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INFORMATION REPORT

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THE CURRENT POLITICAL PURGE IN NORTH KOREA

The current political purge going on in North Korea, the most extensive since the Communist regime was established, is a direct outgrowth of a speech delivered by KIM Il-sung to the fifth meeting of the Central Committee of the NK Labor Party in Pyongyang on 22 December 1952.

The speech is quoted in its entirety below:

"We must strengthen our party loyalty, and fight against the trend of liberalism and the residues of sectarianism. By strengthening Party loyalty I mean that every Party member should be boundlessly loyal to the Party, be active in the works of the Party, know the advantages of revolution, sacrifice his own personal advantages, maintain the principles and advantages of the Party, fight all inaccurate and false thoughts, keep firm the rules and discipline of the Party, and strengthen the tie between the Party and the people. Only the Party member who possesses these qualities can be called a member firmly loyal to the Party. These qualities are the measure by which we appraise Party loyalty and Party attitudes of every member in our Party.

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"But still there are many members in our Party who lack Party loyalty and immerse themselves in a putrifying atmosphere. When members of this sort are employed in responsible posts in the government or Party, they will be blind to the Party and revolutionary works in their pursuit of material benefits. They will make people leave the Party and commit national crimes, drunken by their avarice. Even in this critical moment in our history, there are many leaders who do not faithfully accomplish their Party work and do not see and correct their mistakes. There are many who complain about everything, and even gather in groups to gossip and exchange complaints. There are others who do not offer their opinions in Party meetings but criticize the decisions of the Party secretly.

"There are many who do not follow the decisions of the Party but think their own opinions are best. There are many who only talk and prattle, not heeding the rules of the Party organization. There are also hermit members who have no interests in Party work but care only for their safety. There are members who do not want to bear responsibility for their work and who do not have the ability to accomplish anything great or small, trusting only our past revolutionary history. The evil of implicitly ignoring and not fighting the defects and mistakes of one's kin, friends, or fellow citizens can be found everywhere. All these are the evils of liberalism. These liberals are people without Party loyalty whose thoughts invariably come from petty bourgeois egoism and end in the pursuit of their own benefits. We must fight these liberal trends strongly.

"It is a common saying that there are no sects in our Party, but we cannot deny the fact that there still remain residues of sectarianism. This sectarianism impairs the unity and solidarity of our Party. It expresses itself in the following manner: members who have continued their unprincipled sectarian fighting, and members who have grudges against the Party owing to discontent about their jobs and Party punishment, group together and entice members with relatively bad backgrounds into their group by telling them that they are not trusted by the Party. The sectarians pay attention only to matters concerning the employment and disposition of workers. They try to recommend and hire only their friends in the Party and government, whatever their ability, background, ideological progress, or Party loyalty might be. They even try to recommend those who may hinder the revolutionary movement. Therefore, those who are not employed because of their unfavorable revolutionary background do not seek to improve themselves by strengthening their Party loyalty, but follow after those sectarians who may give them jobs. Taking advantage of these followers, members who can not cast out their sectarian traits gather them under wing to utilize them.

"In order to make safe their posts in the government or Party, these sectarians conceal each other's wrongdoing and boast vaingloriously and praise each other. Some of them even try to benefit themselves by playing off one employe against another, taking advantage of the constant difference of opinions and enmity among the employes. If we leave these actions of the sectarians as they are, these actions will eventually grow into small group movements.

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"We must fight also another kind of sectarian expression; namely those who wear masks of obedient demeanor to the Party line outside, but really blame the Party line in secret. We must also fight against those who flatter the Party but are dreaming other things in their hearts. Today, we can no longer ignore the presence of these people. It is best to confess frankly in front of our Party and cease these anti-Party actions. We must watch their actions closely by stressing Party loyalty and revolutionary alertness of all Party members, and prevent any move by these sectarians. In this day, when we are fighting a severe war with American and British aggressors, these sectarian actions cannot be pardoned. We cannot be blind to the fact that these remaining sectarians will eventually become enemy spies as the experience of the democratic people's republics and our brother parties have taught us.

"There is also a trend among a few members to trust individuals rather than to trust the Party by ascertaining the accuracy of the Party line and the Party organization. These trends give hero-worshippers a chance. In order to eliminate these evil tendencies, we must firmly enforce the principle of 'Democratic Centralism' inside the Party by strengthening the organization rules and building up firm Party loyalty among all Party members. (The concept of "Democratic Centralism" is a product of Bolshevism which seeks to combine democracy -- mass participation -- with the centralism -- leadership -- of the Party. -- Ed.) Only by a perfect unity of the entire Party, accomplished through the enforcement of the principle which says that individuals must submit to the Party, minorities to majorities, lower organizations to higher ones, and the whole Party to the center, -- can we expect to win this long and hard war for liberty and independence. The most important characteristic of Party loyalty is the adherence to this principle and non-compromise with every expression of those trends which breed enemy ideas in to us. Therefore, by appraising the Party loyalty of every leader in the Party, government, and army, we show our Bolshevik adherence to the principle of 'Democratic Centralism.'"

These words of KIM Il-song were an omen that the greatest political purge in the history of North Korean Communist regime was on the way.

South Korea's Chungang Ilbo (The Central Daily News) (0022/1235/2490/1032) stated the following in its article of 5 June 1953, "Puppet Stronghold Is Collapsing":

"According to news from North Korean refugees in Pusan, the recent struggles for power inside the North Korean puppet regime are becoming more and more severe. The purge of PAK Hon-yong (2613/2009/3057) ex-vice-premier and ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and many other important leaders and

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cultured men, is increasing in its force. PAK Hon-yong, who was one of the organizers of the Korean Communist Party 20 years ago and the head of the South Korean Labor Party before escaping into North Korea, was dismissed from his cabinet post and punished by the Labor Party at the beginning of 1953. CHU Yong-ha (2612/1360/3109) who was transferred from the important post of ambassador to U.S.S.R. to the position of Vice-Minister of Communications because of an anti-Soviet statement to Korean students, was dismissed from the Party and removed from office.

"VI Sung-yop (2621/2110/9756), who was mayor of Seoul during the North Korean occupation in 1950 and was later NK Minister of Justice, was also dismissed from the Party and removed as head of the Office of People's Inspection. He is believed to have been taken prisoner when he attempted to escape to South Korea. Among cultured men, more than 20 noted writers were purged because their works were 'reactionary'. Their writing is said to have been removed from textbooks. These purged writers include: VI Tae-chun (2621/3141/0193) and YIM Hwa (2651/0735), according to an article published in Nodong Sinmun (Labor News) (0525/8047/2450/5113).

"Some people say this purge was caused by the fight for power within the puppet regime revolving around the truce problem. The fight for supremacy is between the pro-Soviet group, which demands the continuance of the war, and the pro-Red China group, which wants a truce. The jingoists are led by HO Kai-i (6079/ - / -), Vice-Premier and Chief Secretary of the NK Labor Party. The truce advocates are led by **Deputy Commander of the NK People's Army**, CHOE Yong-kon (1508/1661/0256), a member of the Yen-an (1693/1344) (Pro-Red China) group. He was recently promoted to the rank of vice-marshal. By using his powerful position, HO Kai-i at one time had the personal loyalty of the Soviet Koreans and was the strongest power in North Korean politics, even maneuvering KIM Il-sung. But as the aggressive war failed, the members of the Yen-an group, with their close ties to Red China, began to oppress the pro-Soviet group and tried to usurp its leadership. This brought violent unrest to the whole NK regime.

"In the confusion, the domestic group led by PAK Hon-yong tried to enlarge its power by playing off one group against another, outwardly assuming a neutral attitude. This was their undoing, however, for it was they who received the first blow of the purge. Thus not only the orthodox NK Communist Party members but also the Communist fugitives from South Korea, including politicians like HONG Myong-hui (3163/0730/3588) and YI Kuk-no (2621/0344/7627), and writers like HAN Sol-ya (7291/7185/6851) and YI Ki-yong (2521/4614/3057), are in a state of panic and fear for their safety.

"In the fall of 1952, the Ministry of Political Security (2398/3112/0202/5898/6752) was annexed to the Ministry of Interior and the Political Security Minister PAK Il-u (2613/0001/1342) was replaced by the new Interior Minister, PANG Hak-se (2455/1331/0013). That act was the last move by the pro-Soviet group to gain power in the NK Labor Party and the secret police by changing cabinet posts. After the success of their efforts, they intended to overthrow the pro-Red China group. To guard

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against this, the Yen-an group appointed the Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, KIM Tu-pong (6855/2122/1144), as its nominal chief and strengthened the army under the CHOE Yong-kon's control. By pushing CHOE Chae-il (1508/2490/4135) into the posts of Vice-Premier and Minister of the Treasury, they attempted to get control of fiscal matters.

"It is very interesting to guess which side in the struggle between the pro-Soviet group, with its control of the Party and police, and the pro-Red China group, with its control of the army, will come out victorious. Considering the occupation of North Korea by the Red Chinese Army and the evidence of Russia's commitment of Korean problems to Red Chinese hands, it is almost certain that the Yen-an group will win. Moreover, if there is a truce, the power groups in the NK puppet army will have a big part in rebuilding the political system of North Korea. This would lead to the downfall of the jingoistic pro-Soviet group. It is said that the direct cause of the downfall of PAK Hon-yong is the crime of acquiescence to the 'reactionary acts' of YI Sung-yop."

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It is difficult to obtain accurate information on the recent North Korean surge because of insufficient source material. But here is at least an outline of it taken from a few North Korean publications. The 12 February 1953 issue of Minchu Choson (Democratic Korea) published the letters exchanged by the NK Minister of Foreign Affairs PAK Hon-yong, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indo-Chinese Democratic Republic (presumably the Viet Minh forces. -- Ed.), HWANG Myong-kam, celebrating the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the two Communist regimes.

In an article in the 23 February 1953 Minchu Choson written about the commemorative meeting celebrating the 35th anniversary of the Soviet Red Army in Pyongyang, the names of Vice-Premier PAK Hon-yong and Secretary of the Central Committee of Korean Labor Party YI Sung-yop appeared as members of the meeting's top executive group.

The 13 March 1953 Nongmin Sinmun (Farmer's Newspaper) published a Korean Central News Agency dispatch about the visits to the Soviet

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Embassy made by the leaders of the NK Labor Party and government at the time of Stalin's death. The news included the names of Marshal KIM Il-sung; the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly KIM Tu-pong; the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party PAK Chung-ae (2613/2973/1947); Vice-Premier HO Ka-i; the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party PAK Chang-ok (2613/2490/3768); and others. But the names of PAK Hon-yong and YI Sung-yop did not appear.

In an article about visits to the Czechoslovakian Legation made by leaders of the government and Party at the time of Clement Gottwald's death, the names of PAK Hon-yong and YI Sung-yop did not appear. That article was from a Korean Central News Agency dispatch of 15 March 1953 from Pyongyang, and included the names of the Secretary of the Central Committee of Korean Labor Party PAK Chang-ok, Vice-Premier CHOE Chang-ik (1508/2490/4135), and others.

In the 4 April 1953 Minchu Choson, a congratulatory letter about the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary sent to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, MOLLAR Elig, was signed by NK Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs YI Tong-kon.

There is no material which completely confirms the purge of PAK Hon-yong. But it is believed that he was purged during the latter part of February or early March, 1953. The fact that his name has disappeared from articles and documents where it should appear, and the dates of the aforementioned newspapers, support our view.

In an article entitled "The Decision of the Education Members of the Hwanghae Province Labor Party," published in the 1 April 1953 issue of the NK Hwanghae Ilbo (Hwanghae Daily News), the following statement was made:

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"We shall do our very best in order to realize gloriously the message of Comrade KIM Il-sung, in which he stressed the strengthening of Party loyalty and the fight against the liberal trends and the residues of sectarianism. Here representing all teachers and students in Hwanghae Province, we impeach with bitter anger and rage those traitorous dogs, YIM Hwa, YI Tae-chun, KIM Nam-chon (6855/0589/1131), PAK Chan-mo (2613/6363/2875), YI Won-cho (2621/3293/2600), CHOE Myong-ik (1503/2494/5042), PAK Tae-won (2613/3141/6678), KIM Sun-nam (6855/7311/0589), and others who have committed vicious acts by instilling reactionary and bourgeois ideas into the ideological front. We shall patiently and firmly continue our fight to eradicate the vicious ideological influences which they gave to the thoughts of our teachers and innocent and simple students."

An article entitled "A Few Problems in the Progress of the General Meeting of the Fifth General Assembly of the Party Central Committee" which was printed in the 2 April 1953 Hwanghae Ilbo, contained the following:

"We must inform every member how harmful to our Party and to our ideological strengthening are the cowardly and sectarian acts of a few sectarians such as CHU Yone-ha, YIM Hwa, KIM Nam-chon, and CHO Il-myong. We must fight to prevent the slightest move of the sectarian elements in our Party by strictly guarding against their actions with greater revolutionary alertness and Party loyalty".

The purge of KIM Hyong and SO Sun-ku along with YIM Hwa and KIM Nam-chon can be surmised from the article entitled, "The Meeting of Hwanghae Province Writers and Artists on 25 February 1953", which was published in the 5 March 1953 Hwanghae Ilbo, and from the decision made at the meeting.

Those who appeared in Hwanghae Ilbo articles of 1 and 2 February 1953 were chiefly members of the former South Korean Labor Party or the PAK Hon-yong group and their friends. It can be presumed from the date of the decision made at the Hwanghae Province writers and artists meeting that they were purged before PAK Hon-yong and YI Sung-yop.

It is certain that the group of former South Korean Labor Party members received a death blow by this great purge of its highest

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leaders such as PAK Hon-yong and YI Sung-yop, and its mainstay of writers. The detailed reasons of the purge are obscure because of the insufficiency of source materials. However, it is certain that KIM Il-sung's "Fight Against the Liberal Trends and the Residues of Sectarianism" was directed at the former South Korean Labor Party members. This purge was instigated by the pro-Soviet group which has KIM Il-sung at its head. It has been a long time since this group of former South Korean Labor Party members has not been obedient to the Bolshevik line and policies of of the pro-Soviet group. The discontent and disaffection of the former South Korean Labor Party members toward the Soviet group's high-handed arbitrariness about important matters in the Party and government deep-rooted. It is not difficult to see that the trend of overtly expressing their discontent and disaffection and their desire to enlarge their power must have increased due to the loosened rules, disorder and confusion the "temporary retreat" in 1950-51. This must have offered reason for the pro-Soviet group to purge them.

Recently a South Korean newspaper published an article stating that several people in South Korea had contacted and conspired with the North Korean Communists to establish a coalition cabinet.

Some of these people escaped to North Korea and some were arrested when the conspiracy was discovered by ROK police authorities. (Author has forgotten name and date of newspaper. -- Ed.) It is highly probable that the partner of these conspirators in North Korea was YI Sung-yop. He was one of the highest officials of the South Korean Labor Party, Chief of the NK Labor Party's Department for Liaison with South Korea,

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and Chairman of Seoul People's Committee when the enemy occupied Seoul. If he contacted the conspirators of South Korea, it must have been after discussions with PAK Hon-yong and under the direction of the KIM Il-sung group. Whether these North-South discussions were only a means for espionage against the political movements of South Korea or whether it was really intended to establish a coalition cabinet is unknown. At any rate, the conspiracy was discovered and KIM-Il-sung group blamed PAK Hon-Yong and YI Sung-yop.

It seems logical that the pro-Soviet group, under Russian control, should continue the war, and that the Yen-an group, with its close ties with Red China, should want an armistice. But that they should fight each other about the problem of an armistice is unlikely. It is also doubtful that CHOE Yong-kon is leading the truce-supporting group and that the Yen-an group controls the NK People's Army through him. CHOE Yong-kon was in Russia for three or four years after his long guerrilla war against the Japanese in eastern Manchuria. In Russia, he received his education together with KIM Il-sung, who fought in southern Manchuria, and KIM Chaek (1885/4595), who fought in northern Manchuria against the Japanese. Thus it is more likely that CHOE Yong-kon is allied with KIM Il-sung rather than with the Yen-an group. His close alliance with the pro-Soviet group is evident from the fact that when KIM Il-sung was made a marshal, he was promoted to vice-marshal. The Yen-an group probably has neither leadership nor power to wage a power-struggle against the pro-Soviet group. As long as the influence of the Russians persists, there will never be a power which can overthrow the pro-Soviet group.

This purge by the pro-Soviet group is not limited to members of the former South Korean Labor Party. It also reaches to every person working in the Party or government whose interests are contrary to those

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of the pro-Soviet group. ~~The~~ meaning of this great purge is a consolidation of power by ~~the~~ pro-Soviet group led by **KIM Il-sung** and ~~the~~ disciplining of all the 1 million Party members and workers in North Korea.

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Synopsis of an Article on the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign
by PANG Hak-se
North Korean Minister of Home Affairs

On 31 January 1953, the Puk Han Sin Mun (North Korea Press), official North Korean government newspaper, published a summary of the military committee's decision on "Strengthening the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign." Six days later, on 5 February 1953, the No Dong Sin Mun (Labor Press), official newspaper of the NK Labor Party, published an article by PANG Hak-se, NK Minister of Home Affairs, entitled "Let Us Step Up the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign as a Movement of the Whole People." PANG is a Soviet Russian citizen.

In the beginning of the article, PANG stated that North Koreans were all struggling to arrest spies. "Last year," he wrote, "thousands of people received the National Flag Decoration and other medals from the NK People's Republic for outstanding achievements in the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign. More than 10,000 people were awarded prizes and other official commendation." (Notes: These figures are regarded as exaggerated.) ~~██████████~~

PANG cited examples of NK citizens who had arrested spies, particularly praising a sister who had informed the police against her brother. He also stated that some people had been bribed by secret agents to cooperate with them, explaining that these people had been swayed by human feelings, relationships, or friendship, or that they

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were ignorant of the brutalities committed against them by spies, or that their political view was narrow.

PANG emphasized that the people should not think of human feelings as far as spies were concerned, because spies usually visit their friends, relatives or acquaintances, making such homes their base of operations. Again he warned, ". . . To be friendly with spies means to cooperate with them, and, whether conscious or unconscious, to cooperate with spies means to commit the same crime . . . Turn your sharp attention also to the small undercurrents of public opinion to determine whether or not they are founded on the enemy's reactionary and sensational rumours; expose these rumours by careful political analysis . . . You must observe the sentiments in your offices in order to bring to light the political causes and to prevent the intrigues of spies and other destructive and harmful persons.

PANG also emphasized that "if the enemy spies could enter the party and government, they would be able to gather state secrets easily and in safety."

PANG urged that the Self-Defense Corps be particularly watchful:

(1) When airplanes fly low in the mountains, wilderness or along the coast where spies can land by parachute or boat, especially after a long bombardment.

(2) For signal fires at night when an enemy plane attacks.

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(3) Around all suspicious areas.

(4) Toward soldiers. Does his uniform fit? What questions does he ask? Are his behaviors and questions soldier-like? Are his belongings and identification authentic?

(5) Toward strangers, especially regarding their identity, occupation, behavior and conversation.

(6) For counterfeit money; when in doubt, immediately notify the nearest authorities.

(7) For suspicious rumours.

As for party members and government officials, PANG suggested the following:

(1) Be watchful for enemy spies trying to participate in the party and government in order to create intrigue there; at present, they have been partially successful.

(2) Keep state affairs secret.

(3) Take the greatest care of state documents.

PANG concluded that the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign cannot be successful until all North Koreans cooperate positively.

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COMMENTS:

1. When the North Korean People's Republic was established, the Home Ministry was set up in the building formerly occupied by the Soviet Russian Special Service Corps. Recently, PANG Hak-se, then

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head of the Political Security Bureau of the Home Ministry, was elevated to Home Minister, replacing a Chinese Communist Korean, PAK Il-u (2613-0001-4416). This indicates that the Soviets did not feel entirely secure in North Korea before they promoted PANG.

In North Korea there are many Communist officials who are still full of Marxian idealism and romanticism, particularly evident in the early revolutionary period, and who have a democratic nature not found in the Soviet Russians or Soviet Koreans. These idealistic Communists, of course, are in contact with Chinese Communist leaders. Thus, the Soviet Russians moved to strengthen their position in North Korea by appointing one of their own citizens to the post of Home Minister.

The Chinese Communists thought they were very powerful when they entered the Korean war, but because of Soviet Russian ascendancy, they are really very weak. At present, Soviet Koreans are the leaders or assistant leaders in all important posts. This situation has caused dissatisfaction to PAK Il-u, who was demoted to Communications Minister; to the Chinese Communist Koreans; and to the Chinese Communist government. PANG Hak-se has the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign as one of his major tasks.

2. PANG's article, particularly his statements quoted on page two of this report, bears out the analyst's statement in another report, that "the strengthening of the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign in North Korea means not only to strengthen the campaign of arresting spies but also to strengthen the NK and Soviet Russian control of political thought, making it possible for the government to accuse all North Koreans as possible spies.

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3. The North Korean government has divided the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign into two branches: (1) arresting spies sent from South Korea and those NK anti-Communists cooperating with them, and (2) preventing spies from obtaining support and aid from the NK populace. Without the NK people's support and new anti-Communists' help, the spies of South Korea could accomplish little and would be arrested sooner or later. Fortunately, however, there are many anti-Communists in North Korea who help the spies, and the Communist leaders realize it, too. They are trying to make the spies stand alone by threatening anti-Communist North Koreans.

4. When spies sent from the free world enter the NK party and governmental organs, or get helpers in these areas, their missions can be regarded as generally successful. In North Korea, Labor Party members are greatly trusted and are not watched; on the contrary they watch the non-party members. Government officials who are not party members also are not watched too closely. The laxity in surveillance of party members and non-Communist government officials is a great weak point in the Anti-Secret Agent Campaign. Spies who become party members thus are trusted without question and are able to carry on their spying in relative safety.

5. To find helpers in the party or government is just as necessary as infiltrating these areas, but it is, of course, very dangerous because it is so difficult to distinguish the anti-Communists from the Communists. One standard of measure in making the dis-

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inction is whether or not the party member retreated to the Abnok River with the Communist army in 1950. Many party members remained in UN-overrun territory despite the Communist order to retreat and, on return of the Communists, were reinstated in their party and government positions. Though they still keep their posts, they are not trusted as much and they complain of this. There is no indication in North Korean newspaper articles that these Communists-who-did-not-retreat are being denounced, but it is presumed that they are nonetheless uneasy.

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THE FLOW OF COMMODITIES IN NORTH KOREA

"Because of the war, the flow of commodities in North Korea has dropped to the level of the early days of Communist rule. Despite our efforts, it is still one of the greatest obstacles to our reconstruction and resettlement program. The commerce of North Korea seems to have degenerated to the capitalistic system, discharging capitalistic poison and producing a capitalistic atmosphere among the people. This situation interferes with the work of infiltrating and solidifying the People's Democracy. KIM Il-sung pointed out this degeneration in the national economy at the fifth meeting of the Central Committee of the NK Labor Party. Under the impact of his speech, the NK Labor Party analysed and pointed out all defects in the work of the Consumers' Co-operative Society (3194/6316/4809/0678), presenting agreeable plans to strengthen its service further."

The above quotation from an editorial in the Minchu Choson (Democratic People's Newspaper) of 4 January 1953 points up the precarious economic position in which the North Korean government finds itself today. It also brings into sharp focus the apparent failure of Marxian economic theory and the Communists' application of it in North Korea. The Minchu Choson editorial also discussed the problems of the Consumers' Co-operative Society's service to the Labor Party during December, 1952. Although the editorial did not state specific defects and plans, more recent editorials and articles in other NK newspapers

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reveal a reasonably accurate picture of the economic situation in North Korea. In order to make that picture understandable, the following analysis of the system of the flow of commodities in North Korea is presented.

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Part I

First of all are the defects in the commodity flow system in North Korea. At the fifth meeting of the Central Committee of the NK Labor Party in December, 1952, KIM Il-sung said:

"In 1952 a great deal of goods were not sold at all because of the high prices in the state-owned stores and the stores of the Consumers' Cooperative Society. All those goods were what the people needed, but they did not sell."

On 2 February 1953 the Minchu Choson published an article by RI Chu-yon (2621/0719/8673), NK Minister of Commerce, in which he stated:

"Although there are many young employes recently hired in the stores of the state and of the Consumers' Cooperative Society, they are not trained to work faithfully for their country and people, not educated to recognize the importance of their tasks . . . Although they endeavor to circulate goods smoothly in order to stabilize the economy and strengthen economic relations between city and country, in reality they have distributed more goods to the cities than to the rural areas, intending thereby to simplify their tasks. They do not take any responsibility for the fact that necessary goods are frequently out of stock.

"Moreover, they get a greater quantity of goods by buying over-produced commodities, disregarding the state's efforts to improve the quality of goods. They account for their action by arguing that they must supply the demand of the laboring force. Particularly, instead of trying to protect the property of the state and the Consumer's Cooperative Society, they say it is inevitable that thievery, cheating, greediness and waste occur in trading. They are inclined to attribute all evils to the state . . . Every defect in the trading of the state and the Consumer's Cooperative Society is caused by the employes in the Commerce Ministry

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who are not well educated politically and who do their jobs poorly, in other words, who are not good enough in planning and in leadership."

CHO Hong-hi, commissioner of the Central Committee of the Consumers' Cooperative Society, pointed out the defects in the work of the Society in the Minchu Choson of 13 February 1953 as follows:

"The task of the Consumers' Cooperative Society, whose members are predominantly farmers, is to provide facilities for the members in getting goods, particularly, to provide them with more industrial goods. Nevertheless, its duties are not discharged fully. . . There is no satisfactory method of transporting goods to remote villages. . . The Society does not bear in mind the consumers' circumstances and needs, but distributes goods with no regularity or logic whatever. The Society's employees have become so partial that they distribute much more goods to the cities than to the rural areas, claiming they must do this because of the inadequate transportation system. As a result, farmers live in constant need of goods while dishonest dealers are getting unreasonable profits. . .

"The Society should make its members improve the service by giving them practical advantages for doing so. But the plan of preferential treatment for Society members has not yet been applied regularly in the stores. Because there is hardly any discrimination between members and non-members, the members do not understand the superior nature of cooperative management. In some stores, goods are sold for a higher price than the ceiling price or net price fixed by the government. By being able to sell part of their stocks in bulk at wholesale, many dealers become dishonest. Furthermore, many customers are forced to buy goods which have been ruined by improper storage and goods which are out-of-season in addition to their necessary purchases. Hard-to-get items are sold over the back gate to friends.

"Because the Society is not able to buy all excess farm produce and side-line farm commodities, much farm produce is sold to speculators or dishonest dealers and ends up in the black market. . . Next, the food canning factories are not administered systematically. People live in want of their necessities, such as sauce, hot sausage, bean curd, and vegetable beans, because the canning factories cannot produce enough. . .

"Since 1948, in all classes of the Society, the representative meeting has not been held regularly. In some cases where it has been held, it was only a formality and no elections were held. Because the meeting for reporting of stores has not been held, members have lost interest and enthusiasm. . . And not once since the Society was founded have the Society's profits been distributed to the shareholding members. . . There still remains much bureaucracy, theivery and greediness in our Society. . . "

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In short, what CHO Hong-hi said was this:

- (1) Commodities traded by the state and by the Consumers' Co-operative Society are distributed largely in the cities with hardly any going to the rural areas.
 - (2) Farmers receive very small quantities of industrial goods, if any at all.
 - (3) The quantity and variety of goods sold in the state and Consumers' Cooperative stores is small; necessities are frequently out of stock.
 - (4) The Communists are unable to control the inflation caused by the war.
 - (5) Sale by allotment, wholesale, private sale, and black marketing, all forbidden by the NK government, are widespread.
 - (6) Surplus farm produce is left in the hands of the farmers because the Consumers' Cooperative Society cannot afford to buy all of it. In cases where it does buy up all of a given product, it does so through intermediate dealers.
 - (7) Food canning factories operated by the Consumers' Cooperative Society are not prosperous and produce very little.
 - (8) The Society's political activity is negligible as evidenced by the fact that the NK people still do not have the cooperative spirit.
 - (9) Bureaucracy and wrong-doing is widespread among the Society's employees because they are poorly trained in political thinking.
- All of the defects pointed out by the Communists in the preceding quotations are superficial treatments of a problem in which the real causes remain concealed. These original difficulties can be seen more clearly in

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a comparison of the present commodity flow system with the pre-1950 system.

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Part II

Like other Soviet satellite countries, pre-1950 North Korea had three kinds of commodity trading: (1) state-operated trading, (2) the Consumers' Cooperative Society's trading, and (3) private trading, or entrepreneurship. All three kinds of economic enterprise were assured of protection and prosperity by the Communist government. This proved to be only propaganda, however, for the first two systems flourished while entrepreneurship diminished.

At the beginning of Communist rule in North Korea, there was no state-operated trading or Consumers' Cooperative Society. With the introduction of Communist economic theory, however, these two forms of economic activity grew so rapidly that by June, 1950, just before the war began, all of the small entrepreneurs in the small towns and rural areas had been forced out of business and only a few in some of the large cities, concerned largely with industrial production, remained. Chart I, below, illustrates their growth.

GROWTH OF THE STATE STORES:

<u>year</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950 (planned)</u>
no. of stores	1	104	558	810	1,052

GROWTH OF CONSUMERS' COOPERATIVE SOCIETY STORES:

<u>year</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950 (planned)</u>
no. of stores	950	1,351	1,655	1,919	2,231

Chart 1

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The state-operated stores and the Cooperative Society's stores were very poor at the beginning of Communist rule. Despite large investments and backing by the state, they could not compete with the privately operated stores because of their inferior management and shortage of goods. Gradually, as state production increased, the state stores began to prosper and soon led the private stores. This was due to the fact that the rate of increase in the operating capital of the state-owned and Cooperative Society's stores far outpaced the rate of increase in the total number of these stores. See Chart II below.

OPERATING CAPITAL OF THE STATE TRADE:

Year	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950 (planned)
NK won	1,853,200,000	1,858,175,000	3,772,592,000	7,225,200,000	10,451,620,000
%	100.00	100.26	203.57	389.87	563.96

OPERATING CAPITAL OF THE COOPERATIVE TRADE:

Year	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950 (planned)
NK won	799,210,000	5,870,843,000	7,837,722,000	8,769,800,000	10,737,880,000

Chart II

The privately-owned and operated stores, on the other hand, were very prosperous in the beginning.

" . . . (The Communist government of North Korea) protected private property and entrepreneurship in order to encourage individual origination in commercial and industrial activities and aid in their development. . . It is anticipated that private enterprise will expand greatly as a result of the tax reduction effected by the income tax law revision of 1 October 1949."

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The above quotation (from the Korean ((NK)) Central Year-book, pp. 297-298) proved to be false propoganda, however. As the state expanded its ownership of the means of production, the entrepreneurs lost their sources of goods and were able to deal only in those few commodities which the state did not handle. Gradually, the Communists forced the entrepreneurs to shut down by buying up commodities, by increasing the personal and corporate income tax, by currency reform which abolished their savings, and by falsely accusing them of crimes and confiscating their property. For these reasons, private enterprise in North Korea before the present war was entirely marginal, existing only in that small segment of the economy not occupied by state enterprise.

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Part III

Although the NK Communist government treats the state-owned commercial organization and the Consumers' Cooperative Society as separate agencies, there is really no difference between them. The government keeps them separate on paper in order to implement its propoganda which endeavors to teach the cooperative idea to the people at home and abroad. The Consumers' Cooperative Society in North Korea has the same form of organization as most cooperatives in capitalistic countries. The Communists stress the cooperative nature of their Society by telling the people that they are helping each other, that they can join the cooperative and gain a share of its profits produced by its efficient operation, and by paying the membership fee. The amount which each member pays for membership is quite small; the greatest part of the cooperative's operating capital is paid out of the state budget. Members are not entitled to any say as to its management. Their representatives do not even operate the

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Society. Its management comes entirely from the government.

Most families are forced by the government to join the Society, but they gain no privileges by joining because there is no discrimination between members and non-members. They buy and sell the same goods for the same prices as in the state-owned stores. The Cooperative in North Korea thus is entirely different from the co-op in capitalistic countries. In reality, it has the same functions as the state-owned segment of the economy, and the NK people know it.

In an article in the Minchu Choson of 4 January 1953, CHO Hong-hi, commissioner of the Central Committee of the Consumers' Cooperative Society said that all defects of the Cooperative were due to lack of the cooperative spirit. This "lack of the cooperative spirit" in the Society's members is nothing new; it is a chronic problem which has been present since the Society was established. The NK Communists, through the services of the Society, are trying to show that cooperative control is superior to private management. According to CHO, it is "very important politically and economically to convert the farmers, who are the small producers, into contractors loyal to the People's Democratic government."

Chart III below illustrates how the state and co-op stores get goods from all the producers in North Korea, and how the entrepreneurs receive goods only from two small producers. The private producers produce small quantities of goods, of which they must hand over a certain proportion, at a low price or rate of valuation, to the government as payment for their raw materials and government "protection." The rest they sell to the entrepreneurs at wholesale. When one considers that the total value of the pro-

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duction of the private producers from 1947 to 1948 was only 20 billion won, while the operating capital of the state-owned and Cooperatives stores in 1948 alone amounted to 120 billion won, it is easy to see how small private enterprise is in North Korea.

FLOW OF COMMODITIES IN NORTH KOREA:




Chart III *Producers Utilizing Semi-Finished Materials. This is the name of an organization and is difficult to translate.

Entrepreneurs also get a small amount of commodities from farmers, for, in some cases, the farmers sell their own excess produce and their side-line produce in the free market, but as a rule, they exchange these commodities at the Cooperative stores for tickets with which they can buy certain necessities. Often, however, these tickets are unobtainable.

Entrepreneurs formerly bought goods at retail prices from the state-owned or cooperative stores and resold them at their own stores.

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For example, sometimes there is plenty of laundry soap available in the state-owned stores. Entrepreneurs buy it at retail and when the state-owned stores have sold all their soap and it becomes scarce, the entrepreneurs begin selling their soap at a higher price than the retail price at which they bought it. Entrepreneurs also sell soap in areas where soap is in demand or in areas where state-owned stores and co-ops are not set up. Thus they obtain their goods by way of utilizing the unbalanced supply of goods which the state-owned stores and co-ops theoretically control.

As for foreign commerce in North Korea, the NK constitution of 8 September 1948 states: "Foreign trade is to be carried on by the state or under the direction of the state." Less than a year later, however, on 18 July 1949, the NK cabinet announced that entrepreneurs in North Korea ". . . have progressed to the point where they can now engage in foreign trade. Many an entrepreneur has already started in this business." (quoted from the Korean ~~NK~~ Central Year-book, p. 298.)

Again, this is just Communist propaganda. No one is allowed to do any foreign trading. Before the present war, there were a few private trading companies in Pyongyang which displayed signs saying they were "corporations." In reality, these companies were state-owned enterprises controlled either by the Central Committee of the Labor Party or by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Their function was to help pay government expenses and to keep the government supplied with foreign currencies and other secret funds. The only trading allowed the private companies was smuggling goods from South Korea, and even then it was very difficult to obtain the government's permission. Furthermore, almost all of what was smuggled in was

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handed over to the state and only a small fraction of the total was displayed in private stores for sale. The state itself engaged in practically no foreign trading whatever.

The fact that the private segment of the economy has been much more restricted in North Korea than in the other Soviet satellites is a significant one. The explanation lies in the 40-year occupation of Korea by the Japanese. Under Japanese rule, either the Japanese government or private Japanese citizens owned all of the big business enterprises, most of the medium-sized businesses, and a smaller part of the small businesses. With the end of World War II, these former Japanese enterprises and even the little businesses of Koreans who had been friendly with the Japanese became state property. Soviet occupation authorities held these enterprises until 1948 when they were turned over to the new puppet NK government. Thus it was exceedingly difficult from the outset for the few privately-owned businesses to compete with the state-owned enterprises under the Communist economic program.

The NK Producers' Cooperative Guild (3932/3934/4809/0678) See Chart III, page 9, this report) expanded rapidly until the outbreak of the present war. However, it was no more a real co-op than the Consumers' Cooperative Society was. And, just as the Consumers' Co-op had invaded private enterprise, so did the Producers' Co-op.

The Producers Utilizing Semi-Finished Materials (see footnote in Chart III, page 9, this report) is controlled directly by the Consumers' Co-op and its products are bought directly by the Consumers' Co-op without any "middle-man."

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Part IV

The pre-1950 state and Cooperative enterprises controlled the market of North Korea under such overwhelmingly advantageous circumstances that private enterprise could not survive. The NK government had its own treasury with which to regulate the flow of commodities as it chose. When the price of goods rose, the Communists controlled it by admitting a new supply of stored-up goods to the market. They bought up excess farm-products and side-line farm products by calling in co-op tickets and exchanging scarce necessities for them. And by gradually decreasing prices, they restored public confidence.

However, when they retreated in 1950 to the Abnok river, the economic system of North Korea was broken down entirely; when they returned in 1951 they were faced with a new situation.

The commodities which the state and co-op enterprises had stored up had been distributed and consumed by the population. There was no possibility of building up a new backlog of goods with which to regulate supply and demand. As a result, the function of the state and co-op stores in the economy was reduced to negligible proportions. Business activity receded to the low level at which the Communists had found it in 1945.

What the Communists found when they returned was an unorganized system of free marketing in which large groups of entrepreneurs traveled from one free market to another seeking higher prices for their goods. A form of bartering existed, in which goods were exchanged for goods owing to the instability of the monetary system. When goods were exchanged occasionally for money, the exchange value of rice was taken as the standard of value.

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Most of the NK government officials bought their own necessities in the free market and, for the first year after their return from the north, the NK economy remained unchanged. Although the state and Co-op stores were re-opened, there was not enough goods to stock them.

However, the Communists realized they could not leave the economic situation as it was indefinitely, because it was antithetical to their program of reconstructing their People's Democratic Order. The atmosphere created by the free markets endangered the careful indoctrination of the people in Communist ideology.

With the opening of the truce talks and the stabilization of the fighting front, the Communists determined to restore the economic system which had been disrupted. Forthwith, a few state and Co-op stores were re-opened and the Producers' Cooperative Guild managed to produce some goods with which the stores were stocked. But these newly-reestablished stores did not intend to supply goods to the general public and lowest possible prices. Their prime function was to distribute necessities to government officials and laborers -- work clothes, shoes, salt, and matches. Sometimes the lower classes could not even buy a pair of shoes. The price of such distributed goods was much cheaper than the free market price, but the amount available was extremely small. These goods were closely watched by the Communist officials so as to make certain that they did not find their way into the free market.

State-and Cooperative-controlled wholesalers provided state-and Cooperative-controlled retailers with the commodities of both the state-and Cooperative-controlled producers and the private producers. These

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commodities were sold freely by the state-and Cooperative-controlled retailers at prices which were sometimes higher, sometimes lower than the free market price. The higher prices were due to the higher production costs of the Producers' Cooperative Guild and mismanagement and corruption at the wholesale warehouses.

In the Minchu Choson of 19 February 1953, AN Ki-song, commissioner of the Central Committee of the Producers' Co-op, wrote:

"Our Producers' Cooperative Guild is producing goods of inferior quality without anticipating consumer needs in wartime. Many members of the Producer's Co-op do not try their best to produce the amount and variety of goods estimated by the government. Instead, they produce things out of whatever raw materials are available, without regard to what is needed by the people and without regard to production costs. They are bent only on making the most profit for themselves."

Kim Il-sung explained the high production costs of the Producers' Cooperative Guild at the fifth meeting of the Central Committee of the Labor Party in December, 1952, as follows:

"The Producers' Cooperative Guild is still producing goods of bad quality and goods which are not needed. The government and the Central Committee of the Producers' Guild are indifferent to these problems and leave them to work themselves out. . . In 1952 there were goods piled mountain high in the state-and Cooperative-owned stores -- goods which were never sold because of the high price but which were desperately needed by the people."

Although KIM Il-sung states above that these goods were "desperately needed by the people," it would seem that if they were really needed by the people they would have been sold regardless of the price, for real necessities are in great demand in North Korea. In order to reduce these inventories, the Communists cut prices and then praised and exaggerated this arrangement in the Minchu Choson for 10 December 1952 as follows:

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"The NK government, which is always thinking of the people's welfare, has reduced the prices of unsold commodities in the state-and Cooperative-owned stores by 20 to 50 per cent. Because of the brotherly aid of the Great Soviet Union, China, and other neighboring countries, and because of the democratic policies of the NK government, the flow of commodities has expanded and become smooth. For this reason, the price of home industrial goods has fallen from 20 to 30 per cent, compared with what it was last year. Moreover, a good crop of farm commodities has brought farm prices strikingly low this year.

"In view of these circumstances, the NK government has resolutely cut the price of wholesale goods in the hands of state and Cooperative-owned stores. In order to carry out this task satisfactorily, the government has organized a Price Regulating Committee... Under our new policy, the people can live in more ease and comfort than ever before. The productive organs will produce more goods, and the flow of commodities will operate smoothly."

As KIM states above, the state and Cooperative stores are supplied with goods of poor quality which are priced both higher and lower than the free market price.

If the goods are sold in great quantity at low prices, these stores can control the rising prices in the free market. In truth, however, they never have a great quantity of goods. It is because of this fact, according to the NK Minister of Commerce, that the present flow of commodities in North Korea has so many defects - forced buying (requiring consumers to buy high priced goods before they can buy low priced goods), illegal wholesaling (selling state-and Cooperative-owned goods to entrepreneurs at wholesale prices), and black marketing.

Owing to the small quantity of goods available for sale, the state and Co-op stores do not prosper. The NK government therefore permits them to engage in the same activities as are practiced by the entrepreneurs -- buying goods in the free market and selling them in their own stores. Occasionally, they even buy goods from the entrepreneurs at wholesale prices and sell them at prices lower than the free market. They also buy goods

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in areas where the prices are low and transport them to areas where the prices are high. Recently the state and Co-op stores have acquired trucks for this purpose which gives them a distinct advantage over the entrepreneurs.

As a result of the new wholesale buying activity of the state and Co-op stores, RI Chu-yon, NK Minister of Commerce, was moved to state in his article of 2 February 1953 in the Minchu Choson: "Most of the employees of the Consumers' Cooperative Society are beginning to mistake the Society for a trading organ."

Indeed, that seems to be exactly the case. The free market has apparently grown so large that the state and Co-op stores must now exert pressure on its price level by buying and selling commodities in bulk at wholesale prices.* However, this application of a capitalistic device by the North Korean Communists is undoubtedly fostering a capitalistic spirit among the NK populace. The extent of its effect will be clearly seen if the Communists attempt to abolish the free market.

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Part V

Three years have passed since the Korean War began. Today the state and Cooperative controlled trade of North Korea has lost its sources of supply and has degenerated to a position of small importance in the NK economy. In fact, its existence is barely evident because of the enormous

* This system seems to be equivalent to the operations of the United States government in the commodity exchanges throughout the United States -- buying wheat, for example, at parity prices in sufficient quantity to effect the general price level, then selling it at whatever price is necessary later to adjust the general price level to parity prices, or even holding it in storage in order to keep it off the market and thereby raise the general price level -- Ed.

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growth of the free market and the entrepreneurs. Those merchants who were financial giants before the war have become discontented peddlers following at the heels of the entrepreneurs in the free market. The influence of the state and the Consumers' Cooperative Society on the free market has been reduced almost to nothing.

Said CHO Hong-hi, commissioner of the Central Committee of the Consumers' Co-op, in his article in the Minchu Choson of 13 February 1953:

"According to the changing circumstances of the war, we must organize our work systematically and make goods circulate smoothly. At present they follow the rising free market prices, and our employees are satisfied with the profits they gain. They are obstructing our efforts to reduce free market prices organically."

The fact that the state and Co-op stores exist only in the cities is due to the fact that rural transportation is so scarce and costly. It is to be anticipated that the Communists will endeavor to establish state and Co-op stores in rural areas, but it is not likely that they will prosper for there is simply not enough merchandise to supply stores in both city and country. Occasionally, the Communists have sent mobile stores (trucks carrying merchandise) to the country, but this seems to have been primarily a propaganda move because the farmers' welfare has not improved.

The Communists also point out considerable wrong-doing on the part of ~~workers~~ in the state and Co-op stores. Disloyal employees seem to be easily tempted to make personal profits. It is said that there are only two classes of people who have money in present-day North Korea: the employees in the state and Co-op stores, and the entrepreneurs. Such wrong-doing will not be rooted out until the NK economy goes back to its pre-1950 status.

Today the state and Co-op stores in North Korea, which ought to be the artery of the People's Democratic Republic, have become trading

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organs motivated by self-interest. Their capitalistic practices are negating efforts of the NK regime to indoctrinate the people in Communism. Even government officials are being tempted to enrich themselves -- by misappropriating public funds, and by stealing state property.

The Communists have made great efforts at diagnosing their economic troubles, but their policy of correcting the troubles has been entirely negative. It will be many years after the war ends before the factories and production centers of North Korea are able to supply consumer demand with goods.

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FACTS BEHIND THE CURRENT NK POLITICAL PURGE

The Hwasong Ilbo, dated 20 February 1953, reprinted an editorial of the Notong Sinmun (Labor Press) on the theme "Only Open-Hearted Elements Shall Have a Place in our Rank and File". The editorial reads as follows:

"In his speech at the Fifth Plenary Conference of the Presidium Council, Comrade KIM Il-sung warned that, although there was no sectarian thought within the Party, there may be remnants of sectarianism interfering with the unity of the Party. Comrade KIM then spoke the following words of instruction: 'All Party members should enhance revolutionary awakening and Party spirit in order to guard against sectarian elements. We must fight to prevent the advancement of such activities within the Party, especially at this time, when we are engaged in a severe war with the American and British imperialistic military invaders, we cannot tolerate any sectarian acts....'"

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"The minority sectarian Party leaders are CHU Yong-ha, (2612/1360/3109) RIM Hwa, (2651/0735) KIM Nam-ch'on, (6855/0589/1131) CHO Il-myong and their comrades. These men, far from relying on the Party by following the Party lines and Party policies, boast of their own intelligence in an effort to satisfy the appetite of their personal glory. They have libeled Party policies and the Party central authority, and have behaved as though they were the biggest and the cleverest personages (in the Party). At the same time, they combined other elements with selfish tendencies, impure revolutionaries, various malcontents and ex-convicts, pulling young Party members to their side, to perform dirty deeds....in an attempt to effeminate the capacities of our steellike, unified Party. But the Party will not socially and politically embrace these men forever.

"The Party magnanimously embraces a member who faithfully performs his duties and makes sacrifices for the benefit of the Party and the revolution, no matter how dark his past life may have been. The Party loves and respects one who frankly confesses his sins before the Party and takes an oath to perform his duties faithfully. But the Party would never forgive those who do not confess their criminal acts of conceiving treacherous thoughts and who plan to deceive the Party by performing anti-partisan and anti-nationalistic acts.

"All dishonest and hidden sectarian elements are now being exposed before the tribunal of the Fifth Plenary Conference of the Presidium Council which is now in progress.... At the recent Pyongyang City Party Plenary Conference, the Confessors, RIM Hwa, YI Chae-woo, and others failed to show their honesty and open-heartedness before the Party. Instead of frankly confessing his dirty preliberation life and his anti-partisan and

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anti-nationalistic crimes in post-liberation days, begging for mercy and swearing that he would improve his behavior, RIM Hwa did not speak about the thoughts behind his acts and creative works of the past. He made only a roundabout statement -- a false speech, 'I committed Rightist acts; the results of my work proved so; I could hardly rely on the Party, etc.'

As for CHU Yong-ha, in spite of strict Party criticism about his sectarianism, he did not confess his sins before the Party. Instead, he ignored Party policies and the Party line nonchalantly. Still worse, he did not give up his fight against the Central Party authorities, and is still harboring a revengeful resolution to fight until the bitter end. He is a model for sectarianism. His thought is not only based on the local patriotism for the North or the South,* but also on his lack of confidence in the Party line, Party policies, and the Central Party authorities. The words 'North' and 'South' are used by the sectarians as a camouflage to screen off their anti-partisan and anti-nationalistic activities.... For those who do not speak straight before the Party and employ trickery, there is no place in our Party."

The Hwanghae Ilbo, dated 25 March 1953, published an article entitled "The Fifth Plenary Conference of the Presidium Council -- Yonan County Party Devotees' Conference". The article appears below:

* This is presumably a reference to factional strife between original members of the NKLP and those communists who started out as members of the SKLP. It is believed that CHU Yong-ha was originally a member of the SKLP. RIM Hwa is in this category. He was at one time, in North Korea, in charge of publishing pamphlets to be disseminated in South Korea; he later became an editor of the Korean-Russian Culture (newspaper). -- Ed.

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"...Some elements of liberalism and individualistic heroism, lacking Party spirit, advocate personal honor and private interest above those of the Party and revolution. They dare to possess unprincipled individuality and local patriotism for the 'North' or the 'South'. They disobey Party rules and Party decisions, and they are lax in their duties.

KIM Ki-yon, ex-Chief of the Paymaster's Section of the Yonan Brewery, neglected State business and, blinded by covetousness, he expropriated a large amount of State property. He claimed to be an experienced underground fighter in South Korea; he overrode the decisions of the Brewery manager; he distinguished between the Northerners and the Southerners in the Brewery, paying exorbitant wages to the Southerners giving them extra economic benefits to rally them around him and to cover his most dishonest acts; and, above all, he boycotted the manager.

"YI Sung-ok, ex-Chief of the Yonan Middle School Disbursement Office, relying on his former Southern compatriots who are sitting in responsible positions of the County Committee, pays no homage to his superiors. He is lax in the performance of his duties and vaguely accounts for the disposition of official funds. When the school principal, Comrade YI Ki-ho, investigated the matter, YI Sung-ok shouted: 'If I speak to the Chairman of the County People's Committee, your head will soon roll!' In this manner, he attempted to cultivate a sectarian spirit at the School.

"The anti-partisan, sectarian tendencies of these men became clearer with the testimony of YI Ki-ho. These men often complained, 'The Party doesn't know our merits; when the time comes we shall rise in the world, etc.'" Thus, they are irresponsible in their positions and yet seek higher official rank on the basis of self-appraisal.

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"A group of the (Yonan) County top managers, including the Chairman of the County People's Committee, comrade YI Yong-sun, shielded anti-partisan elements such as YI Sung-ok. These men are the captives of her-ism and ambition; they are lovers of flattery. At the (Yonan County Party Devotees') Conference, the most enthusiastic Party members severely criticized the deeds of those anti-partisan elements as the off-springs of petty-bourgeois thoughts which boast selfishly of one's powers."

The Hwanghae Ilbo, dated 24 March 1953, printed an article entitled "The Fifth Plenary Conference of the Presidium Council -- the Haeju City Party Devotees' Meeting". Extracts of the article appear below:

"At this meeting, the most important question which was discussed.... was 'a certain group of selfish anti-partisan elements....' Some Party members who are lacking in Party spirit become occupied with securing selfish, materialistic privileges as soon as they are appointed to respon-sible posts in State or Party organizations. Forgetting all Party and revolutionary aims, these men commit national crimes by seeking personal profits and performing untoward deed that alienate the masses.

"A model of bureaucracy and corruptness is KWON Yong-paek, former Chairman of (Haeju) City People's Youth Committee, who was notorious in his evil-doings, exciting the indignation of all Party members. As the Chairman of the City People's Youth Committee, KWON was in the respon-sible position of training, organizing and mobilizing the youth on the home front as the Party's reserve battalions. But, far from devoting himself to these activities, his eyes became red hot for personal profits and he misappropriated more than 120,000 won that had been contributed by

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patriotic youths of Haeju for the purchase of weapons. He also wasted State grains, which he illegally obtained, and he seized relief goods. Thus, he committed the most corrupt of crimes...

"Another politically corrupt phenomenon, utterly lacking in Party spirit and characterizing the old ideological residue, can be seen in the case of a middle-school principal by the name of Comrade KIM Won-rim. Having been corrupted in his political thinking, ... neglecting his duties, he spent more than 70 per cent of his daily life mingling and drinking with politically unreliable persons. As a result, the discipline of his school teachers slackened, producing politically unhealthy students....

"The former Head of Samiri Village, YI Tong-ho, is equally corrupt in his deeds. Misusing the authority of his position, he collected from the village people all kinds of imposts such as the 15 August entertainment fee, the police-box captain farewell meeting fee, and the 8 February entertainment fee, personally pocketing this money. Moreover, he promised several politically unreliable persons admittance into the Labor Party and then consumed the 'commission money'.... And he delayed the formation of the Party cell in his village, in order to conceal his criminal deeds....

"The Secretary-General of the City Fatherland Front, Comrade CHOE Kun-hak, loved official fame and had no sense of responsibility for his duties.... When the Party headquarters called on him, he absented himself with various alibis. Comrade CHON did not attend cell meetings for four months, and to the invitation to attend the 'theory lecture meeting' of the Party, he falsely replied: 'Another more important meeting prevents me from attending...' He always complained about his duties, but never presented any proposals on Party organization. He goes on drinking sprees, and when he is drunk, he bellows, 'The Party is only making use of me !

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I have been in Haeju too long! I am sick of it!' As was brought out by the evidence at the devotees' meeting, he lived a life of strong self-conceit and ultra-liberalism, thinking that he will certainly become a big man since he hails from the laborers' class.

"Another example of liberalism and individualistic thinking is Comrade KIM Ok-kyong, the Deputy Postmaster.... Comrade KIM, since he was Chairman of his Cell Committee at the Electric Power Supply Station, has conceived petty bourgeois ideas. To this day, he has not resigned these thoughts. Even while he was Deputy Postmaster, he wanted to become a 'petty king', boycotting the Postmaster by carrying on sectarian activities and causing the development of factions among the postal employees which surrounded him and the Postmaster. Thus, he injured the unity of the Party.... At the Conference, Comrade KIM Ok-kyong did not properly criticize himself about his defective thinking, but he artfully confessed, 'I stick to Party principles in the performance of my duties -- that's why some weak Party-comrades reported me to the Party Headquarters.' He tried to deceive the Party by pretending that he has the best Party spirit.

"At the Devotees' Conference, severe criticism was directed at Comrade YI Uk-kw^{an}, ex-Police Chief of Haeju, and his fellow-policemen.... These men neglected their responsibilities of strengthening the counter-intelligence effort, and their responsibilities of securing State secrets and invigorating police discipline. Furthermore, these men indulged in pleasures and merriments which cannot be allowed under present wartime conditions....

ANALYST'S COMMENTS:

1. In the foregoing quotations, those persons whose names are

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not prefixed with the title "Comrade" are considered to have been purged.

(In this report, all such names have been underscored. — Ed)

2. The Hwanghae Ilbo, is the only North Korean newspaper which contains many facts relative to the current purge, particularly among the lower echelons of the Party and government.

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NK REORGANIZATION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS

The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korea Democratic People's Republic on 22 December 1952 promulgated the following government decrees concerning the reorganization of the local administrative system in North Korea:

1. Decrees reorganizing local administrative districts.
2. Decree concerning the establishment of Laborer's Districts
3. Government-adopted resolutions regarding the execution of these decrees.

These decrees provided that the Myon (面) be abolished; that the areas presently comprising Province (道), City (市), County (郡), Myon and Ri (里) be subdivided; that Ri's be combined and extended; that Laborer's Districts be established in various Ri's where factories, mines and fishing villages are located; and that the Ub (邑) (meaning "town") be established at the center of every County.

At the core of this reorganization plan, the government organized the Central Guiding Committee; the Provincial Executive Committee was established on the provincial level. These new bodies were made responsible for organizing and guiding the reorganization of the local administrative districts, such as determining the demarcation lines between districts, and supervising the work of the Organizing Committees of the newly established Counties, Ri's, Ub and Districts. (See "NOTES" on last page of this study.)

As a result of this reorganization, Counties increased from 91 to 168. Ri's were combined and their number decreased from 10,120 to 3,659. In addition, 168 Ub's were established at the center of each

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County. And 41 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The following is a breakdown of each province, showing all additions and deletions made in the local administrative districts.

1. Pyongan Namdo:

The original 14 counties were subdivided into a total of 27 counties. The original 1,909 Ri's were readjusted to 618. Newly added were 27 Ub's (County towns) and 6 Laborer's Districts.

The additional 13 counties are:

Un San (은산)	Puk Ch'ang (북창)	Sin Yang (신양)
Hoe Ch'ang (회창)	Sung Ho (송호)	Sang Won (상원)
Kang Nam (강남)	On Ch'on (온천)	Chung San (중산)
Suk Ch'on (숙천)	Mun Dok (문덕)	Tae Hung (대흥)
Sun An (순안)		

2. Pyongan Pukto:

The original 13 Counties were subdivided into 26 Counties and the original 1,694 Ri's were readjusted to 603. Besides, 26 Ub's and 4 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The newly established 13 Counties are:

Ch'on Ma (천마)	Hyang San (향산)	Yom Chu (영주)
Ch'ong Song (청성)	Tong Nim (동림)	Kwak San (곽산)
Un Chon (운전)	Ku Chang (구장)	Puk Chin (북진)
Tae Kwan (대관)	Tong Ch'ang (동창)	U Si (우시)
P'i Hyon (피현)		

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3. Hyanghae Do:

The original 19 Counties were subdivided into 33 Counties and the 2,121 Ri's were readjusted to 704 Ri's. In addition, 33 Ub's and 7 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The newly established 14 Counties are:

Chang Dan	(창단)	Kang Ryong	(강령)	Pae Ch'on	(배천)
Rin San	(린산)	T'io San	(로산)	Un P'a	(운파)
Sin Won	(신원)	T'ae T'an	(태탄)	Ryong Yon	(룡연)
Sam Ch'on	(삼천)	Un Ch'on	(운천)	Yon T'an	(연탄)
Yon San	(연산)	Sin P'yong	(신평)		

4. Kangwon Do:

The original 10 Counties were subdivided into 15 Counties and the 1,135 Ri's were decreased to 397. Besides, 15 Ub's and 3 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The five new Counties are:

Chon Nae	(천내)	Ko San	(고산)	P'an Kyo	(판교)
Kum Kang	(금강)	Pah Dong	(백동)		

5. Hamgyong Namdo:

The original 14 Counties were subdivided into 30 and the 1,924 Ri's were readjusted to 690. Besides, 30 Ub's and 12 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The newly established 16 Counties are:

T'oe Cho	(퇴조)	O Ro	(오로)	Sin Sang	(신상)
In Hung	(인홍)	Yo Dok	(오덕)	Su Dong	(수동)
Sin P'o	(신평)	Sin Chang	(신창)	Tok Song	(덕성)
Ho Ch'on	(허천)	P'ung So	(풍서)	Rang Rim	(랑림)

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Pu Chon (부전) Sin Pa (신평) Po Ch'on (보천)

6. Hamgyong Pukto:

The original 12 Counties were subdivided to 19 and the 718 Ri's were readjusted to 353. Besides, 19 Ub's and 5 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The additional 7 counties are:

Hwa Tae (하대) Yong An (영안) O Rang (어랑)
Sam Sa (삼사) Yon Sa (연사) Yu Son (유선)
Ung Ki (웅기)

7. Cha Kang Do

The original 8 Counties were subdivided into 16 and the 517 Ri's were readjusted to 261. Besides, 16 Ub's and 4 Laborer's Districts were newly established.

The 8 new Counties are:

Si Chung (시중) Chung Kang (중강) Hwa P'yong (하평)
Song Kan (성간) Ryong Rim (룡림) Song Won (송원)
Ko P'ung (고풍) Tong Sin (동신)

8. Kaesong Area.

The original one county was subdivided into 2 and 81 Ri's were readjusted to 33. Besides, 2 were newly established.

The newly established County is P'an Mun (판문).

9. Pyongyang City

The original 21 Ri's were readjusted to 13 farm-village Ri's.

(The foregoing was extracted from the 30 January 1953 issue of the Min Chu Cho Sun.)

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HAN Kuk-mo, in an article printed in the Min Chu Cho Sun of 8 January 1953, sets forth the following reasoning behind the reorganization of the North Korean local administrative districts:

"These government decrees purport to abolish the Myon from the local administrative system, to subdivide and adjust Counties, establish new Counties, to reorganize, combine and readjust the presently crowded Ri's....in order to eliminate the irregularities of the present local administrative system and the lines of demarcation between districts, to place the supervisory organs of the People's Government more closely to the people, to enable the people to participate more directly and to a greater extent in the management of activities, and to execute the Party and State directives more quickly....

"Especially at the time of the war for the liberation of our Fatherland....the People's Government is confronted with the task.. of mobilizing all strength and domestic resources in order to achieve ultimate victory. In order to meet this task, the People's Government has to strengthen to a greater degree its ties with the masses... Premier KIM Il-sung, in his historical February Address, said that 'In order to win victory we must better organize and mobilize all domestic resources and strength..... To this end, we must bolster the strength of the People's Committees....which are to organize all domestic activities.....

"Our People's Government, in the process of executing its duties, calls for the people's active participation.... and carries

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out its tasks through the local organs of government. The former system of local government organs and local administrative districts required reorganization in order to conform with the State system to enforce directives emanating from the people. The former local administrative system was organized during the colonial reign of the Japanese imperialists....

"The existence of the Myon in the system of local administration obstructed the superior State organs from servicing the subordinate organs with direct guidance; the will of the wide masses of the people was not quickly reflected in the government; and the Myon obstructed the promulgation of government directives.

"The excessive subdividing of Ri districts has constituted obstacles to the development of the work of the Ri People's Committees, the elementary government organs, and has greatly hindered the organizing and executing among the masses of directives of the People's Government...

"At the same time, we intend to strengthen the Ri People's Committee by increasing the number of paid officials and by assigning officials with experience in administration to these organs. We intend also to place government organs as close to the people as possible, to introduce greater segments of the population to State management, to facilitate the guidance of the central organs of the People's Government over the local government organs.....

"Premier KIM Il-sung said in his historical address, 'One

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must know when the duties of the Ri People's Committee are well carried out... and when the work of the Ri People's Committee is badly carried out....."

As to the "irregularities" of the original local administrative systems and districts, KIM Se-chin, in an article printed in the Kaesong News on 26 January 1953, states:

"The original local administrative system, since local units were divided into many gradations, constituted an obstacle in reaching the organs close to the bottom with the directives of the State, weakening and dispersing these directives.

"...The Myon was nothing but an intermediate liaison organ (between the County and the Ri), whose task it was to reproduce and disseminate the directives of the County and to (report) the status of the Ri's to the County. Therefore, the existence of the Myon was an obstacle between the County and the Ri....Besides, from the standpoint of organization, the Myon could be regarded as a bureaucratic organ whose many officials would impose heavy burdens on a few Ri officials who worked directly among the people.

"Let us examine the original district demarcations. The Japanese imperialists inherited...what the YI Dynasty feudal bureaucrats left behind, substantially adopting the feudal administrative system except for some reorganization made for the convenience of the (Japanese) colonial reign. Districts were marked off according to natural geography alone, without consideration for

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the living of the people, deliberately ignoring natural features, customs....

"Consequently, districts were by far unequally demarcated; some counties had 268 Ri's while others had only 23 Ri's. Some Ri's had a population of more than 5,000 while others had less than 100. Generally speaking, Counties were too wide and Ri's were too small. In Myong Won County, Pyong Nam Province, the farthest Ri from the center of the County was 78 miles away. The fact that Counties were too wide made it difficult for the County to offer guidance to farm villages and prevented the County from approaching the people.

"That the Ri's were too sharply subdivided created difficult conditions for the Ri People's Committees....prohibiting the formation of social organizations and not conforming to the economic foundation of the Republic, that is, the maintenance of small, privately-owned farms."

KIM Se-ghin, in his article, also referred to the establishment of Laborer's Districts and County Towns (Ub's):

"Laborer's Districts were established since factory, mine, fishing-village and forest regions, where most people live on wages and salaries, are different from farm-village Ri's in both economic construction and in composition of population.

"Since the center of a County is the center of politics, economy, and culture of a County, this center is called "Ub"

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(County Town)....to be distinguished from farm-village Ri's and town Ri's of cities and towns....

YI Hi-chun, Chief of the Bureau of Personnel Affairs of the Cabinet, published the following article in the Min Chon Cho Sun on 3 January 1953:

"Today, when the reorganization plan.....is being carried out, it becomes one of the most important tasks of the Government to appoint to and place officials in the reorganized administrative organs on all levels...

"Needless to say, officials are the decisive elements of guiding the work of the State, and whether the duties of the State are well carried out is dependent on them. Therefore, if one wants to attain the results expected from the reorganization of local administrative districts....officials must be indoctrinated properly. The great Lenin taught us that once a political course was fixed, officials decided everything.....

"Workers who have a good reputation among the local people are familiar with the actual local situation, are well-trained and prepared through experience, and must be appointed as officials on the County and Ri levels.

"In order to appoint officials properly, one must know the prospectives very well. And to know a man well, it is not sufficient to meet him one or two times or to make inquiry about him by looking into the records....Therefore, we must cease referring

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to office registers and following the bureaucratic system of appointing officials through a formal investigation, neglecting meanwhile to conduct a thorough investigation of the political quality and ability of the man concerned....

"Officials are always chosen by their political qualities and capacities, and consideration must be made as to whether a man is prepared to fight as a loyal servant of the Party, the State and the people. And one must be fully aware of his ties with the masses, his revolutionary vigilance, his quality, his capacity and his class and political preparedness.

"After officials have been selected...the task of placing them must also be given due consideration.

"Especially important in the field of personnel affairs are the problems of increasing the ability and quality of the officials to guide (subordinate organs) and the filling of vacancies with loyal officials willing to work to the advantage of the Party and the State....

"In order to strengthen the local administrative organs, officials who are selected must be trained and prepared for their work.

"The former existence of the Myon and the minute subdivisions of the Ri required a large number of officials, but the necessity of increasing the quality of the officials and indoctrinating them were neglected. Since the present reorganization is being carried out with the aim of strengthening the Ri particularly, it is

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essential to train and prepare a great number of officials immediately. Training and indoctrination of officials will, on the one hand, enable the officials to learn the business with which they are charged and will, on the other hand, raise their level of scientific political knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.

Before analysing the reorganization plan of the North Korean Government let us briefly refer to the political and social background which forced the Communists to reorganize their local administrative system.

Since the Communist holders of administrative power of North Korea returned from their period of "temporary retreat," the North Korean situation, in a word, has been in a state of utter turmoil. In Government organs, in State enterprises, in the Party and in social organizations, "bureaucratic" and "formalistic" tendencies prevailed among officials. "Corruption" and "waste" in wide varieties were evident. Particularly noticeable was the corruption of the officials of the elementary government organs, who came into direct contact with the people. These officials neglected their duties, failing to execute State directives properly, and indulging in usurpation, stealing, bribery and waste.

Under these circumstances, the people of North Korea became dissatisfied with and antipathetic toward the Communist government and the Labor Party. The fact that the people turned their backs on the Regime created tremendous obstacles to national material and spiritual mobilization which is necessary during periods of war.

In an effort to win the sentiments of the people to their side, the Communist holders of administrative power enacted a "war-time law" to

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straighten out administrative, financial and labor regulations. At the same time they launched the "anti-bureaucracy" campaign in the hope to reduce the corruption and waste of officials. These measures were an apparent failure, hence, the new reorganization plan of the government was formulated. The real motive for this plan was inspired primarily by the failure of the former enactments to surrender control of the North Korean administration and people into the hands of the Communists.

As they have themselves acknowledged, the North Korean Communists are confronted more than ever with the urgent necessity of mobilizing all resources and strength for the sake of executing the war. To this end, government officials should regard their functions with due importance, carrying out their tasks efficiently and expediently. This was not the case in North Korea, however. As mentioned above, important "State directives" were not being properly executed due to the selfishness and irresponsibility of the officials, especially those of the elementary local organs.

The object of the reorganization plan is to abolish the Myon, subdivide the County and to extend the Ri; to eliminate "disloyal" officials of elementary organs; and to appoint class-conscious, thoroughly indoctrinated, trained and experienced officials, loyal to the Labor Party and Communist government. This reorganization plan, which in reality covers a larger area than merely the readjustment of lines of demarcation, is an attempt on the part of the Communist leaders to achieve increased control over the administration of North Korea and its people for the sake of the war effort.

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In this connection, Min Kuk-no, in the above-mentioned article, stated: "The organs of the People's Government are excellently playing the role of organizer, responding to the call of Premier Kim Il-sung, 'Offer all for victory,' strengthening supply lines to the front, consolidating the rear, mobilizing the people toward victory."

The secondary object of the reorganization plan is to win over popular sentiment, which has been turning away from the Labor Party and the Communist Government, by purging from State positions officials who constitute a threat to the "property of the State and the people."

In an article written by Yu Kyong-ryo, printed in the Min Chon Chon Sun on 13 February 1953, the results of this reorganization are noted:

"The reorganization of the local administrative system and districts ... was accomplished more quickly than was expected... under the efficient organizing and guidance of the executive committees of every province and the newly-established organizing committees of all local levels, all led by the Executive Central Guiding Committee.

"We have built the basis for the expeditious dissemination among the people of Party and government directives,...."

"Needless to say, the People's Government has been strengthened and the ties with the people better consolidated by this reorganization..."

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In spite of the "efficient organizing and guidance" of the government, the reorganization cannot be said to have achieved the anticipated results. YU (Yong-ryo) states the following in his article:

"But the reorganization of local administrative districts alone cannot wipe out in a short time the contradictions and irregularities of the past. The anticipated effects of this reorganization can be produced only by continued efforts."

In the process of eliminating the "contradictions and irregularities" inherent in the old local administrative system. Yu continues, other defects have emerged.

Important tasks that were to be accomplished concurrently with the implementation of the reorganization plan were either neglected or poorly carried out. Such work, YU complained in his article were left undone under the pretext of carrying out the reorganization plan. The production of straw materials and the purchasing of meat were inadequately fulfilled as compared with the accomplishments of last winter. The same holds true with regard to the preparatory work concerned with spring seeding and farming.

The securing of good seed, the repair of farm implements, the production of self-supply fertilizer, the provision for the lack of cattle and human labor, the disposition of unattended farmlands, the meetings held to exchange farming techniques to assist in the advancement of farming -- all these, YU reveals, were poorly carried out.

Some of the People's Committees, especially that of Kang So County (Pyong Nam Province), did not formulate an executive plan of

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lacking guidance this year and did not take concrete steps to solve the overwhelming lack of wheat seed this spring. The State has authorized the loaning of money to farmers through the Peasants Bank, but the Counties have made only small efforts to provide the peasants with loans.

YU continues: In assuming the work of the former officials, the new appointees did not recognize the political and economic significance of the unsolved problems and the unfinished business which they inherited. In many instances, the new officials gave cursory attention to pending matters conducting this work haphazardly.

The outgoing People's Committee of Chung-Hua County, for example, did not clearly inform the incoming officials of the disposition of state-owned cattle. In some regions, the dismissed officials did not give accurate accounts of the quantity of tax grains collected and the amount of rice "donated" by the people, leaving behind a state of confusion for the new officials to cope with.

The settlement of government debts with the people, YU writes, formed a major task for the newly-appointed officials. In some regions, these debts were given only secondary attention by the officials conducted this task illegally, thereby weakening the faith of the people in the Government and giving the people cause to complain.

Some newly-appointed officials, the article continues, have expressed dissatisfaction over the posts to which they are assigned; and as a result, minor sabotage has taken place. The major object, YU explains, for the reorganization is to expand the role of the RI People's Committees and to improve the quality of its work. Therefore, important officials from the County and the former Myon levels were reassigned

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to the Ri. Unable to fully recognize the reasons for such reassignment, some officials of the People's Committees of Pyongan Pukto and Hwanghae Do regarded their transfer to the Ri level as a demotion and consequently have not displayed an active spirit and enthusiasm toward their work.

YU Kyong-ryo's account of the success thus-far met with the re-organization plan is self-explanatory. Many cases of insincerity, irresponsibility, corruption, dissatisfaction, etc., have been and are taking place. Needless to say, these factors are harmful to the Communist retention of power and execution of the war.

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NOTES:

The County Organizing Committee is the abridged name for the Organizing Committee of XX County People's Committee. Similarly, the Ri (Ub, Laborer's District) Organizing Committee is the abridged name for the Organizing Committee of XX Ri (XX Ub, XX Laborer's District) People's Committee.

Organizing Committees on all levels are temporary and will be replaced by People's Committees at the various local levels when they are officially elected and organized under the Provincial People's Committee.

The County Organizing Committee consists of 11 to 15 members who are representatives of political parties* and social organizations, leading officials of government organs, and enthusiastic workers and peasants of the County. This body is appointed, approved and organized by the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Committee.

The Ri (Ub, Laborer's Districts) Organizing Committee consists of 7 to 9 members. The respective County People's Committee and County Organizing Committee nominate these members, and the Provincial People's Committee ultimately approves their appointment. The members of this body are representatives of political parties, social organizations and enthusiastic workers and peasants.

SOURCE: Min Chu Cho Sun, 8 January 1953, article

"Questions and Answers Concerning the Reorganization of Local Administrative Districts")

*The other political parties in NK, besides the NKLP, are the Choson Minchu Tang (2600-7639-3046-0031-7825) and the Ch'ontokyo Ch'ongutang (1131-6670-2403-7230-0645-7825) which are fronts for the NKLP. The leaders of these parties are Communists.

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N O R T H K O R E A N P R E S S S U M M A R Y

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Editor : CHONG Kuk-rok

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1. MALENKOV'S SPEECH AT FOURTH MEETING OF SUPREME SOVIET. . .
(PHOTO OF MALENKOV APPEARS)
2. UNITY PERSISTS IN RUSSIA. . .
The fourth meeting of the Supreme Soviet has proven that, in spite of Stalin's death, there is nothing on earth that can disturb the mighty Russian unity or slow down the Soviet Union's rapid pace of socialistic development.
3. LETTERS COMMEMORATING ANNIVERSARY OF RUSSO-KOREAN TREATY (17 March 1953). . .
 - a. Letter from Malenkov to KIM Il-song
 - b. Letter from Voroshilov to KIM Tu-pong
 - c. Letter from Molotov to YI Tong-kon

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4. BERIA'S SPEECH AT FOURTH MEETING OF SUPREME SOVIET. . .
5. KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH AT FOURTH MEETING OF SUPREME SOVIET. . .
6. COMMUNIQUE FROM SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, NKPA. . .
17 March: There is no change in the battle line. Two enemy planes were shot down.
7. GOTTWALD BURIAL PLANNED. . .
The Gottwald Burial Service Committee announced that the late communist leader will be interred at 1:00 p.m., 19 March.
8. SOVIET STANDING COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN VISITS CZECH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW. . .

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9. MAO TSE-TUNG'S MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO CZECH GOVERNMENT. . .
10. MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI VISIT CZECH EMBASSY IN PEIPING. . .
11. ORDERS FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONCERNING LETTERS OF CONDOLENCE OVER STALIN'S DEATH. . .
12. SPIRIT OF PARIS COMMUNE IS IMMORTAL. . .
 Today is the 82nd anniversary of the heroic Paris Commune. It was the first attempt in history to set up a proletariat dictatorship. Although this attempt failed, its spirit still lives among the people fighting for their freedom and independence.

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13. GROMYKO'S SPEECH ON KOREA AT 11 MARCH MEETING OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. . .
14. SEVEN "ULTRA-MODERN" ENEMY PLANES SHOT DOWN. . .
 The brave pilots of KIM Hi-kyong's Air Squadron shot down seven "ultra-modern" enemy planes, including a F-86, in five air attacks. The enemy's supremacy of the air will come to an end within a short time. (PHOTO OF 7 NK PILOTS: YI Kon-il, YANG Tu-hi, CHOI Sang-tae, KIM Chong-sop, SO Chol-ha, Hero KANG Chong-dok, and KIM Si-pom.)
15. MEMORY OF STALIN INSPIRES OUR SOLDIERS TO GREAT HEROISM. . .
16. NK MOTHER HAS SEVEN SONS IN THE ARMY. . .
 CHOI Kon-ik, a woman of 65, who lives in Kangchon-gun, Hamkyong namdo, is honored and loved by her neighbors because of her patriotism. She has seven sons in the Army and does not spare any effort to help our fatherland. Women of the village are determined to learn of the source of CHOI's noble patriotism and devotion.
17. THIRTY-SEVEN ENEMY AGENTS CAPTURED BY ONE MAN. . .
 PAI Ui-sun, Chief of the Self-Defense Unit of an unnamed Ri, Koksang-gun, Hwanghae-do, captured 37 armed enemy agents, despatched 26 January 1953 into North Korea by an American espionage organization. The 37 agents were dropped from planes and later gathered at the Onjin mountain.
18. BARBAROUS AMERICANS CONDUCT GERM-WARFARE IN WONSAN. . .
 Germ-laden flies, mosquitoes, spiders and two other kinds of insects were dropped by Americans on Wonsan at 5 a.m., 2 March.
19. AMERICANS CONTINUE MASSACRE OF OUR POW'S. . .
 The Americans killed 23 and wounded 42 communist POW's in a large-scale massacre on 7 March at the Yongcho-do POW camp. The total number of POW's killed and wounded since the opening of the truce negotiations is 3,289.
20. SPRING SOWING. . .
 Spring sowing began early this year in the Provinces of Kangwon, Hamkyong (South), Hwanghae, and Pyongan (South).

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21. PLENARY MEETING OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. . .

11 March: The resolution was adopted to continue with UNKFA activities. The resolution was proposed by seven nations, headed by the United States. The discussions which took place at this meeting prove that Americans are still against peaceful solution of the Korean problems.

22. POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETS AGAIN. . .

12 March: The Political Committee met today to discuss the reports of the Collective Defense Committee. The Collective Defense Committee was established by the American bloc in 1950 to cover their aggressive actions.

23. POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETS FOLLOWING MORNING. . .

13 March: The Political Committee met this morning to continue discussions on the reports of the Collective Defense Committee.

24. INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS' UNION MEETS. . .

On the evening of 11 March, the executive meeting of the International Students' Union opened in Berlin. They discussed (Article 1) the coming Third World Students' Meeting which shall open in Warsaw on 27 August 1959 and (Article 2) the Fourth World Youth and Student Festival, which shall open in Bukharest this summer.

25. 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF KARL MARX. . .

All the progressive peoples of the world will commemorate the 70th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx on 14 March. An article honoring Marx, written by the Chief of the German Socialist Unification Party, was picked up and re-published in Pravda.

26. CZECH ACADEMY OF SCIENCE. . .

The head of the academy stressed scholars' contribution toward the building of a socialistic country.

27. INDIVIDUAL PROGRESS. . .

A story about a young Russian who became an officer and Party member through incessant learning and training.

end

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