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Dear Mr. Staats;

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of May 1, 1952 transmitting a draft report to the President on the work of the Psychological Strategy Board and a proposed ^{clarifying} ~~clarification~~ of the PSB directive for the President's signature. *memorandum*

We have given careful consideration to this material, and it is the view of the Department of State that the report is an excellent analysis and that the proposed ~~clarification of the directive~~ *memorandum* should be issued.

The Department believes that there is one change which should be made in the proposed clarifying document and wishes to make several suggestions with respect to the report itself.

While I believe that the proposed rotation of the chairmanship among the members of the Board is desirable and is supported by the analysis set forth in the report, the same analysis appears to condemn the suggestion that the Director might serve as presiding officer. If the Director should both assume broader responsibility to "organize the staff and activities under the Board" and serve as presiding officer at the meetings of the Board, it is likely that the effective chairmanship of the Board would in fact migrate to the Director. The Department of State agrees with the position taken in the report that this development would not be desirable. Consequently, we propose that the suggestion that the Director might serve as presiding officer be deleted from the proposed clarifying document.

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We have the following suggestions on the report itself:

1. In the section of the report dealing with the "role and mission" of the Board it is stated that the "cold war headquarters" view of the Board would require "a pattern of relationships with the President and the National Security Council independent of those which its member departments could provide." While this statement is entirely true, it might be added that an adequate distinction between the functions of the NSC and the PSB would become virtually impossible.
2. In the same section of the report the "other extreme view" would have the Board concerned "only with programs specifically identified as psychological operations, such as propaganda and the like." The phrase "and the like" obscures the boundaries of this definition in such fashion that the extreme view is not adequately expressed. The definition would be improved by the deletion of this phrase.
3. In several places, the report speaks of "strategic planning" unmodified by any reference to the field within which the Board is concerned with strategic plans. This problem might be dealt with by footnoting the first use of the term "strategic planning" with the statement that this term as used in the report means strategic planning within the field of the Board's responsibility.
4. The first paragraph on page four implies that the Board has the same degree of responsibility for "forward and strategic planning . . . for specifically identified psychological operations" and for "the psychological aspects of a national effort." It would be desirable to recognize a

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distinction between the responsibility of the Board for plans within the field of psychological operations and for the psychological aspects of other plans and programs. Programs of an economic, political or military character not designed primarily as psychological programs may, of course, have great psychological importance. The Board should provide advice to the Departments and the National Security Council on the psychological aspects of such programs, but it could not reasonably be held "responsible for" these aspects to the same degree as it is responsible for planning of psychological programs. . . . Actually, this ~~fact~~ is well expressed in the last paragraph on page 5. "The obvious intent of having provided for a board structure for PSB is to insure this correlation and, as necessary, subordination of psychological considerations with broader consideration of high military or foreign policy and with operational feasibility."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

May 12

CIA - Mr. Hulick
Room 225 Administration Building

Attached is a rough
copy of the letter Mr. Sargeant
has suggested for Mr. Bruce's sig-
nature to Mr. Staats. Mr. Sargeant
would be happy to discuss it or a CIA
draft with Mr. Wisner & Defense.

Bradley H. Patterson, Jr.
Staff Assistant