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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is the terminal report on "UN POW CAMPS - KOREA," dated 15 January 1954.

Enclosures: 1 Report (19 pages)  
1 Map & Errata Sheet

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S E C R E T



UN POW CAMPS - KOREA

TERMINAL REPORT

15 January 1954

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

This project was begun as a quarterly report in November 1951 primarily for the purpose of collecting available information on POW camp locations and conditions. Since that time there have been seven supplementary issues, the last published 1 May 1953, on the eve of repatriation proceedings.

The purposes for which these reports were designed have, of course, now ceased to exist. It was thought useful, however, to publish a terminal issue on the basis of information gathered from US returnees, and from ROKs repatriated since April 1953, so that, through comparison with previous reports, some idea might be gained of relative accuracy and value of our earlier efforts.

Information is herewith presented first in a camp-by-camp breakdown, then as an over-all survey of POW treatment and organization, and of interrogation and indoctrination methods, including propaganda lines.

Attached to this report is a map plotted in July 1953, intended as an attachment to a projected August supplement. Operation Big Switch made publication unnecessary. Also attached is a map errata sheet, making corrections based on returnee information.

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S E C R E T

## S E C R E T

## I. CAMPS FOR UN POWs OTHER THAN ROK

Camp 1

At Changson was first reported 18 December 1951 as Camp 5, which was deactivated January 1952 and reactivated (with POWs moved here from Kanggye in April 1952.) As of March 1952, camp personnel consisted of US, British and a few Turkish POWs. Since then camp had become known variously as #1, #2, branch 3, #3 (at nearby Kumjon-ni.) (#1 was originally for EM "incorrigibles" 160 of whom were moved S. to start #3.) Markers were set at XE 8779, 8690 and 8488 in October 1952. 50X1-HUM

4 June 1952, at which time 672 of the 947 British POWs were in #1.

As of January 1953, Changson Camp in three villages at XE 8583, 8483, 8423. Interpreter from camp said 2,000 POWs there, but source saw only 800 Caucasians in three compounds.

A June 1953 interview with a Little Switch returnee who was sent to Changson in April 1951 reveals that the camp was formed in a village which had been emptied of civilians and fenced with barbed wire. Source said conditions were bad until the truce talks began. He received indoctrination through special Chinese commissars who spoke fluent English. In August 1952, source was moved to Wiwon (#4) with a number of other reactionary sergeants.

According to another returnee, reactionaries were mistreated at Changson. He himself spent a large part of his time there in jail, from which he emerged periodically when he wrote "self-criticisms." He also reports being subjected to cigarette-burn torture, four months of solitary confinement. According to his testimony, the Progressives were all in 1st Company, and "Rats" and Progressives were repatriated before the rest. There were several covert POW organizations here (including the "KKK") during his confinement.

Another returnee states there were approximately 35 Progressives in #1, and that 1,000 POWs died here of malnutrition in the winter of 1951-52.

From other Phase III debriefings, a 40-50 bed hospital in this camp; "Progressive" POWs allowed to write undictated letters three times a month; 1,200 - 1,700 POWs from all UN (except ROK) units here, scattered all through Changson.

General Information re #1

Changson a permanent camp. Peaceful Valley, Bean Camp, Mining Camp, or Death Valley and the Schoolhouse were normal stops on march to #1. Labor camps in general area of Changson. Camp near main supply points and subject to occasional bombings.

The Platoon and Company organizational setup was used at #1. Camp had no fences but was surrounded by ditch. 800 US and over 600 British POWs here,

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Camp 1 had seven companies: Cos. 1, 2, 3, 4 were Caucasian US (approximately 1,000), Cos. 5, 6 and 7 were British (approximately 500).

POWs of higher rank and age soon removed to officers' camp (#2), and younger, uneducated men used as leaders, along with progressives. British POWs received better treatment in their compound, possibly because of a higher number of progressives. On the other hand, British POWs had an escape organization within their compound. Returnees had no details on same.

Camps 1 and 5 had an anti-Communist unit called KKK which attempted to keep progressives in line. They also contained such pro-Communist committees as the Peace Comm., at both camp and company levels, and a Camp Club, sponsored and approved by the ChiComs, at camp level.

POWs who were openly hostile were harshly treated, denied medical care. Men from broken or poor homes were prime indoctrination targets. Indoctrination possibilities separated for special treatment. All Negroes, officers and sergeants removed from camp in 1952. Compulsory lectures slacked off in mid-52, and only progressives continued studies. They were rewarded for informing, for being members of the Peace Committee, and for study with money, jobs, girls, no work details, medical aid.

On the other hand, "incurables" (reactionary corporals and below for whom this camp was primarily designed) were punished for resistance by long hours at attention, hard labor outside camp, constant re-interrogation, the "dungeon", self-criticisms and confessions. There were even cases of maggots being placed in the ears of sick POWs. A Slave Labor Unit (SLU) detention camp for violent Reactionaries (who were kept in "cages") is reported to have been outside #1.

During interrogations, the Communists were interested in anything concerning US radio, in Alaska and Okinawa airfields, and in the life, financial conditions and education of the POWs in particular. The CCF interrogators finally realized these POWs were poor subjects with limited knowledge and that they could eventually be forced to answer yes to anything.

Territory around #1 was mountainous and full of enemy soldiers, capture was certain and escape past perimeter guards was seldom attempted.

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### Camp 2

Also at Changson (XE 8680), 7 mi. south of village near Song-ni, first reported in April 1952 as located in a school building and civilian houses on a river near a bridge, and in hilly terrain. Camp was originally known as #1, Branch 2 became officers camp when other POWs were segregated. Some civil political prisoners were also kept in this area. Sketch of Camp

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marked October 1952 when still part of #1. this camp was organized in July 1951 (note conflict with report on #1) as part of #1. All sergeants were segregated in special squad as considered "bad influence." In August 1952 they were moved to #4; and Puerto Ricans were moved to #5.

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S E C R E T

## S E C R E T

A Peace Committee was organized under the leadership of a British private until he was transferred to Wiwon. Security depended on guards, camp not wired. There were seven companies in camp, no communication between except during athletic meets which were run by "Progressives."

According to one Little Switch returnee, at the time of his confinement in #2, Branch 1 (from October 1951 to April 1953), the camp had three branches: Branch 1 at Pyongoe-dong, with 165 officers; Branch 2 at Pingchon-ni or Parundong with 170-180 men; Branch 3 at Chang-ni for "incorrigible" officers, who had fewer privileges than men in the other branches. Branch 3 originally listed at Changson, XE 7485 in Communist report October 1952.

Branches 1 and 2 were located side-by-side with a common ration center in tile-roofed buildings surrounded by barbed wire. POWs were divided into nine squads, with 17-18 officers in each squad. Bilets were inadequately heated and POWs had no beds until Easter 1953. No indoctrination was given after November 1952. No forced labor, but POWs were paid if they worked.

POWs were guarded in proportion to their state of health. No leniency was shown hostile attitudes and while POWs were punished by a choice of informing on their fellow-prisoners or solitary, there were no mass punishments.

POWs were segregated from point of time, i.e. those interned in 1951, 1952 and 1953 were kept apart.

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Officer internees in #2, Branch 1 built a radio which was disassembled when not in use. Returnee source received 20-30 letters in 1952 (none in 1951 or 1953) and noted a 3-4 month lapse between postmark and delivery dates. He stated that all men in camp except two got mail, some received as many as 150 letters. All mail was processed through Peking to Pyoktong and on to camps. POWs couldn't write for three months after capture, then allowed one letter every three weeks, the contents of which were sometimes dictated. POWs couldn't write if undergoing punishment. This letter-writing policy was begun by blanket authority in June 1951.

All POWs in this branch were approached frequently to make propaganda broadcasts. They were punished for refusal by food cut-offs, solitary, etc. 20-30% reluctantly made recordings and were given better food. All of broadcasts were dictated.

POWs forced to attend indoctrination classes for eighteen months, a minimum of six hours daily. The study program was "tortuous, arduous and mentally depressing." POWs forced to go along with the program or spend most of their time in solitary. Source didn't believe any officers were successfully indoctrinated, but thought that a number of enlisted men were. Indoctrinated POWs were placed in a preferential camp (#5) where food was much better than in #2. Indoctrination lecturers were civilians, all highly educated.

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Another returnee was interned in #2 from December 1951 to May 1953. He was interrogated six times but was given no indoctrination. He reported in his debriefing that there had been some atrocities committed against POWs when the

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NKA was guarding the camp. After the truce talks began, POWs were allowed mail and given recreation facilities, but were isolated from NK civilians. Five of the Bacteriological Warfare (BW) "confessors" captured in July 1950 were kept in a house outside #2 until they were removed to Pyoktong.



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Other Phase III debriefings substantiate the above by saying that BW indoctrination sessions were held in this camp branch. Also that camp consisted of mud huts in a village which housed 750-800 POWs.

Only information obtainable on Camp 2, Branch 2 was that a mine operated near Camp 3 as an annex to Branch 2, #2, possibly a staging area. Called "Gold Mine Camp."

Camp 2, Branch 3 (XE 8779) was the "incorrigible" camp for the overflow from Camp 2, Branch 1. Returnee source said groups in camp were segregated into companies and not allowed to communicate. Branch had a dispensary hospital where medical treatment was adequate. POWs lived in Korean houses with civilians and other POWs. Punishment in this camp was solitary in 5' x 3' x 6' hole, or standing at attention for hours at a time. POWs here participated in inter-camp "Olympics".



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Camp 3

At "Black Valley" was apparently organized in June 1951 when 160 British reactionaries were sent to build it. British were here until moved to #4 in July 1952. Camp was first reported in July 1952 as an enclosure for US Negro and ROK POWs. In October 1952, the camp was officially reported by the Communists as having two marked branches. Branch 1 at Sinp'yong (Kumjom-ni) XE 8588 and Branch 2 at Songp'yong-ni, XE 9795, 7 miles south of Changson. At first camp contained separate companies of officers and sergeants, then all officers were moved to #2 and all sergeants to #4. As of April 1953, only reactionary corporals and British EM remained.

British returnee source moved to Branch 1 in August 1952 and was told he had come "to further his studies" but received no indoctrination until September when he attended a BW lecture.

According to another British returnee, the camp was called "3rd Regiment Reactionary Camp." There was no POW administrative organization as the camp held relatively few internees (by April 1953 all POWs were those recently captured). The cook-house was the center of clandestine activity where those planning escape got supplies. Reason for the small number of POWs is unknown, except that all had refused political cooperation and personal data.

Mail had haphazard distribution and mail forms had to be requested. Source received 8 of 15 letters written to him, none of his went out.

Source transferred to this camp from #5 when escape plans discovered. Internees segregated by nationality, rank, color. Punishment for infractions: hard labor, "hole", self-criticism.



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S E C R E T

One US returnee said that approximately thirty-three Progressives were planted in #3.

#### Camp 4

At Wiwon (BA 4953) was reported in November 1951 by IntSum 3341, in May 1951 by Air FEAF (when camp also held ROK POWs), and officially by the Communists as marked camp #12 east of Unsanni in July 1952. In August 1952 #12 was apparently relocated at BA 7854 and its old site became #4, first reported by the Communists in October 1952 as Ku'up-tong. First photo coverage of camp was made in November 1952.

This camp was used for reactionary US POWs, mostly sergeants, Returnee information re #4: POWs at first not allowed mail because they refused to use "Against American Aggression" phrase on envelopes, but by the third Christmas there, lenient treatment policy in force and on repatriation trip to Panmunjom, POWs were lavishly treated. Camp was fully organized, published propaganda paper, and had many POW committees. The only indoctrination in #4 was in the form of BW lectures. Camp 4 was 60 miles east of Camp 5. Escape was impossible. Air raid shelters in and around camp.

No political commissars 50X1-HUM  
in #4. When mail policy was relaxed, POWs received clippings, photos, gum, soap, cigarettes through mail. Some of British POWs cooperated with ChiComs and were rewarded by being sent to "Peace Fighters" school at Camp 12.

#### Camp 5

At Pyoktong (YE 0699) was originally reported as #4 and #5 in November 1951. Camp 4 was moved to Wiwon in October 1952 when the reactionary sergeants were segregated from the other POWs. Camp 5 had been in use since December 1950. Markers were posted at YE 059995 and YE 064991. #5 was the model camp and indoctrination "University", as well as the site of the ChiCom POW Camp General Command and NKA General HQ. The camp was for enlisted men (corporals and lower) many of them with little education and from backgrounds of poverty, whom the ChiComs considered good indoctrination material.

General Returnee Information: Whole city of Pyoktong was called #5 since the city ran down the middle of the compound, the compound itself consisted of approximately 200 mud houses of two and three rooms. The Camp was located on dammed lake (from backwaters of the Yalu), enclosed with barbed wire, and guarded by roving patrols. Telephone exchange and NKA HQ in south corner of compound. POWs were not allowed near these buildings. 1,400 - 1,500 POWs died here in the early days from exposure, poor food, lack of medicine. In the beginning, interrogators threatened POWs with "cage," rope treatment. In August 1952, the ChiComs took group of reactionary POWs to "Bad Camp," 80 miles NE Pyoktong in mountains between #4 and #5 (no number). After the camp came under ChiCom control and some of POWs had signed peace petition, food improved.

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## S E C R E T

Officers (two of whom tried to escape) were in separate company in #5 until October 1951 when they were moved to #2, Branch 1. Mail didn't go in or out of camp until 1952. All letters were censored and weren't allowed to go out unless they contained some favorable propaganda. All mail registered. POWs were allowed three outgoing letters per month.

Camp organization: #5 had six companies, 1 US Negro, 2 Turkish, 3 US Caucasian, 4 mixed UN (included Spanish-speaking US POWs), 5 British, 6 political training company located outside compound, deactivated at unknown date. Co. 1 (Negro) was reportedly favored by officials, got better treatment, not forced to attend lectures. From the foregoing, it can be seen that POWs were segregated by nationality and race. Peace Committee members were regular attendants at indoctrination classes. Men volunteering to work around camp also got preferential treatment. Companies were broken down into four platoons, platoons broken down into four to six squads, which were made up of roommates. POWs chose their own squad leaders with ChiCom OK. If anything went wrong, the squad leader was blamed and usually landed in jail. Assistant squad leaders were usually planted informers, called monitors.

There were several anti-Communist and anti-Progressive organizations in #5. The Black Diamond, Negro members, was mainly social but most of the members were either neutral or leaned toward reactionary. Golden Cross was purely fraternal but was disbanded by ChiComs as subversive. Ku Klux Klan used threats and force to keep "Pros" in line. Tattoo Club was originally formed to harrass ChiComs, but was infiltrated by Pros and was soon disbanded. Escape Committee (in both #1 and #5) was formed by British POWs, loosely organized but instrumental in planning a number of unsuccessful escapes. All groups failed to do much since organization was loose and soon infiltrated, disbanded and discipline applied to leaders.

Pro-Communist, Progressive group in #1 and #5 which had the ChiCom blessing was the Peace Committee at camp and company level (see p. 3.)

Indoctrination was rigid at first. In May 1951, POWs were given day-long lectures and were punished for lack of attention or objections to subject matter. Lectures were discontinued when peace talks began in 1952. Two British POWs defying indoctrination were sent to reactionary camp in September 1952. Even doctors in #5 hospital were used as political instructors. Indoctrination was accompanied by mental subjugation of POWs through self-criticism. Younger POWs were especially segregated for intensive indoctrination. In general, there seem to have been three phases of indoctrination in this and other camps: the death march, when POWs walked 35 miles nightly for two months to get from place of capture to camp and 30 POWs died daily; lenient policy through interrogation period when liquor and other bribes were offered for information; indoctrination period through lectures, movies and self-criticism.

One returnee estimated that, at the time he was there in the early period, there were approximately 65 progressives in camp. The number undoubtedly increased at a later date as the efficiency of the self-discipline, self-study, self-criticism routine over formal lectures proved itself and stress was placed on exploiting the individual POW in his autobiography.

All POWs in #5 appear to have been forced to collaborate to a greater or lesser extent through either writing or signing peace petitions, making propaganda broadcasts, writing articles for the camp newspaper, taking part in propaganda movies, or turning outright informer.

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Propaganda. As the model camp 5 was much used for propaganda purposes: POWs were allowed extensive Christmas celebrations, POWs there were main participants in inter-camp athletics, pictures were taken of staged pep meetings. In February 1951, 10 officers and 10 EM were sent from #5 to Pyongyang to make propaganda recordings. According to one returnee, indoctrination and propaganda had little effect on officers, but he felt that 10-15% of the younger EM had been affected.

Treatment. After ChiComs took over camp, treatment in general was not bad except when POWs were punished for rule violations by solitary confinement (two jails in compound), standing at attention for hours, writing self-criticisms, hard labor, withholding medical attention, etc. Medical care was adequate, though the drug supply was not. Clothes were adequate, bedding was not. Informers had special privileges, reportedly including women.

Security. Guards were uneducated, looked on POWs as criminals, unbribable, but it was easy to get out of camp and many escapes were attempted. However, due to terrain, lack of preparation, and civilian informers, all were recaptured. Guards themselves were jailed when escapes were made.

The BW interrogation center, where 24 USAF and 2 USMC officers were held preparatory to making "confessions" at one phase or another of the Korean war, was reported to be a village on the Yalu near Pyoktong.

Camp 9 and Camp 10

At Pongnyong-dong (BA 7367) was known as "Starvation Camp" and contained mostly reactionary British POWs. Ironically, it was located not far from #12, the progressive "luxury" camp where the "Peace Fighters" held forth. Both #9 and #12 were apparently originally parts of the Manpo Camp complex then known as the "infamous" camp where 536 of its original 750 POWs died in the early days of the war. Of this number, 72 were reportedly shot by guards. Manpo camp was first reported in November 1951 as located at BA 7259-7637, and was first used to hold ROK POWs, interspersed with a few US. The camp was apparently split into #9 and #12 after an air raid which killed 60 and wounded 80 POWs in Manpojin in March 1953. The ChiComs took over 100 small adobe houses in Pongnyong village, evicting inhabitants, and moved the remaining 280 POWs from Manpo on foot.

Camp was in a congested farm area at the foot of a mountain range. A road down the middle cut camp in half and the west half was sometimes called Camp 10. POWs in the two halves of the camp were forbidden to associate or ever to leave their own compounds. Camp was first reported by Communists in March 1953.

Treatment was generally bad. There was not enough food, clothes or bedding. No medical facilities. General conditions were below the level to sustain life. TB was prevalent.

POWs in camp were mainly violent reactionaries. There was an active underground known as "Revival of the Korean People," which pitted itself against the "Anti-American National Salvation Strife League," ChiCom-sponsored organization. As it was impossible for members of the underground to hold meetings, they substituted a system of secret messages.

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Indoctrination was mandatory, lectures were held which the healthy were forced to attend for three and one-half hours daily.



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Camp 12

Konha-dong at Manpo (BA 7854) has been partially discussed in connection with Camp 9 and Camp 10. This camp was apparently founded in 1950 and was first used for influential ROK prisoners, both military and civilian. The Chinese closed original #12 eighteen miles from Pyongyang in December 1951. Camp was first reported in November 1951 and again in new location in March 1952 as a camp for ROK POWs at the base of a mountain near Konha-dong. First reference to camp as #12 in January 1953. Source said camp marked. Sketches of camp, hospital and administrative set-up are attached to this report.

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US returnees reported #12 as headquarters of the "American-British POW Organization for Peace," which was headed by Ambrose Nugent and put out a regular news sheet. POWs in #12 also ordered to make propaganda broadcasts for which they were transported to Pyongyang in pairs. Those refusing were sent to "cave." POWs were billeted in civilian houses under 50-75 guards.

A British returnee claimed "progressive" POWs in camp cooperated because they were threatened with return to #9 (Starvation Camp). Also that #12 was under NKA jurisdiction and had been open as such since March 1951 when the original 12 British POWs were taken there. POWs in #12 were given intensive indoctrination under an English-speaking supervisor of political activities at the time returnee was there. British POWs were moved to #5 and #2, Branch 1 in December 1951.

## II. CAMPS FOR ROK POWs

Camp 6

Uha Dong (YF 2506). First reported November 1951, officially listed at other coordinates December 1951, corrected to this site as #7 in January 1952, renumbered #6, same site, October 1952. Never reported abolished by Communists, but no intelligence reports on camp in over a year so probably not in existence at time of truce. This thought is based on ATIS KT 2814 report, reading as follows: Of the 2,000 ROK POWs originally reported in this camp, 1,000 were integrated into NKA units, 500-600 died of malnutrition, and the 400 remaining at the time source left in April 1951 were awaiting transfer to Chonma-dong (#8).

The camp may have held civilian prisoners at the time of the truce however. One US returnee reported such a camp northeast of the town of Uha Ri (YF 1603) complete with log-covered holes which were used as air-raid shelters.

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Camp 7 and Camp 8

Pusang-ni (XE 6244) and Chonma-dong (XE 5644). #7 was originally reported by AIIR-33-52 in May 1952 and again in July 1952 by the Communists as Camp 16, which was, as of that date, renumbered #7. As of November 1952, #7 was reported to hold approximately 150 US and approximately 1,000 ROK POWs. #8 was originally reported by Communists as a ROK camp in December 1951, then numbered #10. It was reported closed in July 1952, reopened and corrected to present coordinates in October 1952. As of November 1952, intelligence reports listed 2,000 POWs in this camp, nationality unknown. For a short while after official reports, camps were known as Branches 1 and 2 of #7.

Pusang-ni #7. ROK returnee source interned here from October 1951 to April 1953 when repatriated. Stated camp in an E-W valley 6 kms. long and consisted of three separate compounds, billets in former miners' houses. Main camp was surrounded by wood fence and contained the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th POW Companies. Also had underground detention cells for resisters, and a hospital with 230 beds. There were originally over 1,000 ROK POWs here but half were transferred to Sinanju in August 1952, leaving the POWs who organized into these six companies. The 4th Co. contained reactionaries and the 5th Co., wounded.

There was a shortage of medicine in camp. Food rations were increased in 1953. Some mistreatment of POWs. 80% of POWs were members of underground movement, the "Save-the-Nation League." Camp was guarded by a personnel of 150, of whom 70 were officers.

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Chonma-dong #8. ROK returnee source interned in this camp from January to April 1953, said original POWs transferred here from Kangdong in January 1951. Before that time, camp buildings were used as non-military vehicle training school. There was an annex to #8 at XE 6587, in valley at Tangsang-ni, administered by 19 NKA officers and 6 NCO where susceptible POWs received indoctrination.

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Other ROK returnees reported billets as cement houses, barbed wire; receiving intensive indoctrination; forced labor; medicine insufficient; personnel of approximately 1,200 ROK POWs; 473 POWs dying of TB; of a mine E of camp where ROK officers were held; poor food; escapees being recaptured and put to work in surrounding rice fields; of 20 US POWs being here in April 1952; of progressive POWs being selected for Little Switch repatriation; of a mail situation where 60% of the POWs wrote home and only 3 ever received answers; and of generally bad living conditions.

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S E C R E T

## S E C R E T

Camp 10

Chasong (CA 0392) was first reported in August 1951. ROK POWs had been seen in this area as early as May 1951. Camp was officially listed and marked in March 1953. Camp apparently at one time also held 1,800 US Negro and white POWs (as of February 1952 - SO 84492.) In April 1952, an NKA newspaper story told of UN planes bombing a POW camp at Chasong.


ROK returnee sources: Buildings formerly a school. Camp administered by NKA. POWs divided into two sections of six companies each, subdivided into four platoons of 40-50 each. POWs had NKA-approved Self-Government Committee and "League to Struggle for Liberty of Our Nation from the US" at camp and company levels, as of March 1953. As of April 1953, 20 of the 1,100 - 1,200 POWs in this camp were repatriated after swearing not to rejoin ROKs.

Indoctrination lectures were given 8:00 - 12:00 every morning. POWs were not mistreated but guards weren't friendly. All outgoing mail required to contain propaganda. No incoming mail. Food insufficient, no bathing facilities, medicine insufficient. Violations of rules reported by POW spies, punished by interrogations, cells, etc. No underground movement in camp though a number of POWs were anti-Communist.



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Camp 11

Original #11, the Pyongyang camp complex (YD 3822-4020 and vicinity) was reported eliminated by the Communists in March 1953. Branch 3 of the complex at Taesong-ni was at that time reported retained as a transient camp. The new Camp 11, with four branches (Branch 1 at Sampong, BA 9983, location of other three branches unknown) was first reported by the Communists in March 1953. It is probably the same camp as Kanggye (BA 9837) first reported in August 1951 as a camp for UN (other than ROK) POWs. Reports of the camp persisted through 1951. By November 1951, camp had apparently been transformed into a ROK enclosure  One returnee reported the propaganda camp sheet "New Life" as being published in this camp.

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Internees were all ROK POWs (760-80) who were billeted in a former primary school, converted to this use in January 1953 when a new building was added to be used as a food warehouse. PO RO marker was on side of this roof. ROK POW source interned here from January to April 1953 when repatriated. The camp site was surrounded by wire, with an electric guard post at the main gate. Compound contained a dirty and badly-equipped hospital. The POWs were organized into six companies, five in the main camp, one in the sub-camp, 400 m. to the south, and worked gathering wood under strict guard. POWs were given political indoctrination. There was some underground activity but no attempt at escape.



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Another source brought to #11 from Pyongyang in January 1953, stayed until repatriated in April 1953. Camp under NKA, camp officers lived in Sampong city.

S E C R E T

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Chasong (CA 0392) was first reported in August 1951. ROK POWs had been seen in this area as early as May 1951. Camp was officially listed and marked in March 1953. Camp apparently at one time also held 1,800 US Negro and white POWs (as of February 1952 [redacted]). In April 1952, an NKA newspaper story told of UN planes bombing a POW camp at Chasong. 50X1-HUM

ROK returnee sources: Buildings formerly a school. Camp administered by NKA. POWs divided into two sections of six companies each, subdivided into four platoons of 40-50 each. POWs had NKA-approved Self-Government Committee and "League to Struggle for Liberty of Our Nation from the US" at camp and company levels, as of March 1953. As of April 1953, 20 of the 1,100 - 1,200 POWs in this camp were repatriated after swearing not to rejoin ROKs.

Indoctrination lectures were given 8:00 - 12:00 every morning. POWs were not mistreated but guards weren't friendly. All outgoing mail required to contain propaganda. No incoming mail. Food insufficient, no bathing facilities, medicine insufficient. Violations of rules reported by POW spies, punished by interrogations, cells, etc. No underground movement in camp though a number of POWs were anti-Communist.

50X1-HUM

Camp 11

Original #11, the Pyongyang camp complex (YD 3822-4020 and vicinity) was reported eliminated by the Communists in March 1953. Branch 3 of the complex at Taesong-ni was at that time reported retained as a transient camp. The new Camp 11, with four branches (Branch 1 at Sampong, BA 9983, location of other three branches unknown) was first reported by the Communists in March 1953. It is probably the same camp as Kanggye (BA 9837) first reported in August 1951 as a camp for UN (other than ROK) POWs. Reports of the camp persisted through 1951. By November 1951, camp had apparently been transformed into a ROK enclosure [redacted]. One returnee reported the propaganda camp sheet "New Life" as being published in this camp. 50X1-HUM

Internees were all ROK POWs (760-80) who were billeted in a former primary school, converted to this use in January 1953 when a new building was added to be used as a food warehouse. PO RO marker was on side of this roof. ROK POW source interned here from January to April 1953 when repatriated. The camp site was surrounded by wire, with an electric guard post at the main gate. Compound contained a dirty and badly-equipped hospital. The POWs were organized into six companies, five in the main camp, one in the sub-camp, 400 m. to the south, and worked gathering wood under strict guard. POWs were given political indoctrination. There was some underground activity but no attempt at escape.

50X1-HUM

Another source brought to #11 from Pyongyang in January 1953, stayed until repatriated in April 1953. Camp under NKA, camp officers lived in Sampong city.

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POWs had 700 gr. food allowance daily, no clean clothing or bedding issued, inadequate medical treatment, received indoctrination. Four POWs formed "Nation-Saving League" here, purportedly anti-Communist but actually an informer group.



50X1-HUM

Camp 14

Siung-myon was first reported as a separate camp for ROK POWs in March 1953. Before this date it evidently had functioned as Branch 4 of #11 (see p. 11). According to three sourced interned in hospital here from March-April 1953, Branch 4 of #11 had been 4 km. NW (BA 8250) and they were transferred to #14 (BA 7949 - site marked) with 800 other POWs after a bombing raid. Branch 4 of #11 was unmarked when bombed, but NKA used incident for propaganda.

#14 was located in an area 350 m. x 300 m., enclosed by wire. There were no civilians in the vicinity. Camp had a self-government committee which was abolished in April 1953. Political indoctrination was given POWs but not stressed. Approximately 600 ROK POWs were in the main camp, 100 more in a small camp 300 m. N of main area. They were divided into six companies which were at times sent out for construction work. Food and clothing insufficient, medical treatment very poor, no recreation allowed. Poor relations existed between 160 guards and POWs. No escapes attempted while sources interned here.



50X1-HUM

## III. TRANSIENT, LABOR AND INTERROGATION CAMPS

Transient camps were normally stops en route to the various permanent POW Camps (most of which were in the far north, near the Yalu River on the Manchurian border.) The majority of information about such camps comes from returnee sources as only a few, Hol Gol (BU 7803), Kangdong-Taesong (YD 5524), and Kaesong (BT8504), were ever announced by the Communists. After capture, POWs were evacuated to the rear area in groups of 50 - 100 during the night, and joined others at major collecting points where they were interrogated at regimental and division level. POWs were usually held at such points only a few days, after which they began their long marches to permanent camps, generally mustering in groups of approximately 110, guarded along the road by platoons armed with PPShs. Many POWs died during marches from time of capture to and beyond these camps, especially in the winter of 1950-1951. In general, POWs had little opportunity to judge conditions in these camps, but what they did find was "wanting in every detail."

Hol Gol

Hol Gol was first reported in July 1952 when markers were noted at two points. In December 1952 CCRACK reported 100-150 US, 50 Turkish, 180-200 ROK

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POWs were confined in Hol Gol. ROK POWs seemed to be permanently there and were used to work in the mines at Suan (BT 7186.) As of March 1953, Hol Gol was used as a screening center for POWs before assignment to permanent camps. Camp was very often crowded.

50X1-HUM

Kangdong (or Taesong)

Kangdong (or Taesong) camp was first reported in November 1951. Since that date, it served as a variously-numbered permanent camp (#8 and #9). In March 1953, it was officially redesignated as a transient camp by the Communists. As the POW Camp Control Bureau was in Pyongyang, it was obvious that a camp would be maintained nearby where POWs could be confined during the period of interrogation and assignment to permanent camps.

As of May 1953, the population of this camp was ROK. According to sources, the camp was separated into two wired compounds, one for the healthy, the other containing a hospital off the main road to Pyongyang for the sick where ten patients died daily. Healthy POWs farmed vegetables, underwent preliminary indoctrination, and lived in what were quarters for gold mine workers.

50X1-HUM

Kaesong

Kaesong was used as an exchange point for repatriates and as early as January 1952, reports indicated that the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang was making preparations to establish a political screening center there, using the facilities of the Soviet Red Cross Hospital, where treatment was planned for returning ROK and other UN POWs. English-speaking Russians, posing as doctors were to give US POWs political indoctrination immediately prior to exchange. New clothing was to be furnished returning POWs as part of program. (SO 92518, 17 July 1952.) (NB: It is interesting to note how closely, judging from returnee reports, this program was followed during Little and Big Switches.)

Unannounced Transient Camps

Unannounced transient camps, reported by returnees were: Mining Camp or Death Valley (so-called because approximately 1,200 POWs died there) was a stop-over for Camp 5 at Pyoktong, located 40 miles NW of Kohu-ri and 70 miles SW of Camp 5 (at approximately YE 1060). Camp consisted of five or six acres of land in a valley where POWs were billeted in 1/4 sq. mile of mud huts. 400 POWs were reported here in December 1950, 150 US POWs in January 1951, and as many as 1,200 in 1953. The normal contingent was 800-900 of mixed nationalities under NK guards. Only Turkish POWs were segregated.

Bean Camp

Bean Camp (YD 3545) 15 miles W of Pyongyang on a one-acre site was really more of a labor than a transient camp. From January - March 1951, approximately



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1,000 UN POWs were reportedly held here, British, Negro and white US being segregated. 600 POWs are reported to have died at Bean Camp.

Other Labor Camps

Five other labor camps for ROK POWs were reported in and around Pyongyang, located in school buildings in the vicinities of YD 3623, 3823, 3722, 4121 and 5423. Approximately 500 POWs, for the most part consistently anti-Communist, were held in each camp.



50X1-HUM

Interrogation and Indoctrination Centers

Interrogation and indoctrination centers were reported by returnees as The Barn, in Pyongyang, Peaceful Valley and The Schoolhouse (locations unknown) and the infamous Pak's Palace 18 miles NE of Pyongyang near Yonsong (probably YD 4830) located in a former brickyard. It was at this interrogation center that POWs were tortured to extract information.

IV. UNREPORTED CAMP POSSIBLY STILL IN EXISTENCE

Chosan Camp

Chosan Camp (YF 3624) was first reported as located in Cholma, a small mining town in November 1951. Reports on the camp continued until December 1952, after which nothing was heard of it until the parents of a US corporal POW were notified by a New York paper in June 1953 that their son was reported on the unofficial lists of POWs in Chosan Camp. Said newspaper said it got the corporal's name from Corporal Raymond Medina.

GENERAL SURVEY

I. POW TREATMENT AND ORGANIZATION

A. On Capture The majority of returnees had been captured in 1950 and early 1951. Search on capture was cursory in most cases. Preliminary interrogation generally took place immediately. Evacuation to the rear took place within a few hours. All POWs marched to holding camps during the night and under guard, generally one guard to every 10-15 men. A number of escapes were made during this period. Due to the general confusion of withdrawal and lack of stringent security measures, escape was not difficult. Successful evasion and return to UN lines was another story. Most of the POWs were weak from inadequate food and forced marches. Korean civilians were either afraid to or unwilling to aid escapees; in many cases they reported escapes.

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POWs captured in the early part of the war report gross mistreatment by the NKA guards. During the "death marches" to permanent camps, between 7,500 and 8,000 POWs are believed to have died from short rations, long marches, improper clothes and shelter, abandoning of wounded along the roads, and complete lack of medical care, or in many cases, to have been deliberately killed by the guards.

The situation improved somewhat after the ChiComs entered the war in the spring of 1951. While there were many violations of Geneva Convention rules, in general the CCF was not markedly brutal.

B. In Camps Camp conditions improved greatly under CCF control. Medical care was still extremely inadequate and sanitation was primitive but there was some attempt at a clean-up movement, and diets increased. Conditions improved even more after the truce talks began, and treatment often reflected how well the talks were going. Reactionaries got the worst of it, being punished for rebellious or subversive acts by solitary confinement, exposure to cold, beatings, withholding medical attention, mental coercion and labor camps. However, those POWs who either went along, or pretended to go along the Party line received reasonably good treatment on the whole. The ChiComs were obviously more concerned with making converts than in vindictive breaking down of morale.

Medical care in most camps presents the blackest picture. Generally inadequate in quantity and quality, what there was, was reportedly used as a coercive device -- a "recruiting tool" which was the prerogative of the progressives and was withheld from reactionaries. During the first nine months of the war, there was not only almost no medical care, but the sick were mistreated as well. After this time, improvement was negligible. The only real addition was crude surgery. Thousands still died from freezing, starvation, and dysentery. It was not materially improved (except in a few camps) until the truce, when UN POWs were treated with Communist wounded before repatriation. Innoculations were given only favored POW groups or during BW propaganda campaigns in the various camps. Camp hospitals were either non-existent or were known as "morgues" or "death houses". Only progressive POWs got anything like adequate medical care. UN doctor POWs were not allowed to treat the sick. (DAIR 2880-53, 25 August 1953)

Outside of the foregoing, the majority of returnee atrocity stories (after the CCF took over UN [non-ROK] camps) center around Camp 1 where there was reported to be a separate confinement area where resistance was punished by enrolling resistors (POWs who tried escape, stole, spread rumors, attacked the guards, or smoked marijuana) in a slave labor unit (called SLU). There were rumors among the POWs of resistors' confinement in cages until "confessions" were written, when resistors were given from one month to three years at hard labor. Forms filled out by repatriates aboard the USNS General Hase in August 1953 indicate that 32 listed US POWs were not expected to be repatriated because of sentences imposed by enemy courts-martial. These men, and other MIA's whose names never appeared on Communist lists, could well be confined in similar slave labor camps.

Attempted escape of POWs while being marched to the rear has already been discussed. Once POWs reached permanent camps, it became evident (especially at

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#5 that a POW could easily leave the compound unnoticed after dark. A number procured crude escape aids, sometimes through a central camp POW escape committee, but none were completely successful in escaping, due to isolated and mountainous terrain, POW informers, and reports by civilian population. Punishment for attempted escapes varied from jail sentences to writing of self-criticism.

Clandestine POW Organizations have already been discussed in connection with Camps 1 and 5. Leadership and organization of these groups is unknown and in general they were soon rendered ineffective through informant penetration. It is possible, however, that the KKK may have held kangaroo courts and have dealt out physical punishment to progressives and/or informers. In general, it appears the ChiComs spent a lot of time searching for organizations that existed in no more dangerous a form than that of a fraternal organization, or only as figments of imagination of POWs who wanted to heckle their captors.

All camps were organized along military lines: primarily in companies, with companies divided into platoons, and platoons divided into squads. Platoon, squad, and assistant squad leaders (who were usually stool pigeons) were appointed by the ChiComs. Each company had a Club to which members were elected by POWs. Club leaders were always progressives and appointed to their specific key positions by ChiComs after elections were held.

The Peace Committee and the Voluntary Self-Study Groups in various camps were almost entirely progressive in membership, although a few "sit-tights" joined as a method of self-protection.

Informant nets were apparently well-established in permanent camps. Information was extracted either voluntarily from progressives or under duress from other POWs. The ChiComs were evidently extremely clever in playing one interogatee against another by indicating they already were in possession of desired information but just wanted to further substantiate it.

## II. INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION AND PROPAGANDA

On capture: First interrogation generally took place right after capture and was usually aimed at getting tactical information, personal backgrounds, economic and welfare conditions in US, etc. The enemy in many cases seemed already aware of the captured man's outfit. ROK POWs were asked about loyalty to their government and family background. Similar interrogations were held during POW evacuation to the rear and in holding camps where POWs were questioned from one to three hours on UN Force potential over a broad front. Interrogations weren't stressed by the NKA, but began in earnest with ChiCom entry into the war. There seemed to be no fixed policy regarding number of questions asked. Interrogators were English-speaking Chinese and North Koreans. A few POWs reported being questioned by men they suspected of being English-speaking Russians.

In permanent Camps: Questioning was both direct and indirect. POWs were required to write autobiographies covering their whole life histories after they had been in camp anywhere from two days to two weeks. POWs giving noticeably falsified or absurd information were required to rewrite these. Anyone refusing to answer questions in autobiography guide book was reinterrogated. There seem to have been few instances of reward promised or coercion used to obtain such information. In general it is believed that many of the POWs did not confine themselves to Geneva Convention rules -- many talked of their families, and it is

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also possible that they gave (wittingly or unwittingly) a good deal of valuable tactical information to the enemy. In all camps, each group of interrogators always began all over again. There was no real evidence that the groups exchanged information already gained, or were in any way systematic about interrogation, although they were often familiar with previous statements issued by POWs. Some returnees said they were repeatedly questioned about the US part in the Korean war, questions being slanted toward admission that America had started the war, and was waging biological warfare during it.

Indoctrination. All POWs were exposed to indoctrination in varying degrees. It was particularly emphasized at Camp 5. Degree of POW susceptibility was indicated by group designation -- "Progressives" readily accepted indoctrination and were used by the enemy as informers and collaborators. "Intermediates" (the majority of POWs) were passive; they did not overtly accept indoctrination but didn't fight it either. "Reactionaries" were openly against Communism, resisted indoctrination, fought control, and even sometimes abused guards and progressive POWs.

Indoctrination began right after capture and continued in the form of slanted interrogations enroute to camp. Methods varied, widest variance being in #5. Once in permanent camps, POWs were classified by rank and race. In this way, young and impressionable POWs who were separated from officers and older men were transformed into leaderless masses and racial groups played against each other were prevented from forming solid fronts.

Indoctrination was achieved by personal contact, lectures, reading, daily discussion groups, self-discipline, self-study, self-criticism (many POWs were required to keep diaries of daily thought and deed), written tests, propaganda sheets printed by progressive POWs themselves (ex. "Toward Truth and Peace," published at #5), movies, radio programs, and organized "Peace Commissions." Lectures were repeated if unsatisfactory progress was shown. Progressives were often segregated and given special instruction. Hopeless reactionaries were segregated and punished in various ways for their attitude.

In the majority of the camps, POWs apparently worked hard and got substantial indoctrination as well. In #5 there was little work done, and POWs were indoctrinated extensively. Lectures on UN Germ Warfare and the Geneva Convention were continuous until January 1953. Other lecture topics included race prejudice, the lot of the US share-cropper, and big city "skid rows." In the lectures, ChiComs were careful to emphasize that they were civilized and cultured people, shocked by US methods and conditions, and by officers' exploitation of GIs. According to one returnee, they "degraded all phases of US life, with the exception of Roosevelt, openly ridiculed the Geneva Convention, praised the USSR for its medical aid in China, bragged that the CCF would eventually control Formosa, and called themselves the 'People's Liberation Army'."

Library material available in the camps was reportedly most effective, since POWs reading to pass the time could not help but absorb some of the Marxist slant of the selected material.

The general returnee consensus was that it was very difficult to resist indoctrination because of difficulties encountered in running against the established mission of the camp officials. Only a few POWs seemed to have been really sold the party line. Some were impressed by different aspects of indoctrination propaganda (especially BW), and most were simply confused. POWs

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definitely against indoctrination said little during lectures, and talked about home and food during compulsory study periods in their quarters. Many of the men who wrote "confessions" claimed they did so only to let their families know they were alive. Many who made taped broadcasts did so for the same reason and because, although the broadcast material was largely dictated, they could add short personal messages.

Mail was a great propadanda-indoctrination factor. Letters telling of good treatment, food, camp conditions, etc., had a good chance of passing the censor. Reactionaries were often punished by having mail privileges withheld. Mail was sometimes used as a bribe to induce POWs to sign various petitions and manifestos. Progressives who went along with indoctrination and took active part in programs had practically no restrictions on mail. All mail was apparently opened. Censorship usually consisted simply of confiscation of an unsatisfactory letter, coming or going. Some POWs got as few as two letters, others as many as three hundred during their confinement. Some received mail weekly, others went six months without a letter.

Propaganda. Use of taped POW broadcasts as a propaganda vehicle has already been mentioned. It is interesting to note that 30% of first day US Little Switch returnees (returned 20 April 1953), 16 had previously been named by the Peking radio as authors of messages attesting in varying degrees to the good treatment given them by their capturs. Nine of the 32 released the second day had made similar statements, but none of the 14 released the third day had been mentioned before. Of the 40 repatriated on the fifth day, 10 had written laudatory messages, most of them as far back as 1951. (FE Survey, Vol. IV, #9, 7 May 1953)

The "plea for peace" line was being used as late as May 1953 when the POWs not yet repatriated were still broadcasting their interest in getting home and working for world peace. (FBIS 14, 25, 27 May 1953)

Much was made propadanda-wise of POW repatriation. One of the themes stressed was good treatment given UN POWs during the exchange vs. bad treatment accorded Korean POWs at the same time. Wilfred Burchett (L'Humanite, 20 April 1953) said not even water was given Korean POWs, that they were poorly dressed and brutally treated, many of them came back in a crippled condition. On 26 May 1953, Alan Winnington broadcast that the US had returned 168 psycho-neurotic Korean POWs whose breakdowns were the result of bad treatment and being witness to compound massacres. In short, according to Communist commentators, "the US plan to get evidence regarding maltreatment of their POWs was a political plot intended as anti-Communist propadanda to cover brutalities perpetrated by the US itself."

Throughout the latter part of the war and during exchanges, Radio Pyoktong and Peking were used to hurl such brutality charges, and to stress Communist clemency in allowing certain POWs repatriation just before the exchange, despite admissions of waging BW, for which the "primary responsibility was not in themselves. After committing the crime, they have honestly confessed to it, therefore the General Political Bureau of the NKPA has decided to extend clemency and issued an order 1 September 1953 to exempt all of them from prosecution." (FeCom IntSum 4018, 9 September 1953)

On 27 July 1953, Winnington broadcast what could be considered a masterful summation of the Communist propadanda line, stating that the Korean war "has had

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many unique features," he named these as:

- 1) the first time war had been waged "under the stolen banner of an international organization aimed to preserve the peace;
- 2) the first time Asia had had to defend herself against imperial aggression;
- 3) the first time bacteriological warfare had ever been used -- unsuccessfully
- 4) the first time only one side had been willing to talk peace at a truce conference;
- 5) but "with all these obstacles, the strength of the Korean people and of the Chinese fighters, and the strength of the demand for peace kept the war from spreading and had finally brought it to an end." (FBIS)

S E C R E T

50X1-HUM

ERRATA SHEET TO BE ATTACHED TO MAP

US POW CAMPS

#1 - OK

#2 Br. 2 further east, adjacent to Br. 1

#3 Br. 1 on map. Existence and location Br. 2 not known at time.

#4 - OK

#5 - OK

#9 mislocated. Location should be switched with that of #13.

#12 - OK

ROK POW CAMPS

#6 misnumbered #7. Location OK.

#7 and #8 - OK

#10 - OK

#11 - OK

#14 mislocated

TRANSIENT CAMPS

Hol Gol - OK

Kangdong - on map as old #11. Br. 3 marked Ipsong-ni on map.

Kaesong - below 38th, not shown.

Mining, Bean, etc. unreported at time map was plotted

UNREPORTED

Ch'osan on map.

Antung - no returnee information on same.

NOTE Movement of camps to north after January 1953.

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SECRET




# POW CAMPS

AUGUST 1953

## LEGEND

- FROM RETURNEE INFORMATION - MAY/53
- ANNOUNCED OCT./52 - ELIMINATED MAR./53
- REDESIGNATED - MAR./53
- NEW CAMPS ANNOUNCED - MAR./53
- ANNOUNCED - OCT./52
- LOCATIONS NOT ANNOUNCED BY COMMUNISTS



SECRET

Visual Aids