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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NSC review(s) completed.

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3 November 1952

Mr. James Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
The National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lay:

I have the honor to transmit herewith to the President and the National Security Council a Progress Report on the National Psychological Effort for the period July 1, 1952 through September 30, 1952.

This is submitted in accordance with your "Memorandum to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board - Status of United States Programs for National Security," dated May 29, 1952.

This Report was approved at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board held October 30, 1952.

Sincerely yours,

Alan G. Kirk
Alan G. Kirk
Director

Enclosures;

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PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board

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* The Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is
specially classified.

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I. SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psychological activities during the reporting period on the part of the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations,

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capabilities for making an immediately effective psychological contribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence. These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in building capabilities for future development.

3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian "jamming" continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the whole field of communications. Insofar as Communist China is concerned, the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses.

Anti-American Attitudes

4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propaganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial increase

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was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect and non-attributable propaganda. However, the above trend makes clear the importance of still further increasing our efforts to develop indirect and non-attributable information activities.

Western Europe

5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues to cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes favorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusiasm continues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military, i.e., NATO and EDC. However, U. S. psychological action has contributed to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries, notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration attitudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread of neutralist sentiments.

Middle East

6. The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U. S. capabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country,

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The danger of further deterioration in Iran, emphasizes the importance of rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries, where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt, the political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the present

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present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements that make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, however, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.

Far East

7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was increased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological impact of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid programs. Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been expanded, [redacted] but little increase in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the United States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolutionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological obstacle, [redacted]

Korea

8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained widespread acceptance in the non-communist world.

"Hate America" Propaganda

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"Hate America" Propaganda

9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been concerned with combatting the Soviet-Communist "Hate America" propaganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on this subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propaganda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by the Department of Defense and its components of information on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United States operations.

Military Assets for the "Cold War"

10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribution these services can make to the national psychological effort. However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of approved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and missions upon which military psychological activities in peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study.

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II. THE WORK OF PSB

General Activities

11. A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with special reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed and submitted to the Board. Pending development of capabilities and situations which may make it possible to envisage a final solution of the cold war, it proposed continued effort in the direction of building capabilities and effecting cumulative retraction of Soviet power.

12. A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with the understanding that it might be "worked into an early speech" in order to provide current psychological operations in Eastern Europe with needed support without implying any more ambitious programs there.

13. The Board decided that intra-agency and inter-departmental coordination for social science research in support of psychological operations should be further developed and agreed to continued PSB association with this study.

Planning

14. During the period under review, the first comprehensive area plan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for approval. This paper, entitled "A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany", lays down basic guidance for U. S. psychological operations aimed at furthering the integration of the German Federal Republic into the Western European Community, and other national objectives.

15. A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area -- Japan -- was completed in draft form during the Quarter and circulated to the departments and agencies concerned for final comments before submission to the Board in the coming Quarter.

16. Apart from 84189/1

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16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance for national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two plans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept of national psychological strategy planning. On the basis of the lessons derived from them, the Director's staff began a study aimed at improving the PSB planning process as a whole.

Coordination

17. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with respect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and Italy was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries took advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems in connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their experiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans was initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to determining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future.

18. In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating panel for implementation of the plan in the field.

Evaluation

19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's responsibility for "evaluation of the national psychological effort". At the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of the national psychological effort directed at Italy. The staff has also undertaken, as part of a larger government-wide economic policy study, an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic policies in the United Kingdom. These projects should contribute

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additionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable approaches for future evaluation activity.

20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for the Quarter:

21. Plans Completed and Being Executed

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France (PSB D-14/c), and
- (b) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy (PSB D-15/b)

(1) During the Quarter under review, the Washington inter-departmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome continued to coordinate U. S. activities under these plans.

(2) According to Embassies Paris and Rome, the French and Italian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to take vigorous action to reduce communist power in their respective countries. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United States should continue to remain in the background, while making known to both governments our concern that vigorous anti-communist action be pursued. They are also agreed that principal liaison should remain at the prime ministerial level.

(3) The Quarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in communist tactics, reflected in both France and Italy, i.e., away from a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist groups and toward a policy of "respectability" and cooperation with non-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and ability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti-communist action might be impaired. In turn, the U. S. would find it more difficult to influence these governments and their people

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in taking a strong anti-communist position.

(c) Psychological Operations Plan for
Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "A"
(PSB D-18/a)

(1) Organization under this plan, which is administered by the Department of State, was completed during the period under review. Figures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now total 20,995 in the countries of reception, plus estimated arrivals of 429 per month. Projects authorized or underway include language and vocational training courses, a visa opportunity search, and registration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care for their urgent immediate needs.

(2) Resettlement is now in progress. Voluntary agencies have requested transportation for 860 escapees under the program. Actual departures number 295, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas. Propaganda utilization has been made of individual cases of resettled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news media. The Department of State has under development a propaganda plan for exploiting the escapee program as such.

(3) Funds obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953 now total \$6,291,760. This includes an initial authorization of \$4,300,000 in dollars and \$1,991,760 in counterpart funds.

(4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been slight. The Department of Defense reports implementation of the Lodge Amendment as follows: applications for recruitment, 6008; rejections, 4847; acceptances, 395; scheduled for processing, 108; under review by CIC, 655. The Department of the Army does not contemplate any further liberalization of the conditions under which escapees may be recruited.

(d) Staff Study

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- (d) Staff Study--Preliminary Analysis
of the Communist BW Propaganda
Campaign with Recommendations
(PSB D-25/b)

This study, which is connected with the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign, was approved by the Board on August 7. Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating operational planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was assigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. At POC direction, a Working Group on Hate America Propaganda has been assigned to the problem.

22. Plans Completed But Not Yet Being Executed--Stand-By Plans

- (a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident
to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations
(PSB D-7/c), and
- (b) Emergency Plan for Break-off of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

The first of these plans is designed to establish special psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to our adversaries, to be implemented in the event of successful cease-fire negotiations. The second plan endeavors to establish for government departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

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- (c) Plan for Conducting Psychological
Operations During General Hostilities
(PSB D-8/b), and
- (d) National Overt Propaganda Policy
Guidance for General War (PSB D-11/b)

Both the plan and the guidance have been distributed to the

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various departments and agencies for their use, and have been integrated by the military services with their war planning. Planning on inter-departmental problems relating to psychological policies and operations in the event of war is currently being accomplished by an X-Day Committee under the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

23. Plans Authorized And In Process Of Development

(a) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "B"
(PSB D-18a/1)

This phase of the plan is concerned with the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would result from the stimulation of defection together with the proper utilization of such escapees. Progress in drafting the final plan will be largely dependent on a decision as to what use will be made of the funds available under Section 101 (a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act. Phase "A", concerned with the care, resettlement and possible utilization of current escapees, is reported on above (see paragraph 21-c).

(b) A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)

This plan will prescribe certain desirable psychological courses of action in respect to: (1) supporting the achievement of German unity; (2) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of Europe; (3) actions designed to reduce Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany,

(c) Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D-22)

(1) This plan will provide a national psychological strategy, designed to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen Western influence in the Middle East, and to insure

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that the resources of the area are available to the United States and its allies for use in strengthening the free world. It will seek to accomplish these objectives by psychological measures aimed at overcoming instability within these countries, strengthening the will and ability of these countries to resist aggression, and establishing a new relationship with these states which will recognize their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign equality.

(2) Annexes covering the basic factors and considerations are now being developed in order to aid in crystallization of the psychological strategy concept and selection of the psychological objectives and tasks.

(d) Psychological Strategy Planning for
Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without. Difficulties in policy interpretation are being resolved and Board approval is expected during the next Quarter.

(e) Program of Psychological Preparation
for Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24)

The participating agencies are now in the process of clearing a Revised Draft.

(f) Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan (PSB D-27)

Following the adoption by the National Security Council of NSC 125/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with

Respect to

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Respect to Japan", the Panel agreed to a draft of a plan which is designed effectively to assist, by means of coordinated psychological operations, in carrying out the objectives of NSC 125/2 necessary to maximize Japan's contribution to the attainment of U. S. objectives in Asia.

(g) Psychological Strategy for Economic
Security Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Orbit
(PSB D-28)

The plan is designed to provide a national psychological strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects of U. S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free World of U. S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. Suggested courses of action to be developed will be governed by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee's decision as to what should be U. S. policy in informational statements to foreign governments with respect to trade in goods which are not covered by the Battle Act and other Security Lists.

(h) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare
Against the USSR (PSB D-33)

The Board has accepted a recommendation that a panel be created to examine the field of ideological warfare specifically directed against Soviet doctrine, and to make recommendations as to how the United States can gain superiority in this field.

(i) Western Europe

In consultation with member agencies, particularly the Department of State, a preliminary study is being undertaken to determine the most fruitful approach to a psychological strategy plan for Western Europe.

(j) East

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(j) East German Youth

On instructions from the Board, an inquiry was carried out by the Director's staff which concluded that a program for utilization of young East German escapees would be of definite psychological value. However, it was impossible without answers to specific questions to weigh the psychological desirability against the cost of overcoming physical obstacles to such a program in Germany. At the suggestion of the Director the Department of State has undertaken a survey in Germany to determine the advantages and disadvantages which would result if such a program were inaugurated.

24. Planning Procedure

An analysis was made of the difficulties which have been encountered in developing PSB plans. Recommendations were developed for an improved format for national psychological strategy plans.

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III. SUMMARIES OF DEPARTMENTAL AND AGENCY REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

A. Summary of the Report of the Department of State on the Foreign Information Program*

During the period under review the tasks of the Foreign Information and Educational Exchange Programs of the Department of State continued to be those set forth in NSC 114/2, namely, to multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism; to intensify and accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and governments of the free world; to combat extremism and neutralism; to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism the hope of ultimate liberation; and to maintain particularly among the peoples and governments of Latin America continued recognition of mutual interdependence.

The report lists the principal actions taken by the Department of State in endeavoring to carry out these tasks. They include:

1. Projecting to the peoples and governments of nations dominated by Soviet Communism the growing strength and unity of the free world. This involved exploiting in the programs of the International Information Administration such policies, activities and events as "OPERATION MAINBRACE", joint NATO maneuvers on the European continent, the ADZUS Conference, the development of tactical atomic weapons, and exposure of the deceitful nature of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany.

2. Projecting

* The full text of the Department of State report is appended as ANNEX A.

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2. Projecting the peaceful intentions of the U. S. through exploitation of our disarmament efforts, of our patient attempts to reach an armistice in Korea, and of the justice of the UN Command's refusal forcibly to repatriate prisoners of war. Particular emphasis was put on exposing the manifest absurdity and evil purpose of the Soviet hate campaign, including the bacteriological warfare charges.

3. In its continuing attempts to aggravate internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism, the Information Program endeavored to exploit such items as the strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the peoples of the USSR implied in plans for the Communist Party Congress; the purges of Communist Party leaders in the satellites and in France and Italy, and the implications of the refusal of large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea to return to China.

4. Convincing peoples and governments of the free world of the need and the possibility of building up adequate military strength as a deterrent to war. This involved exploitation of "OPERATION MAINBRACE" and other maneuvers in Europe; it included also encouragement of moves toward European integration, including the exploitation, largely through indigenous means, of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Authority, of developments within the Council of Europe, and of progress toward the European Defense Community.

5. Maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions and reliable leadership of the U. S. included

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special efforts to give a balanced understanding of developments, especially those affecting foreign policy, growing out of the Presidential election. Special efforts were made in the Information Program to explain the motives of the U. S. when differing with the United Kingdom in the Iranian crisis and with France on the North African problem. The program also placed special emphasis on projecting a greater understanding of the cultural maturity of the United States. Examples of this were the European tour of "Porgy and Bess", the participation of American artists in the Venice UNESCO Conference, and presentations of typical artistic creations at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris.

6. Combatting neutralism through exposing its dangers as a means of safeguarding individual liberty and freedom and as a subversive device of Soviet Communism.

7. Combatting instability and extreme nationalist tendencies, particularly in the Near and Middle East. The report notes that exploitation of the USAF airlift of pilgrims from Beirut to Mecca was left largely to indigenous channels, but was the subject of a pictorial pamphlet produced by the U. S. Information Services in Beirut, of a film, and of a series of statements by members of the crews of the planes involved.

8. Maintaining hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism. Largely through the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin, efforts were made to explain statements in the Presidential campaign concerning U. S. policy towards the

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satellites; to interpret the significance for the satellites of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress; to expose the "Hate America" campaign; to portray the Sino-Soviet meeting in Moscow in a light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese as to the motives of the Peiping regime in dealing with the USSR.

9. Fostering American solidarity through exploitation of such actions as the visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil, the conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth status, and through efforts to expose the threat to Latin American countries inherent in Soviet Communism.

10. Operational activities listed in the report include approval of a project for the establishment of an IIA Regional Service Center in Beirut; inauguration of a new series of Information Policy Guidances known as "Information Guidance Bulletins," initiation of radio programs in nine languages by the ship-borne transmitter "The Courier," stationed at Rhodes; production and distribution of a film showing participation of the individual American voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates, and scheduling of another film showing the voter's participation in the election of the President.

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October 30, 1952B. Summary of the Report of the Department of Defense*

During the reporting period the Department of Defense and the military services have continued to make noteworthy contributions, incident to their primary military mission, to the national psychological effort. However, one of the considerable difficulties noted within the Department of Defense in engaging in cold war activities (except in a supporting role) continues to be the fact that the Department's role in such activities is principally implied. There exists no specific delineation of authority and responsibility upon which military psychological operations in peace-time may be based. Some such specification for the Department of Defense would contribute to more effective participation of the military services in the national psychological effort. This observation applies both to operations designed to attain an independent psychological effect, and to operations in which, although their primary purpose is military, political or economic, psychological factors must be considered.

During the period under review, military and naval maneuvers and statements of high military officials have served psychological ends, primarily in Western Europe. Although the potential psychological impact of maneuvers at home and abroad is not yet wholly integrated into operational plans, continuing attention is being devoted to this matter.

The Department of Defense has joined in combatting anti-American sentiments, particularly in Europe, by various means within its area of responsibility. The Department of Defense feels, however, that we are still on the defensive in regard to the "Hate America" campaign generally.

In the

* The full text of the Department of Defense report is appended as

ANNEX B.

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In the Middle East, the Beirut-Jidda airlift and several other operations involving the Department of Defense have contributed materially to the creation of a psychological climate more favorable to the West. In Korea, notable actions include the North Korea target warning operations and continuous and effective leaflet drops.

Research and forward planning in the psychological field continue, directed for the most part to the contingency of general war. Efforts are continuing to define the specific role of the Department of Defense as an active participant in the cold war.

Operations by Areas

1. In the European area, contributions to reduction of neutralism and anti-Americanism include participation in U.S.-French military maneuvers east of the Rhine and U.S.-British-French ground and air maneuvers in Germany; alert drills of the U.S. garrison in Berlin; the large-scale NATO naval maneuvers in the North Sea and the Baltic; fleet visits to Yugoslavia and elsewhere; and statements by General Ridgway and other senior U.S. commanders re-emphasizing the need for, and practicality of, an unremitting collective effort to build a position of strength against aggression. In the field of troop-civilian relations, a marked degree of closer cooperation and collaboration between U.S. commanders and local government officials has been achieved and will be pressed forward. A trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe. The continued policy of offshore procurement of supplies from European sources contributes indirectly to these ends by stimulating the European economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic defense forces.

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2. In the Middle East, two operations during the reporting period, involving Defense Department action, have contributed to the psychological effort. These were the airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda, and the airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon. In addition, new evidence has emerged of the favorable impact obtained from the good-will tour of Lebanese-born U.S. jet ace Major Jabara (previously reported). These actions, undertaken specifically for their psychological effect, have made a significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in the area.

3. In Latin America the Department of Defense continued to assist in the training and equipping of national military forces, thus contributing to the support of U.S. national policy and to the stability of existing governments.

4. In Korea the conduct of a program to warn civilians residing in 78 North Korean cities of the impending bombing by the United Nations Command expresses the intent to save non-combatant lives, and at the same time is designed to increase the pressure on the communist negotiators at Panmunjom. The continued refusal of the United Nations Command to use force in repatriation of prisoners of war has gained wide support in the free world. Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations, directed at North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers, were continued at a high level. Reports continue to indicate wide readership of the leaflets (of which nearly 3 billion have been dropped to date) despite harsh reprisals and scare propaganda used by communist authorities against the individuals involved. In the radio field, a series was initiated

exploiting

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exploiting the statements of Chinese communist prisoners who oppose forcible repatriation. On the debit side, publicity on agitation in prisoner-of-war camps has provided the communists with additional effective propaganda material, despite U.S. attempts to present a contrary interpretation.

Other Activities

1. Psychological exploitation of military power: Certain atomic weapons tests have been exploited psychologically in conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles, and new weapons. Shows of military force have continued, primarily in Europe (as noted above).

2. In addition to various activities indirectly countering the communist "Hate America" campaign, the Department of Defense has cooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies concerned to coordinate the release of information on biological and chemical warfare by the Department and its components; and has joined in the interdepartmental planning task concerned with countering the BV charges and other "Hate America" propaganda.

Forward Planning and Research

1. The Department of Defense continues to conduct a broad program of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations.

2. To further the wartime national psychological effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to

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support the "Joint Emergency War Plan," using as guidance for this purpose the "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War" approved by the Psychological Strategy Board. The military services and major subordinate commands are currently developing or modifying existing plans accordingly. Planning is progressing on a "Transfer Plan" to facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and personnel to military control.

3. A psychological plan to support the U.S. forces in Japan is being developed.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a paper setting forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, on his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.

5. Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological operations in Alaska, developed by the Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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D. Summary of Reports by Field Staff Representatives of the
Mutual Security Agency*

Western Europe

The defense build-up and its attendant problems continued to dominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period under review. Although the period closed with a short-term upswing in optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the major obstacles to the attainment of U. S. policy objectives in the area.

Following are the significant psychological factors noted:

1. Renewal of the Mutual Assostance Program by the U. S. Congress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and continuity of U. S. policy. However, the relationship of rich benefactor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the "foreign aid" concept, remained the most important single obstacle to favorable psychological exploitation of U. S. programs in Europe. A new concept, geared to the partnership approach, would provide a much healthier climate for psychological operations.

2. The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in the pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-summer the noticeable lift in European confidence and morale which had followed the Lisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there were signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement contracts, change in political leadership in Germany, and the Pinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed to some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of
war,

* This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by the Information Division of MSA.

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war, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense continued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort.

3. Progress toward ratification and realization of the European Defense Community, particularly in France, ran afoul of diminished public enthusiasm.

4. NATO, while maintaining general support as a defensive alliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination. It is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The NATO Information Service has remained ineffective.

5. The impression is spreading in Europe that the economic situation is not getting any better. As the quarter ended, employment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in some places. On the other hand, pressures on living standards and general economic development, growing out of the defense program, were causing visible restlessness. Some progress was achieved by MSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field of productivity and technical assistance. But U. S. tariff and trade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to our general efforts abroad.

6. Neutralism, in its "third force" context, continued to give ground in the face of Europe's growing military strength, the developing sense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace offensive. At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up from the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very serious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented rebuttal needs to be made.

7. Anti-Americanism remained on the increase. Contributing factors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number

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of U. S. troops abroad, the current U. S. election campaign, Congressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad that American officials tended to be more blunt and insistent in their relations with European governments. Economic pressures of the defense program, the generalized European unhappiness with the state of the world, and the feeling in some quarters abroad that America is taking too strong a line against Russia have also been contributory causes of anti-Americanism.

In assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in dealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points to further progress during the quarter in the integration of MSA and State information operations, and to increasing acceptance of the idea within the U. S. government that our information operations should be somewhat decentralized. At the same time, the report draws attention to serious shortcomings in organization, procedure and direction:

1. MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act for guidance as to "national objectives."
2. There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy and operations coordination between military and civilian information elements. This is evident in such programs as offshore procurement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe.
3. The NATO information services have not developed an effective positive program, and remain weak.
4. Recent experience has underlined the effectiveness of indirect propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further development in this field.

5. In view

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5. In view of the great size and psychological impact of the annual influx of American tourists in Europe, more should be done to study and influence this particular movement.

Southeast Asia (Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Formosa, Malaya)

Favorable psychological results accrued during the quarter from MSA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use of DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating trachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid. Distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a noticeable impact in the area. Installation of community radio receivers widened the audience available for information programs.

At the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the maximum psychological impact from U. S. programs in the area were impeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. S. position, in the belief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an identification with Western colonial interests and indigenous ruling groups, in the face of a rising tide of revolutionary nationalism.

The report concluded with the following suggestions:

1. Local personnel should be trained to take over from American personnel as quickly as possible in our various information, economic and social programs.
2. A special effort should be made to influence and support intellectuals, professional people and upper income groups, since their influence is disproportionately large throughout the area. Possibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to establish close liaison with these individuals.
3. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest caliber of U.S. personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia.

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THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM

(Prepared by the Department of State)

(Quarterly Status Report, June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952)

1. The tasks of the foreign information and educational exchange program of the Department of State, carried on by the International Information Administration, continued to be those set forth in Annex V to NSC 114/2, in order of priority as follows:

(i) "The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism."

(ii) "The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability successfully to deter aggression of Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and individual action accordingly."

(iii) "The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of governments and peoples into neutralism."

(iv) "The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without provoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power."

(v) "The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and individual action accordingly."

2. During the period June 30, 1952 to September 30, 1952, the following actions were taken, in accordance with plans for every country and with special plans as noted, to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression and subversion by Soviet Communism:

(a) The growing strength and unity of the free world continued to be projected to the peoples and the governments of nations dominated by Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action

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soberly to exploit particularly

(i) The development and the maintenance of defensive military strength on the part of the free world, as demonstrated by Operation Mainbrace, maneuvers on the continent of Europe, the ANZUS Conference, and the continuing successful resistance to aggression and subversion in Korea, Indochina and Malaya. (IA-PO-2-ANZUS)

(ii) The development of new weapons by the United States and other free nations, particularly tactical atomic weapons by the United States and the explosion of an atomic bomb by the United Kingdom.

(iii) The diplomatic, economic, cultural and other supporting actions given to the people of West Berlin in order that they might the more strongly resist the harassing tactics of Soviet Communists.

(iv) The conclusion of the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic and its planned inclusion in the European Defense Community.

(v) The exposure in the joint replies of the United States, the United Kingdom and France of the deceitful nature of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany.

(b) The friendly disposition and the peaceful intentions of the United States were concurrently projected. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

(i) The continuing efforts of the United States to promote the balanced reduction and limitation of armed forces in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.

(ii) The patient efforts of the United Nations Command to reach an armistice in Korea and the justice of its refusal to repatriate prisoners of war.

(iii) The manifest absurdity and the malign purpose of propaganda designed to arouse hatred of the United States, particularly charges that its forces engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea.

(c) Aggravation of the internal weaknesses of Soviet Communism continued to be sought. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

(i) The strengthening of the tyranny of the Kremlin over the people of the USSR implied in the plans for the Communist Party Congress. (IA-PO-53-20, Interim Guidance re Nineteenth Communist Party Congress)

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- (ii) The renewed purges of party leaders both in the satellites and in France and Italy. (IA-PO-53-17, Italy, 1953)
 - (iii) The implication of the refusal of large numbers of Chinese captured in Korea voluntarily to return to China. (IA-PO-7, Use of Prisoners of War in Propaganda)
 - (iv) The continuing support by the United States of the United Nations as an instrumentality for the adjustment of differences and the relaxation of tensions among nations and the rehabilitation of victims of aggression. (IA-PO-53-16, Rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea)
 - (v) The unsoundness of the fundamental communist economic thesis that the capitalist world is now entering a period of economic crisis which will ultimately and inevitably lead to its collapse.
- (d) Particularly in areas not under the domination of the Kremlin, efforts continued to expose the myths surrounding and inspired by Soviet Communism and minimizing fears of fifth columns acting on its behalf. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly
- (i) The schisms within local communist parties, especially the plight of Marty and Tillon in France.
 - (ii) Through indigenous channels the fellow-travelling tendencies of the authors of the report of the International Scientific Commission on bacteriological warfare. (IA-PO-4, International Red Cross Conference in Toronto)
 - (iii) Through calculated silence, the insignificance of the impending peace conferences in Peiping and Vienna. (IA-PO-Asia Peace Conference, September, 1952)
 - (iv) The proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor of the Economic and Social Council of the UN in a "Red Book" on forced labor. (IA-PO-53-20-Forced Labor: UN Hearings, October 14, 1952)
 - (v) The refusal of the USSR to join in further efforts to negotiate a treaty concerning Austria.
 - (vi) Among Chinese overseas, the nature of the regime now in power in China and its threat to freedom in Asia.
3. The following actions were taken to accelerate the growth of confidence of the free world in its capability to deter aggression or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur.
- (a) Convincing the peoples and the governments of the free world of the need and the possibility of building ready military capabilities as a deterrent to war and of the progress made in achieving them. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly

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- (i) The developing military strength of the free world as revealed in Operation Mainbrace and other maneuvers in Europe, with emphasis on the contribution and participation of the Europeans, in the continuing successful resistance to aggression and subversion in the Far East, in the development of new weapons and new techniques by nations of the free world.
 - (ii) A balanced understanding of the problems created regarding the pace of rearmament by the domestic economic pressures and the reduction of economic and military assistance on the part of the United States.
 - (iii) The interest of nations in the Near and Middle East, particularly the Arab States, in mutual defense arrangements.
 - (iv) The interest of the Philippines and Japan in developing indigenous defense capabilities.
- (b) Encouraging the peoples and the governments of Europe in the development of common institutions for mutual welfare and defense. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly, largely through indigenous means
- (i) The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Authority.
 - (ii) Developments within the Council of Europe.
 - (iii) The need to proceed rapidly with the ratification of the contractual agreements with Germany and the protocols establishing the European Defense Community. (IA-FO-53-14, EDC and European Integration)
- (c) The maintenance of confidence in the peaceful intentions, the consistent policies and the reliable leadership of the United States. This involved substantive action to exploit particularly
- (i) A balanced understanding of developments, especially affecting foreign policy, growing out of the presidential election, with a view particularly to encouraging confidence in the continuity of basic policy regardless of the outcome. (IA-FO-1, The Presidential Campaign)
 - (ii) The patience and the reasonableness of the United States in its role of agent of the United Nations with regard to negotiating an armistice and limiting hostilities in Korea.
 - (iii) The motives animating the United States when, as with the United Kingdom concerning Iran and with France concerning North Africa, the United States has undertaken to follow policies differing from theirs. (IA-FO-5, Self-Determination)

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(iv) The cultural maturity of the United States as an indication of the depth of its perceptions and the sophistication of its people, for example, the tour of "Porgy and Bess," the participation of artists representing the United States in the conference of Venice sponsored by UNESCO and the presentation of typical musical compositions, ballets and performances at the Congress for Cultural Freedoms in Paris.

(v) The development by the United States in the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations of a comprehensive program for the balanced reduction and limitation of arms and armed forces.

(vi) The readiness of the United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, to discuss the unification of Germany with the USSR on suitable terms.

(vii) The dangers of neutralism as a means of safeguarding individual liberty and freedom.

(viii) The interests of indigenous groups understanding of and sympathetic with the objectives of the United States.

4. The following actions were taken to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East, tendencies nationalistic and religious threatening to undermine the stability and the cohesion of the free world. This involved substantive actions to exploit particularly

(a) The respect of the people and the government of the United States for the religion and the culture of the peoples of the Middle East, as demonstrated primarily by the readiness of the United States Air Force to carry thousands of pilgrims to Mecca who otherwise would have been stranded at Beirut and by the attentions shown to Feisal of Iraq during his visit to the United States. Exploitation of the airlift to Mecca has been left largely to indigenous mechanisms, but it is the subject of a pictorial pamphlet produced in Beirut, a film and a series of statements by members of the crews of the planes involved.

(b) Actions taken by the United States to promote a fair and reasonable settlement of the dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom over the nationalized properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

(c) The efforts of the United States to promote direct negotiations between France and the colonial peoples for the achievement of popular aspirations in Tunisia and Morocco.

(d) The encouragement given by the United States to reconciliation between Israel and the Arab States.

5. The following actions were taken to maintain, without provoking premature deeds, hope of ultimate liberation among peoples held captive by

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Soviet Communism. This involved substantive action, carried on almost entirely by the Voice of America and by RIAS in Berlin, to exploit particularly

- (a) The balanced interpretation of statements made in the course of the presidential campaign concerning the policy of the United States toward the satellites of Eastern Europe.
- (b) Interpretation of the significance of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress.
- (c) Exposure of the campaign of hatred against the United States.
- (d) The manifest impracticality of the proposals of the USSR concerning the unification of Germany.
- (e) Portrayal of the Sino-Soviet meetings in Moscow in a light calculated to raise doubts in the minds of Chinese on the mainland as to the motives of the Peiping regime in their dealings with the USSR.

6. The following actions were taken to maintain among peoples traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interests. This involved substantive action

- (a) To foster Latin American association with U.S. objectives and policy especially through exploitation of
 - (i) The visit of the Secretary of State to Brazil.
 - (ii) The conversion of Puerto Rico to Commonwealth status.
 - (iii) The performance of Puerto Rican and Colombian troops in Korea.
- (b) To interpret the position of the United States with regard to issues involved in Latin American nationalism, including nationalization of resources (PO-53-10, Alleged International Oil Cartel, PO-53-5, Self-Determination, and continuous information guidance on Ecuadoran, Bolivian and Chilean elections, on U.S. tin and copper purchasing policy, etc.)

To develop attitudes and methods for meeting the anti-U.S. propaganda of the Argentine Government (Circular instruction of August 26, 1952, and PO-53-13).

- (c) To demonstrate the dangers to Latin America of Soviet Communism. This involved
 - (i) Successful conclusion of the special project in Panama initiated in fiscal 1952.
 - (ii) Preparation of special programming to meet the deteriorated political situation in Chile.

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- (iii) Stimulation of awareness in Latin American countries of the Communist danger in Guatemala.
- (iv) Encouragement of intellectual movements in defense of Western value (Circular airgram, September 30, 1952).
- (v) Counteraction of the Communist BW campaign in Latin America (Circular instruction, September 17, 1952).
- (vi) Counteraction of propaganda in Latin America related to the Peiping "Peace" Conference (IA Special Instruction, August 18, 1952 and Latin American Supplement).

7. The following actions of an operational nature were taken in support of the actions listed above.

(a) Administrative.

- (i) Approval was given to a staff study providing for the establishment of the IIA European Regional Service Staff, whose purpose is to provide USIS missions in Europe and elsewhere, especially Greece and Turkey, with materials originating in Europe, to provide advice as to the effective utilization of media and to cooperate with Office of Information of the Special Representative in Europe in servicing US information offices in Europe.
- (ii) Approval was given to a staff study providing for the establishment of the IIA Near East Regional Service Center in Beirut. Authorization has been given for the shipment of equipment and the assignment of personnel to the Center.
- (iii) The Department of State has under executive order assumed from the Mutual Security Agency responsibility for administering the Information Media Guaranties.

(b) Policy Formulation.

On July 10, 1952, the Current Information Policy Staff, Office of the Assistant Administrator for Policies and Plans, inaugurated a new series of information policy guidance known as Information Guidance Bulletins. The great majority are transmitted by telegram to posts having an interest in the subject matter. As of September 30, 1952, 114 Bulletins had been issued.

(c) Evaluation.

Evaluation studies completed include detailed studies of problems in Turkey and Iran, of the placement of USIS materials in foreign newspapers, of the use of the USIS transcriptions on

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foreign broadcasting systems, of non-theatrical film distribution in foreign countries and of key words in propaganda of the United States and the free world.

(d) International Press Service.

On August 11, 1952, responsibility for the preparation of the four regional editions of the Wireless Bulletins was assumed by the Regional Branches of the International Press Service.

(e) International Broadcasting Service.

(i) The ship-borne transmitter, the Courier, on September 7, 1952 began operations at Rhodes. Programs in nine languages --Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, English, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani and Tartar--are broadcast in short and medium wave lengths during a period of 5-3/4 hours daily. Monitoring reports thus far available indicate excellent reception.

(ii) A fifteen minute broadcast in Tartar was inaugurated at the local programming center at Munich on September 21, 1952.

(iii) A study of the transmitters located in the United States was made by Booz, Allen and Hamilton with a view to providing a stronger short-wave signal to relay bases overseas.

(iv) Alfred Hammond Morton assumed charge of the International Broadcasting Service with the title of Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration.

(f) Information Center Service.

Franklin Publications, Inc., a private corporation formed by a group of publishers and private interests, was formed in July to undertake, on behalf of Foundations and universities as well as the Government, the publication and distribution of noteworthy American books in translation in foreign countries. The first efforts will be made in the Arab States. The sum of \$500,000 has been made available to it by the Department of State.

(g) International Motion Picture Service.

(i) A film showing the participation of the individual voter in the process of choosing presidential candidates has been completed and distributed. Another showing his participation in the election of a President is scheduled for completion immediately after the election.

(ii) The first conference of film officers, involving representatives from posts in the Near and Middle East, was held on Cyprus from August 11 to August 15, 1952, with the purpose of determining how films could be produced with sharper focus on local problems.

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(h) International Educational Exchange Service.

A tendency has been noted on the part of certain foreign governments to undertake unilateral control of the selection of their citizens who may be offered exchange grants by the United States and other governments. The trend appears to be motivated by (1) the heightened nationalism common to Asian states since the war, and (2) a desire to control closely any exchanges that might occur with the Soviet Union and Communist China and at the same time not to make it appear that these governments are being singled out in any way. The Burmese Government has made formal representation in this matter to the United States Government, exempting only the Fulbright program, since it is founded on a formal agreement between the governments. The Department has taken the position that even at the cost of a temporary cessation of exchanges with Burma, the principle must be maintained that this government has final responsibility for selecting grantees financed through congressional appropriations. While Burma is the clearest case in point at the moment, similar situations have developed in Indonesia and in Syria and are nascent throughout most of Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

(i) Cooperation with Private Enterprise.

Projects are under way with various private agencies, social, commercial and philanthropic, to provide foreign groups with books and magazines, to assist Americans travelling abroad, to provide radio facilities to underdeveloped areas, to project a balanced picture of Wall Street, to promote the exchange of persons and to develop bi-national community relationships.

(j) Cooperation with Other Governmental Agencies.

Integration of Information activities of the International Information Administration and the Mutual Security Administration in other countries has taken place in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Integration had already taken place in Iceland, Switzerland and Trieste.

(k) Cooperation with Other Governments.

(i) Bi-national committees to promote the ready acceptance by local populations of troops of the United States established on their soil have been formally established in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Iceland. Similar committees are functioning on an informal basis in Libya and Morocco.

(ii) Negotiations are under way for limited cooperation in foreign information activities with the government of Australia. Cooperation would chiefly concern broadcasts to Southeast Asia.

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(1) Electromagnetic Warfare.

No significant change took place in the overall level of Soviet jamming, although minor changes took place from time to time in the application of the jamming mechanism to the various language broadcasts.

Sufficient information has been received through governmental intelligence sources to warrant the conclusion that the Soviets have in the process of construction, probably in the final states, somewhere between eight and twelve high powered transmitters either designed for or capable of jamming in the medium frequency and low frequency bands. These are generally distributed around the European periphery of the Iron Curtain. An East German intelligence source heretofore found to be reliable, reports the establishment within the government structure of East Germany of an office for radio warfare. A powerful East Zone broadcasting station moved on to the frequency used by the Armed Forces Network in Berlin. Whether this was intended as a deliberate interference measure, or whether it represented a Soviet need for a frequency is not now known.

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SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DURING THE PERIOD FROM
1 JULY THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1952

SECTION I

What activities has your agency engaged in during the period under review which are psychologically significant for the attainment of national objectives? With respect to the following current psychologically significant problems, situations and objectives, the Department of Defense activity was as indicated below.

1. The problem of neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom? To assist in combatting neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, the Department of Defense through the military Services engaged in the following activities:

a. Reduction of neutralism:

(1) Shows of military force in Western Europe have been staged. The participation of U.S. military forces in national and international maneuvers in this area has expressed U.S. determination to assist in the defense of Western Europe from all aggressors. The following major military demonstrations have realistically portrayed U.S. intentions in this area:

(a) The U.S. Navy participated in the allied fleet maneuvers in the North Sea and Baltic areas, involving some 160 warships of seven nations, demonstrated the capability of the allied naval forces to defend Western Europe.

(b) Significant among the activities of the military forces in achieving psychological advantage was the conduct of the combined U.S.-French maneuvers east of the Rhine River and the alert drills of the U.S. garrison in Berlin. The U.S.-French maneuvers served to demonstrate military capabilities and the efficacy of combined operations. Also such maneuvers helped to overcome Western European's lingering belief that SHAPE defense would be west of the Rhine or further back in the event of attack. In Berlin, the U.S. military activities have been most valuable in reaffirming the stated U.S. position to the West Berliners, the "Free World" and the Soviets, that any attack directed at West Berlin would be met with force. Also of significance were the U.S.-British and French ground and air maneuvers in Germany, and the Italian-U.S. maneuvers. Both maneuvers occurred in September and tested defenses against the East.

(c) During the reporting period, the Skyblazers, a USAF aerobatic team of four jet fighters, on behalf of CINCSAFE gave approximately 30 air demonstrations to foreign military and civilian audiences throughout Mediterranean and European countries. In a continuing program to

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rotate combat-ready units of the Strategic Air Command to foreign stations, USAF medium and heavy bombers visited countries in Europe.

(2) Statements by General Ridgway and other Senior U.S. commanders have reemphasized the need for collective effort to build a position of strength as the means of deterring Soviet aggression. Significant among the themes stressed by U.S. military leaders were the following:

- (a) Warnings that critical defense minimums must be met.
- (b) Warnings that the threat of aggression had not lessened.
- (c) Praises of great progress made within the NATO military structure toward our common goal.
- (d) The need for West German contribution to West European defense.
- (e) The allies plan to hold their ground in Germany should the Reds attack.
- (f) Indications of the use of atomic arms for the joint defense of Western Europe.

b. Reduction of anti-American sentiments. Although a certain amount of progress has been made in solving the problem of anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, much remains to be accomplished. The Department of Defense feels that we are still on the defensive in combatting the "Hate-America" campaign but attempts are being made to seize the initiative through the following measures:

(1) Troop-civilian relations committees organized in Western Europe early this year continue to function. Department of Defense participates on these interdepartmental committees organized by Department of State Public Affairs officers, by providing representatives for areas where U.S. military personnel are stationed. A marked degree of closer cooperation and collaboration between U.S. commanders and local government officials has contributed to the success of the program. While no definitive evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of materials and methods used in Service information programs, continuing effort is made to establish trends and indications with a view to improving subject matter presented and to keep it current. The program continues to have a favorable effect and a trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be noted throughout Western Europe. This trend is presumably due to firmer action by host governments against communist propaganda and obstructionism, more favorable local press and better orientation of U.S. military personnel. At a July meeting called by Ambassador Draper to consider troop-civilian relationships in NATO countries, it was decided that formal committees should be established throughout the NATO area.

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It is felt that the activities of such interdepartmental committees, as already exist, have had notable effect upon neutralism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, and have assisted in countering Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda by keeping U.S. military personnel better informed and adjusted to local conditions, thereby reducing the number of incidents. Detailed reports as to the effectiveness of the program as it pertains to the indigenous populations are submitted by Public Affairs Officers through Department of State channels.

(2) In the continuing effort to establish and maintain U.S. good-will in areas of national interest, U.S. defense forces have promoted friendship and understanding by:

(a) Visits to European ports and contacts with local populace by units of the U.S. Navy, including a four day visit by eleven ships to Yugoslav waters.

(b) Scheduled appearances in West European capitals and other principal cities by U.S. military bands before foreign military and civilian audiences.

(3) By sending special teams to indoctrinate NATO forces in the use of U.S. equipment, the Defense Department has increased the confidence of the NATO forces in their capabilities to defend Western Europe.

(4) With the view of promoting defense production, stimulating the economy and fostering understanding among North Atlantic Defense forces, the Department of Defense has continued its policy of off-shore procurement of supplies from European Defense sources. Whenever feasible, this form of economic assistance is so oriented as to benefit the non-communist segments of the countries involved.

2. The problem of securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and the European Defense Community Treaty? To assist in securing ratification and implementation of the Bonn "contractual agreements" and the European Defense Community Treaty, the Department of Defense through the military Services has supplied military assistance or advice as to military matters involved.

3. Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda? To assist in combatting the Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda, the Department of Defense through the military Services has taken the following steps:

a. The Department of Defense Office of Public Information cooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies involved in psychological activities in coordinating information released by the Department of Defense and its components on biological and chemical warfare. As this was a period of intense communist propaganda on biological warfare against the United States, this coordination was significant in assisting the countering of such propaganda. Through the Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda, on which the Department of Defense Office of Public Information is represented, progress was made in developing plans and means for setting forth United States position regarding the false charges of using germ warfare in Korea. The

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Interdepartmental Committee to Combat Communist Propaganda has conducted a constant analysis of the Soviet "Hate-America" propaganda campaign and has sought immediate and long range means of countering such propaganda. The Department of Air Force has undertaken production of a film entitled "Brain-washing", counteracting Soviet charges against U.S. forces in Korea that United Nations Command is conducting germ warfare.

b. The Department of Defense has provided the Department of State with advance notice of troop movements in certain overseas areas in order to minimize communist propaganda against them and to make most effective psychological use of their presence. In addition, these committees have continued to monitor and direct the activities of coordinating subcommittees set up in each country in which there are American troops. These subcommittees consist of representatives from the Armed Forces, Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. Reports indicate that their work has been effective.

c. See references made to paragraphs 1 b and 4 for other examples concerning activities conducted to combat "Hate-America" propaganda.

4. National Policy Objectives in the Middle East. In support of the national policy objective to improve U.S. relations in the Moslem world the Department of Defense has cooperated in establishing good will by:

- a. The airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.
- b. The airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to Lebanon.

As a result of these operations as well as the Major Jabara, USAF, visit, reported in August 1952 annual report, friendly relationships have been established between key Arab leaders and U.S. government representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. It has been suggested that the Jabara visit alone made a more significant contribution to the U.S. cold war effort in the Middle East than any other single act undertaken in the area up to that time.

5. The Allied Position in West Berlin. In support of national policy objectives in Germany, the allied position in West Berlin has been strengthened by:

- a. The maintaining of U.S. military forces in West Berlin and demonstrating the determination to support and protect the city by force if necessary. The recent conduct of maneuvers in West Berlin by U.S. military forces was a dynamic expression of our intention to defend the city.
- b. Continued use of the U.S. military approaches to Berlin reaffirm U.S. policy to keep the approaches to West Berlin open. By interdepartmental action contingency plans for the psychological exploitation of a second Berlin Airlift were developed.

6. The International Role of Japan in the Post-Treaty Era: Department of Defense has rendered support through routine military advice and assistance and by providing training and equipment for the Japanese National Police Reserve. Through the Security Treaty the U.S. has again demonstrated its belief in the efficacy of collective security and has attempted to awaken

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Japan to the communist threat to its national survival. The utilization of Japan as a military base for the support of the Korean Campaign has served to demonstrate the need for collective effort against aggression and the closeness of danger to the Japanese "Home Islands".

7. National Policy Objectives in Latin America. The Department of Defense has contributed to the support of our national policy in Latin America and to the stability of existing governments by assisting in the training and equipping of military forces of the Latin American countries. This has been accomplished by sending U.S. military teams and personnel to various Latin American countries and by inviting Latin American military forces to participate in specialized training programs being conducted in the U.S.

8. The Korean Campaign and Truce Negotiations. The Department of Defense activities in this area are conducted by the Commander in the Far East, who is responsible for the conduct of psychological operations in Korea in accordance with national policy. In the accomplishment of this mission, the Commander has participated in the following significant activities:

a. The conduct of target warning operations in North Korea of impending bombing of 78 North Korean cities expresses the intent of the United Nations Command to save as many lives as possible of non-combatants in target areas. Psychologically, these warning operations are also designed to increase the pressure brought to bear by United Nations Command on the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army negotiators at Panmunjon, and to contribute a satisfactory termination of the Korean conflict.

b. Provision of military representation to the inter-departmental committee which prepares and transmits the Special Korean Information Guidance. This guidance provides CINCPAC with information not readily available in Tokyo, including digest of U.S. and foreign press comments and reactions, and substantive materials and suggestions to be used in maintaining the propaganda initiatives in Far East Command. There are a number of examples in which the U.S. (UN) delegates to the truce negotiations have used information provided them through this means.

c. The U.S. (UN) policy that it will not use force in the repatriation of prisoners of war has had wide psychological repercussions. Although the U.S. adherence to the principle of non-forcible repatriation has gained for it wide "Free World" support, the continuing firmness in this position has blocked the achievement of an honorable armistice.

d. An attempt has been made to establish the fact that agitation in prisoner of war camps was inspired and provoked by "hard core" communists. However, the publicity accorded such incidents has provided the communists with additional material for their propaganda campaign and raised some doubt as to U.S. (UN) intentions.

e. The leaflet, radio and loudspeaker operations directed at the North Korean soldiers and civilians and Chinese communist soldiers continued. A new commentary series exploiting the statements of Chinese Communist Forces prisoners who oppose return to communist control was begun in September. Themes stressed are: Soviet exploitation of China and North Korea; communist brutality and oppressions, and subservience

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of the communist puppet regimes to the USSR. In leaflet operations, now nearing three billion disseminated, theme emphasis is on good treatment, non-forcible repatriation, nostalgia and support of operational plans such as DEADLOCK (armistice negotiations), FRAUD (to discredit communist regimes of China and North Korea) and ERIS (EUSAK plan to create or aggravate friction between CCF and NKA).

9. Psychological Results of Presence of U.S. Personnel Abroad. The stationing of U.S. military and civilian personnel abroad has raised psychological problems, many of which are still unsolved, but, in spite of these problems, it is believed that the presence of such personnel in areas abroad has been of value in reaffirming and demonstrating U.S. intentions to assist in the collective security effort.

a. All U.S. military personnel selected for assignment overseas receive a course of instruction prior to embarkation. In addition, upon arrival at their destination, all personnel are oriented on their mission; proper standards of conduct; cooperation with our Allies; local history, geography, and customs; and other subjects considered essential by the unit commander.

b. To orient and condition psychological warfare personnel of the 580th and 581st ARC Wings, the Department of Defense requested the Department of State to brief unit personnel on the scope of U.S. national psychological programs and the significance of U.S. psychological warfare interests abroad. It is particularly significant that personnel of military psychological units receive such information prior to being deployed to overseas areas.

10. Shows of Military Force. Although the programs and activities of the Department of Defense both at home and abroad are designed primarily to achieve military ends, it is recognized that many if not all of these activities have an inherent psychological impact. In recognition of the natural psychological effect of such Defense activities, both advantageous and adverse, added consideration to the proper exploitation of the following activities is warranted.

a. The continuous program of maneuvers by U.S. military forces both at home and abroad engenders a feeling of confidence in the capabilities of the U.S. to assist in the defense of free nations from communist aggression. However, the potential psychological impact of such maneuvers is not generally integrated into operational plans.

b. In the latter part of September, at the request of the Department of State, action was taken to conduct a flight of USAF B-29's to Malaya, a neutral South East Asia country. Flights such as this, as well as the continued appearance of U.S. aircraft and naval vessels throughout the world, support U.S. position of world leadership by demonstrating military striking potential, technical excellence of equipment, and military preparedness of U.S. Government.

c. Recent expansion of military interests in foreign areas has resulted in the establishment of a strategic air base in Greenland. Such expansions illustrate the scope of U.S. military planning and free-world cooperation and determination to defend against communism in the event of general hostilities.

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d. In conjunction with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, exploitation of certain atomic weapons tests has been made. The Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles and new weapons. This policy provides that agencies concerned with psychological operations coordinate fully whenever public information is to be released on these weapons.

11. What new evidence has emerged during the quarter concerning the psychological effectiveness of activities conducted before the reporting period?

a. As a result of U.S. psychological operations in the Arab World, such as the good-will tour of Major Jabara (Jet Ace) (reported in August 1952 annual report) relationships between key Arab leaders and U.S. government representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have been improved. This has contributed to a psychological atmosphere favorable to U.S. interests in the Middle East and significantly contributed to the U.S. cold war effort in this area.

b. The UN psychological warfare effort is providing valuable support for the Korean campaign. Reports continue to indicate that a majority of the people in a leaflet drop area read UN leaflets, including some party members, and that the leaflets or information contained therein are passed on. The North Korean civilians in general believe the information. Reports still indicate that the North Korean civilian is waiting for and apparently expects a UN offensive. Most local authorities in North Korea are continuing efforts to prevent UN propaganda from reaching the soldier and civilian. Leaflet drop areas are declared "Off Limits", inhabitants are confined to their homes until leaflets are disposed of, the people are told that leaflets are poisoned and all people are threatened with "cruel punishment" if they pick up UN leaflets. Most prisoners state that there is a continuous campaign to minimize effectiveness of UN psychological warfare operations. Communist officers refute UN propaganda statements, the soldiers are subjected to unannounced inspections, leaflets are turned in and burned, men apprehended with leaflets are subject to disciplinary action including confinement.

12. Included in current activities and separate from plans and capabilities is the program of research and development in strategic intelligence and psychological warfare operations. Fundamentally, this program is concerned with rendering maximum assistance to the achievement of national objectives by (1) in times of "cold war", reducing the power and influence of potentially hostile nations, (2) in case of hostilities, defeat of the enemy, and (3) at all times countering threats to our national security. Research and development support of national objectives is rendered by research programs classified under the following technical fields:

a. Strategic Intelligence programs to improve through social science research techniques the collection and military utilization of basic, comprehensive data on foreign areas and peoples, including:

- (1) Potentially hostile groups and peoples.
- (2) Potential allies.
- (3) Strategic areas and peoples which are subjected in times of "cold war" to intense international pressures and tensions.

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b. Psychological warfare research programs to render maximum assistance to achievement of national objectives by affecting (through means other than destructive weapons) the will and capacity of individuals and groups to support their leaders and national policies.

c. Psychological warfare materiel research programs to develop equipment and devices to facilitate communication with peoples in potentially hostile and inaccessible areas.

d. Civil Defense research programs to maintain high morale at home in case of hostilities by such means as increasing efficiency of security measures, adequate defense against enemy psychological warfare, and effective disaster control.

e. Military Government and Military Relations (in Foreign Areas) research programs to increase the effectiveness of techniques for:

(1) The control and management of enemy areas occupied by our military forces.

(2) The indoctrination in democratic principles of enemy nationals in areas occupied by our military forces.

(3) The fostering of better relationships between our military forces abroad and the nationals of host friendly nations.

SECTION II

What significant progress has been made in developing plans, capabilities and organizational means for contributing further to the national psychological effort?

13. Preparation of Psychological Warfare Plan. To further the wartime national psychological warfare effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a psychological warfare plan to support the "Joint Outline Emergency War Plan." The "National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War," approved by the Psychological Strategy Board was used as guidance in the preparation of this plan, which now puts wartime psychological warfare plans and objectives in phase with approved policy guidance. The military Services and major subordinate commands are in the process of developing or modifying existing plans in accordance with current guidance.

14. Specific Planning for Psychological Warfare.

a. In the psychological warfare field planning is progressing toward the development of a "Transfer Plan" which will facilitate the wartime transfer of U.S. foreign information equipment and personnel from other agencies to the military control, for the execution of U.S. psychological warfare operations in military theaters of operations.

b. For the Far Eastern area a psychological plan to support the U.S. Forces in Japan is being developed.

c. An ad hoc committee has been formed to develop a program for promoting the surrender of enemy air crews.

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d. To meet the communist threat in Europe, two plans for the reduction of communist power in France and Italy are presently under consideration.

e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have under study a SHAPE paper which sets forth the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), concerning his wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.

f. Initial plans for the conduct of wartime psychological operations in Alaska, developed by Commander in Chief, Alaskan Forces, have been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and review.

15. Planning for Unconventional Warfare. In the field of unconventional warfare, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently approved a paper establishing a delineation of responsibilities between the Services and the Central Intelligence Agency in the field of Escape and Evasion. In addition, a SHAPE paper concerning the delineation of responsibilities of the clandestine services and SACEUR to include organization and definitions is presently under study and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

16. Planning for Guerrilla Warfare and Covert Operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the period covered by the previous paper, delineated the responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guerrilla warfare, and covert operations. A study is now being made of the command relationship between CIA/DPC (new title: PMS) organization and the armed forces, in active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged.

17. General Planning on Continuous Basis. In addition to activities involving current psychological problems, the Department of Defense, in accordance with national policy, prepares plans and makes preparations for the wartime conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare, and in these fields participates on a continuing basis in:

- a. Interdepartmental and international planning;
- b. Orientation and training of personnel.
- c. Coordination with other agencies and departments;
- d. Support of other agencies and departments as required;

18. Research and Development Emphasis on Psychological Warfare. The Research and Development Board has reactivated a Panel on Psychological Warfare, whose responsibility will be to plan an integrated program of research and development for military psychological operations and periodically review the progress of the departments in implementing this goal. As in the case of all R&DB panels, associate memberships on the Panel on Psychological Warfare will be available to interested non-military agencies.

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