

25X1



This document consists of 1 pages

No. 3 of 12 series A

es

SEP 24 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Department of the Army

SUBJECT: Priorities for Intelligence Collection

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, subject as above, dated  
 29 August 1952

1. In view of the heightened interest in Soviet BW capabilities which you recognized in your memorandum, it would be appropriate if we discussed the matter in some detail at the next meeting of the IAC. I am planning to circularize my reply to Secretary Lovett's 16 August memorandum on this problem prior to that meeting.

2. It is important that the question of increasing the BW covert collection priority be considered in relation with other top priority requirements. The Interagency Priorities Committee is the appropriate group to deal with this problem under IAC-D-28/L, dated 30 July 1951; and I am having it referred to the Committee.

3. Soviet BW capabilities also bear on the first two national intelligence objectives in DCID 4/2, which provides an adequate basis for review of BW covert collection priorities in the light of Secretary Lovett's letter.

Army and OSD  
review(s) completed.

WALTER B. SMITH  
Director

Distribution:

- Copy 1 & 2 - Addressee
- 3 & 4 - Signer ✓
- 5 - DD/I
- 6 - DD/P

*Reading*

TOP SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

80164

TO: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Deputy Director/Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Intelligence

This document consists of 3 pages  
No. 3 of 17 series A

SEP 16 1952

1. PROBLEM.—To determine what action should be taken as a result of Secretary of Defense's letter (TAB A), which advises of an acute requirement for more reliable information on Soviet biological warfare activities, capabilities, and intentions.
2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.—
  - a. Because of the paucity of information on Soviet BW activities, intelligence estimates are largely limited to the broad assumption that the USSR has a specific BW program. It is obvious that the intelligence support needed for effective programing of corresponding US development of this significant weapon of mass destruction, as well as appropriate defense techniques and countermeasures, is lacking.
  - b. Improved collection of BW information is dependent upon a higher priority being accorded to this effort, and upon the development of better requirements. The latter, in turn, is dependent upon better intelligence research and production.
3. DISCUSSION.—
  - a. The failure to collect information which will confirm that the Soviets are or are not engaged in any specific BW activities can be attributed in part to the inherent difficulties in isolating specific BW intelligence targets and accurately determining if BW research is being conducted there. Furthermore, the priority accorded both the covert and special intelligence collection of BW information has been too low to provide a concerted effort by these facilities.
  - b. One means of improving the situation described in Secretary Lovett's letter would be to increase both the priority accorded by USCIB to the  the priority accorded the BW covert collection effort by the Interagency Priorities Committee. The Department of Defense agencies which also received Secretary Lovett's letter are all represented on USCIB and the IPC.
  - c. As a result of Secretary Lovett's action, AC of S, G-2, has recommended to the Chairman, IAC, that emphasis be placed on the BW phase of the clandestine collection program.

25X1

*Reading*

(See TAB B. General Partridge also points out that existing priorities as established by DCID 4/2 place BW and other critical weapons in fifth of seven places. Since Soviet BW capabilities also are related to the first two national intelligence objectives in DCID 4/2, this document provides an adequate basis for review by the IPC of BW covert collection priorities in the light of Secretary Lovett's letter.

- d. Another handicap to the collection of BW information has been the failure of anyone to develop adequate requirements. Intelligence research and production to date has not isolated the best Soviet BW target, nor has it provided the precise data that would be needed to mount a special operation against such a target.
  - e. By agreement reached in the IAC, 14 August (DCID 3/4), primary responsibility for intelligence production in BW is charged to Department of Defense intelligence agencies, and an improved intelligence research effort is largely dependent upon the Services. However, CIA can work to improve the situation within its area of primary responsibility, intelligence production on basic research in the biological sciences (See OSI plan at TAB C).
  - f. This Agency can also insure that a coordinated effort is being made to improve BW intelligence by reviewing the problem at an early date in the IAC, and by providing a close working-level relationship through the establishment of a working conference on biological intelligence under the Scientific Estimates Committee.
4. CONCLUSIONS.—Within the role of this Agency, the present situation with respect to inadequate information of Soviet BW activities can be improved by taking the following action:
- a. Increase the BW covert collection effort commensurate with over-all priorities as reviewed and determined by the IPC. (O/IC will raise this question with the IPC at its next meeting, if it is not raised by a Department of Defense representative.)
  - b. Obtain a higher priority from USCIB for exploitation of pertinent special intelligence. (O/SI, with O/CI, will develop an appropriate presentation to USCIB.)
  - c. Intensify intelligence research and production on basic biological sciences. (See O/SI plan at TAB C.)
  - d. Insure that a fully coordinated plan to improve BW intelligence is being developed by the intelligence agencies by:

- (1) Reviewing the problem at the next meeting of the IAC.
- (2) Providing a close interagency working-level relationship through the establishment of a working conference on biological intelligence under the Scientific Estimates Committee.

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED.--

- a. That the actions outlined in paragraph 4 above be approved.
- b. That the Director sign the attached reply to the Secretary of Defense (TAB D).
- c. That the Chairman, IAC, sign the attached reply to AC of S, G-2, Department of the Army (TAB E).

SIGNED

LOFTUS E. BECKER  
Deputy Director/Intelligence

ANNEXES:

- TAB A - Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to DCI, dated 16 August 1952, TS No. 63950.
- TAB B - Memorandum from AC of S, G-2 to Chairman, IAC, dated 29 August 1952, TS No. 63989.
- TAB C - Program for Intensification of O/SI Research and Production in the Biological Sciences, TS No. 80164-A
- TAB D - Proposed reply from DCI to Secretary of Defense, TS No. 80164-B.
- TAB E - Proposed reply from Chairman, IAC, to AC of S, G-2, TS No. 80164-C.

CONCURRENCES:

15   
Deputy Director/Plans

17 Sept 52  
Date

ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Approved (disapproved), exceptions, if any.

Distribution:

- Copy 1 & 2 - Addressee
- 3 & 4 - Signer Signature \_\_\_\_\_  
Director or Deputy Director
- 5 - DD/I
- 6 - DD/P
- 7 - AD/CI
- 8 - AC/IC
- 9 - TSC/CIA
- 10 - Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002900470091-4
- 11 - BIC
- 12 - AD/SI

24 Sept 52.


Director signed two letters  
attached to this para. 5.

ore



~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



The Secretary of Defense  
Washington

Top Secret  
Authorization

Name BFT  
Date Aug 15 1952

Noted in  
DCI log.

16 Aug 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Intelligence

1. There is an acute requirement for more reliable information regarding Soviet activities, capabilities and intentions concerning biological warfare.



2. The difficulties inherent in gathering intelligence on this subject are recognized. However, the continuing need for more complete and reliable information appears to dictate an accelerated emphasis on biological warfare intelligence. I am forwarding a similar memorandum to Defense Department intelligence agencies and would appreciate any action you deem appropriate to assist in accomplishing this extremely important objective.

(Signed) Robert Lovett

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~





25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002900470091-4

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP80R01731R002900470091-4

C  
O  
P  
Y

Top Secret  
Authorization

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington


16 August 1952

TSC— 2580-2  
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION  
A. C. of S., G-2, DA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Intelligence

1. There is an acute requirement for more reliable information regarding Soviet activities, capabilities and intentions concerning biological warfare. Current intelligence on this



2. The difficulties inherent in gathering intelligence on this subject are recognized. However, the continuing need for more complete and reliable information appears to dictate an accelerated emphasis on biological warfare intelligence.

3. For your information, I am inclosing a copy of a similar memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

C  
O  
P  
Y

25X1



25X1

This document consists of 1 pages

No. 3 of 12 series A

**PROGRAM FOR INTENSIFICATION OF O/SI RESEARCH  
AND PRODUCTION IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES**

1. As a result of the recent IAC decision on division of responsibility in the scientific and technical field, O/SI is reorienting the work of the Biology Division and has or is undertaking the following steps to intensify its effort in this field. This is in keeping with Mr. Lovett's request.

a. Assignment of personnel in the Biology and Medicine Divisions to engage in the systematic survey of the open literature now available on the subject, directed at the development of more adequate collection guidance.

b. Exploration of the possibilities for assistance in this regard through reorientation or expansion of external research contracts.

c. Consultation with the State Department Science Adviser and those responsible for administering the publications procurement program to examine (1) what additional steps can be taken immediately to extend the collection of open literature abroad, and (2) what steps are possible to strengthen the scientific and agricultural attache systems in the direction of more adequate collection of biological information.

d. There is no appropriate specialist presently assigned to the Scientific Division [ ] to provide guidance to covert collection and to conduct overt collection of biological warfare information. O/SI intends to provide two scientific intelligence officers for this work in the near future.

e. O/SI currently is pursuing the exploitation of special intelligence on a systematic basis in the field of biology. This cannot be intensified unless collection and processing in this field is increased by AFS. This is in turn contingent upon appropriate USCIB action.

