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8-823

MEMORANDUM TO: JIGSAW Committee

5 January 1950

FROM : Sub-Committee

1. In accordance with the decision made by the JIGSAW Committee in its meeting of 25 August 1949, a canvass of intelligence projects on international Communism - finished, in process or planned - was undertaken by the Secretary. This canvass covered the US agencies represented in the JIGSAW Committee as well as external research. A separate report covering the results of this survey will be made by the Secretary at the next JIGSAW meeting. However, the Sub-Committee, charged with the responsibility for submitting recommendations on planning for a co-ordinated US program of intelligence in this field, could not meet until mid-November because only then had the canvass been concluded.

2. After frequent meetings from mid-November through December, the members of the Sub-Committee came to the conclusion that a production plan for intelligence on international Communism should consist not merely of an outline of the subject. In order to give perspective and comprehensiveness, the Sub-Committee felt that a production plan should be submitted to comprise, as amended by the Committee, the major "fields of investigation" which are presently significant for national intelligence in this sphere. The Sub-Committee recommends that the JIGSAW allocate primary responsibility for intelligence production in the respective fields of investigation to a special committee responsible for detailed programming.

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This Committee should analyze the production problems substantively and procedurally, and draw up for each field of investigation, a specific program for consideration of the JIISAW Committee. This program should include priorities, topics (with terms of reference), sub-allocations to participating agencies or research organizations, and scheduling as far as it can be foreseen.

3. As thus drawn up and utilized, the production plan herewith submitted can obviously perform at least three important functions additional to that of furnishing an over-all inclusive perspective: (1) in both its fields-of-investigation stage and programming stage, it can indicate topics for advance intelligence collection activity, (2) when its parts are allocated and sub-allocated, it can prevent unnecessary duplication of effort, (3) it can provide a basis for selection of priorities out of the widest and most strategic range of major problems in intelligence production on international Communism.

The planning and programming of intelligence production on international Communism should always permit flexibility. Broad objectives and specific programs should be constantly examined and adjusted in the light of changing events and new estimates.

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For the Sub-Committee:



Chairman

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**Draft Framework and Fields of Investigation for an
Over-All Production Plan of National Intelligence
ON
International Communism**

(with parenthetical references to the topics listed and commented upon in the "Memorandum to JIGSAW Committee from Sub-Committee" of 15 August 1949)

I. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNISM (Cf. Part A of the Memorandum)

A continuing analysis of their development with particular respect to:

A. Theory

- (a) Communist doctrine (A-1)
- (b) Communist organization (A-2)
- (c) Communist strategy and tactics (A-3)
- (d) Communism and the USSR

(To include the role of the USSR in the modification and interpretation of Marxist-Leninist principles and doctrines; the use of doctrine for Soviet political purposes; and the function of the Soviet State in the growing Communist movement as represented in Communist theory and documents.)

- (e) Non-orthodox theories; especially "Titoism"

B. The psychology and sociology of Communism and of Communist activities

II. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY

The nature, activities, and personalities of the various international organizations in which Communists are in total or partial control; USSR sponsorship and utilization of such organization.

- (a) Overt international Communist agencies; e.g., Cominform (3-5)

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II. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY (Cont'd)

- (b) Clandestine international Communist organization and activity: (B-14)
Control of national or regional CPs; espionage and sabotage, etc.
- (c) International front organizations (B-6) and Communist-infiltrated or -controlled organizations (labor, women, youth, student, professional, ethnic, etc.)
 - (1) Communist penetration of strategic industries (B-1)
- (d) Communist operations in international non-Communist agencies (B-13)
- (e) International Communist propaganda: Organization, analysis and effects, etc. (B-7)
- (f) The over-all network and integration of (the above) international Communist organizations and activities; and the relative importance of their respective capabilities and vulnerabilities (B-11)
- (g) Leaders and personalities in international Communist organization (B-10)
- (h) Anti- and counter-Communist elements in international organizations and movements (B-8, B-9)

III. NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTIES, AND COUNTER ACTIVITY

Organization, activities, personnel, and relative importance in Soviet-Communist power politics

- A. A series of country-by-country studies of individual national Communist parties each in its own setting (B-4)

(From a planning viewpoint, it would seem advisable that the study of each national party be more or less comparable with the studies of the rest. This would permit, for instance, an analysis of the relative prevalence of fundamental features, and might give clues to the variations expectable under various emerging or prospective conditions. Because a number of individual party studies are concerned and no committee or a single party would be responsible for drawing an outline for possible

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common features of any study, it would seem wise for JICSAW as a whole to pass upon an outline for national parties before recommending priority for any single party study. Such an outline which the Sub-Committee will submit at a later date may be accepted for both intelligence collection and production.)

B. Type studies and comparative summaries

- (a) The organization of national Communist parties - a type study (B-4)
- (b) Clandestine and underground organization and activity - summary comparison (B-14)
- (c) Capabilities and vulnerabilities of national parties in relation to their respective national or area situations (B-11) - summary comparison, utilizing especially data on capabilities and vulnerabilities in the national party studies
- (d) Inter-relations between national Communist parties (inside and outside of the framework of international organizations)

IV. COMMUNISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Based on continuous coordination of relevant material from studies from I, II, and III above, of separate study of Soviet foreign policy, and of other special studies. To include for the time being, but not to be confined to:

- (a) USSR's promotion, direction and utilization of national and international Communist and non-Communist organizations and activities for the furtherance of its political and economic aims
- (b) The participation of Soviet embassies and missions in its promotion, direction, and utilization of Communism
- (c) Impairment to USSR foreign policy thru ill-advised Communist or thru anti- and counter-Communist activities
- (d) Communism in colonial and semi-colonial areas (B-1)
- (e) Soviet-Communist sabotage of strategic industries, transportation and communication systems, and public utilities (B-5)
- (f) The seizure of political and military power, and the Soviet's role therein.

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- c. The Regional Branch Communism Desk, under the functional guidance of the Chief, International Communism Group, EE/USSR Branch, and under the administrative control of the regional branch chief will be responsible (1) for coordinating and integrating regional and national analysis of the Communist movement in the area concerned, (2) for coordinating this effort with the International Communist Group, EE/USSR Branch, and (3) for keeping the respective Regional Branch Chiefs informed of world-wide Communist activities which apply to their areas.

2. The composition of each of these elements is set forth below:

- a. The ORE Intelligence Production Board augmented by:

- (1) Representative, OIR, Dept. of State
- (2) Representative, FBI
- (3) Representative, OSO
- (4) Chief, International Communism Group, EE/USSR Branch
- (5) Representatives of the other IAC agencies whenever matters pertaining to their interests are under consideration.

- b. The International Communism Group, EE/USSR Branch

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|-----------------------|-------|------|
| (1) Chief | P-7 | (1) |
| (2) Ass't. Chief | P-7 | (1)* |
| (3) Political Analyst | P-6 | (4)* |
| (4) Political Analyst | P-5 | (4)* |
| (5) Political Analyst | P-4 | (4)* |
| (6) Political Analyst | P-3 | (4)* |
| (7) Secretary | CAF-5 | (1) |
| (8) Clerks | CAF-4 | (2) |

Total Professional	6
Total Clerical	3

<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>9</u>
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*No more than five of these positions to be filled concurrently. This will permit flexibility in recruiting and promoting high caliber personnel.

- c. The Regional Branch Communism Desk

- (1) Political Analyst (1) P-4 to P-7 detailed from the Branch concerned.
- (2) Such additional analysts as the branch concerned may elect to assign to such duties

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	D/AD, ORE	Clw	22 Mar
2	Chief, ICAPS	/	
3		WCB	
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, Plans & Policy	WCB	22 Mar
2			
3			

- APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
- ACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURN
- COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
- CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILE

REMARKS: ORE requests that the attached redraft be substituted for the ICAPS First Draft of subject paper.
 Clw

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