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February 20 1959.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Because of the family interest as well as its diplomatic import, I am enclosing tear-sheets containing my exclusive interview with Robert Lansing, Secretary of State under Mr. Wilson during World War I, which the latter suppressed, for reasons never learned. I found some missing sheets of the original script, believed lost, not long ago. They contain the changes and corrections he made, twice at his library in the 18th Street home.

26 Feb 59

That 1916 summer was a hectic period, far more than it is these days, with Germany having declared a sink-everything policy, and the "spectre" of Mr. Hughes as the next White House incumbent. I was in that campaign, interviewing at presidential level, this having been my exclusive field, and I alone having interviewed all, Theodore to Franklin Roosevelt, both inclusive, and missing Truman by an editorial fluke.

The interview, a veritable State paper, intended for the Saturday Evening Post, in which I had landed another by Sec. Knox in 1912 (I always a non-staff specialist after a most unsatisfactory staff connection on the Washington Star, as first international expert in American journalism. 1905-1907) and another with Sec. Bryan. My last was with Sec. Hull, but it never reached publication.

As dean of all Washington writers, trained in diplomacy by two foremost ambassadors in my teens as special if unofficial secretary, from just before the Boxer troubles of 1900, my international vista has been second to none. It was I who put the Department of State on the front page, in 1909, as specialist for the then famous and authoritative New York World. I coined the term Dollar Diplomacy, and thereby transferred the seat of world news from Paris and London to Washington. Mine, in 1913, was the first news observer tour of record, being received, by highest accreditation, at Downing Street and other like spots all the way to St. Petersburg. Having interviewed Wilson in the campaign of 1912, together with President Taft and former President Theodore Roosevelt (a beat I myself surpassed in 1920 with the SEPost's Harding-Cox-Coolidge-FDR), I was the first in the European capitals who knew the then newly inaugurated Wilson, and could authoritatively describe him and his planned

policies. A most interested auditor was Pius X, second Pope to receive me in private audience, Leo XIII having bidden me good-bye and Godspeed before I left as a lad of 11 my natal Rome for the United States. Pius XI in 1924.

Dollar Diplomacy, which we have had under several aliases despite its "being killed off" by several administrations, is a Webster term but the dictionary misinterprets as did so many politicians. Actually, it was based on the Taft credo of peace, "dollars in lieu of bullets," not as a means of infiltration--it was still the era of expansion by force--but much as aid has been given of late years for local betterment.

Were I news writing again, which I have not been able to do because lacking a suitable important medium (my last was Henry Ford's Dearborn Independent, in which I serialized my explanation of fascism, I being in Rome when the black shirts came that 1922, but recorded many other exclusives or firsts, I'd emphasize our aid policy as Dollar Diplomacy.

It was I that in 1950 exposed the genesis of soviet so-called diplomacy, in the venerable Catholic World. It was the result of information I had obtained, the hint coming at Downing Street when talking with Sir Edward (Grey), but the subject matter did not seem more than academic, so no editor felt like using it. Mine also was the first allusion to the possibility of an American Pope, back in 1909, revived in 1950--just now recent news--and the fact that a Catholic can and will be President. President Roosevelt himself said a Jew too would be--and that statement was made around 1907. Too bad my War Industries Board chief, the incomparable Baruch, is 25 years too old-----

Actually, I was around the White House, mostly as a non-reporting visitor, except on special occasions dealing with the Presidents themselves, when mass or mob reporting as nowadays hadn't become the farce it is, no matter how it looks in print next day. President Cleveland himself showed me around the then Executive Mansion, late 1896, and down to DDE, for reasons he knows nothing about but stupid, my appearances at occasional press meetings were always ex cathedra. For none of the correspondents of my time could even dream of duplicating my exclusives or status here or abroad.

Secretary Lansing, knowing of my confidential relations with Secretaries Daniels and Baker, plus others, privileged me with the enclosed 43-year-old talk. A later article we prepared together, for his sole signature, one of a "war" series, went through in 1918.

Because I retained my Italian nationality until we went to war in 1917, and a disagreement I had with Italian representatives here and in Rome, and knowing all the intricacies

of social as well as official protocol in those strict days of such observance, I was personally credentialed by them to their chiefs abroad. American reporters, aside from the two or three routine department men who made no pretense to cover more than handouts, were still provincial as were the newspapers, with the exception of the Star, and this was an experiment. But it was too parochial and stingy. When in 1906 several Latin American envoys wished me to visit their countries, I having written about that area often, and I wished to go along with the Root party, but in no way connected with it, the editors almost died when I asked for an expense account of not much over \$500. Today they spend thousands for trivia.

But most important is the fact that in March, 1910, I disclosed the basic war plans Japan made against the United States, a global sensation. If Secretary Knox had had his way, the chances were for a casus belli. He even accused my also good friend James Bryce, British Ambassador, of representing a nation that tried to play both ways--as long was the case, and still may be. Baron Komura denied the charge in a cable that was printed facsimile on the front page, but the Foreign Minister's was doubletalk.

Curiously, FDR, whom I had known in a special way for 31 years, and last saw him just before he left for Yalta, had known of this forecast, and it came up around 1923, after he left his bedroom, when he told me point-blank that if he were a Japanese and could not land on our coast he would commit harakiri. Yet at the moment when my news was so tragically confirmed after 31 years as Pearl Harbor, he seemed as if his past ideas had evaporated. Moreover, it was I who in 1913 turned his mind definitely towards aerial warfare, so in that sense, journalistically, I am the godfather of nuclear war strategy. I knew of the atomic secret research from the start--the long well kept secret that spies and traitors passed on to Moscow.

Hence, from Hay's open-door, and he was the first to be disliked by Japan, as was TR later, my vista internationally has been second to none.

Last year I had a minor feud with the Department of State over the matter of my receiving an invitation from Mao Tze-tung for an interview. In my Star days I wrote much about China and I was quite close to Wu Ting fang, the still celestially robed representative. He too wished me to go to Peking for a look.

Because of past letters with Mr. Dulles, in 1944 and later, in which he recognized my unusual status, I thought he might make an exception for me. Mr. Berding took over, and gave me the reasons I could not accept, considering

inapplicable to me or my case. Who else of the hundreds now, and thousands of the come-and-gone Washington newspaper representatives, could come within a thousand miles of my coverage? Or standing here and abroad? So I was "downgraded" to the job lot of scribes, most of whom just parrot one another, and their analyses or dope offered ad nauseam. How any one man can turn out endlessly a measured space of original material is one of those idiocies that my profession seems to thrive under. I went days without writing a word. When I wrote I filled the space according to the import of my news.

Did I forecast the Mexican revolution that led to the Diaz flight? I did. I was given the description of what was to come by the man who engineered it. That was in 1910. The World, which had always used my material without change, used but a few lines. And in 1913, traveling from Rome on the Paris Express (which I took purposely, though changing at Pisa for Berlin) I saw ex-Presidente Diaz, and from me he learned what had happened and why--though I did not give him the name of my informant. The latter was executed some years later. In 1942 I asked my old friend Ambassador Daniels if he could in any way find out some of the in-between details of Juan Pedro Didapp, but it seems that the files had been ransacked by the various interests who wanted no incriminating records around.

Yet Ambassador de la Barra, who became provisional President, just as predicted that too, had tried hard to learn from me the identity of said Didapp, characterizing him as a troublemaker. Curiously, the film VIVA ZAPATA! reveals just those episodes.

I tried several times to start for an over-the-world trip, to visit retired friends or their relatives or successors. Just as now I understand the do Amaral of Brazil, who had been secretary in the days of Nabuco in 1906 and later ambassador, is reported as living in quiet age.

My premise was and remains that one of the first tenets of diplomacy is to make an exception when an exception is due, no matter what rule is detoured. I premised that with both Secretary Dulles but my correspondence went to Mr. Berding, and he rigidly held to his "mass" theory. It was my loss in a way but the greater loss the Department's.

My tutor, as it were, was Jules Cambon, acclaimed as the world's foremost diplomat (though I later doubted this on the record), and he the man behind Clemenceau at the 1919 Peace Conference. I saw him that year in Paris, after the debacle, and he gave me details of what really happened--and Wilson never realizing that House and Lansing and others had urged him not to go there as a "delegate."

The break between Wilson and Lansing actually began with

the suppression of the enclosed interview. It was but an invisible crack but it matured with the 1920 firing.

Another mistake was FDR's. When he mentioned that Italy had stabbed France in the back in 1940, echoing Churchill, equally ignorant on the point as I wrote the latter, this country forgot how it had shortchanged Rome at the Versailles meeting. We played in the Lloyd George-Clemenceau hands; Wilson the historian was totally and tragically ignorant of the complicated and underground jealousies and ambitions. So Mussolini could not trust Washington anew--not with Paris and London as shadowing the White House.

There was Caporetto, occasionally revived as an Italian example of bad soldiering and the like. Yes? In fact, it was due to our own stupidity here. Instead of sending such equipment as was needed for mountain warfare, which Washington on-the-desk-spurred officers knew nothing of, West Point or no West Point, it had been diverted through intrigue to the English and French forces. I had warned Italian Ambassador Cellere of Italian ignorance in dealing with Washington, and Lonon too, but to no good. When Marconi came here in 1920 or thereabouts to learn what had happened to a billion or so Liberty Loan dollars granted to Italy, nobuddy knew nuttin.'

I told Secretary Baker about the situation and he thought of sending me to Italy as secret special representative--to see what was what. That was the end of October. I was offered a captaincy. I wanted a colonelship, for my diplomatic knowledge and experience, and as a proof of my standing with rank-conscious foreigners. It was agreed--a matter of just days, perhaps hours, when the false armistice was announced, and a week later the war was over. At the time I was personnel officer under Mr. Baruch.

I was responsible for the recall of Ambassador Aoki of Japan and perhaps of the no-return departure of Cellere, who traveled with the Wilsons, and his still suspicious end. I knew his mother--an eccentric woman who groomed her own horses when she had fits of firing her servants. The Cellere had a villino around the corner from us near Piazza dell'Indipendenza, and on this square was the residence of Larz Anderson, a secretary of the American Embassy, where my pet cat got locked in the cellar and came home dying.

My long planned book of Washington of my time, with revelations without which no Americana of the period can be authentic or complete, has suffered vicissitudes, and the second war complicated matters. So now and then I publish some timely and relevant item that will be part of its backbone. I have no illusions about the situation, personal or official, and as a nonvoter I have retained implicit objectivity. And as a Roman with a family name 2000 yearsold I

have an atavistic tendency to be satirical though constructive. I never reported anything critical without offering an idea or plan or suggestion. Unfortunately, as the world over, one of the general ills is the fixation that election or appointment to high office carries with it sapience and experience automatically. What an idiocy!

I have a wonderful note from former President Hoover, as a result of some comments about what he terms the "tragedy of Wilson." Well, I published all but one of the facts in 1921, the very week he stepped from the White House. The remaining secret I may not be able to divulge so long as one or two individuals are alive. But it is the key to what happened to Woodrow.

That too was a journalistic novelty. I went to see Mr. Hoover at his Palo Alto residence in 1934, two years after he left Washington. I wrote an article explaining the Hoover truth--that he had nothing to do with the depression, which Al Smith would have suffered had he been elected, and the said depression a telegonic result that began either under Taft or under Wilson, and postponed by the war. Not an editor wanted to touch the story. Hoover was "mud." Use of his name would alienate thousands of readers, they said. So it appeared in the Catholic World in 1951, 17 years after, and then everybody "discovered" the new Hoover! What a joke if not so tragic!


I agree with Herbert Hoover, and Bernard M. Baruch, that the advantage of growing old (of course in good health and lively memory) is the store of remembrances, participation or personal presence or knowledge on the spot. Yet many of these men don't know all. None got around as I did. None had met so many from so many places on such personally confidential basis.

When President Roosevelt had me summoned in 1906 to add to something I had published about China, he admitted he himself, and the Department of State, did not know what I might know. It is the only instance of a President, and then Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, that a journalist was credited with knowing more than the government. And Truman a month ago said that the President has access to information no one else has! Well, his record proves otherwise or faulty eisegesis.

I sent copies of the magazine to Mrs. Dulles, so she may take one to the Secretary for reading when he is up to it. I believe this is due you if only as a "family" factor.

Sincerely yours,

To Mr. Allen W. Dulles.






DAUGHTERS  
of the  
AMERICAN  
EVOLUTION  
MAGAZINE

JANUARY 1959

**PUBLISHED BY THE NATIONAL SOCIETY DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION**



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THIS JANUARY NUMBER OF THE MAGAZINE is the first to be issued in the size authorized by the National Board of Management on October 15. We have been told that not only is the format more modern but that printing costs will be lower than those for the former Magazine. In a time when the costs of almost everything have soared, your D.A.R. Magazine is still only \$2.00 a year. We have assembled an interesting group of feature stories for this month; in February we hope to add a section reviewing some of the outstanding books on the Revolution and other subjects of interest to Daughters, as well as letters from our readers.

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Aerial view of Fort Ticonderoga today. In the left foreground are remnants of the French village of trappers and other pioneers that clustered under the protecting battlements of the Fort.

Courtesy, Fort Ticonderoga Museum

# Our Foreign Relations

An Exclusive 1916 and Still Somewhat Timely Interview With Robert Lansing,  
Secretary of State, Unexplainedly Suppressed by President Wilson

By A. R. PINCI

EASILY one half of today's world news, as it appears in the newspapers and other periodicals, consists of topics that are generally termed "foreign affairs." But foreign affairs, instead of being foreign to us as a Nation, are peculiarly our business, on account of the mysterious network of diplomacy, which mothers international relations, of which so much is heard and so little understood.

But what *are* our foreign relations?

That is the paramount question, which only the President of the United States or the Secretary of State can answer. It is a question as well as a riddle, because it involves not only Latin America, Europe, and the Far East, but also international law. International law stands as the riddle, whose complexities grow daily. In granting me the privilege of presenting his views in the press at this overseas war-torn time the Secretary of State in 1916, Robert Lansing, was confronted with the difficulty of explaining in a limited way subjects that half a century hence will be individually described by historians in countless volumes.

The relations of a nation like the United States with the rest of the world, superficially considered either neutral or belligerent, during a terrible war, attain a formidable aspect beside which such subjects as dollar diplomacy and international peace, hobbies of preceding Secretaries of State, were mere child's play.

In the very room facing the wide expanse of Potomac Park, where on two or three occasions I saw John Hay on a diplomatic errand at the time of the "open door," where Elihu Root enthused about our future relations with Latin America, where Philander C. Knox adopted my neologism "dollar diplomacy," and where William Jennings Bryan

proclaimed the desire for universal peace, Robert Lansing in a single statement bared the cause of so much friction among governments in time of war.<sup>1</sup>

"We have," Mr. Lansing said, "an imperfect code of rules that define and govern the relations between belligerents and neutrals. These rules, which have grown up during the past 125 years and have been in some cases differently interpreted by courts of different countries, have been frequently found inadequate to meet new conditions of warfare, and as a result after every war there have been changes, modifications, or additions to the rules, generally through the process of judicial determination of the disputes or questions arising out of the war. Thus the prize courts of belligerents, for example, may become the interpreters of belligerent rights and neutral obligations, and their interpretations often evidence an unconscious prejudice arising from overappreciation of the needs of the belligerent."<sup>2</sup>

"Writers on international law relied upon these prize-court decisions in dealing with the subject of neutrality, so that they have laid down rules formulated indirectly from a belligerent's point of view.<sup>3</sup> In addition to these influences affecting a code to govern the conduct and treat-

<sup>1</sup> When these words were spoken ruthless submarine warfare was commencing; the second Battle of the Somme was underway; a German mine had caused the sinking of the *Hampshire*, with Lord Kitchener aboard, but 6 weeks before.

<sup>2</sup> This comment is quite applicable to the recent Suez Canal dispute and its impact upon the interests and rights of neutral countries.

<sup>3</sup> A new point within this bracket, raised by both Russian and Chinese policy, is what to do about seizing and removing property of citizens of invaded territory, on the plea of *replacement*, before peace treaties and associated agreements can settle and assess reparations, and worse still the abduction of civilians often sent to forced-labor hideaways.

ment of neutrals, international conferences and congresses have generally confided the drafting of rules relating to belligerent and neutral rights to military and naval experts who naturally approach the subject from the belligerent's standpoint. Thus, judicial decisions, textbooks, and international agreements have tended to give all the advantage to belligerents and have shown too little regard for the rights of neutrals."

"What remedy, if any, have you in mind?" was the question.

"It appears to me that the time has come to reverse the process of treatment of the subject of neutrality and to deal with it from the point of view of the neutral," the Secretary said. "I would suggest that the subject might be advantageously divided into two parts: (1) The rights of neutrals on the high seas and (2) the duties of neutrals dependent upon territorial jurisdiction. I have suggested, as a beginning, to the American Institute of International Law that a committee be appointed to study the problem of neutral rights and neutral duties, seeking to formulate in terms the principles underlying the relations of belligerency to neutrality rather than the express rules governing the conduct of a nation at war to a nation at peace, that would give us a substantial foundation for a code of rules."

"Has the present war caused any new conditions?" I asked. "So much has been said, officially, of similar situations in preceding wars that many persons wonder if it is not like going over, diplomatically, old ground."

"So many new conditions have been caused and so many questions have arisen which were never before raised or even thought of that it has been no easy task to meet and answer them. I do not believe that the relations between neutrals and bel-

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DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION MAGAZINE

ligerents were ever more difficult to adjust. It has never been harder to preserve neutral rights from invasion by the determined participants in the present conflict in which the power, if not the life, of the great empires of Europe appears to be at stake.<sup>4</sup>


"The peoples and governments at war are blinded by passion; their opinions are unavoidably biased; their conduct is frequently influenced by hysterical impulses, which is perhaps natural. Patience and forbearance are essential to a neutral government in dealing with such nations. Acts which under normal conditions would immediately arouse indignation must be considered calmly and without temper.

"Then, too, the conduct of our foreign relations is made more difficult because one group of citizens prefers to have their material interests unaffected, even if it comes to abandoning our just rights, while another group insists on demanding rights, because they help one or the other of the belligerents," Secretary Lansing continued after a pause, his pleasant smile fading into an expression of utmost seriousness. "Both groups are to mind un-American. It would be a mistake to listen to either, but the influence which they exert on public opinion increases the difficulties of diplomacy (for the utterances of one group encourages a foreign government to resist our protests and the utterances of the other causes irritation)."

"The people," I remarked, "or at least a portion of the people, seem to be under the impression that they are not taken into the confidence of the administration, and their inability to understand *why* a thing is done or not done makes it appear as high-handed and undemocratic statesmanship."

"International politics are necessarily to a very large extent beneath the surface and do not apparently influence this Government's diplomatic actions. Nevertheless, they do affect such action in many ways and

<sup>4</sup> At the time England, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, and Japan had sided together against Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Germany threatened to commence unrestricted submarine warfare, which became effective February 1, 1917, and forced the United States into the war.



Robert Lansing

more strongly than is supposed. Of course, it would be unwise to disclose this knowledge or to give in every case the reason why a certain policy is adopted. Possibly the apparent reason does not seem a good one to the public at large, and the Government is criticized for its action. As it cannot give the real reason without becoming seriously involved with another Government, it must bear criticism in the hope that the future will justify its policy. Very often the action is the result of conditions which cannot be made public and which may never be made public. It is always my wish to take the people into our confidence, to tell them frankly what the situation is, but you must realize that it cannot be done in every case. The people must try to be patient and trust the Government to do the very best it can in upholding the national honor and dignity and in advancing the interest of its Citizens."

"May I have your views upon the general foreign situation as it concerns the United States?" I asked.

"Yes, in a very general way," Secretary Lansing agreed. "Our relations may be roughly classed as European, Far Eastern, and Pan American. Each embraces the several nations grouped in its geographical distinction; together, they embrace the world. Frequently, we have controversies with all and always with one or the other. Some of these disputes are of grave importance, but the majority are over questions which are constantly arising in regard to the nationals of the respective countries. I assume you are interested especially in the controversies at this time, rather than in the subject of treaties and agreements.

"To begin with, the European situation is extraordinary and requires extraordinary treatment. In a nutshell the situation, which we have to face in our relations with Great Britain and Germany, the representative nations of the two belligerent groups—the two powers with which we have had our principal controversies—is simple. Germany, after developing the submarine as an effective engine of destruction, asserted that she could not, on account of the resulting conditions, conform to the established rules of naval warfare, and we should not, therefore, insist on strict compliance. On the other hand, Great Britain has declared that, on account of the new conditions resulting from submarine activity and the use of mines on the high seas and from the geographical position of Germany, she could not conform to the established rules of blockade and contraband and we should not, therefore, hold her to strict compliance with those rules.

"To complicate matters, Great Britain had no sympathy with the German point of view, demanding that submarines observe the rules of visit and search without exception, while Germany insisted that Great Britain be made to follow the existing law of blockade and contraband.

"The same arguments have been adopted by both governments, based primarily on military necessity, offering the same excuses for their illegal acts, but neither has admitted that the other is in any way justified in its conduct.

"If we admit that the arguments advanced are sound—and I am sure no one will deny that they appear plausible—and submit to changes in the rules of naval warfare, we will be without any standard of neutral rights. Conceding that the rules can be modified by a belligerent to meet new conditions, how far can a belligerent go in changing the rules? It is obvious that, if this privilege existed, the liberties of neutrals on the high seas would be at the mercy of every belligerent. As it is, under the old rules neutrals have to suffer enough when a state of war exists. They should not be further restricted in the exercise of their rights.

"The only alternative, therefore, is for this Government to hold firmly

to those neutral rights which international law has clearly defined and to insist vigorously on their observance by all belligerents. It is true, as I have already pointed out to you, that the code of rules which defines and governs the relations between belligerents and neutrals is imperfect, but not in the slightest degree can the rules so far as they are well settled be modified unless all the parties interested consent to the modifications. This has been the position of the United States from the beginning of the war. We have twice sought to obtain mutual consent from the belligerents to certain changes in the rules, but in both cases we failed and the suggestions were withdrawn. Yet belligerents cannot expect neutral nations, no matter whether great powers or territorially small states, to submit to invasions of their rights.

"If Great Britain finds it difficult to obey the rules of blockade and contraband, that is her misfortune. If Germany finds it equally difficult to conform submarine warfare to the international naval code, that is her misfortune."

"It is asserted that violations of rights may differ in importance."

"That is true, of course," Secretary Lansing explained. "I have frequently pointed this out and said that they require different treatment. Thus, to cite a concrete case, the violation of the natural right of life is a much more serious offense against an individual and against his nation than the violation of the legal right of property.<sup>5</sup> There is not and cannot be adequate recompense for the wrongful destruction of life, but property losses may be satisfied by the payment of indemnities. If one belligerent violates the right of life and another belligerent violates the right of property, you need not debate for a moment which one gives this Government the greatest concern, or which one will call forth the more vigorous protest and the more earnest effort to prevent a repetition of the offense."

\* \* \*

"Yet, I regret to say, some Americans do not recognize the difference. How many take this view it is im-

<sup>5</sup> We considered the *Lusitania* sinking by a German submarine in May, 1915.

possible to say, but the number is not insignificant. Indeed, the view is held by some who sit in the halls of Congress. These people openly complain that the Government does not exert as much pressure to protect American property as it does to protect American lives. They fail to see that property may be restored to the owners or an indemnity paid; they fail to see that lives can never be restored or adequately indemnified. And this mental attitude makes one wonder if the sensibilities of the American people have become so blunted by materialism that they think as much of the loss of their property as they do of the lives of their fellow countrymen."

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"There is confusion in many minds about American loans abroad, official or commercial or both," I said. "May we cover that?"

"The question of loans is an exceedingly important one," Secretary Lansing admitted,<sup>6</sup> "little understood even by well-informed business men. It will be recalled that, at the request of the last [Taft] administration, a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan desired by the Government of China. Our Government wished American bankers to participate along with bankers of other nations, because it desired that the good will of the United States toward China should be exhibited in this practical way, that American capital should have access to that great country, and that the United States should be in a position to share with the other powers any political responsibilities that might be associated with the development of the foreign relations of China in connection with her industrial and commercial enterprises. The present [Wilson] administration was asked, early in 1913, whether it, too, would request the same group of bankers to participate in the loan. The representatives of the bankers through whom the present administration was approached declared that they would continue to seek their share of the loan under the proposed

<sup>6</sup> Prophetic in relation to the controversial policy of loans and grants now.

<sup>7</sup> The loan was for constructing the Canton-Hankow Railway, whose details I had discussed with Secretary of State Knox.

agreements only if expressly requested to do so by the Government.<sup>7</sup>

"The present administration, however, declined to make such a request, because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implication of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request. The conditions of the loan seemed to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this administration did not feel that it ought to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs of that great oriental state, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people.

"The conditions included not only the pledging of particular taxes but also the administration of those taxes by foreign agents. A loan thus secured is obnoxious to the principles upon which the Government of our people rests. We are willing and earnestly desirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammelled development. We will urge and support the legislative measures necessary to give American merchants, manufacturers, contractors, and engineers the banking and other financial facilities which they now lack and without which they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with their industrial and commercial rivals. This is our duty. Our interests are those of the open door—a door of friendship and mutual advantage, and it is the only door we care to enter.

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"In that which concerns sales of arms and ammunition, the duty of a neutral to restrict such trade has never been imposed by international law or by municipal statute. It has never been the policy of this Government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition into belligerent territory, except in the case of neighboring American republics, and then only when civil strife prevailed, which is a very different thing from

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an international war when a country's life is at stake. Austria alone has officially taken up the question of limiting the sale of munitions of war, and this administration was surprised to find that the Austrian Government implied that the observance of the strict principles of the law under the conditions which have developed in the present war is insufficient, as well as the assertion that this Government should go beyond the long-recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt measures to maintain 'an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties.' To this assertion, needless to say, our Government could not agree. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in judgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. Briefly, the contention submitted was that the advantage gained in this case by England and her allies by their superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers through the establishment of a system of nonintercourse with the dominant power."

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"What about the Monroe Doctrine?"

"The Monroe Doctrine, of course, continues unaltered as a national policy of this country, although within recent years we have found no occasion—with the exception of the Venezuelan boundary incident—to remind Europe that the Doctrine is always in force. The American republics are no longer children in the great family of nations. They have attained maturity. They have come into a realization of their nationality and are fully conscious of the responsibilities and privileges which are theirs as sovereign and independent states, and during this time there has grown up a feeling that the republics of this hemisphere constitute a group separate and apart from the other nations of the world, a group which is united by common ideals and common aspirations. I believe

that this feeling is general throughout North and South America.

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"In this connection let me revert once more to the Monroe Doctrine. Some people have the erroneous idea that Pan Americanism has supplanted the Monroe Doctrine. It has not. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy of the United States; Pan Americanism is an international policy of the Americas. The motives are to an extent different; the ends sought are the same. Both can exist without impairing the force of either. I would be utterly opposed to any abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine or any impairment of its vigor. Pan Americanism is not a substitute for the Monroe Doctrine; it in no way weakens its force.

"Yet we must not forget that Pan Americanism is of wider application than the Monroe Doctrine, in that it extends beyond the sphere of politics and finds its application in the varied fields of human enterprise. Bearing in mind that the essential idea manifests itself in cooperation, it becomes necessary for effective cooperation that the peoples of the American republics should know each other better than they do now. They must not only be neighbors, but friends; not only friends, but intimates. They must understand one another. They must study the phases of material and intellectual development which enter into the varied problems of national progress.

"Pan Americanism is an expression of the idea of internationalism. America has become the guardian of that idea, which will in the end rule the world. Pan Americanism is the most advanced as well as the most practical form of that idea. It has been made possible because of our geographical isolation, of our similar political institutions, and of our common concept of human rights.<sup>8</sup> The path of opportunity lies plain before us. The Government and people of every American republic should strive to inspire in others confidence and cooperation by exhibiting integrity of purpose and equity of action.

"And before I conclude, let me add just a word.

"When the foreign policies of this Government are criticized by honest critics—I mean those critics who are not influenced solely by political considerations or personal ambitions—I often would like those critics to state what they would do if they had the responsibility. Would they be bellicose? Would they make demands which, if refused, honor would compel the exercise of force to compel? I wonder what their answer would be.

"Responsibility makes a world of difference in a man's point of view. When a few words may plunge this country into war, the man who has the power to utter those words, if he is a man who has the welfare of the Republic at heart, will consider long before he exercises that power. He will submit to a deal of criticism and endure abuse and ridicule by the passionate and by political opponents rather than see the young men of America sent forth to die on the battlefield."<sup>9</sup>

So ends the first [and only] analysis given for publication by the Secretary of State since the war began—a time, in other words, when every phrase must be weighed and measured. I know that Mr. Lansing would rather have every intelligent American citizen make use of the State Department files if such a thing were possible. But diplomacy would not be served, and so the vaults will retain the secrets of a nation; until that time when historians may have access to them, the people must rest content with explanations like this.

<sup>8</sup> Soon after World War II belief prevailed that that would be what Communist Russia was trying to do—establish a Pan-Slavic union patterned after our Pan-American model, but there is no resemblance, because it is not a free and voluntary ensemble but a cluster of vassal or subjugated countries completely dominated by the Kremlin. Pan-Slavism is no new idea. Foreign Minister Serguei D. Sazonov told me about its desirability when I visited him in St. Petersburg in 1913.

<sup>9</sup> As this interview (my third with a Secretary of State) was granted the first week of July 1916, when the presidential campaign was just getting underway, Secretary Lansing's words were neither a defense nor an explanation of Woodrow Wilson's trying "to keep us out of war," the slogan by which the latter was attacked and satirized but by which he charted American foreign policy until he no longer could control it.