

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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O/NE Comments on "An Essay on Global Strategy" by an  
Unidentified Dutch Strategist

1. In general, the author of this paper appears to have a fairly sound knowledge of Soviet strategy and current world conditions. His factual information, however, is sometimes spotty. For example, he has very good detailed knowledge of Southeast Asia, but in discussing internal developments in the USSR he seems to draw about equally on fact and fantasy. One might infer that he has used sources varying in reliability from The Economist and the New York Times to Kenneth DeCourcy's Intelligence Digest and the Hearst Sunday supplements. His Dutch loyalties are reflected in the final pages of the paper, where he goes to considerable pains to emphasize the strategic importance of Indonesia.

2. Comments on specific paragraphs follow:

I. Russian Military Doctrine

Paragraphs 1-6 represent a logical analysis of Kremlin thinking.

Paragraph 7, which states that "in February 1947 Stalin and the Politburo of the USSR were convinced that the objective conditions of world revolution really did exist," appears highly speculative. At that time the Kremlin no doubt saw local revolutionary conditions developing in certain parts of Asia and the Near East, but hardly viewed them as part of a worldwide pattern.

In paragraph 16, the statement that "the USSR believes itself to be superior to all of its potential opponents" seems open to grave doubt. As recently as November 6 Beria, delivering the major Revolution Anniversary address, referred to some of the postwar industrial objectives laid down by Stalin several years ago. At that time Stalin described a number of production targets, including 60,000,000 tons of steel and 60,000,000 tons of oil per year, which were to be achieved by 1960. Such production would, said Stalin, be essential to ensure the invulnerability of the USSR. Beria, in his November speech, predicted that these goals

would be attained

/ahead of schedule, but his figures indicated that they were still some years away. In view of this and other evidence, it seems doubtful that the Kremlin is yet confident that the USSR's power potential exceeds that of "all of its potential opponents."

## II. The Industrial Framework of Russian Military Power

In paragraphs 1-6, the discussion of the Kremlin's interest in the strategic and industrial importance of Siberia and Central Asia appears quite sound.

In paragraphs 7 and 9, however, are references to the industrial centers of "Singkiang." Although Sinkiang contains important oil and metal deposits, it seems highly unlikely that any major industrial centers have been developed there.

In paragraph 12, and in several later passages, the author speaks of a Soviet desire to avoid a "two-front war." However, he fails to explain how the Kremlin might hope, in the event of a war with the US, to limit hostilities to either Europe or Asia.

In paragraph 13, the author implies that strategic air operations from Korean bases south of the 38th Parallel would be of limited effectiveness against Soviet industrial targets in the Kuzbas, Karaganda, and Lake Baikal districts, but from bases in North Korea we might deal these areas a "shattering" blow. The geography and geometry of the situation, however, do not appear to support this conclusion.

In the same paragraph he speaks of atomic stockpiles and major industrial installations in the "Anggara" Valley (west of Lake Baikal). Before the war Soviet propagandists spoke glowingly of plans for a great hydroelectric and industrial program in the Angara Valley. It was even claimed that one of the dams was to be "larger than Hoover and Grand Coulee combined." However, available evidence indicates that very little actual progress has been made in this development, and it seems highly doubtful that either the author of this paper or any other Westerner knows whether the Angara Valley is the site of a major Soviet atomic stockpile.

## III. The Manpower Problem of the USSR

The author's discussion here appears logical.

IV. Western Front

This discussion also appears reasonable. Considerable emphasis is given to the importance of the Mediterranean and the maintenance of Allied strength in Spain and Gibraltar.

In paragraph 15, the author seems to be on firm ground when he says that by the spring of 1952 the USSR will have enough A-bombs to retaliate against the US should the US use A-bombs against the USSR.

V. Defense Problems and the Importance of Oil Fields of the Middle East

No quarrel is found with the general discussion here.

In paragraph 7, however, the statement that only 7 to 9 percent kerosene can be recovered from crude appears erroneous — in general, the figure would be nearer 20 percent. The statement that 10 to 12 percent aviation gasoline can be recovered from crude is also misleading. The proportion of avgas output to crude input depends almost entirely on the type of refinery equipment available, which varies widely in different plants.

In paragraph 8, the author estimates Soviet 1950 oil production at 36 million tons. The ORR estimate is about 37.5 million tons.

In paragraph 9, the author says that oil production at Grozny and Baku is "rapidly" diminishing. While these fields have probably passed their peak, there is no evidence that their production is yet diminishing "rapidly."

VI. The Communist Offensive in the Orient )

VII. India and Pakistan )

VIII. Southeast Asia )

IX. Indonesia

These sections reflect accurate factual information and reasonably sound analysis.

In this section the author apparently has dedicated himself to demonstrating the vital strategic importance of Indonesia.

He charges (paragraph 10) that the President of the Indonesian Republic has confessed to being a "Moscow Communist". This section also describes elaborate Soviet plans for using Indonesian bases in World War III for attacks on US communications lines and bases in the Philippines areas. The author concludes (paragraph 12) that Indonesia is one of the principle cold war objectives of the USSR.

X. Far East

The discussion of the Korean war seems generally logical. The author again shows his emotional concern over Indonesia, however, by warning that one of the most serious consequences of the abandonment of Korea by the UN would be an invasion of Indonesia by Chinese "volunteers."

In paragraph 9, he says that both tracks of the Trans-Siberian have been completed since World War II and that 4-track construction is now under way. Actually, the double tracking of the Trans-Siberian was completed before World War II, and there is no evidence of a present 4-track program.

In paragraph 10, he estimates the capacity of the Trans-Siberian at 400,000 tons monthly. The present ORR estimate is about 700,000 tons.

In paragraph 16, he concludes by warning that the USSR can be restrained from waging a world war by (a) fear of atomic bombs and (b) maintenance of the UN bridgehead in Korea until Western Europe is strong enough to repel Soviet invasion.

AN ESSAY ON GLOBAL STRATEGY

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I. Russian military doctrine.

1. Communist parties all over the world are pretending that they are fighting for the maintenance of world peace. They point out, that war is a product of class society. As long as the capitalist system exists, there will be war. Therefore Communism approves defensive wars for repelling attacks of capitalist states, or a war of liberation to save workers and peasants from slavery, or a war to free colonial people from the yoke of imperialism.
2. According to Sovjet doctrines all liberated peoples must be united in the Great Communist Fatherland, based on multi-nationalistic loyalties and the Marxist ideals of world-revolution. All these liberated people must acknowledge the leadership of the U.S.S.R. which is coercing all its adherents, irrespective of nationality, colour or race, to fight for the complete annihilation of the white capitalist states.
3. Following this way of thinking of orthodox communism it would be unrealistic to opine, that the Chinese communist state would be more Chinese than communist. For though Moscow is well aware of the importance of nationalism, multi-nationalism and loyalty to the Communist Fatherland is paramount.  
In this respect Titoism is considered to be a deadly sin, because it clashes with the principles of multi-nationalism and the Communist Fatherland, the ultimate aim of world revolution.
4. Stalin has proclaimed many times, that the agonizing life and death struggle between Communism and Capitalism is inevitable. Nevertheless he has hesitated a long time before he changed Russia's policy of defense against the bourgeois states for a more dynamic and offensive one.
5. As a matter of fact the crucial point in the deep-rooted controversy between Stalin and Trotsky was, whether "objective conditions" as prerequisites for a successful world-revolution really existed. As a consequence of careful scientific, but partly theoretical analysis, Stalin is convinced that we are living in the epoch of world revolution. On the other hand, in October 1938, Trotsky put the question as follows: "Have we really entered an epoch of social revolution and should we not raise the question of re-examination of our concept of the present epoch?"

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6. It is obvious, that it will be an everlasting problem of the Moscow leaders, how to know whether "the objective conditions of world revolution" really exist and whether the hour for a revolutionary crisis has really struck. That is, in the communist view, this is the crucial factor for the outbreak of a well prepared revolution and will be decisive for the outbreak of world war III.
7. It seems that in February 1947 Stalin and the Politburo of the U.S.S.R. were convinced that the objective conditions of world-revolution really did exist. As a consequence of this implicit conviction an important change took place in the High Command of the Army of the U.S.S.R.
8. After the war the career generals Zhukov, Malinovsky, Rokossovsky, Konev and others who had saved Russia from disaster proceeded to create a post-war army, according to their own professional concepts. They obviously paid little attention to political and revolutionary considerations.
9. However, these concepts clashed with the dynamic and revolutionary ideas of world revolution, in which the army is only one of several instruments for revolution. In February 1947, according to Stalin's decision the task of the Army in the Soviet order of things was outlined anew. The Army of the U.S.S.R. became above all the instrument of liberation of the workers and the peasants of the world. This Army is an army of brotherhood, not only of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., but of all the workers of the world, the Army of World-revolution imbued with the spirit of communist multi-nationalism of the Great Communist Fatherland.
10. The basic tenet of Stalin's doctrine is that wars must be conducted by the leaders of the state and can not be dominated by strategical demands of professional military leaders. In the struggle for liberation of the workers and peasants of the world alternately or jointly, politics and cold war or a shooting war must be used as circumstances demand.  
War has a total and permanent character as long as the capitalist states and classes in the world are not yet wiped out and workers and peasants are not liberated from slavery. Consequently every war with the Anglo-Saxon capitalist nations is justified.
11. The major theme of this communist thinking is, in the now existing state of total war between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist states, that the Soviet Army has to be completely integrated and co-ordinated with political arms. Therefore a successful world peace campaign, a new big steel plant somewhere in Siberia, a general strike in France, a local victory of Ho Chi Minh in Indo China or of the Hukbons in the Philippines etc., are regarded as tactical moves in the permanent war with the capitalist states.

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12. In this respect it should be kept in mind that a sudden and enigmatic retreat of Chinese troops in Korea, the surprise bid of Malik for a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, can no longer be explained by tactical or strategical factors only. Such decisions may also have been taken for political reasons.
13. In this way of thinking, cold war or a shooting war must no longer be conducted by military leaders, but by the Politburo. And to carry out directives in harmony with the intentions of the Politburo, the General Staff of the Army and the Naval Staff and Airforce Staff must be imbued with communist doctrines. Since February 1947, when Commander in Chief Marshal Zhukow was dismissed because his concepts of defensive strategy clashed with the dynamic principles of Stalin's new strategy and was replaced by Marshal Vassilewsky, all staff officers above the rank of captain in Marshal Vassilewsky's General Staff, have to be party members.
14. According to Russian military thinking, World war III will start with mass-attacks from the air in which all kind of weapons, A-bombs included, will be used. This will lead to a temporary paralysis of the attacked state but not to complete destruction of the economic framework of its military power. No decision can be expected in this first phase of the war and the Russian leaders believe that the stamina of their own people will be much greater than that of their opponents, even in case the capitalist states should use their entire stock of A-bombs.
15. Thereafter a protracted period of a war of attrition will follow on a far more terrible scale than in world war II, waged with conventional weapons such as jet-planes, rocket guns, guided missiles etc. In this period all new weapons will be effectively used and all offensive action will be based upon vastly increased mobility and firepower.
16. Then comes the decisive phase in which either one of the opponents will mount an offensive aiming complete annihilation of the exhausted enemy and ending with operational pursuit on a strategical scale.  
The U.S.S.R. believes itself to be superior to all its potential opponents not only because of her defence forces, which are superior in numbers and equal to those of the capitalist states in quality of armament, but also through its ability to foment revolutions behind the enemy's lines.
17. Though this last suggestion is open to doubt as far as various countries are concerned, it can not be denied, that during the last elections in France 5 million people, one quarter of the electorate, voted for the communist party and for the time being there are no substantial indications that since 1948 the Italian communists have lost many of their adherents any sympathizers.  
Defence planning in Western Europe will have to find an adequate solution for keeping under control the large fifth columns in France and Italy.

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## II. The industrial framework of Russian military power.

1. In world war I the Tsaristic regime had met disaster because the Russian heavy industries could not provide the army with badly needed armement, munitions and equipment. In that war the Russian army was saved from complete annihilation by the awful condition of the Russian roads and the railwaysystem. Once more von Clausewitzes theory, that geography was Russia's invincible ally, was confirmed.
2. When the Bolshevik regime came into power it decided that, at the cost of the Russian farmer, large industrial centres should be established in the towns as soon as possible. Soon after the communist revolution it was also decided to establish large industrial centres in the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. Stalin and Teravessenov worked out plans for these remote regions, affording safety against air-attack.
3. On October 27, 1924 they presented their plans to the Komintern. They were accepted and carried out. When range and bombloads of modern bombers rapidly increased, Molotov declared in 1939 that the construction of new plants in Moscow, Leningrad, the coal-basin of Donbas-district in Southern Russia and other big cities was strictly forbidden. The European part of the U.S.S.R. is now rapidly losing its pre-dominance in output of heavy industries, particularly rolled steel, to the Urals, Kutzbas and Karaganda. (see map).  
World war III has speeded up this shift to the East of the iron and steel industries of Donbas-Krivoirog to the Urals and beyond.
4. The main coalbasins in Siberia, Kutzbas and Karaganda have developed with enormous strides. Since 1940 coal output of Kutzbas has more than doubled and amounts now to 40 million tons yearly, while the production of Karaganda is now nearing 17 million tons.  
While in the fourties Kutzbas provided Magnitogorsk in the Urals with coal, Karaganda coal is now increasingly used for smelting in the Urals, while Kutzbas coal is now used for smelting ore of local deposits.
5. It should be borne in mind, that the Stalin-Teravessenov-plan for industrialisation of Russian Territory East of the Urals was not only inspired by von Clausewitzes concepts of Russia's defensive strategy. Already in 1923 Stalin states in accordance with Lenin's thesis "that Russia must turn her face to the East, taking into account the enormous reserves which are still slumbering there. The Eastern peoples of Siberia and Central Asia linked with China and India are particularly important for worldrevolution....and the awakening of the East should become our primary task."



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Stalin has never been an advocate of defensive strategy in the communist struggle for worldrevolution. He only adopted a defensive strategy as long as the U.S.S.R. did not have at her disposal a large army, navy and airforce and practically invulnerable big industries to supply them with weapons, munition and oil etc.

6. The industries of the Urals and beyond are widely dispersed in Siberia and Central Asia. Even within these industrial centres accumulations of factories and mines have been avoided and they cannot be wholly destroyed by a small number of A-bombs.
7. As is clearly shown on the map the industrial centres of Siberia and Central Asia are the economic framework for an offensive action against China and India and are also designed to keep China and India under control in the future. Sinkiang, Kutzbas, Karaganda, Lake Baikal District and Vladivostok are all connected by main car, van roads and railways with China. All these lines of communication converge on the coast of Northern China above the Yang Tse river between Shanghai and the Southern tip of Korea.
8. This coastal region is now largely controlled by American jet fighters, based on the airfield of Kimpo near Seoul, which can, if need be, give efficient support to any offensive amphibian operation by Chian Kai Shek's troops on the coast of the Yellow Sea between Haichow and Dairen.  
On the other hand this large ring of Russian industrial centres may serve for the defense of the Siberian Heartland.
9. At the same time the industrial centres of Trans-Caucasia, Taschkent and Sinkiang are designed as strategic offensive bases against Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.  
A possible solution of the problem of the Russian General Staff, namely how to conquer Southern Asia in case these countries might side with the democracies in Worldwar III, has been indicated on the map.
10. Using the well known geographical methods of Napoleon's strategical planning only roads, which can be used for strategic purposes are marked on this map.
11. By studying this map it is clear, that there are only two ways to carry out a successful attempt to destroy the Heartland of the U.S.S.R.  
On the one hand it could be destroyed by a strategic operation through Iran and Afghanistan against Taschkent, Kutzbas and Karaganda. The U.S.S.R. can obviate this operation by occupying Iran and Afghanistan in case these countries should not remain neutral.

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12. On the other hand the Allies could launch an attack through Manchukuo and Northern China against the vital industrial centres of Kuzbas, Karaganda and Lake Baikal district. It is highly probable that, in order to prevent such offensive Allied operation in Worldwar III, the communists have tried to throw the Allies out of Korea.

In this respect, the Japanese view, that communist aggression in South Korea is a preliminary action to an invasion of Japan proper, is probably correct. Above all the Moscow leaders will try to avoid a two-front war with a distance of some 10,000 miles between the European and the Asiatic front.

13. Meanwhile the successful onslaught of the Allied troops in Korea has put the communists in a dangerous predicament. Effective bombing by B 29's, operating from airfields south of the 38th parallel, of the vital industrial centres of Kuzbas, Karaganda and Lake Baikal district in case of Worldwar III, is questionable.

The routine range of these bombers is only 1,500 miles. But a shattering blow might be dealt to the key industries of the U.S.S.R. in Lake Baikal district by B 29's based on airfields North of the line Pyongyang-Wonsan. As a result the atomic stock-piles and the hardsteel-alloys factories, vital to the production of cutting tools and machinestools, electronic equipment, jet engines, armor-piercing shells, atomic-energy work etc., of the Anggara valley (West of Lake Baikal), could be wiped out.

14. Supported by her industrial centres beyond the Urals, the U.S.S.R. hold a strong, practically invulnerable position in Asia as long as the Chinese troops of Mao Tse Tung can hold their own. But in the event of Worldwar III the Chinese communists might come into a very difficult position, if Manchukuo should be occupied by Chiang Kai Shek's troops, supported by Allied forces. Then, communications between China and the U.S.S.R. would be cut off, while the industries of Manchukuo would be destroyed or fall into the hands of the Allied troops. This would be a heavy blow to the Communist cause in Asia. For the capacity of the industries of China proper is too small to supply Mao Tse Tung's armies. Moreover these industries, which are concentrated in four or five big towns, could easily be destroyed by air-attacks.

15. If we take a clear view of the industrial framework of Russia's military power, it is obvious, that the economic bulwark of the Urals and beyond will play a role of primary importance in defensive and offensive strategical planning of the U.S.S.R.

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III. The manpower problem of the U.S.S.R.

1. It may be expected, that in worldwar III all the states of Western Europe, except perhaps Britain, Spain and Portugal will soon be occupied by the Russian armies.
2. Thereafter however, in the second phase of Worldwar III the Russians will have to face the same fateful manpower-problem as Hitler in Worldwar II, but on a much larger scale.
3. Hitler's strategy on the inner lines failed, because he could not defeat the Russians in the East before the invasion of the Anglo Americans started in the West. But the main reason why he suffered defeat in Russia was, that at the cost of his striking force in Russia he had to lay strong garrisons in all the conquered territories to maintain law and order and to guard the extended coastline of Europe.
4. Today the strength of the armies of the U.S.S.R. largely depends on her industrial potential. Steel-production of the U.S.S.R. and her European satellites amounts to approximately 35 million tons, about as much as the steel production of Germany and the territories she occupied in Worldwar II. This steel-production was sufficient for armement and supplies of about 8 million German soldiers. Though presently the U.S.S.R. has about 15 million men available for enlistment in the Russian armies, irrespective of the divisions which can be raised from fifth columns in occupied territories and satellite states, it is reasonable to expect, that the U.S.S.R. and her satellites can only provide the armement for about 8 million men.
5. If however they could seize the steelplants of Western Europe with a production of about 38 million tons (British steel-production of 17 million tons not included), the Russians could mobilize 15 million troops. Then little hope would be left for the free world to win Worldwar III.
6. Therefore the main object of the defence of Western Europe must be to prevent that the heavy industries and armement plants of Europe should fall into the hands of the Communist conquerors.
7. However, voluntary destruction of their heavy industries will be very unpopular among the peoples of Western Europe, though complete destruction of steelplants will not be necessary in most cases, provided destruction of vital parts be carefully and scientifically prepared.

Moreover it should be borne in mind, that if in the third phase of the worldwar the Russians should be forced to retreat by a counter-offensive of Allied forces, the former will carry out an all-out scorched earth plan in Europe in order to prevent, that the free world forces might use the valuable war potential of Western Europe.

Therefore it is futile to try to save the heavy industries of Western Europe, if the Communists would overrun the countries of the West.

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8. While the total strength of every modern army largely depends on the industrial framework of the state, in modern warfare yet another manpower-problem must be solved. A decision must be taken concerning the strength of territorial troops and operational troops.

The task of these Allied territorial troops will be to fight fifth columns and airborne troops, to maintain law and order, to guarantee the carrying out of destructions of plants, communications etc.

On the other hand the strength of the Russian operational striking force largely depends on the strength of the garrisons which are needed in occupied territories. Though the number of communists and their sympathisers is impressive in France and Italy, the U.S.S.R. expects that she will have to cope with strong resistance movements in several of the occupied territories in Europe.

9. Moreover large bodies of territorial troops will be needed to guard the extended coastlines of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in case the Russians should not succeed in occupying both entrances to the latter, viz: Suez and Gibraltar.
10. Little more than a delaying action can be expected from the 35,000 British troops in the Suez Canal zone, even when supported by the troops of the Arab League. But Gibraltar can only fall into the hands of the U.S.S.R. if the Western powers, Spain and Portugal included would suffer defeat.

Therefore Gibraltar is one of the key-points of Western defensive strategy.

11. If the Straits of Gibraltar are kept open, the U.S.S.R. will suffer a serious loss in striking power of her operational troops, because a large body of territorial troops, will be needed to guard the Mediterranean coastline.

#### IV. The Western Front.

1. In a strategic offensive against the Western front it might be expected, that the Russians will apply their favourite pattern of assault, viz. massed frontal assault with thrusts of encirclements to cut off rear communications, all manoeuvres being carefully timed.
2. In this way of military thinking the frontal attack might be launched somewhere to the North of Switzerland against the central sector of the Nato front in France and the Low Countries. Thereupon the Allied High Command might be forced to plug an eventual gap in this front with troops held in reserve.

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3. Then the Russians might shift the weight of their attack to the Northern wing of the central sector, trying to capture Rotterdam, the only continental port without locks in the Southern part of the North Sea. Driving down their attack to the south, parallel to the coast, they will try to prevent a second Duinkerken-escape of defeated allied troops or the forming of a defensive bridgehead somewhere on the Atlantic coast.
4. At the same time Russian armies might invade Yugoslavia and following the Save-valley, they might try to break through the Italian Isonzo front. Advancing through the Po-valley, they will reach southern France and the Pyrenees. If they should succeed in cutting off the defeated Nato troops from Spain, there is little hope that general Franco can hold the mountainpasses of the Pyrenees, and as a consequence of a Spanish defeat Gibraltar would fall in Russian hands.
5. Should the U.S.S.R. seize both entrances of the Mediterranean, then she would be able to save a large body of territorial troops, no longer needed to defend the enormous coastline of this sea. If, however, Gibraltar would remain in allied hands, the Allies will retain the initiative for an offensive operation and might strike in the soft underbelly, somewhere in the Balkans or the Middle East.
6. From a purely strategic point of view it seems preferable to rearm Spain and to keep the Iberian Peninsula as a bridgehead for combined land and amphibian operations. This decision however, will meet with strong political opposition from France and Great Britain.
7. If on the other hand the Allies should succeed in maintaining a bridgehead of about 500 square miles somewhere on the Atlantic coast, this bridgehead would be a very vulnerable target for A-bombs and atomic artillery and for concentrated Russian mass-attacks by land and from the air. Moreover control over the greater part of the Atlantic coast would give the Russian submarines the port-facilities needed for operations against the lines of communication between Europe and America.
8. From this analysis of a hypothetical Russian offensive strategy it becomes clear, that even if the optimists should be right and the operational forces of the Nato might muster 40 divisions in the spring of 1953, they will not be able to resist the onslaught of 100 to 150 Russian divisions.
9. Therefore the objectives of Allied defense strategy in Western Europe should be:
  - a. to prevent a Russian attack on the Western front by speedily building up an operational defense force of at least 80 divisions.

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- b. If this policy of military containment of the U.S.S.R. can not be carried out effectively in the near future, maintenance of the Korean front is of vital importance for the security of Europe. For fighting on two fronts 10,000 miles apart will raise so many problems of logistics, that even the Russians might hesitate to venture a third world war.
- c. Should the U.S.S.R. launch an attack against Western Europe, irrespective of these considerations, the main objectives of defensive Allied strategy should be
  1. to secure demolition of the heavy-, armament- and equipment industries of Western Europe by delaying actions of the allied operational forces, supported by territorial troops, protecting the demolition squads against attacks of fifth columns and airborne enemy troops;
  2. to secure the Iberian bridgehead until troops and supplies are rushed in for starting an offensive operation against the Russians.
10. In the foreseeable future demolition of the European war potential can be the only objective of Allied defense strategy. Therefore organization, training and armament of territorial bataljons is of primary importance. This will not delay the formation of operational divisions. As soon as sufficient heavy armament and equipment is at hand, these infantry bataljons, trained as commando's, will form the core of new infantry divisions. (For the organization of territorial bataljons see Appendix I.)

Moreover arming guerillas with small arms is less costly while their training costs less time.
11. These territorial troops should never surrender and should form the core of guerilla units. Many men and women will be willing to join these guerillas and to fight for their lives and their country. For it will soon be clear that in case the Russians should occupy Europe they would not spare their class enemies. Mass deportation to Gulag camps would take place and millions would never return.
12. The Moscow leaders are well aware of the dangers of the so-called "small war", which might cripple their striking force of Infantry- and armed divisions. A special bureau of the Russian General Staff has been set up under General Zogya, the military expert on "small war" operations and has specialized in guerilla warfare. The importance of enemy guerillas is no longer disregarded by the adherents of the new military doctrines of General Shaposnikov, Stalins former braintrust.

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13. Though the Russians are confident that they can over-run Europe in a Blitz, they are well aware that in the long run they cannot resist a general Allied counter-offensive. Not only their war potential is much smaller, but they will also have to cope with intricate problems of logistics.
14. They expect that in this counter-offensive Allied land forces supported by amphibian operations will force the Russian armies to retreat through the endless plains of Europe and Russia. Communist rearward actions will be supported by their fifth columns guerillas and Europe will be devastated by a well planned scorched earth policy.

The Russians expect that the Allied armies will penetrate far into European Russia until their offensive is completely worn out. Then the Allied forces will be routed and utterly defeated by a strong Russian counter-offensive.
15. Can Russia be retained from invading Europe by the deterrent alliance of the Nato? It is impossible for Western Europe to build up impressive joint armed forces at short notice, to prevent a Russian invasion. For not much time is left. There is every chance that in the spring of 1952 the U.S.S.R. will have sufficient A-bombs to retaliate in case the U.S.A. should use these bombs against the Russians in Worldwar III. From that date on nothing could prevent the Russians from invading Europe, except perhaps, the Korean bridgehead on the Continent of Asia.

V. Defense problems and the importance of the oilfields of the Middle East.

1. Neither Iran, nor Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria or the Lebanon are able to offer strong resistance to a Russian invasion in force. Jordan and Israel have the best armies, but could also be overrun easily by mechanised divisions of the U.S.S.R.
2. Turkey's position is delicate. In the event of a third worldwar she will have to defend her 120 miles long Bulgarian border and her Russian frontier of 300 miles with her army of about 1 million troops, vis. 25 operational divisions, auxilliary forces and territorial troops.

Turkey wants guarantees of effective support by the United States and Great Britain in case she could be attacked by Russia and her satellites. With Persia crumbling and some continental Nato-nations opposing her membership of the Atlantic Pact, she would not lack excuses for remaining neutral. Nor does she relish the ideas of a Middle East Pact with the unstable Arab States, which could involve her in a war with Russia, wherein she would have to face the main weight of the Russian onslaught.

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3. Turkish neutrality would be a disaster. As a consequence the Suez Canal zone will have to bear the brunt of fighting. This is the only African defense line of the British Empire. It is defended by 35,000 British troops. Moreover there are 8 native bataljons with European cadres, which are widely scattered over the British African colonies.
4. The states of the Arab League are not strong enough to resist a Russian attack and they probably will be forced to adopt the same ambiguous attitude as Siam and Indo-China in Worldwar II, when those states were invaded by the Japanese. Moreover it is doubtful whether there will be a joint command of British and Egyptian forces in case of a Russian attack or any active support from Egyptian forces for a common defense of the Suez Canal zone.  
Under these conditions it is obvious that the British forces can only fight a delaying action, but can not resist a Russian attack of overwhelming forces. The United Kingdom has now asked her white dominions to support her in her defense effort in the Suez Canal zone with men and materials.
5. In case of emergency air-attacks can be launched against the invading Russians from the airfields of Turkey, if she does not remain neutral, Cypress, Cairo, Habbania (West of Bagdad), Dhahran, Marfak (Jordan) and from aircraft carriers. These airattacks may hamper and delay the Russian onslaught in the Middle East, but cannot prevent the fall of the Suez Canal zone. Then the way to Africa will be open for the Russians.
6. The loss of the oilfields of the Middle East would be a severe blow to the oilsupplies of the Allied armed forces. As in worldwar II the Allies will largely depend on the oil supplies of Central and South America, where drilling in Venezuela is speeded up to attain a production of 100 million tons yearly. But the quantities of oil needed in worldwar III will be much larger than in the last war, for turbo-jets use 4 to 5 times as much fuel as reciprocating engines.  
Standard jet-fuel for turbo jets is kerosine. In the U.S.A. however, the trend is away from kerosine and towards a peroleum product between kerosine and gasoline.
7. This will raise many problems of fuel supply. For only 7 to 9 per cent kerosine and 10 to 12 per cent aviation spirit can be recovered from the world's crude oil production. Though efficiency of aircraft also largely depends on successful gasturbine design, factors of economics and availability of suitable fuel grades will be vital for determining air superiority. In this respect the loss of the oilfields of the Middle East in case of a Russian invasion in worldwar III, will hamper the establishment of Allied air-superiority.



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37.2  
8. On the other hand the estimated oil production of the U.S.S.R. in 1950 amounted to about 36 million tons. Large quantities of kerosine are needed for tractorstations of Russian collective farms irrespective of the large kerosine consumption by turbo-jets of the Russian airforce. Production of dieseltractors is now speeded up to save kerosine for turbo-jets. Moreover the Russians are short of lubricating oil.

9. Production of the oilfields of Grozny and Baku is rapidly diminishing, while drilling and prospecting in Central Asia and elsewhere has been rather unsuccessful.

Though production at the new Ishimbai oilfield is important, it is now clear, that Ishimbai will not become a second Baku. Production of the relatively new Emba oilfield on the Caspian Sea is already diminishing. In this respect some oil experts even think that the Kremlin is several million barrels daily away from touching off a worldwar.

10. If the Russians should occupy the oilfields of the Middle East they can not in the foreseeable future transport large quantities of oil by the one track Iranian mountain railroad to Russia. It is theoretically possible to construct a pipeline across the 10,000 foot mountains to the Caspian Sea or to Tiflis. But any such project must be dismissed as a practical proposition.

11. Nevertheless the Russians might resort to the exploitation of the Middle East oilfields and refineries to solve their supply problems of petroleum products needed for an operation in Africa.

12. Moreover the loss of the oilfields of the Middle East will make Allied forces, operating in the South and South-West Pacific, largely dependent on the oilfields in Indonesia and British Borneo. These oilfields will soon have an approximate production of 10 million tons yearly.

Should these oilfields fall in communist hands, then the Allies would have to cope with the difficult problem of oil supplies in this part of the world. On the other hand Russian submarines and aircraft operating in the South and South-West Pacific could be easily supplied with fuel.

#### VI. The Communist Offensive in the Orient.

1. Communist cold war propaganda does its utmost to incite the main controversies between the peoples of the Orient and their white rulers by stirring up class-struggle, class-hatred and movements for national revolt.
2. Moscow has known better than the Western democracies that premature liberation of the peoples of the Orient, and Africa would create political, economic and social chaos in these territories. As a result Western private capital would no longer be invested in these liberated countries, having become politically unsafe. Living

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standards of the poor would rapidly decline and as a consequence these countries would soon be transformed into hotbeds of communism.

3. In some of these newly liberated countries a large leading class and a prosperous middle class could hold the balance against the masses of the people. Good and stable governments could be established in countries such as India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, where no chaotic conditions prevail.
4. But in the Philippines there is only a relatively small leading class of intellectuals and capitalists, a largely Chinese middle class and masses of extremely poor farmers.  
These people, living in extreme misery and poverty have provided the core of the revolutionary Hukbahalap guerillas. It is highly probable that within some years these communist forces will become a serious threat to the "illustrado's" or better classes.  
The Hukbahalap movement has now spread from Luzon to the Isle of Panay.
5. In Burma the leading classes are much smaller than in the Philippines and until now the political leaders have been unable to establish law and order in this unhappy country. Since Britain granted freedom to Burma there has been constant civil war.  
There exists in Burma a strong middle-class of Indians and most of the managers of Burmese trades are foreigners. Burma's social structure is unstable and soon the objective conditions for a communist revolution will prevail.
6. In Indonesia the leading class is extremely small. Not more than 0.035 per cent of the population are graduates or undergraduates of a university or have had high school education. This leading class of intellectuals is too small to maintain an efficient government. Moreover about 95 per cent of the managers and owners of factories, workshops and estates are foreigners mostly Europeans, Chinese and Arabs.
7. To date the economic, political and social situation in Indonesia is rapidly becoming chaotic. The big communist-controlled trade unions do all that is in their power to keep down production and to stir up strikes. They obediently follow the pattern of action laid down by the ambassador of communist China in Djakarta, aiming at inflation and skyrocketing of prices and wages. Intimidation of workers who refuse to strike has even been sanctioned by one of the Ministers of Labour. But some time this year or next the wages must go down, if prices in the world market deteriorate, while costs are going up. Then the fat will be in the fire and the danger to Indonesia from communism will be greatly increased. (The Economist, 23-6-1951, p.1512).

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8. In Indonesia as well as in Burma and the Philippines there are dangerous social tensions which already have resulted in revolt and bloodshed. Social, economic and political conditions in these countries are favourable for communist class-struggle and class-hatred propaganda.
9. It might perhaps be possible to combat communist class struggle propaganda in the Orient, by point four plans, social reforms and better standards of living. But is there any way out for a solution of the problem of race-hatred which arises from an inferiority complex of coloured people?
10. Russian propaganda is teaching the coloured people that race-hatred is incompatible with the principle of fraternising with all the proletarians of the world. This communist line of propaganda seems to be effective.  
But is there any effective means for the white free world nations to appease race-hatred? Europe's relations with the Orient are riddled with distrust. For instance too much good will and friendliness is felt as humiliation by the coloured man.
11. The levelheaded schemers of Moscow know that it is very difficult to combat race-hatred and distrust. And to dissipate distrust, everywhere in the Orient Russian communist tactics enter the patriotic road. National phrases are used by communist propaganda rather than classwar formulas and an appeal is made to national unity. Everywhere United Peoples Front Parties are established with a strong national tendency.  
Moscow carefully avoids any frustration of national feelings in Asia and stigmatises the Western imperialist states with suppression and exploitation of the coloured nations of Asia and Africa.  
This is also the main reason why they abstain from any direct attack on a coloured nation and have resorted to attack by proxy in Korea and Indo China.
12. Nevertheless Moscow knows, that race-hatred does not only exist between white and coloured races. Severe clashes have occurred between Indians and Africans in South Africa and between Indonesians and Chinese in Java. Those, who have studied the photographs of the horrible mass-graves of Chinese men, women and children, slaughtered by the sovjet-orientated republicans of Djocja, must admit that the problem of race-hatred has a much wider scope and that in future these terrible clashes may be repeated in Indonesia.
13. It is necessary, that the Allied forces should adopt a common line of policy in the Orient. Never a direct attack should be launched against one of the nations of the Orient. Their line of policy should be to give active support to one or more rival groups.  
Therefore an attack in Worldwar III on China proper should be launched by Chiang Kai Shek's troops, supported by the Allies who must provide him with the weapons and supplies he needs, specifically modern aircraft, flown by white "volunteers".

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14. The balance of racial feelings may tip in favour of the white man, if either actively or merely morally he comes to the aid of a coloured nation of South or South East Asia, invaded by Chinese "volunteers". In this respect a notable change in India's attitude against China has taken place since the Chinese occupation of Tibet.
15. In countries where the Chinese middle-class is accused of the direst exploitation of the poor classes, as is the case in Indonesia, anti Chinese race-feelings, if skilfully handed by allied propaganda, may flash into an internecine struggle with Chinese volunteers.
16. As a consequence of this line of policy, the ROK-generals should play an active part in the negotiations of an armistice in Korea with their opponents.  
In worldwar III every move in Asia should be based on the principle, that it supports the rightful cause of anti-Communist groups.

#### VII. India and Pakistan.

1. Since 1940 Pandit Nehru aimed at a federation of all the nations of Southern and South East Asia and China. He expected that after Worldwar II the Western World would be divided in federated groups of states and he argued, that Indians and Africans should refuse to become just hangers-on of these newly established groups. "For a federated Europe, or Europe and America taken together, will exploit the Eastern nations and delay their freedom. Therefore we must look forward...to an Eastern federation of nations".  
It was obvious that in 1940 Pandit Nehru was aiming at a united front of coloured people against political and economic aggression of Europe and America.
2. After the war Pandit Nehru changed his line of policy and tried to establish a Southern Asiatic Federation comprising India, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Malaya. This federation with a strong anti-communist tendency should be instrumental to exert pressure on every white nation in the East, the Middle East and in the near future also in Africa.
3. China did not belong to this Southern Asiatic Federation. Nevertheless in 1950 Pandit Nehru has given political support to the communist Chinese aggressors in Korea. Is he still hoping, as he suggested in 1940, that China in the long run would line up with the coloured races of Asia against the white nations of Europe and America, Russia included?
4. It is obvious that his policy of an United Asian Federation is purely opportunistic and definitely pro-Asiatic. Therefore the value of this federation for the struggle of Western democracies against the Communists is questionable.

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5. Moreover the joint armies of India and Pakistan are not stronger than 150,000 man, while the armament industries of India can not supply even this relatively small force with armament and equipment.  
Moreover the Kashmir dispute will obviate co-operation in a common cause even against Russian invaders.
6. As has been indicated on the map it may be expected that a Russian operation to conquer these states, in case they should side with the Allies in Worldwar III, will probably be completed in a campaign of less than six months. It is questionable whether the free democracies will be able to give them much effective support against the Russian onslaught in the first phase of Worldwar III. Thus these nations unavoidably will feel themselves betrayed by their Allies.
7. Therefore it would be wise to avoid any military commitments in these countries and to advise them to remain neutral.

#### VIII. South East Asia.

1. The prerequisite of every stable government in Asia is to promote production and welfare and to prevent chaos by maintaining law and order. Liberation from colonial rule, however, has been detrimental to economic, political and social conditions in Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines.  
It is open to discussion whether the liberation of these countries was premature or materialised too quickly. It cannot be denied though, that misery and poverty now prevail among the large majority of these nations and that rapidly they will be transformed into communist hotbeds where "objective conditions of revolution" are ripening.
2. The nations of South and South-East Asia are now convinced, that the white man is on his way out. But they are not yet aware, that the Chinese communist imperialists who will replace them, might be worse than their former colonial masters. For the time being some of them seem willing to accept the help of these Chinese communists.  
On the other hand no responsible section of Western public opinion now wishes to restore the colonial system.
3. Even in this cold war phase it is doubtful whether the regular armies of Burma, Siam, Indo China and Malaya might resist an attack in force of Chinese "volunteers" supported by communist rebel guerillas.
4. To date the French army has defeated Ho Chi Minh's troops, which were trained and armed in China. If, however, the 300,000 well trained Chinese troops in Kwangsi and Yunnan would be on the move to invade Indo China as volunteers, the French probably could not resist them.

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5. In this respect it may be suggested, that presumably not Indo China but Burma will have to bear the brunt of an attack of Chinese volunteers. It can reasonably be expected, that Chinese volunteers might support the rebel Burmese guerillas of Nang Saw, their leader in Kachen (Northern Burma) who have been armed and trained in China. If the 10,000 rebel Burmese guerillas elsewhere in Northern Burma should side with these Kachen guerillas and Chinese volunteers, it seems justified to assume that the regular Burmese army of 30,000 men will be defeated.
6. It is moreover an ominous sign, that Head Quarters of the "People's Liberation Army" which will operate in the whole of South East Asia has now been established in Mon Lin in Northern Burma as a sally point for South East Asia. Burma is the powder keg of South East Asia.
7. If the communist succeed in conquering the rich rice fields of the Irrawaddy delta, they will have sufficient food supplies for their operations in the rest of South East Asia, in case Worldwar III should break out.
8. Then they could overrun easily Siam and the isthmus of Kra, cutting off the railroad communication between Singapore and Bangkok. Then the way into Indo China and Malaya would be open to them. It is not to be expected that Siam will offer much resistance to a Chinese attack. Apart from the perennial struggle for supremacy between the army, airforce and navy Pibul Songram's regime is opposed by the leftist sympathizers of Pridi Panomying, who is now in Canton. If supported by strong Chinese forces and red fifth columns he can set-up a red puppet-government.
9. If, however, in worldwar III Siam should be conquered by the communists, the French army now repulsing the violent attacks of Ho Chi Minh in the Tonkin delta of Northern Indo China, would be taken by surprise in the rear.
10. Moreover in the strategic pattern of South East Asia the Isthmus of Kra, belonging to Siamese and Burmese territory, 300 miles to the North of the Malayan border is the key-point of defence of the Malayan peninsula. A British effort to keep the 30 miles wide isthmus might be successful. But the British forces in Malaya are not strong enough to hold the 150 miles long border of Malaya and to prevent large infiltrations of communists, who will be supported by Chinese guerillas, operating in their rear in Malaya. Using the same infiltration tactics as the Japanese, a Chinese force receiving support from the large Chinese community in Malaya, will soon be able to overrun the whole peninsula and Singapore.

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IX. Indonesia.

1. Communist armies with heavy armament and equipment will not be able to cross the 120 miles wide Straits of Malacca because they do not dispose of sufficient amphibian material and ships to carry out big landing operations and island-hopping maneuvers.
2. However, large scale infiltrations of communist infantry units and commando's from Malaya into the province Eastcoast of Sumatra in native proa's, can not be prevented by the small garrisons of the poorly armed Indonesian National Army. Moreover it is to be expected, that the invaders will be supported by local communist guerilla's.
3. After having conquered the airfields of Sumatra supplies could be flown into Sumatra and in their southern drive the communists will soon control the oilfields of Southern Sumatra.
4. From this Southern part of Sumatra and by infiltrations crossing the Straits Sunda, they will soon gain control over Java. This island will not offer much resistance. It is even expected, that in the foreseeable future a communist government will be in power in the republic of Indonesia, as a result of years of communist burro-wings.
5. It is now a well established fact, that in August 1945 the Indonesian Republic was not proclaimed by the Japanese, but by the Communist Students Committee, which after having kidnapped Hatta and Sukarno forced them to establish the Indonesian Republic and provided them with instructions from Moscow.
6. These instructions have been laid down in the so-called last will of Sukarno and Hatta while at the same time four successors of the two leaders, viz: comrades Tan Malakka, Iwa Kusuma Sumantris, Sukarni and the well-known Sutan Sjahrir were nominated in case Sukarno and Hatta should not be able to carry out the directives of Moscow.
7. In February 1949 the Netherlands Government published a pamphlet to warn the Security Council and the United Nations for the dangerous burrowing of the Communists in the Netherlands Indies. 1)
  - 1) Why political negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian republic failed. p.11-15.No heed, however, was ever paid to these warnings.
8. Since sovereignty has been transferred to the Indonesian Republic, the communists of the Students Committee supported by the communist bataljons of the Siliwangi division of the regular Indonesian Army, have liquidated by force the federal states East Java, Madura and

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East Indonesia. They met, however, with fierce resistance in the Republic of the South Moluccas and though the capital on the Island of Ambon with its strategically important harbour and airfields has fallen, resistance is still offered in the island of Ceram against the communist bataljons who now control the larger part of the territory of the Republic of the South Moluccas.

9. Nearly all the instructions from Moscow, laid down in the last will of Sukarno and Hatta now have been carried out, but for one point, Western New Guinea, the springboard for an offensive action against Australia is still under control of the Netherlands.
10. As soon as the Republic of Indonesia will have been proclaimed, the Indonesian communists will contact with the Hukbahalaps of the islands of Pansy and Lusan in the Philippines and the Chinese communists of Malaya. In this respect it should be mentioned, that president's Sukarno's speech on July 15, 1951 at Bandung, was an open avowal of the principles of "marheimsme", Indonesian for "communist multi-nationalism".

Since the end of the war this is the first time, that the president of the Indonesian Republic has confessed in communist jargon, that he is a Moscow communist.

11. In case of worldwar III, Russian submarines, now already sighted on the North coast of New Guinea in the neighbourhood of the oilharbour Sorong, will attack the lines of communications of the American bases in the Philippines, using Indonesian port facilities.

Attacks from the air by aircraft operating from airfields of North Celebes and North Borneo on these American bases also are to be expected. Communist guerillas, supplied by airdroppings, may even attack American bases by land once they would have succeeded in defeating the regular Philippine army.

12. Worldwar III will be a war of attrition, in which economic factors and transport will be of primary importance. While the U.S.S.R. will have to cope with difficult problems of logistics, the Allies will by their seapower control the sea lanes and will be able to buy raw materials from non-communist overseas countries, rubber, palmoil, petroleum products etc, from Indonesia.

Keeping open the sea lanes and controlling the main sources of strategic war-materials is a prerequisite to win the war. If Indonesia should come under communist domination, the Allies would lose control of important communications between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and between the Philippines and Australia. Indonesia is not only a strategic key-point to play an important role in worldwar III, it is also one of the main sources of strategic war materials in the world.

There is no doubt that Indonesia is one of the principal cold-war objectives of the U.S.S.R.



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I. The Far East

1. Cold war is only a preparatory phase of "hot war". This communist principle implies that the main objective of cold war is to jockey into the most favourable position for waging full-blooded war. However, precautions must be taken to prevent, that cold war does not flash into hot war before Russia has outmaneuvered her opponents.
2. It is one of the guiding principles of Moscow, to resort to experiment before taking an important decision, or launching a large scale revolutionary offensive in any country.  
The aggression by communist troops in North Korea must be seen as an experiment of the Moscow leaders to test how far the bourgeois states could be cowed by a bold cold war move.
3. It is a serious setback for the U.S.S.R. when their experiment in Korea backfired. Their effort to throw the United Nations troops out of Korea failed and as a result there is no doubt, that Malik's proposal for a cease fire and armistice is detrimental to China's military prestige in Asia.  
On the other hand the Russians hope, that this new communist peace offensive will bring about a relaxation of the Allied rearmament effort. This might be dangerous for the cause of the free world.
4. When the North Koreans launched their offensive across the 38th parallel, the U.S.S.R. expected the Blitz in Korea to be over in 2 or 3 months. Using conquered Japanese war material and the armament captured from the defeated troops of Chiang Kai Shek, they expected that the Korean Blitz would not impede their own war-effort. But when the Blitz failed they had to provide the greater part of the supplies needed by the Chinese and North Korean forces.
5. Worst of all, Korea has become a dangerous bridgehead on the Continent of Asia for offensive operations against the communist forces in case of Worldwar III.
6. Moreover in Worldwar III Chiang Kai Shek's armies, trained and equipped by the U.S.A., would almost certainly cross the Yalu river and supported by the United Nations troops and airforce might cut off the main lines of communication of the Sovjet Union with China by occupying Manchukuo. At the same time the armament industries of Manchukuo would come under control of Chiang Kai Shek, whose guerillas will also foment counter-revolution in Southern China. This would bring the Red Peking government into an awkward position.

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7. Having lost the industrial backbone for her armies, communist-China would probably no longer be able to resist an onslaught of Chiang's troops in Northern China. Then the main industrial centres of the Russian Siberian bulwark, viz: Karaganda, Kutzbas and Lake Baikal district would be exposed to heavy bomber attacks of B 29's operating from airfields in Northern China and Manchukuo.
8. As a result Russia would have to fight in worldwar III a two-front war. This would be a dangerous drain of her war potential. Moreover experience in worldwar II has taught her, that she could support the Chinese to a limited extent only.
9. At the end of Worldwar II the Russian General Staff planned a Manchurian Blitz of about two months against the Japanese Kwantung Army, with an operational force of 60 divisions of 9,000 men supported by an airforce of 5,000 aeroplanes, 75,000 motor-vehicles, auxilliary forces etc. This force needed 400,000 to 500,000 tons of supplies monthly.  
At the end of the war the capacity of the Trans Siberian railroad, largely a two-track railway, amounted to about 36 trains daily, carrying about 200,000 tons of supplies monthly, irrespective of transport for civilian needs.  
Since the war both tracks of the Transsib have been completed, while plans are being carried out for the construction of four tracks. There are, however, no trustworthy data on how far this plan has been carried out thus far.
10. It seems a fair estimate, that to date the capacity of the Transsib allows the Russians to maintain an operational army of 40 to 50 divisions in the Far East, needing 350.- to 400,000 tons of supplies monthly.  
This is a serious drain on the Russian war effort.
11. History has taught the Russians that their European front is practically invulnerable, because geography is Russia's strongest Ally. But geography may become the direst enemy of the U.S.S.R. if she would have to wage a war on two fronts. Therefore she will try to avoid this at all costs. The only means to prevent a two-front war is to remove the United Nations troops from Korea, by beating them decisively, or by skilful political and diplomatic maneuvering.
12. Latest intelligence reports now estimate that the strength of the Chinese airforce in Manchukuo is rapidly rising, while at the same time 2 to 3 Chinese Field armies are moving from China into Manchuria.  
Moreover in China an intensive campaign has been launched for speeding up the production of war material and collecting gifts for a sustained war effort in Korea. Communist propaganda in China is assuring the Chinese that the American aggressors will be thrown out of Korea in January 1952.

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13. Most notable of all is, that notwithstanding the heavy loss of face, the Chinese have accepted to negotiate an armistice, providing for a mutual withdrawal of all non-Korean troops from the parallel as had been proposed by the U.S.A. on December 15, 1950. In case this proposition should be accepted and complete evacuation of Korea should be carried out by all non-Korean troops, the Chinese troops concentrated in Manchukuo, would be able to cross the Yalu at any moment and could conquer the whole of Korea by a Blitz, before the United Nations could come to the aid of the South Koreans.
14. But if, as a result of peace-negotiations, peace has been restored in Korea and China would declare itself neutral in the first phase of worldwar III, an invasion by United Nations troops in Korea or somewhere in China would stigmatize the free world states as aggressors. This would have its repercussions throughout the whole Asian continent.

As a result the Allies might be forced to abstain from any interference in China and Russia would have the advantage of having to wage a war on one front only.
15. On the other hand, nothing could retain the Chinese volunteers from invading South-East Asia, Indonesia and even the Philippines and staging new cold war offensives as soon as the Korean war is over.
16. There can be no doubt that Korea is at the moment the main defense-line not only of the countries of South East Asia and the South-West Pacific, but also of Western Europe against communist aggressors. Presumably the cause of worldpeace has not yet been defeated and there is hope that it will not be defeated, provided the United Nations forces do not evacuate Korea. This is the only effective means of containment of the U.S.S.R.

At present we can only withhold her from waging a worldwar:

  - a. by fear of a bombardment with A-bombs;
  - b. by occupying Korea as an offensive bridgehead in Asia, until Western Europe is strong enough to repel a Russian onslaught.

July 19, 1951.

APPENDIX

ORGANISATION OF TERRITORIAL B T LIONS

1. The territorial unit is the bataljon of 4 companies, operating in a territory of about 100 to 150 square miles.
2. In the area of every wartime bataljon, a peace-time territorial company should be garrisoned. Every company has six platoons, viz. 3 fighterplatoons of about 35 men, so organized that they can carry out special missions. 1 signal-, 1 sabotage- and 1 transport platoon of about 20 men, which can be divided into three groups to support every fighter platoon.
3. These fighterplatoons are provided with bazooka's, 13 mm machine guns, tommy guns, quickfiring rifles and handgrenades. Moreover every bataljon and every company has its own intelligence staff to eliminate fifth columnists in case of war.
4. The territorial peacetime company will form the centre for commando training for territorial militia companies. Together they will form the wartime territorial bataljon.
5. These territorial bataljons will form if possible, the core of guerilla-bataljons in wartime. They can accept new recruits, in wartime if their admittance is supported by three men, already belonging to the bataljon and if it has been approved by the intelligence staff. These three guerillas remain responsible for the political behaviour of the new recruits.
- Though infiltrations of unwanted elements can never be completely prevented, it is not unreasonable to expect that there is a fair chance to eliminate fifth column agents.