pages of Pravda and Izvestia, the two largest central newspapers. Pravda, the official organ of the party, tends to emphasize party matters; Izvestia, the chief organ of the Council of Ministers, stresses government affairs. Of the two, Pravda is unquestionably the more authoritative. Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya, the newspaper of the party bureau for the RSFSR --the largest republic--and Kommunist, the party's theoretical journal, have the status of departments under the party Secretariat. As such they receive guidance directly from the party secretariat and not, as in the case of Izvestia and other Soviet newspapers, from the propaganda and agitation departments. These three publications and the two departments work closely together, however, and their activities are well coordinated.

Pravda, said to have a circulation of over six million, is published daily in Moscow and in 15 other Soviet cities from matrices flown in from Moscow. Local newspapers rely heavily on the central press, and sometimes as much as 30 percent of one issue of a provincial paper will consist of reprints from Pravda and Izvestia.

The radio is another important medium of communication for the regime. All radio stations in the Soviet Union are under the general supervision of the All-Union Radio and Television Committee which, although an organ of the government, is closely supervised by the party's propaganda and agitation departments. Radio Moscow, the largest station, has an extremely powerful transmitter for beaming broadcasts to domestic and foreign audiences. Its broadcasts are picked up by local stations throughout the USSR and relayed to remote areas or rebroadcast locally.

Radio stations play an important role in familiarizing the population with important party and government decrees and in transmitting official explanations and "clarifications" of established policy. In this, the radio relies heavily on the press. Radio stations, for instance, allot considerable time to broadcasting texts of Pravda editorials and the like.

The Soviet wire service, TASS, is another medium of government communication. Like the radio, it is an agency of the Council of Ministers. TASS, with offices throughout the world, gathers foreign news for the use of Soviet domestic radio and newspapers and transmits domestic Soviet news abroad. It is also a major network for the gathering and transmission of news between Moscow and the provinces. TASS bureaus throughout the Soviet Union play an important

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part in reporting important local developments; Pravda, for instance, prints numerous articles received from local TASS offices.

Pravda is an official channel for informing lower level officials of policy decisions. Pravda not only transmits the texts of decrees but, in accompanying editorials, interprets them and lays down broad policy guidelines. Second-echelon officials are expected to read Pravda daily and act accordingly.

As soon as a decree is published, the propaganda and agitation departments issue detailed instructions to local party committees setting forth a program for propagandizing the decree, making certain that all personnel affected are fully informed of its contents. These directives are sent directly to local party secretariats and include such orders as the kind and number of meetings to call to discuss the decree, who should attend, who should speak, and what line to stress. A briefing of local professional propagandists and agitators is one of the first meetings held.

Agitators are generally part-time volunteers who are charged with explaining decisions of the regime to small groups--in many cases their co-workers in a factory or collective farm. Most of the agitators are attached to the local propaganda and agitation departments or to quasi-independent propaganda organizations such as the Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Political Knowledge. The agitators receive general guidance in their work from the Agitator's Notebooks, published every ten days by the propaganda and agitation departments.

The agitator system is a much more flexible means of communication than the mass public media. Unlike Pravda, for example, the agitators can tailor their approach to suit a specific audience. Furthermore, direct personal talks can often have a greater impact than the printed word. Some idea of the importance the regime attaches to the agitator network is afforded by the vast number employed. Following the economic reorganization decision in 1957, for example, 15,000 agitators were sent to the Donbass coal mines alone to explain the decision.

Controlled Dissemination

There are, of course, numerous top-level decisions and policy directives that are never made public but are kept in closely guarded channels. Such information is sent out to all regional party organizations in the form of secret letters of the party Central Committee. Some are marked for dissemination only to members of the local party bureau, some to the full party membership. Late in

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1958, for example, discovery of "serious deficiencies" in the administration of personnel policy in various parts of the Soviet Union brought on a nationwide campaign for correction of the deficiencies. A series of party meetings was held at the local level at which this problem was discussed on the basis of what was referred to in the press as a "decision of the Central Committee on errors in personnel policy in Stalino Oblast." The text of the decision was never published, however, possibly because public revelation of the contents might have proven embarrassing to the regime.

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SECRET**ANNEX B: SOVIET COLD-WAR OPERATIONS IN SYRIA, 1955-1957**

We have attempted in this study to trace the coordinated use by the USSR of its various instruments of foreign policy in the penetration of Syria, and thus to illustrate the marshalling of these resources by the Presidium in the pursuit of a major strategic objective. In the years following Stalin's death in 1953, the Presidium apparently decided to reverse his policy toward the uncommitted states of Asia and Africa--essentially the concept that "he who is not with us is against us." Instead, Khrushchev and his colleagues planned a full-scale campaign to exploit the neutrality of these states and if possible win them over. The operations against Syria described herein are one phase of this campaign.

Background

After the fall of the Shishakli military dictatorship in February 1954, political power in Syria gradually passed into the hands of the Baath (Arab Renaissance) Party, which was fiercely pan-Arab and professed a rudimentary socialism. Years of steady deterioration of Syria's relations with the West led to a deep-seated Syrian hostility to Western moves and motives, as well as to those Arab governments which had links or friendly relations with the West. Domestic political instability and the intensity of Syrian anti-Western sentiment held out to Moscow the prospect of a rapid Soviet-Syrian rapprochement.

Moscow gave a high priority to cementing relations with Syria, viewing the country not only as a center of anti-Western, pan-Arab nationalism, but as a principal focus of Arab-Israeli tension. Moscow's great interest stemmed also from Syria's location astride two important oil pipelines and, of even greater significance, its position at the rear of the Western-backed "northern tier" defense system which the West was building along the USSR's southern border. Syria became the principal battleground of the forces for and against the Baghdad Pact.

First Phase of Penetration

Moscow proceeded along two principal lines in consolidating its relations with Syria: on the one hand, it gave increasing propaganda and diplomatic support to Syria; on the other, it offered the country large-scale economic, technical, and military assistance.

In the United Nations, Moscow gave increasing support to Syria, both in its border clashes with Israel and in its complaints over Israeli plans to divert Jordan River water, and "demanded" that action be taken against Israel. In a similar manner Moscow sought to enhance Syrian hostility to

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the West by attacking Western aims and interests in the Middle East. Moscow pushed the line that Britain was interested in preserving its colonial positions and interests at the expense of the Arabs, and that the United States was primarily responsible for the creation and continued support of Israel and was firmly committed to backing British pretensions in the area.

Early in 1955 the shaky government in Damascus, alarmed by pressure from neighboring Iraq and Turkey that Syria join the anti-Soviet coalition of "northern tier" states, turned instead in the direction of closer relations with Cairo and on 2 March signed a treaty of alliance with Egypt. To stiffen the new alliance and preserve its anti-Western flavor, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 16 April offering support to Middle East countries opposed to the recently concluded Turkish-Iraqi alliance, which was to form the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact.

The Soviet pose of respectability and support for Damascus was seconded by the Syrian Communist Party, one of the best organized Communist parties in the region. Although technically outlawed, the party had been allowed to operate openly with little restriction since the overthrow of the Shishakli regime in 1954. Baathist leaders, though non-Communist, accepted the domestic support of Syrian Communists against right-wing opposition elements and welcomed Communist bloc diplomatic support, confident of Syria's ability to capitalize on this backing without submitting to Moscow's will.

Bloc efforts to develop economic relations with Syria, foreshadowed by Soviet participation in the 1954 Damascus Trade Fair, developed in a number of directions following heavy bloc participation in the 1955 Damascus Fair. Trade and payments agreements were negotiated or renegotiated between a number of bloc countries and Syria, indicating an effort by the bloc to stimulate trade with Syria which to that date had been insignificant. Various reports of bloc economic and technical aid offers preceded the signing on 16 November of a Soviet-Syrian commercial agreement.

While Moscow's moves to expand trade and to offer economic and technical assistance to Syria played a role in smoothing the way for closer Soviet-Syrian relations, in retrospect it is clear that it was the USSR's willingness to sell arms to Syria and to Egypt which sealed the anti-Western orientation of the Damascus regime. Nasir's announcement in September 1955 that, over Western opposition, he had concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia--acting as front for Moscow--was greeted with enthusiasm in Syria.

Soviet offers to supply arms to Syria had been rumored since the spring of 1955, but apparently it was not until after Nasir's announcement that the Syrians felt

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emboldened to accept them. By late March 1956, Soviet artillery, tanks, trucks, and military equipment began to flow into Syria. Bloc-made armaments were publicly displayed for the first time in the Independence Day military parade in Damascus on 17 April 1956. It was gradually revealed that Syria had contracted for jet fighters, small naval craft, and submarines, in addition to the services of a number of bloc military advisers and instructors, and that some Syrian military personnel would be sent to the bloc for training. Moscow sugar-coated the deal by charging Syria cut-rate prices and by accepting Syrian agricultural exports, principally cotton and wheat, as chief payment over a period of years.

Thus one of the effects of the arms deals was to place the country heavily in debt to the bloc, necessitating diverting to that area an important part of Syria's traditional agricultural exports from European free currency markets. In addition, it meant elbowing the West out as a source of Syria's arms and related transportation, communications, and hospital equipment. This is reflected in the dramatic increase in trade with the bloc. By 1957, 27 percent of Syria's export and 13 percent of its import trade (arms excluded) was with the bloc.

As a result of the months-long crisis provoked on 26 July 1956 by Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal, Soviet interest was necessarily concentrated on Egypt. Nonetheless, Moscow's political, economic, and military investment in Syria continued to increase. At the height of the hostilities in Sinai, Syrian President Quwatli made a short, scheduled state visit to Moscow, taking with him key officials from the Defense Ministry. Although an innocuous communiqué was issued at the close of the visit on 3 November, serious political and military discussions took place and a wide area of agreement was reached.

Moscow Moves to "Protect" Syria

By the end of November, Moscow's attention was again focused on Syria. Soviet moves to throw a mantle of protection around the Damascus regime were prompted by concern over stepped-up Western pressures on Syria. Moscow alleged that having failed in Egypt, the Western powers, together with Turkey and Iraq, were preparing military action to oust the Damascus regime and place in power a pro-Western government. The USSR's intense propaganda drive was accompanied by diplomatic maneuvers and confidential warnings that an attack on Syria could mean the beginning of World War III. Moscow sought to discredit all Western powers, including the United States, by attempting to implicate them in the attack on Syria's ally Egypt, and accused them of successive attempts to topple the Syrian regime by political and economic pressures.

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SECRETThe Development Phase

Soviet-Syrian cooperation continued to develop throughout 1956. In March an engineering survey team from the Chief Directorate for Economic Relations* toured Syria for three weeks and discussed possible Soviet aid for Syria's Seven-Year Plan. This was followed by the visit of a Soviet cultural delegation and by the visit in June of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov, following his stay in Egypt. Shepilov stressed the developing ties of Soviet-Syrian friendship and economic collaboration and hinted at even greater Soviet economic and military support. In September, a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Syria in return for the visit of Syrian parliamentarians the preceding year.

Moscow's diplomatic support and offers of arms and economic aid were supplemented by an intense cultural and propaganda campaign aimed at nongovernmental circles. In late 1956, TASS opened an office in Damascus and began the distribution of free daily bulletins; these were widely used by the Syrian press and radio. Soviet bloc journals appeared in Syria in great numbers, and the Soviet Embassy was active in promoting student and cultural exchanges.

Communist strength continued to build up under the leadership of Khalid Bakdash, probably Communism's most able Middle East leader. Syrian Communist strength developed principally in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, the principal centers of political influence in Syria. Communists succeeded in influencing the Syrian press, labor, and the teaching profession, although their greatest numerical strength was drawn from refugees and from Syrian Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Kurdish minorities. Pro-Communist front groups were active in Syria; with the Congress of Syrian Workers, a WFTU affiliate, wielding the most influence. Affiliates of Communist international youth, lawyer, and women's groups were also active.

In March 1957, Czechoslovakia signed a contract to build an oil refinery on credit at Homs, and other satellites were active in construction and survey work in Syria. Moscow had made generalized offers of economic assistance to Syria as early as 1955, but until the summer of 1957 the Soviet economic program had been less spectacular than its military aid program. A high-ranking Syrian delegation visited Moscow at the end of July and held

* Predecessor of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

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talks with an imposing array of working-level officials, including Deputy Premier Kuzmin, a Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and Deputy Ministers of Trade and Finance. As a result, Moscow pledged further extensive economic and technical assistance to Syria. To implement this offer, a Soviet-Syrian Aid Agreement was signed on 28 October promising Syria up to \$168,000,000 in credit to help meet the foreign exchange costs of its Seven-Year Plan.

- Moscow's impressive offer seemed to the Syrians considerably better than anything offered by Western countries and without visible political conditions. Public statements of Syrian leaders reflected no awareness of possible dangers from engaging in unequal economic relations with the bloc. With an economic program hardly less impressive than its military assistance program, Moscow had built up a unique opportunity to penetrate and control the Syrian economy.

The number of bloc economic and military technicians and advisers increased rapidly. During the first half of 1957 an estimated 325 bloc technicians spent one month or more in Syria, mainly on short-term assignments. Of this number, approximately 125 were industrial and agricultural experts and 200 were military specialists. Soviet military instructors were assigned to Syria's military, air force, and engineering schools, and some specialists were detailed as instructors to Syrian artillery units. A small group of Syrian officers received advanced flight training in the bloc, and negotiations were under way to expand their number.

Effect of These Successes

On 13 August the Syrian Government expelled three American officials on the grounds that Syrian military authorities had uncovered "an American plot" to overthrow the regime. This move set the final stage, after months of complex maneuverings between various Syrian civilian and Army factions, for the ousting of remaining waverers and neutrals and an apparent complete victory for pro-Soviet elements. Moscow's posture of noninvolvement in the army and government changes was intended to rebut Western allegations of a Soviet "take-over" and to lessen Arab concern over leftward moves in Syria. Nevertheless, by a combination of diplomacy, propaganda, economic and military aid, and subversion, the USSR had brought Syria substantially under its influence--a position to be overthrown six months later with the formation of the United Arab Republic.

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SECRET**ANNEX C: "ROCKET DIPLOMACY" IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

Annex B dealt with the Soviet campaign in 1955-1957 to win over Syria. This paper, while concerned with the next phase of Soviet diplomacy in Syria, has a different focus. In the fall of 1957 the USSR--seeking to exploit the world impact of its successes in rocketry--used the position it had won in Syria as the base for a major diplomatic play in East-West relations. Diplomatic, political, and military moves were combined with a skillful use of propaganda to create a war crisis.

The major Soviet objective was to block moves to reverse the trend in Syria which the USSR believed that Turkey and the United States might set in motion. Other objectives included: 1) regaining the prestige lost in the Middle East by Jordan's swing to the West in April; 2) preparing the way for an attack on the West in the UN General Assembly to distract attention from the scheduled presentation of the UN report on Hungary; 3) blocking acceptance by the Arab states of further American aid under the "Eisenhower Doctrine"; and 4) forcing high-level East-West negotiations. Not all of these objectives were achieved; in fact, the campaign was pursued with such intensity that the Arab states recognized the artificiality of the crisis. When it became clear that the Arabs would not unite behind the USSR's leadership, Moscow abruptly brought the operation to a close.

We have not attempted in the following pages to examine the crisis as a whole, but only the techniques--typical of Khrushchev's diplomacy--by which the USSR was able to raise and lower the level of international tension. We have therefore excluded discussion of Western, Arab or Turkish activities.*

The Situation in Syria

By the early fall of 1957, the Syrian Government had fallen into the hands of anti-Western, Arab nationalist, extremist forces who had ousted remaining moderate elements following the discovery on 13 August of an alleged "American plot" to overthrow the Syrian regime. The most influential pro-Moscow leader in the reshuffled cabinet was Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defense and Finance Khalid al-Azm, who had headed the July mission to Moscow and had played an important role in the 1955 arms deal. The Syrian Army officer corps also was purged and Afif Bizri, a Communist, appointed Chief of Staff. A semimilitary civil defense organization, the Popular Resistance Movement, was reinvigorated and promised weapons.

*For instance, certain Turkish troop movements during this period were undoubtedly directed against Syria.

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SECRETSoviet Views of the Military Balance

Moscow's campaign to exploit an alleged "new balance of power" in world affairs was kicked off by the TASS announcement on 26 August of the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Past claims to parity with the West were thrust aside in favor of assertions that the USSR not only had caught up to but now surpassed the West.

In an attempt to exploit the ICBM announcement and to support a stronger hand in international affairs, Pravda on 8 September carried a long interview with Soviet Air Force Chief of Staff Air Marshal Vershinin, in which he painted a picture of overwhelming Soviet military superiority vis-a-vis the West. Vershinin's claims had been asserted previously by Soviet spokesmen, but the marshaling of all these arguments at this time into one highly publicized article was a move to undermine the confidence of America's allies and to support Soviet allegations that ties with the West would serve to increase local risks. It immediately became clear that Moscow had singled out Turkey, the linchpin of Western defenses in the Middle East, as number one target for these pressures.

Pressures on Turkey

Moscow's assertions of direct security interest in developments in and around Syria took a variety of forms and were backed up by a general flexing of Soviet military muscles. Pravda on 9 September initiated this phase of the Soviet diplomatic counteroffensive by voicing its concern over the threat to Soviet security posed by "military adventures," a line echoed by both Izvestia and Red Star. Mikoyan, in an interview with Senator Ellender, alluded to "evidence" in Moscow's hands of American intentions to create an incident in Syria.

At a special press conference on 10 September, Foreign Minister Gromyko charged that the United States was preparing plans aimed at stifling Syria "as an independent state." Gromyko centered his fire on Turkey and intimated that Moscow might bring to bear pressures on Turkey similar to those which it alleged Ankara was directing against Syria. The Soviet press repeated the charges in even sharper tones. Gromyko's remarks were followed on the same day by a note from Soviet Premier Bulganin to Turkish Prime Minister Menderes warning Turkey against participating in hostilities against Syria. Soviet officials abroad--repeating a tactic Moscow had used during the Suez crisis--warned privately that an attack on Syria would precipitate World War III.

Moscow's hand was almost certainly also behind the Rumanian proposal of 10 September that Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia meet with the Balkan Satellites to discuss

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a regional nonaggression pact. This demarche was timed to draw a prompt rejection from Turkey which could be used to reinforce Soviet charges of Turkey's aggressive intentions.

Soviet Treatment of Israel

Moscow at one point assigned Israel the role of co-leader with Turkey in the planned assault on Syria, but generally Tel Aviv was given only a secondary role. The Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv warned Israel on 9 September against any provocative moves toward Syria. Four days later Pravda, reviving a theme used during the Suez conflict, kept up the pressure by alleging that Israeli policy "spells danger to the very existence of Israel as a state." The main purpose of claiming Israeli involvement was to bring the other Arab states to identify their interests with those of the USSR in its opposition to the "plot" against Syria.

Elaboration of the "Plot"

Soviet President Voroshilov, in a "personal letter" on 17 September, warned the Shah of Iran of the dangers of a major conflict and urged him to use his influence to preserve peace in the Middle East. The same day Khrushchev, in an interview with British Labor Party leader Aneurin Bevan, outlined a four-stage plot which he said the Turks were planning with American backing. The Soviet leader intimated that while he did not expect the United States and Britain would push Syria's neighbors into an actual invasion, he thought they would attempt to bring off an internal coup to be followed by appeals from the new leaders for military support from outside.

Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders both publicly and privately dwelled on the USSR's possession of "secret documents" which could be produced at the proper time to prove its allegations. Soviet propaganda combined these claims with its reporting of a series of "provocative" Western moves, including Turkish Army maneuvers, US Sixth Fleet movements, NATO exercises, and American arms shipments to Jordan and Israel, to convey the impression that the US had set in motion a vast military operation in the eastern Mediterranean.

Moscow announced on 18 September that a cruiser and a destroyer, which had been sent early in the month from its Baltic Fleet to make good-will visits to Albania and Yugoslavia, would make a ten-day visit to Syria--the first Soviet warships ever to visit that country. This gesture was probably intended to dramatize Soviet support for the Syrian regime.

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SECRETGromyko in the UN

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech on 20 September at the newly convened UN General Assembly was more moderate in tone than concurrent Soviet propaganda, probably because the Kremlin wanted any charges that Western intervention was imminent brought before that body by an Arab state. Gromyko, in attempting to impart the view that Moscow continued to take a "serious view" of the situation, reiterated the USSR's security interest in Syrian developments and asked General Assembly consideration of Soviet proposals for a four-power renunciation of force in the Middle East and a ban on arms shipments. These proposals, first presented to Britain, France, and the United States on 11 February, had been repeated on 19 April and 3 September. They were designed to demonstrate the "reasonableness" of the USSR's position.

Tightening the Screws

Outside this arena, however, the USSR continued to build tension. On 24 September, Moscow announced that atomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds had been exploded in connection with current Soviet military training exercises.

Encouraged by signs that no Arab state was lining up against Syria, Moscow kept up the pressure. On 5 October, in a four-hour talk with Secretary Dulles in Washington, Gromyko emphasized that the USSR could not remain a passive observer in the repeated crises near its territory and denied any Soviet intention of making Syria a military base. Gromyko's stand was followed by an announcement on 7 October that on the preceding day the USSR had tested a "powerful hydrogen device of new design." On the same day, Khrushchev told New York Times correspondent James Reston that Turkey would not last "a single day" in the Middle East war, thus touching off a renewed campaign to magnify the war scare over Syria. That evening, at a reception at the East German Embassy, Khrushchev told newsmen that Turkey should think twice before massing its troops on the Syrian border, and he reportedly added that it would be too late to reconsider when "cannons begin to shoot and rockets to fly."

On 11 October, in an obvious attempt to build domestic pressure on NATO governments and to isolate the United States from its NATO allies, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party sent letters to the socialist parties of the eight West European NATO countries urging joint efforts to preserve peace in the Middle East. Bloc propaganda kept up a drumfire of charges against Turkey and the United States for "adventures which have made the Turkish-Syrian border the most disturbed in the world."

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SECRETThe Crisis Comes to a Head

Stimulated by Moscow's strong public and private support and probably under considerable direct Soviet prodding, Syria on 15 October requested formal General Assembly consideration of threats to its security and to "international peace" and asked that a commission be set up to investigate the situation on the Syrian-Turkish border. Given this opportunity, Gromyko followed up on 16 October with a letter to the President of the Assembly supporting the Syrian move by accusing the United States of prodding Turkey to commit aggression in Syria. He also stated there was "reliable information that the Turkish General Staff, together with American advisers, has elaborated detailed plans for an attack by Turkey on Syria after the Turkish elections on 27 October." In conversations with Arab and Asian delegates, Gromyko assured them that the USSR was prepared to use force if necessary. Moscow appeared to want to force a vote in the General Assembly which would oblige the Arab states publicly to line up with the bloc.

TASS issued a long, "authorized" statement on 18 October designed to reinforce the appearance of deep Soviet concern and to review the history of the "plot." It added little to charges contained in Khrushchev's interview with Reston, in the messages to the Western European Socialist parties, and in Gromyko's 16 October letter, except to give details of military operations to be taken under the "top secret plan." The statement said the USSR would "take all necessary measures" to aid Syria if the latter were attacked (Moscow did not, however, commit itself to specific independent action) and, repeating a tactic adopted during the Suez crisis, it expressed the Soviet Union's willingness to undertake joint measures with the United States in order to dissolve the crisis.

On 20 October the Saudi Arabian radio announced that King Saud had offered to mediate, and that both Syria and Turkey had accepted and would send delegations to Damman within two days. Gromyko met privately at the UN with a number of the Asian-African delegations to impress on them Soviet willingness to use force if necessary to support Syria. On the following day Turkey confirmed its acceptance of Saud's offer, but Damascus radio denied its previous reports of Syrian willingness to mediate. The Soviet chargé in Damascus reportedly brought about Syria's quick reversal.

Gromyko on 22 October made a bitter attack in the General Assembly on the United States and Turkey and warned against reported attempts to form a Syrian government-in-exile. However, by a vote of 37 to 10 with 34 abstentions the Assembly suspended debate on the Syrian-Turkish dispute pending the outcome of King Saud's mediation efforts and accepted a Soviet-Arab amendment for debate to be resumed automatically in three days.

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SECRETMoscow Overplays its Hand

Now, at the height of the crisis, Moscow brought tension to a peak by a series of extremely blatant moves. On 23 October the Georgian newspaper Zarya Vostoka announced that Marshal Rokossovsky, a senior Deputy Minister of Defense who had been an outstanding combat commander in World War II, had been transferred to command the Transcaucasus Military District which borders on Turkey. The following day Moscow added that military exercises had been carried out there under simulated atomic warfare conditions. Extended Bulgarian troop maneuvers reportedly were also conducted. Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov, winding up a three-week visit to Yugoslavia and Albania, contributed to the atmosphere of crisis by echoing in his public speeches of 24 and 25 October the harsher tones of Soviet propaganda.

The USSR's efforts to get the Arabs themselves to take a stronger line against the West failed, despite Moscow's great pains to depict the projected intervention as an anti-Arab rather than an anti-Soviet move. Despite Moscow's alleged proof of Western intentions--copies of some of the "documentary evidence" reportedly were shown to Arab officials--Soviet sabre-rattling did not rally the Arabs behind Moscow's diplomatic campaign. Seeing the danger of becoming pawns in an East-West conflict, they turned toward Saudi mediation with renewed hopes. At the end, even Syria's enthusiasm for the campaign waned, and the Damascus press on 28 October quoted "Syrian political circles" as being in favor of any UN measures to ease the crisis. This of course left Moscow in a diplomatically exposed position.

The Soviet leaders quickly recognized that they had overplayed their hand and began an immediate strategic retreat.* Propaganda began to moderate its tone and volume, and attention to Syria and Middle Eastern developments tailed off rapidly. Gromyko on 29 October spoke briefly in the General Assembly in support of Syria, but he failed to repeat the threat of Soviet action against Turkey. In a dramatic move to demonstrate that Moscow viewed the crisis over, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan appeared at a reception on 29 October in the Turkish Embassy. Khrushchev described their attendance as a "gesture of peace" and expressed the opinion that prospects

* It is notable that Moscow has made sporadic attempts to lay blame for the military pressures on Turkey on the "adventurism" of the then Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Zhukov. It is quite clear, however, that this was not the cause of Zhukov's dismissal; in fact, he was junketing abroad during the final three weeks of the crisis.

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for peace seemed a little better. Neither Syria's 30 October resolution in the General Assembly calling for the creation of a "fact-finding commission" nor a Western counterproposal for Secretary General Hammarskjold to use his good offices was brought to a vote, and the Syrian issue was in effect shelved.

Postlude and Conclusions

With General Assembly consideration of the crisis having ended indecisively, Gromyko made the expected effort to claim that action by the USSR had saved the world from war. The Soviet press throughout November continued a limited effort to maintain world alarm over the Syrian-Turkish situation, but Moscow's efforts both to keep the issue alive and to depict the lengthy crisis as a victory for Syria and its friends over the "Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine" were halfhearted and obviously for the record. While nothing had been resolved formally, it was clear that, for the time being at least, the "threat to Syria" was over.

The USSR did not use the widespread public and private threats of "volunteers" which characterized its exploitation of the Suez crisis, probably viewing this as too provocative and too vulnerable a tactic to use twice. Many of the Soviet moves looked beyond the immediate crisis toward building an impression of irresistible Soviet power rather than at resolving the immediate dispute.

Even as it experimented with the use of bolder cold war tactics, Moscow was limited by an unwillingness to precipitate hostilities in the Middle East for fear they would get out of hand. The USSR's various "warnings" were purposely vague in order to cloak Soviet intentions and to maintain as wide an area for maneuver as possible. Both public and private statements of Soviet willingness to partake, if necessary, in military action in support of Syria fell short of committing the USSR to unilateral counteraction, and Moscow's pledge that Syria would be supported by the world's "peace-loving" forces was at best equivocal. Behind the facade of an exaggerated Soviet security interest in Syrian developments, Moscow sought to test Western reactions and Western resolution in the face of intensive psychological pressures.

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SECRET**ANNEX D: WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT****Introduction**

This annex describes in some detail the machinery used by the USSR in the selection, development, and putting into production of weapons systems. In the USSR this process involves an interaction of the central organs* with the military, scientific, and economic machinery.

Initial Formulation of Strategic Goals

Soviet policy operates within the framework of strategic goals worked out by the party Presidium. The Presidium begins by specifying the major internal and external political goals it wishes to achieve and believes feasible within the limits of the available resources, and then it proceeds to work out the major guidelines for the economic, military, and scientific capabilities necessary to achieve the political goals.

In working out the strategic goals for the next decade or so the Presidium specifies, for example, the rate of investment, the levels of output for various key heavy industries, the required capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons on US military bases and population centers, and to provide for the defense of the Soviet Union, and the targets for housing and consumer goods. At the same time, the share of national product to be devoted to investment, defense, and consumption is also decided upon in gross terms. Consideration of these programs concomitantly yields a relatively high degree of integration. A high degree of integration of means and ends is also fostered by the fact that the Soviet leaders not only determine the ends but also participate in programming the means on paper, and then actually administer or supervise the day-to-day implementation of the program.

Selection and Approval of Specific Military Weapons Programs

After the major guidelines have been set, specific programs must be formulated and the decision made as to which of several alternatives to pursue. In the case of

* In this annex the top decision-making authority is referred to as the party Presidium, or occasionally as the "regime." While the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers plays a significant role in formulating decisions, the party Presidium is clearly the ultimate voice in major policy decisions.

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military programs, the Soviet Ministry of Defense has the primary responsibility for providing capabilities consistent with the regime's strategic goals. Although in carrying out this responsibility the ministry does not have a blank check to draw upon the economic resources of the USSR, it can make its long-range plans with considerable assurance that the means of fulfillment will be available.*

Decisions related to the choice and acquisition of advanced weapons systems are handled somewhat differently from those related to the expansion and modernization of established systems. Major advanced weapons systems require considerable basic research, experimentation, and development, much of which may prove abortive and involve costs which are large and difficult to predict. On the other hand, the expansion and improvement of established systems involve much less technical risk and much more readily predicted costs. Accordingly, proposals for established systems are considered more or less routinely and in general terms by the Presidium, while proposals for advanced systems are given a good deal of individual and personal attention.

Because of the complexity of problems involved in introducing advanced weapons systems such as radar, jet engines, nuclear weapons, and guided missiles, the regime forms special ad hoc committees to supervise the research, development, testing, and early production and deployment phases of each weapons system. Such committees apparently are headed, or supervised, by a member of either the party or government Presidium and include a number of high officials involved or interested in the development of the new weapons system--Ministers, Chairmen of State Committees, and the Deputy Ministers of Defense whose areas of responsibility involve the operational weapons system. Special ad hoc committees of this type have

* It should be noted that historically the constraints on military research and development in the Soviet Union have differed from the constraints on the production and deployment of weapons systems. The principal limitations on military research, development, and testing activities in the USSR during the postwar period have been in the availability of skilled manpower and some types of laboratory facilities and special equipment. At the present time, these bottlenecks are being eased rapidly. In general, gross resources available have been large enough to make money no object, as far as military research and development work is concerned.

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extensive powers to override normal bureaucratic procedures, to marshal human and material resources for the program, and to assign specific responsibilities to lower organizations. These committees apparently operate until production problems of the new weapons have become more or less routine.

The second stage in the decision-making process may be divided broadly into four phases: a) the selection of the specific military research, development, and production programs; b) the establishment of the scientific and technical feasibility of new weapons systems; c) the consideration of the cost of individual programs and of the effort as a whole; and d) incorporation and final approval of the programs as parts of the detailed plans for scientific research, production, investment, and the allocation of physical and financial resources.

The General Staff in the Ministry of Defense is the principal group which works out the proposals for those specific programs and force levels--and the associated bill of equipment and materials--which will provide military capabilities consistent with the guidelines and strategic goals laid down by the party Presidium. Members of the General Staff are military generalists who apparently are able to provide the Presidium with the staff work necessary to make a clear choice from among the alternative ways of achieving a desired capability.

Proposals may also originate in the Academy of Sciences and research institutes or in other parts of the government such as the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (nuclear energy) and the State Committees for Aviation Technology, Defense Technology, Shipbuilding Technology, and Radio Electronics. Moreover, in the course of working out the strategic goals and indicating the general limits for military expenditures, the Presidium itself lays down on occasion the specific characteristics of certain weapons systems it desires to have developed and deployed. It is able to do this because its members have a long and continuous acquaintance with both the existing and laboratory state of the art.

In the initial stage the Presidium's decisions are somewhat tentative, and the scientific and technical feasibility of most major advanced weapons systems must be established before a final decision to proceed can be reached. The problems may be related either to the establishment of certain more or less fundamental principles or to the incorporation of known principles in a product, weapon, or weapons system, with specified performance characteristics. In either case the solution which is ultimately advanced must be tested.

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SECRET**Testing**

In general, the more fundamental work is done in "research institutes" under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences, while the development of the actual operational weapon is accomplished in "design bureaus" under the supervision of a ministry (e.g., Medium Machine Building) or a technological committee (e.g., the State Committee for Aviation Technology). Considerable flexibility in handling inter-related problems is achieved by having a top leader responsible for over-all progress of each advanced system.

An outline of the steps involved in designing a high-performance aircraft by a design bureau co-located with a Soviet "developmental factory" provides a good example of the machinery of decision. The requirement for a high-performance aircraft as proposed by the Ministry of Defense and modified and approved by the Presidium is transmitted to a selected design bureau subordinate to the State Committee for Aviation Technology. The following specifications are included: 1) the combat mission of the aircraft; 2) the conditions under which it will operate and the tactical doctrine governing its use; 3) the speed, ceiling, rate of climb, load carrying capacity, and armament; 4) the type and power of the engine; 5) interchangeability of parts; and 6) other specifications. The requirement also may state that the designer's attention is to be centered primarily on attaining maximum speed and rate of climb for the aircraft, or, on the other hand, that the requirements with respect to range and load-carrying capacity must be met first.

On the basis of this directive a design team headed by a senior designer prepares a preliminary layout design and mock-up. The preliminary layout design includes the following basic documents and models: 1) general view of the aircraft in three projections; 2) layout drawings; 3) scale and wind tunnel models; 4) outline, control equipment, and load distribution diagrams; 5) aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft; 6) principal data on strength and flying weight of the aircraft with various combat loads; 7) calculation of the center of gravity of the aircraft with respect to the mean aerodynamic wing chord for various combat loads; 8) schedule of emergency rescue facilities; 9) outline diagrams; 10) description of the tactical-technical characteristics of the aircraft, with an illustration of its design features in tables and diagrams; 11) technological characteristics of the aircraft with respect to series production; 12) economic justification of the design with an estimate of unit costs and principal materials inputs; and 13) an explanatory note justifying each modification of the original specifications.

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A "mock-up commission," which usually includes at least one Deputy Minister of Defense in addition to technical specialists and the Chairman of the State Committee for Aviation Technology, then inspects the mock-up and examines the preliminary layout design. The commission may reject the design and/or lay down additional specifications. Approval results in a formal directive to the design bureau or experimental plant to build three prototypes by a specified date. The directive may further order one or more production plants to begin tooling for quantity production.

Following construction of these three prototypes, normal static, taxiing, and flight tests are conducted to determine the rigidity and durability of the aircraft. The results of these tests are reviewed by the commission, and the design bureau receives an official approval or disapproval for its project. If the project is approved, the Soviet Air Force is advised that the new aircraft is ready for state trials, which are carried out by an organization known as the Scientific Testing Institute of the Soviet Air Force. The trials are exhaustive, covering all aspects of performance and combat suitability. The special commission then reviews the findings of the state trials and renders its final evaluation. If the new aircraft proves to be satisfactory, the results are forwarded to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers through the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, and thence to the party Presidium.

In the meantime, the USSR Gosplan uses the estimates of unit costs and materials inputs in the preliminary layout design to compute the cost of the number of aircraft proposed by the Ministry of Defense. Gosplan also ascertains if sufficient productive capacity exists or if additional capital investment is required. These results are forwarded to the party Presidium.

Nuclear weapons design follows the same basic pattern, except that the Presidium takes a more direct and personal interest in specifying the capabilities, dimensions, and mode of delivery of the weapon and issues a formal directive for each new weapon.

Inasmuch as the Soviet leaders usually are straining their economic resources, they are under considerable pressure to halt an unpromising program at an early stage in its development and to use its facilities and manpower for some other high-priority program. These circumstances, coupled with a system of strict centralized control, make for prompt and drastic decisions by the Presidium, but of course these decisions may not always prove correct. Proposals may never reach the Presidium through any of the few established channels, or the Presidium may reject them out of hand. In any event, the research institute, design bureau, plant, or ministry cannot proceed with any considerable amount of developmental activity in the hope

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or expectation that future events will demonstrate the desirability of the project. There is no other market for the project. The controls over resources and manpower are so strict that the most a Minister, for example, could do would be to keep a handful of people working on purely theoretical problems, provided he was willing to resort to a good deal of subterfuge.

Costs

Once a proposed weapons system is found to be technically feasible, its estimated cost must be compared with its effectiveness in accomplishing the desired mission. Particular weapon systems are then considered in relation to one another and to over-all military objectives. The proposed military program as a whole is next examined in the context of the resource demands of the investment and consumption programs in order to identify the areas of serious conflict.

The detailed staff support needed to cope with these economic problems is supplied primarily by the USSR Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance. At the present time the Chairman of USSR Gosplan and the Minister of Finance are members of the Council of Ministers Presidium and probably also of the special ad hoc committees responsible for implementing the highest priority military projects. In contrast with certain other members of the special committees, the effectiveness of these two officials is enhanced by the fact that they have little if any vested interest in particular military, economic, or social programs. Instead they are concerned primarily with the means by which the over-all strategic goals of the regime can be implemented.

Gosplan in particular must strike a balance between the capital, material, and manpower resources available, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the demands made on these resources by all the proposed programs, military and otherwise.

For those weapons already in production or well along in the research and developmental process, Gosplan can give the Presidium a fairly accurate estimate of cost over the next five years. Gosplan has very complete information on unit costs, plant capacity, and manpower requirements for production items, the cost estimates worked out by the research institutes and design bureaus, the plan schedules for future production of materials and capital equipment, and the estimates of future manpower availabilities and training.

The Chairman of Gosplan reports the results of a tentative trial balance, highlighting the areas of conflict between the various programs. Serious conflicts between the military, investment, and consumption programs almost always arise, because the demands of the Soviet leaders for the growth of the economic base and

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of the military potential are, for all practical purposes, insatiable. Not to drive the economy at a pace which stretches the available resources to the limit and a little beyond is unthinkable. Hence, when Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance report back to the Presidium on the estimated cost of the over-all military program in conjunction with other programs, the party Presidium may be faced with choices only it can resolve.

The pattern of Soviet actions in the past indicates no routine solution to this squeeze. More often than not the Soviet leaders first reduce the planned rate of growth of living standards and then proceed to cut back the less essential parts of the military and investment programs. The downward modification of Malenkov's consumer goods policy at the end of 1954 is one example; another is the reduction in military manpower over the past few years. Both actions were designed to bolster the investment program and thus continue the rapid expansion of the heavy industrial base.

Shifts of priority between investment, defense, and consumption do not exhaust the alternatives open to the leadership. A great deal of attention is paid at the highest levels to finding ways to do things more cheaply. It is one of the primary functions of the staff agencies and the ministries to come up with ways to reduce costs.

For example, largely as a result of the pressure exerted by the top planning authorities, the cost of producing industrial goods declined very rapidly between 1950 and 1955, so that a ruble spent for weapons procurement in 1955 probably was worth between 25 and 40 percent more than one spent five years before.

Comparison of the original surface-to-air guided missile system installed around Moscow in 1953-56 with the cheaper and simpler system currently being deployed in many areas of the USSR shows that Soviet planners found a lower cost solution when the extremely high cost of the earlier system appeared to be a factor limiting its deployment. The original Moscow system was not duplicated around 20 to 30 other major Soviet cities, in all probability because of the sizable construction costs of the concrete hardstands and extensive road network. Extended deployment of this system would have forced a re-examination and curtailment of the whole investment and housing construction program, with negative implications for economic growth.

After the party Presidium has decided on a set of military, investment, and consumption-social welfare programs which appear to be internally consistent in terms of their demands upon resources and which will provide the basis for achieving the strategic political goals, these programs are translated into a detailed set of plans specifying what will be produced by whom, when, and at

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what unit cost. For production of end items and construction of facilities, Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance are the principal organizations responsible for working out the detailed plans and schedules.

Final Directives

Together with the special ad hoc committees, Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance draft for the Presidium special directives* which specify when and where the system is to become operational; the quantity of missiles, electronics equipment, and other components to be produced; the technological characteristics and combat capabilities of the missiles and equipment; the type and quantity of fixed installations required; the manpower and special skills required; and the advanced technological processes and techniques to be incorporated in the production and construction process.

The directive also specifies the priority which production and construction will be accorded relative to other high-priority defense and investment projects. Further, the directive sets the timing for the initiation of series production relative to pilot-line production. Whether the Presidium decides to prepare for series (or mass) production almost simultaneously with initiation of pilot-line production depends primarily on the urgency of acquiring an operational system and on the seriousness of the problems which can be anticipated on the basis of prototype testing. In the case of the heavy jet bomber (BISON) the USSR telescoped series production and prototype production to a remarkable degree.

Gosplan's function at this point is to translate the directive into detailed production schedules, stipulating the plants involved and their responsibilities, capital investment schedules for each production facility and operational installation, unit construction cost plans and a schedule for reducing these construction costs, a bill of materials inputs for production and of capital equipment inputs for new investment, a manpower utilization plan and labor productivity goals, unit production cost plans for all components and a schedule for reduction in these unit costs, detailed plans for technological innovation in the form of schedules for new kinds of capital equipment for production and construction and schedules for the introduction of advanced processes, and the appropriate adjustments in the production and investment plans

* The type of directive described in the following discussion assumes the completion of research and development and the initiation of prototype testing. Soviet planning for production and deployment usually begins very early in the testing stage.

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of all industries contributing to the program in order to ensure the timely provision of the requisite quantities of materials and capital equipment. Gosplan also must see to it that each plant and facility involved has its individual microcosmic versions of these plans setting forth the output targets, unit costs, capital construction, labor force, and labor productivity, and so forth.*

After these very detailed plans are integrated into the national economic plans, the plans go back to the party Presidium for final approval, which in this detailed form is largely formal. The approved plans become legally binding on all concerned.

* For the lower priority weapons systems and for most civilian production, the plant plans are consolidated at the level of the Council of the National Economy to which the plant is subordinate. For advanced weapons systems, however, copies of the plant plans--or detailed extracts therefrom are forwarded to the committee directing the program and to the appropriate section of Gosplan USSR.

SECRET**ANNEX E: PRESIDIUM GUIDANCE AT THE PLANT LEVEL**

In the final analysis, all plans worked out by the central authorities must be translated into reality by a plant which produces the end items and by the construction organizations which build the necessary facilities. It is the purpose of this Annex to outline briefly the multiple-command relationships and indirect controls which tightly link the plant or construction organization manager to the Presidium.

Chains of Command

The direct chain of command to the plant runs from the Presidium of the Council of Ministers through the USSR Council of Ministers, the Union Republic Council of Ministers, and finally the Councils of National Economy (s^ov-narkhozes). The Communist Party provides both a means of control and a supplementary chain of command over economic activities, running from the Presidium of the Communist Party through the regional and local Soviets, to the primary party organizations in each plant, shop, and workers brigade. The party not only is responsible for guiding the activities of the factories but also monitors the work of the financial and planning organizations whose function it is to control the plants' activities.*

In addition to the direct chain of administrative subordination, plant activities are monitored through an elaborate control mechanism in the form of the staff planning, financial, and statistical organs: the USSR and Republic Gosplans, the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, and the Central Statistical Administration. These organizations have positive as well as negative control functions in the sense that the Construction Bank of the Ministry of Finance disburses the capital investment grants, and the supply directorates subordinate to the USSR and Republic Gosplans are responsible for planning the supply flows to the plants.

* In Stalin's time the circle of those who checked up on the checkers was much wider, including the Ministry of State Control, the secret police, and the personal secretariat of the party boss. These bodies no longer have the range of functions and prerogatives they once had. The role of the professional party machine, on the other hand, has been greatly enhanced by Khrushchev, and further expansion of party participation in guiding plant activities is under way.

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SECRET**Assignment of Production Targets, Priorities, and Resources to Plants**

The quantity and kind of item to be produced by each plant, as well as the material, capital, and manpower resources assigned to the plant for its construction targets, are spelled out in the plant's microcosmic version of the national economic plan: the "technical-industrial-financial plan" of the enterprise. This plan covers the following areas of activity: production, capital construction, labor force and labor productivity, wages, production costs, new technology, and supplies of raw materials and capital equipment. Each production item is assigned a priority according to a standard classification of priorities. The "technical-industrial-financial plan" provides the standard for measuring the performance of the plant.

Reporting of Plan Fulfillment

Statistical reports on the fulfillment of the targets set forth in the enterprise plan are submitted through the direct chain of command, usually for ten-day, monthly, quarterly, and annual periods. Plants engaged in production of components for advanced weapons systems may submit daily reports. The ten-day reports give only the highlights of plan fulfillment for most aspects of the enterprise technical-industrial-financial plan, while the monthly, quarterly, and annual reports provide immense detail on all aspects of plant performance with respect to the plan. All such reports are made on standard forms according to standard accounting procedures set forth by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Administration.

Control by Financial and Statistical Organizations

The essence of the control function performed by the State Bank--which is subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers--is that the local branch can perform a complete, up-to-date audit of a plant's activities on the basis of the documents in the plant's account at the Bank. All transactions of the enterprise, purchase of materials, wage payments, transfer of finished products, and the like are handled through its account with the local branch of the State Bank. The Bank is responsible for ensuring that the plant's activities correspond, in detail, to those specified in the plan, and that the procedures employed conform to the detailed regulations set forth by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Statistical Administration.

The Construction Bank, through which investment funds are made available to the individual enterprise,

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maintains a set of capital accounts for the plant, including the plant's amortization account, a small amount of profits retained for new investment purposes, and the capital investment grant from the State Budget. All purchases of equipment and materials, as well as wage and other outlays for capital construction purposes, are made through the Construction Bank so that it can perform the same sort of control function over the plant's investment activities that the State Bank performs for production activities.

Local offices of the Ministry of Finance constantly check the financial status of the plants and research institutes in the area. Aside from periodic audits, the local office of the Ministry of Finance maintains a constant check on the payment of profit and turnover tax by each plant as compared to the plan, and on the actual as compared to the planned subventions to the research institutes.

Duplicates of the statistical reports sent up through the direct chain of command, plus other detailed reports of a special nature, are furnished to the local office of the USSR Central Statistical Administration which checks the report against its copy of the plant plan and informs the appropriate higher authorities of any discrepancies or illegal procedures. The Central Statistical Administration, the final repository of most detailed reports, provides a statistical reference library service, complete with research and special report services, to the appropriate higher echelons.

The monitoring functions make it difficult for the enterprises to deviate from planned targets, procedures, and regulations of the Banks and the Central Statistical Administration. In addition, the chief bookkeeper at each enterprise has the right--and duty--to inform higher authority directly of any violation the manager commits more than once.

Resolution of Current Problems

When the manager runs into difficulties in meeting his production schedules he can appeal for assistance through the direct command channels. The first appeal normally is to the next higher echelon in the direct chain of command--the *sovnarkhoz*, for most enterprises. Research institutes can appeal directly to the Ministry or State Committee to which they are subordinate. If the *sovnarkhoz* is unable or unwilling to help, the manager may bypass all intermediate echelons and appeal directly to Moscow, usually to the Presidium member who is directly responsible for his particular area

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of activity. A manager engaged in production of missiles systems components, for example, probably would send a telegram directly to Dimitri Ustinov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the Presidium thereof, who--as noted above--is believed to head a special ad hoc committee for guided missiles. Such direct appeals occur most frequently when materials and capital equipment shortages develop or when bureaucratic stumbling blocks are interposed, and they usually result in immediate and effective action.

Party channels also provide an effective channel of communications from the plant to the top decision-making group in Moscow, quite independent of the direct chain of command. The party organization in the plant is obligated not only to ensure that the plant performs the tasks assigned to it by the plan but also is responsible for lending the plant management every possible assistance in fulfilling the plan. Party channels characteristically are utilized for chronic difficulties, while the type of immediate emergency occasioned by the failure of supplies to arrive on schedule usually is handled through the direct chain of command or by a telegram to the appropriate member of the Presidium if necessary.

Resource Reserves

In order to prevent this elaborate machinery from breaking down because of planning errors and failures of individual plants to ship the requisite materials, a large inventory is maintained at the exclusive disposal of the USSR Council of Ministers. This inventory, designated as "State Reserves," includes a wide range of commodities; coal, petroleum products, nonferrous metals, cotton, grain, and the like. State Reserves may be likened to a surge tank, which keeps the economy going despite temporary deficiencies.* In addition, State Reserves, supplemented by mobilization reserves, also provide a strategic stockpile because the amount

*Plant inventories are kept as low as possible in the drive to maximize output. Individual managers, of course, do not like this policy in the least, and they do what they can to build up their inventories, often resorting to semilegal and illegal means. Limited inventories of materials are placed at the disposal of the Councils of the National Economy and the Union Republic Councils of Ministers for emergency use. Machine-building plants also have "mobilization reserves" of materials and machine tools stored at the plant for conversion to armaments production in an emergency. Supply shortages may be temporarily solved by Moscow's granting authorization for the plant to "borrow" from the mobilization reserves. Most loans from reserves--State or mobilization--subsequently must be repaid from the plant's quarterly or yearly materials allocation.

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held for a number of commodities is well in excess of normal emergency requirements of the economy. State Reserves may be drawn upon for a variety of strategic emergencies short of war; the Malenkov consumer-goods program in 1953-54 and the Satellite disturbances of 1956 are noteworthy examples.

A somewhat longer range problem requiring a resource reserve arises because it is very difficult to estimate at the beginning of a five- or seven-year plan either the unit cost or the precise quantity required for new types of machinery--civilian or military--to be produced toward the end of the plan period. In order to deal with this exigency--and to facilitate overfulfillment of the multiyear plans--Gosplan significantly underestimates the economy's capability to expand machinery and equipment output on the basis of the planned increases in materials inputs. These uncommitted resources are available in the event the estimated cost of advanced types of machinery prove too low, or the quantity required grossly underestimated, or because progress has been sufficiently satisfactory to permit a program larger than that originally envisaged.

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