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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

WASHINGTON

NSC review completed

January 8, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Walter Eedell Smith
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Draft Psychological Strategy for Berlin (Supplement to PSB D-21)

Pursuant to the Board's decision of December 18, 1952, regarding completion of pending planning projects, I attach a draft of A National Psychological Strategy for Berlin, for consideration by the Psychological Strategy Board on January 15, 1953. The Terms of Reference for this document, a Supplement to PSB D-21, were dated March 21, 1952.

Your attention is drawn to two specific issues regarding psychological strategy planning, which are raised in the letter of transmittal from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel which developed this Plan. Since these issues are not likely to arise in future PSB plans, prepared in accordance with the recently promulgated Standard Planning Form, I do not believe that they need delay Board action on this Plan.

In order to meet the Board's deadline, it has proved necessary to curtail the usual period for coordination of agency and PSB staff comments on the Panel draft. Some changes are therefore to be expected in the present text, and if any agreed revisions are received before January 15, they will be transmitted to the Board as corrigenda to the basic paper. Subject to such possible revisions, and to the coordination of comments which may be presented by Board members at the meeting, I request approval of this Plan.

It is also requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure.

[Redacted Signature Box]

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Director.

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

1. [Redacted], dated Jan. 7, 1953
(Supplement to PSB D-21, dated Oct. 9, 1953) Copy No. 42.

2. Letter from Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel "F".

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington 25, D.C.

January 7, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Panel "F" Berlin Supplement

1. Ad Hoc Task Panel "F" having completed preparation of the Berlin Supplement in accordance with the Terms of Reference (PSB D-21/1 dated March 21, 1952) submits the subject paper to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board for his consideration.

2. It should be noted that Action and Support responsibilities in Section V are those which have been recommended by a majority of the Panel. It is understood that the Department of Defense intends to recommend that all the specific assignments of Action and Support responsibility be deleted from the approved Plan.

3. The Panel feels that it would be advisable in the future to define the exact meaning of the terms "Action" and "Support" in order to avoid possible later misunderstandings.

4. Since this issue is beyond the scope of the Panel, it is recommended that it be resolved through the appropriate channels available to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board.

/s/ Geoffrey W. Lewis

for

JAMES W. RIDDLEBERGER
Director, Bureau of German Affairs
Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel "F"

Enclosure:

PSB D-21/2, dated Jan. 7, 1953
(Supplement to PSB D-21, dated
October 9, 1952)

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COPY NO. 42

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PSB D-21/2
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(Supplement to PSB D-21
Dated Oct. 9, 1952)

A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

with respect to

BERLIN

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SECTION I

PROBLEM

To formulate a national psychological strategy with respect to Berlin.

SECTION II

APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES

As set forth in NSC 132/1.

SECTION III

A. Summary and Analysis

1. The city of Berlin is divided between the Western Sectors governed by a pro-Western city government working closely with the U.S., British, and French authorities, and the Eastern Sector, completely dominated by the Soviets and their German puppets.

2. As one of the free world's most exposed outposts, vulnerable to Soviet harassments of many kinds, and posing a constant challenge to

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Soviet efforts to consolidate their position and prestige in Eastern Germany, Berlin will continue to be a focal point of pressures and counter-pressures.

3. While ideally any planning for Berlin should take into account Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to Berlin, both of these and particularly the latter, can be estimated only in general terms. As to the former, the Soviets are capable of making the Western Allies' position in Berlin untenable, either by the use of force or by restricting Western access to the city. A major assumption regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin is that the Soviets will not deliberately provoke, or run a major risk of, war for the sake of Berlin. More tentatively, it is believed the Soviets will not impose another full blockade in view of: a) the failure of the last blockade, b) international political reactions obstructing broader Soviet aims, and c) a Soviet realization that such a course would stimulate western military programs and increase the danger of armed conflict. It is further assumed that the Soviets intend to make Berlin the capital of the German Democratic Republic, and eventually of a reunited, Soviet-dominated Germany as a major step in strengthening the Soviet sphere, if they can do so without incurring grave risk of war.

4. Present Soviet efforts with respect to Berlin may be designed either to put the Western Allies under pressure or to strengthen the Soviet position in the East Zone. Current harassments, such as barring Allied highway patrols and interfering with transportation, appear to be designed to probe Allied firmness and unity of purpose, and to undermine Allied prestige as well as to threaten our right of access.

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5. The present paper identifies general policy objectives and proposes a strategy adaptable to the following contingencies:
- a. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded;
 - b. Serious harassing measures short of a full blockade are employed;
 - c. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed;
 - d. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable;
 - e. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western forces in Berlin occurs.

B. West Berlin's situation. It is now estimated that West Berlin will continue to be:

1. useful as a base behind the Iron Curtain for propaganda, intelligence, and other activities;
2. a symbol of Western strength and determination in the face of Soviet harassment and threat of aggressive tactics;
3. a symbol to the Germans -- East and West -- of the hope for the eventual re-unification of Germany in freedom;
4. vulnerable to, and subjected to, a continued Soviet and East German campaign of encroachment and harassment which could have dangerous effects on the city's economic viability and morale, as well as discouraging and possibly divisive effects on the three Allied Powers, the German Federal Republic, and the West Berlin authorities;
5. subject (despite being strongly pro-Western) to a certain amount of inter- and intra-party discord, special social problems, and

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occasional irritation with the Federal Republic and the Western Allies
due in part to uncertainty concerning Berlin's future;

6. in need of continued subsidization of its economy and moral
support by the Western Allies and the Federal Republic; and

7. required by circumstances to have a special status, separate from
the Federal Republic, and denied the degree of self-government which the
Federal Republic is to have under the Contractual Agreements. (Despite
this, ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic will continue to
be strengthened and West Berlin will in practice be given even more free-
dom of action by the U.S., French, and U.K. authorities.)

SECTION IV

OBJECTIVE

To maintain and reinforce our political, military, cultural, and
psychological position in the Western Sectors of Berlin, and to exploit
that position in the furtherance of U.S. national interests.

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SECTION V

TASKS

(NOTE: Tasks and the Objective in Section IV above supersede the Objective (Page 7 B, Para. 2, Concerning West Berlin) and Tasks (Page 9, Para. 2, Concerning Berlin) outlined in PSB D-21. The implementation of Tasks and Courses of Action under Contingencies B through E may be subject to modification in the light of specific policy decisions made at the time such contingencies arise.

Contingency A. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded.

Task One: To maintain and reinforce the U.S., U.K., and French position in the Western Sectors of Berlin and to buttress the morale of West Berlin.

1. Utilize all appropriate measures to encourage and support among the Governments and peoples of the free world, especially in the Federal Republic and the remainder of Western Europe, diplomatic and other actions intended to foster continued interest in and a sense of responsibility for West Berlin.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE

2. Convince the West Berlin people that their own determination and faith are power factors affecting the whole struggle between the Soviet complex and the Western democracies.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE

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3. Assure the West Berlin authorities and population of the continued support of the free world by such actions as:
(a) official statements, (b) exchange of prominent personalities between Berlin and the West, (c) international distinction awards to the peoples of the city, etc.

Action: STATE

Support: DEFENSE and CIA

4. Provide a counterbalance in West Berlin to the ill-effects of Soviet economic warfare against Berlin, especially so as to maintain and improve, by international action where possible, the standards-of-living in West Berlin.

Action: MSA

Support: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

5. Publicize Allied and Federal Republic aid measures and readiness to defend the city by informing the population of West Berlin of the measures taken in their behalf, and by giving ample recognition to their own achievements in restoring and maintaining their city.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE

Task Two: To deter and neutralize Soviet or Soviet-inspired harassing tactics.

1. Convey to the Soviets, U.S. and Allied determination to remain in Berlin regardless of the consequences, thereby

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giving evidence of Western unity regarding the
Western position in the city.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE

2. Demonstrate, jointly with the French, British, and Germans, where appropriate, the futility of and grave risks associated with any Soviet tactics calculated to cause an Allied withdrawal from Berlin.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

3. Make clear to all the world that the Western powers will hold the Soviet Union responsible for any communist actions against the Western position in Berlin.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

4. Intensify Soviet doubts as to the reliability of the GDR authorities, military forces, and population.

Action: STATE and CIA

5. As may be specifically authorized by Washington, develop and discreetly publicize, within the limitations of security, Allied capabilities for retaliation against possible Soviet harassment measures. This should be accomplished jointly with the U.K., and French authorities where possible.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

Support: MSA

6. Mobilize free-world public opinion, especially in Western Europe, to confront the Soviet Union with a

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consolidated opposition to aggressive Soviet tactics against Berlin which endanger world peace, and to support measures exposing Soviet actions.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE

7. Develop and exploit by all available means political, military, economic, and/or psychological programs of free-world support for West Berlin, especially those undertaken in consonance with existing collective security agreements.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

Support: MSA

Task Three: To utilize West Berlin as a means of strengthening the morale of the free-world and its determination to resist Soviet pressures and possible aggression.

1. Exploit to the fullest, by all available means, Western response to Berlin's situation as evidence of Western strength, determination, and unity of purpose, and as a demonstration of the principle of collective security in action.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE and MSA

2. Communicate to other parts of the free world evidences of the resilience, courage, optimism, and anti-communist sentiment of the people of Berlin.

Action: STATE and CIA

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3. Prepare for publication, jointly with the British and French if advisable, a White Paper, or such diplomatic communications as may be deemed appropriate, designed to contrast the peaceful aims of Allied actions with respect to Berlin with the unwarranted and hostile actions of the USSR.

Action: STATE

Contingency B. Serious harassment short of a full blockade.

Task: To consolidate the Western position in Berlin in the face of increased Soviet pressures.

1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingency A.

Action: As Stated

Support: As Stated

2. Make evident the Allies' preparedness to cope with a new blockade, including their potential for retaliation and/or circumvention.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and MSA

Support: CIA

3. Utilize the crisis in West Berlin to accelerate and intensify Western defense efforts and to strengthen Western unity, with particular reference to the EDC and Atlantic Community concepts.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

Support: MSA

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- 4. ~~Discretely prepare selected elements of the Berlin population for resistance, should the necessity arise, against possible Soviet or Soviet-inspired actions.~~

Action: DEFENSE, STATE, and CIA

- 5. Display to the West German and West Berlin populations Allied military preparedness to resist any maneuvers by the Soviet or East German military or para-military organizations which would indicate that force is to be applied to expel the Allies from Berlin.

Action: STATE and DEFENSE

Support: CIA

Contingency C. A Blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade, are imposed.

Task: To gain international recognition of the Berlin situation or of the aggressive nature of Soviet actions.

- 1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingencies A and B.

Action: As Stated

Support: As Stated

- 2. Stimulate support among member nations of the UN to consider the "Berlin question" in that body, with particular reference to the USSR's aggressive intentions.

Action: STATE

Support: CIA

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3. Exploit by all available means throughout the free world any joint approach by the U.S., British, and French diplomatic representatives in Moscow to the appropriate Soviet authorities concerning the severity of the situation in Berlin.

Action: STATE and CIA

Support: DEFENSE

4. Apply and exploit by all available means such retaliation and circumvention measures as were planned under Contingency B.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, and MSA

Contingency D. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable.

Task: To lay the psychological groundwork for the possible use of Allied military force in Berlin.

1. Intensify appropriate activities listed under Contingencies A, B, and C.

Action: As Stated

Support: As Stated

2. By agreement with British and French authorities, publish an appropriate diplomatic communication.

Action: STATE

3. Stimulate free-world support for any ultimatum to the USSR, which the U.S. and its Allies will deliver in opposition to Soviet aggression.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

4. Employ all available psychological means to make clear to the world that we are determined to prevent out-

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break of general war, and that whatever Western action may be taken in Berlin is to defend Berlin against Soviet aggression.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

Contingency E. A Soviet attack on western forces in Berlin.

Task: To secure the support of all our Allies (including our friends in East Germany) for the Allied policy of armed resistance to Soviet aggression.

1. Intensify our efforts showing the USSR as responsible for precipitating hostilities which, if not checked, will develop into general war.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

2. Stimulate active support among member nations of NATO and the UN for Allied efforts to resist Soviet aggression in Berlin.

Action: STATE, DEFENSE, and CIA

SECTION VI

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

The administrative provisions outlined in Section VI of PSB D-21, dated October 9, 1952, will prevail for the implementation of this strategy.

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