



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
for
EUROPEAN AND SOVIET
POLITICAL/MILITARY AFFAIRS

19 June 1975

Executive Registry

75-2898

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MEMO FOR GEN WALTERS

Attached is my trip report of the Portuguese visit. Because the whole issue is so controversial and because there were so many different views expressed to us, I made it a more elaborate report than otherwise would have been the case.

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Thanks again for your introduction to Gen Da Fontoura.

Wynfred Joshua

WYNFRED JOSHUA

[Handwritten flourish]

DIA review(s) completed.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

S-793/SC-2

TO : LTG Graham

DATE: 17 June 1975

FROM : Dr. Wynfred Joshua

[Redacted]

25XDIA

SUBJECT: Trip Report

1. AUTHORITY: DIA Letter Order Number 106-75 dated 21 May 1975.
2. DATES AND PLACES VISITED: 1-4 June 1975 - Lisbon, Portugal.
3. COMPOSITION OF PARTY:

Dr. Wynfred Joshua, DIO for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs

[Redacted]

25XDIA

4. PURPOSE OF TRIP: Discussions on the Portuguese situation.
5. PERSONS CONTACTED:

Colonel Peter Blackley, Defense/Air Attache
 Colonel Charles Yerkes, Jr., Army Attache
 Captain Alexander Thomson, Naval Attache
 Captain Francis D. Jordan, Jr., Asst Air Attache
 LTC Edward Grubbs, Asst Army Attache
 LCDR Charles Ryan, Asst Naval Attache

RADM Frank Corley, COMIBERLANT

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[Redacted]

Mr. Herbert Okun, Deputy Chief of Mission
General Da Fontoura, Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal

6. FACTS AND DISCUSSION: To the observer who has not visited post-April 1974 Portugal the following stand out:

a. The high visibility of the Communist Party (PCP). Upon arrival at the airport and subsequently throughout Lisbon the observer is struck by the long rows of posters depicting the hammer and sickle. Posters of the MRPP, the supposedly-banned Maoist, party also abound. Communist and Maoist slogans adorn the monuments. Other political parties, including the Socialist Party (PS), have a low visibility in Lisbon, although we were told that this was not the case in the village



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and the country. In Lisbon and at the neighborhood level, people congregate around the PCP headquarters. In the suburbs the PCP was the only party seen with local party headquarters. We were told that the PCP promptly complies with requests for financial and other assistance from Portuguese who turn to the PCP.

b. The high visibility of the Soviet Union. The many Soviet cultural events are widely advertised on billboards, placards, and in the media. In contrast, the US was visible only through slogans identifying the US with imperialism or through slogans rejecting US and NATO links.

c. The apparent erosion of order. In addition to the nationally-ordered nationalization measures, we were told that local workers are taking over restaurants, hotels, apartment buildings, and other commercial establishments. Local police no longer seek to enforce regulations. Local services, such as street cleaning, garbage collection, etc., are provided in a haphazardly fashion or not at all. Sloppy-looking soldiers and commandoes without any sign of responsiveness to higher authority can be seen throughout the Lisbon area. We were told that senior officers can no longer issue orders with any assurance that these will be implemented; discipline in the armed forces has almost totally disintegrated.

The discussions with Americans stationed in Lisbon lent further substance to these surface impressions. Beyond this, however, it was apparent that there are important differences in view among the various US officials on significant substantive issues.

The DIO for European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs met separately with the Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal; where relevant his views are reported.

A. THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (AFM)

Clearly, the armed forces constitute the major power center in Portugal. The AFM of June 1975, however, is quite different from the AFM of April 1974. Some 60 percent of the original AFM members have been purged or are in jail. Yet, some Americans stressed the camaraderie among the AFM members; reports of sharp power struggles and successful and failed purges of colleagues appear to contradict the existence of harmonious relations within the AFM.

Within the AFM, military factions tend to form around individuals. By and large three power groups can be delineated and are represented in the Revolutionary Council, the most important organ of the AFM:

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a. The moderates who tend to coalesce around Costa Gomes. In the Revolutionary Council they form a minority; according to some, they are a majority in the AFM as a whole. While recognizing that more and more moderates were being removed from positions of influence, the DATT believed that the moderates continue to constitute a potential reservoir of power that could be rallied to the support of a strong moderate leader who was prepared to exert his power.

Opinions about Costa Gomes' role ranged from his being a very powerful figure to a balancer between the left and moderates, to one with very little influence. The Brazilian Ambassador believed that Costa Gomes' role had been reduced to virtually nil. Most Americans appeared to feel that real power is vested in the Prime Minister's office rather than in that of the President.

More or less associated with the moderate faction are Maj Melo Antunes, the Foreign Minister; Major Vitor Alves, Minister without Portfolio; Gen Mendes Dias, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force; ADM Crespo, who is returning from Mozambique; and Gen Galvao de Melo, a leader of the moderate CDS party. Some Americans tended to place Gen Fabiao, the Army Chief of Staff, in this category, and explained his more radical pronouncements as the need of a recently promoted four-star general to establish his left wing credentials. The consensus was that both Antunes and Alves are currently relegated to the periphery of the power structure. The Brazilian Ambassador felt that among leaders with some influence only Antunes and Alves could be trusted to work with. The members of the DAO held that there were several moderate officers left who would be receptive to working with the US and who were out of sympathy with Portugal's current leftist course. Under the present policy guidance, however, the US attaches said they had little to offer them but verbal encouragement.

b. A second group of officers consists of power seekers per se. Some tend to gather around ADM Rosa Coutinho. There was a consensus that Coutinho is essentially an opportunist who will support whatever policy or faction promised to enhance his own power position, even though his personal bias places him at the left of the political spectrum. He appears to be after the Prime Minister's position. Another ambitious leader is Otelo de Carvalho, the newly promoted Copcon commander. Several Americans stressed Otelo's anti-NATO and anti-US bias; he was the man who orchestrated the attack against the US Ambassador; he identifies the US with the Salazar regime.

c. A third group of officers consists of radically-oriented ones. Many are ideologically in sympathy with the Communists; others stress Portugal's identification with the Third World (as do members of the

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group of power seekers). On most issues the radicals are the dominant group. Their shared political views notwithstanding, they are not a closely-knit group.

The consensus was that Vasco Goncalves, the Prime Minister, is a key member of this group; it was generally agreed that he is a PCP sympathizer, anti-US, and anti-NATO. Within this third group a major center of power is the 5th Division, controlled by Colonel Varela Gomes' strongly pro-Communist faction. Most US observers believed that the 5th Division* constitutes the link between the AFM and the PCP. The 5th Division is responsible for AFM propaganda and the AFM Bulletin; it runs the cultural dynamization program for the local population at the country and village level; and it implements the indoctrination programs at troop level.

Through smear tactics, radicals with or without encouragement of the PCP are trying to isolate and purge from the AFM the remaining moderates as well as others who do not share their views.

B. THE ELECTIONS AND THE PARTIES

Comment on the recent elections was conspicuous by its absence. According to some observers, everyone is now looking ahead to new elections, later this year perhaps, rather than looking back. On the other hand, this may be read as a sign that the elections were of no real significance. It may be of considerable significance that several political factions are undertaking to arm themselves.

The Socialist Party demonstrated a higher level of popularity than the other parties in the April elections, but it has not been able to translate this into tangible gains. According to the Brazilian Ambassador, the Socialist Party had lost the ability to effect any significant changes in Lisbon's political situation. In Lisbon, few posters were seen supporting the Socialists and the party maintained a relatively low level of visibility in the city. The Socialist newspaper Republica has remained out of circulation for two weeks, closed down by Communist workers on its printing staff, and the entire Republica issue has compounded the split between the Socialists and the Communists and between the Socialists and the government leaders.

The Communist Party (PCP), in contrast to the Socialists, maintains a high level of visibility, particularly in Lisbon, as previously mentioned. The PCP is active at both the grassroots level and as an influential element in the AFM and the central government.

*The 5th division is a staff division, e.g., like J-5.

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It has garnered control of many of the local governments, the media, and the labor unions. It has cooperated with the AFM and supported its program from the beginning. It has taken pains to maintain cordial relations with key AFM leaders. Party leader Alvaro Cunhal is doubtless aware that it is through this tie with the military that the Communists can maintain a level of influence that would otherwise not be open to them. Some American observers felt, however, that at some point in the future the PCP and the AFM will inevitably come into conflict; others, including the Brazilian Ambassador, stressed the identity of goals between the PCP and the dominant AFM leaders.

Cunhal's relations with Moscow are very good, but Moscow is apparently letting Cunhal run his own show in Portugal. Cunhal has been described as more East European and pro-Soviet in his attitudes than other West European Communist Party leaders. At any rate, the PCP has had the benefit of Soviet financial assistance -- perhaps \$35-40 million in the last year or so has been sent in. The party also reportedly receives the receipts from Soviet cultural events in Portugal.

C. ROLE OF THE SOVIETS

There were different views expressed on the extent of Soviet involvement in Portugal and on Soviet intentions there. Some said that the Soviets would like to see Portugal move into their orbit, but they are concerned lest such a development would scare the West. With this in mind, the Soviets are establishing contacts in as many fields and on as many levels of Portuguese society as possible.

The Soviets have undertaken an aggressive cultural program with the Portuguese. Billboards advertising the Moscow circus and the visiting lady astronaut were much in evidence. There is a poet exchange and Soviet cinema program, among others. Discussions have reportedly been undertaken for Soviet support in improving the outdated Portuguese fishing industry. Civil air agreements cover regular flights by Aeroflot into Lisbon and the Azores, while Soviet cargo ships are using Portuguese ports. Members of the Portuguese government are invited and travel to the Soviet Union, while Soviet trade and other groups frequent Portugal. The Soviet Ambassador reportedly meets regularly with key AFM members and is otherwise quite visible and active along with the large Soviet embassy staff. The Soviet embassy has a direct telephone line into the headquarters of the MDP, a Communist front movement.

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Some US officials believed that the Soviets do not want the PCP to take over, even if that would be possible, for fear of repercussions elsewhere. Nor did these officials believe that PCP leader Cunhal wants to take control of the government in Lisbon, knowing that the party is not up to the task. The Brazilian Ambassador did not share this view, but felt it was too early to say whether the PCP would be successful in establishing a Communist Portugal. Other American observers were of similar persuasion.

D. RELATIONS WITH NATO

Apparently there is little understanding of NATO's role among AFM officers. Several officers feel that NATO gets more out of Portugal than Portugal out of NATO. Some key leaders -- Goncalves, de Carvalho -- were said to be opposed to NATO membership. The Portuguese press is generally quite hostile. For all these reasons, the Portuguese were said to be vulnerable to an anti-NATO campaign. Yet the government has so far supported NATO and has maintained its arrangements with NATO.

Prime Minister Goncalves attended the NATO summit meeting. Some Americans said that he went in order to show his power; others believed that Costa Gomes sent Goncalves to see for himself what NATO was all about and because Costa Gomes believed that Goncalves' attendance would lend credibility to Portugal's pledge to continue its NATO commitment.

Portuguese protestations to retain the NATO connection notwithstanding, some American observers were concerned that Portuguese leaders were distancing themselves from NATO by their statements praising the East, castigating the US, and identifying Portugal with the bridge to the third world. It was felt that once the regime in Portugal started to advocate a neutralist stance, it would have defined Portugal out of NATO.

Discussions at IBERLANT revealed that the question of classified data had not yet become a problem. While the Portuguese officers at IBERLANT could not hold any top secret documents, they were permitted to see these. So far, however, the Portuguese had not asked to see any top secret material. Any NATO classified data exchange with the Portuguese Ministry of Defense was a matter beyond the purview of IBERLANT but between Brussels and Lisbon.

E. THE AZORES QUESTION

The mini-uprising on the Azores during early June prompted considerable discussion over what Lisbon would and could do in the face of a serious challenge of Azorean independence. Most observers agreed that there would be problems for Lisbon, but there were sharp disagreements

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over the extent and effects of these problems. The first problems will arise with the initial effort to assemble a military force. With the current lack of discipline in the military, many soldiers would probably refuse to go to the islands and it could take days or even weeks to assemble an expeditionary force.

A second set of problems derives from transporting the troops to the islands. The Air Force has two Boeing 707 aircraft that could be used as troop carriers. An airlift could, however, be stopped by blocking the airfields on the Azores with automobiles or gasoline cans, thus preventing the aircraft from landing. The possibility of using paratroops was generally denigrated by US observers, who felt Portuguese capabilities in this area were seriously deficient.

Most observers agreed that a sealift of troops from the mainland was the most promising approach. Some believed that with enough time, Lisbon could probably assemble some kind of force and transport it to the islands. Members of the DAO, however, emphasized that the harbors could be closed with a few fishing boats and tended to discount the amphibious landing capabilities of the Portuguese armed forces. Additionally, there is good reason to doubt that troops, once transported to the Azores, would be prepared to fight against their fellow Portuguese on the island. The variety of risks in such an undertaking would, according to some observers, cause the leaders in Lisbon to hesitate for fear of losing face. Others held that Lisbon undoubtedly would send forces to the Azores to restore the situation.

It is notable that the DAO members favored the view that a unilateral declaration of independence by the Azores was likely to be successful, partly because of Lisbon's limited capability to oppose it effectively; partly because local troops, who were largely Azoreans, would support the move. Others felt, however, that a UDI would attract only limited support, since the separatist movement was led by a small wealthy elite without deep roots in the Azores.

F. PORTUGAL'S FUTURE

All US observers held -- as did the Brazilian Ambassador -- that Portugal was inexorably moving down the road to socialism. Beyond this, however, US opinions were divided. Some felt that the best case would be a Portugal à la Nasser's Egypt with a Cuban model as a more likely worst case. Others argued that Portugal still had a fair chance to turn into a Western-type social democracy, particularly if the US and the West Europeans would show their active concern and compassion for Portugal.

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
The suggestion was made to us that the US demonstrate its goodwill by canceling the US embargo on military weapons to Portugal. In addition, the US may wish to consider taking the initiative by offering (1) to provide some T-38 aircraft with the instruments and equipment to turn them into F-5s; (2) to send US technical training units to Portugal to upgrade Portuguese technology and training; and (3) to establish an air mobile brigade. The latter appeared to be more feasible than the infantry division to which Portugal was committed under NATO. It was stressed that all three services should be given assistance at the same time, lest others single out the favored service as a tool of US imperialism. The rationale given to us for the suggestions was that a US military aid program would keep lines of communication open with the Portuguese and increase US influence. Furthermore, by giving the Portuguese military more sophisticated equipment than their current antiquated inventory offered, Portuguese military leaders and the officer corps would have to learn to operate the new equipment and would eventually be forced to chose between becoming professional soldiers or remaining political operators. Finally, by giving the Portuguese appropriate new equipment, the military could find a mission and thereby start rebuilding armed forces discipline and esprit de corps.

Among US observers there are significant differences in perception of how much influence the US has left with leaders in Lisbon. Those who saw the moderate elements as remaining strong, saw a greater chance of the US playing an effective role; those who viewed the moderate position as that of an endangered species were more skeptical of the potential for US leverage. Some US observers, moreover, pointed out that the Portuguese regard US intervention as the greatest threat to the revolution. We believe nevertheless that the US would be well advised to use whatever means it has left to try to shore up the moderate cause in Portugal. Time, however, is clearly working against the moderates, and opportunities/for the US to influence the Portuguese situation are likely to diminish as time goes by.

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WYNFRED JOSHUA V
DIO for European and Soviet
Political/Military Affairs



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cc: BG Thompson

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