

RC 9-8990/a

7 DEC 1957

General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, N. Y.

Dear David:

I'm sorry that you won't be able to join us next Monday at the University Club but perhaps we shall be able to arrange another meeting some time in the not too distant future.

I've reread your speech and, again, I was most interested in your comments on the need for continuing efforts to consider and exploit those internal tensions within Communist societies which develop from the hunger of the individual for freedom and human dignity as well as from the forces of discontent and despair to which you refer. I should be interested in your ideas as to the most important vulnerabilities indicated by these elements of tension. You also state that we have failed to translate the battle of ideas into potent action and policy. Where would you suggest that the battle be enlarged, in what areas, and on the basis of which particular aspects of the contest might we be able to better identify ourselves to the victims of the Communist efforts as participants in a common cause?

What specific steps would you suggest to bring about the failure of what you term the Soviet strategy of nibbling and the Communist strategy of intimidation? I would be interested in your ideas as to specific weaknesses, if any, inherent in these principles, both within the context of an expansion of NATO operations and in other realms of activity, which are capable of meeting the challenge.

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And last, and perhaps most important of all, how can the lethargy of the West, if there is in fact such a lethargy, be replaced by a dynamism of mind and spirit sufficient to meet the imperative of the Cold War and the challenge offered by the nibbling successes of World Communism? What further steps can be taken to demonstrate that we lead from a strength, not only in the field of modern war and technology, but in matters of the spirit?

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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Mr. David Bernoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, N. Y.

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Signature Recommended:

[Redacted Signature]

5 Dec 1957

DD/P

Date

[Redacted Box]

5 December 1957

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NEW YORK 20, N. Y.



DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

November 26, 1957

Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, North West
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

12/3/81

Thank you for inviting me to join you at your private dinner at the University Club in New York on Monday evening, December ninth. It is a matter of deep disappointment to me that I cannot be with you. Unfortunately, I had previously accepted an invitation from a rather active member of Congress to be his guest at a dinner on the same evening, to which he attaches some importance and to which he has already invited a number of persons.

I am, as you know, at your service and will be glad to visit with you in Washington or New York at any time that may suit your convenience.

When we met at the White House a few days ago I was encouraged by your reaction to my recent address before the Association of the United States Army. If my recollection serves me correctly, you were to write me a letter selecting those of my recommendations which appealed to you and on which you would like my thoughts as to how they might be implemented.

When I receive your request I shall be glad to undertake the preparation of a memorandum containing my further thoughts on the subject.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "David".

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

DD/P 3-6561

5 DEC 1957

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director

[Redacted]

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Mr. David Sarnoff's Letter to
the Director, dated 26 November 1957

Attached is a proposed reply from the Director to
Mr. David Sarnoff.

[Redacted Signature]

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DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief
Psychological and Paramilitary Staff

Attachment

Communication to The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
D/CIA

By: David Sarnoff

Dec 16, 1957

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9-9505/A

December 20, 1957

COPIES

General David Sarnoff
Chairman of the Board
Radio Corporation of America
RCA Building
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

12/3/81

Dear David:

I spent last evening going over with the utmost care your thoughtful letter of December 16, outlining and expanding your program for a political offensive against world communism.

I wish you to know that I feel this supplement to your earlier statements on the subject is of the utmost use to us and I am having it carefully studied here. It was good of you, with all you have on your hands, to give this quick and effective response to my letter, and I shall be in touch with you later.

With all best wishes for Christmas and the New Year. We can share the wish that in this year we will be able to develop our resources more effectively for the common objectives we have in mind.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

December 16, 1957

Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, North West
Washington, D. C.

12/31/81

Dear Allen:

I acknowledge, with thanks, your letter of December 7.

The questions you pose are so fundamental and sweeping that I can hardly hope to answer them adequately in this communication. But, as you know, I have tried to provide some of the answers in the past. On April 5, 1955, I submitted to the White House a Memorandum* titled -- "A Program for a Political Offensive Against World Communism," which you were generous enough to commend at the time. I returned to the subject thereafter in several speeches.

More than two and a half years have intervened, but whatever validity the Memorandum had at that time, it seems to me, has been underlined by events since then. Let's take a look at the record.

* Copy of the Memorandum attached hereto.

As you are aware, I have always contended that effective conduct of the Cold War, on dimensions geared to victory, cannot be superimposed on national policy which is not geared to the same objective. It makes logic only as it reflects or implements a basic national policy.

Political warfare on a scale to match the enemy's requires, first of all, a far-reaching decision: to undermine the power of world communism to the point where it ceases to be a threat to freedom on this earth. The enemy operates on the equivalent decision, made long ago. His inflexible purpose, to weaken and ultimately to dominate the world, is inherent in Communist dogma. As I put it in the Memorandum:

"We must be quite certain of our destination before we begin to figure out means of transportation. There is little point in discussing the how of it until a firm decision for an all-out political-psychological counter-offensive is reached."

The gist of that new policy or dedication (and its formulation is a critical first step), I wrote, "is that America has decided, irrevocably, to win the Cold War; that its ultimate aim is, in concert with all peoples, to cancel out the destructive power of Soviet-based Communism."

To which I added:

"Once that decision is made, some of the means for implementing it, will become self-evident; others will be explored and developed under the impetus of the clear-cut goal. Agreement on the problem must come before agreement on the solution."

In scientific and technological research, the goal is clearly envisioned long before we know how it will be reached. Establishment of a clear objective is what forces us to think and plan in the direction calculated to reach our objective.

The decision to make a new, ambitious free-world commitment is, I believe, the indispensable condition for its fulfillment. A true Cold War offensive is foredoomed to futility if, on other levels, the free world remains obsessed by negative policies of compromise, accommodation, modus vivendi, stalemate -- in short, purposes inherently at variance with the strategy and posture of a serious offensive.

Our guiding objectives, I wrote in the Memorandum, would have to include the following:

1. To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the spirit of resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and sovereignty. If we allow that hope to expire, the Kremlin will have perpetuated its dominion over its victims.
2. To break the awful sense of isolation in which the internal enemies of the Kremlin live—by making them aware that, like the revolutionists in Tsarist times, they have devoted friends and powerful allies beyond their frontiers.
3. To sharpen by every device we can develop the fear of their own people that is already chronic in the Kremlin. The less certain the Soviets are of the allegiance of their people, the more they will hesitate to provoke adventures involving the risks of a major show-down.

4. To provide moral and material aid, including trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resistance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia proper.

5. To make maximum use of the fugitives from the Soviet sphere, millions in the aggregate, now living in free parts of the world.

6. To appeal to the simple personal yearnings of those under the Communist yoke: release from police terror, ownership of small farms and homes, free trade unions to defend their rights at the job, the right to worship as they please, the right to change residence and to travel, etc.

7. To shatter the "wave of the future" aura around Communism, displacing the assumption that "Communism is inevitable" with a deepening certainty that "the end of Communism is inevitable."

8. To inspire millions in the free countries with a feeling of moral dedication to the enlargement of the area of freedom, based on repugnance to slave labor, coerced atheism, purges and the rest of the Soviet horrors.

To compass objectives of this order calls for a revision of thinking and attitude that will enable us to accept at least the following points (and again I am citing the Memorandum):

1. The struggle by means short of general war is not a preliminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the loser may not have a second chance.

2. It must therefore be carried on with the same focused effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willingness to accept costs and casualties, that a Hot War would involve.

3. In order to establish credence and inspire confidence, our conduct must be consistent. Our philosophy of freedom must embrace the whole of mankind; it must not stop short at the frontiers of the Soviet sphere. Only this can give our side a moral grandeur, a revolutionary *elan*, a crusading spirit not only equal to but superior to the other side's.

4. We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as *enemy-occupied* territory, with the lifting of the occupation as the over-all purpose of freedom-loving men everywhere. This applies not only to areas captured since the war, but includes Russia itself. Any other policy would turn what should be an anti-Communist alliance into an *anti-Russian* alliance, forcing the Russians (as Hitler forced them during the war) to rally around the regime they hate.

5. The fact that the challenge is global must be kept clearly in view. Red guerillas in Burma, Communists in France or the U. S., the Huks in the Philippines, Red agents in Central America — these are as much "the enemy" as the Kremlin itself.

6. We must realize that world Communism is *not* a tool in the hands of Russia — Russia is a tool in the hands of world Communism. Repeatedly Moscow has sacrificed national interests in deference to world-revolutionary needs. This provides opportunities for appeals to Russian patriotism.

7. Though the Soviets want a nuclear war no more than we do, they accept the risk of it in pushing their political offensive. We, too, cannot avoid risks. (It might become necessary, Mr. Dulles said recently, "to forego peace in order to secure the blessings of liberty.") The greatest risk of all, for us, is to do less than is needed to win the Cold War. At worst that would mean defeat by default; and at best, a situation so menacing to the survival of freedom that a Hot War may become inevitable.

Having formulated these bedrock principles, I added a warning which, alas, is more pertinent today than it was in April 1955:

Our present lead in the possession of nuclear weapons and the ability to use them may be matched by the Communists in the next few years. This is the view expressed by competent statesmen, scientists and military experts. If and when nuclear parity is reached, the enemy's fanatics (and there may be a powerful madman — a Hitler — among them) might be tempted to use them against us by throwing a sneak punch. Since our policy is not to throw the first nuclear punch but only to retaliate if it is thrown against us, we may find as more horror-weapons are unfolded, that to yield to the enemy the initiative of the first offensive punch, is tantamount to national suicide. All this further emphasizes the vital need for winning the Cold War and preventing a Hot War.

About nine months later (January 26, 1956), in an address to the National Security Industrial Association, I tried to underline that point:

"It would be folly for us to take too lightly the warning by Soviet Premier Bulganin, only a few weeks ago, that 'rocket missiles which have been developed, particularly over the past few years, are becoming intercontinental weapons.' This long-range missile -- the so-called ICBM -- carrying a cargo of nuclear devastation, is expected to be able to leap the Atlantic in a matter of minutes.

"For the sake of our own security and the survival of our civilization, we dare not permit the Kremlin to acquire even a temporary monopoly of such horror weapons. The Moscow leaders would not hesitate to exploit the advantage in order to blackmail the rest of the world. Not necessarily the use of these weapons, but the mere threat of their use could serve the Soviets' purposes in the Cold War they wage so relentlessly."

And again on that occasion, I stressed the urgent need to fight and win the political struggle, and quoted from President Eisenhower's State of the Union message his impressive statement about -- "The waging of peace with as much resourcefulness, with as great a sense of dedication and urgency, as we have ever mustered in defense of our country in time of war. "

Advocacy of intensified political-psychological warfare, I am sure you understand, implies no criticism of existing agencies. In the nature of the case, U.S.I.A., V.O.A., C.I.A., the State Department itself must operate within the limitations of current policy -- not only American but free-world policy. No matter how brilliant the successes of this or that agency, they still remain within the bounds of the dominant policy and therefore short of the larger goal.

In this connection I italicized the following passage about methods and techniques in the Cold War:

"We should recognize that many of them are already being used, and often effectively. Nothing now under way needs to be abandoned. The problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity -- all geared to the long-range objectives of the undertaking. The expanded offensive with non-military weapons must be imbued with a new awareness of the great goal and the robust will to reach it."

Anyone who has followed carefully Mr. Khrushchev's frequent expressions of view in talking to outsiders must be impressed by one element that runs through them. I refer to his anxiety that we "call off the Cold War" -- by which he means, of course, that we stop broadcasting behind the Iron Curtain, stop appealing over his head to his subjects, et cetera, thereby giving the Kremlin, through its world-wide apparatus, a monopoly of such activities.

A recent issue of NEWSWEEK alludes to a talk with Ambassador Thompson in which Khrushchev made three conditions for improved relations with the U.S.A. The third was normalized trade. But the other two were (1) recognition that his frontiers are unchangeable, and (2) the end of "capitalist interference in the affairs of Communist states."

Bob Considine, who was with William Randolph Hearst on his recent visit to the USSR, wrote from Moscow on November 24, 1957, "Khrushchev offered to give the plans of Russia's sputnik-launching ICBM to the United States if America ends what he calls the prosecution of the Cold War." On an earlier occasion Khrushchev demanded that the United States recognize the "historic changes" in Eastern Europe and stop relying on some "internal forces" to change the situation.

This persistent note leaves no margin for doubt that internal security and internal oppositions are the over-riding preoccupations of the Soviet regime. It means that even our inadequate and unsystematic Cold War measures have the Kremlin deeply worried; that Moscow would pay, or pretend to pay, a high price for an American undertaking to "lay off" his subjects and acknowledge the Communist empire as permanent and irreversible.

It seems to me that Khrushchev's revealed anxiety is the best evidence we could have on the importance of our intensifying Cold War measures. I am fully aware, of course, that such a basic decision and its implementation if it were made, are largely outside the responsibility of your particular agency. I call attention to it, however, because the broad scope of the questions in your letter obviously go beyond the direct responsibility of the C. I. A.

Let me address myself now to your specific questions. The first asks for "the most important vulnerabilities" indicated by "elements of tension" within Communist societies. Here is what I previously said under this head in the Memorandum:

The free world, under the impact of Moscow's Cold War victories, has tended to fix attention on Soviet strengths while overlooking or discounting Soviet weaknesses.

The Communists expertly exploit all our internal tensions, injustices and discontents. Yet within the Soviet empire the tensions are incomparably greater, the injustices and discontents more vast. Our opportunity, which we have failed to use so far, is to exploit these in

production. Nations which used to be exporters of bread (Hungary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for

The nature of a ~~malady~~ can be deduced from the medicine applied. In its fourth decade of absolute power, the Soviet regime is obliged to devote a major portion of its energies, manpower and resources to keep its own subjects and captive countries under control, through ever larger doses of terror. There we have the proof that the Communists have failed to "sell" their system to their victims.

Even a ruthless police-state does not maintain gigantic secret-police forces, special internal security armies, colossal networks of forced-labor colonies just for the fun of it. These are measures of self-defense against actual or potential internal oppositions. After all discounts are made for wishful thinking and error, ample evidence remains that in the Soviet sphere the West has millions of allies, tens of millions of potential allies.

Whether the potential can be turned into actuality, whether the will to resist can be kept alive and inflamed to explosive intensity, depend in the first place on the policies of the non-Soviet world. Our potential fifth columns are greater by millions than the enemy's. But they have yet to be given cohesion, direction and the inner motive power of hope and expectation of victory.

No one knows whether, let alone when, the internal Soviet stresses can reach a climax in insurrectionary breaks. It would be frivolous to count on such a climax. But we have everything to gain by promoting a spirit of mutiny, to keep the Kremlin off balance, to deepen existing rifts, to sharpen economic and empire problems for them.

For the purposes of our Cold War strategy it suffices that the potential for uprisings exists. Soviet economic conditions are bad, particularly in the domain of food

production. Nations which used to be exporters of bread (Hungary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for themselves. As Secretary of Agriculture Benson said recently: "Failure of the Soviet system to provide for the basic needs of its own people could be one of the most important historical facts of our time."

The Soviet peasants, still the overwhelming majority of the Kremlin-held populations, are everywhere bitter and restive. The Politburo knows that it cannot count implicitly upon the loyalty and allegiance of its subjects. At the same time it has failed utterly to assimilate the captive countries, so that it has no allies but only sullen colonial puppets.

In the last war the USSR fought on two fronts— against the foreign invaders and against its own people. There is reason to believe that Hitler's psychological blunders, in insulting and alienating the Russian peoples, helped save the Stalin regime from destruction by its own subjects. In the present Cold War, too, the USSR must maintain its fight against the Soviet citizenry, and at the same time deal with seething dissidence in the subjected countries.

The basic conditions for successful Cold War counter-strategy thus exist.

This was written, of course, before Khrushchev's "secret speech" against Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress; before the Poznan riots; before the Polish and Hungarian revolutions; before the striking evidence of intellectual ferment in all the other satellite states and in Soviet Russia itself. Those events have underscored my statement and, I feel, given it more weight. In any case, it's possible today to sharpen the inventory of vulnerabilities. At the risk of some duplication, let me list a few, without detail, since you will know at once the factors I have in mind:

1. The monolithic unity of the Soviet empire has been damaged beyond repair by Polish and Hungarian events, restlessness in other satellites, the ambiguity of Tito's conduct. Moscow's political authority is no longer taken for granted; it must be reasserted (as in the recent Moscow statement which Yugoslavia didn't sign), patched and defended. Even the Kremlin's ideological primacy is challenged at points by Red China.

2. Nationalist sentiment has intensified among the non-Russian minorities -- the Ukraine, Georgia, et cetera -- in Soviet Russia proper. Moscow's increasing attacks on what it calls "bourgeois nationalism" in the non-Russian areas amount to an admission of this weakness.

3. The ferments among Soviet youth, especially the students, have increased and found more open expression. Traditionally in Russia, movements of popular revolt have had their focus in the universities and the pattern seems to be repeating itself.

4. Soviet intellectuals are demanding more mental and creative freedom. Again it's in the traditional Russian pattern; the intelligentsia is once more the conscience of the country, compelled by subjective pressures to come to the aid of the oppressed populace.

5. The new technical and managerial personnel are pressing for more initiative and autonomy. This is generally recognized as a vital element in the struggle for power: Malenkov has tried to make himself the spokesman for that class. Malenkov failed but that doesn't cancel out the class and its potential.

6. Peasant resistance to the Communist system is as strong as ever. The peasantry remains sullen and uncooperative, resisting every attempt to turn it into "farm proletarians." The Kremlin does not even pretend that it commands the loyalty of the village masses.

7. Soviet economy is unbalanced and in a constant state of unacknowledged crisis. Even while Sputniks circled our globe, Khrushchev has had to admit acute inadequacy of food, clothes, housing, consumer goods generally -- the admission implicit in his promises that these things will be available by 1960, in a decade, depending on his temperature of optimism.

8. The struggle for power within the dictatorship remains as sharp and as debilitating as ever in the past. The much touted "collective leadership" has proved a dud. In the absence of legality, intrigue and plotting - - the kind that ousted Marshall Zhukov recently -- in the final analysis decide the shape of the leadership.

9. Both inside the Soviet sphere and in the world at large, Communism has lost its original glamor and appeal. In your own recent words: "The initial ideological fervor is seeping out of the international Communist movement, particularly in the Soviet Union." Non-Soviet intellectuals by the thousand have been deserting the Communist fold. Books like Milovan Djilas' "The New Class" and Howard Fast's "The Naked God," aside from their direct value, are telltale symptoms of a trend,

10. Most important, after 40 years, the Soviet regime has failed to win the allegiance of its subjects. It dare not, in a genuine sense, relax the inner tensions, let alone dismantle the machinery of secret-police control. It must continue to divert major manpower and energy to endless internal propaganda and indoctrination. In short, it cannot count on the automatic loyalty and obedience of its people.

11. There are striking contradictions between Soviet Russia's modern technology and its medieval political despotism; between the need to create an educated class for its technology and the compulsion to impose thought control; between the spectacular achievements in science and the continuing wretchedness in everyday living standards.

This, of course, does not exhaust the inventory. Every one of these vulnerabilities and all of them taken together provide endless opportunities for exploitation in terms of the Cold War, in line with the bedrock principles I cited earlier. No one would claim that we have made the utmost use of those opportunities or, for that matter, that we have developed the organizational mechanism for exploring and implementing such potentials.

Still in the context of vulnerabilities, let me quote a pertinent passage from the brilliant article by John Foster Dulles (Foreign Affairs, October 1957). Having summed up Russia's hostile and mischievous policies, he added:

"We need not, however, despair. International Communism is subject to change even against its will. It is not impervious to the erosion of time and circumstance. Khrushchev's speech of February 1956, the July 1957 shake-up in the ruling clique at Moscow, and Mao's speech of February 27, 1957, indicate that even in Russia and the China mainland Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes are confronted with grave internal pressures and dilemmas. The yeast of change is at work, despite all the efforts of 'democratic centralism' to keep matters moving in a strictly Leninist pattern.

The rulers of Russia do not find it possible to combine industrial and military modernization with the personal repressions of the Middle Ages; and the rulers of China will not find it possible to fit the richly diversified culture of the Chinese into a Communist mold of conformity."

In recent years the free world has reaped a good many vital Cold War successes -- among them those to which the Secretary of State refers. But candor compels us to recognize that we did not do the plowing and the sowing. In no instance are they the direct result of our policies and actions. Often, as in the Polish and Hungarian events, they came despite us and as complete surprises.

On the other hand, the Cold War failures -- such as the psychological blow struck by the Sputniks, our tragic lack of readiness to aid the Hungarians, the frustrations deriving from our inability to give even token aid in that crisis -- are the direct consequence of free-world inadequacy in the understanding and prosecution of the Cold War.

The Kremlin clearly foresaw the psychological impact of being first with an earth satellite and it planned accordingly. Had we been committed to fighting and winning the ideological contest, we too would have foreseen it and channeled effect accordingly.

In relation to Poland, Hungary, et cetera, we were consistently too pessimistic in estimating possibilities of internal resistance and revolt. Press and official comments on those countries in the preceding year proves too clearly that we underestimated the potentials.

It was universally assumed that all sources of resistance had been eliminated by terror; that a new, indoctrinated and loyal generation was being raised; that the Army and the Communists would defend the regimes to the bitter end. And we were wrong on all these counts.

The same kind of defeatism today prevails vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. The forces of potential resistance are recognized but in general undervalued. Yet a study of the Hungarian experience yields significant lessons, of immense value in planning Cold War strategy and tactics. Hungary established:

1. That revolution against a Totalitarian Communist regime is possible. It is no longer the figment of wishful thinking.

2. That such a revolution can be successful. The uprising in Hungary, let it be remembered, did succeed. It had to be crushed by an external force. There is no such external force capable of saving the Soviet regime when and if there is a revolt.

3. That a Communist regime's vast military establishment would not save the Kremlin in a similar crisis. Hungary showed that when the hour for popular uprising is ripe, the soldiers too become people. The size of military forces is irrelevant -- only its mood counts.

4. That the Communist reliance on the indoctrinated young generation, heretofore a fixed point in Leninist dogma, has been washed out.

5. That a new Communist intelligentsia, no matter how carefully shaped in terms of the "new Soviet man," tends to turn against the regime which created it. The traditional role of the educated minority -- to express what the masses feel -- applies under a Communist tyranny no less than it did under a Tsarist autocracy.

I have given so much space to a discussion of vulnerabilities because the answers to your other questions are implicit in every one of them. The existence of a weakness determines the kind and the quantity of strength that should be brought against it.

For example, you ask: "Where would you suggest that the battle be enlarged, in what areas, and on the basis of which particular aspects of the contest might we be able to better identify ourselves to the victims of the Communist efforts as participants in a common cause?"

My answer would be: on all the aspects indicated in the analysis of vulnerabilities. For instance, the intellectual and cultural leaders of the free world should be enabled to make manifest their understanding of and sympathy for the Soviet and satellite intelligentsia. All media of communications should be made available for this purpose, and our best brains brought to bear on the problem of creating new channels of contact. The knowledge that their plight is appreciated, that their strivings are in line with civilized opinion in the outer world, that they are not wholly isolated, will tend to raise the morale of these elements in the Soviet world and fortify their courage to resist.

At this point let me direct your attention to Chapters V and VI of the Memorandum, where some of the answers to your questions are spelled out in detail. The specific proposals seem to me even more pertinent today than they were in 1955.

V

TOWARD COLD WAR VICTORY

1. ORGANIZATION:

An organizational framework for fighting the Cold War already exists. It needs to be adjusted and strengthened in line with the expanded scale and intensity of operations.

A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military side, is suggested. It should function directly under the President, with Cabinet status for its Head. Top representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U. S. Information Agency, should sit on this Board. Liaison on a continuous basis should be maintained with all other agencies which can play a role in the over-all effort.

There will be various operations which the Board would undertake in its own name, with its own facilities. But its primary function should not be operational. It should be to plan, initiate, finance, advise, coordinate and check on operations by other groups and agencies, whether already in existence or created by the Board for specific undertakings.

One cannot, however, be too specific at this point about the organizational forms. John Foster Dulles wrote in 1948:

"We need an organization to contest the Communist Party at the level where it is working and winning its victories. . . . We ought to have an organization dedicated to the task of non-military defense,

just as the present Secretary of Defense heads up the organization of military defense. The new department of non-military defense should have an adequate personnel and ample funds."

2. FINANCING:

On the matter of funds, likewise, one cannot at this stage offer specific estimates. But let us recall that appropriations over the past four years for our Military Defense averaged approximately 45 billion dollars annually. *In contrast, it is significant to note that for the fiscal year 1955 the total appropriation for the U. S. Information Agency was 79 million dollars, of which 17 million dollars is available for the world-wide activities of the Voice of America.*

As a working hypothesis it is suggested that a specific and more realistic ratio between military and non-military appropriations be worked out: say an amount equivalent to 5 or 7½ per cent of Military Defense appropriations to be granted to the Strategy Board for Political Defense — this, of course, without reducing the military budget and not counting foreign military aid and Point Four types of expenditure.

I am convinced that if the American people and their Congress are made fully aware of the menace we face, of the urgent need for meeting it, and the possibility of doing so by means short of war, they will respond willingly as they have always done in times of national crisis. They will realize that no investment to win the Cold War is exorbitant when measured against the stakes involved, and against the costs of the bombing war we seek to head off.

3. IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE:

We must go from defense to attack in meeting the political, ideological, subversive challenge. The imple-

mentation of the attack would devolve upon specialists and technicians. In gearing to fight a Hot War, we call in military strategists and tacticians. Likewise, we must have specialists to fight a Cold War.

This implies in the first place the mobilization of hard, knowledgeable anti-Communists who understand the issues and for whom it is not merely a job but a dedication. *The specialist in communications is important; but the message to be communicated is even more important.*

The main weakness of our efforts to date to talk to the masses — and even more so to the elite groups (Army, intelligentsia, etc.) — in the Soviet camp is that we have not always been *consistent* in what we had to say to them. Our message has been vague and subject to change without notice. As long as we regard Communist rule as permanent, we can have no strong psychological bridges to those who are under its yoke. The only free-world goal that is relevant to them is one that envisages their eventual emancipation.

With the formulation of a message, we will at last have something to say that interests *them*, not only *us*, and can devote ourselves to perfecting the means of delivering the message.

Before essaying a breakdown of Cold War methods and techniques, *we should recognize that many of them are already being used, and often effectively. Nothing now under way needs to be abandoned. The problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity — all geared to the long-range objectives of the undertaking. The expanded offensive with non-military weapons must be imbued with a new awareness of the great goal and a robust will to reach it.*

No outline such as follows can be more than indicative. Operations are necessarily related to current developments and opportunities opened up by events.

In all categories the arena of action is the whole globe. Our Cold War targets are not only behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but in every nation, the United States included. *In the battle for the minds of men, we must reach the Soviet peoples, our allies, and the uncommitted peoples.*

The agencies involved will be both official and private. The objectives must aim to *achieve dramatic victories* as swiftly as possible, as a token of the changed state of affairs. While the Kremlin has suffered some setbacks and defeats, its record in the Cold War has been strikingly one of success piled on success. This trend must be reversed, to hearten our friends, dismay the enemy, and confirm the fact that Communist Power is a transient and declining phenomenon.

4. PROPAGANDA:

If the weapon is our Message, one of its basic elements is propaganda. It is the most familiar element, but we should not underestimate its inherent difficulties. Hot War is destructive: the killing of people, the annihilation of material things. Cold War must be constructive: it must build views, attitudes, loyalties, hopes, ideals and readiness for sacrifice. *In the final check-up it calls for greater skills to affect minds than to destroy bodies.*

Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end in itself. It is a preparation for action. Words that are not backed up by deeds, that do not generate deeds, lose their impact. The test is whether they build the morale of friends and undermine the morale of foes.

No means of communication should be ignored: the spoken word and the written word; radio and television; films; balloons and missiles to distribute leaflets; secret printing and mimeographing presses on Soviet controlled soil; scrawls on walls to give isolated friends a sense of community.

5. COMMUNIST TARGETS:

The Communist sphere must be ringed with both fixed and mobile broadcasting facilities, of a massiveness to overcome jamming. The Voice of America will acquire larger audiences and more concentrated impact under the new approach. *Its name, it is suggested, should be expanded to "Voice of America — for Freedom and Peace."* This slogan added to the name will, through constant repetition, impress the truth upon receptive ears.

Besides the official voice, we have other voices, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation. There are other popular democratic voices that should make themselves heard: those of our free labor movement, American war veterans, the churches, youth and women's organizations.

Already there is a minor flow of printed matter across the Iron Curtain, especially aimed at the Red occupation forces. The volume and effectiveness of this effort can be enormously enlarged. Magazines and newspapers which outwardly look like standard Communist matter, but actually are filled with anti-Communist propaganda, have brought results.

A greater hunger for spiritual comfort, for religion, is reported from Soviet Russia and its satellites. Programs of a spiritual and religious character are indicated. They should preach faith in the Divine, abhorrence of Communist godlessness, resistance to atheism. But in addition they can offer practical advice to the spiritually stranded — for instance, how to observe religious occasions where there are no ordained ministers or priests to officiate.

The enslaved peoples do not have to be sold the idea of freedom; they are already sold on it. The propaganda should wherever possible get down to specifics. It should expose the weaknesses, failures, follies, hypocrisies and internal tensions of the Red masters; provide proof of

the existence of friends and allies both at home and abroad; offer guidance on types of resistance open even to the individual. It should appeal to universal emotions, to love of family, of country, of God, of humanity.

6. FREE-WORLD TARGETS:

The fighting front is everywhere. The program of the U. S. Information Agency should be reappraised with a view to improvement and expansion. "The Voice of America — for Freedom and Peace" has tasks to perform in many nations of the free world second in importance only to those in the unfree world.

Merely to point up the inadequacy of our present effort, consider Finland — a country on the very edge of the Red empire and under the most concentrated Soviet propaganda barrage. Soviet broadcasts beamed to Finland total over 43 hours weekly. A television station is now being built in Soviet Estonia which will be directed to a million potential viewers in nearby Finland. To maintain their morale under this pressure, the Finnish people, still overwhelmingly pro-West and pro-American, have desperate need of our encouragement. Yet the Voice of America in 1953 was compelled to discontinue its daily half-hour broadcast to Finland to save \$50,000 annually.

We need in every country, newspapers; magazines; radio and TV stations, consciously and effectively supporting our side. Those that exist should be aided materially to increase their range and vitality; others should be started with our help. The strongest individual anti-Communist voices must be provided with better facilities for making themselves heard in their own countries.

Mobile film units are already penetrating backward areas. The operation should be enlarged, its message and appeal perfected. In addition, mobile big-screen television units in black-and-white and in color can carry our message. Their very novelty will guarantee large

and attentive audiences. ~~Vast~~ regions in Asia and elsewhere, where illiteracy bars the written word and lack of radios bars the spoken word, could thus be reached. To quote the Chinese saying: "One picture is worth ten thousand words."

The so-called backward parts of the world, particularly Asia, are under the most concentrated Communist psychological attacks. Of necessity the counter-offensive must take this into account, and develop special techniques for reaching both the masses and the elite of those areas.

7. RADIO RECEIVERS AND PHONOGRAPHS:

Mass production of cheap and light-weight receivers tuned to pick up American signals are now feasible. They should be made available by the million at cost or gratis, as expedient, to listeners in critical areas and behind the Iron Curtain.

There are millions of persons in the world who do not have electric power receptacles, electron tubes, batteries or any of the electrical and mechanical marvels which the free world has and takes for granted. A simple, hand-operated phonograph device costing no more than a loaf of bread, could be produced in quantities and supplied gratis to millions of persons living behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains and in other critical areas.

An unbreakable and intelligible record, made of cardboard and costing less than a bottle of Coca-Cola, could carry our messages to these people. Such records could be dropped from the sky like leaflets and the messages they carried could not be jammed.

8. USE OF FACILITIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES:

Nearly all European and many Asian countries possess broadcasting facilities. We should seek to enlist their use to supplement and intensify American broadcasting on a world-wide scale.

In some cases this could be negotiated on a *quid pro quo* basis where we are providing military or economic aid; in other cases we may have to buy the necessary time for transmitting our message. Our friendly allies, such as Great Britain, have vast short-wave facilities of world-wide scope and range and have the same reasons as we have for seeking to win the Cold War. *We need their help in this field. We are fully justified in asking for such help and ought to receive it.*

Propaganda is a large concept. In a sense it includes and exploits all other activities. Its successful use calls for imagination, ingenuity, continual technical research and, of course, effective coordination with all other operations that bear on the problems of the Cold War.

9. PASSIVE RESISTANCE:

Pending the critical periods when active resistance in one or another Soviet country is possible and desirable, full encouragement and support must be given to passive resistance. This refers to the things the individual can do, with minimum risk, to create doubt and confusion in the ranks of the dictatorship, to gum up the machinery of dictatorship government.

The worker in the mine and factory, the farmer, the soldier in the barracks, the office worker are able to do little things that in their millionfold totality will affect the national economy and the self-confidence of the rulers. It is the method that comes naturally to captive peoples, especially in countries with a long historical experience in opposing tyrants.

Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful direction. In this concept the individual opponent of the regime becomes a "resistance group of one." He receives, by radio and other channels, specific suggestions and instructions. The tiny drops of resistance will not be haphazard, but calculated to achieve planned results.

Special action programs of the type that do not require large organization — or at most units of two or three — would be worked out and transmitted. Our sympathizers in the Soviet orbit would feel themselves part of an invisible but huge army of crusaders. Symbols of protest would appear on a million walls. The rulers' morale would be deliberately sapped by a multitude of actions too small, too widespread, to be readily dealt with.

The special value of passive resistance, aside from its direct effects, is that it nurtures the necessary feeling of power and readiness for risk and sacrifice that will be invaluable when the passive stage is transformed into more open opposition.

10. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE:

Pockets of guerilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, China, Albania and other areas. There is always the danger of activating them prematurely. But their existence must be taken into the calculations and, in concert with exiles who know the facts, they must be kept supplied with information, slogans and new leadership where needed and prudent.

Many of these resistance groups are so isolated that they do not know of each other's existence. The simple realization that they are not alone but part of a scattered network will be invaluable; methods for establishing liaison, for conveying directions, can be developed.

11. INSURRECTIONS:

The uprisings in East Germany, the strikes and riots in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, the dramatic mutinies inside the concentration camps of Vorkuta in the Soviet Arctic, are examples of revolutionary actions that failed. But they attest that insurrection is possible.

We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's chain of power. The country adjudged ripe for a break-

away should receive concentrated study and planning. A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be a body blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to resistance elsewhere. (That little country is geographically isolated, ruled by a handful of puppets; able leadership is available in the Albanian emigration.)

Eastern Germany is among the weakest links. Its revolt would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and Poland. The time to prepare for such actions is now — whether the time to carry them out be in the near or distant future. Meanwhile we must not allow the Soviet propoganda to make unification appear as the Communist's gift to the Germans. It is a natural asset that belongs to West Germany and her allies.

12. COLLABORATION WITH EMIGRES AND ESCAPEES:

Tens of thousands of self-exiled fugitives from Communist oppression emerge eager to plunge into movements for the freeing of their homelands. When they fail to find outlets for their zeal, disillusionment and defeatism set in.

Maximum exploitation of this manpower and moral passion is indicated. They must be drawn into specific, well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist organizations and activities; utilized for propaganda and other operations; enabled, in some cases, to return to their native lands as "sleeper" leaders for future crises.

Officers' corps of emigres can be formed: perhaps groups of only a score to a hundred, but available for emergency and opportunity occasions. The existence of such nuclei of military power — a fact that will be widely known — should help generate hope and faith among their countrymen back home.

13. PLANNED DEFECTION:

Escapees have come, and will continue to come, spontaneously, now in trickles, other times in rivers. Beyond

that the need is to stimulate defection on a selective basis. Individual "prospects" in Soviet missions and delegations, in Red cultural and sports delegations, can be carefully contacted and developed. Types of individuals needed to man Cold War undertakings will be invited to escape, assured of important work. Special approaches can be worked out to encourage defection of border guards, Army officers, secret-police personnel disgusted by their bloody chores, scientists, important writers, etc.

Escapees today are often disheartened by their initial experience. They are taken into custody by some foreign Intelligence Service, pumped for information, and sometimes then left to shift for themselves. Their honest patriotism is offended by the need to cooperate with foreigners before they are psychologically ready for it.

It is suggested that emigre commissions be set up, composed of trusted nationals of the various countries. The fugitive would first be received by the commission of his own countrymen. Only when found desirable and prepared for the step, would he be brought into contact with American or British agencies.

14. TRAINING OF CADRES:

The immediate and prospective activities of the Cold War offensive will require ever larger contingents of specialized personnel for the many tasks; to provide leadership for resistance operations; to engage in propaganda, subversion, infiltration of the enemy; even to carry on administrative and civic work *after* the collapse of Communist regimes in various countries, in order to stave off chaos.

Already, limited as our political efforts are, there is a shortage of competent personnel. Meanwhile thousands of younger men and women among the emigres are being lost to factories, farms, menial jobs. This amounts to squandering of potentially important human resources.

We need a network of schools and universities devoted to training *cadres* for the Cold War. The objective is not education in a generic sense, but specific preparation for the intellectual, technical, intelligence and similar requirements of the ideological-psychological war.

This training, of course, should not be limited to people from the Soviet areas. A sort of "West Point" of political warfare — analogous to the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow — might be established. Staffed by the ablest specialists obtainable, it would seek out likely young people willing to make the struggle against Communism their main or sole career.

The present "exchange of persons" program is clearly valuable. Hundreds of foreign students go back home with a better and friendlier understanding of America. But beyond that, it is possible and necessary to educate invited young people from abroad, carefully selected, along lines of more direct and specialized value to the Cold War effort.

In a sense these shock troops of democracy would be like the "professional revolutionaries" on the Communist side. They would be equipped to operate openly or as secret infiltrators wherever the enemy's assaults need to be neutralized. Trained anti-Communists from Asian areas, dedicated and knowledgeable, would be available for countries under Red pressure, as today in Southeast Asia; Latin Americans, Europeans, would serve similar functions in their respective regions.

Thus, from a largely amateur enterprise, our counter-offensive would gradually be transformed into a professional undertaking.

15. CAMPAIGNS BY SPECIAL GROUPS:

An American trade union in the clothing field played a major role in preventing Communist victory in the Italian elections in 1948. The International Confedera-

tion of Free Trade Unions (in which both the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. are active) is conducting important psychological drives in many countries and offsetting the mischief worked by the Moscow-controlled labor international.

Speaking as workers to workers, trade unionists have a legitimate approach to the laboring masses in the Soviet sphere. They have a special justification for exposing and publicizing forced labor, onerous laboring conditions and laws, phony totalitarian "trade unions."

In many countries — France and Italy, for instance — there are competing Communist-controlled and democratic unions. Free labor of all countries can throw its moral and material support to the anti-Communist federations. It can take the lead in breaking Moscow's grip on influential segments of world labor.

Corresponding political campaigns should be mounted on a telling scale by other non-official, popular groups: farmers' organizations and peasant unions would concentrate on the evils of Red collectivization; great church groups on the immoral and atheistic aspects of Communist theory and practice; youth organizations on the perversion of youth under Communism, etc.

The scope of such focussed group and class appeals is enormous. Some of them are being made already, but without the coordination of effort and continuity of impact that is called for.

What a specialized group can achieve has been demonstrated by the society of Free Jurists in West Berlin, which indicts and condemns *in absentia* persons guilty of Communist crimes. Its work is sowing the fear of retribution in East Germany. Radio Free Europe has made successful forays of the same order — identifying brutal officials, exposing Red agents, etc. But the surface has only been scratched in this type of psychological pressure.

VI

DIPLOMACY IS A WEAPON

The Kremlin treats foreign affairs as a primary arena of ideological and psychological effort. It makes moves on the diplomatic chessboard for their propaganda impact: to rally its friends in the outside world, to win over a particular element in some country, to embarrass its opponents. In the measure that democratic diplomacy fails to do likewise, it is defaulting in a vital area of the Cold War. Let us bear in mind:

1. Day to day conduct of foreign affairs is pertinent to the struggle for men's minds. The rigid observance of protocol, in dealing with an enemy who recognizes none of the traditional rules, can be self-defeating. We must make proposals, demands, exposés, publications of official documents, etc. that are carefully calculated to show up the true motives of the Kremlin, to put a crimp in Moscow political campaigns, to mobilize world opinion against Soviet crimes and duplicities.

For ten years we have made one-shot protests against Soviet election frauds in satellite countries, against violations of treaties and agreements, against shocking crimes in the areas of Human Rights as defined by the U.N. Charter. The archives are packed with these documents. These should be followed up through consistent publicity, renewed protests, etc.

Even when nothing practical can be immediately accomplished, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggressions, violations of Yalta, Potsdam and other agreements must be kept continually before the world. Diplomacy must champion the victims of Red totalitarianism without let-up. At every opportunity the spokesmen of free

nations should address themselves to the people in the Soviet empire over the heads of their masters; to the people of free countries in terms of universal principles of morality and decency.

2. The measures of reciprocity should be strictly applied to Soviet diplomats, trade and other representatives. These should enjoy no more privileges, immunities, access to information than is accorded to free-world representatives in Communist lands. Even socially they should be made aware of their status as symbols of a barbarous plexus of power. The desire to belong, to be respectable, is by no means alien to Red officialdom.

3. Economic leverages, too, must be applied. Trade can be turned into a powerful political weapon. The stakes are too high to permit business-as-usual concepts to outweigh the imperatives of the Cold War. Where acute distress develops in a Communist country, our readiness to help must be brought to the attention of the people as well as their bosses. If and when food and other relief is offered, it must be under conditions consistent with our objectives — to help the victims, not their rulers.

4. In virtually all countries outside the Communist sphere there are large or small organizations devoted to combatting Communism, at home or abroad or both. There is little or no contact among such groups — no common currency of basic ideas and slogans, no exchange of experience. Without at this stage attempting to set up a world-wide anti-Communist coalition, or Freedom International, we should at least facilitate closer liaison and mutual support among anti-Soviet groupings already in existence.

The above presentation, directly and by inference, is no less relevant to your request for "specific steps... to bring about the failure of what you term Soviet strategy of nibbling and the Communist strategy of intimidation."

An all-out Cold War offensive would of necessity aim to seize the initiative. The "nibbling" and "intimidation" would then increasingly be directed against the Communist world. The Soviet sphere, by reason of increasing internal tensions, would be kept off balance. The more that its energies and preoccupations are turned inward, the less will remain for application outward in their operations of nibbling and intimidation.

The actual loss of some part of the Soviet empire -- if no more than a peripheral satellite like Albania - would be a major psychological victory for our side and for the people in Russia who are against the Soviet dictators. A High Command for political operations, such as I proposed, would determine the most vulnerable portion of the Communist territorial anatomy and concentrate major forces against that segment.

The attitudes summed up in the word "containment" still prevail although the word itself has been abandoned. The battles of the Cold War are either lost by default or fought on our own terrain.

We have left the Communists substantially undisturbed in their own sphere, merely reacting when they act. The task is to initiate actions that oblige the enemy to react, to go on the defensive. We must deepen the tensions already existing in the Soviet orbit, and seek to create new ones. We must convey to the opponents of Communism inside the Communist world a sense of comradeship and moral allies outside.

Finally you ask: "How can the lethargy of the West, if there is in fact such a lethargy, be replaced by a dynamism of mind and spirit sufficient to meet the imperative of the Cold War and the challenge offered by the nibbling successes of World Communism."

Once more, it seems to me, the answers inhere in the policy I am suggesting. There are enormous potential and actual anti-Communist forces in the free world. But their aggregate dynamism has never been mobilized and applied. The very realization that the major nations, under American leadership, have really accepted the Soviet political challenge would activate those forces, imbue them with a sense of mission. It would cancel out the defeatism that today weighs on those most interested in frustrating the Communist bid for total ascendancy.

Consider, for instance, how much could be achieved if the religious and moral potentials of the free world -- in the first place the churches of all religions - were mobilized and systematically directed against Communism, atheism and amoralism.

A veritable crusading spirit could be generated that would not only splinter existing lethargy but could not be kept from reaching the millions on the other side of the curtain who hate and are guilt-ridden because of Communist crimes, terror, slave labor, Godlessness.

Communists, we are told, are spending over two billion dollars a year on Cold War propaganda, and certainly billions more on other phases of their assault on our civilization. They maintain great universities for the training of full-time "agitators" for operations at home and abroad. They invest more on jamming our voices than we spend on those voices.

The very minimum called for is saturation broadcasting of roughly the same dimensions as the enemy's. No war has ever been won by purely defensive strategy -- and the cold struggle is a war. Defeat in that struggle, as I have said repeatedly, "would be as catastrophic and as final as defeat in a shooting war. Whether we freeze to death or burn to death, our civilization would be equally finished."

Professor Robert Straus-Hupé recently wrote -- "The very gravity of the decision of making war in the nuclear age enhances the role of ideological warfare." Our obligation, he went on, is "to break down the false images of Communism, to expose its inherent contradictions, to reveal its fraudulent contentions and, on the other hand, present the overwhelming positive sides of our society."

But, coming back to my starting point, that kind of assignment cannot be carried out unless the free-world makes it a matter of urgent policy, entitled to priorities in every department of life. It implies the renunciation of pleasant self-delusions about some magical "liberalization" of the Soviet beast; of some clever gadget that will end the Cold War and freeze the world permanently into half-free half-slave sections. It calls for leadership through organization of top-level authority, and for coordination of anti-Communist forces outside government in all free nations.

A thirty-six page letter should end with an apology for its length. But your questions are so broad in character and scope that I am conscious as I am about to sign off, that I have not covered the subject as fully as it deserves. So, I offer you instead my apologies for its brevity.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



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**PROGRAM FOR A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE
AGAINST WORLD COMMUNISM**

A MEMORANDUM BY DAVID SARNOFF

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INTRODUCTION

Our best and surest way to prevent a Hot War is to win the Cold War. Individual democratic leaders have long been aware of this truth, but it has not yet been fully grasped by the free world.

Because the label is of recent coinage, many people assume that the Cold War is a new phenomenon. Actually it has been under way ever since the Bolsheviks, entrenched in Russia and disposing of its resources, launched the Third or Communist International.

World Communism has been making war on our civilization for more than three decades. And the term "war" is not used here in a merely rhetorical sense. It has been a war with campaigns and battles, strategy and tactics, conquests and retreats. Even the postwar years, it should be noted, have seen Red retreats—in Greece, Iran, Berlin, for instance—as well as victories; but such retreats have occurred only when the West acted awarely and boldly.

I

HOW THE COMMUNISTS
WAGE COLD WAR

There have been intervals of truce in the Cold War but not of true peace. Periods of seeming Communist moderation have been used as a cover for frantic build-ups and deployments for the next big push. There has not been a single year when the Kremlin did not, with single-minded concentration, make the most of its opportunities by methods short of general war.

Not a single country today under Communist rule was conquered by outright military assault. Russia itself fell to the Bolsheviks through a political *coup*, after other parties had overthrown the old regime. The East European satellites were placed behind the Iron Curtain by cunning diplomacy and brute extortion. China was joined to the Soviet sphere by "rear operations" performed from inside.

It is useful to break down Moscow's political-psychological techniques for easier observation. But it should be remembered that they are all inextricably intermeshed, that they are stepped up or soft-pedalled as required, that they are supplemented with physical force and the menace of such force according to circumstances. The listing that follows is therefore overlapping.

1. PROPAGANDA:

The massive use of all media of communications by the Soviet Government, its puppet governments, local Communist parties, and by ostensibly independent groups under Moscow control or influence, is vast but impossible to measure.

In 1948 Soviet broadcasting to foreign targets totalled 528 hours per week. By 1954 this figure was increased

to 1,675 hours. In addition, the Soviet news agency "Tass" broadcasts 121 hours *daily* to the foreign press. By comparison, the Voice of America broadcasts only 716 hours a week.

It is estimated that over 1,000 Soviet transmitters are engaged in "jamming" our signals. The Kremlin spends more for jamming it than we spend on all operations of the Voice of America. The Soviet and satellite expenditures in all types of foreign propaganda cannot be accurately gauged—nearly everything Communists do has a propaganda content—but these costs run into billions of dollars annually.

Printed matter in tremendous quantities pours out of the USSR into the non-Soviet world. Several large publishing houses in Moscow and elsewhere do nothing else but feed this flood. Besides, the Kremlin operates a chain of large publishing enterprises on foreign soil. Their Red tide of books, pamphlets, reports, posters, etc. inundates the world.

In nearly every non-Soviet country and region there are newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations, either overtly under pro-Communist control or in "liberal" disguises. These speak in local tongues—but the voice is Moscow's. In addition, thousands of Kremlin-oriented individual writers, commentators, editors, and trained propagandists are smuggled into strategic non-Communist spots to plug the current Moscow lines.

All available forums, from the United Nations to cultural and sports gatherings, are exploited to advance the battle for men's minds.

Special emphasis is given in Communist plans to what is called the "propaganda of acts"—strikes, riots, demonstrations, mass meetings in support of Soviet objectives or in protest against local policies distasteful to the Soviets, and contrived events of every kind.

Soviet films are rated high in the Communist propaganda plans. Pure entertainment in films, of course, is almost non-existent. The result is that any and all pictures made in the Soviet sphere, however disguised as art, contain a "message" which contributes to their cumulative effort to brainwash the non-Soviet world.

2. INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION:

Through Communists, fellow-travelers and assorted sympathizers, there is a systematic "colonization" of governments, labor unions, educational and scientific institutions and social organizations. The goal is to weaken the infiltrated bodies or to use their leverage to influence public opinion and official policy in the Kremlin's direction; to undermine traditions and subvert loyalties which block the road to Communist thinking.

In the infiltration of government agencies, espionage is by no means the chief purpose. Far more important to the Soviets is the subtle pressure an infiltrator can bring to bear upon the shaping of national policy and the influencing of national moods. The theft of secret documents is routine. The subversion of a government's self-interest, the sowing of disunity, the careful sabotage of policies unfavorable to Soviet interests—these require and receive more polished methods.

3. FIFTH COLUMNS AND FALSE FRONTS:

Communist Parties, whether legal or proscribed, are the primary fifth column. They function under direct instructions from Moscow headquarters, usually under leaders assigned from outside.

But this is the beginning, not the end, of the apparatus of power reaching into every corner of the free world. Innumerable committees, congresses, leagues are set up—outwardly devoted to legitimate and even noble causes like peace, race equality, anti-fascism, but actu-

ally controlled and manipulated by Communists for strictly Communist objectives.

These false-front outfits are spawned continually, discarded when their purpose has been served. In the United States, where this technique has been widely practiced, they have run into scores. Every new situation produces its organizational instrument. At times a front started for one purpose is shifted overnight to its opposite: thus fronts for keeping America out of the war during the life of the Moscow-Berlin pact were converted into fronts for putting America into the war after the Germans attacked Soviet Russia.

Besides creating these fifth-column devices, the Communists also are expert at "capturing" organizations started by others. By joining some existing society or committee, acting as a disciplined minority bound by caucus decisions, a dozen persons have frequently succeeded in taking effective control of organizations with thousands of members.

4. SABOTAGE AND TERROR:

The use of these weapons in time of war is familiar, but its systematic use in peace-time is the great Communist innovation. In all free countries the main targets of infiltration are defense industries, communications, transport and police systems—all of which offer ample opportunity for mischief affecting a nation's security. Strikes at strategic points and strategic times, as well as overt physical sabotage, can slow up a country's preparations for defense or actual war-making capacity.

In regions where it is useful and feasible, the Communists do not disdain raw terror: incendiarism, kidnapping, assassination. A special research section of the MVD (Soviet secret police) is devoted to developing murder weapons, poisons and the like.

5. CIVIL STRIFE:

Internal discontents and economic crises are stimulated and then systematically exploited to produce inner disunity, chaos and actual civil insurrection. Guerilla forces under professional military leaders are frequently reinforced by "volunteers" from outside.

Para-military formations, underground organizations of every variety in line with local conditions and opportunities, are standard techniques. Genuine grievances are channeled and exploited through local "nationalist" or "anti-colonial" and "anti-imperialist" movements, either started by the Communists or infiltrated and captured.

6. PREPARATION OF "CADRES":

In Soviet Russia and now in its colonial states there are schools and universities of revolution. Students, drawn from all countries, are taught the theory and practice of political warfare, sabotage, guerilla operations, propaganda methods.

Virtually all heads of Red Satellite states and insurrectionary movements in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America are products of such institutions. Tito, Dictator of Yugoslavia; Ho Chi Minh, number one Communist of Indo-China; Rakosi, the top leader in Red Hungary; Bierut, President of Red Poland; Liu Shao-Chi, Vice President of Communist China, and General Liu Po-Cheng, one of the foremost military leaders of Red China. The same is true of many leaders of Communist Parties in non-Soviet countries.

The job of preparing *cadres* to implement the Cold War and to provide generalship for civil conflicts and other revolutionary actions has been going on since the 1920's. Even during the last war, while the Kremlin ostensibly was on terms of friendship with its allies, the

training of leaders for revolutions in the allied countries was not slackened.

7. PREPARATION OF RESERVES:

The Communist high command does not depend only on the faithful Communists. It attaches great value to its peripheral "reserves"—groups of sympathizers or innocent collaborators willing to travel along the Communist road part of the distance. These are mobilized and brainwashed through the false-front organizations, United and Peoples Fronts, the spread (as required) of pacifist or neutralist sentiment, doctrines of class struggle, belief in the "inevitable" collapse of capitalism and free societies.

In advanced countries like the United States, Britain, France, some segments of the so-called "intelligentsia" have proved especially vulnerable to Communist indoctrination. Not only their self-doubts and frustrations but their most generous idealistic instincts have been canalized and perverted to promote victory for the Soviets in the Cold War.

The turnover in these "reserves" is of course high. Fellow-travelers by the thousand are likely to become disillusioned with every new Soviet policy zigzag. But expert manipulation of public opinion serves to retrieve such losses.

8. TREACHEROUS DIPLOMACY:

In its Cold War operations the Kremlin enjoys the advantage of working on two levels—as a conventional State dealing with other states and as a conspiratorial movement embracing the whole globe. In its guise of "just another government" the Politburo can make promises and engagements which world Communism is under orders to violate.

Soviet diplomacy takes full advantage of the moral code and "political naiveté" of some free countries and

especially of their eagerness for peace, sometimes peace at any price. It uses the threat of war as a species of blackmail, and is past master at playing off one country against another. It appeals to the profit motives of competitive economies, and in general exploits what it refers to as the "inner contradictions" of the free world.

It can make the most of amorphous slogans like "peaceful coexistence"—a phrase coined by Lenin, repeatedly used by Stalin and candidly defined in Communist literature as a "tactic" or "stratagem" to gain time, deploy forces, undermine enemy vigilance.

In the arena of foreign relations the Kremlin can blow hot or cold, inflame our fears or our hopes to any required temperature, and use trickery to induce its enemies to drop their guard. Its announcements of policy, negotiations and talk of negotiations, tourists to Red areas, artistic and cultural missions abroad—everything is grist for the Cold War mills.

The Communist high command recognizes no restraints, no rules of fair play, no codes of civilized behavior. It regards its great "historical mission" as a mandate which cancels out traditional values in the relations between man and man or country and country. In pursuance of that commitment it considers any cost in life and substance to be justified. A system of power which has not hesitated to "liquidate" millions of its own citizens cannot be expected to hesitate to wipe out lives anywhere else.

Moscow has brought one-third of the human race under its iron control by means short of a Hot War—by shrewd diplomacy, deception, propaganda, the blackmail of threats, fifth-column subversion, guerilla forces and, where expedient, localized shooting wars. These political and psychological methods—the Cold War—have paid off, at smaller risk and infinitely lower cost than a Hot War would entail.

Accordingly they are being applied without stint to the conquest of the rest of mankind. For world Communism, with its high command in the Kremlin in Moscow, the Cold War is not a temporary or holding operation, nor a prelude to a Hot War. It is the main bout, the decisive offensive, conducted on an unlimited scale, with total victory as its goal.

In a decision of the U. S. Supreme Court (Vol. 339, May 8, 1950) an opinion written by the late Justice Robert H. Jackson stated the case against Communism in language that is clear and penetrating. He said:

"The goal of the Communist Party is to seize powers of government by and for a minority rather than to acquire power through the vote of a free electorate. . . .

"... It purposes forcibly to recast our whole social and political structure after the Muscovite model of police-state dictatorship. It rejects the entire religious and cultural heritage of Western civilization, as well as the American economic and political systems. This Communist movement is a belated counter-revolution to the American Revolution, designed to undo the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and our Bill of Rights, and overturn our system of free, representative self-government.

"Goals so extreme and offensive to American tradition and aspiration obviously could not be attained or approached through order or with tranquility. If, by their better organization and discipline, they were successful, more candid Communists admit that it would be to an accompaniment of violence, but at the same time they disclaim responsibility by blaming the violence upon those who engage in resistance or reprisal. It matters little by whom the first blow would be struck; no one can doubt that an era of

violence and oppression, confiscations and liquidations would be concurrent with a regime of Communism.

“Such goals set up a cleavage among us too fundamental to be composed by democratic processes. Our constitutional scheme of elections will not settle issues between large groups when the price of losing is to suffer extinction. When dissensions cut too deeply, men will fight, even hopelessly, before they will submit. And this is the kind of struggle projected by the Communist Party and inherent in its program.

“ . . .

“Violent and undemocratic means are the calculated and indispensable methods to attain the Communist Party’s goal. . . . In not one of the countries it now dominates was the Communist Party chosen by a free or contestable election; in not one can it be evicted by any election. The international police state has crept over Eastern Europe by deception, coercion, coup d’ etat, terrorism and assassination. Not only has it overpowered its critics and opponents; it has usually liquidated them.”

II

WE DARE NOT LOSE THE COLD WAR

If we ignore these facts, or do not counteract them effectively in good time, we shall lose the Cold War by default. For the United States and other free nations, defeat of this sort would be as catastrophic and as final as defeat in a shooting war. *Whether we freeze to death or burn to death, our civilization would be equally finished.*

Were the Communists willing to settle for a permanently divided world, each half pledged not to interfere with the other, they could readily arrange it. But they are not interested in a stalemate. In the nature of their ideology and world-wide apparatus of action, they must continue to drive relentlessly toward their ultimate objective. They are irrevocably dedicated to *winning* the Cold War. They *prefer* to attain world dominion by non-military means because:

(a) They consider themselves masters of Cold War techniques pitted against those whom they regard as amateurs; their chances of victory seem to them incomparably greater than in a conventional military showdown.

(b) Political warfare does not directly endanger their own territories, industry, manpower and above all, their mechanism of dictatorial power.

(c) Clear-cut victory in the Cold War would give them access to our technology and resources, our great cities and treasures, *intact* and ready for exploitation; whereas a military victory would give them only the ruins of nuclear devastation.

Now as in the past, they proceed in the conviction that they can gain world hegemony by methods that, in the phrase of Leon Trotsky, constitute "neither war nor peace." For Moscow, the real alternative to a nuclear showdown is not "peace" but political-psychological warfare of a magnitude to weaken, demoralize, chip away and ultimately take over what remains of the free world.

III

TO PREVENT A HOT WAR, WE MUST
WIN THE COLD WAR

Political psychological offensives are not new. They have frequently been employed in war-time, to supplement ordinary military action. We used them ourselves in both world wars. Their purpose has been to soften up the enemy's will to resist, to win friends and allies in hostile areas, to drive wedges between belligerent governments and their citizenry.

The democracies are familiar with war-making in the normal military sense and hence do not hesitate to make huge investments and sacrifices in its name. They do not shrink from the prospect of casualties. All of that seems "natural." But they are startled by proposals for effort and risk of such dimensions in the life-and-death struggle with non-military means.

Under these circumstances it has become incumbent upon our leadership to make the country aware that non-military or Cold War is also terribly "real"—that the penalty for losing it will be enslavement.

Hot War is always a possibility. It may come through force of circumstances even if no one wants it. Limited, localized wars are also a continuing threat. Nothing in this memorandum should be construed as a substitute for adequate military vitality. On the contrary, superior physical force in being is the indispensable guarantee for effective non-military procedures.

We must maintain our lead, and accelerate the tempo of progress, in the race for ascendancy in nuclear weapons, guided missiles, air power, early warning systems, electronic know-how, chemical and bacteriological

methods of warfare. We must maintain adequate and well balanced forces for the ground, sea and air. These conventional military forces must be ready and capable of deterring or meeting an outbreak of peripheral or small-scale wars this side of a general showdown. They will be indispensable in a general war, if one should be fought without nuclear weapons. We must stockpile and protect the sources of vital strategic materials.

But short of a blunder that ignites the Third World War which nobody wants, the immediate danger is the debilitating, costly, tense war of nerves that is part of the Cold War. Because there is no immediate sense of overwhelming menace, no thunder of falling bombs and daily casualty figures, we are apt to think of this period as "peace." But it is nothing of the sort.

The primary threat today is political and psychological. That is the active front on which we are losing and on which, unless we reverse the trend, we shall be defeated. Its effects are spelled out in civil wars in parts of Asia, legal Communist Parties of colossal size in some European countries, "nationalist" movements under Communist auspices, "neutralism" and rabid anti-Americanism in many parts of the world—in pressures, that is to say, of every dimension and intensity short of a global shooting war.

Unless we meet this cumulative Communist threat with all the brains and weapons we can mobilize for the purpose, the United States at some point in the future will face the terrifying implications of Cold War defeat. It will be cornered, isolated, subjected to the kind of paralyzing fears that have already weakened the fibre of some technically free nations. We will have bypassed a nuclear war—but at the price of our freedom and independence. I repeat: *we can freeze to death as well as burn to death.*

OUR COUNTER-STRATEGY:

Logically we have no true alternative but to acknowledge the reality of the Cold War and proceed *to turn Moscow's favorite weapons against world Communism*. We have only a choice between fighting the Cold War with maximum concentration of energy, or waiting supinely until we are overwhelmed. Our political counter-strategy has to be as massive, as intensive, as flexible as the enemy's.

We must meet the Cold War challenge in our own household and in the rest of the world, and carry the contest behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. We must seek out and exploit the weak spots in the enemy's armor, just as the Kremlin has been doing to us these 30-odd years. We must make our Truth as effective and more productive than Moscow's Lie.

Our political strategy and tactics should be in terms of a major enterprise, on a scale for victory, with all the inherent risks and costs. We cannot fight this fight with our left hand, on the margin of our energies. We have to bring to its resources, personnel and determination to match the enemy's. This is a case where, as in a military conflict, insufficient force may be as fatal as none at all.

If obliged to make tactical retreats, moreover, we must not bemuse ourselves that they are enduring solutions. To do so would be to disarm ourselves and open ourselves to new and bigger blows. This is a principle of particular importance during intervals when negotiations with Moscow or Peking are being discussed or are in progress.

The question, in truth, is no longer *whether* we should engage in the Cold War. The Soviet drive is forcing us to take counter-measures in any case. The question, rather, is whether we should undertake it with a clear-headed determination to use all means deemed essential,

Our counter-measures and methods must be novel, unconventional, daring and flexible. They must, moreover, be released from the inhibitions of peace-time, since it is peace only in outer forms.

Almost against our will, in point of fact, we have launched more and more Cold War activities. But they have been piecemeal, on an inadequate scale and often without the all-important continuity of action. Worst of all, they have not been geared for total victory, being treated as extras, as harassment operations while hoping against hope that there will be no outbreak of war or that there will be a miraculous outbreak of genuine peace.

Our current posture shares the weakness inherent in all defensive strategy. The hope of a real compromise is a dangerous self-delusion. It assumes that Soviet Russia is a conventional country interested in stabilizing the world, when in fact it is the powerhouse of a dynamic world movement which thrives on instability and chaos.

Our duty and our best chance for salvation, in the final analysis, is to prosecute the Cold War—to the point of victory. To survive in freedom we must win.

THE ENEMY IS VULNERABLE:

The free world, under the impact of Moscow's Cold War victories, has tended to fix attention on Soviet strengths while overlooking or discounting Soviet weaknesses.

The Communists expertly exploit all our internal tensions, injustices and discontents. Yet within the Soviet empire the tensions are incomparably greater, the injustices and discontents more vast. Our opportunity, which we have failed to use so far, is to exploit these in

order to undermine the Kremlin, exacerbate its domestic problems, weaken its sense of destiny.

The nature of a malady can be deduced from the medicine applied. In its fourth decade of absolute power, the Soviet regime is obliged to devote a major portion of its energies, manpower and resources to keep its own subjects and captive countries under control, through ever larger doses of terror. There we have the proof that the Communists have failed to "sell" their system to their victims.

Even a ruthless police-state does not maintain gigantic secret-police forces, special internal security armies, colossal networks of forced-labor colonies just for the fun of it. These are measures of self-defense against actual or potential internal oppositions. After all discounts are made for wishful thinking and error, ample evidence remains that in the Soviet sphere the West has millions of allies, tens of millions of potential allies.

Whether the potential can be turned into actuality, whether the will to resist can be kept alive and inflamed to explosive intensity, depend in the first place on the policies of the non-Soviet world. Our potential fifth columns are greater by millions than the enemy's. But they have yet to be given cohesion, direction and the inner motive power of hope and expectation of victory.

No one knows whether, let alone when, the internal Soviet stresses can reach a climax in insurrectionary breaks. It would be frivolous to count on such a climax. But we have everything to gain by promoting a spirit of mutiny, to keep the Kremlin off balance, to deepen existing rifts, to sharpen economic and empire problems for them.

For the purposes of our Cold War strategy it suffices that the potential for uprisings exists. Soviet economic conditions are bad, particularly in the domain of food

production. Nations which used to be exporters of bread (Hungary, Poland, Russia itself) now lack bread for themselves. As Secretary of Agriculture Benson said recently: "Failure of the Soviet system to provide for the basic needs of its own people could be one of the most important historical facts of our time."

The Soviet peasants, still the overwhelming majority of the Kremlin-held populations, are everywhere bitter and restive. The Politburo knows that it cannot count implicitly upon the loyalty and allegiance of its subjects. At the same time it has failed utterly to assimilate the captive countries, so that it has no allies but only sullen colonial puppets.

In the last war the USSR fought on two fronts—against the foreign invaders and against its own people. There is reason to believe that Hitler's psychological blunders, in insulting and alienating the Russian peoples, helped save the Stalin regime from destruction by its own subjects. In the present Cold War, too, the USSR must maintain its fight against the Soviet citizenry, and at the same time deal with seething dissidence in the subjected countries.

The basic conditions for successful Cold War counter-strategy thus exist.

GUIDELINES FOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE:

Our guiding objectives in an all-out political offensive are fairly obvious. They must include the following:

1. To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the spirit of resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and sovereignty. If we allow that hope to expire, the Kremlin will have perpetuated its dominion over its victims.
2. To break the awful sense of isolation in which the internal enemies of the Kremlin live—by making them aware that, like the revolutionists in Tsarist times, they have devoted friends and powerful allies beyond their frontiers.

3. To sharpen by every device we can develop the fear of their own people that is already chronic in the Kremlin. The less certain the Soviets are of the allegiance of their people, the more they will hesitate to provoke adventures involving the risks of a major show-down.

4. To provide moral and material aid, including trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resistance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia proper.

5. To make maximum use of the fugitives from the Soviet sphere, millions in the aggregate, now living in free parts of the world.

6. To appeal to the simple personal yearnings of those under the Communist yoke: release from police terror, ownership of small farms and homes, free trade unions to defend their rights at the job, the right to worship as they please, the right to change residence and to travel, etc.

7. To shatter the "wave of the future" aura around Communism, displacing the assumption that "Communism is inevitable" with a deepening certainty that "the end of Communism is inevitable."

8. To inspire millions in the free countries with a feeling of moral dedication to the enlargement of the area of freedom, based on repugnance to slave labor, coerced atheism, purges and the rest of the Soviet horrors.

This inventory of objectives is necessarily sketchy and incomplete. But it indicates the indispensable direction of the Cold War effort.

IV

THE MESSAGE OF FREEDOM

We must be quite certain of our destination before we can begin to figure out means of transportation. There is little point in discussing the *how* of it until a firm decision for an all-out political-psychological counter-offensive is reached.

In Hot War, you need a *weapon* and means of *delivering* it to the target. The same is true in Cold War. The weapon is the *message*; after it has been worked out, we can develop the facilities for *delivering* it to the world at large and to the Communist-captive nations in particular.

The essence of that message (and its formulation is the critical first step) is that America has decided, irrevocably, to win the Cold War; that its ultimate aim is, in concert with all peoples, to cancel out the destructive power of Soviet-based Communism.

Once that decision is made, some of the means for implementing it will become self-evident; others will be explored and developed under the impetus of the clear-cut goal. Agreement on the problem must come before agreement on the solution.

"To be effective," as one student of the problem has put it, "our decision must be as sharp-edged and uncompromising as the Kremlin's; it must be spelled out as unequivocally as the Communists have done in the works of Lenin and Stalin and the official programs of the Comintern and Cominform."

Adjustment of our thinking in accord with such a decision to win the Cold War demands clarity on at least the following points:

1. The struggle by means short of general war is not a preliminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the loser may not have a second chance.

2. It must therefore be carried on with the same focused effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willingness to accept costs and casualties, that a Hot War would involve.

3. In order to establish credence and inspire confidence, our conduct must be consistent. Our philosophy of freedom must embrace the whole of mankind; it must not stop short at the frontiers of the Soviet sphere. Only this can give our side a moral grandeur, a revolutionary *elan*, a crusading spirit not only equal to but superior to the other side's.

4. We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as *enemy-occupied* territory, with the lifting of the occupation as the over-all purpose of freedom-loving men everywhere. This applies not only to areas captured since the war, but includes Russia itself. Any other policy would turn what should be an anti-Communist alliance into an *anti-Russian* alliance, forcing the Russians (as Hitler forced them during the war) to rally around the regime they hate.

5. The fact that the challenge is global must be kept clearly in view. Red guerillas in Burma, Communists in France or the U. S., the Huks in the Philippines, Red agents in Central America — these are as much "the enemy" as the Kremlin itself.

6. We must realize that world Communism is *not* a tool in the hands of Russia — Russia is a tool in the hands of world Communism. Repeatedly Moscow has sacrificed national interests in deference to world-revolutionary needs. This provides opportunities for appeals to Russian patriotism.

7. Though the Soviets want a nuclear war no more than we do, they accept the risk of it in pushing their political offensive. We, too, cannot avoid risks. (It might become necessary, Mr. Dulles said recently, "to forego peace in order to secure the blessings of liberty.") The greatest risk of all, for us, is to do less than is needed to win the Cold War. At worst that would mean defeat by default; and at best, a situation so menacing to the survival of freedom that a Hot War may become inevitable.

Our present lead in the possession of nuclear weapons and the ability to use them may be matched by the Communists in the next few years. This is the view expressed by competent statesmen, scientists and military experts. If and when nuclear parity is reached, the enemy's fanatics (and there may be a powerful madman — a Hitler — among them) might be tempted to use them against us by throwing a sneak punch. Since our policy is not to throw the first nuclear punch but only to retaliate if it is thrown against us, we may find as more horror-weapons are unfolded, that to yield to the enemy the initiative of the first offensive punch, is tantamount to national suicide. All this further emphasizes the vital need for winning the Cold War and preventing a Hot War.

V

TOWARD COLD WAR VICTORY

1. ORGANIZATION:

An organizational framework for fighting the Cold War already exists. It needs to be adjusted and strengthened in line with the expanded scale and intensity of operations.

A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military side, is suggested. It should function directly under the President, with Cabinet status for its Head. Top representatives of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U. S. Information Agency, should sit on this Board. Liaison on a continuous basis should be maintained with all other agencies which can play a role in the over-all effort.

There will be various operations which the Board would undertake in its own name, with its own facilities. But its primary function should not be operational. It should be to plan, initiate, finance, advise, coordinate and check on operations by other groups and agencies, whether already in existence or created by the Board for specific undertakings.

One cannot, however, be too specific at this point about the organizational forms. John Foster Dulles wrote in 1948:

“We need an organization to contest the Communist Party at the level where it is working and winning its victories. . . . We ought to have an organization dedicated to the task of non-military defense,

just as the present Secretary of Defense heads up the organization of military defense. The new department of non-military defense should have an adequate personnel and ample funds.”

2. FINANCING:

On the matter of funds, likewise, one cannot at this stage offer specific estimates. But let us recall that appropriations over the past four years for our Military Defense averaged approximately 45 billion dollars annually. *In contrast, it is significant to note that for the fiscal year 1955 the total appropriation for the U. S. Information Agency was 79 million dollars, of which 17 million dollars is available for the world-wide activities of the Voice of America.*

As a working hypothesis it is suggested that a specific and more realistic ratio between military and non-military appropriations be worked out: say an amount equivalent to 5 or 7½ per cent of Military Defense appropriations to be granted to the Strategy Board for Political Defense — this, of course, without reducing the military budget and not counting foreign military aid and Point Four types of expenditure.

I am convinced that if the American people and their Congress are made fully aware of the menace we face, of the urgent need for meeting it, and the possibility of doing so by means short of war, they will respond willingly as they have always done in times of national crisis. They will realize that no investment to win the Cold War is exorbitant when measured against the stakes involved, and against the costs of the bombing war we seek to head off.

3. IMPLEMENTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE:

We must go from defense to attack in meeting the political, ideological, subversive challenge. The imple-

mentation of the attack would devolve upon specialists and technicians. In gearing to fight a Hot War, we call in military strategists and tacticians. Likewise, we must have specialists to fight a Cold War.

This implies in the first place the mobilization of hard, knowledgeable anti-Communists who understand the issues and for whom it is not merely a job but a dedication. *The specialist in communications is important; but the message to be communicated is even more important.*

The main weakness of our efforts to date to talk to the masses — and even more so to the elite groups (Army, intelligentsia, etc.) — in the Soviet camp is that we have not always been *consistent* in what we had to say to them. Our message has been vague and subject to change without notice. As long as we regard Communist rule as permanent, we can have no strong psychological bridges to those who are under its yoke. The only free-world goal that is relevant to them is one that envisages their eventual emancipation.

With the formulation of a message, we will at last have something to say that interests *them*, not only *us*, and can devote ourselves to perfecting the means of delivering the message.

Before essaying a breakdown of Cold War methods and techniques, *we should recognize that many of them are already being used, and often effectively. Nothing now under way needs to be abandoned. The problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity — all geared to the long-range objectives of the undertaking. The expanded offensive with non-military weapons must be imbued with a new awareness of the great goal and a robust will to reach it.*

No outline such as follows can be more than indicative. Operations are necessarily related to current developments and opportunities opened up by events.

In all categories the arena of action is the whole globe. Our Cold War targets are not only behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but in every nation, the United States included. *In the battle for the minds of men, we must reach the Soviet peoples, our allies, and the uncommitted peoples.*

The agencies involved will be both official and private. The objectives must aim to *achieve dramatic victories* as swiftly as possible, as a token of the changed state of affairs. While the Kremlin has suffered some setbacks and defeats, its record in the Cold War has been strikingly one of success piled on success. This trend must be reversed, to hearten our friends, dismay the enemy, and confirm the fact that Communist Power is a transient and declining phenomenon.

4. PROPAGANDA:

If the weapon is our Message, one of its basic elements is propaganda. It is the most familiar element, but we should not underestimate its inherent difficulties. Hot War is destructive: the killing of people, the annihilation of material things. Cold War must be constructive: it must build views, attitudes, loyalties, hopes, ideals and readiness for sacrifice. *In the final check-up it calls for greater skills to affect minds than to destroy bodies.*

Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end in itself. It is a preparation for action. Words that are not backed up by deeds, that do not generate deeds, lose their impact. The test is whether they build the morale of friends and undermine the morale of foes.

No means of communication should be ignored: the spoken word and the written word; radio and television; films; balloons and missiles to distribute leaflets; secret printing and mimeographing presses on Soviet controlled soil; scrawls on walls to give isolated friends a sense of community.

5. COMMUNIST TARGETS:

The Communist sphere must be ringed with both fixed and mobile broadcasting facilities, of a massiveness to overcome jamming. The Voice of America will acquire larger audiences and more concentrated impact under the new approach. *Its name, it is suggested, should be expanded to "Voice of America — for Freedom and Peace."* This slogan added to the name will, through constant repetition, impress the truth upon receptive ears.

Besides the official voice, we have other voices, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation. There are other popular democratic voices that should make themselves heard: those of our free labor movement, American war veterans, the churches, youth and women's organizations.

Already there is a minor flow of printed matter across the Iron Curtain, especially aimed at the Red occupation forces. The volume and effectiveness of this effort can be enormously enlarged. Magazines and newspapers which outwardly look like standard Communist matter, but actually are filled with anti-Communist propaganda, have brought results.

A greater hunger for spiritual comfort, for religion, is reported from Soviet Russia and its satellites. Programs of a spiritual and religious character are indicated. They should preach faith in the Divine, abhorrence of Communist godlessness, resistance to atheism. But in addition they can offer practical advice to the spiritually stranded — for instance, how to observe religious occasions where there are no ordained ministers or priests to officiate.

The enslaved peoples do not have to be sold the idea of freedom; they are already sold on it. The propaganda should wherever possible get down to specifics. It should expose the weaknesses, failures, follies, hypocrisies and internal tensions of the Red masters; provide proof of

the existence of friends and allies both at home and abroad; offer guidance on types of resistance open even to the individual. It should appeal to universal emotions, to love of family, of country, of God, of humanity.

6. FREE-WORLD TARGETS:

The fighting front is everywhere. The program of the U. S. Information Agency should be reappraised with a view to improvement and expansion. "The Voice of America — for Freedom and Peace" has tasks to perform in many nations of the free world second in importance only to those in the unfree world.

Merely to point up the inadequacy of our present effort, consider Finland — a country on the very edge of the Red empire and under the most concentrated Soviet propaganda barrage. Soviet broadcasts beamed to Finland total over 43 hours weekly. A television station is now being built in Soviet Estonia which will be directed to a million potential viewers in nearby Finland. To maintain their morale under this pressure, the Finnish people, still overwhelmingly pro-West and pro-American, have desperate need of our encouragement. Yet the Voice of America in 1953 was compelled to discontinue its daily half-hour broadcast to Finland to save \$50,000 annually.

We need in every country, newspapers; magazines; radio and TV stations, consciously and effectively supporting our side. Those that exist should be aided materially to increase their range and vitality; others should be started with our help. The strongest individual anti-Communist voices must be provided with better facilities for making themselves heard in their own countries.

Mobile film units are already penetrating backward areas. The operation should be enlarged, its message and appeal perfected. In addition, mobile big-screen television units in black-and-white and in color can carry our message. Their very novelty will guarantee large

and attentive audiences. Vast regions in Asia and elsewhere, where illiteracy bars the written word and lack of radios bars the spoken word, could thus be reached. To quote the Chinese saying: "One picture is worth ten thousand words."

The so-called backward parts of the world, particularly Asia, are under the most concentrated Communist psychological attacks. Of necessity the counter-offensive must take this into account, and develop special techniques for reaching both the masses and the elite of those areas.

7. RADIO RECEIVERS AND PHONOGRAPHS:

Mass production of cheap and light-weight receivers tuned to pick up American signals are now feasible. They should be made available by the million at cost or gratis, as expedient, to listeners in critical areas and behind the Iron Curtain.

There are millions of persons in the world who do not have electric power receptacles, electron tubes, batteries or any of the electrical and mechanical marvels which the free world has and takes for granted. A simple, hand-operated phonograph device costing no more than a loaf of bread, could be produced in quantities and supplied gratis to millions of persons living behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains and in other critical areas.

An unbreakable and intelligible record, made of cardboard and costing less than a bottle of Coca-Cola, could carry our messages to these people. Such records could be dropped from the sky like leaflets and the messages they carried could not be jammed.

8. USE OF FACILITIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES:

Nearly all European and many Asian countries possess broadcasting facilities. We should seek to enlist their use to supplement and intensify American broadcasting on a world-wide scale.

In some cases this could be negotiated on a *quid pro quo* basis where we are providing military or economic aid; in other cases we may have to buy the necessary time for transmitting our message. Our friendly allies, such as Great Britain, have vast short-wave facilities of world-wide scope and range and have the same reasons as we have for seeking to win the Cold War. *We need their help in this field. We are fully justified in asking for such help and ought to receive it.*

Propaganda is a large concept. In a sense it includes and exploits all other activities. Its successful use calls for imagination, ingenuity, continual technical research and, of course, effective coordination with all other operations that bear on the problems of the Cold War.

9. PASSIVE RESISTANCE:

Pending the critical periods when active resistance in one or another Soviet country is possible and desirable, full encouragement and support must be given to passive resistance. This refers to the things the individual can do, with minimum risk, to create doubt and confusion in the ranks of the dictatorship, to gum up the machinery of dictatorship government.

The worker in the mine and factory, the farmer, the soldier in the barracks, the office worker are able to do little things that in their millionfold totality will affect the national economy and the self-confidence of the rulers. It is the method that comes naturally to captive peoples, especially in countries with a long historical experience in opposing tyrants.

Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful direction. In this concept the individual opponent of the regime becomes a "resistance group of one." He receives, by radio and other channels, specific suggestions and instructions. The tiny drops of resistance will not be haphazard, but calculated to achieve planned results.

Special action programs of the type that do not require large organization — or at most units of two or three — would be worked out and transmitted. Our sympathizers in the Soviet orbit would feel themselves part of an invisible but huge army of crusaders. Symbols of protest would appear on a million walls. The rulers' morale would be deliberately sapped by a multitude of actions too small, too widespread, to be readily dealt with.

The special value of passive resistance, aside from its direct effects, is that it nurtures the necessary feeling of power and readiness for risk and sacrifice that will be invaluable when the passive stage is transformed into more open opposition.

10. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE:

Pockets of guerilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, China, Albania and other areas. There is always the danger of activating them prematurely. But their existence must be taken into the calculations and, in concert with exiles who know the facts, they must be kept supplied with information, slogans and new leadership where needed and prudent.

Many of these resistance groups are so isolated that they do not know of each other's existence. The simple realization that they are not alone but part of a scattered network will be invaluable; methods for establishing liaison, for conveying directions, can be developed.

11. INSURRECTIONS:

The uprisings in East Germany, the strikes and riots in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, the dramatic mutinies inside the concentration camps of Vorkuta in the Soviet Arctic, are examples of revolutionary actions that failed. But they attest that insurrection is possible.

We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's chain of power. The country adjudged ripe for a break-

away should receive concentrated study and planning. A successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be a body blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to resistance elsewhere. (That little country is geographically isolated, ruled by a handful of puppets; able leadership is available in the Albanian emigration.)

Eastern Germany is among the weakest links. Its revolt would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and Poland. The time to prepare for such actions is now — whether the time to carry them out be in the near or distant future. Meanwhile we must not allow the Soviet propoganda to make unification appear as the Communist's gift to the Germans. It is a natural asset that belongs to West Germany and her allies.

12. COLLABORATION WITH EMIGRES AND ESCAPEES:

Tens of thousands of self-exiled fugitives from Communist oppression emerge eager to plunge into movements for the freeing of their homelands. When they fail to find outlets for their zeal, disillusionment and defeatism set in.

Maximum exploitation of this manpower and moral passion is indicated. They must be drawn into specific, well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist organizations and activities; utilized for propaganda and other operations; enabled, in some cases, to return to their native lands as "sleeper" leaders for future crises.

Officers' corps of emigres can be formed: perhaps groups of only a score to a hundred, but available for emergency and opportunity occasions. The existence of such nuclei of military power — a fact that will be widely known — should help generate hope and faith among their countrymen back home.

13. PLANNED DEFECTION:

Escapees have come, and will continue to come, spontaneously, now in trickles, other times in rivers. Beyond

that the need is to stimulate defection on a selective basis. Individual "prospects" in Soviet missions and legations, in Red cultural and sports delegations, can be carefully contacted and developed. Types of individuals needed to man Cold War undertakings will be invited to escape, assured of important work. Special approaches can be worked out to encourage defection of border guards, Army officers, secret-police personnel disgusted by their bloody chores, scientists, important writers, etc.

Escapees today are often disheartened by their initial experience. They are taken into custody by some foreign Intelligence Service, pumped for information, and sometimes then left to shift for themselves. Their honest patriotism is offended by the need to cooperate with foreigners before they are psychologically ready for it.

It is suggested that emigre commissions be set up, composed of trusted nationals of the various countries. The fugitive would first be received by the commission of his own countrymen. Only when found desirable and prepared for the step, would he be brought into contact with American or British agencies.

14. TRAINING OF CADRES:

The immediate and prospective activities of the Cold War offensive will require ever larger contingents of specialized personnel for the many tasks; to provide leadership for resistance operations; to engage in propaganda, subversion, infiltration of the enemy; even to carry on administrative and civic work *after* the collapse of Communist regimes in various countries, in order to stave off chaos.

Already, limited as our political efforts are, there is a shortage of competent personnel. Meanwhile thousands of younger men and women among the emigres are being lost to factories, farms, menial jobs. This amounts to squandering of potentially important human resources.

We need a network of schools and universities devoted to training *cadres* for the Cold War. The objective is not education in a generic sense, but specific preparation for the intellectual, technical, intelligence and similar requirements of the ideological-psychological war.

This training, of course, should not be limited to people from the Soviet areas. A sort of "West Point" of political warfare — analogous to the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow — might be established. Staffed by the ablest specialists obtainable, it would seek out likely young people willing to make the struggle against Communism their main or sole career.

The present "exchange of persons" program is clearly valuable. Hundreds of foreign students go back home with a better and friendlier understanding of America. But beyond that, it is possible and necessary to educate invited young people from abroad, carefully selected, along lines of more direct and specialized value to the Cold War effort.

In a sense these shock troops of democracy would be like the "professional revolutionaries" on the Communist side. They would be equipped to operate openly or as secret infiltrators wherever the enemy's assaults need to be neutralized. Trained anti-Communists from Asian areas, dedicated and knowledgeable, would be available for countries under Red pressure, as today in Southeast Asia; Latin Americans, Europeans, would serve similar functions in their respective regions.

Thus, from a largely amateur enterprise, our counter-offensive would gradually be transformed into a professional undertaking.

15. CAMPAIGNS BY SPECIAL GROUPS:

An American trade union in the clothing field played a major role in preventing Communist victory in the Italian elections in 1948. The International Confedera-

tion of Free Trade Unions (in which both the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. are active) is conducting important psychological drives in many countries and offsetting the mischief worked by the Moscow-controlled labor international.

Speaking as workers to workers, trade unionists have a legitimate approach to the laboring masses in the Soviet sphere. They have a special justification for exposing and publicizing forced labor, onerous laboring conditions and laws, phony totalitarian "trade unions."

In many countries — France and Italy, for instance — there are competing Communist-controlled and democratic unions. Free labor of all countries can throw its moral and material support to the anti-Communist federations. It can take the lead in breaking Moscow's grip on influential segments of world labor.

Corresponding political campaigns should be mounted on a telling scale by other non-official, popular groups: farmers' organizations and peasant unions would concentrate on the evils of Red collectivization; great church groups on the immoral and atheistic aspects of Communist theory and practice; youth organizations on the perversion of youth under Communism, etc.

The scope of such focussed group and class appeals is enormous. Some of them are being made already, but without the coordination of effort and continuity of impact that is called for.

What a specialized group can achieve has been demonstrated by the society of Free Jurists in West Berlin, which indicts and condemns *in absentia* persons guilty of Communist crimes. Its work is sowing the fear of retribution in East Germany. Radio Free Europe has made successful forays of the same order — identifying brutal officials, exposing Red agents, etc. But the surface has only been scratched in this type of psychological pressure.

VI

DIPLOMACY IS A WEAPON

The Kremlin treats foreign affairs as a primary arena of ideological and psychological effort. It makes moves on the diplomatic chessboard for their propagandist impact: to rally its friends in the outside world, to win over a particular element in some country, to embarrass its opponents. In the measure that democratic diplomacy fails to do likewise, it is defaulting in a vital area of the Cold War. Let us bear in mind:

1. Day to day conduct of foreign affairs is pertinent to the struggle for men's minds. The rigid observance of protocol, in dealing with an enemy who recognizes none of the traditional rules, can be self-defeating. We must make proposals, demands, exposés, publications of official documents, etc. that are carefully calculated to show up the true motives of the Kremlin, to put a crimp in Moscow political campaigns, to mobilize world opinion against Soviet crimes and duplicities.

For ten years we have made one-shot protests against Soviet election frauds in satellite countries, against violations of treaties and agreements, against shocking crimes in the areas of Human Rights as defined by the U.N. Charter. The archives are packed with these documents. These should be followed up through consistent publicity, renewed protests, etc.

Even when nothing practical can be immediately accomplished, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggressions, violations of Yalta, Potsdam and other agreements must be kept continually before the world. Diplomacy must champion the victims of Red totalitarianism without let-up. At every opportunity the spokesmen of free

nations should address themselves to the people in the Soviet empire over the heads of their masters; to the people of free countries in terms of universal principles of morality and decency.

2. The measures of reciprocity should be strictly applied to Soviet diplomats, trade and other representatives. These should enjoy no more privileges, immunities, access to information than is accorded to free-world representatives in Communist lands. Even socially they should be made aware of their status as symbols of a barbarous plexus of power. The desire to belong, to be respectable, is by no means alien to Red officialdom.

3. Economic leverages, too, must be applied. Trade can be turned into a powerful political weapon. The stakes are too high to permit business-as-usual concepts to outweigh the imperatives of the Cold War. Where acute distress develops in a Communist country, our readiness to help must be brought to the attention of the people as well as their bosses. If and when food and other relief is offered, it must be under conditions consistent with our objectives — to help the victims, not their rulers.

4. In virtually all countries outside the Communist sphere there are large or small organizations devoted to combatting Communism, at home or abroad or both. There is little or no contact among such groups — no common currency of basic ideas and slogans, no exchange of experience. Without at this stage attempting to set up a world-wide anti-Communist coalition, or Freedom International, we should at least facilitate closer liaison and mutual support among anti-Soviet groupings already in existence.

VII

SUMMARY

No claim is implied that the foregoing outline is complete, or that all of it can or ought to be launched at once. The program here suggested should not be judged on the basis of this or that specific proposal but on the over-all concept and its underlying philosophy. As a practical matter, methods flow from correct policies, the availability of funds and trained manpower, the existence of leadership and organization prepared to take advantage of unfolding events.

Summarized, my observations and conclusions are:

1. We are in the midst of a Cold War which the Communists are prosecuting vigorously on all fronts in an unswerving determination to win.

2. We dare not lose this Cold War, because defeat may be as fatal as would defeat in a Hot War. We can freeze to death as well as burn to death.

3. Our best and surest way to head off a Hot War is to win the Cold War which is already in full blast all over the world. But for the reasons mentioned, such as insufficient funds and inadequate tools, our efforts in this decisive field are strikingly little compared with the enemy's and are wholly inadequate to achieve victory. We must meet the political-psychological challenge of world Communism fully and on a scale geared to winning the struggle.

4. We should organize our efforts to win the Cold War on a basis comparable to our organization for winning a Hot War which we seek to prevent. To this end it is recommended that a Strategy Board of Political Defense (or some other

suitable name) be set up to function as the Cold War equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military side. Top representatives of the State and Defense Departments, C.I.A. and U.S.I.A., should be members of this Board. Its activities must be effectively coordinated with all Departments and Agencies of our Government concerned with this effort. This new Strategy Board should function directly under the President and its Head should have Cabinet status.

5. Our decision to win the Cold War should be communicated to the entire world as a fixed goal of American policy. This will not rule out conventional relations on the governmental level, where the Kremlin, too, functions despite its clear commitment to world revolution.

6. The American public should be made promptly and fully aware of the nature of the present Cold War, the importance of our winning it, the costs and sacrifices that this may entail. The significance and urgency of the problem should be conveyed to the American people, through discussion over Radio, TV, and in the Press.

7. The idea of our determination to win the Cold War must be presented for what it actually is: a project that can be carried through successfully and thereby prevent a general war that could force a devastating nuclear showdown. Once grasped, this prospect would help to offset the fears and frustrations generated in the public mind by constant emphasis on the horrors of Atomic War. The alternative presented, is understandable and hopeful. Instead of concentrating on the perils of defeat, we can dwell on the prospects for victory.

8. Key leaders in Congress should be drawn into the philosophy and purposes of the Cold War counter-offensive from the outset. No program of the scope suggested here can be undertaken and executed without adequate funds that only Congress can appropriate. In addition to legislative support the Congress can aid immeasurably by stimulating united, patriotic effort as complete and non-partisan as in a Hot War.

9. To wrest from the Communists the advantages they gain through constant use in their propaganda of the appealing word "peace" — while casting us in the role of "war-mongers" — it is recommended that the present name of the "Voice of America" be extended to the "Voice of America — for Freedom and Peace."

10. Our Diplomacy should be used as a weapon against World Communism and our Message to their captive peoples should contain the hope for their eventual freedom. Our Message of Truth should tell the world the truth about Communist objectives, methods and practices as well as the truth about ourselves.



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12/3/56

General David Sarnoff
Chairman of the Board
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear David:

Congratulations on receiving the Army's Exceptional Civilian Service Award. This recognition of outstanding service is well deserved. Your contribution to your country redounds to the benefit of many and I am sure must give you considerable personal satisfaction.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

O/DCI/ [] (25 May 56)

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
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Sarnoff

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12/3/56

ARNOFF)
DEFENSE SECRETARY WILSON PINNED THE ARMY'S EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE
DECORATION ON RETIRED BRIG. GEN. DAVID SARNOFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
OF RCA.

THE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE
C. MARSHALL AND OTHER TOP WORLD WAR II LEADERS ATTENDING A MEETING AT
THE PENTAGON.

ARMY SECRETARY BRUCKER READ A CITATION PAYING TRIBUTE TO SARNOFF'S
"NOTEWORTHY" CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HIS "KEY ROLE
IN MARSHALLING PUBLIC OPINION AND BRINGING ABOUT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAM OF THE ARMY."

. 5/23--TS216P

HIGH ARMY AWARD GIVEN TO SARNOFF

Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, May 23—A reunion of the 1963 Committee of Department of Defense Organization was marked today by the decoration of one member, David Sarnoff, chairman of the board of Radio Corporation of America.

Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, who called the seven men in to advise him on reorganizing the Pentagon early in 1963, held the reunion luncheon in his official suite.

Just before the group left the Secretary's office for the dining room, Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, said he had a paper he would like to read. He read a citation praising Mr. Sarnoff's noteworthy contribution to national defense and his key role in marshaling public opinion particularly with regard to the Reserve program.

Mr. Sarnoff succeeded the late Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs Adler as chairman of the National Security Training Commission. Secretary Wilson pinned on him the Army's Exceptional Service decoration.

The seven-member committee was headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller. It included General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Vannevar Bush, then president of the Carnegie Institution; Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, president of Pennsylvania State University; Arthur S. Flemming, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, and Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense. All were present today except Mr. Lovett, who had a conflicting engagement.

Sarnoff Is Given Medal By Army

Washington, May 23 (AP)—The Army's medal for exceptional civilian service was presented today to David Sarnoff, chairman of the board of the Radio Corporation of America, for his "untiring" work in promoting the new reserve training program.

Secretary of Defense Wilson made the presentation at a Pentagon ceremony after Secretary of Army Brucker read the citation. It praised Sarnoff's "eminent career" and his great "personal contributions of time and effort to the military service in undertaking numerous responsibilities and assignments to assist the cause of national defense."

The citation particularly stressed Sarnoff's role as chairman of the National Security Training Commission, in which he was praised for playing a "key role in marshaling public opinion and bringing about a better understanding of the reserve program."

Washington
Evening Star
23 May 1956
page A-6

Sarnoff Gets Service Award

David Sarnoff, chairman of the board of the Radio Corp of America, today received the Army's Exceptional Civilian Service Award.

Defense Secretary Wilson presented the award to Mr. Sarnoff before a distinguished audience that included Gen. George C. Marshall, former Secretary of State and of Defense; Dr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President; and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Vannevar Bush, former military research and development chief.

Army Secretary Brucker read the citation accompanying the award at the ceremony in Mr. Wilson's office.

It stated that Mr. Sarnoff had been "noteworthy for his personal contributions of time and effort to the military service in undertaking numerous responsibilities and assignments."


It complimented him on his contributions to the Army in the communications field and added that since his appointment as chairman of the National Security Training Commission "he played a key role in marshaling public opinion and bringing about a better understanding of the reserve program."

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DOLLE
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
General David Sarnoff received the Army's Exceptional Civilian Service Award from the Department of Defense on 23 May. Attached is a congratulatory letter.



25 May 56

(DATE)


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RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA
RCA BUILDING
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.



DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD



May 31, 1956

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

Thank you ever so much for your thoughtfulness in writing me your note of May 26 and for your generous observations on the occasion of my receiving the Army's Exceptional Civilian Service Award.

It was a memorable occasion for me and I shall always cherish the Award.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,


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28 APR 1956

General David Vernon
Chairman of the Board
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, N. Y.

Dear David:

Many thanks for your note of April 18 concerning my recent address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

I really appreciate your most kind words of applause regarding my remarks.

I also want to take this opportunity to add my congratulations to the many I know you have already received for the special citation given you at your retreat ceremonies the other day. The award for your outstanding contributions is certainly more than well deserved in my opinion.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

SIGNED


Allen W. Dulles
Director

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RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA
RCA BUILDING
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.



DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

April 18, 1956

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I have just read your splendid address on the "Purge of Stalinism" in Los Angeles on April 13. It is by all odds the clearest and most convincing -- as well as the most encouraging -- interpretation of the posthumous purge of Stalin that I have yet seen. I could not resist the urge to break into your busy life with this word of sincere applause.


It is a pity that the address has not received the wide attention it so clearly merits, and wonder what could be done now to give it larger circulation.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "David".

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WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES SQUARE

Approved For Release 2001/04/04 : CIA-RDP80-01731R000700010018-9



Sarnoff Is Saluted At Retreat Parade

WHILE 54 state and territorial flags flapped in a chilly unspring-like breeze yesterday at Fort Myer, Va., the Army honored Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff at a full dress retreat parade.

The 65-year-old General, who rose from messenger boy to president and chairman of the board of the Radio Corporation of America, also received a special citation for his outstanding contributions to the Army. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker made the presentation.

First, there was an 11-gun salute, followed by ruffles and flourishes, and the General's March played by the United States Army Band. Then, the band "trooped the line" and the crack Third Infantry Regiment passed in review.

In the reviewing stand with General Sarnoff and Secretary Brucker was Maj. Gen. John G. Van Houten, Commanding General of the Military District of Washington.

Seated nearby to watch her husband on his great day was Mrs. Sarnoff—wearing a cinnamon wool coat and small black hat. To her right was NBC's vice president Frank Russell (as protection against the cold wind, HE was wearing Mrs. Sarnoff's mink stole over his top coat).

ALL of the VIP guests arrived at the parade from the Shoreham Hotel where they had a luncheon for Military Re-

serve Week. Gen. Sarnoff is the chairman of the National Security Training Commission. A member of the Commission, Warren H. Atherton of Stockton, Calif., was there. Then there were Rep. Overton Brooks, chairman of the House Subcommittee for Reserve Affairs, Undersecretary of the Army Charles Finucane, Assistant Secretary Hugh Million and Adm. Thomas Kincaid.

Gen. Milton B. Baker, superintendent of the Valley Forge Military Academy, came down from Pennsylvania for the luncheon and parade. Mr. and Mrs. John H. Wilson were there from Philadelphia.

Others were Brig. Gen. and Mrs. Harry H. Semmes, the Ed Sheltons and her mother, Mrs. A. L. Jones.

MINK FOR THE MAN—A little mink goes a long way on a windy day. Mrs. David Sarnoff, at far right, on hand for the military salute paid to General Sarnoff at Ft. Myer yesterday, lent her mink stole to NBC vice president Frank Russell, center, who shielded his shoulder against the unspring-like wind at the parade with the fur. At left is NBC secretary Pat O'Neill.

At Home in Texas

Mr. and Mrs. Robert A. Raley Jr. are now residing in San Antonio, Tex., following their March 31 marriage in Milton, Del. The bride is the former Susan N. Graves, daughter of Mrs. Milton T. Graves and the late Mr. Graves of Milton. The groom is the son of Mrs. Robert A. Raley and Mrs. Raley of D. C.

FREE GIFT!

To make a tired complexion glow!

Regular 30-day supply of Lady Esther Hormone Cream with regular 89¢ Lady Esther 4-Purpose Face Cream

BOTH FOR



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