

STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE OF CANADA (MAJ. GEN. J. F. M. WHITELEY, COMMANDANT)  
11 MARCH 1948

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General Whiteley, members of the staff and student body: I am greatly honored to have been invited to come here and address you on the subject of strategic intelligence today. I feel that the invitation and my presence here has a dual significance. In the first place, it represents a tangible example of the closeness which exists between your country and mine. It means that the great admiration and understanding which developed through our joint efforts in the last ten years are being projected into the future in the interests of that type of strength which will greatly contribute to peace in the world. If peace is not to be our share, then we have laid the groundwork for that type of joint association which will insure victory

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in any armed struggle which is forced upon us.

I cannot help but feel, as I am sure that you must feel, that if there is to be a war it may well start with an attack upon this hemisphere -- upon the industrial cities of Canada and the United States and the concentrated centers of population, whether in your country or mine.

Secondly, I feel that there is significance in my having been invited because it indicates that intelligence has achieved the position which it has so long deserved in your curriculum, as it now has in the senior staff colleges of my country -- such as our National War College, our Armed Forces Staff College, and our Air University.

I feel that it is almost presumptuous for me to come here to talk to you about intelligence. The long association which you must have had with British

Intelligence -- which I think is the finest in the world -- makes it difficult for me to find things to say when we are so young in the field. In addition, the masterful job which was done by your people in the case of the Soviet spy ring has strengthened our hand immeasurably in securing popular support, by being able to point to an example of what can be done in the field. I am sure that our countries are earnestly devoting their talents today to the field of intelligence.

I want to present the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency to you in some detail so that you may understand it as a vibrant going concern rather than just another group of Washington letters. Before discussing our task with you, however, there are certain things I wish to say as background. As I have indicated, there has been an enormous growth over the past few years in the appreciation of intelligence matters. ~~If, as you graduate from here, that appreciation goes with you in ever increasing amounts and continues to grow throughout your career, it will make an important contribution to the security of~~ <sup>your</sup> ~~this~~ country. This increased appreciation is due in part to a full realization of ~~our~~ pre-war failures in the field of intelligence. In Washington, some of it is due to the reduction of our armed forces as

they approach their peace-time complement. It is axiomatic that the more the actual combat forces are reduced the greater is the role that must be played by intelligence. Commanders in all grades have expressed a high regard for operational intelligence.

As General Spaatz said recently, in testifying before the President's Air Policy Commission:

"I think Intelligence must be exploited to the maximum. We must spend all that is necessary to get the best Intelligence."

Testifying before the same Commission, Admiral Nimitz suggested that the Commission

". . . give thought to the importance of intelligence to our national security.

The greater the capabilities of our

enemies for sudden attack, the more important it becomes that our intelligence agencies and activities be the best that we can devise."

From this knowledge, gained through the experiences of the past decade, an appreciation of intelligence has spread through the highest ranks and agencies of our Government.

All intelligence is not sinister, nor is it an invidious type of work. There are many ways of illustrating just what intelligence is -- beyond the cold definition of the word. A manner which I have found particularly helpful is to consider the intelligence estimate of a nation as a kind of super jigsaw puzzle. When first seen, the pieces of this picture are all confused; the analysts start working and eventually there emerges a partial solution, about 75% of the

puzzle. This part is the pieces that are available from overt sources -- books, charts, periodicals, radio broadcasts, technical surveys, photographs, commercial surveys, general information, etc. Now, we have 75% of a picture, showing that much of the capabilities and potentials of our target country.

There are still gaps and omissions and to fill these we must resort to clandestine and covert methods. By use of such means we can get perhaps 15% more, thus making our picture 90% complete. At this point, by deduction we can get perhaps 5% more. The final 5% is most probably unattainable as it consists of ideas and policies not even formulated, existing only in the minds of the leaders of our target country. However, the 95% we do have should give, within narrow limits, the potential, the capabilities, and the probable and possible intentions of our target.

At this juncture I would ~~ordinarily~~ like to discuss with you the report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack published in 1946, but bearing in mind ~~the~~ *that I speak*

~~under an~~ ~~injunction under which I speak~~ not to discuss history, and because I think that the study of that report may well be elsewhere in your curriculum, I merely

*particularly* wish to point out to you the validity of many of the

findings and conclusions of that Committee, ~~including~~ *concerning*

some failures which went to the very foundation of our intelligence structure; namely, the failure to exploit obvious sources, the failure to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence

and the failure to centralize intelligence. One point that the Committee made, I think deserves particular underlining, and that is the statement that "efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war".



~~a foreign government for the eyes the foreign  
intelligence -- with which to see.~~

~~Our war experience in the intelligence field,  
the conclusions of the Joint Congressional Committee  
which investigated the Hawaiian attack, and the  
studies of many other groups and committees, focused  
attention on the need for a centralized intelligence  
system.~~

As most of you know, a National Intelligence Authority was established by President Truman on 22 January 1946, by Executive Directive. The Central Intelligence Group was designated as the operating agency of the National Intelligence Authority.

Since the Central Intelligence Group has now been legalized by the National Security Act of 1947 -- under the new name of the Central Intelligence Agency -- I shall not discuss the old organization further --

but will proceed to the new.

With this background, I would like to discuss with you the pertinent provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, insofar as they affect the intelligence picture. This Act establishes -- for the first time on a legal basis - a National Security Council, the function of which is to advise the President on the integration of foreign, domestic and military policies relating to the national security. The Council is to be presided over by the President himself, or by any member he may designate. Its membership is composed of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, together with certain others who may be appointed at the option of the President.

The Central Intelligence Agency is established under this Council. ~~To all intents and purposes, therefore, the National Security Council will take the place of the~~ <sup>old</sup> ~~National Intelligence Authority, which is specifically abolished by the Act.~~ The law does not set forth the powers of the Council as they relate to our Agency, in the manner in which the President's original Executive Order delineated the powers of the National Intelligence Authority in relation to the Central Intelligence Group. However, the fact that the Agency is placed under the Council would appear to give the Council the same general authorities for directing the planning, development, and coordination of all Federal foreign intelligence activities which the National Intelligence Authority had before it.

The Act specifically provides for a Director

of Central Intelligence, who is to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from either civilian or military life. Certain additional safeguards are then included, so that the Director shall not be subject to the usual supervision, restrictions and prohibitions which apply to members of the armed services. It further states that he is not to possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers or functions -- other than those he

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would exercise as Director -- over any component of the armed services. These clauses were included in order to assure to the satisfaction of the Congress that the Director would be free from undue service politics and influence.

The law specifically provides that our Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions. ~~This provision was also in the old Executive Order, and it is one which we are very happy to have included in the law.~~ We have consistently urged that Central Intelligence have nothing whatsoever to do with police powers or functions connected with the internal security of the United States. The internal security functions are properly a part of the work of the F. B. I., and we have no desire whatsoever to interfere with this. It is a burden which we do not wish to assume.

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During the Congressional hearings which preceded the passage of this Act, Central Intelligence was under attack as a possible and incipient Gestapo. We held that this argument had no basis in fact, since a Gestapo can arise only when police powers and intelligence are combined in one organization. We pointed out time and again that our interests are solely in the field of foreign intelligence. Therefore, as I have said, we welcome this provision in the law which eliminates any possibility that our organization will merge intelligence with police power, or assume any functions relative to the internal security of the United States.

And now I wish to discuss with you certain provisions of the law relating to the specific duties of the Agency. These duties were enacted "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities

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encyclopedic information of more or less permanent nature and general interest, which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. The best example of basic intelligence is what we call a National Intelligence Survey -- an N.I.S. An N.I.S. is a concise digest of basic intelligence required for strategic planning and as the basis for initial higher level operational planning, and A Survey will be prepared for each important foreign country and area of the world. It is a basic intelligence production and maintenance program, based in part upon priorities set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in accordance with the capabilities of the agencies within our Intelligence Advisory Committee.

An N.I.S. is divided into nine chapters, each of which treats a major functional aspect of basic intelligence relating to the country or area under consideration.

This entire program is a coordinated venture for which an ad hoc committee, representing the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, has been set up; it ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~determining~~ the basic outlines for these surveys and these outlines are coordinated with all of the Committee Members. Because this is an important example of how CIA can coordinate in the field of intelligence, I am going into it with you in great detail.

The ad hoc committee has determined that the nine basic chapters of the N.I.S. surveys should be broken down as follows: Chapter 1 -- a Brief, <sup>a</sup> succinct, presentation of the salient, basic intelligence aspects of the N.I.S. area as a whole. The succeeding chapters encompass Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Sociological, Political, Economic, Scientific, Armed Forces and, finally, Map and Chart



Appraisals, including a Gazetteer. Certain topics, involving numerous details, are given a general treatment in the N.I.S. itself and a fuller treatment in supplements. It is proposed, initially, to have four supplements -- namely, Ports and Naval Facilities; Air Facilities; Telecommunications; and Towns.

To insure close coordination with the State, Army, Air Force and Navy Departments, tentative allocations of responsibilities for production are made, providing for a single agency to act as over-all coordinator for each chapter. In each case, allocation of responsibility involves the relative interest of the agencies in a given section and their capacities to produce. In some of these chapters, the assistance of agencies outside the State Department and the Military Establishment is needed. For instance, it is obvious that a complete study of economic conditions

in a country can be made only with the assistance of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior. Because these agencies do not understand intelligence as we do, and because they do not have available -- for reasons of security -- considerable information of a highly classified nature, we have tentatively designated the Department of State to assume the responsibility of coordinating the economic chapter, calling on these other departments for appropriate information.

We try to limit a given N.I.S. to the borders of a political entity. Sometimes, however, this is not possible, particularly in Chapter Two, which deals with geography. For example, since the Iberian Peninsula -- including the approaches through the Pyrenees from France -- seems a natural geographic concept, it should be considered geographically as a whole. Thus, the geographic treatment of this area

would serve as Chapter Two for both the N.I.S. -- Portugal, and the N.I.S. -- Spain.

As I have stated above, it is the task of the intelligence staffs of the State Department and the agencies of the National Military Establishment to implement the N.I.S. production and maintenance programs in accordance with agency responsibilities. In the exchange of drafts and information in connection with this work, intelligence channels will be used. Moreover, we do not disregard that vast amount of intelligence already produced in such publications as JANIS, Marshall Plan reports, and other basic data with which you are familiar.

Quite properly you may ask, "Where does the coordination lie of which you speak?" "What is the role of the C.I.A. in this work?" Briefly, it is this: If you will recall the chaos in the field of

competed to secure the best personnel, it was necessary for each of them to back up its experts by asserting that its reports were the best available, and that the others might well be disregarded.

It is the task of Central Intelligence to see that this type of duplication is eliminated by our over-all coordination of the joint effort. It is for us to see that these agencies do not engage in jurisdictional border disputes among themselves in the production of this work.

Central Intelligence has the responsibility for editing the final product of the National Intelligence Surveys. After the responsible agencies have agreed on a section or a chapter, our editors turn it over to our research staff, with two questions to be answered: One, "Is it correct?" and two -- "Is it comprehensive enough, or are there gaps or deficiencies in the text?"

We bear the responsibility and the burden of answering these two questions and of the final editing, the printing, and the dissemination of the final product.

Although I have been quite lengthy in what I have said regarding the program for National Intelligence Surveys, I have done so advisedly, because of their vast importance. ~~Each and every one of you -- if we should again find ourselves in a global conflict -- may become the J-2 of a theater, or the Chief of Intelligence in a higher headquarters somewhere.~~ I hope <sup>we</sup> you will be able to rely on the survey for <sup>each</sup> your area as the basic intelligence Bible at hand. Our work today is to compile these and maintain them at the ready.

Now, because I think specific examples are important, ~~and because Colonel Fortier said that you wanted to know specifically about the production of intelligence~~

~~and our coordinating functions, particularly in the production field;~~ let me just remind you that I indicated that port facilities form a Supplement to each N.I.S. This brings us to another example of coordination in the field of basic intelligence. Just a year ago, the Chairman of the Joint Merchant Ship Statistics Board-- which was created in 1944 as a Government Board -- addressed a memorandum to General Vandenberg, who was then the Director of Central Intelligence. This memorandum stated that the members of the Board were interested in detailed data on all port facilities in the world. Among the membership of the Board was the U.S. Maritime Commission, the Intelligence Division of the Coast Guard, the Offices of Domestic Commerce and International Trade in the Commerce Department, the Bureau of Customs in the Treasury Department, the State Department, the Offices of Naval Transportation

Service and Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department, the Office of the Chief of Transportation in the Army. In addition, the Board had certain private members, namely, the American Bureau of Shipping, the Association of American Shipowners, the Shipbuilders' Council of America, the American Merchant Marine Institute, and others. The U. S. Maritime Commission has certain obligations to these private shipping organizations to provide them with port data, so that they can tell where private American shipping can sail and dock. The interests of the various government agencies are obvious.

In the past, the port data required would have meant duplications of requests to foreign missions ad nauseam. A Naval attache in France might have had half a dozen separate agencies asking him for data on the harbors of Cherbourg and Le Havre. A commercial attache in Australia might have had additional requests

from several agencies on port facilities in Australia -- and so on throughout the world.

What we did when we received this request from the Joint Merchant Ship Statistics Board was to sit down with all of the agencies of the Board and work out a fixed reporting form for port facilities. It is so detailed that it has taken us almost a year to complete it, and it is now in its final stages of coordination. It is divided into a classified and an unclassified section. When the information is returned to us, the classified details -- such as harbor defenses -- will be turned over to the appropriate military establishments. The unclassified data the Maritime Commission can make available to American shippers anywhere.

We have served two purposes here. The first is to establish an over-all reporting form, covering



every conceivable piece of information one needs to know about a given harbor -- the tides, the fortifications, the berthing facilities, the labor situation as to the number of stevedores usually available, rail lines coming into the port, grain elevators, customs facilities, medical facilities and so on. One standard form will serve the purpose. These will be made available in our missions abroad. The report forms will be filled out and kept current and returned to us. Thus, the attaches and members of the Foreign Service will have just one request for data on each given port in their country. When that data comes back to us, it will be our responsibility to disseminate it to the agencies of the Government having need for the information. That is what we mean by the coordination of intelligence production. So much for basic intelligence.

Following basic intelligence, we come to current intelligence. Current intelligence is that spot

information or intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest and value to operating or policy staffs which is used by them usually without the delays incident to complete evaluation or inter-

*Admiral:  
do you want  
to omit  
this?*

pretation. As its contribution to current intelligence, CIA prepares a daily Top Secret summary of the most pertinent data received each day which goes to the President, his Chief of Staff, and the Members of the National Security Council and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services. This daily summary may consist of one or several "hot" items which are of such current interest that they should receive this dissemination. In addition, the departments also have their own internal arrangements for daily summaries to their top officials containing information pertinent to their own departments. Also, in the field of current intelligence, I would list our Top Secret weekly summary

President and appropriate officials can draw a well-rounded picture on which to base their policies. And it should be clearly borne in mind that the Central Intelligence Agency does not make policy.

The estimates furnished in the form of strategic and national policy intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency fill a most serious gap in our present intelligence structure. These estimates should represent the most comprehensive, complete and precise national intelligence available to the Government. Without a central research staff producing this material, an intelligence system would merely resemble a costly group of factories, each manufacturing component parts, without a central assembly line for the finished product.

*out* [ An additional example of national intelligence is a "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to

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the Security of the United States" which we prepare in advance of each meeting of the National Security Council. This is a seven to ten page analysis and evaluation of trends in particular areas of interest to our national security. In addition, from time to time we prepare estimates of reactions to prospective United States policies.

Now if you go out from here and become the J-2 of some organization you may ask, "What intelligence will I receive from the Central Intelligence Agency?" It is very hard to think of anything which you will receive specifically marked "To J-2 from CIA". You will, to be sure, have the National Intelligence Surveys in your area. These, however, will come to you from your department -- be they Army, Navy or the Air Force. It is hoped that they will contain sufficient information to lay out general plans. It is up to the

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collection activities. This is the type of collection which can best be done by the experts of the departments in their various fields.

The law provides one section which establishes the right of the Agency to collect certain intelligence material, and I shall quote this section verbatim: "To perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." This section is written primarily to allow the Agency to engage in foreign clandestine operations -- to give to the United States, for the first time, the espionage system which is, unfortunately, made necessary by conditions in the world today. In addition, it allows us to perform certain collection and other functions which would otherwise have to be done individually by each of the

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Recently the Arab League held a conference in  
Cairo. [ In a broadcast intercept [ ]

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[ ] , which apparently was an oversight in the

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security measures of the Arab League Conference,

the text of the decisions was released.] There were

no subsequent broadcasts or releases on the Arab

League Conference. Consequently without the monitor-

ing service of the FBIB this information would not

have been available to us for weeks, if ever.

In October of 1947, TASS, the Soviet news  
agency, broadcast a communique which reported the  
formation of the Cominform. The FBIB, having monitored  
the TASS communique, immediately set to work to  
determine the reaction of radios throughout the

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world. On the following day the FBIB was able to present a cross section of world reaction and within the next two days the Soviet reaction was broadcast as an excerpt from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. CIA had the information 2 or 3 days earlier than would have been the case without FBIB monitoring.

At about the same time that the Cominform was front-page news with Commercial press services the FBIB picked up the first notice of the Communist worldwide attack on Socialists when it heard Radio Bratislava announce the arrest of Czechoslovakian right-wing democrats.

Two examples of specific intelligence gleaned from broadcasts over a long period are the reports on the "Soviet Transportation System" and the "Status of Soviet Agriculture", in which all of the data on one subject from one source were presented in brief

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form for use by research analysts making studies based on all sources.

Finally, I have stated that this section of the law, which instructs us to perform certain functions centrally, is used as the cloak to hide the right to operate the clandestine services of the United States which have been assigned to us by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

The collection of information by this means has been over-dramatized, and unfortunately, over-publicized. However, I believe we should frankly acknowledge the need for and provide the means of collecting that intelligence which can be obtained only by clandestine methods. In this we only follow, late by many years, the policy and example of every major foreign power. When properly provided for and established, these operations must be centralized

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in one organization. The experience of the British Secret Intelligence Service over hundreds of years proves this. The Germans violated this principle -- as did the Italians and the Japanese -- with disastrous results for themselves.

Failure always marks a multiplicity of secret intelligence organizations. Study of many intelligence systems throughout the world, talks with those who have operated in the field of secret intelligence for long periods of time, and post-war interrogations of high intelligence officials in the Axis countries, have shown conclusively that when there are separate services, the result is chaos, so far as production of information is concerned. Internal bickering, with continual sniping, develops between the various services. There were too many German spy organizations, each of them

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jealous of the other. They all developed a policy of secrecy, so that each might be the one to present some juicy tidbit of information to the leaders. Coordination went out the window.

If the United States is to enter clandestine operations in any area abroad, then such operations should be centralized in one agency to avoid the mistakes indicated, and we should follow the experience of the intelligence organizations of other countries which have proven successful in this field.

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