

# New Look in Policy Of Soviet Needs Reply

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Continued From First Page  
in the Western defense against communism which urgently needs filling.

## Solution Sought

Even here in Washington, the returning traveler is struck by the impression that complacency is not entirely universal. The troubles of the administration with its foreign-aid bill, for instance, seem to reflect a new spirit of reappraisal in Congress. It is not, one suspects, that the Congress has suddenly made up its mind to junk the foreign-aid program, or even necessarily to reduce it. What seems more likely is that the administration has failed to explain adequately how the program is to be adapted to meet the new need.

On both of these fronts, the main object of the search is to co-ordinate the efforts and the energies of the free world in reaching clearly defined common objectives. In mobilizing its resources for an era of peaceful competition with communism the need for concerted policy is at least as great—though perhaps harder to achieve—as in building a military defense.

It is not impossible. Admitting that different countries have special interests in various parts of the world is hardly a justification for each country taking a separate line of its own which ignores, and often actually frustrates, the efforts of its allies. Yet it is exactly this tendency to pursue separate and contradictory national policies that is the greatest single source of weakness in the free world today.

## Co-operation Essential

If NATO can evolve into an organization capable of defining common objectives and charting common action, it could do a great deal to wipe out the inconsistencies that bedevil Western policy in the whole European area. But short of this, if the powers with major responsibility could recognize clearly the enormous advantage in pulling together instead of in opposite directions, the whole outlook would be transformed.

The advantage would not be confined to Europe. In North Africa and the Middle East, where the major threat to Europe lies, the dividends would be greatest. If wholehearted American support were given to the British and French in their efforts to protect Western interests in these areas, there would be very little question about the outcome. And even if the process of doing this involves treading on a few toes, the long-range effect is likely to be highly beneficial.

Foreign aid, being the mainstay of American diplomacy, is perhaps primarily an American concern. But a distinction can be drawn between the bulk of this aid (about 85 per cent) which goes to bolster the military power of the anti-Communist world, and the remainder which is spent to build up the economic strength of underdeveloped areas.

## Benefits Doubtful

There is plenty of evidence that the second part of the program as presently administered does almost as much harm as good in many areas. Apart from the demoralizing effect of accepting handouts, this kind of aid is almost universally regarded abroad as a somewhat ignominious effort by the United States to buy political influence. The impression is strengthened by the rigidity with which the program is carried out. A strict "cost-accounting" rule, requiring detailed justification for every penny spent and close American supervision of each program largely nullifies its effect. The result today is that Russia with a far more flexible program can reap greater political and propaganda dividends at a fraction of the overall cost.

One solution might be to free the American effort from the mass of red tape that enfolds it. Another which deserves serious consideration is to place the administration of a world-wide economic foreign aid program under the United Nations.

Those who support the second solution offer a number of concrete advantages. Contributions to a development fund could be allocated among member nations on the same basis that they contribute to the support of the U. N. itself. The result would be an outside contribution of \$2 for each dollar supplied by the United States. Russia would be invited to join. If she accepted, the whole business of economic development would be lifted out of the cold-war struggle. If she refused, Russia would stand alone and her own program would be unmistakably identified as the self-seeking political weapon that it is. Finally, the U. N. solution would be enthusiastically welcomed by the underdeveloped nations themselves, while the basic idea behind the American program would remain valid: That the healthy economic growth of backward areas in itself provides the best defense against communism.

## Thinking Must Change

Given courage, imagination and will, there is little question of the West's capacity to provide an effective answer to the

new Communist challenge. But above all a change is needed in our thinking about communism itself.

Communism must be accepted as a competitive system. It is time to stop talking about it as one would talk about a disease. It is time to stop preaching about it as a sin and assuming that, in the eyes of a majority of people in the world, all morality lies on the side of the dedicated anti-Communists.

In its new guise, it no longer is possible either to pin the Western case against communism primarily on the fear of subversion or military domination. The danger may still be real enough. But, except in a very few areas, fear is no longer an effective guarantee of co-operation.

Accepting this, the West must also recognize that the competition with communism is still in deadly earnest. Whatever cards the Communists may be using today, the stakes still involve the survival of millions and the survival of democratic society. And the game is still being played for keeps.

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# THE RED CHALLENGE

## 'New Look' in Policy Of Soviet Needs Reply

By CROSBY S. NOYES

If the New Look in Russian policy is, as the evidence strongly suggests, a deliberate offensive and a threat to the security of the free world, an answer would seem to be called for.

The answer, surely, is not to take refuge in the hope that the offensive will fail of its own accord. Or still better, that it will backfire and bring the Communist world tumbling into ruin.

It doesn't lie either in the pretense that nothing really has changed and that the West can go on waging the cold war with the same slogans and the same techniques that have worked in the past.

Finally, and most emphatically, it doesn't lie in simply

### Last of Five Articles

throwing in the sponge, dismantling the painfully constructed military defenses, calling off the economic struggle and allowing the free world to relapse into a state of torpid disintegration.

If any of these responses seemed likely the Communists, with good reason could congratulate themselves on a brilliant diplomatic victory. Fortunately, however, behind the facade of optimism, there are signs that at least some Western leaders are taking a realistic view of the challenge which today confronts them.


France's Foreign Minister

Christian Pineau may not be the most dazzling statesmen of our time. When he complains publicly that there is no such thing as a co-ordinated Western policy in Europe, diplomatic fur flies in a half-dozen capitals. Which does nothing to change the fact what Mr. Pineau says is essentially true. Or that many other Western statesmen have been saying the same thing privately for a number of months.

NATO, which is the cornerstone of the common Western effort against communism, is facing up to the challenge. At this point, its "Three Wise Men"—Foreign Ministers Lange of Norway, Pearson of Canada and Martino of Italy—are touring Western capitals trying to work out practical measures by which the effectiveness of the alliance may be broadened. It is not a question of finding new and useful work for NATO to do. It is in response to a need that is acutely felt in Europe—a gap

Continued on Page A-2, Col. 1

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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
WASHINGTON, 25. D.C.

Attention



DOCUMENT  
NO CHANGE  
DATE: 12 MAR 1981  
REVIEWER: [Redacted]

STAT

Dear Sirs :

In the Sunday Evening Star appeared the last article by [Redacted] about the RED CHALLENGE.

The last part of the article which I underlined must give the order of Lenin to Mr.Noyes.

I agree fully with Mr.Noyes that " Thinking must Change." But he talks only about OUR thinking and not about the communistic one and for which he sees no remedy.

Against the competitive communistic system, as far as it goes, Free Enterprise has only ONE remedy : to increase its own efficiency and for which Mr.Noyes did not offer one suggestion. Against that I can show that this can be done, but this was not deemed practical, though I never got a chance to demonstrate it.

I never thought that Karl Marx's theory of value and dialectical materialism was a sin. On the contrary our conventional science has never been capable to show that it was wrong, but talking about a " freedom " on which it cannot give even a reasonable concept. Talking about backward areas? It is considered that Mr. Paul Hoffmann is somewhat soft on communism. Does he think in the same line as Mr. Noyes ?

There is however something what Mr. Noyes does not know : that his articles are directed against a wall without holes, for the simple reason that the U.S. Government does not possess ONE Agency which can deal practically with " communism." Though it might put " communists " in jail.

Very truly yours,  
B.G.H. Vanderjagt



THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

Attention

In tonight's Evening Star I read the attached article by Mr. Noyes.

I underlined some sentences. When I was last year in Holland I could convince myself that with great anxiety the tactics of combatting communism in the U.S.A. were followed. Not that theirs were much better but Holland is not a leading nation.

Mr. Noyes is a good columnist and critic. That is to say he does just that but does not give any ideas how something else has to be done.

Not that he is wrong, the communists are convinced from a scientific point of view that they are right. And we have nothing against it in this direction but methods which have not been entirely successful.

Titto, Nehru and Nasser are neither convinced that communism is wrong.

It is for this reason that at the present I am pressed to finish the addendum for Dunnewolt's <sup>book</sup> as quick as possible and which will be translated in the other european languages.

Very truly yours,

B.G.H. Vanderjagt.

### THE RED CHALLENGE

# Soviet Goal Is Same: To Weaken America

By CROSBY S. NOYES

Anyone getting home from an extended spell abroad is called on to make a number of more or less strenuous mental flip-flops. But a reporter who has spent most of his time dabbling in the field of politics may find the adjustment almost beyond his mental agility.

A curious kind of self-hypnotic optimism seems to have settled over the United States. Our most responsible leaders are talking like confirmed disciples of Dr. Coue, endlessly repeating the comforting formula that every day in every way the world and everything in it is getting better and better.

The tendency to look at the world through rose-colored glasses applies most particularly

#### Europe's View Different

to the question of our foreign relations. The Communist world, we are assured, is cracking up. The leaders of the Kremlin have lost their grip to such an extent that communism may no longer be an effective instrument in the cold war. The general impression is that the struggle is about over and that the free world, strong and united, can stand by to rake in the chips. Secretary of State Dulles last week set the millennium as no more than 10 years off.

Though not necessarily more accurate, the European perspective on this situation is at least strikingly different. In terms of its effect in the European area, the new look in Russian policy shapes up as anything but a retreat.

On the contrary, it has all the

This article is the first of a series of five by Mr. Noyes, former European Correspondent of The Star, analyzing the Communist threat to the West in light of recent developments.

earmarks of a carefully calculated and positive decision by the new Russian leadership. As a pattern of action, everything that has been done makes sense. The spirit behind it is aggressive. The objective is familiar: To destroy United States prestige and power throughout the world—to bring what remains of free Asia, Africa and perhaps even part of Western Europe under increasing Communist influence and ultimate Communist control.

#### Began With "Peace Offensive"

It has been in the works for a long time. The abortive "peace offensive" which started soon after the death of Stalin in 1953 began the process of internal relaxation and reform within the Communist dominion. It came to an end in the Berlin riots of June 17, 1953, when the Red Army had to be called in to quell violent anti-Communist demonstrations throughout the

Since then the Red leaders

See CHALLENGE, Page A-5

**NEW MEMBERS LISTED.**  
The 10 crew members aboard the Navy plane were listed as: Lt. James J. ...  
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G. Becker, Tillamook, Oreg.; Airman 2/c Danny Pillsbury, Orange, Tex., and T/Sergt. David ...  
an air base in Japan.

## CHALLENGE

**Continued From First Page**  
have bided their time and mended their fences. But there is no evidence to suggest that they ever abandoned the long-range idea of a return to a line of policy which promised them glittering dividends.

No one outside Russia—and for that matter, few people inside—can measure with assurance all the reasoning that lies behind the Russian new look which began to take firm shape at the Summit Conference at Geneva last year.

**People's Attitude.** Social and economic pressures inside Russia and the satellites may have played a part.

**Leaders' Attitude.** The new leaders themselves may feel that the kind of internecine warfare which characterized the Stalin era has lost its zest.

**Military considerations.** They may have become convinced that military expansion in an age of nuclear weapons involves too great a risk.

**Eisenhower's Salesmanship.** President Eisenhower finally may have persuaded them at Geneva that the United States would never be the first to launch an aggressive war.

**Concern Over Chinese.** The Russians may be seeking closer ties with the West to counter-balance the awesome weight of 600 million Communist Chinese.

**Confidence at Home.** They may also feel that the Communist regimes at home and in the satellites are so firmly established that the upheavals of 1953 will not be repeated.

### Olive Branch More Effective

Each of these factors could have helped to shape the decision. But perhaps the biggest reason of all is that the new Russian leaders understand what Stalin never understood: That in the struggle between two world systems, the olive branch is a more effective weapon than the big stick.

They believe, in short, that the Communist world can compete with the West on a political and economic plane. They are also convinced that in this competition, their side will win—first, because with a strictly controlled economy they can divert available resources wherever they will do most good—second, because communism shorn of the threat of military domination still makes an extraordinary appeal to many people ...  
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Having reached their decision,

the Kremlin leaders have acted with impressive energy. The liberation of Austria last spring provided the first major diplomatic bombshell. Allied governments were caught so flatfooted by the move that there is still some question of what to do about the multi-million-dollar military installations which were under construction at the time.

### Second Thoughts Arise

When Khrushchev and Bulganin showed up in Belgrade to pay their respects to Marshal Tito, there were plenty of observers on hand—including this reporter—to point out the irony in the situation and hail the event as a significant triumph for the one-time outcast Yugoslav dictator. But since then, with Tito being feted in Moscow as a returning prodigal, or touring Western Europe spreading the gospel of neutralism, there have been some second thoughts.

The same goes for the other major features of the Russian new look—the hatchet-work on Stalin, the junkets to India and Burma and Britain, the offers of economic aid, arms and give-away "trade agreements" to uncommitted countries, the partial demobilization of the Red Army, the endless talk about disarmament, peace and co-existence.

If the Russian leaders are willing to make themselves look ridiculous on occasion, if they contradict themselves, appear to be outsmarted and sometimes take risks, it is a safe bet that they do it of their own will and with a deadly serious purpose.

### No Sign of Breakdown

The hope that this process will place an unbearable burden on the internal structure of the Communist apparatus is a little far-fetched. The recent riots in Poland have been put down with a self-assurance which hardly suggests a tottering regime. Recent criticism of the Russian Party by Communists in France, Italy, Britain and the United States generally is believed to have been inspired, if not directly ordered, by the leaders of Moscow.

Another handy straw to clutch is the thought that the Russian leaders themselves will fall under the spell of their own liberality. Given time, some people think that Russian communism could evolve into a different sort of system, not actually benign, perhaps, but at least compatible or permanent co-existence with Western capitalism. This apparently was in Secre-

tary Dulles' mind at his Wednesday press conference. Here again, however, the evidence is less than convincing. Whatever changes may take place in the face which communism presents to the outside world, certain essential features remain. The methods may evolve. But wherever the Communist dominate in the world, they do so as firmly today, if not as roughly, as before. No country which has ever fallen under Communist control has ever had another free second-guess.

### In Successful Competition

At any rate, whatever real or imagined dangers may lie in their path, Russia is clearly moving ahead with a logical program which confronts the West with two facts deserving urgent recognition:

1. For the first time, communism as a system is in open and successful competition with democracy, fighting in areas and with weapons on which the West until now has had a monopoly.

2. This competition which is basically hostile to the interests of the free world, cannot be met successfully by diplomatic techniques and propaganda created during the opening phases of the cold war.

In an atmosphere of election-year optimism, these conclusions may strike an unpleasantly discordant note. But in the light of what is happening in the European area today, they also present a challenge which the United States cannot ignore much longer without courting disaster.

(Tomorrow—The Communist offensive in Europe.)

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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
WASHINGTON, 25.D.C.

Attention



Dear Sirs :

I really do not like to waste paper and stamps but in this mornings Washington Post appeared a column by that eminent writer George Sokolsky and which you must ~~have~~ probably have read because it would be enormously practical to do it.

THE MEANING OF MARXISM. Another columnist who is certain worth the order of Lenin.

What Mr. Selsam says : "Man, a part of nature and its highest product changes and controls nature by means of tools and thereby compels the forces of nature to serve his ends."

<sup>MADE</sup>Marx this much more eloquent in his linen-cpat formula and in which were all the mysteries of value.

If it was only in the Washington Post, but Noyes in the Evening Star is also advocating that in the end we have to accept Marxism as inevitable.

So that one of these days the commies will become the leaders of the good old U.S.A. if by one accident or another the steel strike may ruin our economy in a comparatively short time and the Central Intelligence Agency may remember some papers in which I " showed " that and Mr. Marx and Mr. Selsam and Mr. Noyes were wrong and what will become of me?



No wonder that they are asking from Holland if I never will finish the Addendum.

Very truly yours,

B.G.H. Vanderjagt.

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B.G.H. VANDERJAGT



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