

Executive Registry
10-7657


23 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : SARNOFF

Attached is another version of the letter to Sarnoff modified along the lines that I am told you desire. It has been discussed with Fitzgerald.

25X1



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General


Attachments

ER-

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
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


23 May

Here are new pages 1, 2 and 6 to
be substituted in Sarnoff letter, copies of which
you have. I did not know exactly how many
copies I had made, but this should be plenty.

This new version (the original, that is) has gone
to DCI this date.

25X1



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25X1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO:		26/4/56
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>The original of this letter, together with all background papers (including a draft prepared by PP -- do not know date) were handed to DCI on 23 April by Mr. Kirkpatrick. He may not sign this version, but here are copies if he does. If you have any questions when (and if) you receive papers, be sure to give me a ring.</p> <p><i>(over)</i></p>		
FROM:		EXTENSION
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	

25X1

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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 56

REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957-O-439445 (47)

4/29/58
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orig w/ Sarnoff ltr
att to Dey Fitzgerald
for comment.

5/21/58
in OIG for retyprng

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STAT

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


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York



Dear David:

The months that have passed since your letter of December 16, 1957, are indicative of the intensive study that we have been giving your views, both as presented in that letter and in your original program for effective political action against world communism.

I want you to know that we have found your ideas both stimulating and challenging. In many instances certain of your thoughts have served to focus and clarify some of our own concepts, which may become occasionally blurred by our closeness to the problem and the necessity of working through governmental channels. Further, the perspective you have given the problem has been very helpful to us who are concentrating intensively on the worldwide struggle with communism.

Finally, there could scarcely have been a more opportune time to review our activities in this struggle, with changes taking place in the Soviet hierarchy, intensive diplomatic maneuvers on their part, worldwide unrest, and the possibility of the so-called summit discussions.

Certainly you have focused on an important area when you state that the problem is one of attaining and maintaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity in any political offensive against world communism. This is especially true when the objective is to undermine the power of world communism to the point where it is no longer a threat. Whether this can be done as long as Russia is Communist is a serious question, for we need no convincing that Moscow is to the Communists what Mecca is to the Mohammedans.

I am sure it will come as no surprise to you when I state that the amount we spend to combat world communism is but a small fraction of the amount spent by the Communist bloc to spread its doctrine. And in calculating the amount spent by the United States I would include economic and military aid and the information service, as well as the efforts of my own organization. In pointing this out I assure you that I am not complaining about a lack of money for CIA, as we have always found the Congress most understanding of our needs. The point does illustrate, however, the fact that our counter effort is on a much smaller scale than the drive of the communists.

Illustrative of the effort and expense that the Soviet Union is throwing into the struggle is this paragraph about the Communist World Youth Festivals from the booklet "Communist Fronts in Focus: Youth":

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"The festivals are publicized as non-political, and cultural and social events dominate the schedule, although politics is never far from the surface. For many of those who attend, however, the principal appeal of the festival is as a low-cost vacation trip to Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. The trip is inexpensive because the Soviet bloc not only subsidizes travel within the Communist-controlled areas, but in many cases, pays the expenses the festival visitor would otherwise incur in travelling from his home to the borders of the Soviet bloc. For the Moscow Festival in 1957, the British Youth Festival Committee offered an all-expense round-trip to Moscow for 47 pounds (\$141.00) --less than a third of the cost of the cheapest commercial tour. Norwegians were given the opportunity to make the festival trip for slightly less than 36 pounds (\$100.00)--a quarter of the price of a commercial 10-day Soviet tour. Americans were offered the chance to travel from San Francisco--half-way around the world--for precisely the same price the Norwegians were asked to pay. Even greater bargains were offered to Asian and African youth. As at previous festivals, young people from the economically less privileged parts of the world were assisted through "International Solidarity Funds," a system through which the youth groups of the more wealthy nations underwrite the expenses of delegations from specific Asian or African states. To the funds collected in this manner have been added substantial subsidies from the

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USSR and the Soviet bloc nations. After the Warsaw Festival in 1955, return tickets home were given free to all who requested them--regardless of the distance to be traveled. With the festivals claiming some 30,000 visitors, the total cost to the sponsors of travel alone is astronomical. The Soviet New Times reported that for the Moscow Festival 1,075 railway carriages, seven ships, 'many' aircraft and 2,600 busses would be placed at the disposal of the visitors."

It would appear that if the Soviet Union is willing to put this effort into this one phase of political warfare, their over-all program may well run into the equivalent of several billion dollars.

Accepting the fact that the magnitude of our effort must necessarily be on a smaller scale than the communists, it then becomes even more important that we conduct our campaign in order to exploit the most important Soviet weaknesses which are accessible. Your inventory of vulnerabilities is an excellent one, and certainly lists the major targets. The problem now becomes one of a concentration of effort where our resources can be most effective.

It is fairly obvious that the greater accessibility we have to the target group the more effective can be our effort. The new cultural exchange program has opened new possibilities in this regard. Here is an opportunity to show Soviet intellectuals the creative freedom available in the western world, to keep stirring the ferment in Soviet youth,

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and to give a first-hand view to Soviet managerial personnel of the autonomy typical of a free enterprise system. These seeds sown by their own personal observations in the United States may germinate when they return to the USSR, and we can stimulate the cultivation. This exchange will also contribute to the deglamorization of communism, and the awakening of the realization among the Russians that they have been misinformed by their government about the outside world.

We should recognize however that the exchange program will also have some drawbacks. The Soviet Union will send forth their best to the cultural battle. We will be impressed by the grace and excellence of their ballet, the quality of their musicians, the achievements of their athletes, their accomplishments in medicine and science, their academic accomplishments and industrial skill, to mention only a few. Others will be affected too, particularly in the uncommitted areas of the world, and probably our friends and allies.

The uninitiated may well ask how these things can be accomplished under communism. The naive may question whether the USSR could still be a menace. This will inevitably make the problems of attaining the requisite magnitude and continuity in our struggle against world communism more difficult. It will also make it even more important that our guard not be lowered, undoubtedly a major objective in the Soviet campaign.

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Another element of the communist offensive that must be countered is the major economic warfare campaign on which the Soviets have embarked. This obviously has too many facets to comment on here. It is an obvious challenge, perhaps deliberately directed toward creating a crisis in this country, if we attempt to match them item for item. But we may be able to turn the sword and use it to create further imbalances in the Soviet economy. It may well prevent adequate production of consumer goods in the USSR adding to the restiveness of the Russian people, particularly those who have seen what is available to the westerner. Further, if we are prepared to engage in this form of economic warfare--and are willing to create the necessary mechanism and take the required sacrifices--we may be able to take advantage of their over-commitments and failures to make promised deliveries.

Other vulnerabilities of the communists will be laid open for exploitation as the aforementioned weaknesses develop into serious internal problems for the USSR. If the cultural exchange proves dangerous, and the economic program boomerangs, the struggle for power will be accentuated.

What we need to do in a more positive way to speed the process of undermining world communism is difficult to answer. As you are well aware, several different organizational approaches have been used in Washington in recent years in an effort to make the overseas activities of the United States Government most effective. While the present system

may not be perfect, it is functioning reasonably well, and provides in the Operations Coordination Board a "Strategy Board for Political Defense." We are constantly re-examining the effectiveness of our various programs and devising new methods of getting the greatest impact out of our effort. Obviously we cannot advertize all of our activities, nor can be boast of our successes. While the size of the OCB itself is small--and its immediate staff is not large--it does have a large number of working groups composed of many experts on different areas and subjects and representing the departments and agencies of the government most directly concerned. The over-all effect of its efforts are on a rather considerable scale, and perhaps can be judged in part at least by the apparent Soviet anxiety to conclude the cold war.

At least, I am sure we are making progress. Such progress is aided by contributions such as your valuable ideas, and I can assure you that we are grateful for the time and effort you have put into this.

With very best wishes.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

23 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Attached is:

Tab 1 - A new draft reply to General Sarnoff

Tab 2 - Outline of General Sarnoff's major points

Tab 3 - General Sarnoff's letter of 16 December 1957 and

your reply of 20 December. This also includes

Sarnoff's original memo, "A Program For A Political

Offensive Against World Communism", submitted to

the White House April 5, 1955.

Tab 4 - Draft

25X1

Tab 5 - A clipping on Sarnoff

I'm sorry that preparing this took so long, but I felt a truly responsive answer was necessary, and this entailed considerable work.

25X1

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear David:

The months that have passed since your letter of December 16, 1957, are indicative of the intensive study that we have been giving your views, both as presented in that letter and in your original program for ^{effective} ~~a~~ political ^{action} ~~offensive~~ against world communism. ^{to} I want you to know that we have found your ideas both stimulating and challenging. In many instances certain of your thoughts have served to focus and clarify some of our own concepts, which may become occasionally blurred by our closeness to the problem and the necessity of working through governmental channels. Further, the perspective you have given the problem has been very helpful to us who are concentrating intensively on the worldwide struggle with communism. ^{to} Finally, there could scarcely have been a more opportune time to review our activities in this struggle, with changes taking place in the Soviet hierarchy, intensive diplomatic maneuvers on their part, ^{worldwide unrest,} and the ^{possibility} ~~imminence~~ of the so-called summit discussions.

Certainly you have focused on an important area when
~~you have placed your heavy emphasis on the major issues when~~
and maintaining
 you state that the problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity in any political offensive against world communism. This is especially true when the objective is to undermine the power of world communism to the point where it is no longer a threat. *Whether this can be done as long as Russia is Communist is a serious question, for we need*
~~whether we as a people can agree on the sacrifices required in order to attain "requisite magnitude" necessary to destroy world communism is~~
no convincing that Moscow is to the Communists what Mecca is to the Mohammedans.
~~yet another thing.~~

I am sure it will come as no surprise to you when I state that the amount we spend to combat world communism is but a small fraction of the amount spent by the Communist Bloc to spread its doctrine. And in calculating the amount spent by the United States I would include economic and military aid and the information service, as well as the efforts of my own organization. In pointing this out I assure you that I am not complaining about a lack of money for CIA, as we have always found the Congress most understanding of our needs. The point does illustrate, however, the fact that our counter effort is on a much smaller scale than the drive of the communists.

Illustrative of the effort and expense that the Soviet Union is throwing into the struggle is this paragraph about the Communist World Youth Festivals from the booklet "Communist Fronts in Focus: Youth":

OUTLINE OF GENERAL SARNOFF'S MAJOR POINTS

1. Need a decision to undermine power of world communism to point where it is no longer a threat.

2. Objectives would be:
 - to keep alive in Soviet Empire the spirit of resistance and hope of eventual freedom.
 - to break awful sense of isolation of internal enemies of Kremlin.
 - to sharpen Kremlin's fear of their own people.
 - to provide moral and material aid, including leaders, to opposition.
 - to make maximum use of fugitives from USSR.
 - to appeal to simple personal yearnings.
 - to shatter wave of future aura around communism.
 - to inspire moral dedication in free countries.

3. The problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing, coordination and continuity.
 - we should exploit Soviet weaknesses, sharpen the inventory of vulnerabilities:
 - a. monolithic unity of USSR has been damaged
 - b. nationalist sentiment intensified in non-Russian minorities
 - c. open ferments among Soviet youth
 - d. Soviet intellectuals demand more creative freedom
 - e. managerial personnel want more autonomy

- f. present resistance strong
 - g. Soviet economy unbalanced
 - h. struggle for power
 - i. Communism has lost its original glamor and appeal
 - j. after 40 years Soviet regime has failed to win allegiance
 - k. contradictions between Soviets modern technology and medieval despotism
4. "Free world inadequacy in the understanding and prosecution of the cold war."
5. Hungary established:
- a. that revolution against a totalitarianism communist regime is possible
 - b. that such a revolution can be successful
 - d. that the soldiers become people; the military won't save the Kremlin
 - e. that a new communist intelligentsia turns against its creator
6. Create new channels of contact for intellectual and cultural leaders of free world to make manifest their understanding of Soviet intelligentsia.
7. Cold war must be constructive--it must build views, attitudes, loyalties, hopes, ideals and readiness for sacrifice.

- (1) Organization - a Strategy Board for Political Defense
- (2) Financing - a percentage of Defense Budget
- (3) Implementing the counter offensive
- (4) Propaganda
- (5) Communist targets
- (6) Free world targets
- (7) Radio receivers and phonographs
- (8) Use of facilities in friendly countries
- (9) Passive Resistance
- (10) Organized Resistance
- (11) Insurrections
- (12) Collaboration with emigres and escapees
- (13) Planned defection
- (14) Training of cadres
- (15) Campaigns by special groups

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
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2			
3	DCI <input type="checkbox"/>		
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5			
6			

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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
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APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
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COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
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CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

Per DCI's instructions, herewith a reply to Mr. David Sarnoff's essay. This final form incorporates DCI's marginal comments made on an earlier draft.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
<input type="checkbox"/>	2028-K, Ext. <input type="checkbox"/>	18 Mar 1958

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R009761R000700010017-0

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear David,

Your outline of ideas for prosecution of the "cold war" was stimulating. I appreciate the detail into which you went and therefore want to comment in return, over and above my original acknowledgment of receipt. You have given me too much food for thought in your letter to permit my comments to be formulated quickly.

You stipulate that there must be a will to undertake a political and psychological counter-offensive against the USSR. I think it can be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it does, in fact, exist. Every now and then seemingly attractive propositions obtain attention and hold out hope of some near-miraculous overall solution. If they are based on the shaky premises that the Soviets also dislike international tension, that they can be mollified by appeasement, or that basic issues between two enemy systems can be solved at a quick high-level meeting, they do not last very long because the basic good sense of the American public recognizes that acceptance of these premises could lead us into mortal danger.

It took some time after World War II for this country to come alive to the peril, but there seems to be no possibility of return to the misconceptions of war and immediate post war era. Certainly the government itself has no intention of revoking the general intent of policies that consistently since 1947 have attempted to keep this country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of communistic Soviet imperialism. Even the organization of the government is bent in this direction and, as you know, my own agency has certain functions based directly on the governmental will to enter into this field.

Granted that this is true, I take it that your thinking emphasizes that certain guiding objectives should be kept in mind, that enough money should be devoted to the effort to assure a certain magnitude, and that an organization should be set up to handle these specific problems.

As to the guiding objectives, I think we are in complete harmony. Those listed in your letter pages 3-8 are not only praiseworthy and suitable but most of them are implicitly or explicitly stated in current directives. That more money should be spent on them is a position I would not challenge.

That there should be a new cabinet position for these matters, is a proposal that would run counter to most of the thinking on organization that has developed since the National Security Act of 1947 and would recall the unhappy episode of the Psychological Strategy Board, which endeavored to consider a psychological program apart from the executive decisions themselves. It would be very difficult to convince those who have lived through the various alternatives that we don't have a pretty good solution now, i. e., guiding policy is centralized with the NSC, operations are decentralized to executive agencies but coordinated through the OCB.

It is the latter, the OCB, that is the strategy board for the Cold War. It has developed a system of working so that the agencies pull together on the common task while recognizing their differentiated missions.

The most recent problem facing us is the development of a sound strategic plan and appropriate tactics to meet the Soviet economic offensive in the underdeveloped areas. They offer aid to these countries but lure them into nationalistic adventures that draw attention of leaders away from the need for basic economic and political stability at home. Their long-range plan is to prevent stabilization so that communism will have a fertile field. Our approach must encourage stable institutions to which communism will offer little appeal.

My people are checking out the details of your list to make sure that nothing has been overlooked in their planning and operations. They have not the slightest doubt about the urgency of keeping up pressures on the communists.

And much is being done. I would not be coy with you and flutter the veil of secrecy but it is a fact that much of what is done in the cold war would become ineffective if surfaced and therefore has to be and is conducted in secrecy. Because of this, it is easy to get the impression that we are not acting vigorously. For the same reason, there is more of a coordinated effort with our allies than meets the eye.

I would be the first one to admit that it is not enough; we can never be complacent on that score. But the will is there, the organization has had many of the kinks worked out of it, and we have never yet had to hold back from anything really important merely from lack of money.

I hope this will afford you some assurance that the effort is being pursued. Your thoughts and ideas on it will always be most welcome.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

3-65616

Executive Registry
10-2110

**General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York**

Dear David,

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It took some time after World War II for this country to come alive to the peril, but there seems to be no possibility of return to the misconceptions of war and immediate post war era. Certainly the government itself has no intention of revoking the general intent of policies that consistently since 1947 have attempted to keep this country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of communistic Soviet imperialism. Even the organization of the government is bent in this direction and, as you know, my own agency has certain functions based directly on the governmental will to enter into this field.

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

3-7389

90 JAN 1958

10-717

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Reply to Mr. David Sarnoff.

1. It is my understanding that you wish to reply to Mr. David Sarnoff's essay on the cold war in some detail. A proposed reply is attached in draft form because it is expected that you may wish to make changes because of the subject matter and your personal relationship with Mr. Sarnoff.

2. Any answer, other than a mere acknowledgment, opens the possibility of an extended debate through the mails. However, an answer must grapple with the issues that Mr. Sarnoff raises. I suggest that this draft letter faces them in a fashion that rounds off the exchange of letters without encouraging debate.

(Signed) Desmond FitzGerald

**Desmond FitzGerald
Chief**

25X1

✓cc: DDCI



Attachment

**Proposed reply to
Mr. David Sarnoff.**

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01774R000700010017-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DCI

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS


COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01187R000700010017-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM: DCI			NO.	
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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P-1102

103-6561A
Executive Registry
10-2110

**General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York**

Dear David,

Your outline of ideas for prosecution of the "cold war" was stimulating. I appreciate the detail into which you went and therefore want to comment in return, over and above my original acknowledgment of receipt. You have given me too much food for thought in your letter to permit my comments to be formulated quickly.

You stipulate that there must be a will to undertake a political and psychological counter-offensive against the USSR. I think it can be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it does, in fact, exist. Every now and then seemingly attractive propositions obtain attention and hold out hope of some near-miraculous overall solution. If they are based on the shaky premises that the Soviets also dislike international tension, that they can be mollified by appeasement, or that basic issues between two enemy systems can be solved at a quick high-level meeting, they do not last very long because the basic good sense of the American public recognizes that acceptance of these premises could lead us into mortal danger.

It took some time after World War II for this country to come alive to the peril, but there seems to be no possibility of return to the misconceptions of war and immediate post war era. Certainly the government itself has no intention of revoking the general intent of policies that consistently since 1947 have attempted to keep this country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of communistic Soviet imperialism. Even the organization of the government is bent in this direction and, as you know, my own agency has certain functions based directly on the governmental will to enter into this field.

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I hope this will afford you some assurance that the effort is being pursued. Your thoughts and ideas on it will always be most welcome.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Signature Recommended:

(Signed) Richard Helms 9 MAR 1958
A/ Deputy Director (Plans) Date

DDP OFitsGerald: 18 March 58

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

2 - ER

1 - DDCI

1 - DDP

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Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DCI

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE


OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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

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P-1102

25X1



**General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York**

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Signature Recommended:

(Signed) Richard Helms 19 MAR 1958
Deputy Director (Plans) Date

25X1 DDP DFitzGerald 18 March 58

25X1 Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - ER
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP

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103-6561A

10-2110

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30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York**

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Signature Recommended:

(Signed) Richard Helms
A/ Deputy Director (Plans) 19 MAR 1958
Date

DDP/ [] DFitzGerald [] 18 March 58

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 2 - ER
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - DDP

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Executive File
10-2110

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Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York**

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dallas
Director

Signature Recommended:

(Signed) Richard Helms
A/ Deputy Director (Plans) 10 MAR 1958
Date

DDP [] DFitzGerald [] 18 March 58

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

- ✓ 2 - ER
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - DDP

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JAN 1958

10-717

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Reply to Mr. David Sarnoff.

1. It is my understanding that you wish to reply to Mr. David Sarnoff's essay on the cold war in some detail. A proposed reply is attached in draft form because it is expected that you may wish to make changes because of the subject matter and your personal relationship with Mr. Sarnoff.

2. Any answer, other than a mere acknowledgment, opens the possibility of an extended debate through the mails. However, an answer must grapple with the issues that Mr. Sarnoff raises; I suggest that this draft letter faces them in a fashion that rounds off the exchange of letters without encouraging debate.

(Signed) Desmond FitzGerald

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief

25X1

cc: DDCI

Attachment:

Proposed reply to
Mr. David Sarnoff.

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Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01734R000700010017-0

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

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NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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P-1102

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0

2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0

ER 9-6272/a

✓
10' 00

Mr. David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
RCA Building
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

12/3/61

Dear Mr. Sarnoff:

In the absence of Mr. Dulles, may I acknowledge and thank you for your letter of August 15 and the copy of the report which was enclosed.

As Mr. Dulles will not return until around the middle of September, I have placed the report in the proper hands here for evaluation and distribution, and will bring this to his attention when he is back in the office.

Once again, your courtesy is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED)

[Redacted Signature]

STAT

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O/DCI/[Redacted]rc/16 Aug 57 [Redacted]
Rewritten 19 Aug 57 Assistant to the Director

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - OO/C - Attn: [Redacted] w/basic
- 1 - JAS
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Reading

15 03 58 52

ILLEGIB

[Redacted Box]



25X1

20 JUN 1957

General David Sarnoff ✓ *card*
Chairman of the Board
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear Dave:

Many thanks for sending me the material
on television in Germany.

This data largely confirms that which we
have obtained from other sources and, as such,
it is very helpful to us. I greatly appreciate
your thoughtfulness in passing it on.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

STAT O/DCI/[redacted]rc/13 Jun 57

Rewritten 17 Jun 57

Rewritten 18 Jun 57

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DD/I w/basic for info

1 - Col. Grogan

1 - JAS

1 - ER

1 - Reading

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12/3/57

ILLEGIB

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE [redacted])

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14 June 1957

25X1

[redacted]

Room 227, Administration Building

25X1

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the attached report on East and West German television prepared [redacted] and sent informally to the DCI by General Sarnoff.

25X1

We find the report quite useful. It very largely confirms the data that has been obtained by the Agency from numerous other sources. The only significant difference concerns the number of TV receivers in use in East Germany. [redacted] figure is 200,000, while our best estimate for the end of 1956 is closer to 100,000. At the moment we agree in general with

25X1

[redacted] estimate on the potential of television in the area as an effective medium of mass communication for propaganda and other purposes. We also agree with his interesting comments and estimates on the intentions of both East and West Germany to provide area and some inter-area television coverage.

As you know, the importance of the role assigned to television by the Kremlin for the USSR and, probably through Kremlin influence, for the EuSats, is reflected in the dynamism with which ambitious plans are being prosecuted to establish television stations, television network facilities, and a broad reception base.

25X1

We have taken a copy of the attached report for our files. It is suggested, however, that the report be passed [redacted] for processing and distribution in the normal way.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
Chief, ORR [redacted]

Attachment:
Report on East and West German Television.

X

ILLEGIB

[redacted]

12/3/8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

25X1

Attached is an evaluation of the paper
General Sarnoff sent you.

25X1

After you have seen this, we will pass

25X1

it on

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

17 Jun 57
(DATE)

Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0

RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA
RCA BUILDING
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.



DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

November 4, 1957

Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

Thank you for your note. I am glad that you found my speech of October 29 of interest and I send you herewith a dozen copies for such use as you may wish to make of it. If you want any additional copies, please do not hesitate to ask for them.


With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,



25X1

12/3/61



25X1

ER 9-8126/a

OCT 30 1957

General David Barnoff
Chairman of the Board
Radio Corporation of America
NCA Building
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear Dave:

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your
October 29 address.

The subject of your discussion is of great
interest to me and I note your kind reference
to me in your speech.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Signed

Allen W. Dulles
Director

O/DCI/ [redacted] 28 Oct 57

Dist:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - AAB

~~1~~ - ER w/basic

1 - Reading

102A OCT 30 1957

P. S. Would appreciate receiving some additional
copies of your address in order that I might pass
them on to some of my people.

12/3/61

9-8126

RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA
RCA BUILDING
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.



DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

October 24, 1957

Honorable Allen Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

General Sarnoff has asked me to send you an advance copy of the address which he is scheduled to deliver in Washington on October 29 at the Third Annual Meeting of the Association of the U. S. Army. You will note that the release date is 9:00 A. M. , Tuesday, October 29, 1957.

Sincerely,

Ella E. Helberg
Secretary

x

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Colonel Grogan		11-6-57
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The "note" mentioned in attached letter is the Director's 30 Oct letter sent to General Sarnoff thanking him for sending a copy of the 29 Oct address (copy attached for your info - pls return).

The 4 Nov letter from General Sarnoff does not appear to require an answer.

Do you agree.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
Assistant to the Director		6 Nov 57

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THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES
IN THEIR RELATION
TO
U. S. STRATEGY AND POLICY

By

DAVID SARNOFF

October 29, 1957

THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES IN THEIR
RELATION TO U. S. STRATEGY AND POLICY

ADDRESS

BY

DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA

AT THE

THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE U S. ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OCTOBER 29, 1957

**THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES IN THEIR
RELATION TO U. S. STRATEGY AND POLICY**

The part of the subject assigned to me for discussion this morning is "The Importance of Allies in Their Relation to U. S. Strategy and Policy." If my remarks do not correspond to the precise wording of the title, I hope you may regard them, nevertheless, as pertinent to the main theme of our Conference.

That we cannot dispense with allies is, of course, too obvious to require elaboration. Whatever isolationist illusions may have survived the Second World War have been washed out by a decade of headlong progress in aeronautics, electronics and nuclear science.

We live in a world so shrunken that political and social explosions anywhere produce instant and frequently serious tremors everywhere. Like it or not, we have become in large measure our brother's keeper. Areas on the world map which not long ago seemed too remote and exotic to interest anyone but archeologists and anthropologists have now become items of front-page news, objects of Cold War rivalry and seedbeds of international trouble.

One of the main objectives of Soviet intrigue and diplomacy has been to isolate the United States by stripping it of friends and allies. Every symptom of free-world disunity — of what the Communists call “contradictions in the camp of imperialism” — brings joy to the Kremlin. Moscow has used everything from cajolery to blackmail in its drive to break up NATO and other defensive alliances. It has not hesitated to make naked threats of nuclear annihilation against country after country aligned with the West.

This concentration of enemy effort should be sufficient proof of the critical importance, at our end, of strengthening existing alliances and winning new friends among the so-called uncommitted nations. Every affirmation of free-world solidarity is a body-blow to Soviet policy. But the allies, actual and potential, whom I propose to emphasize, are in another and too often neglected dimension.

CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE OUR ALLIES

I refer not to nations but to peoples: to millions of men and women on the dark side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains who hate their Soviet chains and whose cause is therefore our cause. They are the secret legions of freedom deployed on farms and in factories, in schools and offices, in the Armed Forces and even in the ranks of the ruling parties, throughout the Soviet empire.

This week marks an anniversary at once glorious and tragic. It was in the last week of October one year ago that the people of Hungary made their thrilling bid for freedom. Those who scoffed at the possibility that

the victims of Communist dictatorship could ever rise against their masters received a flaming answer, as they had received it a few months earlier in Poznan, Poland, and three years before in East Germany and in Siberian slave camps like Vorkuta.

We know, as the Kremlin knows, that the Hungarian people have not surrendered in their hearts, and await only a favorable opportunity to strike again. Tanks and machine-guns can impose sullen obedience but not allegiance. And we know that the same explosive forces of discontent and despair, the same God-given hungers for freedom and human dignity, are maturing under the surface of every other Communist-held land, including Russia itself.

It has long been my conviction that those who plan our strategy and policy should at all times take this element in the world equation into their calculations. Internal tensions on every level of Soviet society represent the weakest links in the Kremlin's chain of power and therefore our greatest opportunity for making common cause with the direct victims of Communism.

For many years we have seen the fateful contest between two worlds on which depends the future not alone of our own country but of the human race. On at least one front of this complex struggle, the one involving communications, I have been not only an onlooker but a participant. And it has seemed to me increasingly clear that the contest is essentially *a war of ideas*. Abstractly, this has been so widely acknowledged that it has the ring of a platitude. But concretely, we have not yet translated the platitude into policy and action of the necessary potency and on the necessary scale.

TECHNOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY

At the conclusion of World War II we witnessed the emergence of two spectacular species of force, seemingly at the very opposite ends of the spectrum of power. One was *technological*, dramatized in V-1 and V-2 missiles in the European theatre, and in the first atomic bombs on the other side of the globe. The other was *ideological*, manifest in the thunderous clash of 'isms, the collapse of old colonial empires, the dynamic Soviet challenge to the very foundations of our civilization. Since then, both species have unfolded and expanded at a dizzying pace.

At the technological end, we have seen breath-taking aeronautic, electronic and nuclear progress, now converging in a climactic weapon: the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capable of delivering unprecedented destruction and death from any point on this earth to any other point. The artificial "moon," launched by the Soviets early this month which circled our globe every 95 minutes, is a symbol of scientific achievement packed with peril to the human race.

At the ideological end, the unfolding has crystallized in what has come to be called the Cold War — in political offensives, propaganda duels, psychological campaigns, wars of nerves. Taken together, these are changing the patterns of human society more deeply than did any shooting war in our recorded past.

Technology and ideology — these span the fields of tension now prevailing everywhere. Though so different in character — one being in the domain of matter, the other in the domain of mind and spirit — they are

nevertheless part of a single challenge. The penalty for ignoring or underrating the ideological end and concentrating almost entirely on the technological end of the great span, can be total defeat. The surest way to prevent it is to *win* the Cold War. *For we can freeze to death as well as burn to death.*

The alarming fact is that, in the free world today, there is nowhere near the concentration on the ideological front that there is on the technological front. At first, in the immediate postwar years, we ignored both sections of the span. We dismantled our magnificent military machine and at the same time gave unimpeded right of way to Communist mischief in both Europe and Asia. It took a series of major disasters — the conquest of Czechoslovakia, the fall of China, the Korean aggression — to splinter our smugness.

Belatedly and reluctantly we recognized the reality of the Cold War and the danger of a Hot War. So we went to the aid of Greece, launched the Marshall Plan, undertook the building of defensive alliances, and started large-scale military programs.

Sputnik — the Soviet-made satellite — streaking through our American skies, is significant proof that Russia is making greater and faster progress in technology than was expected even by some of our experts. We have seen, too, how cleverly and swiftly the Communist leaders exploit their technological advances to create a psychological impact upon people everywhere.

COLD FACTS OF THE COLD WAR

Because military forces and weapons in the hands of ruthless dictators represent a more familiar type of menace, our people over the years have been more

readily aroused to organize and sacrifice in this area. The ideological challenge seemed somehow too vague and esoteric to galvanize us into full action. The pervasive fear of nuclear war, in fact, fostered the delusion that we were enjoying peace, though in truth our world, our interests, our system of human values were under continuous assault.

Not without bruised egos, we have gone through several binges of wishful thinking. Recall how recently, after Stalin's death, some people hailed the end of the Cold War because of a supposed New Look and a Diplomacy of Smiles in Moscow. Then something called the "Geneva spirit" was born on a Swiss summit. That blithe spirit, alas, had already departed by the time Khrushchev and Bulganin came to England to celebrate its birth.

Only this July, when old-timers like Molotov and Kaganovich bit the dust, our mood was one of hopeful speculation. The hope applied in particular to the talks on disarmament then under way in London, talks that soon thereafter petered out in the usual futility.

One after another these desperate hopes have foundered on the rocks of Communist inflexibility of purpose. The temporary balmy weather has not melted the ice of the Cold War. Soviet foreign policy just now is as tough and aggressive, its blasts against the free nations are as chill and blustery, as in some of the nastiest Stalin seasons.

Gromyko at the United Nations Assembly still made some of the familiar noises about "peaceful coexistence," but he left no doubt that we could have that blessed commodity only on strictly Communist terms.

Since the launching of Russia's artificial satellite, Khrushchev has joined this chorus by suggesting a Two-Power deal, over the heads of our allies. Red propaganda continues to play variations on the theme of "relaxing tensions" but it is only background music while the Communists go on steadily blowing up little troubles into big ones. Moscow, in short, exploits our yearning for peace, as the best way of destroying any sense of urgency, on our part, in relation to the political struggle.

Soviet Russia's influence in world affairs is growing. For the first time in history, Russia has obtained a foothold in the Middle East and thereby in the entire Mediterranean. Its naval ships prowl the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, while Soviet arms and planes and submarines pour into Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Communists have won control in a key state in India and in British Guiana; pro-Western leaders have been ousted in Ceylon; Moscow's influence grows apace in Indonesia; Red China has intensified its pressures on Burma, South Vietnam and other neighbors.

Only two weeks ago, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, publicly voiced anxiety about the continuing Soviet infiltration and subversion "in most of the countries of Asia and Africa." He said: "This process is going on. How far it has got varies. But the Communist forces are at work, eating away — an implacable, unrelenting onward movement."

Most serious of all, in the context of the war of ideas, the Communists retain substantial initiative in the propaganda duel, often to the point of monopoly. Despite its barbarous behavior in Hungary, Soviet

Russia still gets away with the outrageous pose of champion of anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa. Even while brandishing its ballistic missile and its space satellite, it is accepted by millions the world over as the noble champion of peace and nuclear disarmament. The spokesmen of freedom and genuine peace are still on the defensive.

THE CRITICAL TIME ELEMENT

Time for an adequate Cold War offensive — not a mere holding action but an offensive geared to victory — is running out. If we are to prevent defeat in this area we must intensify our efforts in the field of psychological warfare, which I prefer to call *psychological peacefare*.

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, concluded a recent address in San Francisco with these words: "The people of Russia, if given the time to continue their evolution to freedom out of the narrow bounds of Communist dictatorship, will themselves help to find a peaceful solution." He put his finger on the most important "if" — *the time element*.

For the shadow of the ultimate weapon grows more ominous on the horizons of human affairs. If we are to win the Cold War, or at least obtain the upper hand in it, this must be done before mankind is overwhelmed by the holocaust of hydrogen war.

And this brings me back to the technological pole in that arch of power. The Kremlin recently announced a successful test of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,

and claimed that it had reached its target area "a huge distance" away.

The Moscow announcement on the I.C.B.M. may be exaggerated but it is not safe to rely on that assumption. The crucial fact is that the perfection of this weapon is now inevitable. Both sides know its principles and techniques. It is only a matter of time, therefore, before both sides have an operational missile, after which its mass production will become as routine as the present production of atomic bombs. Here, again, *the time element* is all-important.

DANGERS OF 'DREADFUL PARITY'

Because electronics is at the heart of this weapon, I have been close enough to its development to believe that this climax will be reached within five years, and possibly sooner. At that point the prime rivals will have achieved the stalemate that figures in my own mind as *Dreadful Parity*.

An edifice of wishful thinking has been erected on that Dreadful Parity. But I, for one, am convinced that it rests on shifting sands, not on the granite of reality. The argument goes that with each side capable of annihilating the other, war will have become "impossible" — "unthinkable" is the consoling word most often used.

The argument makes logic. But unhappily logic is not the final or even the main ingredient in the conduct of men and nations. Emotion, raised to a pitch of hysteria by the very magnitude of the menace, may vanquish reason. Catastrophe could be touched off by miscalculation. The temptation to strike a sudden

knockout blow may prove insuperable to madmen in places of power, to paranoiac fanatics, to dictators in a mood of desperation. We cannot know who will be Khrushchev's successor in the Kremlin, nor how soon he may appear.

Secretary of State Dulles makes an ominous observation in an article in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*. "Such weapons," he writes, "might in the future get into the hands of irresponsible dictators and be used as a form of international blackmail." They may, indeed, and that opens up another vista of danger in the hour of Dreadful Parity.

What if Red China, with a Soviet gift of missiles in its possession, chooses to end the impasse in Formosa or Korea at one blow? What if a Nasser, or some new pocket-edition Hitler who may emerge in the interim, has a nervous finger on the pushbutton of thermo-nuclear doom? What starts as blackmail can end as bombing.

No doubt it is true that "nobody wants a third world war." It is the kind of generalization, however, that breeds dangerous complacency. In effect it enables the Communists to operate with impunity as long as their aggressions are too small in scope, and well enough spaced in time, to avoid the showdown.

Moscow is too wise to risk a challenge so immense and alarming that free peoples will be shocked into armed resistance. Instead it spreads its challenge thin — in a series of moves, no single one of which would provoke or justify war. Yet the sum-total of seemingly minor and unrelated Soviet victories could amount to absolute defeat for the West. When the current Syrian

episode, for instance, is evaluated a few years hence in the mosaic of an array of "Syrias" it may be recognized as infinitely more provocative than it looks right now.

TWO VITAL PRINCIPLES

It seems to me vital that we grasp two principles: First, the more "unthinkable" a final showdown becomes, the more successful the Soviets will be in their *strategy of nibbling* on what remains of our freedom and independence. Second, the more terrifying weapons become, the more effective becomes the Communist *strategy of intimidation*.

The dangers inherent in both these strategies have been immensely enlarged by the Soviet triumph in launching the first artificial satellite. Its military importance is not immediate. But its psychological impact is immediate and can be very harmful. It adds enormously to Soviet Russia's capacity to frighten small nations into neutralism or submission and to exact political blackmail from some big nations. More than ever before, a world with its eyes fixed upon the Soviet-made "moon" will be inclined to yield on a piecemeal basis rather than risk war.

Let us grant, for argument's sake, that a military stalemate would cancel out the chance of a decision by a Hot War, as so many believe it will. Doesn't this, in common sense, imply that the decision will be sought by the Communists on another level, by other means? The importance of the Cold War would actually be multiplied a hundredfold. And this makes the struggle, by means short of total war, our paramount concern.

THE GREAT NEED — TO WIN THE COLD WAR

The stakes are too high to gamble survival on the thin margin of hope that logic will prevail. For even sheer accident may wash out hopes geared to logic. We must do all we can to prevent a Hot War and I firmly believe that the surest way to prevent it is to fight and *win* the Cold War.

After all, we are not without opportunities for taking the initiative. The Soviet empire is racked by inner pressures, problems and dangers. The enemy expertly exploits our internal tensions, yet his own tensions are vastly greater.

The *moral* prestige of Soviet Communism — after the disclosures of Stalin's crimes during twenty-five of the forty Soviet years, and after the barbarous suppression of the Hungarian people — is lower than ever before. It has taken a nose dive especially within the Communist world itself. The Soviet intellectuals, whose number is growing larger all the time, are reaching out more courageously for some mental and creative freedoms. Students and young people generally are ever bolder in asking questions and rejecting party-line answers. The peasantry still remains unreconciled to its collectivized fate. The people's elementary needs for food, clothes, housing, everyday consumer goods are still being met with promissory notes that are being repeatedly renewed rather than fulfilled. Meanwhile, the murderous struggle for power among the hierarchs goes on without abatement.

Khrushchev and his henchmen are caught in a dilemma. Their economy and the rise of a newly educated managerial class require some degree of per-

sonal freedom and initiative. But when the terror is relaxed, all the pent-up hostility of the people breaks to the surface in demands that threaten the survival of the regime. So their policy swings in panic between gestures of moderation and renewals of terror.

This certainly does not mean that we can sit back and wait for Communism to disintegrate from within. That would be to forget *the time element* — the ticking clock of the coming Dreadful Parity. No, we must and can hasten the processes of disintegration with every resource at our disposal — moral, psychological, political, diplomatic, economic. We must make common cause with the millions of Communist victims already our allies and draw tens of millions more into the alliance. We must increase pressures against the Soviets from every possible direction. There is a NATO for combined *Military Defense*. Is it too much to hope that a NATO can be formed for combined operations on *Political Defense*?

I believe that we have possibly five years within which to take the necessary steps to head off catastrophe for the human race. But, the perils we face and the urgency of the situation, admonish us not to waste even five minutes of this precious time. The free world under American leadership must concentrate its best energies and resources on the supreme task of weakening World Communism — from within and from outside — to the point where it ceases to be a peril. When this is accomplished, the United Nations will have the first real opportunity to achieve agreement between nations on a practical program of disarmament and to establish effective safeguards against nuclear devastation.

Even in this period of grace before the advent of Dreadful Parity, physical force will, of course, weigh heavily in the scales. The Soviets have invariably put bombs before bread and shoes, despite the serious risk to their political stability involved in depriving their people of bread and shoes.

We must exert our best efforts to lead, and in all events not to fall behind in the race for weapon ascendancy. We must maintain well-balanced forces for air, ground and sea. We must resolve whatever inter-service conflicts there may be in the field of ballistic missiles and related weapons, and speed up their development into operational forms.

We must stimulate our promising young people to pursue courses in science, engineering and related subjects and increase their opportunities to obtain an education in these fields. The effectiveness of modern industry, as well as modern weapons, depends upon an adequate supply of trained manpower. At the same time, the United States must preserve and fortify its ability to intercede quickly and decisively in menacing situations short of general war. We must preserve our economic strength and maintain our financial stability. We must stockpile and protect the sources of vital strategic materials and help sustain the military health of our allies and friends. This is indispensable insurance.

To attain all these objectives, we must have an informed public whose interest and criticism can be determining factors in the struggles we confront. The freedom to criticize is a basic and precious right of American Democracy. But criticism, especially in the

perilous times we face, should be constructive and not destructive. Where we do not agree with their policies or actions, we may criticize our responsible officials in Government and urge our views upon them. At the same time, we must help our Government to carry its heavy load of responsibility. We should support reasonable requests for appropriations that may be necessary to increase our National Security.

The patriotism of our people, the ingenuity of our scientists and engineers, the skill of our labor, the efficiency and productive capacity of our industrial plants, and the dedicated men and women serving in the Armed Forces and in other branches of our Government, make it possible for us to accomplish all these tasks and to maintain our power as the leading nation in the world.

But physical power, by itself, is not enough. It must be accompanied by spiritual faith, political wisdom and human understanding. They must be so employed that the ideas and the emotions moving men become vital factors in determining the outcome of any conflict. This has been true, in varying degrees, throughout history. Today that truth is all-important.

It is late, but not too late, to face up to the imperatives of the Cold War. In the battle for men's minds, Soviet successes have been due less to the genius of the Kremlin than to the lethargy of the West. We can still turn the Kremlin's own weapons against World Communism — and we can lead not from weakness but from genuine strength.

