

Address

by

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to

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It was 34 years ago I was last at this post. I was driving a truck. I came into the Army and I was interviewed by a Master Sergeant who was very very interested in these various languages I knew and he sent for a Major, and, you know, you didn't see very many majors in those days. The Major came and he asked me a lot of questions about all these languages.

This was the time when the Army was expanding. They were making the President of General Motors a Lieutenant General. The President of RCA was a Brigadier General in the Signal Corps. And I figured they were going to make me a Lieutenant Colonel, but if they offer me a Majority I'll accept it since we'll soon be in the war and everybody has to make sacrifices. So at the end of this thing everybody was comparing MOS's and I looked at my thing and I saw something, as I recall, that said 0506. I thought this was time to exercise some of this leadership I was going to be called on, so I turned to one of the other guys and said, "Go find out what 0506 is." It worked like a charm. He went away and came back with a puzzled look on his face. He said, "0506 is a truck driver." I said somebody's made a mistake. Nobody had. Guess who drove a truck for quite a while.

Then I went to Officer's Candidate School. Then I went into a new Infantry Division, and then an Army without computers suddenly reached in and got me for a special intelligence detail, the Military Intelligence Training Center. To tell you the state of American Intelligence, the Commander of this Military Intelligence Training Center was a British Colonel.

I am supposed to talk to you about the future of intelligence but I've got to talk to you a little bit about the past of it. Right now there is a lot of effort around the world to make it appear that intelligence is un-American or immoral and the founding fathers didn't approve of it. Well I have news for you. They not only approved it. They used it widely and they did some things that I'm not sure the Senate Select Committee would have liked. George Washington organized three kidnap operations to kidnap Benedict Arnold. And you know what he would have done with him if he had got him. Benjamin Franklin, for three years before the Revolution, was running a mail-intercept service on the British. And he got in trouble. He lost his job as Assistant Postmaster General of the Colonies for that. So I guess the predecessors of the Senate Select Committee caught up with him.

There are a number of these things that were going on. However, we Americans have had only one peculiarity. We've always started a war without intelligence and immediately the war is over we've disbanded.

You know, in 1932 when Mr. Stimson -- this gets right into your area -- was Secretary of State, they offered him some intercepted messages and he said, "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." But about seven years later when he was Secretary of War, he couldn't lay his hands on enough "other gentlemen's" mail. So, you know, we have these various phases in our national existence when we think, "this is terrible; this is awful; you know we shouldn't be doing this; it's alright for the dirty old Russians, British, French, and Germans to do it but we pure Americans don't do this sort of thing." Well, the fact is, we've had to in the past and, if we want to remain a free nation, we're going to have to in the future.

Just a few words about intelligence. What is it? Intelligence is information that is vital to the U.S. Government, collected, analyzed, evaluated, and disseminated. Why do we need it? We need it because probably not since Valley Forge has the United States been in as relatively a bad power position vis a vis other powers. I don't think since Valley Forge any nation has had the capability to destroy the United States until the very recent past and right now. And this is why it is more important to us than ever before. We hear all about détente and we<sup>all</sup>/hope détente works. I myself hope it works, but supposing it doesn't. At every indication that I can see from where I sit is the

Russians are pursuing two tracks. One of the tracks is détente and the other track is not détente. I must tell you about a little détente story I heard in Europe not long ago. Someone said two young Americans were visiting Moscow and they were taken to the zoo by a young Russian. They were shown the various animals in their cages and so forth and finally they came to this cage and there was a huge Russian bear in the cage and he had teeth that long, claws that long. In the same cage was a rather worried looking lamb, but he appeared to be in good shape. The young American said to the Russian, "Why do you put those two in the same cage? That's a very peculiar combination." The young Russian said, "This is to prove that peaceful co-existence is possible." The young American said, "Well, that's very impressive." And his buddy said, "It sure is convincing." The young Russian looked around to see if anybody was there, and not seeing anybody, he said, "Of course, you understand, every morning we have to put in a new lamb." So, if you don't run out of lambs, you know, it's in great shape. We hope it will work, but as we look at the Soviet Union, what do we see? We see the Soviet Union right now deploying four brand new systems of ICBM's, third generation ICBM's. We see the beginning indication of a fifth system of ICBM's. We see the Soviets building larger more powerful submarines,

developing missiles for those submarines that they can fire from Soviet parts into the heart of the United States. We see them building these submarines both in European Russia and in Asiatic Russia. We see them building an intercontinental bomber, or at least, a bomber that could be used against the United States. We see them in vastly improving the equipment and the training of the red army. They have just gone from about a twenty percent increase in the tank strength of the Soviet rifle division. We see them building up tremendous force. If the Soviets build up to the full strength the number of missiles allowed to them by the Vladivostok Agreement, within three to five years they will have five times the throw weight on their missiles as the United States has on its. This is force far in excess of what is required for deterrence. It is force far in excess of what is required for defense. So the question rises, what use will the Russians make of this enormous strength that they are building up. This is the question for which the government of the United States must turn to the Intelligence Community -- to Defense Intelligence, to Central Intelligence. What use will they make of this? Now, we have various means of collecting intelligence. We collect an enormous amount of intelligence overtly, through reading the newspapers, through listening to broadcasts, through various things like this. We have old gals who can read the Minsk Pravda and tell you

who is coming up in the Politburo and who is going down. We have these tremendous overt -- the U.S. Embassies all over the world are overt -- collectors. Then we have the technological collection. Technological collection such as what you do, technological collection such as is done overhead of all sorts, and various other technical kinds of intelligence. These are tremendously important. I think probably the greatest contribution the United States has brought to the intelligence business have been in the field of technology and analysis. Some of our Allies -- the British -- have been in this business since the late 1500's. We have brought to bear the technological skill of the United States in all of these areas, in the Signal area, in the reconnaissance area, in the overhead area, and in many other areas. We have done things that are well nigh miraculous. But if we were to tell them and anybody knew we were looking through the window, all they would have to do is pull down the blinds or turn out the lights. This is one of the great problems. As Colonel M said, we try and stay off TV. It's very difficult nowadays. I went down to Atlanta the other day to give a speech to the Rotary Club and there were three live television cameras in the room and 12 microphones on the desk. So it's a real problem. Nevertheless, you hear an awful lot about what's going out, but, thank God, everything we have is not going out. This is very important because it makes a lot

of people nervous. We have these investigations going on. I would say that we are now embarked on a great experiment to determine whether any nation, any great nation like the United States, can run its secret intelligence service, so to speak, in a goldfish bowl. Now we may succeed because we are a very unusual people. But if we do, it<sup>is</sup>/going to be just like going to the moon. We'll have been the only people who did it. All of these accusations and everything else, of course, one of the things that bothers me is one of the efforts that is coming out of this present thing is to create a caste system in the United States whereby if you've ever worked for CIA, you're either an infiltrator or an assassin and are unfit to work anywhere else. Of course, the net effect of that is going to be to try and knock off our recruiting so we can't get any good people and thereby knock our efficiency down. Then you have these myths that go out. For years we had this myth, the CIA was living and making money off some kind of drug trade in Southeast Asia. The latest myth is we infiltrate other government agencies. We have never infiltrated any government agency. Mr. Butterfield never worked at the CIA, for the CIA or with the CIA in any way. Yes, we have people in other agencies. Generally, because the head of those agencies or someone very senior in those agencies didn't have a space and he thought we could bear the burden and put the people up. We have no



people working in any U.S. Government Agency anywhere who are not known to those people. Now I don't say that they walk around in their job carrying a sign around their neck saying, "I work for the CIA." But there is no attempt to keep them, they do not report back to the CIA on what is going on in the Agency where they are. These are, again, the type of myths that we have going around.

I am happy to tell you that these things are not as effective as you might imagine. One of the startling things to us has been that ever since the Seymour Hersh article was published in the New York Times accusing us of massive domestic espionage, we have had roughly four times as many people applying to work at the CIA as at any time in the past. Nearly all of them young. Well, now, some of that may be the economy. Some of that may be what the old Hollywood movie star said that she didn't care what they said about her as long as they spelled her name right. It's pretty difficult to spell ours wrong. There are only three letters in it. Even to us that has been a rather startling and a rather reassuring thing. As a matter of fact, the other day a newspaperman in Atlanta asked me whether when this was all over I thought whether we could regain the confidence of the American people. And I said I wasn't conscious that we had lost it. Certainly not the applications to work there. Statistics !!

In any case it is within the American system to have this kind of oversight and this kind of investigation and we hope it will work. We think it will work if it is conducted in a serious, responsible, and positive fashion and not used as a political football. I personally think that intelligence is much too precious to the United States to be kicked around as anybody's football. So we will work with this. We will accept any form of oversight the Congress wants to set up.

The Central Intelligence Agency came into being as the result of the National Security Act of 1947. As a matter of fact, the last kind of these investigations we had was in 1945-46. There was a seven-month-long investigation about Pearl Harbor and that investigation discovered that almost all the pieces of the puzzle that would have told us what was going to happen were available in various parts of the U.S. Government. But everybody was jealously squirreling away his little piece and not telling anybody else. Hence, the word Central, the idea was to have a central repository where this would be brought together and someone could go to the President and say, "Look, this is going to happen." As a matter of fact we have exactly such a procedure right now. It's an Alert Memorandum. If we see a situation building up and we deem that it's going to be troublesome, we talk to DIA, we talk to the three services, and we go the President and the White House with an Alert Memorandum saying, "Watch Somaliland, watch this, watch that, watch the other," as

we see this. Now we have a great thing of these intelligence post mortems, but intelligence post mortems are only held when we weren't successful. If we did give them warning, no one suggests that we have a post mortem. So this is one of the problems in the intelligence business. You always get investigated and criticized for the things that you fail to do or didn't do right. Very rarely do you have a post mortem that says you did a fantastic job on this. You gave us warning; you told us it was going to happen. We don't have them on those.

Now, I was talking about the means by which we collect intelligence and I said we had the overt means and we had the technological means. We also have a third means, which is the human means, which is the agent, the spy, the clandestine services. Now, why do we need these? All the technology in the world and all the overhead reconnaissance in the world won't get you inside a business, nor will it tell you what's inside a man's head. For example, during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 we saw and knew exactly what the forces were on both sides of the Suez Canal. What we were not privy to was the decision to go on the 6th of October. I might add, however, that we had a report in CIA in late May 1973 that said, "Egypt and Syria will start war against Israel on the 6th of October." We duly reported this. But one of my experiences with the intelligence business has been that the analysts generally shrink from telling you something really unpleasant and

ever after we try to fit every piece of intelligence<sup>in</sup>/to show that it wasn't going to happen on the 6th of October. We finally got ourselves convinced that it wasn't going to happen on the 6th of October. As a matter of fact, I'm the guy that signed the Watch Report that said it wasn't going to happen that Saturday morning, and it happened that Saturday afternoon. So there is some tolerance for mistakes in the U.S. Intelligence Community.

To get back to some of the stories about the CIA, yes, we've been criticized for some things that we probably did that we shouldn't do in the light of what the standards are now. We've probably done some things wrong that we wouldn't do if we had to go back over them. But I submit, if you took the Department of Agriculture over the last 27 years and submitted it to the kind of scrutiny that we've been submitted to you'd find something of the same sort. If you took a town with roughly the population of the number of employees of the Central Intelligence Agency I think you'd find some things not unlike what we've found. We hope for guidelines from these Congressional investigations, that they will give us a guideline of what's acceptable and not acceptable because, as I say, the standards change. Mr. Stimson in 1932 thought it was awful to read other people's mail. Mr. Stimson in 1939 thought it was great. "Give me some more." What I'm worried about is that about 1995 someone will come and say, not to me, but, to one of my successors,

"What were you doing back there in 1975?" Not what were you doing, why weren't you doing this, that, or the other. So we hope these guidelines, whatever guidelines the Congress gives us for intelligence, will include some means of incorporating changes in public attitudes. As these various standards change, you know, we gloss over a lot of this in our history. When the State Assembly of Maryland was about to vote Maryland out of the Federal Union and into the Southern Confederacy, Mr. Lincoln sent troops over and closed down the State Assembly of Maryland. There were 1100 people killed in New York in the Copperhead Riots. We close our eyes to these things, and, oh, no, they didn't happen. But they did happen. The other day we had a group of Congressmen out at the CIA and we got on to the question of assassination. Mr. Colby, our Director, said, you know this is a question of perspective. If anybody in 1943 or 1944 could have shot Adolph Hitler, he would have probably been the first joint recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross in history. And one of the Congressmen said, "Ya, but if you could have got him in '35 or '36, think how many lives you would have saved." In '35 and '36 we weren't at war with Germany. And here is this guy suggesting that we do in the past what he disapproved of our doing now, or of our even considering doing now.

One of the other factors is in an Agency like ours obviously all sorts of contingencies are discussed. So if we discuss something and they say did you discuss it, or even if it was discussed at the lowest level and somebody wrote a paper with a GS-7, we have to say yes, we considered it. But the fact is none of these people have been killed by anybody in the CIA. There was some discussion about it. But on the assassination, Director Colby's position has been: It does not do the United States any good to put the finger on anybody in the Agency, outside the Agency, or above the Agency. All the facts are being given to the Congressional Committees and they can decide what they want to do. We do not think it is in the national interest for us to point the finger at anybody. They can make whatever decision they want in that respect.

I can only say that as far as I know, and I have access to a considerable amount of this, I do not know of anything of this type that is legally subject to prosecution. You can't prosecute people for thinking about things. The fact is, Mr. Fidel Castro is still alive. Everybody forgets that at the time these discussions were going on, Mr. Fidel Castro was shooting people everyday in the National Stadium in Havana in front of the television cameras. I saw it. And he was very proud of this. So, some of the moral outrage I don't totally share at this sort of thing.

Then you hear a great deal about the Rockefeller Report. This is much quoted. Now, in my turn, I'd like to quote a part of the Rockefeller Report that the media have not been giving any publicity to, and I quote directly:

"A detailed analysis of the facts has convinced the Commission that the great majority of CIA's domestic activities complied with its statutory authority."

I give another quote from the Rockefeller Report:

"The Agency's own actions terminating activities on which this Commission focused....."

In other words the Agency terminated many of these activities, nearly all of these activities, long before these investigations started. As far back as 1972 Mr. Helms put out a directive (who was then the Director) and said, "Assassination is not the policy of this Agency. It will not be considered as a solution." A similar policy was put out by Mr. Schlesinger in '73 when he was Director. Many of these things that they object to which were perfectly acceptable at the time that they were being done have been terminated by us following our perception that the American people are no longer prepared to accept this, that, or the other policy. So, one of the things that concerns us very much is that Mr. Colby is down there day after day testifying on events of the

1950's or the early 1960's. I'm very concerned about the late 1970's and 1980's because that's where your freedom and mine is going to be decided. It's like talking to Gerald Ford about something Harry Truman did. This is the kind of time frame that they're talking about. They're talking about events in '52, '58, '60, '61. Almost none of these events are beyond '61 that they are talking about. So I think it is proper and appropriate to look into these events and if the Congress feels that any of them should not be done they should give us guidelines, clear guidelines so that the responsibility will rest with them as to what was done and what was not done. Because the only guidelines we got were in the National Security Act of 1947 which said, "The Central Intelligence Agency will do such other things in intelligence as directed by the National Security Council." If you want my honest opinion, I don't think we have any chance whatever of getting any clearer guidance this time around. No one is going to want to say you should or should not do this particular thing. We're going to just have to go on with it again. The people in the early 50's and the early 60's were operating on the basis of the last investigation of the CIA which was conducted by General Doolittle and his Committee, with General Mark Clark and various other people. They concluded that the United States was facing a ruthless and implacable enemy that was determined to use all means to destroy the



United States, and our only hope of survival was to match their dedication with our dedication and their ruthlessness with our ruthlessness.

The idea that the United States can fight the KGB and the GRU by using Marquis of Queensberry rules is like sending someone out to fight somebody with brass knuckles fighting Marquis of Queensberry rules. However, if the American people want us to do it that way, that 's the way we'll do it. Now, one of the other things you have as an impression<sup>is</sup> that we were sort of an invisible government doing things by ourselves without telling the Congress. The National Security Act of 1947 set up -- because it was within the framework of the National Security Act -- the Armed Services Committees of House and Senate as the Oversight Committee. For many years the Armed Services Committees of House and Senate did not go into great detail, but we always were responsive to their questions. We always told them anything they wanted to know. We reported fully to them. We held nothing back from them, and we have never had a leak out of either of those Armed Services Committees. Because the Appropriations Committees vote money, we had the same relationship with them. To give you just some idea, this year so far Mr. Colby has testified more than 40 times before 18 different Committees of the House and Senate. On other than the investigation of the CIA, I can't tell you how many Congressmen or Senators come to us

and say, "I'm going to Russia," or "I'm going to China. Would you give me a briefing on it." We do. Groups, or Committees, or anything else. They'll come to us and say, "Well, now, what about this Turkish business. What will we lose if the Turks throw us out of the installations?" We go down there; we spend four or five hours telling them what we'll do.

Now, when following the Watergate, some questionable activities came to light, and I say questionable because I can't take a position of whether they're legal or illegal or right or wrong -- all of that is a question of historic perspective and time -- Dr. Schlesinger, who was then the Director, went out and asked everybody who knew of anything questionable to help. We got a report. We took that report down to the Senate Committee and to the House Committee. And we briefed them. You'd be surprised how many of them don't remember that they were briefed, but we have a memorandum of conversation and briefing listing who was there and the questions that were asked by some of the people who don't remember they were briefed. We've made great progress in medical science, but I don't think anybody has yet discovered a vaccination against selective amnesia.

You know, one of our problems as a nation is that we spend a great deal of time flagellating ourselves and pointing<sup>to</sup> our own shortcomings to ourselves, and we do have shortcomings. We're trying to correct

those shortcomings. Someone once said, what was the nationality of Adam and Eve. The answer was, they didn't have a stitch of clothing on their back, they didn't have a roof over their head, they didn't know where the next meal was coming from, but they thought they were in Paradise so they could only have been citizens of the Soviet Union.

We know there are things wrong with our society and we are trying to fix them and correct them. Not long ago a European said to me, "I used to think that the flagellantes and the penitentes were two small sects in Arizona and New Mexico, but now I realize you've got them all over the United States." And you have all these people telling us how awful we are. Not long ago in Atlanta, a girl came up to me and she said, "Don't you think that all of these activities by foreign powers against us are in retaliation for what we are doing to them?" And I said, "Well, if you take the view that the United States is a hostile, imperialist, aggressive power, probably you can rationalize it that way. But since I don't take that view, it doesn't make much sense to me. "

When you think we've won a number of great wars this century and not only have we taken nothing from the vanquished, but in all human history the victor has never done more for the vanquished than we did. We're the only people in history that have ever financed our competitors back in business with us. And if Volkswagen is selling cars in the

United States today and taking business away from Americans, it's because under the Marshall Plan, in which I was working, we put the machine tools back in that Volkswagen factory. And that's true of the Fiat factory or the Citroën factory, or any of the other factories in Europe. So I really don't have the appropriate guilt complex about the United States that I think we should.

One of the problems we face is that we are facing a new kind of war that we have had no experience in. Twenty-five hundred years ago a great Chinese writer by the name of Sun Tzu wrote a book called the Art of War. And he described how to undo your enemies. It's a very difficult book to read because it's in the form of a Chinese dialogue and if you're not Chinese it's pretty hard to read. I always describe it as something like swimming in a pool full of molasses, but there is an awful lot of real sugar in there. He has a series of Commandments he puts out on how you undo your enemies, and he says, as a first general consideration. "Fighting is the most primitive way of making war." And he then has 13 commandments, "How you undo your enemies." I'm only going to give you four, so don't worry. The first is, "Cover with ridicule everything that is valid in your opponent's country." The second is, "Aggravate by every means at your command all the differences existing in your opponent's country." The third is, "Denounce their leaders and at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow

countrymen." The fourth, "Agitate the young against the old." There are nine more. And he winds up with this general summation. He said, "The supreme excellence is not to defeat your enemies in a hundred battles; the supreme excellence is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them." We keep looking for an old fashioned conventional battlefield. And we don't find it. We find a different kind of a battlefield. Cover with ridicule everything that is valid in your opponent's country. The campaign against the Armed Forces, for instance. They say, oh, we don't want the CIA to do that in the United States. The FBI should do it. But when the FBI tries to do it, they denounce the FBI. They call the FBI's attempts to obtain evidence in national security cases burglaries. That's like calling executions by the State murder. Some people view them <sup>in</sup> that way, but I don't think that's the general consensus of how it should be viewed. But nevertheless, this is a real problem for us. How do we face and counter these new forms of war? We see within the United States today an attempt to create a caste system whereby anybody in intelligence is some sort of a second class citizen. He isn't to be trusted. They use the word spying all the time. So and so was spied on. Anybody's welcome to spy on me. I don't worry about it. This is the constant hammering attempt. The real attempt, of course which is long term, is to prevent the recruitment of good people into intelligence. In my

view today the real issue is not the truth or falsehood of these allegations of 15 or 25 years ago. The real issue is will the United States have eyes and ears for the future or will the United States have to stumble into the future, into the '80's, a blind and deaf giant until we come to the day when we have to choose between nuclear blackmail or abject humiliation. This is the real issue we have to decide on. Whether we're going to go forward unable to see what's happening, unable to know what's happening.

Again, as I say, we're a remarkable people. Not long ago I was talking to my French counterpart, and this was before the Mayaguez incident, and he said to me, "Did you hear the story about the Frenchman, the Englishman, and the American who were captured by cannibals on a Pacific Island?" I said, "No." Well, he said, the three of them were captured by the cannibals and the cannibals informed them they were going to eat them the next day for lunch but before they ate them they were going to give them each one wish, not including setting them free. So they said to the Frenchman, "What do you want?" The Frenchman said, "Well, if I'm going to be executed in the morning, I would just as soon spend my remaining time with that beautiful cannibal girl over there." So they untied him and he and the cannibal girl went off in the woods. Then they said to the Englishman, "What do you want?" The Englishman said, "I want a pen and paper." And they said, "What do you want a pen and

paper for?" He, said, "I want to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations to denounce the unjust, unfair and unsporting attitude you have adopted towards us." So they took the Englishman into a hut and they gave him a pen and paper. And then they said to the American, "What do you want?" The American said, "I want to be led into the middle of the village, I want to be made to kneel down and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end." The Chief said, "That's a very odd request, but then the Americans are very odd people, and I promised, so okay." So they led the American into the middle of the village, they made him kneel down, they untied him, and the biggest cannibal took a running kick at him and knocked him about fifteen or twenty feet. The American had been hiding a submachine gun under his clothes all the time so at this point he whipped out the submachine gun and cut down the cannibals. The rest of the cannibals fled. The Frenchman, hearing the gunfire came out of the woods; the Englishman, hearing the gunfire came out of the hut. They looked at the American and they said, "Do you mean to say you had that submachine gun the whole time?" The American said, "Sure." They said, "Why didn't you use it before?" The American looked at them very earnestly and he said, "But you don't understand. It wasn't until he kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for it."

When all this is said and done, I am absolutely confident in the future of intelligence. We cannot do without it and it is a fascinating and rewarding career. Rewarding in my case; rewarding in the case of Lieutenant General Graham, who is the head of DIA; Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, who is the Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community, and many other officers. And, really, I don't know anything more fascinating than working in this highly technical, highly skilled area. To know what's going to be in tomorrow morning's newspaper before it's there is really a fascinating thing. I always feel that the great thing in life is not how much money you earn, but that every morning when you get up you feel a challenge. It isn't, oh, God, what's it going to be today. It's something you think, what is it going to be today? This has the additional advantage of not only being interesting, not only being fascinating, but giving you the feeling that your contributing to the things you really believe in. And if I had to make the decision over again, I'd make exactly the same decision. Sometimes I feel I'm a sort of Jonas at the CIA because barely had I arrived when Watergate burst upon us. Barely was Watergate over when this stuff started. I've spent the last three and a half years testifying and all this sort of business and I'd still do it again. It's worth it. And as I say, it gives you a feeling of contributing.



One thing I want to make clear is that as far as we're concerned in the Central Intelligence Agency, we have no part in the formulation of policy. When I go down to the White House to a meeting of the White House Special Action Group, I am instructed not to take part in the discussion on what we do. All I tell them is what will happen if you do A, what will happen if you do B, what will happen if you do C. They ask me a few technical questions and that 's it. I do not take part. We are not a policy forming organization. We do not take part in the formulation of policy. They ask us a question. We answer it.

The other thing I would like to say is that good intelligence doesn't necessarily mean sound policy. It would be very difficult to have sound policies without good intelligence. And I must say one of the satisfying things is to know that the first document that the President sees every morning when he gets up is the Presidential Daily Bulletin that we prepare for him containing the most secret intelligence we have on matters susceptible of being of interest to him. And he sees that every morning before he even reads the newspapers.

I think the future of intelligence is going to be bigger and more important than ever in the past. Simply because the threat is bigger. The threat to the very existence of the United States exists to a degree greater than at any time, as I said, since Valley Forge. We have got

to produce the best. We've got to use our best people. We've got to find out what's going on. We've got to be able to tell our government, which has responsibilities all over the world, what's coming up next. Because the only alternative is slavery. I often chide my newspaper friends and say, you know, in my view, America can never be defeated from the outside. America can only be defeated from the inside by convincing Americans that their cause is unjust. The other day I talked to the National Press Club. I talked for 40 minutes and I answered questions for an hour and they never printed one word of it. I said, you know, a lot of you used to worry when President Thieu would close or suspend one of the five opposition newspapers in Saigon. I have news for you. This is no longer a problem. There are no opposition newspapers in Saigon anymore. This is so often what they forget. They told us it was wrong to support this repressive government; it was wrong to support this dictatorship. Well, I only wish they could talk to the people of South Vietnam now and find out what kind of shrift the opposition gets there.

But, in any case, I think the important thing for all of us, and one of the consoling things to me, is to see how all parts of the intelligence community are working together in the United States more closely than ever before. I knew it when we just had the three service agencies and

the CIA. We didn't even have DIA. Many people think we live in separate compartments. The people in DIA and CIA, ACSI, ONI, and AFCIN read the same telegrams, the same information every day. The idea that we live in watertight compartments is nonsense. We have a secure conference net whereby the analysts in CIA, DIA, and the services can talk to one another and discuss anything. Many of the estimates that we put out, part of it is drafted in one of the agencies, part of it is drafted in the other. I lived in a period, when I was an Attaché, when we had great parochial rivalry. As a matter of fact when I was the Attaché to France, I found out who the next Head of the French CIA was going to be, so I went up and told the CIA Station Chief and he looked at me rather pityingly and he said, "That's nonsense. It's going to be a General or a Prefect. It's certainly not going to be a civilian." I said, "Okay." About three months later, he dashed into my office and he said, "Do you know who is going to be the new head of the French CIA." I said, "Yes, Alexandre de Marenches." He said, "How did you know?" I said, "I told you. He showed me a letter from the President saying he was going to be." He said, "That's right. What do you know about him?" I said, "Plenty. And just as soon as my telegram to DIA has been sent, I'll give you a copy." We don't have that kind of nonsense anymore. We don't have that kind of

nonsense even within the intelligence community of which the Director is the head. He feels very strongly that the primary responsibilities of military intelligence is military. Yes, we in the CIA should retain an independent assessment capability. But fundamentally, it is a military responsibility. I can tell you that I have been in intelligence thirty years and I have never seen the relationship between the various parts of the intelligence community better than it is today. We have really experienced people. We have really good people working in it. We have really dedicated people. I've been at CIA three and a half years. I have not spent my whole adult life there. People often ask me, "How do you feel about it after three and a half years?" And I say, "Well, I can sum up my feelings in one word. And that word is 'reassurance'." Reassurance at the competence of the people I've found there, reassurance at the continuity of people staying for years on the same subject, but reassurance, most of all, at the integrity of the people that I've found there. I found there Americans -- one of the things they try and do is claim that the people in the military in general and intelligence in particular are some kind of different American. We are not different Americans. We're a slice off the same cake. We live by the same standards as other Americans. The same things are acceptable to us that are acceptable to other Americans.

We are not a breed apart living <sup>with</sup> a whole mythology of our own.

Every day when I go to work at the Agency, I walk in the door and on my right I see the stars carved in the stone wall that commemorate the members of the Agency, that I have the honor to be Deputy Director of, who have fallen in line of duty on the silent battlefield of intelligence, which is silent but never quiet on which we are condemned to fight not by our own choice, but by those who would destroy us. And on the other side of the wall I see a sign, an inscription which is the motto of the Agency, which says, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth will make you free." I think perhaps its dangerous to fool with biblical quotations, but as I have mentioned earlier, times change, and I'm not sure we shouldn't change that motto slightly and have it read, "You must know the truth for only the truth will keep you free." Thank you very much.