THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ON VE DAY --- VJ DAY

Prepared by
Secretariat
Strategic Services Unit
War Department
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Ι

FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BRANCHES

A. INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES

1. Secret Intelligence (SI)

Intelligence in military, political, economic, sociological and scientific fields was collected through espionage and other means not usually open to normal Government procedure, then evaluated and disseminated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to authorized American military and civilian agencies. Direct liaison for information and training purposes was maintained with Allied secret intelligence services.

2. Counter-Espionage (X-2)

Information concerning the activities of foreign intelligence services and clandestine organizations was collected, lists of subversive personalities abroad were prepared, and this information disseminated to authorized American military, counter-intelligence, and Government agencies. Advice and assistance on the institution of measures necessary to protect U. S. interests from enemy espionage and counter-espionage activities were supplied to executive agencies of the U. S. Government. Direct liaison was maintained with other Allied and neutral nations' counter-intelligence services.

3. Research and Analysis (R&A)

Detailed intelligence studies were prepared embracing political, psychological, sociological, economic, topographic and military information required for strategic services operations or requested by the JCS, the Armed Services and authorized Government agencies. In addition sections of the Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were compiled, as well as special map or cartographic studies.

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B. PAF	A-MILITARY BRANCHES
1.	Special Operations (SO)
para-mi viduals	Sabotage of enemy communications and special targets, of underground resistance groups and special clandestine litary operations were planned and conducted. Indi- , teams or underground organizations behind enemy lines ganized, equipped, and trained.
2.	Operational Group Command (OG)
perience Fifteer aid and tions a OG was	The OG was a separate military unit within OSS of or- i, uniformed commandos or guerrilla troops who were ex- ted in and spoke the language of their target territory. In-man and thirty-man operational nuclei were trained to il direct resistance groups in carrying out guerrilla opera- and to attack selected targets behind enemy lines. The active in MedTO (as 2671st Special Reconnaissance Bat- i, ETO, and FETO.
3.	Maritime Unit (MU)
	Maritime operations were carried out, including the confidence of agents and operatives and supplies necessary

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Special Projects 5.

Special operational assignments and missions with special weapons were carried out as approved by the Director.

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Field Experimental Unit 6.

New special weapons and techniques were demonstrated to OSS field missions. Later this unit prepared a plan for penetration of Korea from the Pacific which was under consideration of the Theater Commanders at the end of the Pacific war.

C. AUXILIARY BRANCHES

Communications

Communications required for operations were maintained and personnel trained and special equipment developed for this purpose.

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Schools and Training

Personnel were trained for strategic services operations including SI, SO, MO, and MU.

Security

Responsible for maintenance of security and security procedures in OSS personnel and installations in Washington and overseas.

5. Research and Development

Secret devices and equipment required for special operations were invented, developed, tested, and camouflaged

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where necessary. Clothing and accessories used for travel and residence in enemy-occupied or neutral territory were collected and provided to OSS operations branches. Liaison with OSRD and other agencies on technical matters was maintained.

6. Chief Surgeon

Medical officers not only provided medical care and supplies, but also cooperated in the field with intelligence procurement branches collecting and analyzing medical intelligence and data on enemy medical supplies and techniques.

7. Presentation

Charts, graphs, maps, and other presentations were prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Commanders, Army and Navy and other agencies.

8. Field Photographic

Motion and still pictures were produced for Army, Navy and Government Departments including training, documentary and historical movies as well as recording OSS operations and techniques.

D. PERSONNEL BRANCHES

- 1. Headquarters and Headquarters Det.
- 2. Naval Command
- 3. Civilian Personnel
- 4. Personnel Procurement

E. SERVICES BRANCHES

- 1. Budget and Procedures
- 2. Reproduction
- 3. Office Services
- 4. Procurement and Supply
- 5. Transportation
- 6. Finance


F. ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCHES

- 1. Director
- 2. Assistant Directors
- 3. Planning Group and Planning Staff

Responsible for formulation of over-all strategic plans on which OSS operations were based.

- 4. Executive Office
- 5. Secretariat
- 6. General Counsel
- 7. Board of Review

A quasi-judicial body to pass on matters of funds and expenditures.



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II

VE	DAY:	EUROPE,	AFRICA.	THE	NEAR	EAST
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A. EUROPE (ETO and MedTO)

1. Reporting on Surrendering German Army Units

Intelligence units which had been deep behind German lines in Berlin, in Central Germany and in the Redoubt continued to supply military information and order of battle of the disintegrating and surrendering German armies. Some of the teams were over-run by advancing Allied units and reported in person; others maintained contact by wireless or by direct ground-to-plane ultra-high-frequency radio telephone.

New directives were issued these units to report also on civilian morale, resistance nuclei or "Werewolves", and conditions of installations, supplies, roads and railroads, at the request of Military Government.

2. Occupation Period Intelligence Network Developing

OSS headquarters in Paris and London prepared to implement detailed plans for intelligence coverage of Germany. Two operational units, at Maastricht and Luxemburg and such advance units as the OSS 7th Army Detachment, had already established operations in occupied parts of Western and Southern Germany and Austria and made certain key political, industrial and labor contacts. These were to supply both local elements, Military Government, and the occupation forces, and also SHAEF and Washington customers.

3. Redeployment to Far East Begun

Redeployment of personnel to the Far East was already well under way for such OSS activities as had completed their mission in Europe. The Parachute School and many of the Operational Groups and Special Operations personnel that had been active in France and the Balkans were on their way to new assignments in the China Theater.

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5. Joint Document-Collection Teams

City or "T-Force" Teams composed of X-2, SI, and R&A personnel working with the 6th and 12th Army Groups were collecting and evaluating all documents which might show the capacities or plans of the Japanese or which might have any connection with Germany either politically or industrially for particular use in the collection of evidence for Reparations Commissions, for War Crimes and for the "Safehaven" work seeking hidden enemy assets.

6. X-2 Liquidating German Intelligence Service

Counter-intelligence units were maintained in all the major neutral and allied-occupied capitals of Europe to assist in the liquidation of the German Intelligence Service by the use of mobile special counter-intelligence teams and by participation in the CI War Room. In addition, information was gathered on foreign intelligence activities and techniques and liaison was maintained with the Allied counter-intelligence services. Captured German intelligence personnel and agents were interrogated, plans were discovered for stay-behind networks, the German Intelligence Service itself was penetrated and plans for its complete liquidation developed.

7.	Morale Operations

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8. The Photographic Project Continued

Strategic harbors, ports, railroad yards, factories, dams, and power installations as well as the coast line of Western Europe were being photographed in a joint R&A-Field Photographic intelligence photographic documentation project.

	B. AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST					
		1. Covert Intelligence Coverage				
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		2. X-2 Making Security Checks X-2 agents were operating				
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1.

CHINA

III V-E DAY: THE FAR EAST 25X1 Intelligence coverage extended. Directives called for the further development of intelligence from China, French Indo-China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. At this time coverage of South China was relatively complete, including a coastwatching network from HongKong to Shanghai maintained for the U. S. Navy. Coverage of North China Central Government areas and of northern French Indo-China through Communist areas and of Manchuria and Korea were awaiting Theater approval. Meanwhile, agents were being trained for Korea and an independent Chinese network had been contacted in Manchuria. Intelligence data supplied to Theater Command, the 14th Air Force, and Navy included tactical targets, weather data, information on shipping and aircraft activity, order of battle information, operational and situation intelligence. In addition, R&A prepared special strategic studies for the 14th and 20th Air Forces, and SI obtained specific strategic intelligence at Theater request. At this time SI and Field Photographic personnel sent to Kwangtung Province to make for Theater a survey of HongKong to Hainan Strait were setting up a coast-watching system in this previously uncovered area. 25X1 Para-military teams cut enemy lines. SO teams were operating under a Theater directive to interdict the enemy's strategic routes of communication in north and south China and northern French Indo-China, by training, supplying and leading guerrilla forces in sabotage behind enemy lines.

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Personnel being reinforced. Personnel redeployed from Europe and others shifted northward from Burma were reinforcing the China staff to permit further expansion of intelligence and para-military operations.

2. SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Det. 101 at climax of operations. Nearing the completion of the Burma campaign, OSS guerrilla forces in Detachment 101, the only combat forces in this area, were engaged in heavy fighting endeavoring to clear the enemy from the Shan States in southern Burma. Twelve OSS field groups furnished the only intelligence from this area, maintaining coverage of enemy withdrawals into Thailand. This was the beginning of the phase of Detachment 101 operations which won the Distinguished Unit Citation.

Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia. Intelligence teams were providing information on Jap shipping and defenses as well as weather data from peninsular Burma, central Malaya, the Andaman Islands and Sumatra. The infiltration and exfiltration of agents from enemy-occupied territory had become a regular procedure, carried out by MU

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VJ DAY: EUROPE, AFRICA, THE NEAR EAST
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<u>EUROPE</u>
Aid to AMG, Occupation Forces, and Washington
Intelligence directives were revised in emphasis from the tactical and military situation to strategic political data for Washington consumption, and a priority objective became the collection of information on Russian activities and on events in the other Allied occupation zones.
Intelligence bases continued to supply political, economic, sociological and industrial information to Military Government, the occupation forces, and the Political Advisor with particular concentration on the exploitation of intelligence opportunities in Germany and Austria.
War Crimes Data Collection
A concentrated effort to obtain War Crimes data was aimed both in the collection of documentation and in the interrogation of key Nazi military and political figures.
X-2 Adapting to Longer-Range Basis
Liquidation of the German Intelligence Service continued and new plans were developed Emphasis was shifted to long-range strategic counter-espionage rather than strictly military activity.
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AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST

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Activities being Curtailed

Activities of all Africa stations were being surveyed and evaluated in order to tighten the organization to meet budget requirements even at the risk of reducing intelligence coverage already considered thin in some areas.

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The Near East coverage situation changed little.
Intelligence emphasis focusses on Russian activities and on political developments.

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V	- J	DAY:	FAR	EAST	·
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1. CHINA

Recrientation of objectives upon surrender. Theater placed principal responsibility on OSS to furnish it basic necessary intelligence during the re-occupation period. All teams in the field, both intelligence and para-military, were placed under the direction of the chief OSS Intelligence Officer and assigned to seize enemy documents and to report military, economic and political intelligence pertinent to re-occupation operations in their areas. Mercy teams ordered by Theater to rescue prisoners of war permitted the expansion of intelligence collection into hitherto inaccessible regions. Counter-espionage activity was re-directed toward the apprehension of enemy agents in the major Chinese coastal cities.

Retrieval of prisoners of war. Teams composed of SI, SO, Medical and Communications personnel and interpreters parachuted into Mukden, Peiping, Weihsien, Keijo in Korea, and in conjunction with AGAS into Shanghai, Hainan Island and Hanoi. All were successful except the Korea mission, which was sent back by the Japanese and later cancelled. In addition to valuable reports and intelligence procured, over 250 prisoners and internees, including General Wainwright, were immediately flown out, and many other received badly needed supplies and care. For example, on Hainan Island the team located 400 prisoners of war, most of them dying from malnutrition and disease, and after radioing for supplies set up a 200-bed hospital. An additional intelligence team in Formosa made an intensive survey of the Japanese defenses of the island even before the official surrender of the large Japanese garrison there.

OSS the major producer of intelligence in China. By V-J Day OSS was providing over two-thirds of G-2 and AAF intelligence, at least 40 percent of intelligence on Asiatic shipping and the bulk of weather information in China. X-2 had compiled a list of over 15,000 individuals suspected of cooperation with the enemy. An increasingly large number of requests for specific information were being directed to OSS by other American agencies in the Theater. Coverage of the China Theater extended from Peking and the Shantung Peninsula in northern China to the Tonkin Gulf area in French Indo-China. Operations planned for areas further north were awaiting Theater approval.

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Para-military operations harassing the enemy until V-J Day. Guerrillas led by SO men continued attacks against the enemy's troop concentrations and lines of communication. Since January 1945 SO teams were responsible for killing over 12,000 Japanese.

Five Chinese Commando units were operating against the enemy, having made the first combat parachute jumps ever taken by members of the Chinese Army. Three of these units working together accomplished the capture of the Tanchuk Airfield.

Morale operations effective. The distribution of thousands of subversive items in both north and south China was bringing about the surrender of hundreds of puppets and the intensification of Jap counter-measures.

2. SOUTHEAST ASIA

Intelligence coverage. OSS was supplying the major part of American G-2 intelligence in the India-Burma Theater. Progress was being made toward the objective of obtaining both overt and covert intelligence coverage in Thailand, Malaya, Java and southern French Indo-China. Teams were sent into key cities in occupied areas even before surrender terms had been settled. With the surrender, emphasis of reporting changed to definition of the Japanese attitudes in Southeast Asia, the ambiguous position of the Thais, and political and economic information.

Support to Thai resistance. Delivery of supplies and dissemination of subversive publications had continued until the surrender. Over 480 prisoners of war were brought out of Thailand and supplies of food and medicine taken to others.