Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25 July 1973

Major General J. F. Kirkendall Commandant Armed Forces Staff College Norfolk, Virginia 23511

#### Dear General Kirkendall:

Thank you for your letter of 14 June inviting me to address the 54th Class of the Armed Forces Staff College. I would be delighted to make the presentation on the National Intelligence Community on 9 October.

I will have my office get in touch with Major Griffith of your Guest Speaker Office to make the arrangements. It will be a pleasure to join you once again.

Faithfully,

Isl Vernon A. Walters

Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

VAW/ncl l - ER l - A/DCI

Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001900090010-6



# ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT Executive Approved For Release 2603/01/29!RCIA!RD#80R01731R0019000900104

14 JUN 1973

Executive Registry,

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear General Walters:

One of the key elements in our curriculum is our guest lecture program comprised of distinguished speakers who add their expertise to the various fields of study conducted here at the Armed Forces Staff College. The 54th Class of the Armed Forces Staff College will begin in mid-August, and I sincerely hope that you will join us again and make the presentation on the National Intelligence Community which is tentatively scheduled for Tuesday, 9 October, at 1000. The normal operating procedure, you'll recall, is for the lecture to last 45 minutes followed by a 15-minute break and a 45-minute question period. I will be very pleased if, following your presentation you can join me for lunch with a few students and faculty members.

Your lecture on the National Intelligence Community is a key segment of our curriculum, since our students need a firm understanding of the role intelligence plays in the national security process in order to be prepared to plan and organize large scale joint and combined operations. While the intelligence functions at various levels of military organization are studied and taught throughout the course of instruction at AFSC, this particular lecture serves as the overall introduction to United States intelligence capability.

During this introduction, there are several areas that are germane to the curriculum and of special interest to the student body. First consideration is the organization, mission, and capability of the U.S. intelligence community. If this can be accomplished by placing the present structure and status in historical perspective to basic national law and to the U.S. World War II intelligence structure, a more complete understanding will be achieved. The relationship among the DCI, DIA, and NSA and other elements of the intelligence community will comprise a major portion of this part of the lecture.

Also of interest is the contribution of the intelligence community to the national policy-making process and its role in overseas operations. A

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discussion of collection capabilities and limitations would serve to complete the picture of U. S. intelligence at the national level. Some brief examples of specific information gained through overseas operations or through visits to this country by foreign national leaders will add interest and support the confidence military officers have in our intelligence capability.

I am enclosing a breakdown of the 54th Class composition, a summary of our course of instruction, and other data which will be of interest.

There is one feature of our guest speaker program that I wish to emphasize. We have a strict nonattribution policy, and the speaker can be assured that his remarks will not be discussed outside the College. This permits a frank discussion of controversial issues and greatly enhances the learning experience of the student body.

I hope I have covered the salient points but we will be happy to enlarge on them if you wish.

Major Ruth A. Griffith, USAF, of my Guest Speaker Office (Phone: (804)-444-5422), will complete the arrangements for your visit.

I certainly look forward to welcoming you back to the College.

Very best personal regards.

Atch.

1. 54th Class Composition

2. Course Summary

3. Information Sheet - Mission

4. Information Sheet - Administrative

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Since

14 JUN 1973

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505

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Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA

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Since rely,

Atch.

J. F. KIRKENDALL
Major General, USAF
Commandant

- 1. 54th Class Composition
- 2. Course Summary
- 3. Information Sheet Mission
- 4. Information Sheet Administrative

The Armed Forces Staff College called with some questions about your

talk there What is the classification? There will good 9000 6 ttendance.

At your last session there, they were present for the speech

but were not allowed to stay for the question and answer period. Not speed

Will you be using vu-graphs or slides? Will you stay for lunch? You are, of course, invited.

Will you be accompanied by anyone?

How will you travel, private airplane, pov...?

The College routinely sends a list of the speakers on their program to the local press and they in turn request interviews

Approved For Release 2003/07/29s: CMARDP86R0W731R001900090010-6nfirm later.

I did not think you would agree to that but would 0-6nfirm later.

# ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE 9 October 1973

#### THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

GENERAL KIRKENDALL, GENTLEMEN:

I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE FOR YOU TODAY THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THE MAJOR
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS THE HEAD OF THAT COMMUNITY,
AND THE ESSENTIAL MEANS BY WHICH THOSE FUNCTIONS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE FULFILLED.

IT IS NOT STRAINING THE TRUTH TO SAY THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS WE KNOW IT TODAY RESULTED FROM OUR EXPERIENCE AT PEARL HARBOR. THE SPECTACLE OF VARIOUS DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WORKING EACH IN ITS OWN WAY, WITH NO MECHANISM TO COORDINATE EITHER THEIR EFFORTS OR THE RESULTS, COST OUR COUNTRY DEARLY. THIS DEBACLE CREATED THE DETERMINATION, FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, TO ACHIEVE A COORDINATED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WAS AT LEAST PARTLY THE RESULT OF THIS DETERMINATION.

THIS LEGISLATION WAS DESIGNED TO ENSURE ENOUGH
COORDINATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO IMPORTANT GAPS

AND NO UNDESTRABLE DUPLICATION IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THIS ACT WAS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CIA AND THE FUNCTIONS IT PERFORMS.

THIS STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION--LIKE MANY PUBLIC LAWS--IS SET FORTH IN FAIRLY BROAD TERMS. HOWEVER, THE CONGRESS PROVIDED FOR FURTHER DEFINITION AND REFINEMENT OF CIA'S FUNCTIONS. IT SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED CIA "TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NA-TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF SUCH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AS RELATE TO NA-TIONAL SECURITY." UPON RECEIVING PRESIDENTIAL AP-PROVAL, THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE ISSUED IN A SE-RIES OF CLASSIFIED PAPERS CALLED NATIONAL SECURITY Council Intelligence Directives. THE NSCIDs (THERE ARE 8 OF THEM) ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FUNCTIONS, AND THEY DIS-TRIBUTE ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG THE DIFFERENT U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

NSCID #1 ALSO PROVIDES FOR STILL MORE PRECISE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES.

THERE ARE 41 OF THESE. I COULD NOT BEGIN TO ACQUAINT YOU WITH ALL THE DETAILS COVERED BY THE NSCIDS AND

DCIDs. But the important point is that they represent a means for the intelligence community to update and adjust to the changing circumstances, needs and challenges facing U.S. intelligence.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS GAVE THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TWO PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS BY LAW THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND, BY PRESIDENTIAL ORDER, THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN THESE CAPACITIES, HE ACTS AS PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND AS COORDINATOR OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. THUS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS THE HEAD OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

LET'S CONSIDER THE COMPOSITION OF THE INTELLI-GENCE COMMUNITY.

SLIDE #**1** INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ABOUT WHICH I SHALL SAY MORE IN DUE TIME, IS, OF COURSE, PART OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SECOND, THERE IS THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING GENERAL

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

THE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PARTICULAR MISSIONS OF EACH ONE OF THE SERVICES. MUCH OF THE WORK OF THE THREE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS IS COORDINATED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DIA.

IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THERE IS AN INTELLIGENCE UNIT WHICH SERVES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE POLICY PLANNERS. IN A SENSE ALL OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL ARE INTELLIGENCE GATHERERS. BUT THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT FOR MEN WHO APPLY THEMSELVES PROFESSIONALLY TO THE ANALYSIS OF THAT INFORMATION TO DETERMINE ITS BEARING ON PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HAS A SPECIALIZED CHARTER DEVOTED TO THE VITAL FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS.

A PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IS THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT YOU CAN EASILY IMAGINE THE VITAL CONNECTION BETWEEN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. SO THE FBI, TOO, IS A MEMBER OF THE

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE FBI AND CIA WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH COMBATING AN INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF COMMUNIST CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE OPERATIONS AND AGENTS MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES. (PARENTHETICALLY, IT SHOULD BE STRESSED HERE THAT BY LAW CIA HAS NO DOMESTIC INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY, AND IS FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO REPORT ON U.S. CITIZENS.)

IN RECOGNITION OF THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT WAS OFFICIALLY ADDED TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BY PRESIDENT NIXON IN NOVEMBER 1971.

Lastly, there is the National Security Agency, which holds a somewhat unusual position that I shall mention in a moment.

THESE, THEN, ARE THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--CIA, STATE, DIA, NSA, AND THE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS, AEC, TREASURY, AND THE FBI.

In order to round out the picture of the community, I must add a number of what we call "services of common concern." It might be more enlightening to call them <u>National Intelligence Assets</u>.

THESE ARE ACTIVITIES WHICH SERVE THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN ANY PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY.
SUCH AN ACTIVITY MAY BE MANAGED, STAFFED AND FUNDED
BY ONE AGENCY, BUT ACTUALLY OPERATE DIRECTLY FOR THE
ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE LARGEST OF THESE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSETS IS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WHICH IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR CRYPTOLOGIC INTELLIGENCE--INTERCEPTING AND DECODING ELECTRICALLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGES. ITS PRODUCT IS DISSEMINATED WITH ADMIRABLE
SPEED THROUGHOUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND
HAS PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN MANY OF OUR MOST CRUCIAL
INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS OVER THE YEARS.

OTHER IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS ARE
THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER, AND

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Now, ALL THE AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WHICH MAKE UP THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE TIED TO-GETHER, FOR GUIDANCE PURPOSES, BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD, WHICH WE OFTEN REFER TO AS USIB.

THIS BOARD WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER DIRECTIVES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. IT ADVISES AND ASSISTS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, AND IN ESTABLISHING INTELLIGENCE POLICY, OBJECTIVES, REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF USIB. This, by the way, is one place where the Director's two Jobs--His "two hats"--are very carefully differentiated. When he chairs the U.S. Intelligence Board, he is there as the President's principal intelligence officer, Not as the head of CIA. The USIB passes on the agreed, coordinated judgments of the entire intelligence community--what we call "National Intelligence"--and it might hamper this function if the director were

SIMULTANEOUSLY TO ACT AS CHAIRMAN AND TO ADVANCE
THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. FOR
THIS REASON, CIA HAS SEPARATE REPRESENTATION ON THE
BOARD IN THE PERSON OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE OTHER PRINCIPALS ARE:

THE STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE

AND RESEARCH;

THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;

THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF THE AEC;
THE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI; AND
A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIA, THE INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE HAVE CONTINUED TO ATTEND AND PARTICIPATE IN USIB, BUT AS OBSERVERS RATHER THAN AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS. THEY RETAIN THE RIGHT, AND, IN FACT, THE DUTY TO EXPRESS ANY DISSENT THEY MAY HAVE ON MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSION, AND THIS IS A FUNCTION THEY DO NOT HESITATE TO PERFORM.

I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT THE USIB IS CONCERNED WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE BOARD SETS FORTH--AND PERIODICALLY REVISES--THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN CHOOSING INTELLIGENCE TARGETS AND IN ASSIGNING ASSETS TO COVER THESE TARGETS.

THE USIB ALSO REVIEWS IN DRAFT FORM AND IN GREAT DETAIL THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND CERTAIN OTHER REPORTS WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

USIB IS SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES WHICH FUNCTION IN SUBSTANTIVE FIELDS, SUCH AS NUCLEAR ENERGY, MISSILE INTELLIGENCE, AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. OTHER USIB COMMITTEES PROVIDE A MEANS OF REGULAR CONTACT AND A CHANNEL FOR GUIDANCE TO CERTAIN INTERAGENCY PROGRAMS, SUCH AS SECURITY, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF DEFECTORS.

THIS, THEN, IS A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

ON NOVEMBER 5, 1971, IN A DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, THE PRESIDENT

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THESE STEPS WITH YOU, AND ELABORATE ON HOW I BELIEVE SOME OF THE NEW MACHINERY OF THE COMMUNITY WILL OPERATE.

THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTIVES IN DIRECTING THESE MANAGEMENT STEPS WERE TO ENSURE:

- --CONTINUING REVIEW OF THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT TO HIS NEEDS.
- --STRENGTHENED LEADERSHIP FOR THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.
- --More efficient use of resources in the col-Lection of intelligence information.
- --AN EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WITH A VIEW TO ELIMINATING THE LEAST PRODUCTIVE ONES.
- -- IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY, SCOPE, AND TIME-LINESS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

JUST WHAT MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS WERE DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT? THE FOUR FOLLOWING STEPS REPRESENT THE MAJOR CHANGES:

- --AN ENHANCED LEADERSHIP AND PROGRAM ADVISORY
  ROLE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
- --ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY COUN-

- --ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
  ADVISORY COMMITTEE.
- -- RECONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTEL-LIGENCE BOARD.

LET US DISCUSS THESE CHANGES, BRIEFLY, ONE BY ONE.

As we have seen, the Director of Central Intel-LIGENCE HAS ALWAYS HAD A RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOP-ING REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND FOR COORDINATING ITS PRODUCTION. UNDER THE RESTRUCTUR-ING DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT, THE DIRECTOR OF CEN-TRAL INTELLIGENCE WAS ASKED TO FORMULATE A CONSOLI-DATED INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET, AND TO RECONCILE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES WITH BUDGET-ARY CONSTRAINTS. WHILE THE PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE DID NOT GIVE THE DCI ANY INCREASED COMMAND AUTHORITY OVER THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COM-MUNITY, HE WAS GIVEN THE SIGNIFICANT NEW RESPONSI-BILITY OF BEING INFORMED ON AND EXPRESSING VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLOCATION OF ALL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN THE COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF A NATIONAL CHARACTER. IN THIS REGARD THE DIRECTOR MAY BE CALLED ON BY THE PRESIDENT, THE KEY CONGRES-SIONAL COMMITTEES AND BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE

OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET TO COMMENT ON AND DEFEND
THE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE. WHILE THE
AUTHORITY TO INFLUENCE BUDGETS CARRIES CONSIDERABLE
WEIGHT, THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
WILL CONTINUE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED LARGELY THROUGH
FRIENDLY PERSUASION, HARD WORK, AND GOOD SENSE. I
THINK THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED, AND WE HAVE MADE A
PROMISING START. BUT IT WILL BE A SLOW PROCESS.

OTHER CHANGES DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT CONSIST OF VARIOUS COORDINATING MECHANISMS THAT SHOULD
MAKE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. LET US LOOK AT THESE MECHANISMS, AND
SEE WHAT THEY ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH.

SLIDE #2

REL. OF DCI
TO PRES. &
INTEL. CTTY.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE FILLS A GAP THAT HAD BECOME QUITE WORRISOME
OVER THE YEARS. THERE WAS NO ARRANGEMENT FOR SYSTEMATIC FEEDBACK OF CRITICISM AND COMMENT FROM HIGH
POLICY USERS OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE. THE NEW
COMMITTEE IS CHAIRED BY DR. KISSINGER, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE

CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS, AND THE DCI--IN OTHER WORDS, THE POLICY LEVEL FOR WHICH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS DESIGNED.

WITH THIS COMMITTEE, THE PRESIDENT HAS CREATED A FORMAL GROUP OF SENIOR POLICY OFFICIALS TO DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE FORMULATION OF U.S. FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY. THIS COMMITTEE WILL ALSO PROVIDE FOR A CONTINUING EVALUATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF PRIME INTELLIGENCE USERS. THIS WILL ENABLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO RESPOND IN A MORE ORDERLY, TIMELY, AND EFFECTIVE MANNER TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NEEDS.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE IS ANOTHER ONE OF THE DIRECTED IMPROVEMENTS. THIS IS CHAIRED BY THE DCI AND INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, DEFENSE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND CIA.

THIS COMMITTEE WILL FORMALIZE AND UPGRADE
PREVIOUS LOOSER INTERDEPARTMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS TO
ASSIST THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN
CARRYING OUT HIS BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ASSURING THE MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES--MONEY, MANPOWER, AND EQUIP-MENT. THIS COMMITTEE WILL ALSO ASSIST THE DIRECTOR IN PREPARING THE CONSOLIDATED INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET.

THIS BRINGS US TO THE LAST OF THE MAJOR CHANGES—THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD. WHEREAS USIB PREVIOUSLY HAD SOME AUTHORITY OF ITS OWN, IT IS NOW LIMITED TO AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. IN ADDITION, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT WAS ADDED, AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WAS DESIGNATED VICE CHAIRMAN OF USIB. THE ADDITION OF THE TREASURY REPRESENTATIVE REFLECTS THE FACT THAT FISCAL AND MONETARY INTELLIGENCE IS VERY MUCH FRONT AND CENTER IN THE GOVERNMENT TODAY. THE PRESIDENT IS INTENSELY INTERESTED IN WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY IS EAGER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO TURN FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE TO THE FUNCTION OF CIA-SINCE THAT IS THE ORGANIZATION THAT MOST DIRECTLY

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STILL ANOTHER TYPE OF OVERT COLLECTION CONSISTS

OF THE PROCUREMENT, THROUGH OPEN CHANNELS, OF FOREIGN

PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS, SCHOLARLY

JOURNALS, MAPS, AND UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS.

AS YOU ALL KNOW, CIA ALSO UNDERTAKES CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION THROUGH OUR OVERSEAS STATIONS.

THESE COLLECTION OPERATIONS MAY RELY ON AN AGENT PENETRATION, THE SURREPTITIOUS ACQUISITION OF DOCUMENTS, THE USE OF AUDIO DEVICES, OR OFFICIAL LIAISON WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. CLANDESTINE COLLECTION CAN BE CATEGORIZED BY ITS PURPOSE. IN CIA, WE USE THE TERM ESPIONAGE TO REFER TO THE COLLECTION OF POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE, OR SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION REGARDING, SAY, SOME COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY OR INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE OUTPUT OF AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT, OR THE CAPABILITY OF A WEAPON SYSTEM. WE USE THE TERM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHEN WE WORK TO FRUSTRATE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGAINST THE U.S. OR OUR ALLIES, OR TO PROTECT OUR PERSONNEL

AND OUR OPERATIONS FROM BEING PENETRATED OR ROLLED	05)/4
UP BY OTHERS.	25X1

CIA PARTICIPATES ACTIVELY IN THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR EXPLOITING PHOTOGRAPHY FOR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THROUGH THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER—OR NPIC AS WE CALL IT. THIS CENTER IS ADMINISTERED BY CIA IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND IS JOINTLY STAFFED BY THE TWO AGENCIES. AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, THE NPIC EXAMINES FILMS IN DETAIL AND ANALYZES AND INTERPRETS THE PHOTOGRAPHY AND OTHER IMAGERY. THE WORK OF THE NPIC FEEDS INTO AND SUPPORTS INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY.

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I NEED ONLY MENTION THE DETECTION OF THE SOVIET	
MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA IN OCTOBER	
1962, TO PROVE HOW ESSENTIAL NPIC IS TO OUR INTELLI-	
GENCE EFFORT.	25X1
	25X1

MENTS IN MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972, OUR POLICY MAKERS

NEEDED RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE NUMBERS,

CAPABILITIES, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC

WEAPONS.

AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATIONS AGREEMENTS, NPIC'S ROLE ASSUMED EVEN
GREATER IMPORTANCE. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
NOW HAS THE TASK OF MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE
WITH THE AGREEMENTS, AND WE WILL LEAN HEAVILY ON
NPIC IN CARRYING OUT THIS VITAL TASK. OTHER TECHNICAL COLLECTION SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS "OLD FASHIONED"

HUMAN SOURCES, WILL ALSO BE CALLED UPON. WE HAVE BEEN PREPARING FOR THIS JOB FOR SOME TIME NOW. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN ACCUMULATE THE EVIDENCE AND ACCOMPLISH THE ANALYSIS THAT WOULD PROVIDE TIMELY WARNING OF A SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN MOSCOW.

TO ASSIST THE DIRECTOR IN CARRYING OUT HIS
HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AGREEMENTS, HE HAS SET UP A
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF USIB PRINCIPALS. THIS COMMITTEE IS CALLED THE USIB STEERING GROUP ON MONITORING
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS, AND IS CHAIRED BY THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ITS THREE
MEMBERS ARE THE DIRECTOR OF DIA, THE DIRECTOR OF INR
FROM STATE, AND CIA'S DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE. THIS GROUP IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GUIDANCE TO
AND SUPERVISION OF ALL INTELLIGENCE MONITORING ACTIVITIES REQUIRED UNDER THE SALT AGREEMENTS.

THE NEXT PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS COVERT ACTION,
THIS TERM EMBRACES OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES, BUT WHERE
THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS HIDDEN.
IN THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD, WE FACE ADVERSARIES WHO HAVE DEPLOYED NUMEROUS AND WORLD WIDE

CLANDESTINE RESOURCES, WHO ARE HIGHLY TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF CONSPIRACY AND SUBVERSION, AND WHO CONTINUE TO USE THESE RESOURCES TO UNDERMINE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS.

THERE ARE INFREQUENT OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS
IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO COUNTER THESE
EFFORTS BY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.

COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS FALL INTO TWO
CATEGORIES. ONE WE CALL POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS INVOLVE
THE SUPPORT OR USE OF INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS ELEMENTS OF PO-

OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AS ELEMENTS OF PO-LITICAL INFLUENCE OR PERSUASION.

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THE OTHER CATEGORY OF COVERT ACTION OPERATION IS WHAT WE CALL <u>PARAMILITARY ACTION</u>. THESE OPERATIONS INVOLVE THE USE OF PARAMILITARY FORCE OR THE FORMULATION OF PLANS FOR ITS USE. OUR WORK WITH THE TRIBAL IRREGULARS AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS IN LAOS IS A GOOD INSTANCE OF PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY.

COVERT ACTION--WHETHER OF THE POLITICAL OR THE PARAMILITARY TYPE--FALLS IN THE SHADOWY, TWILIGHT ZONE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS THAT CONGRESS HAD IN MIND WHEN IT DIRECTED CIA TO PERFORM "SUCH OTHER SERVICES" AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT DIRECT. OUR CRITICS WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE CONGRESS GAVE THIS AUTHORITY IN 1947, CIA HAS DONE AS IT HAS PLEASED, WITHOUT REGARD TO OFFICIAL POLICIES OR OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND SOMETIMES IN DIAMETRIC OPPOSITION TO THOSE POLICIES.

This is not at all the case. The fact is that whenever the CIA carries out a covert action program overseas, it is with the <u>Prior approval</u> of the highest levels of the government.

While we are on the subject of supervision of Agency activities I would like to say that, contrary

TO GENERAL IMPRESSION, CIA IS SUBJECT TO RESPONSIBLE AND AUTHORITATIVE SUPERVISION ON A CONTINUING BASIS BY INSTRUMENTS OF BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE THIS SUPERVISION IS EXERCISED BY SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE APPROPRIATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES. IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, CIA IS UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND THE VARIOUS COMMITTEES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. THESE COMMITTEES PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER OVERSEAS OPERATIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

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THE THIRD PRIMARY MISSION OF CIA IS TO PRODUCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND TO PROVIDE FOR ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION TO THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND OTHER TOP POLICY-MAKERS. THIS IS ONE

OF THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ALTHOUGH SOME INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES ARE PREPARED SOLELY WITHIN CIA, A GOOD MANY OTHERS ARE PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE OF THE LATTER TYPE. TO THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE NIES, THEY ARE THE PAPERS WHERE, BY USING OUR PRESENT KNOWLEDGE OF A SITUATION AND EXISTING DATA AS A BASE LINE, WE TRY TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE AND TO ESTIMATE WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN IN SOME PARTICULAR COUNTRY OR ON SOME PARTICULAR TOPIC.

MANY NIEs COVER FAIRLY STANDARD TOPICS SUCH AS, "THE OUTLOOK IN COUNTRY A OR AREA B." HERE WE LOOK AHEAD TWO OR THREE YEARS AND DEAL WITH BROAD TRENDS AND EXPECTED LINES OF POLICY IN THE COUNTRY OR AREA IN QUESTION.

ANOTHER GROUP OF NIEs are MORE SPECIALIZED
PAPERS ON THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THESE
ESTIMATES ARE BUILT ON A SOLID BASE OF EVIDENCE;
THEY GO INTO GREATER DETAIL AND GENERALLY LOOK
AHEAD FOR PERIODS UP TO FIVE YEARS. THE PRINCIPAL
ONES FOCUS ON THE USSR'S STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES,

STRATEGIC DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. THE PRODUCTION OF THREE ANNUAL PAPERS ON THESE TOPICS IS TIMED TO ASSIST IN THE PLANNING OF DEFENSE FORCE LEVELS AND BUDGETS.

A THIRD TYPE IS THE SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, OR SNIE, WHICH IS COMPOSED OF AD HOC PAPERS ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF THE MOMENT, SUCH AS THE EXPECTED REACTION TO SOME PROPOSED—BUT AS YET UNAPPROVED—COURSE OF ACTION BY THE U.S. AS A PURELY HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE, A SNIE MIGHT ASSESS THE REACTION IF THE U.S. WERE TO TAKE ACTION AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY. THE SNIES ARE USUALLY REQUESTED BY SOME POLICY—MAKER, AND, AS YOU CAN SEE, THEY OFTEN GET INTO SOME PRETTY SENSITIVE MATTERS.

ALL OF THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES. THE BOARD AND OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE IN CIA, BUT THEY ASSIST THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NOT AS HEAD OF CIA. THE NIES ARE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. THEY MUST, THEREFORE, REFLECT THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY. THIS IS ENSURED THROUGH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY, THROUGH CONTRIBUTION OF FACTS AND JUDGMENTS, IN THE PREPARATION OF THE ESTIMATE AND ITS REVIEW BY THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD. THE OBJECTIVE OF EACH ESTIMATE IS A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL SET OF JUDGMENTS WHICH WILL BE OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE POLICYMAKER AND PLANNER—AND IT IS PRESENTED AS THE DCI'S ESTIMATE. THE MECHANISM FOR PRODUCING NIES IS NOW UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW BY THE DIRECTOR AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE BOARD AND OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES WILL SOON BE REPLACED BY NEW MACHINERY UNDER THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

ANOTHER TYPE OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE IS CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. IT IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE DECISION MAKER IS WELL INFORMED ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES, ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ALERT THE POLICY-MAKER TO AN INCIPIENT CRISIS.

CIA MAINTAINS AN OPERATIONS CENTER WHICH, LIKE HAROLD'S CLUB IN RENO, OPENED YEARS AGO AND HAS NEVER BEEN CLOSED. THIS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ALERT

OUR PEOPLE TO PRODUCE SPOT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OR TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON A 24 HOUR BASIS IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS. THE OPERATIONS CENTER IS ALSO CONNECTED BY RAPID AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER AND THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IN THE PENTAGON, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER, AND THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM. THE FUNCTION OF THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER IS TO MAINTAIN AN AROUND THE CLOCK INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WATCH FOR INDICATIONS OF FOREIGN PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK THE U.S., ITS FORCES OVERSEAS, OR ITS ALLIES.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE HAS OFTEN BEEN COMPARED TO A NEWSPAPER. I BELIEVE THERE IS ONE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE. CIA'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS PRODUCED BY A GROUP OF ANALYSTS WHO ARE EXPERTS IN THEIR FIELDS AND WHO HAVE ALL SOURCES OF INFORMATION OPEN TO THEM. CIA'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS DISSEMINATED IN DAILY AND WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS, SPECIAL MEMORANDA, AND SITUATION REPORTS ON CRISIS TOPICS. A SPECIAL DAILY REPORT IS ALSO PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Another type of intelligence production comprises the <u>research</u> <u>study</u>. These studies cover a 25X1

WIDE VARIETY OF TOPICSFOR EXAMPLE, AN ANALYSIS
of the various sectors of the Soviet economy,
THE STUDIES ARE OFTEN PRODUCED IN RE-
SPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE,
THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, OR THEIR

SENIOR OFFICERS.

These, then, are some of the principal vehicles through which our finished intelligence reaches the  ${}^{SLIDE}$   $^{\#3}$   ${}^{ORG}.$   ${}^{OF}$   ${}^{CIA}$  Policy-makers who need it.

As for the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA is divided into four principal groupings--referred to as Directorates--and several staff or special functions, the heads of which report directly to the Director. An example of the latter is the Office of National Estimates which I referred to earlier.

Now for the Directorates, the DDI, or <u>Intelligence</u> <u>Directorate</u>, is the principal producer of finished substantive intelligence. This Directorate includes functional offices responsible for current intelligence, economic research and strategic (military) research, which provide the muscle for the

STAT

PRODUCTION PROCESS.

THE NEXT DIRECTORATE IS THE DDO OR <u>OPERATIONS</u>

<u>DIRECTORATE</u> WHICH IS ANOTHER WAY OF REFERRING TO THE CIA'S CLANDESTINE SERVICES. THEY CONDUCT ESPIONAGE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.

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THE DDO IS ORGANIZED IN A SERIES OF
AREA DIVISIONS, SIMILAR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
REGIONAL BUREAUS. IT HAS STAFFS FOR SPECIALIZED
MATTERS SUCH AS PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS, COVERT
ACTION AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. THE DIRECTORATE
ALSO OPERATES OUR CLANDESTINE UNITS ABROAD, WHICH
WE CALL "STATIONS." THE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
AND THE CHIEFS OF OUR OVERSEAS STATIONS SUPPORT
THE DIRECTOR IN HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO-ORDINATING
THE COVERT COLLECTION OPERATIONS WHICH ARE CONDUCTED
BY OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS.

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THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AS THE NAME SUGGESTS, CONCENTRATES ON THE SCIENTIFIC

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AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED TECHNICAL COLLECTION OPERATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTING SUCH ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS THE PRODUCTION OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE ON ADVANCED WEAPONS AND OTHER S&T CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NATIONS. IT ALSO ADMINISTERS THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER.

THE FOURTH DIRECTORATE IS THE <u>DIRECTORATE OF</u>

MANAGEMENT AND <u>SERVICES</u>, WHICH EMBRACES THE VERY

IMPORTANT AND HIGHLY SPECIALIZED SUPPORT SERVICES,

SUCH AS SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAINING, PERSONNEL,

FINANCE, LOGISTICS, PRINTING AND THE HOUSEKEEPING

FUNCTIONS. THIS DIRECTORATE ALSO HOUSES OUR COMPUTER

CENTER.

BEFORE CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION TWO IMPORTANT WAYS IN WHICH CIA AND THE REST OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE INPUT FOR
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. WE DO THIS, I WOULD STRESS,
WITHOUT PARTICIPATING IN SUBSTANTIVE DEBATES CONCERNING
POLICY POSITIONS.

ONE WAY WE PARTICIPATE IS THROUGH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPARATUS, AND THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDA--WHAT WE HAVE COME

TO CALL NSSMs. This process enables us to carry out our advisory and policy support role in a direct fashion and at a level previously rather unusual for the Intelligence Community.

Well over a hundred of these NSSMs have been commissioned, and CIA participated in the great majority of them. These studies range from highly specific projects, such as U.S. policy toward Spain, to lengthy and wide-ranging studies of choices for the U.S. strategic posture. Some, like the world oil problem, have short, crisis-like deadlines, while others go on for the best part of a year.

OUR FUNCTION IN THIS PROCESS IS TO SUPPLY THE INTELLIGENCE FACTS AND MAKE THE INTELLIGENCE JUDG-MENTS WHICH GO INTO THE ARRAY OF POLICY OPTIONS WHICH A NSSM IS DESIGNED TO PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT. THESE EFFORTS HAVE COME TO TAKE A CONSIDERABLE SLICE OF OUR TIME, ESPECIALLY THAT OF OUR SENIOR OFFICERS. IN MY VIEW, HOWEVER, THIS NEW PROCEDURE OF INVOLVING INTELLIGENCE IN THE POLICY-MAKING MACHINERY MAKES FOR A MUCH FULLER USE OF THE COMMUNITY'S CAPABILITIES. WE ARE, TO USE TODAY'S JARGON, MORE RELEVANT.

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LASTLY, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
IS CALLED UPON TO BRIEF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ITSELF ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF ISSUES TO BE
DISCUSSED.

I HOPE THAT YOU HAVE GATHERED FROM MY REMARKS
THAT THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN RELATION TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IS BOTH EXTENSIVE
AND IMPORTANT. IT CALLS FOR A LOT OF HARD WORK FROM
THE DEDICATED MEN AND WOMEN WHO STAFF THE VARIOUS
COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY. AS HAS OFTEN BEEN
POINTED OUT, OUR FAILURES GET WIDE PUBLICITY AND
OUR SUCCESSES GENERALLY GO UNHERALDED. EVERY NOW
AND THEN, HOWEVER, WE GET A "WELL-DONE" FROM THOSE
WHO REALLY COUNT. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO MERIT
THEIR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

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Specialized skill and dedication to a degree not required before.

NOT COMPETITIVE OR DUPLICATING.

EACH DO OUR SHARE.

ATTACHE	HAS	ACCESS	TO	PEOPLE	AND	INSTALLATIONS
25X1						

WE CAN AND MUST WORK TOGETHER. WE SHALL HAVE FEWER FIREMEN. WE MUST KNOW WHERE FIRE HAZARDS ARE. IF I WERE TO SUM UP MY EXPERIENCE IN THE AGENCY DURING THE LAST 17 MONTHS, IT WOULD BE IN ONE WORD--REASSURANCE. TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCE, DEDICATION AND CONTINUITY.

"WE ARE CAPTIVES IN A FREE LAND. A LONG TIME AGO WE WENT LOOKING FOR FREEDOM AND FREEDOM FOUND US AND CAPTURED US. WE HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO LIVE BY JUST LAWS, LEVELED BY EQUALITY, CHARGED BY FAITH AS OUR BROTHERS' KEEPERS, HEMMED IN BY OUR NEIGHBORS' PERSONAL LIBERTIES, AND DRAFTED FOR THE DURATION, BY THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS YET UNBORN."