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6 April 1956

Dear Roger:

Many thanks for sending me the copy
of your Jonathan Peterson Lecture which
I find both interesting and instructive.

Sincerely,

AS

Allen W. Dulles

The Honorable Sir Roger Makins *and*
Ambassador of Great Britain
Washington, D. C.

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DCI - 1 cc
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D.I. (Wash)



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BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

PERSONAL

March 30, 1956.

Dear Allen,

You asked me to send you a copy of the Peterson Lecture which I gave in New York on March 7.

The full text has finally become available, and I enclose a copy.

*James
Page*
Roger Watkins

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.

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March 26, 1956

New York, N. Y.

THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN A MODERN DEMOCRACY

Text of the Jonathan Peterson Lecture delivered by His Excellency Sir Roger Makins, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., British Ambassador to the United States, at the Town Hall, New York City, on March 7, 1956.

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CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen: I am happy to say that this morning we are having one of the top events of our regular season, the Jonathan Peterson Lecture.

The Jonathan Peterson Foundation was founded by members of Mr. Peterson's family to memorialize a man who was an outstanding leader not only in business but in civic and national life, who was also very deeply interested in Anglo-American relations.

So it is altogether appropriate his life and memory should be commemorated here in Town Hall. The first Jonathan Peterson Lecture was presented in 1935, and some of the most important figures in the English-speaking world have been Jonathan Peterson Foundation lecturers.

The general purpose of these lectures is to promote a better understanding among the English-speaking people, and to further advance those principles upon which modern English-speaking civilization rests; namely, respect for human rights and civil liberties with justice for all and individual freedom under the law.

We are most fortunate this morning in having as our Jonathan Peterson Lecturer one of Britain's foremost diplomats, Sir Roger Makins, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to the United States.

After a brilliant career at Oxford, and after the study of law, Ambassador Makins entered the field of law, but very soon felt himself called into the Foreign Service. His first assignment in the Foreign Service was to the Embassy in Washington. So he has been in this country many times, and on very important missions.

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- 2 -

He spent a great deal of time in the London Foreign Office. During the war, World War II, he was with the Allied Mediterranean Command where he worked very closely with General Eisenhower.

After the war he came back to the British Embassy in Washington, and then went back to be Director of the Economic Department of the Foreign Office in London. He then became Deputy Secretary of State, and in 1953, in January, he came here as Ambassador.

I think that Ambassador Makins' - I might say, "love" of this country - his indefatigability as an Ambassador of Goodwill as well as an official ambassador is represented by the fact that in the three years he has been in this country he has been on official missions to 36 out of the 48 states in this country.

He is going to speak to us this morning on a particularly appropriate topic, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy in a Modern Democracy."

Mr. Ambassador, it is a pleasure and a privilege to welcome you here.

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Mr. Davies, Ladies and Gentlemen: The last time I was on this platform I was supported by two, if not three, beautiful film stars. I know that Mr. Davies is doing his best to substitute for them this morning.

I am very glad to see so many people here today. You know, when I was asked to give this lecture, I couldn't think who could possibly want to come and hear an Ambassador lecture at eleven o'clock in the morning. I suppose, however, the happy conjuncture of a British Ambassador and British weather has brought a few of you out to try the experiment.

When I looked at the names of my predecessors as Peterson Lecturers, I realized what an honor it is to be invited to come here today. I noted Lord Halifax and Sir Alexander Cagogan under both of whom I have served, and my friend Lester Pearson with whom I have participated in so many diplomatic negotiations in various parts of the world. I feel that I am, indeed, following in distinguished company.

This morning I thought I would offer you some reflections on the formulation and execution of foreign policy in the contemporary world, and I intend, after saying a few words about the transformation of diplomacy in the last two generations, to examine the way in which international policy is decided and executed in democratic and totalitarian states. And I shall try to assess the advantages and disadvantages inherent in our Western democratic way of doing things.

But I must first make a point that is fundamental to the foreign policy of all countries, whether democracies or not. Those who hold power anywhere in the world are theoretically free to formulate their foreign policy as they choose. But in practice there is usually only a limited room for argument about what the needs of a country are and about where its interests lie.

- 3 -

Foreign policy is largely dictated by almost unalterable consideration of geography, economics and of history, by the need for security, by the need for access to raw materials, by the need to safeguard foreign markets, and by the need to adapt political actions to the abilities and, to some extent, to the aspirations of the people.

I needn't belabor this point. It is a familiar one. But perhaps in many countries it is a source of frustration to some of the citizens that a political party has far less choice in its international than in its domestic politics, and far less control over events. International politics even more than domestic politics, is the art of the possible, and the possibilities are quite often very limited.

Moreover, changes in international situations when effected by negotiations and not by war, normally take place very slowly. Those changes can, of course, be accelerated by the action of individual governments if their position in a particular negotiation or situation is suddenly strengthened or weakened, or if they decide for one reason or another to make concessions. And, of course, the growth and development of a country's resources will gradually increase or diminish its influence and interest in world affairs. But broadly speaking, a government's freedom of maneuver in foreign policy at any given moment is very much less than is popularly supposed.

Since the fundamental objectives of a country's foreign policy are controlled by permanent or semi-permanent factors, they change very slowly. Of course, circumstances can and do alter policies in the long run. For example, the advancement of science has led to the shortening of communications and the development of aviation which has contracted the world; changed the scale of political action; and caused a revolution in strategic concepts.

In all countries foreign policy is still primarily in the hands of government leaders aided by a small group of professional advisers. I draw a distinction here between policy making, where the decisions are taken by political leaders and politicians, and diplomacy, which is the carrying out of these decisions, and which is usually left to the professionals. But the border lines between policy formulation and execution are often blurred just as the lines between tactics and strategy are blurred in war.

I will talk this morning about the problems that beset the diplomatist and the political leader almost equally; for in a modern democracy both alike have to take into account public opinion and emotion to a much greater extent than in the days when the man in the street was content on the whole to leave the determination of policy to the professionals according to their judgment of the national interest.

The changes that have taken place in the last two generations are much less marked in the formulation of policy than in its execution; that is to say, in the conduct of diplomacy. In the days before the First World War the conduct of foreign affairs was left very largely in the hands of the rulers or leaders. A few officials, kings and presidents, premiers and foreign ministers made and executed policy. They negotiated treaties themselves or sent ambassadors with very full plenipotentiary

powers, and under the system which then prevailed of economic liberalism and laissez faire, economic and financial diplomacy was in general left to private bankers and merchants.

Certainly there has been a great change since pre-1914 days, and to a large extent the change can be traced back to the impact of the First World War. The destruction and desolation left by that conflict led to a demand for much more public participation in the shaping of foreign policy and for more information about the conduct of diplomacy.

These demands found a prophet in a man who, for a short time, was perhaps the most popular and most powerful man in the world, President Woodrow Wilson. In his Fourteen Points and to a lesser extent in the conduct of negotiations at Versailles in 1919, he enunciated the doctrine, which perhaps later was misinterpreted, of "open covenants openly arrived at."

The new conditions of the post-1918 world made ever greater demand on diplomatic versatility. Before the First World War the questions with which the diplomatist was most concerned were primarily political, but, when the ability as well as the desire of governments to intervene, as a matter of general policy, in new fields increased, he - that is to say, the diplomatist - had to deal far more than before with a wide range of economic and financial matters and to break virtually new ground in coping on the international plane with social and technical questions.

The League of Nations, and later the International Labor Organization, did much to promote these new fields of international endeavor. And the tendency to diversify the areas of intergovernmental cooperation and, therefore, the task of the diplomatist, was greatly accelerated after the Second World War by the establishment of the United Nations Organization and its specialized agencies. And the so-called "cold war" with its sequel of regional pacts and associations has carried the processes still further.

At the same time, the spread of education and the universal demand for political independence and diplomatic equality have added to the size and complication of international organizations and international conferences. This growth, this demand for popular independence, has combined with the improvement of communications to encourage the conduct of diplomacy by means of large-scale conferences in which the delegations, the members of the international secretariat, and the press, tangle indiscriminately together in the process of negotiation, which is at the same time illuminated and obscured by a welter of contradictory information and rumors.

From being mainly concerned with bilateral relations between pairs of states, foreign policy became more and more concerned with multilateral negotiations, and the sum total of negotiation was enormously increased. Individual countries have become progressively less able to stand aloof from affairs with which in a less closely-knit world they might have regarded as having little to do.

The simultaneous broadening both of the field of foreign affairs and of public interest in them - and Bismarck would probably have said "public interference" in them - changed the

- 5 -

conditions in which diplomacy was carried on. The thirst for popular information about the conduct of foreign policy, the constant questioning of an eager and vigilant press, the critical supervision of legislators, mean that governments are constantly forced to explain their policies more fully than may be desirable from the point of view of effective negotiation.

Diplomacy has some resemblance to a game of chess or cards. Nobody thinks of playing these games by explaining the moves in advance or placing the cards face upwards on the table. In discussions between countries similarly situated and, therefore, playing more or less the same rules, this state of affairs has the disadvantage of forcing declarations of intent and purpose and, therefore, of obliging the negotiators to take a position from which they cannot subsequently retreat without loss of face or public criticism. And in negotiations between countries which are not playing the same rules the disadvantages are of a different kind and are indeed self-evident.

Of course, the people and their elected representatives have the right to information so that they can judge whether those to whom they have given political power have been exercising it wisely. The difficulty is that the press and the political opposition often demand the facts about policies and form opinions upon them before a full judgment can be made and when mere publication may jeopardize the success of a policy before it can ever be implemented.

There is a related point which even in the year 1956 I do not hesitate to mention; namely, the inhibiting effect of elections, the handicaps which their preliminaries, their conduct and their aftermaths can impose upon the smooth development of policy and its execution. Elections may delay or distort the formulation of policy. They may produce results which disturb its continuity, and interfere with the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. When a number of countries are trying to coordinate policy, the fact that elections take place in different countries at different times introduces an almost continuous factor of disturbance in the cooperation between members of the group.

I don't want to make too much of this point because the leading western nations have already managed to find means of mitigating the effects of this factor, and the relations between the United States and Britain are deeply enough rooted not to be disturbed by political controversies or changes in either country.

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, dictatorial and totalitarian governments are free from these civilized handicaps. They are not constrained to explain and defend their actions in general and in detail to inquiring pressmen or politicians - or for that matter, to inquiring audiences.

Hitler, Stalin, and the present rulers in the Kremlin have this in common, they are able to lay down a party line which will be followed without question in all public utterances and writings, in the press and broadcasts, and they are able to suppress as well as to invent news.

- 6 -

An interesting example was the recent correspondence between Marshall Bulganin and President Eisenhower concerning the Soviet offer of a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States. President Eisenhower's reply was concealed from the Soviet people for an entire week while the Soviet rejoinder was prepared and the two were then published together, thus enabling the Soviet leaders to blanket the effectiveness of the American reply. At a later stage in the correspondence a letter from the President was published in Moscow immediately on receipt.

Or take the recent visit of the Soviet leaders to South-east Asia. Western statesmen on a similar errand would have been pursued by a chorus of criticism and advice from home. The Russian leaders were unhampered by any such restraints, and, with a home base secure, could take the initiative without hesitation.

Finally, to cover any tactical or other change in foreign policy which circumstances may dictate, they are able to use their complete control of the intellectuals and their printing presses to rewrite history in order to suit the needs of the moment. And the current denunciation of Stalinism by Stalin's once devoted followers is a classic example.

Now, of course, totalitarian systems pay a heavy price in many ways for their falsification of news and their suppression of criticism, but from the diplomatic point of view it does give them the advantage of maximum flexibility and surprise and makes for freedom of maneuver.

The fact must be faced that in the rough hard-headed business of international politics the democratic governments are handicapped not only by having to play so much in the open, and by the denial of so many of the possibilities of maneuver and surprise, but also - and I put this in inverted commas - by "having to play like gentlemen."

Moral considerations assume a very large part in the policies of the democracies. In any country with Christian traditions and democratic ideals there is an overwhelming public demand that foreign policy and its execution conform to reasonable standards of justice and fair play. It has often been claimed that the United States more than any other country demands that high principles and moral considerations should guide its relations with other nations. And there is a lot in this, although I must say there is no foundation for the corollary which is sometimes drawn that, by contrast, other western countries are guided purely by expediency.

Now, a topical illustration of this point can be found in your present, though not always in your past, practice of the diplomatic recognition of foreign governments. We in Britain are inclined to recognize governments when we are satisfied that they are in fact effectively exercising power and, therefore able, though perhaps not always willing, to fulfill their international obligations. You are inclined to demand that they should also be exercising their power in a decent and civilized manner.

- 7 -

Consistency and integrity in formulating policy, loyalty to international obligations and allies, these are the principles which western peoples demand that their leaders should never forsake. It is, for example, generally taken for granted that we can never launch an aggressive war or use a thermonuclear weapon except in retaliation. Totalitarian regimes, however, are not under such inhibitions at any stages in negotiations. They are free to subordinate means to ends. At the conference table they can alternate between blandishments and abuse, between affability and intransigence, just as it suits them. Away from the conference table they can engage in subversion and intimidation, without any fear of being repudiated by a gust of moral indignation at home, and in the pursuit of their needs and ends they can ruthlessly condemn even their own people to seemingly unnecessary privation as, for example, when war-ravaged Czechoslovakia and Poland were forced to deny themselves the benefits of the Marshall Plan by a diktat from Moscow.

They can make defenseless individuals pawns in the game in a way that no democratic people would tolerate, as their treatment of German, and now of American prisoners has shown. Nor can it be taken for granted that they will not initiate an aggressive or thermonuclear war.

Another advantage which, in the short run at least, a totalitarian regime can have in the world struggle lies in the use of economic resources in support of foreign policy, a very topical subject nowadays. In a country where the government fully controls every detail of the national economy, it is possible for it, at any time, to take resources away from home production and offer them to the other states where they may prove an effective bribe or bargaining counter. But in a country where private enterprise is the normal rule, the government has either to obtain legislative authority for the use of public funds, or to convince private enterprise and private contractors of the advantages of undertaking operations in areas of the world where there are grave uncertainties, and this is necessarily a slow process. If public money is involved, a democratic government is compelled by tradition and by loyalty, too, and perhaps by fear of the taxpayers, to lay down conditions and to enforce an accounting which may substantially diminish the appeal and the political effectiveness of the assistance that is being offered.

There is another important factor implicit in the democratic conduct of foreign policy. Today more than ever before a nation can only achieve its objectives by working in alliance or in association with other states, but a democratic government cannot easily align itself with whom it will or break its obligations when it will. The repudiation of an obligation between western democracies, western democratic associates, is unthinkable except for some necessity which is recognized to be overriding by the other parties such as, for example, defeat in a war or for some action by one state of such a grave and unfriendly nature as to force repudiation. In our concept an alliance is not merely a treaty. It is, if it is to mean anything, a day-to-day working relationship.

Totalitarian governments, on the other hand, regard such alliances as matters of convenience and have no hesitation in denouncing or repudiating them and in changing sides if there seems to be clear advantage in doing so. What the French call "renversement des alliances" was a fairly common practice among authoritarian regimes down to the 19th Century. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, a notable example occurred in 1939 when it made a pact with Hitler. Another example of the same sort of thing occurred recently when the Soviet Union denounced its treaty of friendship with Britain and France, on the grounds of the inclusion of Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of which they were members, but soon after offered a treaty of friendship to the United States which was the architect of the same policy and a member of the same organization; they even offered to reconclude treaties with France and Britain. Such actions are not inconsistent by totalitarian standards.

Perhaps totalitarian regimes cannot have allies in the western sense, only satellites. This hypothesis may be born out by the breach between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948. And some further light may be thrown upon it by the future course of relations between the Soviet Union and China. Alliances between dictatorships can only be secure when one side has the whip-hand, and this is a potential weakness.

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, in spite of this qualification, I may by this time have put you in a state of some despondency about the prospects of the western democracies, and so I will now proceed to redress the balance, for I assure you that even in diplomacy the assets of the democracies outweigh their handicaps. (Applause)

It is a capital maxim, whether in war or in politics, never to be so conscious of the weaknesses of one's own position that the weaknesses of the adversary are overlooked. Totalitarian regimes are apt to present a monolithic front to the outside world, and it is difficult to define the nature of the stresses and strains, the personal rivalries and the controversies which are assuredly a handicap to the formulation of policy and hinder its execution. But every now and then a head rolls, or the minister falls, or the regime is shaken to indicate a ferment, just as the occasional eruption of a seemingly quiescent volcano indicates the hidden pressures beneath.

In the first place, democratic governments are apt to have a better understanding of the outside world not only through personal contacts but also because their representatives are free to report things as they see them rather than the things their superiors want to hear. I am sure that in general our policies are based on far more accurate and objective reports than are those of the totalitarian states. In the Berlin Blockade and in the invasion of Korea, we had two examples of major Communist miscalculation about the West's willingness to resist.

In the second place, of course, democratic governments benefit because their policy is under the constant scrutiny of a vigilant public. By contrast the mistakes made by dictatorships can be disastrous. Absolute power is so easily able to corrupt good judgment. One has only to think of the gross miscalculations of Mussolini and the catastrophic blunders of Hitler and the misreading by Stalin of German intentions in 1941 to illustrate this point.

Thirdly, though in theory, and often in practice, diplomacy of a dictatorship or totalitarian regime is more flexible, it can paradoxically enough be subject to great rigidity in that it is controlled by certain dogmas or fixed ideas and because its agents have no discretion to vary whatever the party line may be on particular issues.

The fact that the policies of democracies are subject to constant public and parliamentary control with elections at frequent intervals means that they are kept broadly in harmony with the popular will. Premature publicity and premature criticism may be a handicap, but an educated citizenry which weighs up the issues, discusses alternatives and freely supports the conclusions is fundamentally a source of strength.

In a totalitarian country the mass of the people is neither for nor against the policies of the government. They merely have to accept them as "none of their business." Consequently they have no sense of responsibility for and no feeling of being committed to these policies at any given time, and the caucus at the summit can veer in any direction.

In the same way, the fact that democratic action has to have the moral sanction of the people is also a source of strength in the long run, although it may appear immediately and superficially as a disadvantage. It may interfere with tactics but not with strategy.

For example, Britain was handicapped in the conduct of the Boer War in 1899 by the fact that an appreciable number of British citizens thought the war was unjust and said so, but this turned to our advantage a decade later when many of those who had deplored the South African struggle fully supported our entry into the First World War. When people who had shown that they were not afraid to reject the doctrine of "My Country Right or Wrong," supported our armed intervention in Europe, it did much to reinforce the conviction of the rightness of our cause not only at home but also in the eyes of the world.

Let us not forget, Ladies and Gentleman, that the essential struggle in the world today is for men's minds, and Lincoln's dictum about not fooling all the people all the time is applicable to world as well as to domestic opinion, however much this truth may be obscured for shorter or for longer periods by intensive propaganda.

Nothing has more embarrassed Communist propaganda than the cynical alliance Stalin suddenly made with Hitler in August 1939 after six years of declarations that the Nazis were the real enemies of Russia. For many naive people who had not been ill-disposed toward Communism this came as a devastating revelation of the opportunism, the lack of principle of its adherents, and Communist politicians and newspapers the world over became a laughing stock with their abrupt change of line in slavish imitation of Moscow.

Take another example, the Czech coup-d'etat of 1948 brought within the Communist orbit a strategically placed country 12 million strong, but the price of that ruthless triumph was a heavy one for the Communists. Every other smaller nation in

- 10 -

Europe was alerted to the menace. Some who might otherwise have been neutral joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It became far harder for individual Communists all over the world to get away with their pretensions of being decent and loyal citizens. If the Soviet leaders had to answer to an electorate with a conscience they would never have made that mistake in Czechoslovakia.

I think that Communist leaders are apt to be inhibited in their opportunism by their dogmas. Under pressure they have no hesitation in changing their line dramatically, but nonetheless the men who are making policy in the Kremlin today once believed in and still pay lip service to Marxist theories about the inevitable decadence of capitalist countries. They have never fully freed themselves from the involutions of Marxist thoughts.

In the conduct of negotiations, too, good faith and fair dealing eventually bring their own reward. The opportunism and the inconsistency which the Communists have shown in the past in the United Nations and elsewhere is one of their greatest handicaps today in their efforts to capture the sympathy of the uncommitted peoples of the world.

After the events of the last eleven years only the unbelievably naive could take for granted the good faith of Communist negotiators. On the whole we find that most countries, not only our closest allies, accept our good faith.

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, as is, I hope, proper in a lecture, I have treated my theme from an academic rather than a topical point of view. Nevertheless, I cannot pass without comment over the new phase in the relations between the Western democracies and the Communist bloc which has of late become clearly established.

There has been an unmistakable change in Soviet policy, a change of the kind which, as I have tried to explain, they are able to make so easily and so arbitrarily. They have turned their attention much more intensively than before to the uncommitted and under-developed countries of the world and endeavored to gain new footholds by offering military and economic aid.

I will not here with you enter into the question of whether this change is merely a switch of tactics or something more, except to say the strategic objective of Soviet policy is certainly not altered. This remains quite avowedly the establishment of a world Communist society.

But we in the free world have plainly to adjust ourselves to a long period of competitive co-existence. It presents us with a serious challenge. Some countries may be inclined, some countries are all too ready to take Soviet protestations at face value and to accept the Trojan horses of their aid. There is no doubt that the progress in Soviet industrial development and the presumed improvement in Soviet economic conditions will henceforth enable the Soviet Union to compete with the West to an increasing degree in the economic as well as in the purely political and propaganda fields.

- 11 -

We must keep our balance about this. The Soviet economy still lags behind that of the West, and her present allies and satellites are still further behind. Many of the recent Soviet overtures represent token gestures rather than large-scale offers of aid. It is a matter of skillful propoganda on their side, sometimes unwittingly aided by over-anxiety on ours, that elevates them to disturbing proportions.

But the challenge is likely to become more genuine and more substantial as the years go by. A Soviet policy, which is at the same time more flexible and superficially more reasonable, such as that displayed in the words of the Soviet leaders at the recent Communist Congress in Moscow, requires us to reassess our own external policies particularly in the field of economics and in regard to those countries in which the Soviet Union has been displaying special interest.

This Soviet approach, more subtle and more deceptive than the blundering methods of the Stalinist era, may for the reasons that I have given be more difficult for us to deal with. Nonetheless, the old saying that times change and we change with them applies in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. This new development in Soviet policy must surely be related to changes now taking place in economic and social conditions inside the Soviet Union which, if continued, may themselves impose a different series of restraints and exercise new influences on the formulation as well as on the execution of Soviet policy. Though the transmission may be very slow, it may well change the meaning of co-existence in the Soviet lexicon perhaps in such a way as to make possible a genuine co-existence, in our sense, between the two rival systems of organizing society. But the essential proviso to this highly speculative hypothesis is that the western democracies should be alert enough, well organized enough, and united enough to deal with the greater, because less obvious, dangers which this transition already holds for us.

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am led, as you see, to a conclusion which is far from pessimistic. As I said at the beginning, a country's foreign policy is largely dictated by circumstances, by national interests and conditions which powerfully affect policies of the government of the day. Since the last war both our countries have displayed, generally speaking, a marked degree of bi-partisanship in the conduct of foreign policies. But you cannot have something for nothing. There is quite a heavy price to be paid diplomatically for the advantage of our democratic system. We would, if necessary, of course pay a far heavier price, but there is no need to be extravagant, and we should see whether we cannot through understanding our handicaps, reduce the price as far as possible.

There are various ways in which this can be done. The first is by more education and information about the questions which I have touched upon. All of us who are concerned with or are interested in world affairs should accept responsibility for spreading knowledge and understanding of them among a wider public so that opinion in our countries may be as little emotional, as little subjective and as realistic as possible, and I am sure that this is one of the ways in which this institution, Dr. Davies, is performing a notable service.

- 12 -

In this way what is perhaps already implicit can become explicit. Diplomatic action is not an end in itself but a means of giving effect to national policies, and national policies have to deal with things as they are and not as the democratic majority would like them to be.

Then there is the question of responsibility. Under our system numbers of people in politics, in journalism, in business, obtain information about government policies and intentions, in many cases scarcely less complete than that possessed by the officials who are actually dealing with them. And it should perhaps be recognized that it is the possession of the information rather than the position or function of the individual which imposes responsibility in regard to its use. If this sense of responsibility were generally spread, as it is already partially spread through our countries, the impediment to the smooth conduct of our diplomacy would tend to be diminished.

And so the seeming diplomatic advantages of a totalitarian state are largely illusory, or at best short-run. In the long run the advantages of public discussion outweigh the advantages of surprise. In the long run the advantages of straight dealing outweigh the advantages of sharp dealing. In the long run the example of consistency and decency pays off. And in the long run let us hope the people in our democracies will become so educated to the nature of foreign affairs that by wise criticism, and still more by wise forbearance from criticism, they will deprive our totalitarian rivals of even those short-term diplomatic advantages which flow from their monolithic systems. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Sir Roger, I don't think I need to tell you that we are deeply grateful to you for having brought us this interesting, important and significant statement. I think it is something that we are all going to want to give a great deal of thought to.

I think we can also see what good work as an ambassador you do as you go about the country. And I think we are also very glad to know that this lecture has been recorded and will be published so that it will be available for all of you to study (Applause)

And now for some questions. I would like to ask the first question. It isn't along the line you touched on in your lecture although I think it is cognate to it. You spoke a great deal about the change in the way diplomacy has worked over the past forty years.

Would you comment on the quality of young men coming into the Foreign Service at the present time? Is it designed to be good enough to continue the things we have been doing? Is it better? Or is it worse? Would you comment on it?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, of course, I can only speak about the British Foreign Service. I think that we have been fortunate in maintaining the standards which we have always tried to set in our Service. Since the war we have altered the examinations, the method of entry, to try and tap a wider group. We have insisted always on maintaining the highest intellectual standard; that is to say, a very good university degree as a condition of

- 13 -

entry. So far, I am glad to say, we have managed to maintain that standard very well, and I hope we shall continue to do so.

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: It is very difficult for the United States to carry on the task that England did so well in the Near East, as we are so far away, and Britain had the advantage of centuries of stabilizing all parts of the world. Is there any chance that England will again take on this great task?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I think that in the Middle East, as elsewhere, we have to work together, we and you, to uphold our interests, and to maintain the peace. Of course, it is true that in the past Britain has carried almost the entire burden of maintaining stability in that region, but gradually, of course, with your expanding influence and resources you have found that you cannot disinterest yourselves from the affairs of the area, and I am sure that will continue. I don't think there is any question of going backwards. You can't go backwards in politics. You can't reoccupy political positions from which you have withdrawn. You have to adopt new policies. Our policy in the Middle East must continue to be one which is coordinated between us. That is the precept which we are following today.

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Ambassador, would you care to comment on the dismissal of Sir John Glubb?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I mustn't depart too far from the theme of my lecture and stultify my own words. So I will say simply that it is a serious matter which is being studied at the moment. I shan't say more in public today, or I will have to tear up my own lecture.

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: What better incentive do you think we can offer China toward the kind of behavior we want than the subsequent possibility of United Nations membership, what subsequent control of her behavior than to commit it to the principles of the United Nations?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I don't know whether the question should be approached on the basis of incentive. This is an Anglo-American occasion and I shall confine myself to our two governments. There is, of course, as everybody knows, a difference of approach toward the problem of Communist China although there is no difference of judgment as to the meaning and the effect of its emerging power.

Now, we have gone on the basis that the realities of the situation required us in 1950 - which is some time ago now - to recognize the fact that the Peking regime had acquired control over the mainland of China and its nearly 600 million inhabitants. We recognized that fact, we accorded to the regime diplomatic recognition, we established a diplomatic mission in Peking, and proceeded to deal with that regime diplomatically without, of course, modifying our judgment as to what the regime stood for or its policies. And we have also been inclined to trade with China in non-strategic goods; that is to say, commodities which are not defined as strategic by international agreements and arrangements.

- 14 -

Now, we think that by dealing with China, by trading with them in innocuous ways, we may gradually get on some sort of terms with them and perhaps loosen the ties, particularly the economic ties, by which they are increasingly bound to the Soviet Union. That is the approach which we have adopted toward this problem.

I wouldn't call it an incentive because, after all, we are not handing out carrots. What we are doing is this: we are pursuing a policy which we regard as the best policy in our own interest and in the interest of our associates and in the interest of the West. That is our judgment. You may think it is wrong, but that is the way in which we are approaching this problem.

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Do you feel that the Soviet is prepared to jump into Central Africa if and when the British and other white groups are forced out?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, I think that Soviet Communism is rather like the tide which comes in and moves into inlets or wherever the water can flow. And there is, of course, the old truism that you can't have a vacuum anywhere in the world. If you create a vacuum, something else is going to be drawn into it.

So that I think that if we so conduct ourselves as to give Communism a chance to flow into Africa, it will flow in, and we must conduct, and indeed are so conducting, our policies as to make that impossible, or at least very difficult.

There is a conflict here between the demand for complete independence and the ability to stand on one's own feet in the modern world. We have to try and balance out all these considerations. Our problem is peculiarly difficult at the moment because we are trying to pay every regard to the desire of the countries to stand on their own feet, to be independent, to be free and so on, and at the same time to have regard to the dangers which menace those countries if they are insufficiently stable economically, not viable, not strong enough to stand on their own feet. That is the main problem and I think we are dealing with it to the best of our ability.

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Do we western nations not suffer from some disadvantages with the totalitarian regimes to the extent that aggressive politicians secure backing of office holders for the promotion of only one political viewpoint?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: As an Ambassador and a public servant, I am never rude about politicians.

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Your talk closed with the idea that in the long run our way of diplomacy will win out. Do you feel that time is with us or is running out?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: I think that we have no time to lose.
(Applause)

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: And now a final question which has come from several of our audience.

- 15 -

What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the United Nations in world politics? And do you feel that a stronger United Nations would help all countries with their foreign policies?

AMBASSADOR MAKINS: Well, it is here, of course, that the United Nations has not quite fulfilled the purpose for which it was founded. It has not been able to do so because the basis of the Charter was Great Power harmony, and since the United Nations was founded we have unfortunately had Great Power discord.

Nevertheless, we should never lose faith in the United Nations. We must continue to support it. It is itself changing. It has just acquired sixteen new members. It is and will increasingly be the mirror of the world, as President Eisenhower called it. It is a place where the points of view of all nations can come together. And while it may not have developed exactly as was hoped in 1945, nevertheless it is progressing. It has great possibilities for good, and I am sure we must continue to support it. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN DAVIES: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

We now stand adjourned.

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