

*see memo*  
*not used for DCI for CIA Draft*  
Oct. 31, 1949

Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter  
Director of Central Intelligence

CIA Representative on the Combined  
NSC-4 and NSC-43 Staffs

25X1

CIA Participation in Foreign Information Programs and Planning for  
Warlike Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare

NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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State, NSC reviews completed

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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS

1. In considering CIA's participation in the foreign information programs and planning for wartime conduct of overt psychological warfare, major problems are present:

- a. In combining NSC-4 and NSC-43 into a new NSC paper, what language should be inserted in order to legally express the role and mission of CIA?
- b. In order to discharge such responsibilities, what should CIA propose for an organization and a statement of functions?
- c. What action should be taken concerning disposition of the request of the JIC dated May 1949?
- d. What action should be taken concerning disposition of the letter from Mr. Armstrong to the DCI dated 7 October 1949?

ANALYSIS

2. DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM 1a

a. The combined interdepartmental coordinating staff created under NSC-4 and NSC-43, as its first task, has been attempting for the past month to write a single NSC directive which will merge into one paper the functions and responsibilities created respectively by these two papers\*. One of the major questions under consideration has been the role and mission of CIA under such a single combined directive and staff. There is a problem created because of the conflicting language in the two directives under consideration. \*NSC-4 dated December 9, 1947 relates to the Coordination of Foreign Information Measures while NSC-43 dated March 22, 1949 relates to the Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare.

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(1) Under NSC-4, CIA's (rights and) responsibilities were stated as follows:

- (a) Par. 8a - "The Secretary of State should be charged with formulating policies for and coordinating the implementation of all information measures designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives and to counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda. ... The Assistant Secretary should consult with an informal group composed of representatives of other appropriate departments and agencies."
- (b) Par. 8c - "The Assistant Secretary should be assisted by a staff including qualified full-time personnel detailed from such appropriate department or agency. ..."
- (c) Par. 10 - "The Assistant Secretary should be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency with appropriate coordination for foreign intelligence."
- (d) The organization thus created by NSC-4 called for the Assistant Secretary of State to be assisted by a Consultative Group and a working Staff. Although not specifically stated, the language just quoted was interpreted to call for the appointment of a CIA member to both the Group and the Staff. In January of 1948, General Wright became the Group member and in April of 1949 I became the Staff member. In February of 1949 Mr. Abbitt replaced General Wright.

(2) Under NSC-43, CIA's (rights and) responsibilities were stated as follows:

- (a) Par. 1 - "There shall be promptly established within the Department of State a small organization to plan and make preparations for the coordinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of war as determined by the President. Such plans and operations shall be consistent with U.S. policies and be coordinated with related planning under the NSC-10 series, and with approved plans for military operations."
- (b) Par. 2 - "This organization shall consist of:  
"a. A Director ...

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b. Policy consultants representing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSAS upon request of its chairman.

c. A staff composed of qualified full-time personnel designated by the Department of State and the National Military Establishment. The staff shall also include liaison representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board. Upon request of the Chairman of NSC-43 to the Director, the liaison representative of such organization shall become a full-time member of the staff.

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The Director shall be authorized to call upon all departments and agencies of the government for such intelligence and planning assistance as may be necessary.

(c) The organization thus created by NSC-43 called for a Director to be assisted by a group of Policy Consultants and a working staff. Unlike NSC-4, which provided for representation for "appropriate departments and agencies" the language of NSC-43 specified that the Consultants should represent State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the NSAS; it further specified that the working staff shall be composed of "full-time personnel" from State and the NSAS while CIA should be represented by a "liaison representative".

*Over Small Planning Group*

(d) With regard to personnel, it can thus be seen that the language of NSC-43 diluted and weakened the representation of CIA. It specifically exempted and thus ignored CIA's function exercised on the Consultant level and it reduced the CIA staff representation to a "liaison" member.

(e) With regard to function, NSC-43 neglected to specify the role and mission of CIA with regard to intelligence. While NSC-4 specifically stated in Par. 10 that CIA should furnish "appropriate coordinated foreign intelligence", NSC-43 not only failed to say anything concerning this CIA function but went further and in Par. 2 stated that "The Director (of the NSC-43 organization) shall be authorized to call upon all departments and agencies of the government for such intelligence ... as may be necessary." In consequence, NSC-43 apparently contradicted and was in conflict with the National Security Act since such a function should presumably be exercised by the Director of CIA.



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b. As the CIA representative on the merged NSC-4/NSA-43 staff, during the negotiations for the combined 4/43 paper I attempted to rebuild a strong CIA position. The arguments were basically that (a) no NSC paper could deliberately ignore CIA's responsibilities as stated in the National Security Act; that if such responsibilities were omitted they must be necessarily implied; (b) experience of a year and a half showed the need for and the usefulness of a full-time CIA staff member and a CIA policy consultant; (c) the Policy Consultant could be doubly useful in coordinating the NSC-43 work with related planning under the NSC-10 series.

c. Attached hereto at TAB A is a copy of the last draft of the combined 4/43 paper dated October 25, 1949. You will see that Par. 4b calls for a CIA consultant, Par. 4c for a full-time CIA staff member and Par. 5 for the supplying of the organization with coordinated foreign intelligence by CIA.

d. Messrs. Shannon, Childs and Rabbitt have been continuously aware of and informed concerning this situation and Messrs. Childs and Rabbitt have been aware of the related problem of discharging CIA's responsibility outlined by the language of the NSC papers (see below). In order to obtain a specific responsibility for CIA in the combined paper, Messrs. Shannon and Childs approved the insertion of language similar to Par. 5 of NSC-4 in the event that no stronger commitment could be obtained. Because of the original language of NSC-43 and in the light of a negotiated understanding between the DCI and Mr. Armstrong concerning the functioning of the psychological warfare intelligence committee, the Department of State member on the NSC-43 staff would accept no stronger language for Par. 5 of the draft paper (TAB A) and in consequence that was submitted as the draft version of CIA. My intent was to provide some language in the draft paper, however weak, rather than have no commitment whatever to CIA.

e. About a week and a half ago, Mr. Stevens of the P. H. R. proposed that the language of Par. 5 of the draft be changed to read as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide intelligence support for the planning and conduct of the foreign information and psychological warfare programs and shall coordinate an inter-departmental intelligence effort for these purposes." This was cleared with Mr. Rabbitt and Mr. Childs. In response to my question, Mr. Childs



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stated that he would prefer the above language but, if this couldn't be achieved we should attempt to have language similar to NSC-4, inserted. I returned to the negotiations, found the State member adamant and, considering the fact that the previous draft paper had completely eliminated all prior similar reference to CIA in my absence, I felt happy to have at least Par. 5 inserted as it now reads.

- f. Mr. Stevens felt that nevertheless this was an inaccurate statement of CIA's statutory responsibilities and suggested we enter a dissent to the wording of Par. 5. This was cleared with [redacted] and 25X1 Mr. Childs and I accordingly informed the state action chairman of the staff, submitting the paper at 11:30 outlining our reconsideration.
- g. The draft version of the combined NSC-4/NSC-A3 paper is now being forwarded to the Policy Consultants for their consideration. On this level Mr. Dean represents the Department of State and B. Gen. John Magruder the Department of Defense. Since Mr. Rabbitt, A/D, OAS, has never officially been removed as CIA's NSC-4 Consultant he may well have a carry-over position here and be entitled to be heard on the current Consultant level. In any event, this draft paper must be considered by the NSC working staff before final approval by the NSC. Thus CIA continues to have, possibly two, but at least one more opportunity to press its desire for appropriate language in the combined paper. Meanwhile, it is imperative to take action with regard to the type of organization to implement the ultimately agreed upon responsibilities.

### 3. DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM 1b

- a. In June of this year CIA proposed to the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Department of State, that a committee be created within CIA for the purpose of considering problems arising from the request of the JIC and from a general consideration of the problems of psychological warfare. In August a reply was received in general agreeing with the committee concept but stating that such a committee should function under the NSC-A3 organization.
- b. As a result of this disagreement the DCI and the Special Assistant had a conversation. I was subsequently informed by Mr. Childs and received later corroboration through Mr. [redacted]

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that the DCI stated he would not insist on the psychological warfare committee sitting in CIA and that it could function under the NSC-43 organization but, if so, it must have a CIA chairman. On the strength of this conversation and its aftermath, the Special Assistant wrote a letter to the DCI in early October essentially accepting the proposal. This matter was discussed with Mr. Habbitt in Mr. Child's office and it was decided that, since I was the CIA member of the NSC-43 staff, I should also be chairman of such a psychological warfare committee.

- c. Since no memorandum was available of the conversation between the DCI and the Special Assistant, the NSC-43 staff proceeded on the basis of beginning to work and solving problems and responsibilities as they came along. I reported to the Staff that the major jurisdictional problem was solved and considered some of our intelligence problems at some length as indicated in a copy of a minute of one of our meetings (see TAB C).

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[redacted] discussed with me the possible problems and the personnel of such an interdepartmental committee, subsequently tentatively nominating [redacted] as the CIA representative.

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- d. On the 20th and 21st of October I was present for CIA at the meeting of the E & DS's Panel on Human Relations and Morals. At the sub-panel meeting on Psychological Warfare, Mr. Shannon explained in general terms the functioning of the NSC-43 staff. Thereafter I explained that CIA was now chairing an interdepartmental committee on psychological warfare research and intelligence, that psychological warfare considerations had passed beyond the individual interests of any one service organization and they must be considered on a national basis. Accordingly, I suggested that CIA sponsor a conference of the nation's outstanding security cleared consultants in psychological warfare in order to arrive at a statement of intelligence requirements and priorities for the purpose of planning a national psychological warfare program. This suggestion was received with interest and I am currently moving forward towards a specific proposal for the Projects Review Committee. Most all of these facts are known, not only to the NSC-43 staff and the Department of State but to Messrs. Shannon, Childs, Habbitt and Stevens.
- e. It is now proposed by Mr. Stevens, unless I very much misunderstand him, that the DCI now take a firm position contrary to the assumptions on which we have been working and state that we

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working psychological warfare intelligence committee will function under the NSC-43 staff unless it is controlled completely by its CIA chairman and without interference by the NSC-43 organization; otherwise, CIA will now unilaterally move to establish its own committee on psychological warfare intelligence. He further feels that the CIA representation on the NSC-43 staff should be a part-time one.

- f. Of course, while such a course is possible, it would be contrary to the understanding that State now has; it would render impossible the conduct of relations between CIA and OIR except under the most strained conditions with every conversation being reduced to writing; and it would destroy the existing favorable position that has been built up within the past year and a half for CIA in the area of operations for which the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs is responsible.
- g. In consequence, if I have correctly understood Mr. Stevens and accurately stated his position, I must say I thoroughly disagree with it.
- h. It is unrealistic to assume that an intelligence officer functions in a theoretical vacuum divorced from operations. My combat experience I have had has taught me that the closer the operations officer can work with the intelligence officer the better will be the operation. The struggle of the intelligence officer is to be invited to participate and to establish his credibility. Intelligence is only a tool of the commanding officer and if he doesn't want to use it that's his responsibility. That is equally true of psychological warfare as it is of combat.
- i. Accordingly, having been now invited by the NSC-43 staff in the new draft directive to participate at both the Consultative and full-time staff member levels, it is my thought that we ought to continue the course we are currently steering and immediately form an ad hoc intelligence committee to function with a CIA chairman under the NSC-43 organization, leaving the question of the charter and personnel of such committee to be resolved by COMAFS and, if necessary, the IAC.
- j. For the purpose of immediately forming such an intelligence committee I suggest that a letter similar to the one at NSC-43 be sent out requesting nominations. For the further purpose of having COMAFS and the IAC agree on a statement of mission and functions for such a committee, I propose for consideration

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the statement at TAB E (this was originally drafted by me, redrafted by Mr. Stevens and thereafter slightly changed by me).

- k. In order to place CIA squarely in the business of psychological warfare intelligence it is not inconceivable to me that the proposed psychological warfare intelligence committee will function under the NSC-43 staff for some purposes, e.g., determination of requirements, and within CIA for other purposes, e.g., allocation and supervision of production of psychological warfare intelligence projects. In both cases CIA has the chairmanship of the committee.

4. DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM 1c

- a. In May of 1949 the JSPC transmitted to the JIC a detailed request for an intelligence estimate to be used in planning for psychological warfare. CIA/ONE sponsored a meeting largely composed of ONE personnel for the purpose of considering this request. It was noted that NSC-43 created comparable problems and it was thought that concerted action could be agreed upon by State and CIA. Accordingly, there ensued the letters and conversations to which reference was made above. As of this date in October <sup>20/1949</sup> is still seized of the request and the last proposal for its disposition was made by Mr. Armstrong in suggesting that it be referred to the psychological warfare intelligence committee to function under NSC-43.
- b. I concur in this recommendation and suggest that it be transferred to me within CIA as the CIA representative on the NSC-43 staff.
- c. If this is accomplished, it is my thought that the request would be considered by the committee together with the panel of consultants we would muster for that purpose.

5. DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM 1d

- a. There is currently pending in ONE an unanswered letter from Mr. Armstrong dated 7 October 1949. The answer to this letter is awaiting a resolution by P & P, ONE or at least the problems outlined above.
- b. If the problems and solutions outlined above present a logical basis upon which to proceed it is suggested that ONE draft a letter to Mr. Armstrong embodying the recommendations in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

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CONCLUSIONS

6. WITH REGARD TO PROBLEM 1a

- a. The working draft at TAB A, plus the additional CIA memo at TAB B, currently represent the CIA position. Agreement should be reached within COMPS as soon as possible with regard to an agreed CIA position with regard to the appropriate language for Par. 5 here involved. This agreed position should then be urged as long as the NSC-43 working staff has the draft paper open for consideration.
- b. The language thus agreed upon should be approved by the IAC and forwarded to the working staff of the NSC for inclusion in the new NSC paper.

7. WITH REGARD TO PROBLEM 1b

- a. Agreement should be reached within COMPS with regard to the appropriateness of the organization and mission suggested in TAB E;
- b. Such agreement should then be formalized by the IAC;
- c. In the interests of national security and CIA's inherent responsibilities an ad hoc psychological warfare intelligence committee should be immediately formed for initial orientation and the discharge of stated responsibilities;
- d. The ad hoc psychological intelligence committee should be formed by sending out the letter at TAB D (it should be noted that the NSC-43 staff chairman probably feels that this letter should come from the staff signed by the CIA member rather than from the DCI);

8. WITH REGARD TO PROBLEM 1c

- a. The request of the JIC to CIA in May of 1949 should be immediately referred within CIA to me for action as the CIA chairman of the ad hoc psychological warfare intelligence committee.
- b. My proposal should be approved in principle for a CIA sponsored conference of the nations's outstanding security cleared consultants in psychological warfare in order to arrive at a statement of intelligence requirements and priorities for the purpose of planning a national psychological warfare program (the request of the JIC will, of course, be considered);

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9. WITH REGARD TO PROBLEM 1d

- a. The A/D, ORE should be requested to draft a letter as soon as possible to Mr. Armstrong embodying the recommendations in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above.

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October 28, 1949

Working Paper - Draft #13 - Following discussion of Draft #12 at Staff Conference, Friday, October 28.

THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM AND OVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. Foreign information programs in periods of peace and psychological warfare programs in periods of national emergency or war are permanent instruments of national policy. These programs must, therefore, be continuous and must be directed toward the achievement of national aims.

2. To provide for the strengthening and coordination of all foreign information and psychological warfare activities, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for:

- a. The formulation of policy for a national foreign information program, to include all foreign information activities conducted by departments and agencies of the U. S. Government and designed to influence foreign attitudes in a direction favorable to the attainment of national aims.
- b. The formulation of national psychological warfare policy in time of national emergency and the initial stages of war.
- c. The coordination of plans and policies for the national foreign information program and for overt psychological warfare with the Department of Defense and with related planning under the NSC-10 series.
- d. The coordination of the implementation of approved plans and policies by appropriate departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

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Working Paper  
Draft # 3  
Directive

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3. There shall be established within the Department of State an organization to make recommendations to the Secretary of State on the interdepartmental aspects and implications of foreign information plans, policies, and programs and to make plans for overt psychological warfare. To assure the coordination and continuity required by the national foreign information program and plans for psychological warfare on an interdepartmental basis, the organization shall also assist the Secretary of State in his responsibilities to:

- a. Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans for the national foreign information program and for overt psychological warfare, including preparations for overt psychological warfare in time of national emergency and the initial stages of war.
  - b. Assure the necessary interdepartmental coordination of plans and policies for foreign information and for overt psychological warfare, including continuous coordination of the latter with joint war plans through the planning agencies of the Department of Defense.
  - c. Assure the necessary interdepartmental coordination of the execution of approved plans and policies for the national foreign information program and for overt psychological warfare, including the most effective utilization of national facilities.
4. The organization provided for in paragraph 3 shall consist of:
- a. A Director appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with other departments and agencies represented on the National Security Council.

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Working Paper  
Draft #13  
Directive

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- b. Policy consultants representing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the Director of the Central Intelligence.
  - c. A staff composed of full-time personnel representing the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The staff shall also include a liaison representative of the National Security Resources Board, who, upon request of its Chairman, shall become a member of the staff. Liaison representation or membership from other departments and agencies of the government shall be determined by the Director after consultation with the consultants.
5. The organization shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency with coordinated foreign intelligence. 11/1/60
6. Plans for overt psychological warfare shall provide for the coordination of overt and covert psychological warfare, censorship, and domestic information.
7. Existing foreign information activities and facilities of departments and agencies of the U. S. Government constitute the essential nucleus for psychological warfare. Plans for national emergency or the initial stages of war shall provide for the employment and expansion of these activities and facilities insofar as is feasible in order to assure rapid transition from peacetime operations.

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Working Paper  
Draft #13  
Directive .....

8. The Department of Defense shall control the execution of approved policy in theaters of military operations; the Department of State, in areas other than theaters of military operations. Approved psychological warfare policy shall be transmitted to theater commanders through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

9. The Secretary of State shall determine requirements for funds needed to discharge the responsibilities assigned him under this directive.

10. The NSC-4 and NSC-43 series are hereby superseded.

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**TAB**



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October 31, 1949

*Revised*

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, ICAPS  
Department of State

SUBJECT : Draft No. 13 of a Working Paper entitled "The Foreign Information Program and Overt Psychological Warfare"

1. Paragraph 5 of the subject paper provides that "The organization shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency with coordinated foreign intelligence."

2. The Central Intelligence Agency upon reconsideration now feels that this wording does not accurately state its mission as it appears in the National Security Act of 1947, viz Section 102, (1):

"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council--

- (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
- (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;
- (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities..."

3. In order to discharge its responsibilities as quoted in paragraph two above, the Central Intelligence Agency requests that paragraph 5 of the subject paper be redrafted to read as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide intelligence support for the planning and conduct of the foreign information and psychological warfare programs and shall coordinate an inter-departmental intelligence effort for these purposes."

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4. In the event that ICAPS does not redraft paragraph 5 as set forth above, it is requested that this paper be attached to the subject working paper when it is forwarded to the NSC for its consideration.

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CIA Representative, I.C.A.P.S.

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**TAB**

D R A F T

Conf. No. 3

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING STAFF

COMMITTEE NO. 2

Minutes of Meeting  
October 13, 1949  
at 10:00 a.m.

PRESENT:	State:	Mr. Stone, Chairman
		Mr. Thomson
	Army:	Lt. Col. Curtin
	Navy:	Capt. Woodruff
	Air Force:	Col. Gossay
	CIA:	<span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>

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Reports of the Working Groups were made as follows:

1. Coordination of Policy Direction: Mr. Stone called at Archives to survey Office of War Information material. He found that there were many unasssembled and unfiled cables, motion pictures, etc. The Department of State historian, Mr. Connell has been reviewing OWI policy papers; Dr. Lilly has been doing the same type of research for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*per Connell*

2. Coordination of Execution of Policy: The weekly meeting of this working group was postponed because of a meeting of the entire staff.

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3. Intelligence:  reported that at the beginning of May the Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the Joint Intelligence Committee to furnish it with an estimate of psychological factors that can be used as a basis for psychological warfare planning in connection with the U.S.S.R., war satellites, Soviet-occupied countries, and other countries liable to be overrun by enemy forces in the event of war. This request was referred for action to CIA. To date, no action has been taken with regard to this memorandum pending determination as between CIA and the area of the Department of State of the machinery for processing the request. This jurisdictional question has now been resolved by the creation of an intelligence working group to function under the NSC-4/43 staff, with the CIA representative on the staff serving as chairman.

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It is proposed that this Staff's Intelligence Working Group will be organized in a fashion similar to the current "Jigsaw" project of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agencies and that the first task of the group will be a consideration of the request of the JSFC. The Intelligence Working Group (hereinafter referred to as IWG) will in the first instance consider the request of the JSFC and, if necessary, expand it to make of it a definitive statement of intelligence requirements useful for psychological warfare planning. It is then proposed that the IWG would (1) determine what current research is in process, both within and outside the Government structure, which would be useful to the completion of such projects; (2) would allocate new projects in order to completely satisfy the existing intelligence requirements; (3) would monitor the completion of such projects.

The IWG would, in addition, proceed with the planning of the intelligence organization necessary to support a psychological warfare effort. In determining the existence of, or in placing, projects with extra-government research organizations, the team of Kirkpatrick and Peardman (State and CIA) will be consulted.

In the ensuing week, it is hoped that agreement can be reached on the composition of the IWG and that, as soon as the personnel of such staff is named, immediate work can proceed concerning both the request of the JSFC and the planning of intelligence support for psychological warfare. Among other things, it is thought that perhaps within two weeks after the group starts to function, a report will be forthcoming on the status of the extra-government research useful in this operation. Several estimates have been made of a minimum of about one year required to complete the intelligence thought to be useful for psychological warfare planning. It is possible that priorities can be established wherein certain projects can be completed much sooner than the period of one year. It is also thought that periodic reports can indicate the rate of progress of the research projects.

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[redacted] wished to consider the request of the JSFC in detail, paragraph by paragraph, but due to the limitations of time, this procedure was not possible. It is thought, however, that a consideration of this request, both by this group and also by the full staff, would be highly desirable.

4. Personnel and Training: Col. Geewey reported on his recent trip to Maxwell Field. Col. Geewey, Mr. Theodor, and Mrs. Rasmussen were requested to make a survey of the OWI personnel files at Archives.

5. Logistics: Capt. Zondorak reported that his group would not be active until more plans by the other groups are formulated.

The meeting adjourned at 11:00 a.m.


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**TAB**

Draft  
31 October 1949

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D.C.



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
To: (IAC Members)

Subject: Representation on Psychological Warfare Intelligence Committee.

1. The existing NSC-4 and NSC-43 directives are currently being revised and combined into one document dealing with foreign information programs and planning for wartime conduct of overt psychological warfare. Pursuant to the terms of both these directives, and carrying over into the combined document, the Secretary of State is given responsibility for the achievement of overall objectives and the Central Intelligence Agency is assigned an intelligence responsibility.

*omit*

2. It has been determined to create a Psychological Warfare Intelligence Committee to discharge this intelligence responsibility. Since there is at present an area of doubt concerning the precise statement of the mission and of the personnel requirements of such committee, this agency is preparing for the consideration of the IAC members a document setting forth its views in the matter.



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3. Meanwhile the exigencies of the current world situation are such that it is imperative to immediately create an ad hoc committee to begin orientation with regard to the problem and to solve those patent questions which are not subject to juridical dispute.

4. Accordingly, you are respectfully requested to name at your earliest convenience one member to serve on such Psychological Warfare Intelligence Committee under this Agency's chairmanship.

Roscoe Hiltenkoetter, Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

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DRAFT  
31 October 1959

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. In order to assist the Director of Foreign Information and Psychological Warfare Programs, (and) the Director of Central Intelligence (in fulfilling their respective responsibilities under the terms of NSG <sup>Sec</sup> there is <sup>the DCI</sup> hereby established an intelligence committee on foreign information and psychological warfare, to be known as the P.W. Intelligence Committee.

2. The P. W. Intelligence Committee shall act under chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, and shall be composed of the following:

1. Chairman, CIA
2. Member, Department of State
3. Member, Department of the Army
4. Member, Department of the Navy
5. Member, Department of the Air
6. Such external consultants as the committee deems necessary.
7. Such additional representation from the agencies represented as the committee deems necessary.

3. The committee shall be responsible for:

a. the formulation of intelligence production requirements for the conduct of foreign information programs in periods of peace and psychological warfare programs in periods of national emergency or war. Such requirements shall include a recommended schedule of priorities for production and recommended allocation of production

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responsibilities as between participating governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies.

*Omit*  
b. the coordination of intelligence production (requirements) for the above stated purposes with the Director of the P. I. and P. W. Programs, the D/EI, the J. C. S., and the Departmental Agencies concerned, to insure that both planning and operational intelligence needs have been provided for.

c. the transmittal of coordinated intelligence production requirements, for the above stated purposes, to the D/EI for implementing action.

?  
d. the development of recommendations for the composition, organization, placement and training of the intelligence components required by each of the services for the conduct of psychological warfare both at the national level and in theaters of operation.

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