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4701

October 18, 1962

TO: Members of Tuesday Planning Group

FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Meeting of October 23, 1962

At our meeting Tuesday, October 23, 1962, the attached paper "Problems of Southern Africa", dated October 4, 1962 will be discussed.

Attachment:

"Problems of Southern Africa",
Oct. 4, 1962.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Problems of Southern Africa

The attached paper provides a general description of the problems in the white dominated areas of southern Africa and sets forth the nature of the policy issues and contingencies we face in that area. As such, the paper is designed to facilitate a discussion of the general approach we should adopt in meeting these problems on a long-range basis. The operative section, entitled Avenues of Approach, is designed primarily to sharpen discussion of the issues since many of the specific short term actions set forth may require reconsideration in the light of fast breaking developments in the area and at the UN General Assembly. In addition, much depends on the evolution of the UK's policies in Africa.

In light of the general policy decisions which may arise out of a further exploration of the issues presented in the paper, it will be possible to consider a more concrete program of action related to forthcoming developments in Africa and the United Nations.

AF:AFI:RCFoulon:mjk

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Revised Draft
October 4, 1962

PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

Background

The most striking political phenomenon in Africa over the last ten years is the southward sweep of independence. Whereas in 1950 only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South Africa were independent, there are now thirty-three independent African States in the northern three quarters of the continent. Other than South Africa, however, no African state has come to independence below the Congo-Tanganyikan line, and none is likely to do so soon except for Nyasaland where 9,000 whites are not expected to oppose the imminent move toward independence of its three million blacks. In Southern Africa, the revolution of colonial liberation which has swept Asia and Africa since the war has finally rolled up against the last remaining redoubts of control by European settlers, investors and administrators. Furthermore, there is growing evidence of cooperation and tentative joint planning among white military, business and even government groups in that area. This is sure to lead to greater tension; it may lead to violence, and even local warfare--all of which can seriously compromise our relations with Afro-Asian nations.

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The Geopolitics of Africa

A quick review of geopolitical factors will explain to a considerable extent why the movement for independence came to a virtual halt in Southern Africa. Northern Africa, an Arab-Berber Mediterranean minded area, has looked north or east since classical times. During the last 100 years its contacts with Europe, and particularly with France, have made it relatively advanced in thinking as well as development. It is not surprising that the peoples of North Africa should have jumped early on the bandwagon of independence. Except for the white settlers and businessmen of Algeria, the transition has been smooth.

The strip of desert, gravel and savannah states running across the bottom of the Sahara from Senegal to Chad also had a certain amount of French influence, while at the same time they had virtually no white settlers and relatively few large white investors. Once the small African elites in these tribal areas were struck by the fever of independence, there were few European groups on the ground to oppose them.

Still further down the West African coast lie the rain forests, which run from just below Dakar to a little below the mouth of the Congo. Until the last thirty years this area was

too

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too unhealthful for white penetration and western colonial activity was limited to its surf-swept beaches and malarial lagoons, with a scattering of trading post towns in which the white man rarely felt himself a permanent settler. Thus, no European groups of any size existed to stem the southern sweep of independence along Africa's west coast.

Lastly, the inhospitable climate of the scorching Somali-Kenya-Tanganyika littoral occupied the attention of Italian and British officials, but offered little inducement to them to stay on permanently. And the mountain ranges and high plateaus of Ethiopia, independent except for short periods over the last 1500 years, repelled such white invaders as were tempted to take them over.

In simple terms, the great land mass of Western and Central Africa was not "White Man's Country" and during the 100 years during which Africa has been opened up it has not attracted many white settlers.

The physical map of Africa shows that the Highlands of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika are basically attractive to white settlers. However, such settlement was barred after World War I by British decree, except for certain areas in the so-called White Highlands of Kenya, and this island is being swept away by the black tide and its political power has already been greatly reduced.

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The White South

When we look at an elevated map of Africa, however, we find that the southern quarter of the continent presents a different picture. This stretches from the Cape of Good Hope northward to approximately the line of Luanda, Malange, Luso, Kolwezi, Elizabethville, Mufuliria, Ndola, Lusaka, Kariba, Salisbury and Beira. It is true that within this region there are waterless deserts, inhospitable swamps and bare and rugged mountains. Large areas, however, have a climate comparable with Central or Southern Europe with sufficient altitude to be stimulating as well as healthful. Great stretches of fertile and well-watered soil abound, and beneath the surface lie an incredible variety of minerals. In Katanga, in the Copper Belt, in parts of Southern Rhodesia and a central strip of South Africa are to be found a substantial percentage of the world's diamonds, gold, copper and a score of other valuable minerals. In essence, this southern quarter of Africa is healthful, fertile and immensely rich, and is an area well-suited to European settlement and European exploitation. It is "White Man's Country" and to it the white man has gone in numbers, liked what he found, and has settled down to stay.

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In southern Africa we find 1,800,000 Afrikaners of Dutch descent, 1,200,000 Europeans of English descent, and almost a million and a half persons of mixed blood. South West Africa is sparsely settled, but its 70,000 whites make up about 1/8 of the population. In Southern Rhodesia the European settlers now number about 215,000 out of approximately 3,000,000. Northern Rhodesia has about 72,000 European settlers out of a population of 2,300,000. In Angola there are approximately 190,000 Europeans (excluding military) centered in the coastal cities and the central part of the country out of a total population of 4,550,000. In Mozambique, there are about 75,000 Europeans largely living in the southern part of the country out of a total population of 6,310,000. And in Katanga, we find about 20,000 Europeans largely living in the southern part of the country out of a total population of 1,500,000.

This adds up to a white population of about 3.5 million versus 35 million Africans. Although the whites constitute only 10%, their influence in Southern Africa is completely disproportionate to their numbers. In general, the Africans there have neither the education, the wealth nor the know-how to perform more than manual labor, so that almost all positions on the lower-middle, middle, or upper range of the wage scale are held by whites.

White Attitudes

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White Attitudes

The attitude of the whites towards the Africans throughout this area of Africa differs substantially. In Southern and Southwestern Africa, the Boers believe in a policy of separate development which they say is intended to preserve the cultural heritage of both races. As presently practiced, however, it results in the Afrikaners or British holding all important or lucrative positions while the Africans supply manual labor. The Government of South Africa is immensely rich and powerful and is operating under a series of extreme laws which have greatly reduced freedoms as they are known in the West. The chances that these white leaders will be overthrown in the next five years are remote. However, civil disobedience, violence and sabotage are likely at almost any time. The same factors govern the over-all situation in South West Africa.

In Southern Rhodesia a more liberal-minded white government is giving the Africans the possibility of obtaining 18 out of 65 seats, which is as far as Prime Minister Whitehead can push his white settlers. It is, however, not far enough to gain the support of the increasingly politically conscious African Nationalists who have refused to take part in the elections. Unless a compromise

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can be worked out under which the Africans will agree to vote in the April elections, growing tension and eventual violence can be expected.

In Northern Rhodesia, an area still controlled by the Colonial Office, the Africans have, in general, shown a willingness to go along with the British proposal for elections to be held in October, and are reasonably hopeful of obtaining a majority in the new Legislative Council if they can obtain the help of some of the white candidates. There is still sporadic violence in Northern Rhodesia, largely between members of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress led by Harry Nkumbula and the United National Independence party which is led by Kenneth Kaunda. In the copper belt, the Rhodesia Selection Trust, which has much American money in it, quietly supports Kaunda, as does the British Rand Corporation.

There is, however, in Rhodesia a firm known as the British South African Company which holds wide mineral concession rights until 1985 and receives about fifteen million pounds a year for them. This organization has been playing with the African National Congress and the conservative elements and would probably favor a strong white stand in a showdown.

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In spite of its geographic location, Nyasaland is not part of the White South since it lacks enough white settlers or white businessmen to stand out against Dr. Banda's African nationalism. It should be noted, however, that Dr. Banda seems disposed to make a deal with the Portuguese for railroad access to the Indian Ocean, which is of great importance to him.

Angola and Mozambique have non-racial policies in theory, but the social patterns are such that the African, with a few exceptions, is beyond the pale. The Portuguese have recently issued a series of reforms within the Portuguese State dealing with education, labor, franchise, etc., but they exist largely on paper and would require more money than now appears available. Although the revolt which broke out in Northern Angola in March of 1961 is only simmering at present, it may flare up again at any time, and may also break out in Northern Mozambique. In order to prevent this, Lisbon has more than 55,000 Portuguese troops in these two overseas territories and has made it clear that it intends to remain in the dominant position. Recent Portuguese statements about ^{self-determination} ~~eventual independence~~ must be taken with great caution.

Lastly, in Katanga, the influence of the European mining interests is such that Tshombe has broken away from the rest of the Congo. Herculean efforts by the United Nations and the U.S.

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have so far been unable to bring him back into the Central Government fold. Although Katanga cannot strictly be considered a part of the white dominated south, the struggle between Leopoldville and Elisabethville has represented in many minds the opening round in the battle over Southern Africa.

Intensified Conflict Likely

There is an outside chance that Tshombe's troubles with Adoula will be settled amicably, that Northern and Southern Rhodesia will move in comparative peace into the position of multi-racial states, that a change of Government, or of heart, in Lisbon will turn Angola and Mozambique into genuine multi-racial states, and that eventually the evolution of attitudes in South Africa will lead to some formula for racial peace. It is more probable, however, that none or few of these things will happen, and that, instead, the southern quarter of Africa will, over the next few years, see a great intensification of the white versus black conflict. Armed revolt may flare up again at any time in the Portuguese areas. And civil disobedience, sabotage and guerrilla action may soon appear in the Rhodesias and South and South West Africa.

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The white inhabitants of this part of Africa speak different languages, come from different cultural backgrounds, have different patterns of government and different philosophies of dealing with the Africans; however, they have in common a realization that the southern part of Africa is a rich and fertile area which they and their children would like to occupy forever. They agree that the African is most useful as a field hand, an unschooled or semi-skilled laborer or a low-level clerk. In other words the whites are on top and they see no reason to turn over the great cities, rich mines and fertile farms which they have built to the unlettered blacks who most of the whites believe incapable of maintaining a high degree of civilization.

We have already had reports of visits by army officers from South Africa to Rhodesia, the Portuguese areas and Katanga. No formalized arrangements are believed to exist, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that these and other talks in Luanda, Lisbon, Salisbury and Pretoria have touched on ways and means of defending the white dominated areas against the further southward sweep of African nationalism. If they should choose to pool their armaments, their wealth, their know-how and their white troops, the Europeans have the ability to hold the southern quarter of Africa--as a veritable white bastion against any military offensive or insurgency which the black Africans might stage.

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It is true that Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Casablanca Powers have considerable military force between them, but they do not have the logistical ability to bring that force to bear south of the Luanda-Elisabethville-Zambesi line without help from outside Africa.

However, whether the confrontation of white and black in Southern Africa resulted in major hostilities or more likely in guerrilla action and widespread sabotage, it would have a direct impact on two of the major axes of tension in the world: the latent division between North and South along racial lines and the active East-West competition for world influence. Continuation and aggravation of existing white-black relations will embarrass the position of the West throughout the Afro-Asian world; and it could fatally compromise our over-all strategy of fostering a cooperative community of free nations if the new African nations feel they are forced to choose between achieving their aspirations for the liberation of their brethren in southern Africa and continuing cooperation with the West in their development.

Any serious impact on North-South tensions would greatly enhance Bloc opportunities in Africa. Black Africans are perfectly capable of playing one group of whites off against the other without realizing the danger this might represent to their own aspirations.

Russia

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Russia, China and their allies would seize the opportunity, probably through "volunteer operations" by the Casablanca Powers, to place substantial military strength in the heart of Africa. If the Russians did this, and if the West did not actively intervene, Bloc influence in Africa would climb rapidly and large segments of the continent north of the White South would move from neutrality into active pro-Communist positions.

If events are allowed to drift in these dangerous directions, it is apparent that they would have a profound effect on the overall balance of forces in the world. Not only would the credit gained by the wise decolonization policy of most Western powers be lost to the hopeless cause of the few remaining "hard-nuts" in Southern Africa, but the beneficial economic interchange between Europe and Africa might be disrupted. More seriously, the huge African land mass represents a net strategic plus of considerable dimensions to us now. If this is erased it can compromise our defense (and space) posture; and if equivalent advantage were gained by the Bloc it could compromise our position in other areas closer to the heart of our defense. These contingencies make it necessary to find some way through this last, but most difficult "crunch" of decolonization--and they well

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illustrate the desirability of devising a policy which recognizes that apparent conflicts between our short run policy interests in Europe and those in Africa may be entirely consistent with and necessary to a good policy for the long pull in both areas. In short, a good European policy is incomplete without a good African policy--as exemplified by our present understanding with the Belgians in regard to the Congo.

General Approach to the Problem

The intractable nature of the human emotions involved in southern Africa make it very difficult for us to devise ready measures of heading off the ugly contingencies involved. The problem is further complicated by the conflicting interests and objectives we have in the area. We are caught between competing interests in maintaining the good will of the new nations of Africa and our direct security interest in South Africa, including the need to avoid conflict in the area which would open avenues of exploitation by the Bloc. On the level of principle, similar dilemmas exist. Suppression of the popular will in South Africa or Angola is as repugnant to us as the aggression, direct or indirect, which might be mounted by outsiders to remedy
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such suppression; and in South West Africa, for example, armed intervention to enforce the mandate might be as dangerous to the future of international organizations as continued South African violation of the mandate would be to the principle of the rule of law.

However, it is possible to discern a general strategy which has a chance of gradually whittling the problem down to manageable size. Special factors, not present in the core area represented by South Africa, exist in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the High Commission Territories, and possibly even the Portuguese territories; and they present opportunities to reduce the possibilities of any joint action by white dominated governments and to make progress which may have a chance of bringing about a change of attitudes in South Africa.

Southern Rhodesia is perhaps the key to such a strategy and it illustrates best of all how desirable it will be for us to work out a joint US-UK approach to the problems of Southern Africa. Despite Sir Roy and the serious racial problems in Southern Rhodesia, the attitudes of the white population and the Southern Rhodesia Government toward the development of a non-(or multi) racial society are far more constructive than the apartheid

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apartheid policy in South Africa or the anachronistic outlook of the Portuguese. Patient handling offers some hope that the opposing racial groups there can learn to work and govern together; and, without Southern Rhodesia, there is little chance that South Africa could seriously envisage any form of joint action with other white elements to stave off complete isolation in Africa. The effect of this isolation and of the eventual good example in Southern Rhodesia would have some hope of bringing about a change in South African thinking.

Concerted action with the British could provide the most effective means of dealing with the problems in the Rhodesias and also in the other areas in Southern Africa. In addition to the fact that the British have a preponderance of interest, responsibility and influence in the Rhodesias and South Africa, we have learned, notably in the Congo, that close US-UK cooperation is a key to success and effective action. Coordination with the British may impose certain undesirable limitations on our policy and entail liabilities in our relations with the Africans. However, knowledge among the new African nations that the U.S. and the U.K. are seriously working together to achieve self-determination in Southern Africa will tend to give them the confidence in eventual success needed for the moderate

Africans

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Africans to resist the strident urgings of the radicals whose actions would bring about the disasters and bitterness we hope to avoid.

As presented below there are certain influences which the British might be able to exercise in Southern Rhodesia under cover of a joint US-UK strategy for dealing with pressures from elsewhere in Africa and with economic problems in Southern Rhodesia. Similar possibilities for joint action in regard to other territories in Southern Africa are also explored in the following section. There is a good possibility of making these actions mutually supporting. Resolution of Katanga separation should reduce the counterproductive influence Tshombe has had in Northern Rhodesian politics and on Federation policy. Progress in implementing the mandate in South West Africa could provide the first crack in the armor of apartheid in South Africa; while African political progress in the long neglected Swaziland or Basutoland protectorates will at least show South Africans what can be done close to home by other races. As for Angola and Mozambique, they present an opportunity primarily because joint US-UK action, if achieved, is bound to have a great influence on Portugal, especially if it helps us to reduce Portuguese bargaining power in regard to the Azores. For a number of reasons

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reasons the British may be prepared to move more vigorously on Angola than elsewhere. This possibility should be fully explored since the chances of a violent turn of events elsewhere in Southern Africa would be greatly reduced if some pacification of African feelings on Angola could be achieved. There is also a good chance of French and German support on this issue.

Accordingly, the various possibilities outlined in the following section should be explored at the earliest possible date with the British with a view toward arriving at a joint strategy for dealing with the many interrelated policy issues arising from the knotty problems in Southern Africa. The imminence of painful decisions regarding South West Africa and Angola, among others, imposes urgent handling. The difficulty and gravity of the issues and the need for a long-range strategy indicate that discussion at high levels will be required.

Avenues of Approach

As outlined above, it will probably prove more productive, as a general strategy, to chip away at the edges of the white redoubt--with especial attention being given to the Rhodesias--than to make a frontal assault on the hard rock of South African apartheid.

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apartheid. Although we cannot plan in detail the specific tactics in each case, we should a) recognize the ultimate objectives of liberation from colonial or racial domination, b) continuously explore all means of bringing constructive influences to bear on the separate aspects of the problem and c) understand that steady progress--sufficient to give the moderate majority of Africans confidence in ultimate success -- will be essential if violence, bitterness and the many resultant contingencies they will entail are to be averted.

Working with the British: At present, the root of our problems in working with the British is that they do not have any over-all African policy. Although British performance in decolonization has been one of the most positive aspects of Western relations with the underdeveloped nations, the UK has now come up against the tough cases and is basing its action largely on the exigencies of the moment as imposed by the different national or private British interests in the many different situations in Africa. Accordingly, in discussing Southern Africa with the UK, we should attempt to alert the higher levels of the British government to the need we see to
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bring to bear on Western policy the wider implications of the various problems and contingencies presented by the area and to stimulate them to develop their thinking on area-wide strategy. This general approach -- coupled with an expression of our desire to arrive at a joint approach -- is likely to be more productive than any attempt to address first or in detail the individual problem situations in Southern Africa. On the basis of whatever general understanding is reached on over-all African policy, we can then proceed to details and try to work out joint or mutually supporting lines of policy on the different territories or problems.

There is no great assurance that we can reach a satisfactory agreement on general strategy. The UK is absorbed with many other international problems and has to contend with many serious internal political problems in dealing with Africa--not to mention the severe financial limitations which the Treasury seems to impose in most instances. However, the effort will be worthwhile even if only to gain a greater appreciation at higher levels of our policy motivations and a greater receptivity to cooperation in individual instances such as the Portuguese problem. This limited objective is nevertheless important since we should

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in any case maintain our policy lead in regard to Africa. Our policy lead has enabled us not only to maintain our moderating influence on African nationalism but to provide a basis for the constructive action of the elements of the British and other west European governments which are trying to bring broader considerations to bear on the African policies of their governments.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: The advent of African led governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia is expected to lead to the early demise of the Federation as presently constituted. Accordingly, the situation in the individual territories, along with the politics of reconstructing the economic ties among them, is of more direct interest in considering the problems of the area than the current attitudes of Sir Roy Welensky's government.

In Northern Rhodesia the move toward African independence is much further advanced than in Southern Rhodesia, although less advanced than in Nyasaland. Elections on October 30 are expected to give the African nationalists under Kenneth Kaunda a slight majority in the legislature. The African led governments in the two northern territories may be able to bring

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great influence to bear on the white government of (Northern) Rhodesia in the process of negotiating the restructuring of the relations among the three territories. In addition, the two northern territories may be able to facilitate resumption of the constitutional dialogue between Africans and Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. The possibilities for stimulating and assisting action along these lines by the new government should be explored with the British and possibly with American mining interests in the territory.

Until recently there was general feeling in Washington that Southern Rhodesia, under the guidance of Prime Minister Whitehead, was moving satisfactorily along the path towards being a multi-racial society. Recently, however, the Africans of Southern Rhodesia have taken the bit in their teeth and have refused to take part in the elections scheduled this spring unless they can look forward to gaining enough seats (one-third, plus one) to obtain, under the terms of the new territorial constitution, sufficient power to block any attempt by the whites to reverse the trend of constitutional progress. On the other hand, Whitehead apparently feels he can gain no more concessions from the white settlers and businessmen of Southern Rhodesia. In addition, the Prime Minister recently felt it necessary to outlaw

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the dominant African nationalist party in order to suppress its use of physical intimidation in imposing its will. Unless the deadlock is broken, further progress towards multi-racialdom will be checked and serious violence will probably occur within a year or two.

The British appear inclined to play a passive role in Southern Rhodesia until next spring when the new territorial constitutions are fully implemented in all three territories and negotiations over the future of the Federation are expected to occur. These negotiations will involve the break-up of the Federation as presently constituted and an attempt to put it back together as an economic grouping of individual states. The British probably expect to have more leverage to influence Southern Rhodesia at this time than before or after. Southern Rhodesia may have to make political concessions in order to obtain both the economic cooperation of its financially stronger sister territory (then under African leadership) and the general support and protection of the British in dealing with the financial problems (Federal debt, currency, etc.) and international pressures which the Federation's demise will entail for it.

All this is hopeful, but the problem lies in the fact that weak African leadership in Southern Rhodesia is under great pressure

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to resort to violence if not satisfied in regard to the franchise, since their minimum conditions constitute, in their minds, their only chance of advancing African political progress by legal means. Such violence would not only spoil the thin chance of achieving a multi-racial society in Southern Rhodesia but, coupled with existing UN pressures on the Southern Rhodesia problem, would inflame Afro-Asian opinion and convince it that forceful measures were required throughout Southern Africa. This problem is compounded by the fact that radical pressures in the UN strongly stimulate local Africans to look for irresponsible solutions rather than demonstrating the local responsibility needed to convince the whites they can be trusted in government.

We need to ascertain from the British their estimate of the prospects for (a) achieving a promising settlement of these issues during the forthcoming constitutional review and (b) averting the immediate contingencies which could spoil any chance of success at that time. Some formula for obtaining from the whites a guarantee of African political progress following the next elections might be scouted and we could explore the chances for bringing about more responsible leadership by the African nationalists, possibly through the influence of the

African

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African leaders of the other two Federal territories or of some intermediary who could stimulate a meaningful dialogue (now lacking) between white and black leaders.

Our cooperation might be offered (a) in providing some of the economic or financial support needed by the whites to ensure that they can survive the transitional crisis of confidence involved in African political progress, (b) in attenuating the pressures in the UN--possibly on the basis of a U.S. proposal to establish a committee to examine the problems of transition towards a more representative society and make recommendations which might assist the constitutional review, (c) in consulting other African nations about the need to allow time for the fruition of the constitutional processes of the British, and (d) possibly in finding a useful intermediary to stimulate the proposed dialogue and other responsible action by the African leaders.

In effect, these suggestions constitute a policy of helping the British to maintain a situation in which their policy of patiently bringing along a basically hopeful situation can succeed--both in the Rhodesias and in the context of reducing the white redoubt pattern to size.

Angola and Mozambique:CONFIDENTIAL

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Angola and Mozambique: If for the moment matters are to move rather slowly in the Rhodesias, the need for progress elsewhere is increased in the psychological scale of priorities Africans apply in pursuit of their aspirations for a liberated Africa. Since British interests are not so directly involved in the Portuguese situation, and as part of a joint over-all strategy, we might be able to look for more active British support in dealing with the Portuguese. This opportunity to exert greater influence on Portuguese policy may be needed not only in dealing with the Azores problem but in handling the repercussions of the anticipated resurgence of rebel activity in Angola.

Except for the possibilities of a political shake-up in Portugal, the avenues most likely to influence a change of colonial policy in Portugal are, first, to reduce the bargaining value the Portuguese place on the Azores for use in the African situation and, second, to exert the combined persuasiveness of important Western powers. While we must continue to deal reasonably with the Portuguese and maintain, certainly, our offers of assistance, there is a need to disabuse them of overestimating their bargaining power and its resultant intransigence.

The British and other European allies can help us do this by impressing upon the Portuguese Government that the Alliance is in

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no position either to allow the Azores matter to ruin its relations in Africa or to accept lightly any loss of the use of the facilities on the islands. In addition to diplomatic support of this nature, we should probably discuss with the British, and possibly other allies, the contingent possibility of dealing with the Azores matter in some form of NATO framework in the event that the Portuguese try to hold out too long on renewal.

As for Portuguese colonial policy, any attempt to change it significantly by persuasiveness may seem hopeless enough in the face of current intransigence. However, a combined effort among Western powers is bound to have some effect in making the Portuguese realize that the Lusitanian community can be preserved only by more positive measures and more rapid action. The Germans and French are as concerned as we are over the danger which Portugal's policy creates for the Western position in Africa. We must enlist their help along with that of the British. At the very least a strong expression of Western concern will put the Portuguese on warning in the event it becomes necessary for us, individually or jointly, to take measures to forestall heavy Bloc influence with and support for the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists and their African allies.

South West Africa:

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South West Africa: Although this large territory is sparsely settled and its Africans are not very far advanced, it is now in the forefront of Afro-Asian attention because of South Africa's persistent disregard of its obligations under the old League of Nations mandate. Extreme measures, such as sanctions or revocation of the mandate, are being recommended by various UN committees for consideration by the 17th General Assembly. Although the International Court has yet to rule that South Africa has violated the mandate or that the UN can unilaterally revoke the mandate, it will probably do so by the end of next year pursuant to current and proposed proceedings. In addition to devising tactics for dealing with the immediate issues before the UN, we need to think through the issues regarding the eventual future of this territory.

Although it is difficult to believe that South Africa will bow compliantly to the force of ICJ rulings and UN pressures and seek a trust agreement with racial policies satisfactory to the UN, it appears even more unlikely that South Africa will accept peacefully UN action to detach the
territory

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territory and place it under some form of UN trust administration leading to early independence. Any test of strength over control of the territory would almost certainly lead either to hostilities of some sort--ideal for mischief-makers in Africa--or to results which would place severe strains on, and possibly discredit and undermine, the UN. Even if it proves possible for the UN to assume administration of the territory, there remains the question of whether the UN has the support and the administrative and financial capacity needed to undertake this responsibility.

Although both we and the British have frequently tried to prevail upon the South African government to be less intransigent on this issue, we should explore with the British the advisability of a joint approach--possibly using special representatives--designed to set forth to the South Africans a) the serious contingencies we see on the horizon and b) the necessity we will find, in the final analysis, to support the application of international law against South Africa unless it can work out some form of UN presence in South West Africa acceptable to both sides. (For example, we can explain that we can hardly propose trade sanctions against Cuba and oppose their

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their application against a nation which disregards openly its international agreements and UN authority over a mandate.) If South Africa understands that the US and UK are together on these points and that further recalcitrance on its part will seriously risk the worst of the alternative it faces, it may be led to see some reason on the matter.

In any event, Afro-Asian opinion will be favorably influenced by knowledge that the US and UK are getting down to brass tacks with the SAG and this result could materially assist our current tactics in the UN. Also, the fact that the SAG invited the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee on South West Africa to visit the territories last year offers some hope that the government might be persuaded to invite the committee officially this year. Such a move would not only reduce pressures at the General Assembly but it might offer some chance of setting the stage for a permanent UN presence in South West Africa.

The approach suggested above is designed to avoid for the moment a serious confrontation with South Africa over South West Africa but it offers, in addition, some prospect that the application of apartheid in South West Africa can be gradually humanized and affect thereby its application in South Africa as well.

High Commission Territories:

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High Commission Territories: These territories have long been neglected but offer a real opportunity to further African progress and multi-racialism right in South Africa's backyard since they are entirely subject to British control and have few settler problems. More rapid development and political progress in these areas offers the hope of demonstrating for South African benefit a more fruitful approach to South Africa's future. Swaziland is especially important since the attitudes of its white settlers are quite constructive. Because of this prospect we should probably revise our aid--and Peace Corps--priorities in Africa in order to devote more attention to the High Commission Territories than in the past. The University in Basutoland and education in general should receive priority attention.

In addition to discussing these prospects with the British, we should also explore their thinking on the future of these territories. Their eventual separate independence seems somewhat unrealistic while it is possible that the prospect of future incorporation in a revised form of South African federation might eventually provide some incentive for improvements in South Africa's racial policy. This prospect might be especially appealing

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appealing as a catalytic factor if the blacks in South Africa proceed to exploit the Bantustan idea in practical ways which might help strengthen the position of white South Africans who oppose the government's present rigidity on racial issues.

South Africa: Although there is little chance for constructive action in South Africa, the possible implementation of the Bantustan proposals deserves more analysis.

We should continue to recognize that they fail to represent an acceptable long-run solution to South African problems. Aside from the basic principles involved, Bantustans will fail to meet the major aspect of the problem, represented by the urban black, and will require more material and administrative resources than the South African Government can afford if it implements the proposals in good faith. In addition, we have been informed that the government is not really serious about extending the franchise in the proposed African areas.

Although there is little likelihood that the blacks will ever accept the Bantustan concept, partial implementation of the policy may actually give the blacks a practical means, and probably the only legal avenue available, for improving their political leverage in South Africa's internal politics. The

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areas set aside may allow the blacks enough of a basis for legal activity to improve their bargaining power in fighting the application of apartheid. Such action might also lead to a split within the governing Nationalist Party over the wisdom of applying the Bantustan policy consistently with resultant effects upon its power further to impede racial progress in South Africa. We should watch this situation carefully for the possible development of opportunities for constructive action along lines which would not derogate from our opposition in principle to apartheid. Our posture should at all times be opposed to the principle of apartheid.

British opinion on these matters and their relation to the other aspects of the Southern Africa problem would be valuable; and their influence on the Anglo-Saxon elements in South Africa might be useful in getting South Africa to implement the Bantustan idea in the most acceptable form.

Refugees from Southern Africa: The Congo and Tanganyika *Home* have become the chief asylums for refugees from southern Africa. The refugee groups represent a potential rather than immediate threat to stability in the area. American voluntary agencies
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and a UNOC feeding program using American foodstuffs have helped meet the needs of Angolan refugees now in the Congo. An equally important problem is raised by the student refugee groups in Dar-es-Salaam and Leopoldville, who now appear to be principal targets of the Communist Bloc. Our own aid to the student group has been very limited, although the recently approved AID/African American Institute Program in Dar-es-Salaam may be able to help as many as 75 African refugee students annually to further their education in other parts of Africa and the Near East. The U.S.-sponsored Lincoln University program has offered scholarships for a limited number of qualified refugee students from Southern Africa to complete their studies in the United States. However, our program clearly must be expanded--particularly to include medical assistance and "in Africa" pre-university training in the Congo--if we are to meet the political challenge represented by the large Communist scholarship program directed toward the refugee groups.

RFoulon/RSanger/ebd

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