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DAC D-1a
January 21, 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Problems Involved in Preparation of Paper on
Disclosure and Verification

The attached document is being circulated in conjunction with,
and as background to, DAC D-1, "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing
Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments".

Now D-1/1

Edward G. Platt, Jr.
Secretary

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January 18, 1952

PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PREPARATION OF
PAPER ON DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

1. Preliminary.

This paper has been prepared in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs in the Department of State. It must be emphasized that it has not been cleared anywhere, even in the office which prepared it. It is contemplated that in order to save time it will be dealt ^{with} / simultaneously in State, Defense and AEC not as a government position but as a working paper to be presented to the Disarmament Commission by the United States Representative acting as an expert and not as a government representative.

2. Timing.

The General Assembly resolution "directs the Commissionto consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a further and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament program envisaged in the present resolution."

It is anticipated that in view of the policy directive in NSC 112 the United States will take the position that at the outset the newly created commission should deal exclusively with the problem of disclosure and verification. However, since both the President and the Secretary of State have said that we are willing to discuss other phases of the subject we fear that we will not be able to confine the discussions at the outset to disclosure and verification. The practical question that is likely to arise is to what extent can we maintain

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maximum emphasis on disclosure and verification. One thing is completely clear - unless we have a constructive and forward-looking paper on that subject to present to the Commission at the outset, we will not succeed in our efforts to secure maximum emphasis on disclosure and verification.

We anticipate that the paper must be submitted about February 20,

Therefore, the first problem is to organize the preparations of this paper in such a manner that we can have a working paper to submit by that date. It would be satisfactory for the paper to be submitted as a working paper rather than as an official government position. This was the device utilized in the submission of the papers to the Collective Measures Committee and it turned out very satisfactorily both from the standpoint of the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

3. Relation of paper to NSC 112.

Any paper on this subject obviously must be in conformity with NSC 112. The proposals which we make must be honest and must be of such a nature that if accepted contrary to our expectations, we could live with them.

The general program set forth in NSC 112 is an honest program that we can live with. It was not too difficult for the President and the Secretary of State and Ambassador Jessup to justify the broad outlines of this program on the grounds that it was a morally right program.

When, however, we proceed from the general outline to the problem of stages of disclosure and verification which is dealt with in Annex A of NSC 112, we are confronted with a somewhat different situation. The

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recommended stages of disclosure and verification very properly are based solely upon the security interests of the United States. In other words, the items to be disclosed in the first stage would be those where the disclosure and verification by the United States would be least harmful to its security interests, and where the disclosure and verification by the Soviet Union would be most advantageous to the United States. That is entirely satisfactory as a hidden objective. However, it is not possible for the United States Representative in the Commission to justify staging on the ground that it is advantageous to the interests of the United States and disadvantageous to the interests of the Soviet Union. It is necessary in this paper to find a logical and morally sound and appealing basis for the staging. If there is such a basis then it is of no consequence that the results of such a staging happen to coincide with the security of the United States. It must be thoroughly understood however that the security considerations are in fact paramount. The staging suggested in the paper would in general be satisfactory from the standpoint of presentation to the United Nations - the only aspect of the situation where UNA has professional competence. We venture no opinion on whether it adequately protects the security interests of the United States, this being a matter for determination by Defense and AEC. We sought, however, within the limits of our knowledge to conform the staging to United States security interests on the following line of reasoning.

The specific staging can be logically justified on the ground first of proceeding from the least secret areas in the early stages, to the most secret, and second on the ground of proceeding from those areas where verification can

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be accomplished with a minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country to those where verification would require greater interference. At the same time we hoped that the result of such a pattern would be to accomplish substantially the chief objective set forth in the annexes to NSC 112.

- a) The staging concerning disclosure of atomic energy recommended by the AEC.
- b) The establishment of a system of inspection with broad functions at the commencement of the first stage.
- c) The postponement of any disclosure of novel weapons until the last stage.
- d) The elimination of research and development activities from the process of disclosure and verification.

4. Adaptation of Position to the United Nations.

The ultimate arrangements in connection with disclosure and verification will be highly complex. For example, the disclosure of the numerical size of armed forces is probably entirely appropriate for the first stage. However, these forces may be engaged in activities and may utilize weapons which would be reserved for later stages of disclosure and verification. This is merely one of the swarm of highly technical problems which will ultimately have to be decided. It must be recognized frankly however, that the newly organized Commission is not an appropriate organ for dealing at the outset with problems of this nature. Our general experience with United Nations committees is that a long process of education is necessary to secure international agreement on complicated programs. In the early stages it is merely possible to scratch the surface.

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surface. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare a comparatively simple and straight-forward paper and to avoid overwhelming the Commission with a mass of complicated details.

This objective is accomplished chiefly through the device of presenting in an extremely generalized form the items to be disclosed and verified in the respective stages, and postponing the more detailed discussions until individual countries submit their specific programs. In other words, until the individual country programs are submitted the discussion will be confined to general principles.

5. Other problems.

Three problems not fitting within the categories set forth above, arose in connection with the preparations of this paper and should be briefly noted:

- a) Research
- b) Aerial reconnaissance
- c) Definition of novel weapons.

a) The elimination of research and development activities from the disclosure and verification besides being in accordance with preferences expressed in NSC 112 may be logically justified on two grounds:

- i) research and development in its early stages does not constitute arms production;
- ii) research and development is practically impossible to verify.

b) It would be consistent with NSC 112 to suggest verification through aerial surveys in all stages. Such a result would clearly benefit the United

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States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The paper reserves aerial reconnaissance for the second and third stages in accordance with the concept that the disclosure and verification in the first stage should be in connection with the less secret areas.

*Now
all stages*

The considerations which led us to reach this conclusion were somewhat different from the reason stated in the paper. It is apparent that unlimited aerial reconnaissance will be about the most objectionable subject from the standpoint of the Soviet Union of all those contained in the paper. Since the United States can with some justice be accused of "stacking the deck" against the Soviet Union, it seems to us that the propaganda benefits from postponement of aerial reconnaissance to the second stage outweigh any advantages of including it as part of the first stage.

c) Definition of novel weapons. It will be noted that the novel weapons reserved for disclosure and verification in the third stage are those which were not in general use at the end of World War II. This staging is apparently advantageous to the United States in two respects: (i) the chances are that weapons in general use at the end of World War II - such as the Norden bomb sight - has by this time become quite well known to the Soviet Union; (ii) atomic weapons were not in general use at the end of World War II although it could readily be claimed that the production of fissionable material had ceased to be novel. Therefore this staging in the field of non-atomic weapons helps to maintain consistency between the staging in connection with atomic weapons and that in other areas.

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DAC D-1/1

February 15, 1952

WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Disclosure and Verification

The attached redraft, including in particular the annex on stages of disclosure and verification of atomic armaments, incorporates the suggestions of members of the Working Group.

As agreed in the Working Group meeting of February 8, the paper should be considered simultaneously in State, Defense, AEC and, if desirable, CIA, with a view to its clearance as a working paper (not as a U.S. Government position) which would be submitted to the Disarmament Commission about March 1.

Edward G. Platt, Jr.
Secretary

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Draft
February 14, 1952

Proposals for Progressive and Continuing
Disclosure and Verification of Armed
Forces and Armaments

Introduction

The General Assembly resolution calling for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments directs that the Commission be guided by a number of principles, including the following:

(Operative paragraph 3)

"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces - including para-military, security and police forces - and all armaments including atomic;

"(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established."

Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:

"5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the out-set plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution".

It is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution contemplates that the newly created Disarmament Commission should as a matter of priority deal with the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

U. S. Proposals

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U.S. Proposals

The United States proposes the following program of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

A. Extent of Disclosure and Verification

1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements of a continuing program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be on a permanent or at least a long term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.

2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

3. The verification of armed forces and armaments must likewise cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

B. Stages of Disclosure and Verification

4. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been satisfactorily completed. The reasons for proceeding by stages are two:

(a) in the existing state of international tensions all states must be protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the
system

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system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The existence of stages gives all states the opportunity over a period of time to test the good faith of all other states. The mere agreement to enter into a system for disclosure and verification would give no assurance that the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all. With disclosure and verification in several stages and with each step of one stage completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, all States have the opportunity at periodic intervals of checking the good faith of other States through review of the information theretofore disclosed.

(b) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification would proceed from the less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in early stages to the more secret areas. A phasing of this nature in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information which many States would like reserved until substantial cooperation and good faith has been demonstrated.

5. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States had as its objective the full implementation of the program of disclosure and verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, would unduly delay not only the program of disclosure and verification but also the entire program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces
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and armaments. With this in mind, the United States concluded and is proposing that the number of stages of disclosure and verification should be four - a figure which represents the minimum number consistent with the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. In each stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the successful completion of the program.

6. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed. Annex II sets forth the same information with respect to atomic armaments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons are presented in a separate annex solely in the interests of clarity of presentation. Both the problems involved and the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic weapons differ so greatly from the problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both atomic and non-atomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes the items set forth both in Annex I and in Annex II for disclosure and verification in that stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding stages.

7. Without commenting in detail at this point on the specific items subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have three general characteristics:

(a) They

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- (a) They should prove to be the least secret items.
- (b) In the main, they are most susceptible of verification by periodic visits of inspection and through reference to statistical records - with the result that verification can take place with the minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries. Some resort would nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot" inspection, and reconnaissance would be required in all stages to assist in checking the adequacy of the disclosure.
- (c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification as provided in this stage in and of itself would act as an indication of good faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ultimate goals of the entire program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.

8. The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the second, third and fourth stages are progressively more secret and more difficult to verify except through "on-the-spot" investigations in conjunction with extensive aerial reconnaissance.

9. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the four stages as outlined in Annexes I and II can in general be summarized as follows:

Stage I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report on existing strength levels of all armed forces and of the location of installations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types including atomic.

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Stage II.

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Stage II. Detailed disclosure of organization of armed forces and of installations and facilities concerned with the basic materials required for production of all armaments including atomic.

Stage III. Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel armaments) fissionable material and installations and facilities utilized in their production.

Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments including atomic (armaments not in general use by the end of the second World War but in volume production today) and installations and facilities utilized in their production.

C. Inspection

10. The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the overall program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of disclosed information. In addition provision must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of "on-the-spot" inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports and through aerial surveys.

11. Extensive

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11. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential in all stages of the disclosure and verification procedure.

12. It is contemplated that "on-the-spot" inspection will take place in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the first than in the later stages because of the greater ease of verification through other methods of the items disclosed in the first stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the right of "on-the-spot" inspections in early stages are set forth in Annexes I and II.

13. Each state at the commencement of each stage should submit to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed should be granted to inspectors.

14. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and facilities be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed.

Accordingly,

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Accordingly, each State should be required during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever situated.

15. Each state should facilitate the activities of the international inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require.

16. Procedures should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission of the necessity for inspection of any facilities or installations access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required.

17. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination confirmed by the Security Council of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the state guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other states should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system.

18. The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the program of disclosure and verification and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of

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the General Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment pursuant to such treaties of international machinery responsible for carrying out the program of disclosure and verification including the position of such machinery located within the territory of states adhering to the program.

19. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first stage should commence upon a Security Council determination that the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed.

20. The Security Council decisions set forth in paragraphs 17 and 19 should be by an affirmative vote of any seven members.

21. It is not contemplated that research or development activities in the field of armaments shall be included within the program of disclosure proposed herein unless and until such activities reach the stage of volume production of armaments.

D. Miscellaneous

22. The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the time of the adoption of the general principles governing this program the necessary inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed forces and armaments, including those involving atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to the program. In establishing this machinery, consideration should be given to its subsequent utilization to supervise the program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The machinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably be utilized in connection with

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the disclosure and verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The problem of appropriate United Nations machinery both for purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the subject of a separate study.

23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering states should begin simultaneously and should go forward at approximately the same tempo.

24. The disclosure and verification system must be open for adherence by all States and authorities and must be agreed to at least by those States, and authorities, the military resources of which are so substantial that their failure to provide information and adhere to the verification aspects of the system would endanger the program. The draft treaties or agreements referred to in Operative Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution would include the list of States and authorities the adherence of which to the disclosure and verification system would be required.

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ANNEX I

PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

ARMED FORCES AND NON-ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

STAGE I

Disclose (a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces and para-military organizations, including training establishments and security and police forces, broken down into each category.

(b) Location of all operational military installations.

Verify (a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to include personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.

(b) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations.

(a) and (b) - inspectors will have access to entire national territory to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

STAGE II

Disclose (a) Organization, composition and disposition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I.

(b) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.

Verify

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- Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units and administrative support supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
- (b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.
- (a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

STAGE III

- Disclose (a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up overall strengths disclosed in Stages I and II, except units equipped with novel weapons.)
- (b) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and capacity.

- Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
- (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labor force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

STAGE IV

Disclose (a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons.

(b) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.

(c) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons.

Verify (a) By cross checks with Stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed.

(b) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross-checked with information disclosed in Stages I and II and III.

(c) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labor force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a), (b) and (c) by aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.

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ANNEX II

PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

STAGE I

- Disclose (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation.
- (b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the product material and the process used in each instance.
- Verify (a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine that all atomic energy installations have been declared.)
- (b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination of all structures and unboxed equipment. Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant.

STAGE II

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STAGE II

- Disclose (a) Design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water, and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.
- (b) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

- Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.
- (b) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

STAGE III

- Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to

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to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.

- (b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.

Verify

- (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects of the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.
- (b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.

STAGE ^{IV} III

Disclose

- (a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.
- (b) Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand.

Verify

- (a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.
- (b) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III and (a) above.

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REMARKS: Due to URGENCY attached draft is being considered simultaneously in State, Defense, AEC and CIA, with a view to clearance as a WORKING PAPER (not US Government position) BEFORE 1 MARCH.

DD/I asked me to pass the attached to DD/P for his reaction to the draft. DD/I stresses that only an informal "OK" (if OK seems indicated) is required.

(OVER)

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