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A P P R O V E D

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FSB M-9a

MINUTES

Ninth Meeting of the
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
January 31, 1952 2:45 p.m.
Director's Conference Room
Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency

MEMBERS:

- General Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence,
Chairman
- Honorable William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Honorable James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
- Honorable W. Averill Harriman, Director for Mutual Security,
Executive Office of the President
- Dr. Raymond B. Allen, Director, Psychological Strategy Board

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

Department of State

Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Ass't Secretary of State for Public
Affairs

Department of Defense

Brig. Gen. John Magruder, USA (Ret'd)

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brig. Gen. Jesmond D. Balmer, USA

Central Intelligence Agency

Office of Director for Mutual Security, Executive Office of
The President

Mr. Samuel Berger, Ass't to Mr. Harriman (Agenda Item 2 only)

Psychological Strategy Board

Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Mr. Edmond Taylor

Col. Charles W. McCarthy, Executive Officer

Major Edmund J. Bennett, Secretary

U. S. Senate

Senator Brien McMahon (for Agenda Items 1 through 3)

Charles W. McCarthy
Charles W. McCarthy
Colonel, U.S.A.
Executive Officer

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NSC review(s) completed.

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Approval of Minutes of Seventh Meeting

Minutes of the seventh meeting were approved. Amendments to the minutes of the eighth meeting were suggested by Mr. Foster and Mr. Webb. General Smith asked that these be inserted and underlined and then circulated for approval.

Agenda Item No. 2. - Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/b)

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Action:

Approved as amended. Amendments proposed by Mr. Harriman and General Smith were accepted. Mr. Webb offered some observations on Group B actions for inclusion in the minutes; these will be considered at the next meeting.

Discussion:

Mr. Harriman proposed the following amendments to Section III, all of which were unanimously approved by the Board:

- a. Par. 1, lines 1 - 3. Strike out "westward" and "in Europe".
- b. Par. 1, lines 3 to 7. To be rewritten as follows:
"It has strategic significance as the instrument through which the Soviet Union is harassing French economic recovery, weakening the French and NATO defense effort, and encouraging neutralism, all with the object of making France an dependable ally of the West in times of peace or war. The French communist party thus constitutes a serious threat to American foreign policy and to NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe."
- c. Par. 10, second sentence, eliminate "and appropriate guidance and support by the French Government" and insert a new sentence between the first and second to read, "The most important actions that could be taken to reduce communist power in France are for the Government to give positive support to the democratic unions in their struggle against communist domination of organized labor, to stop subsidizing the communist unions and stop dealing with them, and to work towards a more equitable share of the national income for labor."

General Smith then proposed the following amendments, which were also unanimously approved by the Board:

- a. Section VI. Administrative Matters, par. I.A., 4th line. Delete "including" and insert in lieu "where appropriate chaired by a member of the Psychological Strategy Board staff"

- b. Add a par. C. to par. I, Section VI:
"The reports of the various members shall be made available to the others"

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
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Mr. Webb indicated his willingness to accept the Plan but requested that the following observations be incorporated in the minutes:

"The Department of State agrees with the purposes and objectives in PSB D-14/b. Because of the novelty of many of the proposed courses of action in the new fields under which we would be taking U.S. Government operations, we accept this report as guidance to planners and as permissive rather than mandatory. The judgments of the Ambassador and of the policy officers here will have to be resorted to for decisions to initiate, carry out or suspend the actions concerned, and to time them.

"The courses of action in particular which are specified in Group B of Section V of the report are of a nature so novel in the operations of one sovereign government within the jurisdiction of another sovereign government that a few words of comment to emphasize and fortify the preface of Group B are necessary.

"The actions in Group B reveal a recognition on our part of basic structural distortions and inequalities in French society. The reforms proposed are designed to bring about a stability within France which will strengthen it against communism and enhance our security.

"However, there is a great gap between stating praise-worthy objectives dealing with reform in the field of labor management relations, in the distribution of income, in business and social practices, etc. in France, and realizing such objectives. Without a proper appreciation of the width of this gap we expose ourselves to frustrating experiences, if results do not measure up to intentions. To put through such reforms requires political power. Political power has been lacking in French Governments. The margins of power to enable the French Government to push through such wide and basic reforms, on the assumption that the French Government desires them, have not been available. The question arises whether the programs proposed in the report does not presuppose a political vitality which if it existed would of itself constitute an answer to problems of French society.

"Moreover, the adoption by the French Government of a good many of the programs outlined presuppose a high degree of governmental control of economic activity. This would necessarily call for a significant shift to the left of the basis of political power in France

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while we are striving for free enterprise and freer competition. We would therefore constantly have to bear in mind whether such a shift in French political direction would be entirely an unmixed blessing from the standpoint of the objectives we are seeking.

"It therefore becomes obvious that each of the courses of action suggested must be weighed in relation to political factors requiring the most acute exercise of political judgment and timing. We cannot enter into them uncritically and unreservedly without taking into account both the negative and the positive implications bearing upon our political interests. Ultimately the question becomes not one of effecting reforms in the French system but of developing and maintaining in power elements of sufficient strength and desirable orientation to accomplish the reforms and at the same time to continue French collaboration with us toward our common security objectives. There is no easy formula or quick attainment of a political undertaking of this magnitude.

"If the foregoing considerations are kept constantly in mind by both the planners and the officials who will be responsible for implementation, the courses of action flowing from this paper should lead us in the right direction and should enhance our security."

The other Board members asked that they be given an opportunity to study these observations and then discuss them at the next meeting before formal incorporation in the minutes.

Agenda Item No. 1. - Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8a)

Action:

To be considered at the next meeting at which time the views of the Department of Defense will be presented.

Discussion:

Mr. Foster advised that Defense's views were being cleared. These views had been discussed informally by the alternates, but certain points are still unsettled. General Smith indicated his concern over the Joint Chiefs' proposal to use "theatre of war" instead of "theatre of operations". He observed that the "theatre of war" definition would probably mean "global" which, in relation to the paper at hand, would give the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for virtually the entire job. Such a definition would not be acceptable, General Smith declared, since, in his opinion, the military responsibility should, generally speaking, be limited to areas where fighting is occurring or about to occur.

Agenda Item No. 3. - Terms of Reference for PSB Weapons Information Guidance Committee (PSB D-17d/1; previously unnumbered, but dated 17 January 1952)

Action:

Approved as amended.

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Discussion:

General Magruder proposed and the Board accepted the following changes:

- a. Omit "for the National Security Council", page 1, par. 1a under "Problem".
- b. In second sentence of par. 3 "Procedure", change the phrase "the NSC may issue" to "may be issued".
- c. In par. 4, insert after the word "chairman", "Department of Defense", in parentheses.

General Smith proposed, and the Board concurred in a suggestion that the phrase "in the United States" at the end of par. 2c be inserted after "understanding" in the same sentence.

Agenda Item No. 4. - Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees - Phase "B"
(PSB D-18/a) (National Psychological Strategy
Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with
respect to Defectors, Escapees, Refugees, and
Potential Guerrillas from and in the Soviet Orbit)

Action:

Approved. The Board stipulated that the Panel should initially narrow the scope of the actual study to immediately probable U. S. capabilities.

Discussion:

Dr. Allen reported the PSB staff view that the terms of reference for Phase "B" were essentially an extension of the terms of reference for Phase "A" and were not an elaboration.

Mr. Webb observed that the proposed terms of reference were somewhat broad and should be more restrictive. He cautioned against a study that would develop plans for mass defections. Mr. Foster and General Smith replied that they did not construe the terms of reference as in any way inferring a plan for mass defections.

General Smith reported his staff's view that the terms were rather general and therefore the panel should establish definite limits within the context of the problem from which a feasible and phased plan can be evolved. The panel, General Smith suggested, should carefully formulate, as a first order of business, its concepts and outline the immediate practical limits around which a study can be built.

Dr. Allen suggested that rather than attempt to rewrite the terms of reference, the panel be requested to review them and develop necessary modifications to keep the study within manageable and realistic limits. Mr. Harriman urged early action to implement the Defector-Escapee Program, since he had to account to Congress shortly on the \$100,000,000 of MSA funds from which support will be drawn for this Program.

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Agenda Item No. 5. - Terms of Reference for Sub-Panel B-1 (Inventory - Second Stage)

Action:

Approved. The Board directed that a PSB panel: (a) undertake the strategic aspects of this job; and (b) delineate the specific tactical tasks and indicate their allocation to operating agencies.

Discussion:

Mr. Webb approved the paper and suggested that the PSB panel make use of the studies and information on this subject and on economic warfare which are available in State and other agencies. General Smith suggested that since the study to be undertaken involved operations and tactics, consideration should be given to transferring it to the POCC. Dr. Allen also favored considering such a move.

General Magruder and Mr. Barrett, members of POCC, reported that POCC is concerned primarily with propaganda. There is a good deal of international covert work and strategy involved in the subject study which POCC is not equipped to handle, they said.

Mr. Webb said since covert work was involved in the study a PSB panel should be used for it. Mr. Barrett suggested the job of developing detailed tactics could be given to POCC and CIA.

General Smith commented that since the problem states "to recommend concrete steps which the United States (and its Allies) can take in the future to frustrate Soviet blackmail tactics," it is out of the realm of strategy. General Magruder and Dr. Allen suggested the phrase "concrete steps" be omitted and the Board agreed. Dr. Allen offered to have the PSB staff aid in developing the specific tasks under this problem. The Board accepted this offer.

Agenda Item No. 6. - Guidance for the Director in Dealing with Congressional Committees

Action:

Mr. Webb was designated to give guidance to the Director on Congressional relations.

Discussion:

General Smith reported that this item had been discussed at the luncheon preceding the meeting.

Mr. Webb offered to develop some guide lines for the Director to follow in dealing with Congressional committees. Dr. Allen said he would like very much to have such guidance.

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Agenda Item No. 7. - Effectiveness of the US-UK-French Disarmament
Proposal in the United Nations (PSB D-20 (DRAFT))

Action:

Accepted the paper for its information.

Discussion:

The Board members complimented the PSB staff on the fine job they had done on this paper and expressed the hope that similar evaluation papers would be forthcoming from the PSB staff in the future.

Mr. Webb reported that Mr. Phillips had some comments on the paper which he would pass on to the PSB staff.

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