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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

NSC Review Complete as Redacted.

3 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT:

Report on the Status of the Foreign  
Intelligence Program as of 30 June 1953

DOE Review  
Completed.

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1. In accordance with your request of 29 May 1953, I submit to the President, with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the attached report on the status of the Foreign Intelligence Program as of 30 June 1953.

2. In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to point out that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this report.

3. Inasmuch as intelligence programs by their very nature are not subject to rapid change, I propose, with the concurrence of the IAC, that hereafter a complete revision of this status report be prepared only on an annual basis (as of 30 June or such other date as the National Security Council may desire), and that semi-annually there be submitted a brief supplementary statement of the most significant changes which have occurred since the last annual report.

4. I recommend that paragraph 5 of Section XII be made available only to the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

5. In lieu of a financial statement, not included in the attached report, I shall make an oral report to the National Security Council on CIA's expenditures. This oral report will pertain only to CIA data and will not include expenditures on intelligence made by the other members of the intelligence community.

State Dept. review completed

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

Attachment

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*submitted 9/20/53  
9 Aug 53*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

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ELLEN W. DULLES

Director

Attachment

OIC: [Redacted] (30 July 1953)

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Distribution:

2 - Addressee

1 - DD/I

2 - DCI

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# 11

Intelligence

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\*DOE REVIEW  
COMPLETED\*

NO. 9 — THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred  
in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Objective . . . . .	Back of divider
I. Coordination . . . . .	1
II. National Estimates . . . . .	1
III. Political, Social, and Cultural Intelligence . . . . .	2
IV. Armed Forces Intelligence . . . . .	3
V. Economic Intelligence . . . . .	4
VI. Scientific and Technical Intelligence . . . . .	5
VII. Psychological Intelligence . . . . .	7
VIII. Geographic Intelligence . . . . .	7
IX. Basic Intelligence . . . . .	8
X. Warning of Attack . . . . .	8
XI. Collection . . . . .	9
XII. Support and Collation Facilities . . . . .	12

MORI/CDF Pages 4-12, 14-21.

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### OBJECTIVE

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council —

(1) to advise the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: provided, that CIA shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions: provided further, that the departments and other agencies shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: and provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

— National Security Act of 1947,  
as Amended

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3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the one hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy is fixed. This is being done with increasing frequency and directness of application to the policy issues.

4. Special efforts are being made to get greater precision and clarity in estimates generally. As a particular case, considerable progress was made in NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957", (16 June 1953), over NIE-64, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1954", (12 November 1952):

a. Greater analytical precision in the section on political warfare capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical areas of the world, and which distinguishes between the capability to overthrow governments and the capability to influence governments and peoples.

b. Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors, which occupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE-65.

c. Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities sections, with fewer figures, more emphasis on military programs, and a more specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and of Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic weapons in the U.S.

### III. POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence has been very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate only for the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands have been met only partially and inadequately.

2. The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from slight to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustive coverage and research on which sound estimates and analyses depend. Coverage of the USSR, the Eastern European Satellite complex, and China, has been most nearly adequate. Relatively lower priority has been given to research on other areas, with [redacted] and Southeast Asia at the upper end of the scale, graduating downward to Latin America and Africa. The inadequacy of resources has been reflected chiefly in an inability to prosecute sustained research programs at all desired points. Nonetheless, there has remained sufficient flexibility to produce individual studies of considerable depth on selected major problems.

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World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, has been satisfactorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneuverings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research into matters of organization, financial support and infiltration into political and social organizations has been less satisfactory.

#### IV. ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE

##### 1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence covering the combat zone area for the support of current military operations in Korea is generally adequate. There still remains a serious deficiency in our ability to obtain timely identification of or information on the movements or locations of Chinese forces in all areas behind the immediate front line armies in Korea back through Manchuria into China. Information on installations and on developments in Manchuria, such as types and extent of training, reorganization and resupply of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of the Yalu River is inadequate. This deficiency remains substantially unchanged. Reliable information of the enemy's long-range plans and intentions is practically non-existent.

The extent of our information on Chinese Communist activities in South China is inadequate.

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The present level of information would be inadequate for support of operations by U.S. forces, however; inherent in any commitment of U.S. forces would be the rapid development of combat and operational intelligence efforts.

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A possible early augmentation of U.S. intelligence personnel in Indochina should improve present U.S. coverage in that area. However, the picture for the major target area in Asia, i.e., Communist China, is very dark.

The achievement of any major improvement must depend on the increase in scope and efficiency of clandestine operations against military targets.

##### 2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Communist China and -- to a lesser degree -- the European Satellites is partial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of collection.

Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the United States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is generally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations whose national policy restricts our access to such information.

### 3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on economic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit and is in intermediate research stages for [redacted] the Far East; increasing research emphasis continues on military targets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate to support joint operational planning but more vigorous data collection efforts will be required to maintain these studies on a current basis and to support extended systems analysis to meet detailed service requirements.

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Initial production of dossiers for priority combat targets is almost complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for the satellite and approach areas. Extensive tactical target coverage has been completed on areas adjoining Korean theater but on other areas is in various stages of completion.

### 4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)


NATO requests have been filled with the best available intelligence consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence studies and intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files are provided to the NATO Standing Group and NATO major commands. Releasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the mission of the NATO major commands are continuously provided.

## V. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE


1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents few serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material of variable quality and from the multiplicity of sources.

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3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in Section IV, Armed Forces Intelligence, continue to involve the large-scale processing of foreign economic and technological data.

4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field make it imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minimum. Closer integration of research programming among the various agencies concerned with economic research for intelligence is being developed through the Economic Intelligence Committee.

VI. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE


1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of 1953. However, in the last analysis, production of realistic estimates is still dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectives and progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and evaluation of available information; however, the flow of information of a scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for the further development and utilization of new and improved methods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence information. Efforts along these lines have progressed slowly in the past six months, notwithstanding present potential in the fields of

photographic reconnaissance.

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2. A review of the effects of DCID 3/4 (which allocated primary production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the Department of Defense and established the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC)) was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to provide more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive, the review has been postponed until August 1953.



## 5. Industrial Information

Specialized data to meet departmental needs are maintained by the Defense Agencies. CIA collates all other types of foreign industrial information, including research establishments doing industrial research and development work. The material is maintained by individual establishment and is controlled by a tabulating card indexing system. References to industrial end-products are being indexed by tabulating machine methods to speed the analysis of data being supplied to all IAC agencies.

## 6. Photographs and Motion Picture Films

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographic and related documentary libraries, including motion picture films, consistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Except for post-war coverage of Soviet and Satellite Areas, the photographic support is nearly adequate for present needs.

## 7. Map Procurement and Reference Service

Procurement of foreign-published maps and information on mapping abroad is coordinated by [redacted] serving an interagency map committee. Results during the past three years have proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related information through the Foreign Service Geographic Attache program. Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and engineering drawings from domestic sources. Service Attache channels are also being used. The currently published foreign maps required for intelligence activities are received on a continuing basis through exchange arrangements between the Department of State and many foreign official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to those of an operational character maintained by the Military Service. Excellent map reference service in support of intelligence requirements are maintained by close working arrangements between the map libraries.

## 8. Foreign Language Publications

Approval of NSCID 16 has given new impetus to cooperative IAC activity in this field, and definite progress is being made toward implementation of the directive. An interagency advisory committee and its subcommittees are working on methods of improving the coordination of procurement and exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes. CIA is taking action to centralize its library, reference, and indexing services for foreign language books and periodicals, and to facilitate the use of such services by other agencies. Efforts are being made to coordinate operations, apportion the workload, and

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reduce duplication between the following activities: overseas abstracting by US missions to satisfy the local and departmental needs; exploitation by various agencies of technical and other publications to fulfill specific requirements; and exploitation by CIA of foreign language publications for information of interest to more than one intelligence agency. A central index of translations, maintained by CIA, prevents duplication between the translating activities carried on by each agency, and makes the translated product accessible to other intelligence consumers.

Good coverage of foreign publications needed for the intelligence effort is now being obtained, although further intensive collection action should be undertaken with regard to Soviet Bloc and Communist Chinese publications.

9. External Research


Plans for developing further coordination of external and contractual research in the social sciences (i.e., non-governmental) of interest to intelligence suffered modification when the Department of State felt obliged to cut back severely its expenditure in the External Research Staff. [redacted] will permit continuation of the existing program, but by no means full realization of the scale of operation which seemed to be in sight before the current budgetary allocations were determined. For the foreseeable future, therefore, there will continue to be imperfections in the efforts to minimize duplication in external research, to insure community benefit from such research and to facilitate the rational letting of external research contracts.

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Positive recommendations for a better balanced and integrated program of research in the fields of psychological and unconventional warfare within the Department of Defense have been made by an advisory group to the RDB. Action on the report has been deferred pending re-organization of the research and development program of the Defense Department.

The Economic Intelligence Committee plans to compile a report of all government sponsored economic external research on the Soviet Bloc classified through Secret. The report would include completed research, research in progress, and contemplated research.

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CIA 36313-2  
IAC-D-55/4  
(Final)  
25 August 1953

Copy No. 11

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN  
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

1. Attached for the information of the IAC agencies is a copy of subject report as reproduced by the National Security Council Secretariat.

2. In view of the fact that this final issue is the same as IAC-D-55/4 (Revised), it is only being issued to members of the IAC in the form of a single copy for the record.

RICHARD D. DRAIN  
Secretary

IAC-D-55/4  
(Final)

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COPY  
August 4, 1953

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No. 9 - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

(In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to point out that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this report.)

I. COORDINATION

1. Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential to producing adequate intelligence for national security purposes and to reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There is still some duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelligence, but steps are being taken continually to reduce this to a minimum.

2. On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCID No. 16, directing the DCI to ensure coordination of procurement and processing of foreign language publications. No other recommendations for coordination have been made to the NSC during the past six months; however, several improvements in intelligence coordination have been accomplished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies and others. There are at present, in addition to the Intelligence Advisory Committee established by NSCID No. 1, nine interdepartmental committees to coordinate important intelligence programs in atomic energy, domestic exploitation, defection, watch procedures, economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, scientific intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign language publications.

II. NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950 for the production of national intelligence estimates continue to operate satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence community is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.

2. A production program for national intelligence estimates is prepared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time obligatory charges are made. This program provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Continued emphasis is placed on the completion of basic estimates on the USSR in advance of the review of US budget estimates and NATO plans.

6. Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open scientific literature and in research in depth on institutions, but knowledge of basic scientific research and development behind the Iron Curtain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range scientific development programs is similarly poor. Information on the quantity of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reasonably adequate, but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory. In view of the increasing importance of such basic scientific information to the prediction of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort to improve intelligence in this field is planned for the coming months.

#### VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

1. Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare programs have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the framework of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and organization of the material for the psychological warfare user calls for unaccustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in analysis.

2. The Department of State has created a Psychological Intelligence Research Staff designed to increase coordination of governmental and private research in this field.

3. The final report of the Advisory Group on Psychological and Unconventional Warfare to the Research and Development Board recommended methods by which research in these fields might be better balanced and integrated within the Department of Defense. Because of the pending reorganization of the research and development structure in the Department of Defense, the report has not been acted upon.

4. A major deficiency in this field is the lack of information and of coordinated effort among intelligence agencies in determining resistance potential, psychological vulnerabilities, and of our propaganda effectiveness with respect to target audiences behind the Iron Curtain. Encouraging progress has been made individually by intelligence agencies in the development of an intelligence basis for the support of psychological warfare activities. The results produced thus far do not meet operational requirements, in part because of the difficulty of defining those needs.

#### VIII. GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, including evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing (a) regional studies, (b) objective and area analyses in support of covert operations, and (c) staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coordinated

geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in support of the National Intelligence Survey program.

2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet Bloc and adjacent areas is inadequate. Geographic intelligence research gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic facts that are required in support of planning and operational intelligence for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on the exploitation and utilization of available Russian technical literature in filling critical gaps.

#### IX. BASIC INTELLIGENCE

1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was begun in 1948 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was intended to meet with U. S. Government's demands for encyclopedic factual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was begun 1,729 individual sections have been produced on 66 of the 108 NIS areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 26 complete NIS. Of this number, 1,224 have been published. For the first time during the history of the program, the rate of production by contributing agencies equivalent to 8 NIS, as established by the JCS, was attained in fiscal year 1953. Based on this performance, a similar production program has been established for fiscal year 1954.

2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have precluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and made it necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However, NIS production on the group of 19 areas and 4 ocean areas of highest priority is approximately 54% complete, whereas the entire program is about 28% complete. NIS on twelve individual areas are over 75% complete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research support for NIS has been excellent.

3. In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be expected to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are published under the Maintenance Program which was started in fiscal year 1952. However, the time lag between production and publication still remains a problem. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is maintained with the JCS.

#### X. WARNING OF ATTACK

1. Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations drawn from



inadequate evidence. They must usually be based on estimates of the overall situation, adjusted to available current factual information.;

2. The IAC Watch Committee provides an interagency mechanism for assuring that new, detailed information is quickly pooled and evaluated. Maximum use is thus made of partial and inadequate information. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies make careful cross-checks of information from all sources against an elaborate analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tried.

3. In general there has been improvement during the past two and one half years in the ability of intelligence to provide prompt notice and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet as well as in the neutral and friendly areas.

4. Intelligence cannot assure adequate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations.

Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrangements to handle any information that is received.

## XI. COLLECTION

### 1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service have been satisfactory. Intelligence needs have been met most adequately in the political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. These deficiencies have been generally attributable to a lack of specialized personnel in those fields which are not closely related to the basic diplomatic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and a continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with more complete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial measures in progress concern:

a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational programs in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the psychological and sociological fields, and,

b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the national intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign

Service Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence instructions.

As a result of a recent study, measures to meet the needs for basic scientific information are being carried out.

## 2. Service Attache System

The Service Attache System furnishes extensive useful military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attaches in the Soviet Bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable information, although under the restrictions imposed on them by Communist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be considered adequate. The Service Attache System has been strengthened since the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Constant efforts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Service Attaches by the development of new collection guides and techniques.


## 3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive information. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zone of Germany and Austria.

Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on friendly and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China and Eastern Siberia.

## 4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of the overriding considerations of other than intelligence nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance capabilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contributions in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo interpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; corrective measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the analysis of economic and scientific developments in respect of the Soviet Orbit is being strengthened. Research and development effort is being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles ("guided missiles" and satellites) to overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of various detecting devices.



5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribution for security reasons.)



b. Propaganda Analysis

Requirements of estimating offices and psychological warfare activities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the propaganda




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analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of weekly reviews of the whole propaganda field and towards the production of more numerous specialized propaganda studies on substantive intelligence problems.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has increased appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful data to economic and scientific intelligence and to the [redacted] program. While military operations in Korea have not led to the capture of many important military end-items since January, plans are under consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis of captured explosives, propellants and other material available in the Far Eastern theater.


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The Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the JIC has absorbed the functions of the former Joint Material Intelligence Agency in the collection and exploitation of foreign materials.

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XII. SUPPORT AND COLLATION FACILITIES

1. Availability of Materials

With few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelligence is distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition to the distribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to locate and extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelligence material that was collected during and after the war, both in the United

States and overseas. The sheer volume of these materials present difficult problems of storage, analysis, and collation before they can be made readily available for research analysts and current intelligence purposes. The use of microfilm and machine techniques is providing assistance in dealing with these problems.

## 2. Reference Facilities

CIA provides a central reference facility for the IAC agencies through its collection of basic intelligence documents received from all sources. In addition, separate files of specialized intelligence data and materials are maintained to supplement the basic collection of the IAC agencies. These include biographic data, industrial data, photographs and motion picture films.

## 3. Library Facilities

Library services in the IAC agencies should become increasingly effective as a result of new measures for interlibrary cooperation in publications procurement, indexing and reference service.

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## 4. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains a file of biographic data on foreign personalities in the categories for which they have been assigned basic responsibility, and makes such data available to the other agencies upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political, military, economic, and scientific personalities. The depth of coverage varies with the intelligence interest, and with availability of source material. In those Iron Curtain areas where information is not easily obtained, the IAC agencies provide for more comprehensive coverage of the press, radio, and scientific and technical literature. There are extensive programs for the exploitation of displaced persons, returning PW's, and defectors, as well as other personnel having a knowledge of personalities in various areas. Every effort is made to include in dossiers that biographic information which is needed by intelligence researchers, such as political orientation, ability, [redacted], [redacted], probable course of action, past career, religion, marital status, associates, membership in cliques, location, etc.

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