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S-10,067/AA-1/Mr. Funk/48486/7 May 73/caw

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Problems in Maintaining Attache Presence (U)

1. (C) Since 1965, there have been continuing difficulties with Department of State, not only in pressure by State to reduce authorized attache manning, but also in preventing the Defense Intelligence Agency from assigning replacement personnel to existing approved positions.

2. (C) Although President Kennedy indicated in 1962 that he wanted Army, Navy and Air Force Attaches in every country where the United States has a diplomatic mission, and Presidential guidance in 1966 directed action to extend and improve the use of the Attaches, authorized manning for the Defense Attache System has declined from 1880 to 981 since 1965. Most of the reductions in attache manning took place in 1968-1969, as a result of the BALFA (Balance of Payments) reductions in U.S. overseas manning directed by President Johnson. The magnitude of these reductions and their distribution among agencies were largely determined by the Department of State. On 27 March 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard acted to forestall additional reductions in the DAS by appealing to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. On 26 May 1970, Dr. Kissinger advised Defense that the President had agreed to suspend further reductions in the attache system.

3. (C) On 29 August 1971, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard wrote to Secretary of State Rogers to register Defense concern with mounting presssure from State to reduce the number and size of Defense Attache Offices. In his letter, Secretary Packard noted that problems arise when Embassy personnel attempt to evaluate a specific Defense Attache Office solely in relation to its contribution to the State Department mission. Citing the sizable reductions that had occurred in Defense Attache manning since 1965, Secretary Packard stated that the Defense Attache System needed a period of relative stability to allow informal adjustments free from the requirement to react to additional pressures to reduce. Although Secretary Packard recommended to Secretary of State Rogers that a message to the field would assist in reducing misunderstandings on the issue, State declined to take this action.

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4. (C) Despite Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of 26 May 1970, suspending personnel reductions in the Defense Attache System, Department of State is unilaterally reducing the DAS at a time when our need for attaches, because of command drawdowns and increased monitoring responsibilities in Asia and Eastern Europe, is steadily increasing. Since 1963, attache manning has been reduced by 58 percent.

5. (C) Per our conversation on 4 May 1973, I am forwarding a summary of the problems experienced by the Defense Intelligence Agency in maintaining adequate levels in attache manning for use by you and Deputy Secretary Clements in discussions with Dr. Kissinger. I have also included a draft memorandum to serve as the basis for new Presidential guidance.

6. (C) I am also providing a copy of this material to Admiral Anderson, Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to keep him informed. I discussed the matter with him on 9 May. He will act in our behalf.

s/ V. P. de POIX
V. P. de POIX
Vice Admiral, USN
Director

2 Enclosures
1. Summary of Problems in Maintaining Attache Presence (S)
2. Draft Memorandum to Secretary of State (C)

cc: Director, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS IN MAINTAINING ATTACHE PRESENCE (U)

1. (C) Since 1965, there have been continuing difficulties with Department of State, not only in pressure by State to reduce authorized attache manning, but also in preventing the Defense Intelligence Agency from assigning replacement personnel to existing approved positions. Currently, State is unilaterally forcing reductions in Defense Attache manning despite the Presidential guidance contained in Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of 26 May 1970 suspending reductions in attache manning. These reductions are being forced at a time when our need for attaches, because of command drawdowns and increased monitoring responsibilities in Asia and Eastern Europe, is steadily increasing.

2. (C) For purposes of perspective, previous White House guidance on attaches should be noted. In early 1962 President Kennedy discussed attache matters with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He expressed an interest in seeing as wide a deployment of military attaches as possible. He asked why there were not attaches at each capital where the United States had diplomatic representatives. A Department of Defense memorandum dated 9 July 1962 reported that the President would like to see Army, Air Force, and Navy attaches in every country, especially in Latin America. In a memorandum to Secretary Nitze on 7 November 1962 President Kennedy noted that attaches can make both short and long-term contributions of major significance. In the short-term, in President Kennedy's view, "a valuable assessment of the political and military situation in a country can be made by attaches because of their access to information resulting from respect held by most foreigners for our military power", particularly where the host country military have a prominent role. In the long-term, the memorandum continued, "the admiration attaches earn for the United States and the bonds of friendship they forge with the leaders of these countries can be of inestimable value to this country". In 1966, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Presidential Advisor to President Johnson, recommended action to "extend and improve the use of service attaches", and designated Africa, Asia, and Latin America to receive emphasis. This guidance became directive upon DIA on 16 August 1966 by action of the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

3. (S) The foregoing White House guidance on increasing the size of the attache system occurred at the time when that system

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was at its greatest numbers. Major reductions in attache manning took place in 1968-1969 as a result of the balance of payments (BALPA) reductions in U.S. overseas manning directed by President Johnson. The magnitude of these reductions and their distribution among agencies were largely determined by the Department of State which required the attache offices to take proportionately heavier cuts than other agencies. Similar reductions took place in 1970 under the Presidentially-directed overseas personnel reduction project (OPRED). In 1970, Defense was informed that the President had indicated [redacted] 25X1

Defense Attache System would be 1024 on 1 July 1970 (representing 856 fewer personnel than the 1880 authorized for 1965) Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard decided to appeal further reductions. In his memorandum, dated 27 March 1970, he cited the many benefits provided by attaches, noted the preceding five years of personnel turbulence in DAS manning, and concluded with the statement that further attache reductions "would not appear to be in the best interests of the Department of Defense and the United States Government".

4. (C) On 26 May 1970, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense as follows:

"After reviewing your memorandum of March 27, 1970, the President agreed to suspend further reductions in the military attache system as you recommended".

5. (C) Again on 20 August 1971, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard wrote to Secretary of State Rogers to register continued Defense concern with new pressure from State to reduce the number and size of Defense Attache Offices. As noted in Secretary Packard's letter, "problems arise when Embassy personnel attempt to evaluate a specific DAO solely in relation to its contribution to the State Department Mission". Citing the sizable reductions that had occurred in Defense Attache manning since 1965, Secretary Packard stated that the Defense Attache System needed a period of relative stability to allow informal adjustments free from the requirement to react to additional pressures to reduce. Secretary Packard noted that the need for stabilization in attache manning had been agreed to by the President in 1970 and enclosed a copy of Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of May 1970 suspending reductions.

6. (C) Although Secretary Packard had urged that State send a message to U.S. embassies to clarify U.S. policy on this matter, State's reply, 2 September 1971, from U. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, advised that

there was no campaign in the Department of State to reduce the number and size of attache offices and that although some ambassadors had questioned the usefulness of certain service attache positions, each of these cases had been "raised and resolved on the basis of its own merits". Undersecretary Johnson indicated that he was opposed to sending any guidance to the field exempting attaches from manpower reductions.

7. (C) Authorized manning for the Defense Attache System is now down to 981, a reduction of over 47% from the 1880 figure of 1965 and a reduction of 58% from the maximum 2345 figure of 1963. Despite Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of 26 May 1970 suspending personnel reductions in the attache system, the Department of State is urging still further reductions in the attache system at a time when our intelligence requirements are increasing and our other resources for intelligence collection are diminishing.

8. (C) The Department of State continues to delay the re-opening of attache offices in areas of current intelligence interest (Sudan, Bangladesh) and prevents the augmentation of attache offices where additional attaches are warranted by the priority of existing intelligence requirements for regional intelligence coverage (e.g., [redacted] for coverage of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf).

DIA 25X1
25X6

9. (C) Other examples of manning problems with the Department of State are as follows:

a. Despite the objectives of the NSC-approved study of 1971 whereby U.S. agencies were committed to work towards enhanced opportunities for rapport with key Latin American officials and to augment selected DAO's, State has been pressuring for attache reductions in Venezuela and Dominican Republic (1972-1973).

b. Denied approval for assignment of an Army Attache in Honduras (1971-1972).

c. Denied placement of the Defense Attache/Army Attache, Costa Rica in 1971, forcing the closing of that post. The attache designee had finished all required training, including language instruction, at the time of State's decision.

d. Denied DIA request, 14 April 1972, to assign a resident Army Attache in New Zealand desired by the New Zealand Chief of Staff and by C/S, US Army. This denial was dated 26 September 1972 and apparently reflected a Washington level decision since

U.S. Embassy, Wellington favored a resident Army Attache. (A counterproposal by State to reduce the Naval or Air Attache billet in New Zealand was deemed infeasible).

e. Prevented augmentation of DAO Jordan by an Assistant Army Attache and enlisted man (1971).

f. Forced the reduction of Naval Attaches in both Malaysia and Burma (1972).

g. Denied assignment of an Air Attache in Saudi Arabia (1972); denied resident Naval and Air Attaches in Tunisia (1973).

DIA 25X1 h. Denied added accreditation of the Naval Attache, Malagasy to Mauritius [redacted] because of estimated unfavorable reaction of Mauritian Government (1972).

i. Pressured for reduction of three assistant attaches and associated support personnel in DAO, USSR (1972).

10. (C) An urgent current problem is the situation in Prague, Czechoslovakia, where the replacement of a sergeant in the Defense Attache Office by an already language-trained replacement was blocked by the Department of State on the ground that State was complying with the President's 1969 letter outlining the coordinating authority of U.S. Ambassadors. From a Defense viewpoint, Czechoslovakia is a Priority I area with both Soviet and Czech troops present. The current DAO manning is at a minimum to accomplish the existing mission. The DAO will be of increasing importance with the added verification and monitoring responsibilities resulting from MBFR. When DIA reminded State of Dr. Kissinger's 1970 memorandum, the Department of State representative stated that Dr. Kissinger's memorandum was no longer in effect.

11. (C) A definitive statement of White House guidance would make it clear to the Department of State that there should be Defense Attaches in all diplomatic missions, with first priority emphasis to those countries where we have our principal military intelligence interests, and that the Defense Attache System should be excluded from pressures of reductions directed at other elements of our overseas presence. The current strength of 981 persons in the attache system is a minimum for effective operations and includes only 307 military attaches, the balance being support personnel. These 307 military attaches provide an intelligence return far out of proportion to their small number and it would be false economy to reduce them further.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Military Attaches (U)

I understand that the Defense attache system has been experiencing recent and continuing reductions. I believe we should suspend further personnel reductions in the military attache system as outlined in my memorandum of May 26, 1970. In addition, we should be flexible and responsive to recommended increases where the case is clearly justifiable and the advantage to our national interest significant. On each case where agreement cannot be reached I would like to be informed with a minimum of delay and will assist in the resolution. Please inform the Chiefs of Missions of the above for their use in OPRED deliberations.

Henry A. Kissinger

Copy to:
Secretary of Defense

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-2688-73

14 MAY 1973

SECRET - Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL upon removal of attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Problems in Maintaining Attache Presence (U)

1. (C) I am deeply concerned over the erosion that has occurred in our Defense Attache System. We have suffered a 58% reduction in attache personnel in the last decade. Much of this reduction stemmed from BALPA and OPRED, but the State Department continues to press for further reductions in this vital area. In my view we need to enhance our collection capability, particularly now that our requirements are increasing and other intelligence collection assets are decreasing.

2. (C) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency prepared for our use the attached summary of events which have impacted on the Defense Attache System. It is recommended that a copy of this summary be forwarded to Henry Kissinger.

(Sgd) T. H. MOORER
T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
a/s

SECRET - Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL upon removal of attachment

ASD(C)

SECRET

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

8 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Maintaining Attache Presence (U)

(C) I am forwarding to you Admiral Moorer's memorandum of May 14, 1973 in which he expresses his concern over the reductions in our Defense attache system which have continued to occur despite your memorandum of May 26, 1970, expressing the President's wish that no further reductions be made. I concur with Admiral Moorer's attached summary of our current problems in this area, and support his position that we should seek to strengthen our attache system rather than to decrease its size and effectiveness.

(C) It is well established that our attaches are effective collectors of military intelligence and have particular usefulness

DIA
25X1

It is also established that the Defense attache system is one of our least expensive programs, and is cost-effective in terms of intelligence return for expenditures. On this basis it would seem prudent not only to preserve the system, but to strengthen it further, particularly in areas of known collection deficiency and increased intelligence importance.

(C) As pointed out in the attached summary of the problems, the Defense attache system has suffered not only unilateral reductions by the State Department in Costa Rica, Malaysia, Burma, and Prague but has

Upon removal of attachments this document becomes

also been denied increases which I believe are justifiable in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, Honduras, New Zealand, Malagasy, Sudan and Bangladesh.

(C) Despite the intent of your May 26, 1970 memorandum on this subject, there continues to be conflicting guidance on attache manning levels and cumbersome procedures for adjudication and appeal.

(C) To remedy this problem area, I recommend that you send a memorandum similar to the attached to the Secretaries of State and Defense which would: (a) reaffirm your May 26, 1970 memorandum in suspending further reductions, (b) encourage increases where the need is clearly justified, and (c) open up a readily accessible and responsive arbitration procedure to resolve differences arising between our two Departments in this area.

(U) I would be happy to discuss this matter with you personally.

Signed /

BILL

Attachments

Executive Registry
73-6673

ATTACHES

DIRECTOR
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

101,

MEMO FOR DCI

Bill -

Here are the papers on the problems with State in maintaining the Defense Attache System at strength. We discussed this matter the day you were over here recently.

Vince

DDCI

DCI/DDCI

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	IG		
2	DDCI		✓	12	D/PPB		
3	DDS&T			13	SAVA		
4	DDI			14	ASST/DCI		
5	DDO		✓	15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC	✓		17			
8	D/ONE			18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks:

FYI - Can we help with State where appropriate? —

23 OCT 1973

DCI/~~DDCI~~