

DRAFTSECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 46PSB D-45
June 22, 1953

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.INTERIM U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION
OF UNREST IN SATELLITE EUROPE
(NSC Action 817-e)1. Problem

To assess the significance of recent signs of unrest in the European satellites of the USSR, particularly in the so-called German People's Republic, to estimate U.S. psychological capabilities for influencing the situation, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated U.S. psychological operations to exploit rapidly existing opportunities for furthering U.S. national objectives in the Satellite states of Europe, while laying the foundations for more ambitious programs in the future if events should warrant them.

2. The Situation

A dramatic new element has been introduced into the European situation by the current wave of unrest sweeping satellite Europe. Popular discontent over Communist oppression has flared into open defiance of Communist authority in Czechoslovakia, where workers' demonstrations of a violence and temerity hitherto unknown in the Satellite states broke out early this month. Though these riots appear to have been triggered by resentment over monetary reforms, in Pilsen, at least, they had broader implications. There, by the admission of the governmental press, an angry mob trampled on the Soviet flag and hoisted the American one. Minor acts of resistance have been reported elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and in Rumania. For some time, Albania has appeared to be on the verge of revolt, and a sober U.S. press observer, after a recent visit to Budapest, compares Hungary to a volcano which could erupt at any time.

NOTE: This document contains 18 pages, including 1a, 1b, 1c. Page 15 is the last page.

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It is in the so-called German Democratic Republic, however, that the most significant and spectacular developments have occurred. The anti-regime demonstrations which began in East Berlin on June 16, and developed the next day into bloody mass rioting, subsequently spread throughout a large part of the Soviet Zone and were frankly characterized by the governmental press and radio as a rebellion. Despite the proclamation of martial law and the deployment of Soviet armed forces in East Berlin and in several parts of the Soviet Zone, calm had not been fully restored six days after the outbreak of the uprisings. Several hundred thousand Germans appear to have participated in the movement. There were widespread strikes. The rioters were mainly workmen, many of them from heavy industry and public utilities. Several strategically important large plants were either destroyed or badly damaged. The communist press has reported what it termed "murderous assaults" on Party officials and police or other state employees, and mob attacks on government offices, jails, Party headquarters and other installations have been noted.

where
In East Berlin and elsewhere/mass riots occurred, the puppet police and military forces appeared to be ineffectual. A number of defections from the Communist police occurred. The pusillanimous behavior of Deputy Minister Otto Nuschke and other puppet officials did not enhance the prestige of the regime. The reenforcement or replacement of East German by Soviet military forces, including tank units, naturally tended to suppress large-scale mob demonstrations but did not immediately cow the rebellious workers. A number of audacious attempts to spike the guns or sabotage the treads of Soviet tanks were reported. Clearly there was no magic even in the most impressive manifestations of Soviet military strength. The tearing-down of the huge Soviet flag that has waved over the Brandenberger Gate in Berlin since the Red Army first entered the

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city was a symbolic act of tremendous portent.

The drastic and sweeping Soviet repression, involving thousands of arrests and a number of summary executions, had not broken the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany a week after the beginning of the uprisings. Official communist statements reported in the Western press on June 22, declared that many of the "fascist provocateurs" alleged to be responsible for the disorders were still at large and admitted that even in factories where work had resumed a number of the workers still exhibited an embittered spirit. Food shortages appear to be aggravating the unrest in Berlin.

Efforts of the East German puppet officials to win over the rebellious population by announcements that workers who were merely misled will not be dealt with harshly, by abject self-criticism which almost certainly foreshadows a sweeping Party purge, and by promises of drastic reform and economic relief, seemingly have been even less successful than the Soviet repression of the rebellion. Though resentment over excessive production quotas, food shortages and hard conditions of life generally triggered off the revolts in Germany as in Czechoslovakia, these grievances were overshadowed by the clearly expressed political objectives of the rebels. More than anything else the German uprisings appear to have been a kind of spontaneous direct-action plebiscite in which the East German masses voted with their fists for free elections, the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.

The repeated mob shouts of "Russki Go Home" and similar slogans gave the uprisings a clear anti-Soviet character from the start, but it would be a mistake to view them as pro-Western. Their essential motivation was nationalist. Unless the Soviets are prepared to come to terms with German nationalism--which seems unlikely--or to adopt savage measures

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of mass repression, there seems little likelihood that the spirit of resistance in Eastern Germany will abate. On the contrary, the partial victory over the puppet government indicated by the promises of reform which have already been wrung from it, is likely to enhance the morale and step up the expectations of the resistance forces.

At the same time the sweeping concessions which the Kremlin has forced the puppet authorities in Germany to make, or promise, are almost certain to stimulate demands for similar concessions in the other where the Kremlin can less easily afford to grant them. Satellites/ This communist dilemma, plus the indications that popular resentment in all the European Satellites is near the boiling point, plus the discrediting of the German puppet regime and the revelation that Soviet power in Eastern Germany has no basis but naked force, plus the demonstration furnished by the German rebels that defiance of Soviet authority is not always equivalent to suicide, adds up to the greatest opportunity for effective U.S. psychological operations to help roll back Soviet power that has yet come to light.

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June 22, 19533. U.S. Psychological Capabilities

a. United States capabilities in the Satellite States of Europe--including European or non-official American organizations normally responsive to U.S. official influence--are comparatively great, especially in East Germany. In no other part of the Soviet orbit is our position so favorable for influencing the thoughts and actions of large numbers of men. In one area at least--Eastern Germany--the population is probably more responsive to U.S. leadership than it is in many free countries. Our capabilities are probably lowest in Rumania and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia however has significant psychological capabilities with respect to Bulgaria which could be used to support certain U.S. objectives.

(1) The greatest single U.S. capability in Eastern, as in Western Europe is the personality and prestige of President Eisenhower, both as an individual leader and as the symbol of America's enormous power in the service of the cause of human freedom which most inhabitants of Eastern Europe still regard as their own.

(2) The importance of the President as a U.S. psychological capability is enhanced by the relative effectiveness of U.S. controlled mass media in most of the Satellite areas of Europe. This makes it possible to project U.S. leadership rapidly throughout a large and populous region. The most important vehicles of U.S. influence in Eastern Europe are the following radio stations or programs: RIAS, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America. Throughout most of the Soviet Zone of Germany, RIAS has a popularity and an influence probably unequalled in the history of psychological warfare. Radio Free Europe is operated by a private American organization, but its staff will conform their programs to the national interest. Despite intensive jamming and danger to the individual in listening, RFE exercises locally a real and important influence in parts of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. VOA, though heavily jammed, is heard

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throughout most of the region.

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b. Apart from the direct U.S. or U.S.-controlled capabilities listed above, there are significant free world capabilities for supporting common objectives in the Satellite areas. By appropriate methods it should be possible in most cases to stimulate more effective exploitation of these foreign capabilities and to coordinate them more closely with U.S. capabilities. Both the BBC and the French national radio system have substantial listening audiences behind the Iron Curtain and both could effectively support overt U.S. programs if the two governments could be persuaded to adopt more dynamic psychological policies. Both the French and the British have some covert capabilities in the Satellites which could be exploited more vigorously. The psychological capabilities, both overt and covert, of the Yugoslav Government are believed to be substantial in southeastern Europe. U.S. support of, and selective cooperation with, the Yugoslav programs is of major importance. Existing West German capabilities, official and non-official, are probably being exploited to the maximum, or close to it, at present, but they could be expanded with U.S. help.

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Radio Madrid puts a strong signal into much of the region and its programs include a good deal of hard-hitting psychological warfare against the Soviet and puppet authorities in Satellite Europe. It is said to have a large listening audience.

The Italian Government radio facilities and Radio Vatican have been developing regular programs for the captive nations of the Soviets and should be useful in an integrated program.

The Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic churches, particularly the latter, have politically significant capabilities behind the Iron Curtain.

The real capabilities of the various emigré organizations are hard to evaluate and the rigid political objectives with which some of them are identified often impede effective coordination. On the other hand, the unexpected scale and intensity of the current wave of unrest in Satellite Europe as indicated in Paragraph 2 suggests the possibility that the emigré groups may have been underestimated. In any case, an objective unprejudiced reexamination of the role of nationalist emigré organizations and leadership with respect to Eastern Europe generally would be required before the capabilities of these organizations, either in the Satellites or in the USSR itself, could be accurately assessed and a full scale program developed.

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June 22, 19534. Conclusions

a. While the current wave of unrest in the satellite states of Europe may not foreshadow the beginning of a vast anti-communists and nationalist revolt throughout the Soviet empire, it does unquestionably offer the most promising opportunity yet seen for effective U.S. psychological and political attack upon Soviet power in the area.

b. U.S. capabilities, particularly covert capabilities, are not yet adequate to foment or support a widespread revolt against Soviet power in the European satellites, but, despite certain weaknesses, chiefly on the covert side they should be able to contribute effectively to maintaining and extending the existing unrest. In view of the limitations of present U.S. capabilities, particularly the lack of substantial military power in Western Europe, we should be careful not to fan the sparks of revolt in Eastern Europe to the point where they risk flaring up into mass, open rebellion.

c. Owing to the lack of adequate intelligence on Eastern Europe, we cannot accurately predict the development of the situation there, even in the immediate future. Consequently, our psychological programs to exploit the present situation should be sufficiently flexible to:

(1) Taper off without loss of confidence or prestige in the eyes of the local population if the present unrest should die away in a few weeks;

(2) Permit rapid expansion and intensification if the national resistance movements in the satellite appears to be gathering momentum;

(3) Not rule out the possibility that despite our efforts to avoid encouraging premature rebellion, such open rebellions may actually flare up at any time in the Satellites and even spread to

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the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, the Baltic states, or to the other non-Russian nations of the USSR, thus creating a situation in which the entire course of history might be favorably altered by bold and prompt U.S. action in the form of military assistance to the rebels.

d. In order to increase free world capabilities for vigorous and coordinated action in Eastern Europe,

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In view of the contingency mentioned in paragraph (3) above, we should also undertake, without delay, an objective and complete reevaluation of the possible role of anti-communist emigre and other nationality organizations and leadership, particularly in relation to the potentialities of nationalism as an anti-Soviet force, both in the satellites and in the USSR itself.

5. Psychological Objectives

a. For the purpose of this interim plan, our first objective is simply to stimulate, spread and maintain throughout the European satellites the spirit of active resistance to communist oppression evidenced in Eastern Germany, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. Pursuit of this objective, however, must be qualified by the following considerations:

(1) We must avoid stirring up resistance to the point of open rebellion unless or until the United States is willing and able to give effective military support.

(2) U.S. measures to encourage the spirit of resistance must not be so obvious as to throw doubt on the spontaneous nature of the resistance, which we should exploit as a valuable psychological asset.

b. While we should encourage resistance for its own sake as indicated in the foregoing paragraph, we should also seek whenever feasible to direct it towards certain targets. The most immediately important target is the

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puppet regimes in all the satellite states. We should seek to discredit them, to undermine their prestige and authority, and to weaken them in every possible way. Every time naked Soviet power, military or otherwise, has to be exercised owing to the failure or unreliability of the puppet authorities, we should consider this a major psychological victory, and so exploit it.

c. We should exploit every evidence of significant unrest in the Satellite states of Europe, as vigorously as developing events justify, to convince the peoples of the USSR, of Communist China and North Korea, and of the neutralist nations in Asia, that the Soviet empire is beginning to crumble. A sub-target of particular interest for this line of attack is the minds of nationalistically oriented groups in the republics of the USSR contiguous to the European Satellites.

d. Finally, we should seek to convince our friends and allies in the Free World, particularly those in Western Europe, that the love of liberty and the hatred of alien oppression are stronger behind the Iron Curtain than they have dared to believe, and that the problem of popular resistance to ruthless totalitarian authority is less hopeless than they have imagined.

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June 22, 19636. U. S. Courses of Action: Phase I.

(Actions which can be launched within sixty days on the basis of existing U.S. capabilities and within the framework of the estimate of the situation as indicated in Paragraph 2)

a. Basic Tasks.

(1) Intensify overt and covert U. S. information programs to the European satellites, including Eastern Germany aimed at stimulating the spirit of resistance everywhere. In programs to Eastern Germany seek to convince the population that their resistance has already wrung promises of important concessions from the Soviet authorities and that continued or increased resistance will produce additional concessions, culminating in the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces and free elections for the unification of Germany. In other satellite areas--unless or until new major acts of resistance occur outside of Germany--the emphasis in our overt programs should be upon rapid, strictly-factual reporting of all resistance-news, from Germany or elsewhere, with particular attention to successful techniques of resistance, and to the unquenchable love of freedom from which resistance springs. In covert information programs outside Germany--and to some extent in the overt ones--great emphasis should be put on the gains won by the German resistance--particularly the de-collectivization measures and all relief to peasant land-owners and small businessmen--as indicating the immediate goals of local resistance activities. (For an extended list of appropriate themes, see Appendix A).

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(a) Creating pressure on the communist authorities for specific reforms;

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(b) Discrediting or undermining the authority of puppet regimes in order, where feasible, to provoke open Soviet intervention.

(3) Wherever possible seek to establish secure resistance nuclei in the satellite areas capable of further large-scale expansion.

(4) Intensify overt and covert defection programs with particular emphasis upon inducing the defection of Satellite police leaders and Satellite military personnel--especially pilots--but without neglecting any opportunity, such as now exists in East Berlin--to induce defection of Soviet military personnel as recommended in PSE D-18a/1a, dated Jan. 15, 1953 and in PSE D-43, ^(draft) dated June 10, 1953.

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(6) In information programs to the Free World, to the USSR, to Communist China and North Korea and to the neutralist nations of Asia, emphasize the themes in Appendix A which relate particularly to the objectives indicated in 5 d.

b. Special Undertakings.

(1) Through appropriate official statements or diplomatic acts, emphasize at the earliest possible moment the strong support of the United States for the unification of Germany based on free elections to be followed by a peace treaty.

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(2) Activate the implementation of NSC 143 immediately, and complete necessary consultations with British Government and the Federal Republic of Germany as quickly as possible in order to permit early release of planned official announcement and subsequent psychological exploitation.

(3) Through appropriate procedures, bring the question of Soviet repression of East German revolt before the U.N.

(4) Launch immediately a world-wide movement to honor the martyrs of the East German revolt, linking it with the achievements and sufferings of the Czechoslovak resistance forces, but focussing attention upon Berlin. The proposed campaign should include one or more of the following subsidiary campaigns or actions:

(a) Cash collection, offer of scholarships, presentation of various gifts, etc. for the widow and children of Willi Goettling.

(b) Erection of a memorial in Berlin to all heroes of anti-Soviet resistance.

(c) Annual ceremonies in Germany on each anniversary of June 17 revolt.

(5) Urge the U.S. Red Cross to ask International Red Cross to investigate conditions in East Germany in wake of Soviet repressions, to determine the need for medical supplies, food, clothing and other relief for victims of the ^{oppression} ~~repression~~ and their families.

(6) Stimulate the international organization of free trade unions in Brussels to denounce Soviet repression of East German revolt and demand investigation of economic and labor conditions which set it off.

(7) Stimulate religious, humanitarian and cultural organizations in the United States--and if possible in other free countries--to

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collect funds and gifts for the families of the victims of Soviet repression in Germany.

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(9) Undertake immediately a study aimed at identifying possible gaps in the coordination of U.S. psychological programs in Europe, with particular emphasis upon improving cooperation where necessary with Allied governments and with the governments of Spain and Yugoslavia, and take all appropriate steps to effect rapidly any administrative improvements which may be desirable for the purposes of this plan.

(10) Undertake the special study of emigre and nationality organizations suggested in paragraph 3.b. under ^{U.S.} Psychological Capabilities.

(11) The announcement by the President of allocation of specified funds to MSA for the alleviation of the suffering of escapees to Germany should be vigorously exploited.

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(12) The chief of state of some country with vast underpopulated areas such as Brazil, should be induced to make a public offer to re-settle large numbers of escapees who have fought against tyranny and have been forced to flee their homelands.



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If at all feasible,
(14)/ an effort should be made to appropriate a Soviet or satellite tank or other military vehicle and bring it to this side of the Iron Curtain, preferably at night. The impression should then be given that its "crew" have just escaped with it. Identities of the "crew" would be concealed "in order to protect friends and relatives back home." The materiel could be returned to the Russians in due course.

(15) A one-shot handbill operation should be staged where covert capabilities exist, giving the impression to the Soviet and satellite officials and personnel of the armed forces that the hour is late and all opportunities for escape should be seized at once.

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7. U.S. Courses of Action: Phase II.

(Actions requiring lengthy preparation, or contingent upon developments)

a. Basic Tasks.

(1) Wherever feasible, organize, train and equip underground organizations capable of launching large-scale raids or sustained guerrilla warfare when so directed.

(2) Through appropriate overt and covert information programs develop and sustain the confidence of resistance forces to wear down Soviet control by constant harassment; emphasize the argument that when the right time comes synchronized uprisings at many widely scattered points will overtax the capabilities of the Soviet army and play up particularly any confirmed symptoms of disaffection, disunity or demoralization, both in the Soviet armed forces and among the civilian population of the USSR.

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(3) Intensify defection programs aimed at the Soviet Armed Forces, and launch a general attack through overt and covert information programs on every vulnerable point in Soviet morale, seeking to convince both the Soviet occupation forces and the home population that they are engaged in hopeless struggle in trying to maintain Soviet ^{control} over the Satellites against the growing resistance of the whole population; appeal to workers and peasants in the Soviet army not to fire on workers and peasants in the Satellite countries; seek to convince non-Russian elements in the Soviet Union that successful national liberation movements in the Satellites will hasten the liberation of the non-Russian republics from the Moscovite yoke, or at least oblige the Kremlin to modify its present false nationality policies.

b. Special Undertakings.

Consider the feasibility and desirability of indicating
(1) /through appropriate official statements or diplomatic acts

at the suitable time the desire of the U.S. Government for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany, Austria and the Satellites, holding of free elections in the Satellites as well as Germany, and the association of the Satellite states with the West European Community with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation.

(2) Encourage the expansion of existing radio programs to the Satellites, whether official or private, to increase coverage of the whole area and to emphasize the free cooperation among the various national resistance movements as foreshadowing a free European commonwealth of independent but associated states.

(3) Consider the feasibility and desirability of developing new covert organizations, with suitable radio or other outlets, based on the following concepts:

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- (a) A conspiracy of Soviet army officers to save the USSR from the blunders of the Kremlin by liquidating the Party leadership and establishing a regime which would make peace with the West on honorable terms protecting legitimate national interests.
- (b) A "Promethean" program specifically dedicated to promoting cooperation between Satellite resistance elements and "bourgeois nationalists" in the non-Russian Soviet republics in order to destroy the tyranny of Moscow by coordinated revolutionary action.
- (c) A high-level "UNESCO"-type appeal to Soviet intellectuals attracted by Western culture which could be used to spread subtle defeatist propaganda and to discredit individuals.

(4) Consider the feasibility and desirability of launching Phase II of the Volunteer Freedom Corps program to include nationals of the USSR.



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COPY NO. 46DRAFTSECURITY INFORMATION
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PSB D-45
June 22, 1953GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR OVERT AND COVERT INFORMATION PROGRAMS

NOTE: The following list of themes is not to be considered exhaustive or mandatory in all circumstances but is intended to indicate some of the major ideas which, with various adaptations, should be recurrently stressed from time to time to give coherence and direction to our information programs aimed at exploiting unrest in the European Satellites.

1. Not Only Bread, But Freedom

Emphasize the real nature of the "German Revolt," following on the heels of the Czechoslovak uprisings, as a dynamic demonstration of the pent-up feelings of a people longing for freedom from communist tyranny. The spark which set off the original spontaneous riots in East Berlin--workers' demands for lower norms--should be played secondary to the major theme of general demands for withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections, unity, etc.

2. Return To Europe

Promote the "Return to Europe" concept as a driving force within the countries now behind the Iron Curtain and cut off from Europe, pointing to integration moves in the West, appropriate statements at Strausbourg, and the activities of the "European Union" as manifestations of this force; describe the "Return to Europe" idea as a thread which can bind together all peoples of Eastern Europe in their efforts to throw off the Soviet yoke.

3. Soviet Power Is Running Down

Prevalence of irrepressible resistance in satellite Europe should be treated as further evidence that "Soviet power is over the hill and running down," and that popular uprisings such as

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these in East Germany are further proof of the inevitability of victory for the democratic forces.

4. The Too-Thin Red Line

In output to the Soviet Union especially, the Kremlin's ability to deal forever with these recurrent break-outs in its tenuous empire should be severely questioned, and in covert programs Soviet criticism of the Kremlin's self-defeating strategy should be emphasized.

5. Fear The Russians Bearing Gifts

Ridicule the Soviet propaganda line about the "warm and enduring friendship" between the non-Russian satellites and the USSR, capitalizing on every strike, every riot, every overt evidence of unrest as a sign that history, tradition, and fundamental differences such as race, religion, and mores are really at the core of the trouble-- that these uprisings are simply expressions of much more deep-seated resentment of Soviet oppression.

6. '48 Again?

Explore the connotations in different areas of the revolutionary movements of 1848, to determine whether the symbol "48" can be used effectively to crystallize resistance today. Wherever the results of the study are negative, choose other historic parallels which are locally appropriate.

7. Pilsen--The New Cradle Of Liberty

Special programs directed to Czechoslovakia should give credit to the Czechs, especially in Pilsen, for having taken the lead in showing real resistance to the Soviets. Programs to Germany which might be overheard in Czechoslovakia should emphasize the "common bond" of freedom from tyranny which no man-made borders can block,

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but we should avoid giving the Germans credit for sparking these outbreaks. An effort should be made to assuage the "guilt complex" reported running through the people of Pilsen now, for not having followed through. This double-play of credit must be discreetly and carefully handled because of the German-Czech antipathies and the likelihood that one audience may well eavesdrop on what is being said to the other. The real point is to give credit where credit is due, avoiding any implications that either party failed to act as perhaps it might have, and emphasizing the deep-seated community of interest which joins people of all oppressed nations.

8. Freedom And Food

We should stress the better standards of living in West Berlin, than in East Berlin especially with respect to food. In this connection, we could contrast the West Berlin food stockpile with the scarcities in the East (as long as they last) made worse by the "Workers' Army" drain on what little there is there. We could imply that the food stocks in the West are not packaged in party politics--that this food could be available to the East Berliners if the Soviets would grant the peoples' demand to unify the city, instead of sealing it off with tanks and armored columns. We could also imply, if not actually recommend, that West Berlin could provide food relief stations in East Berlin if the barriers were down and proper safeguards were guaranteed.

9. 28 Million Provocateurs

Every opportunity should be taken to refute the Soviet charges of U.S. instigation of the uprisings in Germany, without over-protestation and with diversive counter-suggestions wherever possible.

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The news itself should be used to disprove these allegations: We should ridicule the charges being made by the Soviets concerning the U.S. by pointing to the uselessness of our providing saboteurs and rebels---there are obviously millions of home-made insurgents churning through Germany today with a lot more at stake than a U.S. agent could possibly have.

10. War of Nerves

The more information we can play back to the East with facts and figures the better we should be able to convince the Russians, or at least stimulate their suspicions, that all their efforts to control the people have failed. RIAS should be used more and more to carry on a kind of "nerve war" against the Russians emphasizing its importance to the people of Eastern Europe as a contact with the West and reaffirming its credibility and reliability as a source of the truth. We should maintain the impression, backed up by facts, that the barriers which the Russians have found necessary to impose on the East Germans are not effective; we are getting the news and the people who carry the news--and RIAS broadcasts prove it.

11. "Loyal" Labor Is Slave Labor

Soviet calls to "loyal workers" to take over industries crippled by strikes should be played back to all Eastern/^{European} targets in the framework of the UN/ILO "forced labor" study, making it clear that we understand what the Soviets mean by "loyalty" -- labor performed at pistol-point. This should be described as the low-water mark in inhumanity and symbolic of the society to which the Soviets have reduced the people under their control. This should be especially pertinent if reports of uprisings at the Aue uranium mines are confirmed since the mines are known to be a forced-labor camp, and

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"loyalty" there is meaningless.

12. "Ivan, Go Home"

We should never let the Soviets forget their use of armed might to deal in human relationships. Continued demands by Western authorities, both German and others, for an explanation of this show of force would bring a sorry response, if any, from the Soviets, and add fuel to the "Ivan, Go Home" line. This could be enhanced by whatever use the Soviets make of the Wehrmacht officers, if they ever get them: committing "genocide" against a class of Germans on trumped-up scapegoat grounds, or turning them into "loyal" servants of the Kremlin, again at pistol-point.

13. The New Quislings

Otto Grotewohl should be made symbolic of the puppets trying to act like statesmen all over Eastern Europe. His traitorous conduct over the past years, climaxed by his calling on Soviet tanks and machine guns to bail him out, should be made to stick in the craw not only of the Germans, who need no help from us in this respect, but of other Eastern Europeans. The whole concept of "quislings" in the satellite states should be made a recurrent propaganda line, and efforts should be made also to discredit all the "junior puppets," of the Nuschke variety, who appear anxious to take over if and when the dust settles on the incumbents. Any encouragement to the people in Eastern Europe to rid themselves of these puppets will have a strong psychological, if not actual, impact. Further, the contrast between uprisings of this nature especially, and the stability and moral strength of the Western world, will prove the fundamental validity of our position.

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June 22, 195314. Run For Your Life

We should also suggest that if and when the Soviets recover control in East Germany (and elsewhere, if the uprisings spread abroad), Kremlin-ordered purges will be initiated to "clean up" the Armed Forces, the puppet Governments, and other control-mechanisms. In other words, everyone will face the possibility of death or slave-labor, no matter how small his role. Events and rumors both should be used extensively to bolster this line, adding fuel to the flames of suspicion wherever possible.

15. Special Military Defection Themes

By covert means, in programs aimed at the Soviet Union, we should foster distrust in the Army high command, and suspicions of the uses to which the Army is being put, especially suggesting that the MVD may be manipulating the Army for its own ends. To the enlisted men and junior officers, it should be stressed that the MVD is afraid to permit them even the off-duty pleasures normal in Western armies. Another line of attack would be to ask the soldier-audience whether putting down workers' demands for decent conditions is the kind of duty to be expected of an intensively-trained "workers' army". In covert programs to satellite personnel, we should make it plain that "patriots" who can act for liberty and remain hidden should do so; those who cannot stay should be assured of asylum in the West. Lesser communist officials who turn on the regime may be assured their efforts will be their passport to the West.

16. Free Elections

In the political framework, our propaganda should continue to insist on free elections leading to unification, but without giving

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credence to the Soviet maneuvers to make concessions in Eastern Germany which would permit anti-European integration forces to look upon such moves as real accommodations. If we commit the Soviets to withdraw their forces, they cannot afford to do it, especially in the light of what has gone on this week. If by some chance they do call us, we should emphasize that the withdrawal has been forced by the rebellion, and that in turn makes it apparent that East Germany is free to vote as it will. We should be prepared to take immediate steps to promote free all-German elections, meanwhile continuing to regard the uprisings in the East and the forced withdrawal of the Soviets as proof of Western strength, in spiritual rather than in military terms.

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